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Safety Engineering and Risk Management Debate 2012
Safety Engineering and Risk Management Debate 2012
Discussion Topic 9: Safety and risk management in oil and gas industry
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Comments
Quote
HSE " Success in managing major Hazards is not measured by the Occupational Health and Safety
Statistics but by measuring the performance of critical systems used to control risks to ensure they
are operating as intended.
This statement is a very powerful statement and i want to stand on the premise that it should form
the basis of assessing and formulating regulation regimes.
However let us look at the sensitive details of this statement and compare to what has been the
safety approach historically
Safety Statistics- HSE says whatever models we have as a measure of success in safety appraoch
it should not be based on whether an accident eventually occured or not or how many times it
occured but on the measurment systems predefined. but if we look at the the history of safety
regulation and Legistion from the First known safety Legislation in 1862 the incident of the beam
of a pumping Engine at Hartley Colliery in Northumberland land which broke the only mineshaft
and means of ventillation, 204 miners suffocated and died. that gave birth to mining Legislation
two years later that required every seam in a mine to have two shafts or outlets to the present
goal getting (Safety Case) Regime, which is as a result of the piper Alpha incident, it is historically
obvious that the only reason why regulators feel that there is a need for reviev is after a major
disaster.
So in the real sense Legislation has always been on the basis of safety statistics
Measuring the performance of critical control systems : If I try to understand what this means it
tries to say that Safety process and systems should adopt PROACTIVE Measures rather reactive
measures. In other words we should be able to estimate the lets says probabilisticaly to
effectiveness of the system even before any incident is likely to occur.
This brings us to my main Point if we need to determine the performance of a safety systems
proactively and every single Legislation/Regulation approach in history has always been a reactive
approach then the Premise upon which the safety Regime has been built though has been quite
effective is yet faulty and requires urgent reviews. I am sure that is why these Accidents keep
reoccuring and reoccuring even when we think we have made significant progress we still continue
to have accident(The Marcondo Well 2010 )
Michael Saiki
In addition to Michael Saiki's point on our current reactive measures to safety instead of a
proactive one, here are some of the accidents that have occurred and how they continue to show
our reactive attitude to safety in the industry.
March 28, 1980, Alexander Keilland capsized and sank off the coast of Norway in the North Sea
killing 123 people. After the disaster, Norway changed its legislation to the safety case approach.
[1] [2].
February 15, 1982, Ocean Ranger capsized and sank off the coast of Newfoundland in the
Canadian waters killing 84 crew members on board. Nobody on the rig survived the accident.
Canada also adopted the safety case approach to improve the safety in its offshore operations [1]
[3].
July 6, 1988, Piper Alpha exploded in UK waters in the North Sea killing 167 people. The Piper
Alpha disaster was the worst offshore disaster in terms of death toll and its impact on the offshore
oil industry. After this disaster, the UK also overhauled its offshore industry and came up with its
Offshore Installations Safety Case Regulations [1] [4].
However, not until the recent Deepwater horizon oil spill disaster which occurred on April 20, 2010,
the safety legislation in the US has not been reviewed to adopt a mandatory safety case approach
instead of the prescriptive approach currently been used [1].
How many more human lives are we going to sacrifice before the regulators and operators alike
adopt a more proactive approach?
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BrO87PQKTx0&feature=related
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_L._Kielland_(platform)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ocean_Ranger
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piper_Alpha_disaster
Michael has
said it right. Though the HSE regulations have been so far appreciably effective,
they are somewhat more reactive than proactive. Over the years it has been
obviously
known that there is a need for a step to step procedure in achieving an effective
proactive HSE culture. Many efforts towards this have shown that it will also
take personal commitment and self-responsibility on the part of the HSE
regulators as well as operators to achieve this. The Reactive HSE Culture is
concerned with what went wrong? In other words, any improvement in HSE
performance is only due to learning from incidents after they occurred. This is
still a common approach worldwide despite evidence that with this model it is
not possible to achieve continuous HSE performance improvement. The main
challenge
here is with the reporting and monitoring processes. Reporting tools provide
data only after accidents have occurred. These accidents may be health, safety,
security and/or environment. The reportage of these incidents are mostly classified
as accidents and near-misses. However, because the significant potential of
the near-misses can be hardly realized, it is not reported properly and this
can translate into undesired consequences.
To have safe oil and gas productions, it is expedient that HSE regulations
become as proactive as possible and shouldnt wait for the occurrence of an
accident
to revive or review regulations, just like the case of the piper alpha incident.
References
http://www.pdo.co.om/hseforcontractors/online_library/downloads/2006090208
3010.pdf
In addition to the on going discussion we will observe that safety in the oil and gas industry
has never been taken to heart till on the 27th December 1965 when the Sea Gem Sanked and
13 lives were lost. The major routine before this incident was just to collect a licence from the
then government and start exploring and exploiting this mineral resource from the seabed
without knowledge of the implications to Health, Safety and the Evironment. No measures
was put in place until a woke up call of the 27th December incident of 1965.
Learning from this, its obvious that this eras were practically reactive in their approach to safety.
A little further into the early 80s on February 15, 1982, Ocean Ranger capsized and sank off the
coast of Newfoundland in the Canadian waters killing 84 crew members on board. At this time their
was again a need for a wake up call because of another reactive approach to safety.
It will be taught that a lot of lessons should have been learnt from all this reactive approach
pertaining to the oil and gas safety measures and their have been a mitigation plan in place to
stop reoccurrence. But instead it was another blow on April 20, 2010 the Deepwater horizon
oil spill disaster.
The Deepwater horizon oil spill disaster of April 20, 2010 . Now the question here is
that: 1. Why is it that the incident is allowed to happen or occur before we start
thinking of solution .2. Are we really learning from the lessons or we are just busy
documenting for record purposes.
I called this approach a reactive one. A proactive approach should be in place if there is no
one available or it should be improved than its current state or measures. It should involve
ways of identifying the following:
2. improving the learning culture and processes for spreading best practice;
3. greater integration between the regulatory authorities;
4. a clearer command and
control structure in the event of a spill;
5. robust arrangements to ensure operators level of
liability and ability to pay in the event of a spill; and
Proactive intergrity management approach to Safety and Risk measures will be the only way
safety of the oil and gas industries can be most guaranteed in the nearest future as against
reactive approach. Or else we will be learning again.......
I see the comments about a reactive vs proactive approach in the offshore oil industry but I hate
to break it to you that it is not likely that we will move to a more proactive approach anytime soon.
I think regulators and Oil majors would definitely tell us what we want to hear but in principle, it is
not likely that anything would change. THE PROACTIVE APPROACH STARTS WITH THE
REGULATORS. I will take the Deep water horizon accident for example. We know that on offshore
installations, blowout preventers (containing powerful shear rams designed to cut through the
drilling rigs steel pipe and shut off a well that has gone out of control) are installed to provide
redundancy if all else fails. In 2001, the Minerals Management service, commissioned a study that
revealed over 100 failures in the testing of blow out preventers and were advised by experts to
enforce the operation of TWO SHEAR ARMS in blow out preventers for all offshore installations. .
Historically as with enforcement agencies (The Energy department ignored recommendations to
apply offshore, the CIMAH regulations already in place onshore in 1975, and we know how their
ignorance paid off) they ignored the advice and one wonders if this second shear ram was present,
maybe, just maybe the deep water horizon accident would have been avoided. Controversial
reports alleged that the Mineral Management service neglected to enforce a rule that required oil
companies to provide evidence periodically showing that their shear rams did in fact work (New
York Times, June, 20, 2010).
What makes it worse is that, the same article in 2010, said that at the time, roughly two-thirds of
the rigs in the gulf still had only one shear ram as opposed to TWO as prescribed by experts in
2001. I bet if another survey was carried out today, that fraction would be the same and these
companies are still in operation). Correct me if I am wrong but I think the regulators are given a
free/lenient pass when an accident occurs and it is the oil companies that fact the wrath of the
media, public, and the same regulatory bodies. I think the regulators do not come under enough
fire and this is why their lapses are ignored and downplayed. The regulators only react to incidents
and accidents instead of being proactive. And finally to answer the question about how many more
human lives must be lost. My answer is more from more accidents until somebody starts to hold
regulators more responsible.
Is education, certification and professional memberships the best means of identifying and
nurturing the best attitudes and cultures that will ensure that industries are policed effectively.
The US really uses prescriptive regulation which can result in companies waiting to be caught and
punished whereas the UK safety case and PFEER regs push the companies to PROVE their safety
and risk management practices. NPD and PSA in Norway employ a similar regime whereby
performance based regulations, standards and processes are applied as frameworks for companies
to work within, monitoring their own management systems with auditable assitance obtained or
periodically enforced by the agencies eg DNV.
http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/DHSGFinalReport-March2011-tag.pdf
Who does it best ? Does UK/Norway do it best ? The US is now looking at UK/Norway as they seek
to make step changes in their command and control structures and regulatory systems.
Should there be GLOBAL regulations ? to protect OUR WORLD and FUTURE ? Is this workable ?
regards
tony morgan
You may like to attend the SUT event "Macondo - Lessons and implications for the North
Sea" on next Wednesday (10 October) and challenge the speaker.
Whilst I agree with some of the points raised in this discussion thread, I would like to highlight one of
the many proactive programmes that the UK HSE are currently undertaking to tackle issues identified
in the offshore indutry.
Given a large number of the offshore platforms in the North Sea have now exceeded or are close to
exceeding their original design life, it is recognised that there is an increased likelihood of equipment
and asset integrity failures due to material degradation. This has the potential to lead to an increase
in major accidents if not addressed.
Strategy for KP4 - Ageing and life extension inspection programme 2010 - 2013 [1] is a strategy
aimed at promoting awareness of the issues associated with ageing plant in the offshore oil and gas
industry.
"The specific objectives of the strategy are:
- to raise awareness within the offshore industry of the need for specific consideration of ageing
issues as a distinct activity within the asset integrity management process and, in particular, of the
need for senior management to demonstrate leadership on and commitment to this matter;
- to define a programme of inspection of individual duty holder approaches to the management of
ageing and life extension to ascertain the extent of compliance with the regulatory requirements;
- to identify shortcomings in duty holder practices on the management of ageing and life extension
and enforce an appropriate programme of remedial action;
- to work with the offshore industry to develop a best practice common approach to the management
of ageing installations and life extension, including the development of long-term plans, for
implementation in safety cases and thorough reviews, to ensure the continued safe operation of all
ageing offshore installations on the UKCS."[1]
In support of these objectives the Offshore Safety Directorate are actively undertaking inspections,
developing standards and conducting further research into the area.
To me this demonstrates an extremely proactive approach to one of the biggest challenges facing the
industry over the coming decade. I encourage you to read the KP4 document referenced below and
welcome any further discussion.
[1]http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/ageing/kp4-strategy.pdf
Sure Andrew, the regulations even further demand that the duty holder reviews the safety case to
ensure its still a live document, sound and applicable to the current conditions. This is another
example of how proactive the HSE regulations get. For proof of this I quote this from the KP4
strategy that Andrew has touched on in his post; Regulation 13 of the Offshore Installations
(Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (OSCR) requires duty holders to thoroughly review current safety
cases within five years of the previous acceptance or review, to confirm that the safety case as a
whole continues to be fundamentally sound, and continues to demonstrate the effective
identification, management and control of major accident hazard risks on the installation, as
described in Paragraph 187-190 of the L30 Guide to OSCR 2005. And again one of the main aims
and objectives of this KP4 strategy on ALE is to identify areas of improvement and further
encourage these improvements in ALE management.
Reference
KP4 Strategy, Ageing & Life Extension Inspection Programme For Offshore Installations 2010 2013
Ambrose Ssentongo
I agree with Andrew and Ambrose on the proactive approach of the HSE.
However, an interesting dimension to the work of the Health & Safety
Executive, even though they are the regulators is that they also sponsor
research and provide guidance to the industry through research-oriented
papers to advance knowledge for the industry, document their concerns
especially in particular areas, and present a focus of engagement between
the regulators and the industry. Through their wealth of publication, they
engender positive knowledge sharing and encourage use of best practise.
Other pro-active measures will have to be by the industry itself. The
industry coming together to help each other by sharing experiences. The
experiences of most operators are similar in most cases and there are
common themes to issues being experienced by operators. The Step
Change in Safety is a forum that provides an opportunity for an industry
approach to address such topical issues. An example is the production of
the Hydrocarbon Release Reduction Toolkit produced by the Step Change
in Safety which contains good practice techniques to assist operations in
reducing HCRs{1}. The type of Joint Industry solution to topical issues
such as happened post Macondo in the UK for example where there was
the set up of the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Advisory Group
(OSPRAG) to fund and procure a well capping device and enhance the UKs
capability to respond to a major, sustained release of oil.
Reference
1.
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/Hydrocarbonreleases.cfm
Adejugba Olusola
to further strengthen the discussion i would like to say that we cannot say that we have an
effective safety management regime if we put the responsibilty of safety solely on the Employers
and Industry as is the case in this present Regime.
The implication of this is that the Industry or employers are driven by profit oriented objective and
shareholders value chain.
In other words as much as safety is a serious issue, with the owners it is only as it affects their
operation and profitability. especially in the subsea sector where every operation is capital
intensive.
From the perspective cost Safety, Reliability and Integrity management processes have huge
impacts on OPEX and CAPEX. and thus every employer seeks to minimize this cost
Therefore, there should be efforts towards redesigning the regulation/legislation regime to
something that would would sorth of share responsibility with the State and other stake holders in
every safety model developed for offshore/subsea installation and production systems. Especially
now that E & P is going offshore
Or should we wait until we have another High impact accident before we begin another Regime
Michael Saiki
OSPRAG
Priorities
The
UK industry co-ordinated its response to the issues arising from the Gulf of
Mexico incident by structuring OSPRAGs work according to four priorities:
Changhwan, I will like to highlight the point you raised above on Minimising the length of time and
At a recent event organised by the Society for Underwater Technology (SUT) titled Macondo Lessons and implications for the North Sea, Brian Kinkead, a Consultant and Lead of the Technical
Review Group which produced the OSPRAG capping device, gave a presentation on the
development of the OSPRAG cap [1].
During the question and answer session, one of the attendees asked a question on how long will it
take between the time an oil spill occurred and when the well capping device will be installed in
place on site. The response from Brain was quite shocking. He said that based on some estimated
calculations, it would take about 6 Weeks to transport, deploy and install the capping device.
Approximately 6 weeks? That is approximately half the time it took BP to cap the Macondo oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico without any Emergency Response Plan (ERP). What I will like to
highlight here is even though we have an ERP in place, it will still take this long to cap a well in the
North Sea. How many thousands of barrels of oil would have spilled into the sea, how many
marine life would have been lost, what extent would this spill have covered, and what will be the
cost of cleaning up a spill which has been running for about 6 weeks?
Im sure cost will be a limiting factor for the response to take that long. Why dont we increase
the cost and reduce the time in order to save lives and protect our environment.
REFERENCES
[1]
http://events.sut.org.uk/2012/121010_aberdeen/121010_report.pdf
1
The Chinese Mining Industry : in 2008 there were 3000
deaths these included Zhenghou; 25 deaths, Shanxi 38 deathsand the
lis goes on. The underlying issue here appears to be lack of regulations
and hence less regard for workers well being before profit. Many of the
accidents are attributable to poisonous or volatile gases. Chinese
government has blamed illegal production and although safety
improvements and procedures are being introduced they are still very
often ignored. Until Government can enforce these, the situation is
unlikely to improve. The PRC government see the enforcement costly, and
difficult due to geographical problems associated with enforcement. For
example many of the mines are located in rural areas that are remote and
difficult to access. It appears that this growing economy still has a long
way to go achieve safety standards that we in Europe are accustomed to.
2
St Frances dam break 1928 resulting in 450 deaths, and the
destruction of the town of Santa Paula. The cause was found to be a
result of an ancient geological landslide on the eastern side of the dam.
The 1920s technology was not advanced enough to identify this. The
damn collapsed as a result of the full hydrostatic load in the reservoir
after a heavy rainfall. Thus exerting excess stress to the eastern side. To
put this into perspective; the constructions foundations were unsuitable
on the eastern side of the dam and collapse was certain. The release of
the Flood wave said to be in excess of 40m cascaded the town of Santa
Paula. During the inquiry there was conflict between the Government
departments, the geologists and the design and engineering departments.
The hearings in the aftermath recommended that "the construction and
operation of a great dam should never be left to the sole judgment of one
man,
3
Piper Alpha 187 deaths. Lead to radical change in regulations
for offshore installations. The incident was said to have been caused by
miscommunication during a maintenance operation on a Pressure relief
valve. This was said to have been moved from a gas compression module
and replaced by a blind flange. The flange was only hand tightened as the
operations were said not to restart until later in the day. When they did
restart the Valve was missing and the flange was still only hand tight.
Ignition was then imminent. Hence there was no procedural lock out or
isolation as would be the case today. The Cullen report was issued in the
aftermath and a series of recommendations were implemented; including
the necessity for Duty Holders to produce a safety case. The introduction
of several Statutory instruments were also introduced which regulated the
design and construction of offshore installations. Initially this was
regulated by the Dept of Energy but nowadays it is policed by the Health
& Safety Executive. The report was also critical of Piper Alpha's operator,
assessment was too erroneous and stated that items such as the turning
off of emergency systems is not a violation. Following the accident,
questions arose about the future of the plant and its eventual fate. All
work on the unfinished reactors 5 and 6 was halted three years later.
However, the trouble at the Chernobyl plant did not end with the disaster
in reactor 4. This reactor was sealed off in concrete whist the other
reactors were still in service due to the energy shortage created by the
disaster.
10
Iraq gulf war. Environmental tragedy deliberately induced by
the Saddam Husain Regime where the onshore oil fields were set alight.
The disaster is man made as a result of a political war that today is seen
by many as illegal. Husain had ordered the wells to be set alight to
ensure the oil was not taken by his
enemies
Apart from the odd exception in the above top ten; such the Fukashima
disaster (which was the product of a natural phenomena), the remaining
disasters have one thing in common. They were all avoidable. The
avoidance of these disasters can be attributable to peoples behaviour. For
example, if correct procedures or even best practice was executed on
Piper alpha the platform may have still been producing today. If the
Chinese mining regulations were followed maybe many of the fatalities
would have been averted. Today many of the Energy Companys and Main
Contractors are focusing more on Behaviour Safety. The thought behind
this is to encourage employees to alter their unsafe habits regardless of
how great or small the consequences may be. This may be as simple as
holding the hand rail whilst ascending or descending a stairwell. The
concept here is that; whilst tools are available such as procedures, risk
assessments, correct equipment etc, there is a need to focus on correct
use; ie follow procedures, use equipment as instructed by manuals etc. To
put this concept in perspective consider a situation where you have just
put your new shoes on for a night out. Your lace is undone and unnoticed.
You are then descending a stairwell and you trip. Case 1: you are not
holding the hand rail, and the likely consequences from an inevitable fall
could be anything from a minor injury, serious injury that may have
lifetime affects or even death. Case 2 you are holding the hand rail and
you trip. The natural body reaction would be to tighten the grip on the
hand rail reducing the likelihood of a fall. Indeed the likelihood is that you
would probably end up in a sitting position on the stair with a few bruises
or a sprained wrist from the grip. The same concept can be applied in any
work or play situation where our behaviour is changed to reduce or
eliminate the risk
Oil and gas industry is a broad industry that is divided into two sector namely upstream and
downstream sector. While upstream sector is marjorly offshore base and deals in exploration and
process of crude oil and gas, it poses equal amount of risks to human in comparison to
downstream sector which is onshore base in most cases and engages in further processing and
refining crude oil and gas.
In oil and gas industry, the most highly rated hazards in term of severity of consequencies are
highly combustable and toxic hydrocardon gas and flammable liquid, the crude oil itself. The
concept of safety in design make provisions for these hazards to be safely confined in their paths
of movement and containments without or with control exposure to environment. Some of the
accidents that have occurred on offshore facilities includes:
- 2001 - P36, sinking of semi-submersible, 11 fatalities
-2005 - Bombay High, ship collision with platform and riser fire, 22 fatalities
-2007 - Usumacinta, jack up collision with platform, 22 fatalities
Similar events have also occurred on onshore facilities. Recent examples include:
-2003 - Chongqing, sour gas blow out, 243 fatalities
- 2004 - Skikda, explosion on LNG plant, 27 fatalities
-2005 - Texas City, explosion on refinery isomerisation unit, 15 fatalities
- 2009 - Nigeria, pipeline explosion, 100 fatalities
-2009 - Jaipur, explosion in gasoline storage area, 12 fatalities
- 2010 Congo, gasoline road tanker overturned, 230 fatalities
(source: RPS Energy, Preventing Major Accidents in Oil and Gas Industry, Nov 2010)
However, the integrity of these hazard containments are compromised by a number of factors that
cause their unplanned release to environment with undesired consequencies. Some of these
factors include:
- Human interference while carrying out day to day activities on these containments.
- Equipment failure or malfunctioning
- Deterioration of fixed equipment due to ageing
In broader view all other factors are embedded in these four main factors.
Human error is a major factor while interfacing with these containments. Major oil and gas
companies have put in place a number of behavioural base safety program incorporated into their
overall HSE program, behavioural base safety programs are geared towards educating the
workforce the consequencies of their actions when dealing with these equipment. Also, commonly
used is a system of work permit system and equipment isolation procedure to prevent unplanned
release of hazrds from their containment. Also standard equipment repair procedure should be in
place, if properly followed, the likelihood of making fatal mistake by personnel while working on
these equipment would be reduced. Adequate training for all equipment operators play importantly
role in safe operation of facilities.
In most cases, accidents occur as result of monitoring equipment malfunctioning, adequate
preventive maintenance program should be a major focal point of top management to ensure that
all the control and measuring devices are functioning as designed and function within normal
operating range. Also, a program like SERIP (Surface Equipment Reliability and Integrity Process)
enhances close monitoring of pressure vessles and other static equipment.
Kareem R. Saheed
Still on the theme of the obvious lapses in the regulations guarding health and safety in the
offshore oil and gas industry today, i want to highlight a new perspective to it. Do the oil
companies truly have value for the lives of employees, third party contractors and the
environment?? The answer is NO. These companies are required by law to have in place the
fanciest HSE policies and procedures, HSE deprtments, draw up safety cases and mitigation
methods, all these requirements they fulfill, but the bottomline remains that these companies push
the limits of nature and technology to squeeze out ALL resources possible from the noth sea(oil
and natural gas) to satisfy shareholders and various boards of directors. Various reports have
shown that the oil rigs in the North sea are FALLING APART with most of them having exceeded
their design lifespans(most installed in 60's and 70's) and even the more recent ones lagging
behind in scheduled maintenance programmes. these companies are rolling out funds to push the
limits of technilogy to extend even further ALREADY EXPIRED INSTALLATIONS and in the process
jeopardizing the lives of employees, third party staff in the pursuit of continuous production. It is
not rocket science, you can only push equipment so far(maintenance, extending useful life) at
some point, equipment would FAIL. In my reading about the TOTAL Elgin gas leak earlier this year,
an artile in the daily mail revealed that employees on the platform had expressed safety concerns
predicting a gas leak less than a month before the accident bu employers had assured that should
a leak occur, there were adequate safety systems to protect lives of employees at risk. Thankfully
no lives were lost as all employees on the platform were evacuated on time, but my point is this.
Operations in the area are risky by default, why knowingly expose employees to even higher risk
profiles and "hope" that safety systems would protect them in the event of an accident? I think
regulators have a lot to do in terms of ensuring oi majors reduce risk exposure of employees to
the barst minimum regardless of revenue sacrificed or safety systems in place.
and limit undesirable accidents. These accidents very often may conclude
into
serious injuries of the workers involved and also fatal in many occasions
like
the history taught us throughout these years.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_industrial_disasters)
Insufficient analysis, design and optimization for
safety and hazard.
(http://mitei.mit.edu/news/risk-management-oil-and-gas-industry)
Andreas Kokkinos
MSc Oil and Gas Engineering
Safety in the oil and gas industry has been a concern to the world.
Most of the concerns result from handling oil and gas industry and safety has
been a priority in this industry, major concerns have been raised because most
of the laws and regulations are driven by accidents happening e.g. the piper
alpha in 1988 had proper regulations been in place it would not have happened.
UK offshore oil and gas industry is a
major hazard industry; the sector demonstrates a relatively low lost time
injury rate and has, for many years, outperformed a number of comparatively lower
hazard industrial sectors in the UK. A report states that there were just two
fatalities in the UK offshore oil and gas industry and that was at the first UK
continental shelf fatalities in a four- year period. Human safety has been
given priority hence the reduction in the number of fatalities and injuries.
Hydrocarbon release has also reduced drastically since the
introduction of the regulation on their emissions.in 2010 , HSE started a
program to look into the reduction of hydrocarbon releases , in April 2012 HSE
published data to show that the was a continued improvement in the reduction of
these emission. The reduction target was set for all hydrocarbon releases, it
was noted that there was 40% decrease in major and significant releases and
this was attributed to the program.
Another factor attributed to improvement
in safety in the sector was proper maintenance and repair of offshore plants. The
safety-critical parts of offshore installations are subject to a verification process
to ensure that they are suitable for their intended purpose and remain in good
condition and repair. These verifications are done by independent competent
people.
Source
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/cmsfiles/modules/publications/pdfs/HS074.pdf
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
References:
Sidney Dekker, The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error, Ashgate Publishing, 2006.
Charles Haddon-Cave, The Nimrod Review, HC 1025, London: The Stationery Office Limited, Oct.
28, 2009.
Nancy Leveson, Safeware, Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1995.
Given this system and control view of safety, we can identify the flaws in the safety control
structure that allowed the Deepwater Horizon accident to occur and what can be done to
strengthen the overall offshore oil and gas industry safety control structure. The general key to
preventing these occurrences in the future is to provide better information for decision making, not
just for the government regulators but for those operating the oil rigs.
There are many changes that would be useful in strengthening the safety control structure and
preventing future oil spills, these changes are:
Learning from events. A systems approach to accident and incident investigation needs to be
implemented by everyone in the industry in order to improve the learning and continual
improvement process [Leveson, 2011]. we need to do the following:
this steps however should be followed to ensure an effective safety management system in the oil
and gas sector to reduce the risks of accident occurenc
References
Nancy Leveson, Engineering a Safer World, MIT Press, to appear fall 2011. In the meantime, a
final draft can be downloaded from http://sunnyday.mit.edu/safer-world.
Mike Martin and Roland Schinzinger, Ethics in Engineering, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1989.
Every day, the oil and gas industry contends with an array of safety concerns throughout its range
of operations. In the face of increasing regulatory oversight, as well as increased public scrutiny,
oil and gas industries have implemented and are still implementing effective safety management
systems to help protect their workers, the general public and the environment.Oil and gas
companies have established specific systems, programs and processes to manage and monitor
activities that affect their safety performance, management systems that support safety
sustainability and business performance throughout the full life cycle of their assets.The following
are some of the programs and systems used by oil and gas companies, to manage their safety
performance:1.
2. Incident and near-miss investigation. Companies adopt different tools for their near-miss and
incident investigation. Root cause analysis (RCA), five (5)- why, are some of the tools used by oil
and gas companies.
3. Management of change (MOC) system design. This is a system that is put in place to manage
change which may be a temporary or permanent change, especially if what to be change has a
safety concern.
4. Permit to work system. This is a system that is put in place to manage and control the day to
day tasks that are carried out. Tasks that are likely to impact the safety of the personnels are
further reviewed, so as to have more controls in place and done in a safe manner.
5. Lock out and Tag out (LOTO). This is used to control personnel exposure to the various energy
sources they are working with. Locks are fitted to either a mechanical or electrical isolation and
can only be removed, when the tasks have been completed. Tags are also used to create the same
awareness as a lock.
6.
7.
8.
Risk are inherent in every forward-looking business decision. As a result, there has been a great
deal of work done and resources invested in risk management in the oil and gas industry in recent
years.
Financial and regulatory risks have been the focus of much of this effort. But more recently,
companies have started including operational risks, process safety risks, prioritizing them,
and thinking about how they can manage and monitor all risks in a coordinated way. An
effective risk management system needs to offer solutions tailored not only to the industry,
but also to the specific company and the sectors in which it operates.
1.
REFERENCES.
1. Top 10 risks for the oil and gas industry. www.spe.org.
2. Oil and gas risk management. www.absconsulting.com
3.http://go.chevron.com/fatalityprevention.
RS
Oluwaseguu, I agree with the point that an effective risk management system must offer solution
that is not only tailored to fit the industry but must also be company specific.
Leading Oil and Gas Companies like shell, Chevron etc have well established safety and Risk
management systems that ensures that the safety of their operations are guaranteed. These
companies most often have invested billions over the years in safety related matters. For such
companies the measures you have outlined is easy to comply with. But what about smaller or
emerging companies with smaller oil fields? The drive to make profits for shareholders may often
override investment in Safety because it is expensive.
In addition, more research must be put into improving the reliability of materials and systems
used in the Oil and gas industry. As efficiency of systems improve, safety also will improve.
Hi,
Reference
[1] http://www.opito.com/uk/library/emergency_response_training/bosiet_bridg...
Regards,
When talking about Health and safety in the oil and gas
industry, one major regulation comes to mind which is the Offshore Installation
(Safety Case)Regulation 2005 (SCR05)1.
Extracting from the regulation, r.12 states:
Among other things, a duty holder is required to ensure;
Regulations 1995. (RIDDOR) Please note this regulation buttressmy point in my earlier comment
about the need for systematic approach to recording and reporting of incidents in the workplace.
The identification of
Permalink Submitted by chukwuemeka uzukwu on Tue, 2012-10-09 06:54.
prior to the 1990s when safer construction practices were instituted) and move
platforms great distances, releasing greater quantities of oil and dispersing
oil over wider geographic areas. Storm events are high-risk, low-probability
events but do create dangerous scenarios because safety precautions are
hindered during the event.
References :
http://www.ehow.com/about_5348311_offshore-drilling-dangers.html
Xenios Zenieris
Msc Oil and Gas Engineering
It has been suggested by several people in this discussion that the UKs goal setting regime places
too much responsibility place, but I believe it is important to consider the risks of a prescriptive
regime and also the flexibility of the goal setting regime.
A prescriptive regime could to lead a safety by numbers approach where individual situations are
not adequately evaluated to consider their particular conditions and risks. It could lead to a false
sense of security in that the necessary legislative requirements have been met therefore the
operation is safe.
Under the UKs goal setting regime the HSE issues guidance for offshore regulations and in some
cases approved codes of practice (ACOPs). ACOPs are designed such that if a company were to
follow one they should be in compliance with the relevant legislation. However, it is not a get out
of jail free card as the requirement to assess hazards and reduce risks to as low as reasonably
practicable will always take precedence. Conversely, a company is not required to follow the ACOP,
but if they were taken to court over a health & safety failing then they would have to prove that
that that the safety measures in place were at least equal to the ACOP.
Guidance notes do not have the same legal standing, but deviation from them or industry
standards and good oilfield practice would almost certainly be questioned in a prosecution.
This system gives flexibility in that good standards are defined there is a prescription that can
be followed but within the freedom allowed by the goal setting regime new and better practices
can evolve. If these practices are then used to update the defined standards then the system will
continuously improve.
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Claire, I am glad that you brought up your point about Independant Competent Person(s). I would
very much like to add to the discussion on this point.
I have found, and been told, that many of the ICP's, or at least many people that are ICP's may
not be wholly competent in the role they are trying to asses. Lots of ICP's are in fat just going by
the regulations they have written down in front of them instead of using the experience of the
people they are working with, or indeed the people they are auditing (or similar), to figure out
whether a practice is safe.
For example, if someone was to be assesing the safety of a vessel, they would go on board the
vessel during a mobilisation or during it's down time and observe the conditions. However,
the better way to observe the safety of a vessel is to be on board during operations. Watching the
people go about their jobs as if you weren't there.
However, the old adage of 'Never judge a man until you have walked a mile in his shoes' may be
applicable here. Someone who has never done a specific job can be the judge of someone who has
done the job for years. The person who has done the job for years has built up all of these ways of
making a job easier for himself, and then an ICP can come along and destroy all of his methods
due to safety concerns.
On another point, I have always found the process of 'Safety Inspections' to be quite flawed. As
with any type of inspection, generally people are warned to be on their 'best behaviour', so I feel
the true way to inspect for safety is to use some sort of remote system, ie cameras etc which can
observe without people thinking they are being observed, only then do you get true behaviours.
Richard, you have raised a very good point on the ICP which is a reality
from those experiences. There exists the frustration of the ICP simply
going by the letter of the regulation. I guess the moot point, though, is
does that mean that the operators are running foul of regulations? That
said, I feel there is still a positive to having the ICP especially if they
can engender the quality discussions that should go on between the ICP
and the dutyholder on the condition of each Safety Critical Element.
The responsibility for operating safely still sits squarely on the shoulder of
the Duty Holder so a decision to either accept, consider or reject any ICP
recommendation will need to be taken by operators as the duty holder.
Duty Holders have personnel known as Technical Authority who must be
technically competent and are responsible for evaluating and making
Safety Inspections
Permalink Submitted by Adejugba Olusola on Sat, 2012-12-08 10:54.
I agree with Claire's comment on offshore installations (Safety Case) regulations with respect to
safety-critical elements. It has been well researched that major offshore accident and hazards
could have been avoided if strict compliance and best industry practice were observed and
implimented to detail and specifications but the challenge is often cutting corners and human
factors.
Attending the last GASECH 2012 CONFERENCE in London where I listened to a presentation of LNG
Shipment and Bunkering risks and challenges by the Llyods Register, I then appreciate the need
for stringent compliance to offshore HSE regulations. There are always releases of hydrocarbons
during tieing in via loading and offloading of gas, fuel or diesel and this a major challenge to the
industry.
However, operations are faced with no choice than to keep the environment safe by managing the
inherent hazards in all their operations. With the golden era of SHALE GAS and Floating Liquidified
Natural Gas (FLNG), the risk level will ultimately rise and call for critical survelliance by regulators
and coastal agencies to checkmate the activities oil and gas bunkering.
VICTOR ITA
ETIM
51126236.
OGE.
At Jesse (Geographical coordinates 5.870 N, 5.750E) a town in the Oil rich Niger Delta Region of
Nigeria on the 17th of October, 1998 an oil pipeline belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) and served as a link between an oil Refinery in the south
eastern town of Warri and the Kaduna Refinery in the Northern part of the country was engulfed by
fire. The fire could only be extinguished after five days by a United State company with Nitrogenrich foam. It took the life of over 1200 people including children, youths, and
adults. It is indeed a great disaster.
It was found out that the cause of the fire was as a result of leakage from a pipeline. The pipeline
was laid in the early 70s and ought to have been changed. It was also discovered that there were
no safety devices on the pipeline as it was designed with old technology. It was finally concluded
that the cause of the fire was due to ageing of the pipeline and lack of maintenance by the
company involved.
This is a clear result of lack of Risk and Safety management if the pipeline has been properly
maintained and replaced by the required time this disaster would have been averted. After the
incidence it was recommended that the pipeline be replaced and remidiation be carried out on the
spilled area of land and the families of the victims be duly compensated.
REFRENCE:
Wasting Lives [Reports by Doifie Ola and David Eighemhenrio]
I would like to generate some discussion around the issues to be considered in the layout of a new
facility so as to minimise the risk to personnel working on the facililty. Below are a number of
considerations, please expand on my discussion thread with other issues you think should be
considered:
Physical separation of safe areas from high risk areas
It is important when designing a new facility that you maximise the separation distance between
areas where personnel will regularly be stationed, and high risk process areas. On an offshore
platfrom this often means having the drilling/wellhead area at the opposite end of the platform (or
on a separate bridge linked platform) from the Accommodation module. In doing so you minimise
the likelihood of major accident events in the wellbay area from impacting personnel within the
accommodation module. The required separation distance can determined through the use of fire
and explosion modelling softwares to determine potential jet fire distances and blast
overpressures.
In designing an offshore platform, large process vessels and containers for storage of hazardous
chemicals should preferrably be situated on a lower deck, such that in the event of a loss of
containment, the liquids drain to the sea rather than cascading onto equipment below. In the
event of a fire, having a large vessel leaking flammable liquids onto equipment below greatly
increases the likelihood of escalation and should be avoided if possible. If this is not possible then
installation of a plated deck with appropriate bunding and hazardous closed drains can be used to
safely transport any flammable liquids away from an area, thus reducing the likelihood of fire. One
such example of a hazardous inventory would be the flare knock out drum, this is a vessel which
collects flammable liquids from the flare system. This vessel is usually situated on a lower deck of
a platfrom such that the liquids can freely drain to the vessel, and so that in the event the vessel
leaks that the inventory is released to sea rather than dripping down onto process equipment
below.
Whilst in onshore oil and gas facilities the designer often has the luxury of having a large land area
upon which to layout the required equipment, for offshore platforms the emphasis is very much on
minimising the footprint to remain within the limits of the jacket structure. To do this requires the
stacking of multiple decks to house the required process and utilities equipment.
In doing this you greatly increase the level of confinement as you essentially box in volumes of
space which have the potential to fill with flammable vapours in the event a leak occurs. Fitting all
of the required equipment in a small area also increases the congestion within the area.
These two factors, confinement and congestion, have an impact on the explosion overpressures
experienced in the event of delayed ignition of a flammable gas cloud. Confinement and congestion
aid in accellerating the blast overpressure wave, increasing its destructiveness. This can have a
devastating effect on the immediate area and lead to escalation due to damage to surrounding
equipment.
In offshore facility design it is important to maximise the natural ventilation of a space in order to
minimise the likelihood of flammable gas clouds forming. This can be done through a number of
means including:
- use of grated decks rather than plated decks to reduce confinement and encourage natural
ventilation
- Orientation of equipment to minimise congestion
- Use of forced ventialtion in enclosed modules where natural ventialtion is not possible
These are just an example of the steps which can be taken to reduce the likelihood, and
consequence of an explosion offshore.
Given the small footprint of an offshore platform it is often not possible to provide physical
separation between process equipment in order to reduce the likelihood of escalation. Instead, fire
and blast walls are often used to segregate areas and reduce the impact of a fire or explosion in an
area.
Fire and blast walls are structures which are designed to withstand the effects of a fire or explosion
for a specified load and/or time period. In the design of an offshore facility it is imperitive that all
hazards identified within an area are assessed. This is often done through the use of fire and
explosion modleling softwares to predict the magnitude and duration of an event given certain
process conditions. This modelling then allows the designer to select an appropriate fire/blast wall
design to ensure the wall remains intact for the required duration, thus minimising the likelihood of
escalation.
One example of the use of fire/blast walls is in the design of an offshore temporary refuge. The
purpose of a temporary refuge is to provide an area for personnel to muster to assess an event
and decide on the appropriate means of escape or evacuation if required. To enable personnel to
take refuge the TR must be adequately designed to withstand the effects of foreseeable fires or
explosions for a sufficent period of time for personnel to take the required action. The survivability
of the TR is ensured through the use of fire/explosion proof cladding along with HVAC design.
Monitoring
should provide:
feedback on
OSH performance;
. information
to determine whether the day-to-day arrangements for hazard and risk
identification, prevention and control are in place and operating effectively;
and
the basis
for decisions about improvement in hazard identification and risk control, and
the OSH management system.
As a follow
up to my earlier comment, I thought I would talk more on Active and Reactive
montoring
Active
monitoring should contain the elements necessary to have a proactive system and
should include:
monitoring
of the achievement of specific plans, established performance criteria and
objectives;
the
systematic inspection of work systems, premises, plant and equipment;
surveillance
of the working environment, including work organisation;
(d)
surveillance of workers' health, where appropriate, through suitable medical
monitoring or follow-up of workers for early detection of signs and symptoms of
harm to health in order to determine the effectiveness of prevention and
control measures; and
(e)
compliance with applicable national laws and regulations, collective agreements
and other commitments on OSH to which the organisation subscribes.
Reactive
monitoring should include the identification, reporting and investigation of:
work-related
injuries, ill-health (including monitoring of aggregate sickness absence
records), diseases and incidents;
other
losses, such as damage to property;
deficient
safety and health performance, and OSH management system failures; and
Safety Plan
Permalink Submitted by Mykola Mamykin on Sun, 2012-10-21 21:03.
There are six stages in the life of a structure and all six
stages require inspection management. They are:
Design
Manufacture
Fabrication of the structure
Service life
Decommissioning
Pipeine
Safety issues for the LNG industry Storage of the LNG and conversion
to its gaseous phase
References:
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/lng/documents/CEE_LNG_Safety_and_Se...
Xenios Zenieris
MSc Oil and Gas Engineering
Topic 9
Permalink Submitted by Giorgos Hadjiel... on Sun, 2012-10-21 07:19.
Topic
9
Safety
and Risk management in oil and gas industry
In the oil and gas industry
finding oil and supplying it is not the only concern companies have. Safety is
also a very important issue.
Every day accidents occur on
the oil rigs and also while oil and gas is being transport.
Regarding safety,
environmental issues must be concerned also. Steps should be taken for any
instrument malefaction because if any problem will take place oil and gas leak
is very pollutant.
Companies nowadays are using
a system for managing safety issues for the safety of their workers, the
company its self and of course the environment.
There are several ways to
ensure safety in the industry.
Trained staff should be in
charge for safety issues and monitoring the working environment. There must be
a frequent maintenance and emergency plans on oil rigs.
A good way to avoid any
accidents is to learn from previous disasters and some mistakes should be
extinguished.
http://www.hsepeople.com/
Safety issues for the LNG industry Storage of the LNG and
conversion to its gaseous phase
Inside the LNG storage tanks, the liquids that are introduced
sometimes are from different densities and for that, several layers of the liquid
are created. The liquid with the higher density goes to the bottom and the
lighter to the top. The heat from the side walls leaks inside to the top layer
and the heat from the side walls and from the bottom walls warms up the heavier
liquid. Once the heat warms up the bottom liquid, it starts to evaporate and
because of the hydrostatical pressure the vapor is superheated and may cause sudden
increase of pressure in the tank. This phenomenon is called rollover. This excess
pressure may result to crack or other structural failures of the tank and to
avoid this to happen; the density of the liquid that is introduced in the tanks
is always measured and if the density is different the liquid is unloaded
accordingly. LNG tanks have rollover protection systems, which include
distributed temperature sensors and pump-around mixing systems.
References:
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/lng/documents/CEE_LNG_Safety_and_Se...
http://www.igu.org/html/wgc2006/pdf/paper/add11684.pdf
http://www.physike.com/oldweb/%E4%BD%8E%E6%B8%A9%E6%B5%8B
%E8%AF%95/scien...
Xenios Zenieris
MSc Oil and Gas Engineering
BP did not conduct an investigation into the reasons for the delayed detection of the kick.
Transocean personnel admitted to BP that individuals associated with the
March 8 kick had "screwed up by not catching" the kick.
Moreover, ten of the 11 individuals on duty on March 8, who had well control responsibilities, were
also on duty on April 20 during Macondo blowout.
On the top of that, everyone on board the Deepwater Horizon was obligated to follow the
Transocean "stop work" policy that was in place on April 20, which provided that "each employee
has the obligation to interrupt an operation to prevent an incident from occurring." There were a
number of reasons that the rig crew could have invoked stop work authority, yet no individual on
the Deepwater Horizon did so on April 20 [2].
So the question remains - is training sufficient and adequate?
REFERENCES
1. www.iadc.org
2. BOEMRE report on Macondo Blowout
Industrial Standards
Permalink Submitted by a.bhardwaj.12 on Sun, 2012-10-21 21:14.
Oil and Gas industry has evolved from a very basic setup. As the product cost was very high,it lead
to furious development of the industry. Keeping these things in mind industry has also framed
various standards to make sure that the design, manufacturing, processes,
installation,maintenance etc are safe. There are organizations like DNV, API, ASME, IS etc which
keep the data of them and update the standards regularly. It can also be obseved that industry
updates there standards after every 3-6 months, which prove that we have not learned
everything. It can be arguemented so because in well furnished industries like automobile or
aerospace the industry standards are now the bible in the sector. Eg. DNV 2.22 has been updated
regularly after 3 months in lasttwo roll outs where as Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) have
there standards fixed since 1987 in terms of automotive field.
The point where I want to throw the light is that since the "STANDARDS" which are supposed to
control the Oil & Gas activities from concept to installation and then to decommissioning are still
floating, which proves that all the aspects of safety and health are not fully in practice. Hence its a
responsibility of the companies to carry out third party verification for them to ensure H&S.
References:
http://www2.worksafebc.com/i/posters/2012/WS_12_01.html
http://www.ehs.gatech.edu/chemical/mercury_and_compounds.pdf
Xenios Zenieris
MSc Oil and Gas Engineering
I read a very interesting article the other day in Octobers issue of The Naval Architect
which, I think closely relates to reliability concepts we are reviewing in Safety Engineering
course.
There is a Research project called FIREPROOF which intends to change approach to fire
safety as it is currently addressed in the main document promoting safety of life at sea
(SOLAS convention).
SOLAS, which is applicable to Passenger / Cargo ships, Drill ships and Mobile Offshore
Drilling Units uses probabilistic approach for calculation of damage stability in its Ch. II-1 ,
but deterministic in Ch II-2 which deals with fire safety.
The projects objective is to develop a Risk-Based approach to fire safety, taking into
consideration a number of novel designs for ships and drill ship which will emerge due to
global economy downturn and resulting competition of shipbuilders.
Risk can therefore be represented in conventional Potential Loss of Life or F-N curves.
The researchers used a number of modern software to account for various scenarios of high
and low consequences of fire ignition and escalation.
Topic 9
Permalink Submitted by Lee Soo Chyi on Tue, 2012-10-23 04:53.
Regards,
Lee, SooChyi
Two days earlier an unfortunate incident took place. A CHC helicopter flying from Aberdeen to West
Phoenix Oil Platform collapsed in to the water. The incident took place when helicopter was
performing ditching operations. It is assumed that the reason was low flying and rough sea or fuel
error or anything else. The location of crash was 32 miles South-West from Shetland.
There were 19 people aboard and 3 were from Oceaneering. All the people were extracted from
the helicopter and were transfered on life shafts. Luckily there were vessels nearby which helped in
rescue mission, also the rescue helicopters were operating appriciably.
All the people were safe including pilot and co-pilot and reached the mainland safe and sound
today evening (24th October 2012). Oil and Gas Union is now raising question for the safety in
north sea. Agencies are actively looking into the issue and helicopter is getting towed to the
mainland, investigation will follow once its on the aberdeen land.
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/AAIB%20S3-2012%20G-REDW.pdf
[Accessed 28th October 2012]
Safety
and risk management in the oil and gas industry has always been a major issue
and a stand-point for major oil industry disasters. Ranging from the deepwater
horizon to the famous piper alpha accident, it has always been one of reactive
rather than proactive approach. After the "keep it flowing" people
incident, the later regulations demanded that for every installation, there
must be a document to demonstrate how risks had been identified, the nature of
the control measures to be employed and the adequacy of these measures in
providing safe working conditions. Now, the point is that the regulator who has
certified these documents will not be on the platform on daily basis to see to
the effective implementation, thus, it lies on the duty holder and its
employees.
To
me i would rather that these measures be carried out with all sincererity of
purpose for it is only by adherence to the principles and technologies in place
that accidents may be prevented as employers always blame major accidents on
employee sabotage.
It is easy to say that companies and regulators are "reactive" and not proactive. However it is
immeasurable to quantify the number of accidents that didn't happen due to a piece of proactive
legislation or implemented safety procedure.
Much of today's safety barriers and procedures result from risk based analysis using probabilities
of accidents occurring. Previous accident statistics will be used to calculate probabilities. Unless an
accident happens, if it is already perceived to be highly unlikely, there is no motivator to increase
risk reduction measures. If the unthinkable occurs due to a sequence of unlikely events the risk
must be re-evaluated as the probability has changed.
Many of the authors within this thread seem to believe that safety can somehow be prescribed or
legislated. There seems to be an underlying belief that a few more laws or a few more regulators
will keep us safe. It appears as if there's a desire to have an army of regulators looking over each
workers shoulder ready to correct them should they stray into unsafe behaviors.
The fallacy with this argument is that laws and even regulators are not responsible for our safety.
We are all responsible for our own safety and the safety of those around us. Though it may seem
a bit clich, I found it to be true no matter what industry you work in. It is normally fairly easy to
spot a "safety minded" company. They are normally the ones in which the employees drive safety
from the bottom up rather than management droning on and on about their latest safety
initiatives. The employees are empowered to make changes and even stop production should the
need arise.
Personal safety
Permalink Submitted by Mykola Mamykin on Sun, 2012-11-04 23:23.
Safety and risk management should be legislated to ensure standard in our working Environment.
This is done by carrying out risk analysis of the system in all stages of operation: Design,
Fabrication, Installation, Operation /Production and decommission. It helps to ensure that all
possible failures are identified and mitigated as low as reasonably practicable, ALARP before
commencement and during operation for safe and smooth running of the system.
While agreeing with Mr Adavis that employees are responsible for their safety and that of others
around them, his opinion to do not take into consideration systemic failure of the system due to
poor design, failure of component as a result of sharp practices or standards not being adhere to.
Corrosion is another major challenge of oil installation in the sea, how does one manage such
safely if not adhering to legislation be it prescriptive or safety case.
In conclusion, Legislations like the Offshore Safety Case Regs.2005, Health & Safety at Work etc.
Act 1974 and the PFEER Reg. 1995 are meant to guide our activities and the Integrity of
Installations or equipment used while Working safely help reduces occupational hazard and
fatalities.
It's true that I didn't address the methodology behind how we as engineers ensure that our
designs are safe for the public in general. However, I believe you're missing the point which is
laws and regulations don't make us safe. When I design an apparatus or a piece of equipment, I
review the safety aspects not because it's legislated but because its the right thing to do. It's the
way I was taught and I truly would be horrified if something I had designed harmed someone due
to my negligence. There are many tools I use to ensure a safe design. However, very few of those
tools are regulations or laws. Most are simply good engineering practices.
Don't get me wrong. I do believe legislation has a place in the world. I wouldn't want to live in
anarchy. Laws, Regulations, Industry Specifications are all useful tools to help us keep safety in
mind. However, they do nothing to ensure safety. Words on a piece of paper or computer won't
keep you safe, unless someone chooses to review and follow them. Individuals have to decide to
be safe and keep others safe. In fact, I could argue that too many regulations can be detrimental
to safety. I'm sure we can all think of examples of regulations that have grown to the point of
being incomprehensible. A regulation or law can sometimes grow to the point where it takes a
team of people just to understand it. At that point, it's not much use to us as engineers.
I truly believe every accident/injury can be avoided. However to accomplish this, we all have to
change the way we view safety. We have to think about safety at home, at work, as we walk
through the airport...
Also, a Certificate of Fitness issued by a third-party certifying authority is to operate all the
equipment on a drilling installation. If a single underlying certificate or permit cannot be obtained,
the Certificate of Fitness is canceled.
In final argument authors point out how difficult it will be for the US to roll-out goal setting
approach.
They mention that any rapid increase in the size of a regulatory bureaucracy presents a number of
risks. More staff and the fundamental restructuring of multiple departments can easily lead to
organizational chaos.
Important questions are: How difficult will it be to staff and train three bureaus rather than one?
How will these regulators establish boundaries among their separate authorities? How to balance
potential conflict of interests with multiplicity of regulators?
Authors cast doubt on the idea of creating more regulators and emphasize, that without a
structured process, there is a considerable risk that the objectives in the new goal-oriented
regulation will follow the old prescribed regulations, or even change for the sake of change
Risk is an essential part in the oil industry. Failure to manage risk can bring an end to a Project.
Risk is any potential future event that may influence the achievement of a Project. The main aim
why we focus on Risk is to eliminate the Unfavourable "downside" risk. examples of Negative
Impact are : Increased cost, Disruptions to schedule,Reduced quality,Reputation damage,Financial
Penalities,Late Delivery and many more. There are alot of Benefits to Risk Management: Example,
Fosters clear understanding of challenges ahead.Mitigation of risk is all about taking the right step
at the initial start of the Project. HS&E goals should be : "NO ONE GETS HURT AND NOTHING
GETS HARMED" .
Oil and gas industry is vast very complex sectorand development is not easy there are many risk
involves like technical risk ,construction risk,technology risk, operational risk ,regulatory risk,workers
risk including various types working at height, chemical exposure etc and it iscomplicated to prevent
the occurrences of incident/accidents.owner,operators,contractors, and suppliers working in petroleum
industry all must find innovative solutions to minimize complexity and risk in these massive
undertakings, as it becomes a top priority to have all players on a project team work more closely
together.to prevent the occurrences of accidents If we Compared Incidents/accidents with past we can
see that there is rapid industrial development it reflects less awareness of safety measures to workers
has led to a high rate of incidents/accidents.
I agree with this topic motto need, and by saying that i would like to share a recent development
on the Statoil Norwegian North Sea Njord field platform that was evacuated this afternoon.
http://www.newsinenglish.no/2012/11/07/hundreds-airlifted-off-tilting-platform/
Instead of trying to fix the problem with all onboard, statoil considered to be a serious matter and
in my view correctly opted to minimise its risk by maintaining strictly needed personel on board to
try and stabilize the problem. We cant forget that the main issue in the Nort Sea is the water
temperature, which for a normal person with those temperatures should only last for 5 or 10
minutes, therefore a quick moving fleet to evacuate was taken.
The platform started tilting because one of the tanks an acnhor ruptured on of the balast the
pontoons in the quarters area ruptured and starting filling up.
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/07/norwegian-oil-company-evacuatesworkers-after-rig-starts-tilting/
Ajay Kale
Permalink Submitted by Ajay.Kale on Thu, 2012-11-08 04:26.
Ajay Kale
The
term safety has been used to an extent that means to preclude the event of
failure. But in our world, every device, and even human life, is bound to fail.
No matter how long it takes, the life of everything comes to an end. Thus, it
has become a necessity that when one event is about to fail/end, it should not
lead to the end of other events which had a, perhaps, longer time before its
end.
In the oil industry, much care
has been taken to ensure that certain known factors do not cause events that
are likely to bring to an end, an otherwise long-living event. There have been
major failure events that have happened in the past and these are what have
shaped the oil industry. Some of the hazards have been prepared for because
according to human and computational estimates, those were likely to happen. But
for those that there have been no previous knowledge, they are likely to be a
huge burden and more likely to happen.
Some
events are more likely to have able bodied resolutions to them than others. But
the oil and gas industry is more reactive to major incidents. Although the
industry is quite old, it has not faced all possible hazards that are likely to
occur. In this regard, all institutions in charge of generating ideas to solve
major risks have resorted to not being prescriptive in their ways of handling
safety and risk.
It
is usually the duty of business owners to evaluate every possible hazard and
risk at a worksite so as to inform their employees the possibility of danger.
This directive is very well advised. It goes to benefit the government and also
help managers and owners of businesses to correctly protect those who are
helping them generate wealth.
Ideas
from HSE Lectures, EG50S1 and EG501D.
were neglected, there was more focus on the offshore section of the upstream
section, but this doesnt leave out the fact that there have been several accidents
in other sections which have occurred onshore. Due to recent accidents in this
industry, I feel more countries should use the goal setting approach
legislation currently in use by the Norwegian government to reduce the amount
of accidents occurring in this industry.
REFERENCES
1) November 2008, J.S. Munro,
"An Overview of Regulating Offshore and Onshore Major Hazards".
2) March 2011, ERM, "Sustainable
Solutions for the Oil and Gas Industry".
A very relevant comment Liu Yishan: I clicked on your link and found a mountain of information
about the OMS and an iied report.
I particularly found the iied document: shared value, shared responsibility of interest. It
highlights that employee and contractor influence towards safety is increasing within the oil and
gas industry affecting the environmental and social responsibilities of large organisations. The
future vision of this document aims towards removing the tick-box mentality which hinders the
implementation of good practice standards. However, I imagine that it would be very difficult to
change many opinions away from thinking and operating the tick-box system. This
organisational change of behaviour would have to extent all the way down to the individual
employees and contractors who (I have already mentioned) have a growing influence in their own
methods of working. Change would be a slow process, even with our current safety culture.
Reference: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16026IIED.pdf
William Wilson
MSc Subsea Engineering
Preventative measures are the most effective means of minimizing the probability of equipment
failure and its associated risk. Protection systems are not substitutes for well-designed and
well-maintained detection, warning and shutdown systems. However, they can protect the
structure and process equipment, limit damage to these facilities and prevent escalation of fire.
Examples of Risk reduction measures implemented on existing installations include; prevention,
detection, control, mitigation, and EER (Evacuate, Escape
and Rescue).
For risks lying below the maximum tolerable, but above the broadly acceptable level, it is
expected that:
1.
the nature and level
of risks are properly assessed and the results used properly to determine control measures;
2.
the residual risks are not unduly high and kept ALARP; and
3.
the risks are periodically reviewed to ensure that they still meet the ALARP criteria.
Duty holders should not assume that if risks are below the maximum tolerable level, they are
also ALARP. This should be demonstrated through:
1.
2.
In essence, the duty holders ALARP demonstration should address the question What more
could I do to reduce risks, and why havent I done it?
The degree of rigor of the ALARP demonstration should be proportionate to the level of risk
associated with the installation.
In choosing between design options, duty holders should:
1.
2. choose the option which achieves the lowest level of residual risk, provided grossly
disproportionate risks are not incurred; and
3. confirm that the residual level of risk is no greater than that achieved by the best of
existing practice for comparable functions.
Reference:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/strategy/prevent.htm
http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/434-19.pdf
www.isgintt.org/files/Chapter_19en_isgintt_062010.pdf
Adesunloye-Oyolola O.
MSc Oil and Gas Engineering
The
management of safety and risk in the oil industry is an issue of great
concern.
With public concerns and activities of various pressure groups; there has
been
a drive in the industry to achieve near to perfect safe operations. This I
believe
can happen by practicing a safety and maintenance culture. Safety
Culture is
seen by many as a way of ensuring high levels of safety performance in
organisations, in contrast to the systematic engineered management of
hazards
and effects. They are mostly defined by values, beliefs, common working
practices and response to unusual situations. However, the development
of
safety culture experiences so many obstructions and I discuss a few of
them
below.
BUREAUCRATIC
CULTURES: The levels of bureaucracy and red-tapes that exist in the oil
industry and health and safety regulations pose a great challenge which
most
people are oblivious of. An organisation that has struggled to become
proactive
may easily revert, especially in the face of success. At such levels of
success
and development, hierarchical structures begin to break down under high
tempo
operations. This is mostly experienced when an organisation tries to
transit
from reactive to generative.
REGULATORS
AND THE LAW: This may come as a surprise to most of us but the
regulator is
also a form of barrier. Regulators are more inclined to the letter than the
spirit of the law. This can mean that regulators will not support
experimental
improvements, which is typical of a proactive industry. Rather, they may
set
high standards which are hard to meet and this can be an obstacle for
safety
culture progress.
MANAGEMENT
FAILURE: A cultural change is very drastic and doesnt happen overnight.
Changes in top management may prevent the advancement of safety
culture in an
organisation as priorities may also change.
CHANGE
IS HARD: It is very difficult for personnel to accept new situations which
are
different from the normal standard procedures of operation. This makes it
impossible for a new convention or code of practice to implemented or
enforced,
or in most cases take longer periods before they are incorporated into the
operating procedures.
The
practice of a well organised safety culture will to a very large extent
manage
risk in the oil and gas industry. Though this may at times prove difficult
and
costly, a good management practice can ensure they are well enforced.
References
http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFulltext/RTO/MP/RTO-MP032///MP-032-08.pdf
practices the operators emphasise to improve safety and reduce risk in the
risk-prone environment that they work.
Below are the points he
highlighted and referred to as Focusing on Tempo
MIST
Permalink Submitted by Ekaterina Pavli... on Sat, 2012-11-17 23:06.
I see that all my colleagues have with enthusiasm covered much of the
aspects of Safety in the Oil and Gas Industry and Id like to briefly refer to
the safety training of the individual worker within this industry.
The minimum safety requirements are covered by the acronym MIST;
this is the Minimum Industry Safety Training and the expectation is that all
workers are trained to competently undertake their professional duties,
while being fully aware of the following main points with respect to safety:
1) To understand the hazards of working in an off shore environment
2) To be able to work safely and follow all the safety regulatory measures
3) To be able to assess the risks involved with their work
4) Understanding the permit to work system
5) A working knowledge of platform integrity
6) Manual handling
7) Control of Substances hazardous to health (COSHH)
8) Working at height
9) Mechanical lifting.
These points are often referred to as the 9 Elements of MIST.
BOSIET
Permalink Submitted by Ekaterina Pavli... on Sat, 2012-11-17 23:21.
Accidents hardly originate from just single cause. What we see when an accident happens is the
event that finally occurs at the time of the accident, such as component failures and human errors.
Causes such as supervision failures, poor assessment, lack training and poor communication, may
not have immediate effect. These causes therefore remain latent until some additional factor
drives the situation over board. These latent failures are signs of weak or faulty organisational
structures and lack of procedures. Key steps in safety management therefore are prudent hazard
identification, assessing the hazards and making sure the appropriate policies and procedures
are implemented, proper supervision, training and above all commitment of management to
reduce the related risk.
The main objective of safety management in any industry is to address the cause of accident and
take action to break the accident causation link. This can be achieved by identifying and
preventing potential failures through hazard identification, analysis of the hazard, devising control
measures, implementing the control measure and monitoring it. It is important to periodically
review the whole prevention measure to assess its effectiveness vis--vis the accident records
before and after the implementation. Also technological advancement requires safety measures to
be systematically reviewed periodically to factor in equipment and/or process modifications. The
success of safety and risk management greatly depends on employers or management
commitment to safety and communication. For example, a decision which requires resource
allocation for personnel training can only be implemented with the consent of the
employer/management.
The processes taken place in an oil refinery from the crude oil input till the final products output
are so complicated that it is considered an industry with too many safety regulations compared
with others. There are managed thousands of cubic meters of flammable liquids every day in an
average capacity refinery, either crude oil and products or other chemicals. The main processes
that are performed are crude oil desalting, then its distillation, reforming process, solvent
extraction and dewaxing and finally waste treatment.
Analyzing the dangers, first of all should be considered the crude oil and its products sensitivity to
any flame source with the continuous fear of igniting a major accident after leakage during the
process. Some hydrocarbon gases are denser than air and tend to be concentrated into the
refinerys drainage system, into pits or any underground areas and access to those places require
safety measures to be taken. Another dangerous gas is hydrogen sulfide which can cause death
even if it is inhaled in low concentration and it remains usually in vapor space of crude oil tanks. In
addition, other dangerous gases produced or used in a refinery are hydrogen which is explosive,
inert gas which can cause lack of oxygen, carbon monoxide which is poisonous, chlorine which is
fatal, pyrophoric iron sulfide which is extremely flammable and many other process chemicals.
As we can understand from the above concise analysis the safety procedures must be strictly
followed by the refinerys personnel every day in every routine job otherwise the probability of a
major accident is highly increased.
References:
1)National Center for Manufacturing Sciences. Petroleum Refining Impacts, Risks and Regulations.
http://ecm.ncms.org/ERI/index.html
2) Numaligarh Refinery Limited. Safety Manual of Oil Refinery.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/53147746/Safety-manual-of-Oil-Refinery
The oil and gas industry is known to be a multifaceted global industry which makes a huge impact
on all aspects of our lives. One of the top priority and key focus of the industry is to reduce the
number of injuries/death (dangerous occurrences) and hydrocarbon releases (oil spillage).
Health, safety and environmental issues have risen enormously in the oil and gas industry's
agenda which reflects both increased pressure by the society/public and more complex operational
challenges faced in the industry.
Although the industry generally works with high pressure, high temperature and flammable fluids
and in some cases at very hostile operating environments, it has been discovered that for the past
few years as compared with other industries such as construction, mining and transport, the oil
and gas industry safety's performance has been better.
For example, in 2009, the hours of work across the industry rose, and and a 26% improvement in
lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR) was recorded as well as an 11% improvement in total
recordable injury frequency rate (TRIFR) (1).
Also, in terms of safety management issues, the areas where all regulated oil and gas companies
must look into and invest both effort and resources in order to ensure continual improvement of
safety and environmental protection include;
1. Corporate leadership and safety culture - the company's senior leaders should be responsible for
overseeing the safety of the company's operation which is vital to the society. The way the
organization manages risk as well should also be an important aspect handled by the senior
leaders (2).
2. Effectiveness of management systems - the responsibilities of individuals to ensure the
organization's safety, security and environmental protection goals are achieved, should be clearly
communicated by the company's management system(2).
References
1. http://www.appea.com.au/oil-a-gas-in-australia/safety-and-health/overvie...
2. http://blog.fieldid.com/2012/09/3-safety-management-issues-emerging-in-oil-andgas-industry/
Safety and risk management approach is largely goal-oriented in the offshore oil and gas sector. This
means that high level performance is required in specifics and various types of analysis method
carried out to spot the best possible arrangements and the key performance indicators for
measurement of success is pre-agreed upon. These places on one hand the duty of care on the duty
holders and on the other hand personal responsibility on the employees as well for their own safety.
One of the main challenges is the concept of acceptable risk criteria.
I believe that the introduction of pre-determined acceptable risk criteria may give the wrong focus
meeting these criteria instead of an overall whollistic approach towards identifying everything that may
go wrong and taking a cost effective measure to its solution. This will involve: identifying the relevant
decision attributes (costs, safety, health, hazard); dealing with uncertainties at different project phase;
balance between project risk and management portfolio; formulation and use of goals; criteria and
requirements to stimulate performance and ensure acceptable safety standards; use of cautionary
principles like the ALARP.
Thus, the focus should be on meeting overall safety objective which should be stipulate using
observable quantities (such as the frequency of occurrence of a particular type of accident no matter
how small it may seem)
RFERENCES
Aven T. and Vinnem J.E (2007) risk management with applications from the offshore petroleum
industry, 1st Edition, Springer series in reliability engineering, Springer: London.
As per a blog article on professional societies the feed was stating that: The young engineers who
step in to industry tend to find the easy way. As the company procedures and standards are
difficult to follow than the bookish calculations, hence they have a denial tendency towards the
standards.
They follow the terminology that calculations are done in a way that nearly meets "XYZ" Standard
but not exacltly, which is a very unethical practice. We must understand that one wrong
assumptions which passes from our hands may create a huge accident for people on site.
As Oil and Gas industry is developing at a very faster rate hence the scope of the standardization
industry is also expanding at same rate. Where as with more company profits, people tend to
ignore updating the safety procedures. But its the good fortune of the industry that controlling
societies like DNV, API, LLoyd's etc. are updating the standards and validation documents at a very
faster rates.
Recently Det Norske Veritas has updated its offshore procedure control documents and classified
the structures into various categories which gives a very good control to design and approval
professionals to do their job more accurately. Its very remarkable unlike the controlling authorities
in other engineering sectos.
In relation to oil and gas safety the recent incident that took place on an oil platform operated by
Black Elk energy in the Gulf of Mexico can be said to be one of senior managerial negligence to
safety conduct. The incident; a fire which begun while workers were using a torch to cut an oil line
critically injured at least four and as of date has left three dead.
Coming from reports this is the fourth incident associated with Black Elk in nearly two years with
recent incidents drawing heavy fines including a suit being filed against them (March 2012) by a
rig worker for "creating unreasonably dangerous conditions on the platform".
In September 2011, the company paid a fine of $307,500 after the Federal Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management found that Black Elk let a well go longer than the required six months without
being tested for leakage.
In February 2011, a battery charger caused a fire on a Black Elk rig in the Gulf of Mexico when the
battery shorted.
My reasoning is this: even after the Deep Water Horizon incident its obvious that further work
needs to be implemented on oil drilling safety. Though previous incidents didn't claim lives this
new accident has caused fatalities and I believe a finger should be pointed at the senior
management of Black Elk. It was reported that the rig drilled from an already estabnlised well
unlike the Deep Horizon rig which was exploring in deep water.
So far no evidence of oil spills relating directly to the incident has been reported but in the light of
this one will have to ask if the required regulatory bodies didn't carry out proper inspection on the
oil lines before welding began. Reports say that production seized as of mid-August and the oil
which ignited the fire was that trapped within the pipeline network thus pointing fingers to the
inspection unit for not complying with the set hydrocarbon content limit in pipelines before any
welding job can take place.
Well I can't be too sure as to why the company exposed the lives of these rig workers to such
hazards but whatever reason it might be it sure will have a demeaning effect on the face of Black
Elk and even more on the Safety Regulatory bodies considering the short time lapse between this
and the Macondo incident. Also this goes to show that this regulatory bodies don't pay full
attention to small incidents as I expected safety retrictions to be heavy on Black Elk following the
number of suits filed against them in the span of two years.
[1] http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57551062/2-missing-4-badly-burned-in...
Ikechukwu Onyegiri
Msc Oil and Gas Engineering
Safety and risk management in the oil and gas sector is one of the very important aspects in the
industry as accidents in the sector affects peoples property, health and the environment. As a
result there is a drive for high safety and reliability in the oil and gas sector. Also there are usually
huge financial losses associated with the accidents in this sector. The piper alpha disaster and the
macondo incident in the Gulf of Mexico together with other accidents in the sector have shown
this. Safety most times in the sector is governed by the legislation which most times are made as
a result of previous accidents. The legislation can be prescriptive or goal setting. The prescriptive
legislation prescribes the exact actions to be taken to ensure safety in certain situations while the
goal setting legislation ensures that each hazardous situation is individually analysed and the best
preventive steps taken to ensure safety.
Risk management has to do with risk analysis and decision analysis. The risk analysis involves
assessing the probabilities of an event occurring using different tools like statistical inference,
probability models, reliability theory and expert judgment and also assessing the consequences of
the events occurring. With the risk analysis done, different decision to reduce the impact of the
accident event are analysed and the best decision taken to manage the risk. This is how risk is
managed in the oil and gas sector.
A number of hazardous risks are inherent in oil and gas operations. Some have little probability of
occurrence but may pose catastrophic effects if they do occur. For example, the BP oil spillage in
the Gulf of Mexico. Safety and operational risks in occurrence may impact the oil company's cash
flows, financial position, prospected projects, goals, and liquidity. Key safety and operational risks
include:
Process, personnel safety, and environmental risks
Oil and gas companies are faced with an extensive range of health, safety, security and
environmental risks due to the nature of the business. Materialization of any of these risks could
lead to legal action and financial loss as well as injure the company's reputation. This category of
safety and operational risk encompass risks posed by natural disasters as well as technical
systems failure which could cause loss of containment of hazardous fluids leading to fires and
explosions. Thus, failure to offer safe working environments for employees and general public
could give way to regulatory actions and legal liabilities.
Furthermore, due to the uncontrollable location of exploitable reserves, oil and gas operations may
be carried out in environmentally sensitive locations which are protected by strenuous
environmental and safety laws. Therefore, the effects of a spill, explosion, and other hazardous
incidents in such locations may prompt sanctions such as penalties, and even the risk of revoking
the licence to operate in that and subsequent locations .
Security
Oil and gas companies face security threats which largely depend on the country they are
operating in. Nonetheless, acts of violence, sabotage, terrorism and disruption of property act to
impede and delay operations of companies. Breaches in security are more common in developing
countries and could also arise due to political unrest. Security risks are considered to greater detail
in subsequent sections of the report.
Product quality
Oil companies risk harming and losing customers as well as polluting the environment if they fail to
meet the quality specifications of their products. In such a scenario could lead the company to
incur sanctions from regulatory bodies as well as some degree of financial loss.
Also, transportation of produced hydrocarbons involves grave risks. Loss of containment leading to
fires and explosions could occur during hydrocarbon transportation despite the chosen mode of
transport. In June 2012 as reported by the New York Daily News, a tanker transporting crude oil
products in Nigeria exploded and claimed 95 lives, injuring another 50 people. A similar event
occurred in Congo claiming 200 lives. This reveals the level of risk involved in transporting oil
products and the severity of the potential impact of such risks occurring.
Kuma Mede
51126022
references:
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_br...
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-07-12/news/32652122_1_nigeria-truck...
Safety in the oil and gas sector is measured using certain safety indicators. Some of which
includes: Fatal accident rate, serious injury rate, individual risk, lost time injury frequency rate,
annual fatality rate, potential loss of life and societal risk. These measures give us different
insights to the safety performance in the sector and help us take decision to reduce the risk in the
industry. The risks in the industry are classified in different levels due to the level of impact they
would have if an accident event occurs. In the industry, each risk is reduced to a region of ALARP
which is as low as reasonably practicable. This is the region where the risk is tolerable only if cost
of risk reduction is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained by spending the money to
reduce the risk. If there is a risk which cannot be reduced and its probability of occurrence is high
and it has a high negative impact, then, the risk cannot be justified and is avoided. Also in the
industry, the risk assessment matrix is used to determine the level of safety.
The identification of safety culture as a main contributor to industrial accidents has started to have
a deep effect on the way risk and safety are managed within the oil and gas industry. It proposes
that the occurrence of accidents can be projected on the basis of certain factors that are
suggestive of the organisation's state of safety'.
Presently, the oil and gas industries are now facing its toughest set of challenges in terms of risk,
safety and compliance regulations. Today's corporations (oil & gas industry) are not just weighed
on their economic performance but also on their capability to manage many different types of
risks. A robust track record in managing these risks and providing safety measures are frequently
mentioned as an indicator of a well-run company. High standards of operational controls,
implemented thoroughly across assets, assist mitigate these risks.
The current Macondo blow out incident in the Gulf of Mexico has conveyed sharp emphasis the
need of the oil and gas industry to effectively identify and manage the risk from major accidents.
Delivering effective key hazards management has never been easy, and the consequences for
failure, in terms of impact on human, reputation and assets are becoming more extreme.
Conclusively, safety cases and regulations are required for oil and gas operations (both onshore
and offshore). The principal aim of the regulation is to lessen the risk from major accident hazard,
to the health and safety of the workers employed. The Safety case is a document that gives
confidence to both the duty holder and HSE that the duty holder has the capability and means to
control major accident risks effectively.
References:
1. http://www.xerafy.com/userfiles/misc/resources/whitepapers/XERAFY_RFID_R...
2. http://www.rpsgroup.com/Energy/Services/Advisory/Downstream/pdf/RPS-Fina...
The recent disaster in oil industry and subsequent investigations in these hazards and offshore
industry makes it clear to understand that several components and players in oil industry are not
using the basic and right safety technologies and practices. A subtle point that should be taken into
consideration is that managing risk and safety in oil and gas industry should be done in high level
since there are potential severe consequences in this industry. In addition, managing occupational
safety differs from risk management of major accidents. Quantitative Risk Assessments/Analyses
(QRAs) which identifies and describes barriers in risk analysis are used for risk management in the
Oil and Gas industry.Risk management in an approach which involves a formal process for
analyzing, identifying and responding to risk events through the period of the life a project, achieve
acceptable degree of risk control. Also, it tackles both insurable and uninsurable
risks.References:
http://mitei.mit.edu/news/risk-management-oil-and-gas-industrySPE
Middle East Oil and Gas Show and Conference, Mar 12 - 15, 2005 2005, Kingdom of BahrainMerna,
T, (2002) summarises risk management
The recent disaster in oil industry and subsequent investigations in these hazards and offshore
industry makes it clear to understand that several components and players in oil industry are not
using the basic and right safety technologies and practices. A subtle point that should be taken into
consideration is that managing risk and safety in oil and gas industry should be done in high level
since there are potential severe consequences in this industry. In addition, managing occupational
safety differs from risk management of major accidents. Quantitative Risk Assessments/Analyses
(QRAs) which identifies and describes barriers in risk analysis are used for risk management in the
Oil and Gas industry.Risk management in an approach which involves a formal process for
analyzing, identifying and responding to risk events through the period of the life a project, achieve
acceptable degree of risk control. Also, it tackles both insurable and uninsurable
risks.References:
http://mitei.mit.edu/news/risk-management-oil-and-gas-industrySPE
Middle East Oil and Gas Show and Conference, Mar 12 - 15, 2005 2005, Kingdom of BahrainMerna,
T, (2002) summarises risk management
The exploration, development and production of oil and gas involve activities that are carried out in
risk environments. Overtime, major and minor accidents from safety related issues such as
fatalities, severe injuries, loss of properties etc has occurred in the industry; this occurrence has
aided formation of sterner safety regulations in the industry.
Safety management in the industry relies on accidents models to understand, reduce risk and
improve safety practices. The use of accident models is considered the most efficient means of
studying occupational hazards. There are various types of accidents models that can be used
namely:
Early Accident Model provides the process of accident occurrence.
Quantitative and Statistical Accident Model provides the entire estimate of accident likelihood
Comparison Model used to compare conditions in a case system with existing/ongoing reference
system.
Swiss Cheese Model
HAZOP
Irrespective of this models,management systems must incoporate the continuous awareness of
safe practises to staff.
Safety and Risk Management is challenge oil and gas industry must contend with an array of
health and environmental concerns throughout its range of operations. In the face of increasing
regulatory oversight, as well as increased public scrutiny, oil and gas industry need to implement
effective safety management systems to help protect its workers, the general public and the
environment. The approach that works well at an offshore installation may not be the best option
for a refinery. An effective risk management system needs to offer solutions tailored not only to
the industry, but also to the specific company and the sectors in which it operates.
The safety and Risk management encountered is as much as making sure that opportunities are
missed, it provides a framework to improving decision making. It involves identifying risks,
predicting how probable they are and how serious they might become, deciding what to do about
them and implementing these decisions. Safety and Risk analysis and subsequent risk mitigation
provides financial information to potential lenders, promotes equity providers for project scenario.
It improves project or business planning by answering what if questions with imaginative
scenarios. Safety and risk management in oil and gas industry provides alternative plans and
appropriate contingencies and consideration concerning management as part of risk response.
Decisions are supported by thorough analysis of the data and estimate can be made with greater
confidence both technical and financial.
Safety and Risk management in oil and gas industry is one of the most important issues facing oil
and gas organisation today. Safety and Risk management can be considered as the sustainability
of a business in the environment it is in. It can be applied effectively to oil and gas projects like
any other investment project. The results of risk and safety analysis, both sensitivity and
probability can identify the quantitative effect on a project economics should such risk occur. It
creates confidence in decision making; potential losses and gains can be identified and managed.
Common factors that cause major accidents in Oil and Gas Industry are: lack of safety culture
among the workers, lack of real commitment to safety by supervisors, inadequate hazard analysis
(example Job Safety Analysis) and design for safety, Inadequate learning from prior events,
confusion between occupational and system safety and belief that process accidents are low
probability.
Reference
Leveson .N.G (2011), Risk management in the oil and gas industry [online] available at
http://mitei.mit.edu/news/risk-management-oil-and-gas-industry [accessed on 8
December]
My
earlier submission leads me to identification of one of the functions of safety and risk
management. For safety and risk management implementation in an industry to be successful a
safety policy and procedure in place this is a corporate statement and guidelines, documented,
that clearly expresses the employers or management commitment to safety in the industry. The
statement must clearly define the safety goals of that industry. The policy must state the
importance of safety in all aspect of the industrys operations. It must identify individually, the
hierarchy of personnel with corporate responsibility right from the board level, and it must clearly
describe the safety standard established. It must also indicate employers readiness to provide the
necessary resource in terms of funds and time to promote safety. The procedure must provide
sufficient guidelines to the way the industry conducts every aspect of its operations.
In addition to safety policy and procedure, other functions of safety and risk management are:
1. Cordial management/labour interaction A two way communication at all level must be
established. This will encourage good safety culture in that industry.
2. Effective hazard management mechanism There must be a prudent hazard identification
system, risk assessment and a commitment to fully implement preventive and
mitigating actions. There must be a way of measuring and reviewing the
effectiveness of this mechanism.
Safety appraisal A means of monitoring and
reviewing safety performance over a period of time. This should answer
questions like; has the safety plan been adopted, fully implemented? Is it
achieving its goals? Is it improving the safety performance of the organization?
Etc.
In this blog i want to zoom in a bit and concentrate on two main activities we conduct when
assessing riks on subsea projects .
1) Technical Risk Analysis:
On each subsea project , a Technical risk analysis is performed by Contractors for all the items
(system/subsystem/equipment) part of their supply, with the objective to identify, assess and
mitigate the technical risks that could impact system availability and production efficiency. This
study is used to feed into the Maturity Assessment required for determinining the Qualification
tests required on the project.
2) Operational risk analysis :
A specific operational risk analysis is performed by Contractors, in order to systematically
investigate all potential risks that could occur in operation on Subsea Facilities, during the
installation phase (including transportation), offshore operations (including commissioning,
inspection and maintenance) and normal production (for technical risks occurring during
operations).
For each risk, Contractors determine cause / consequence / frequency / criticality, and propose
specific mitigation actions in order to minimise the impact of the identified risk.
The operational risk analysis consider the following parameters:
a) Main operational phases
b) Subsea installation and Tie-in,
c) Commissioning,
d) Intervention / Maintenance.
e) Normal production (including start-up and shut down).
Main risks categories considered are :
1) Production impact of the failure
2) Equipment damage
3) Severe injury or Fatality,
4) Hydrocarbon and/or chemical release to sea.
Helicopter safety
Permalink Submitted by Claire Snodgrass on Sun, 2012-12-09 12:36.
Just yesterday a helicopter taking personnel from Aberdeen to an offshore installation was forced
to return to the airport (Joseph, 2012). This comes not long after the ditching of a helicopter in the
North Sea (please refer to my previous post for details). Discussing the issue with friends and
family it seems that these high profile incidents have made some people believe that travelling by
helicopter is very risky and something they wouldn't like to do. This got me thinking, is the actual
risk of helicopter travel the same as the perceived risk?
An HSE (2004) safety review of offshore helicopter use compared the fatality rates for different
types of transport over the period 1992 - 2001. The fatal accident rate for offshore helicopter
travel was 4.3 per billion passenger kilometres, which is roughly on a par with travel by car with a
fatal accident rate of 3. Rail transportation is effectively ten times safer with only 0.04 fatalities per
billion passenger kilometres, and air (fixed wing) travel even safer with a fatality rate of only 0.01.
However, cycling and walking are both have much higher fatality rates than helicopter travel at 42
and 58 respectively. Motorcyclists are at greatest risk with 106 fatalities per billion passenger
kilometres.
Over the period 1995 to 2002 the fatal and non-fatal accident rates per 100,000 flying hours in the
UK continental shelf region were 0.14 and 1.10 respectively. This is much lower than the
equivalent worldwide rates of 0.57 for fatal accidents and 1.10 for non-fatal accidents. So it can be
seen that the helicopter travel in the UK is safer than the global average.
Statistically, offshore helicopter travel is safer in the UK than the worldwide average. Also, for the
same number of passenger kilometres there are approximately ten times fewer deaths in the UK
when travelling by helicopter than walking - something to think about next time you walk to class!
Reference:
Joseph, A. (2012). Helicopter makes emergency landing at Aberdeen Airport', Evening Express, 08
December Evening Express [Online]. Available at:
http://www.eveningexpress.co.uk/Article.aspx/3042338 [Accessed: 09 December 2012].
HSE (2004). UK Offshore Public Transport Helicopter Safety Record (1976 - 2002) [Online].
Available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/misc/helicoptersafety.pdf [Accessed: 28
October 2012].
Following all comments (positive and no positive approaches) in this forum I would say that the
effectiveness of safety and risk management in the oil and gas industry and the roles of the parties
involved in this process are questionable subject. This argument being based the major accidents
the industry has experienced such as: the Piper Alpha disaster 1988, Texas City refinery explosion
2005, Gulf of Mexico oil spill 2010, and the Venezuelan refinery explosion 2012. All of them
resulted in more than hundred casualties and material damages. This is an indication that although
investigations have been carried out and actions taking to improve safety culture and new
regulations have been developed, the industry still need to make a significant improvement in
safety and risk management. Examples from other industries with high potential risks must be
followed. Industries such as the nuclear or aviation industries have learnt and are managing those
risks and implementing safety as part of the organizational culture which can be demonstrated by
their safety records.
Certainly something is not going well in this process of managing risk and safety in this industry. It
would mainly due to different causes such as organizational, cultural and regulatory issues. Some
of the players are not fulfilling their roles leaving some gaps which have affected the effective
implementation of the safety and risk management process.
The gaps of this process result from people failing to apply proper designs for safety or follow
procedures or there are not policies to reinforce these processes. There are some organizations in
which the safety culture does not have strong basis or lacks of appropriate safety engineering
concepts. Other organizations have those strong bases, but either there is not commitment and
ownership or lack or reinforcement and responsibility to use them. On the other hand, there are
some organizations that have those strong policies and a safety culture which is implemented,
followed and reinforced within the organization resulting in a continuous improvement process for
recognising and assessing risks and managing safety.
Some of the main causes identified in the oil industry which have resulted in failing to implement
the risks and safety management are: lack of commitment of leaders and employees to use safety
and risk management as part of their culture, lack of implementing effective management of
change processes or sometimes a no existence of them at all, inadequate learning and reporting
systems to disseminate the learnings and improve the safety awareness, inadequate risks
assessments or paperwork cultures with not effective implementation of mitigations, lack of
enforcements of safe behaviours, safety policies and standards, lack of sense of liabilities and
weakness on regulatory control and reinforcement.
Things can be as good or as bad as we want to see them, however, most important is to think
about the ways how we can encourage the use of safety and risk management processes. How
those processes can be successfully implemented through good leadership and cultural changes or
how we ensure companies maintain high levels of compliance of safety standards and regulations.
All those initiatives can be implemented by:
Hazard Management
Permalink Submitted by Thomas James Smith on Sun, 2012-12-09 16:17.
Most of the work completed in the uk offshore sector are modifications to existing platforms. As such
there is a requirement to assess the impact to the existing platform by conducting continuous reviews
form concept through to final installation and commissioning.
The normal process (non fast track jobs) is to complete a concept select study, then into Front End
Engineer and Design (taking one of the concepts forward) through detail engineering and design into
fabrication and construction to final commissioning and hand over.
The normal approach is to have a Hazard management plan for the project that details how the
project is going to manage the hazards through the project life cycle by Environmental identification
and design reviews, risk assessments, and regulatory compliance demonstration.
Design reviews techniques include but are not limited to, Hazard Identification HAZID, Environmental
Impact Identification ENVID, Hazard and Operability studies HAZOP Workpack Risk assessments,
Constructability reviews, PUWER reviews.
During the Concept stage and dependant on the information available it is useful to complete course
HAZIDs, ENVIDs, Inherently safe design (ISD) reviews. During FEED youd look at Fire and Gas
philosophies, Blast design philosophies, HAZIDs, ENVIDs, ISD (better to conduct ISD workshop as
early as possible so that the outcomes can be incorporated into the design), HAZOPs (May be better
to leave to the end of FEED start of Detail Design so that the design is mature enough to review), any
fire blast studies should be kicked of to allow the outputs to be affectively incorporated into the
design. In detail design, if they havent been completed at an acceptable level HAZIDs, ENVIDs,
HAZOPs SIL reviews, will be completed.
With a Hazard Management plan in place and completed during the complete lifecycle of a project it is
expected that measures will be in place to manage all hazardous associated with the project.
its place in a dynamic industry like oil and gas industry. It is important for organisations
to recognise that work environment do change and some changes may occur at a
high frequency or with some degree of unpredictability. DRA is not an exclusive
tool but should be incorporated into a broader risk management programme. DRA
is largely an on the spot decision making process and should be considered for
managing dynamic situations in which the employee may find themselves in. Thus DRA
relies heavily on the behaviour and competency of personnel and part of making
the personnel competent relies on received and past experience.
Ref:
http://www.onepetro.org/mslib/servlet/onepetropreview?id=SPE-151139-MS
Mitigation processes
have been put in place by the industry to avoid the severe negative
consequences from major accidents. Some companies have rigorous
process in
place to identify major hazards, and assess and manage the risks if it
occurs.
It cannot be emphasized enough that there is no single better way of
managing major
risks.
the
industry in order to deliver good safety and operational performances.
Working as a project manager in the oil and gas industry is basically 95% risk management, and
rightfully so. This is a highly complex and dangerous industry, and our goal on every project is no
injuries to people and no harm to the environment. In order to accomplish this goal, risk
management has to always be on the mind of the project manager. This is especially true when
managing project on the bottom of the ocean.
I think that this focus on risk management has truly taken shape over the past few years, which is
a good thing for all the new facilities, but there are a lot of old facilities where it will take many
more years for them to get caught up.
I have been a project manager in this industry for approximately 7 years and have managed about
25 different projects, with a total expenditure exceeding $250 million, and not one of my projects
have been to increase production, but instead they were mitigating a risk of one form or another.
I know the industry has a bad reputation regarding safety, but I've witnessed first hand all the
time and money which is spent on a daily basis in order to try to produce oil and gas in a safer
manner.
The HAZOP
Permalink Submitted by Thomas James Smith on Mon, 2012-12-10 14:35.
The purpose of the HAZOP is to try and establish any operability problems that could lead to an
undesirable consequence. The process system is reviewed systematically, dividing it into discrete
nodes an analysing against guidewords that have been agreed in a pre-determined Terms of
Reference.
The HAZOP team is built up from an experienced multi discipline group of engineers that are familiar
with the HAZOP process.
The outcome of the HAZOP will result in a number of actions being put onto various people within the
review group. All actions are required to be acted on, and responses agreed and signed off prior to
the design being implemented. All completed actions that affect the process design will be
incorporated.
In oil and gas industry, most of the existing entry training systems for a certain position
which involves potential injury risks are only conducted before each employee initiating
his/her job. But according to some statistics, a considerable portion of injuries related
with lack of awareness of mistakes during working and wrong operating habits. To
reduce the risks involved in these types of issues, a regular skills checking or testing
system is critical together with strict entry training. That means employees who take the
potential risk related work, their skills or working routines should be checked and tested
against standard operation routines on a certain time base (such as one or two years
time). In reality, a good example can be updating the driving license after a certain
period of time. I believe this would help reduce the possibility of injury resulting from
wrong operation routines in oil and gas industry.
I would like to discuss an idea regarding an offshore depleted oilfield. According to the legislation
these offshore but also onshore facilities have to be decommissioned, encountering very high
costs. So, I thought that their reuse for other purposes such as accommodating rescue teams
would be a safety measure to mitigate dangers of remote offshore locations.
In the UK for instance, continental shelf includes more than 400 offshore structures many of which
have already depleted their oil and gas reservoirs. But these structures have potential life of many
years. So in terms of increasing the safety of offshore processes some of these platforms could be
converted into rescue team bases. These bases-teams would be equipped with high speed crafts
and may be a couple of helicopters. Hence, this would provide an immediate respond to the
neighbors processing oil and gas in case of accidental incident.
I believe the costs of maintaining rescue crew in offshore locations, much closer than other
onshore positions, can be afforded by many companies and this will decrease significantly the
fatality. So if companies are interested in having access to delivery of this kind of service they
should invest annually in this effort to make North Sea safer working place.
ID: 51233945
The process of HSE Risk Management starts right from the design stage where major accident
hazards are identified and reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and to a tolerable
overall risk. This approach allows early identification of concerns when more effective action may
be taken and provides a clear understanding of the safety critical elements used to control and
hazard scenario. It follows principles of inherent safety and the risk reduction hierarchy consisting
of
Elimination of the hazards
Reduction by substituting with a lesser hazard
Isolation of people from the hazard
Control of the hazard through procedures
Typically, a HAZID review is conducted at an early stage in order to identify major hazards and
action appropriate control measures. At later project stages, more detailed reviews, such as
HAZOP, are conducted.
Hazards which cannot be eliminated through principles of inherent safety are managed through
application of principle of layers of defence mainly consisting of the following;
Prevention of the release (though overpressure protection and prevention of ignition sources)
Detection of the release (through Fire and Gas detection systems)
Control by inventory removal to a safe location (emergency depressuring and flaring)
Mitigation (through active and passive fire protection)
Emergency response (through provision of escape routes, muster locations and ER equipment)
The design of these defences is applied through the variety of reviews and risk studies by different
engineering disciplines.
Sanjay Vyas- Student ID - 51234203
Hi colleagues,
I'm planning to start drafting my M.Sc thesisregarding safety in upstream oil & gas.
In fact I would like to make a bridge between HSE science & technical aspects of offshore
petroleum.
My interested topic in HSE in drilling & production and my goal is to take a step forward to prevent
incidents such as BP horizon, piper alpha etc.
Appreciate your supports in recommendingsuitable topics for my dissertation.
Regards