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DE CASTRO VS. JBC Leave a comment
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive

Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from

making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start
the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly

done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.

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De castro vs JBCFACTS: The movants present their arguments on the main issue at
several levels. Some argue thatthe disputed constitutional provisions Article VII,
Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) are clear and speak for themselves on what
the Constitution covers in banningappointments during the election period.23 One
even posits that there is no conflict becauseboth provisions can be given effect
without one detracting against the full effectiveness of the other,24 although the
effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favorof a deferment
for the incoming Presidents action. Still others, repeating their originalarguments,
appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their
point.Issues:Whether or not Section 15, Article VII of the Phil Consti. does not lead to

an interpretationthat exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on

midnight appointmentsRULING: The court denies the motions for reconsideration for
lack of merit, for all the matters beingthereby raised and argued, not being new,
have all been resolved by the decision of March17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court
opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and
emphasis.Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, andaccordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or
abandoning Valenzuela ruling,It has been insinuated as part of the polemics
attendant to the controversy we are resolvingthat because all the Members of the
present Court were appointed by the incumbentPresident, a majority of them are
now granting to her the authority to appoint the successorof the retiring Chief
JusticeHad the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to theappointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. Theycould not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easilyand surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equallyapplicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, mostlikely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that theprohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within twomonths before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or ActingPresidents
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.We cannot permit the
meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit
the purposes of any quarter