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Alejandrino v Quezon G.R. No. L-22041. September 11, 1924 07/23/2010
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Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth
District, be, as he is hereby, declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the
Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of certain,
phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the
credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino.

Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect,

for five reasons. He prays the court:
(1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from
executing the resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and
injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the
petitioner to exercise his office as Senator

Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action,
it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.

Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be
directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process.
The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer
must be sustained.

The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the
power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the
Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a
department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of
legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this
extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.

In view of the propriety of mandamus

Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to
compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which
therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive
control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at
least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate
to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus
is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing
a mandamus is to be determined."
In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House Members
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine
representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature.
These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the GovernorGeneral." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.)

They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and
the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an
elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an

appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive
member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in
the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the
Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General
by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The
Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the
Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.

In view of effects of punishment

Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the
House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when
permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the
constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to
fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced.
Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.

In view of no remedy
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the
exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed
for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not
possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular
action. If it be said that conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the
answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power.

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THURSDAY, AUGUST 26, 2010

Case Digest (Political Law)
VERA V. AVELINO, 77 Phil. 863
FACTS: Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the
Congress of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the
previous month. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and
violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in
said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.

During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum
resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the 16 candidates for
senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on
Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the
termination of the of the protest lodged against their election.

Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues

responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling
respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial
prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over
contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the
validity of the pendatum resolution.
.
ISSUE:

1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or

not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.

2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and
Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests
lodged against their elections.

RULING:

The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers,
holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent right of the
legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.

Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to

suspension of the petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such
suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as
the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should
be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch
of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to establish
judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances
wisely woven into our institutional setup.

The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any speech or debate" in
congress, Senators and congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other place."

The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this privilege to include the
giving of a vote or the presentation of a resolution.

. . . It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it towards

spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written
reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which,
though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, . . .
(Kilbourn vs. thompson, 103 U.S., 204; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.)

In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer questions put to him by the
House of Representatives of the United States Congress, concerning the business of
a real estate partnership, was imprisoned for contempt by resolution of the house.
He sued to recover damages from the sergeant at arms and the congressional
members of the committee, who had caused him to be brought before the house,

where he was adjudged to be in contempt. The Supreme Court of the United States
found that the resolution of the House was void for want of jurisdiction in that body,
but the action was dismissed as to the members of the committee upon the
strength of the herein above-mentioned congressional immunity. The court cited
with approval the following excerpts from an earlier decision of the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts:

These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the members
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people,
by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear
of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I, therefore, think that the article ought not to be
construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be answered. . . (103
U.S., 203.) (Emphasis ours.)

Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby relates apparently as

controlling, the following incident:

In 1910, several Members of Congress having been served with a writ of mandamus
in a civil action brought against them as members of the Joint Committee on
Printing and growing out a refusal of a bid of the Valley Paper Company, for the
furnishing of paper, the Senate resolved that the Justice issuing the writ had
"unlawfully invaded the constitutional privileges and prerogatives of the Senate of
the United States and of three Senators; and was without jurisdiction to grant the
rule, and Senators are directed to make no appearance in response thereto."
(Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.)

Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account for their votes in approving
the Pendatum Resolution. Having sworn to uphold the Constitution, we must enforce
the constitutional directive. We must not question, nor permit respondents to be
questioned here in connection with their votes. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.)

Case dismissed.

U.S. V. PONS, G.R. NO. L-11530 AUGUST 12, 1916

FACTS:

The defendant appellant Juan Pons et.al were charged with the crime of illegal
importation of opium,

Pon's counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of
the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381,
under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on
the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is
null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted
that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's
proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated
the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the
Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be
proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether
the court can take judicial notice of the journals.

Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by
authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will
inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. From
the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of
legal science which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence.

In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous
decisions of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein
laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the
rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover
the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those
of the Federal Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the
courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.

Affirmed the decision.

MORALES V. SUBIDO, 27 SCRA 792

FACTS: At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer
in the Armed Forces" was inserted in the proposed measure.

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a

bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high
school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served
as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or
higher.

It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the
phrase "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the
rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a
high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second
year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the
legislative process the phrase ["who has served the police department of a city or"]
was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.

The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as
amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on
third reading, and that when the bill emerged from the conference committee the
only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as
chief of police with exemplary record".

In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted documents to prove his

contentions:

It would thus appear that the omission whether deliberate or unintended of the
phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or was made not at any
stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the
bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by
Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a

rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. It

is for this reason that the petitioner would have us look searchingly into the matter.

The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the judiciary under our system of
government. As we observed explicitly in our decision, the enrolled Act in the office
of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that section 10
is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of
Printing. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened.
The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act
upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the
official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did
happen in the labyrinth of law-making with consequent impairment of the integrity
of the legislative process. The investigation which the petitioner would like this
Court to make can be better done in Congress.

The motions for reconsideration are denied.

TOLENTINO V. SEC. OF FINANCE, 235 SCRA 630

First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills,
H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue
bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference
committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as
a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a
revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the

coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.

what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of
local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to
be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of
such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate
as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution[8] because the second
and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was
because on February 24, 1994[9] and again on March 22, 1994,[10] the President
had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a
bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and
[ii] t has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause,
because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the
"except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless"
clause [i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval] would not
only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the
"except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which
is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the
printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be
so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be
doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies
of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a
law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for
President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution, such a law is required to be
made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session.

That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three
readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the
bill which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S.
No. 1630. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions
not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were
"surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee.
this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to
include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House
bill or in the Senate bill.[17] If the committee can propose an amendment consisting
of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several
provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute,"
so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses
of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge
that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is
thus without any basis.
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No.
7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases[20] manifest firm adherence to the
rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of
its due enactment.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills
have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill.
To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect
due the other two departments of our government.

Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by
the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G. R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art.
VI, Section 26[1] which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that
neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL
transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the
Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting
this fact in its title.
The question is whether this amendment of Section 103 of the NIRC is fairly
embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein

of P. D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the
title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one
way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions
granted before. To insist that P. D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in
addition to Section 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to
insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise
upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so
that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner
did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any
defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although
published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their
existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than
the title of PAL's own franchise under P. D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of
its tax exemption. The title of P. D. No. 1590 is:

TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun
1987]

Facts: Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the

following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to
the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter
thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of

trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;

3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast
powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;

5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and

6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is

not.

We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.

1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the
title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks
to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the
statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the
statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or
as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
2 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out
the general object." 3 The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the
title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power
of legislation. 4 It should be given practical rather than technical construction. 5
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the
DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent
(30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease
or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall
accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the
municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the
tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title.
The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and
title. As a tool for regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE

to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and
5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory
Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble
and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those
objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE.

2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and
oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious
question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 8 The power to impose
taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts
scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except
such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax,
the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security
against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure
prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around
P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on
retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to
the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theaterowners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the
admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It
is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer
the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film
piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the
legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no

constitutional limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement of the state's
police power. 13
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.

3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of
the DECREE by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution providing that "whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there
exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim
Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate
action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders,
or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land."

In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th
"whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies
corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic
recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with
dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President, considering
that the issue of the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said
Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of
the question raised at the proper time.

4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue

delegation of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority
to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of
such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a
delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as
to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very
language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a
"fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to
the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be
the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as
unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be
without adequate remedy in law.

5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is,
among other categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position that Section 15 of
the DECREE in providing that:

All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of fortyfive (45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and
secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business and to
register with the BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes,
discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they
could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in
the possession of any person engaged in the videogram business without the
required proof of registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of
violation of the Decree, whether the possession of such videogram be for private
showing and/or public exhibition.

raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the
required proof of registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus
partakes of the nature of an ex post facto law.
The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.

... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a
law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what
evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People vs.
Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that when
certain facts have been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the
existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be
a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so
that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and
arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience".

Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational

connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact
presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie
presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period
counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character.
6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated
and being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new
industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of
the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that
public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition
posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public
brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes
containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses
in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention
the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere
payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in
business.

The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the
"demise" of the video industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to
have proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.

In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and
expediency of the DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and
exclusively a matter of legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may
be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of
each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of
a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to
the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to
which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the
challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and
cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a
challenged statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify
us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

GUINGONA v. CARAGUE, G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991

This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality

of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81,
entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177,
entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act
Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan
by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections
31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the
disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid
decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in
February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of
President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2,
1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a
new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up
to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion
automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no
law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No.
1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3,
Article XVIII which provides
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)

They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24,
Article VI of the Constitution, i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. (Emphasis supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by
Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said
decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as
follows
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.
12

RULING:

The Court is not persuaded.

Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its
framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos
may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are
inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.

The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31
of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations,

unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was
thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.

SENATE VS. ERMITA , GR 169777

APRIL 20, 2006

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for
the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration
as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine
elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate
Scandal.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.

The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of

the Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch

whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose

information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:
Note: The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can
neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked.
There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department
which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that
officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate
for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing
the privilege is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring supplied)
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there
is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or
whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected.93
These, in substance, were the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege
asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez94 and, more in point,
against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities v. Nixon.

[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from
disclosure impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm
against plaintiffs needs to determine whether to override any claims of privilege.

A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and
description of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons
for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is impossible for a
court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be
protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte
speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An improperly
asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a
claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not
recognize the claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the
Court to make a just and reasonable determination as to its applicability. To
recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or
compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny, would make a
farce of the whole procedure.101 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than
a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor.

Note: Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged
order the alleged unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section
2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United
States where, so it claims, only the President can assert executive privilege to
withhold information from Congress.

OSMEA v. ORBOS, 220 SCRA 703

Facts: On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special
Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF).
The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil
and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and
from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.

Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of
E.O. 1024, and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of
Energy.

Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on
February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for
possible cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices
of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery being left for
determination by the Ministry of Finance.

The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, reading as follows:

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special
fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government.

The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as
amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust
fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue
generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the
purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner
further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through
the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use
thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created."

He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28
(2). Article VI of the Constitution, viz.:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the Government;

and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation,
"the limits, limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must
not only specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also
impose a specific limit on how much to tax.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account
of the Ministry of Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8,
paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956, as amended, "said creation of a trust fund being
contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the Constitution.

(2) Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as
amended by Executive Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of
legislative power to the Energy Regulatory Board.

Held: The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of
minimizing the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment
and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 dated 27
February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the following sources:

a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed
on petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with
the Board of Energy;

b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in
consultation with the Board of Energy;

c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the

resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the
Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the
business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;

d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil
companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the
peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the
Board of Energy.

Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes,
they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the
OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is
segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as
a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and
review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the
constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without
precedent.

With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds
that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional

amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the

authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect
the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D.
1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the
resources of the Fund.

What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or
"a specific limit on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the
petitioner on the premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as
already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not so much the
power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to
impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it
cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to
act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by
the police power of the State.

The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the
determination of the price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting
need to either augment or exhaust the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting
of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the petitioner. To do so would
render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the
undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed
suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking
account of the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.
Posted by MR. CHEF JUSTICE at 8:34 AM
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