Loc Gov Full Text

R
G.R. No. L-5631
Local Government Fulltext

October 17, 1910
THE
MUNICIPALITY
OF
CATBALOGAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, opponentappellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellant.
Provincial fiscal Barrios, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On June 19, 1908, the municipal president of the
pueblo of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, filed,
in the name of the municipality, an application
with the Court of Land Registration in which he
asked for the registration, in conformity with the
Land Registration Act, of a parcel of land of
which the said municipality was the absolute
owner, bounded on the north by calle Corto
south of the church square, on the east by
Second Avenue, on the south by land belonging
to Smith, Bell & Co., and on the west by First
Avenue; the application states that the said land
has an area of 666.60 square meters and its
description and boundaries are given in detail in
the map attached to the application, which sets
forth that the property described was appraised
at the last assessment levied for the purpose of
the payment of the land tax, and that there is no
encumbrance on it; that no one other than the
applicant, to the latter's best knowledge and
belief, has any right or interest therein; that the
said land was acquired by possession and
material occupation for a large number of years
and is at present occupied by the applicant as a
municipal corporation duly organized; and that,
in the unlikely event of the denial of the said
application, made in accordance with the Land
Registration Act, the applicant invokes the
benefits of chapter 6 of Act No. 926, since the
said corporation has been in poossession of the
land mentioned, which is entirely surrounded by
a fence, and has been cultivating it for a great
many years.
On March 18, 1909, the Attorney-General, in
representation of the Director of Lands, filed a
Page 1 of 104
writing opposing the registration solicited and

alleged that the land in question belonged to the
United States and was under the control of the
Government of the Philippines Islands. He asked
that the applicant's prayer be denied and that, in
case the said property should be declared to
belong to the Insular Government, the same be
awarded to it, together with the issuance thereto
of the proper certificate of registration.
The case having been heard on March 22, 23,
and 24, 1909, and oral evidence adduced by both
parties, the judge, on the 24th of the said month,
overruled the opposition of the Director of
Lands, and decreed, after a declaration of
general default, that the property in question be
awarded to the applicant, the municipality of
Catbalogan, and be registered in its name. The
Attorney-General, in representation of the
Director of Lands, excepted to this ruling and
announced his purpose of filing a bill of
exceptions. He asked at the same time for a new
trial on the grounds that the findings of fact of
the court were openly and manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence, and that the latter did
not justify the said decision which, he alleged,
was contrary to law. This motion was denied and
exception was taken thereto by the AttorneyGeneral, who duly presented the required bill of
exceptions which was certified and forwarded to
this court.
The question submitted to the decision of this
court, through the appeal raised by the AttorneyGeneral in representation of the Director of
Lands, is whether the lot occupied by the courthouse of the municipality of Catbalogan, of the
Islands and Province of Samar, belongs to the
said municipality or is state land under the
control of the Insular Government.
In order to obtain a better understanding of the
final conclusion to be established in this
decision, it is meet to state: That for the purpose
of the establishment of new pueblos in this
Archipelago, at the beginning of its occupation
by the Spaniards, an endeavor was always made
to find, in favorable places, a nucleus of
inhabitants and, later, near the pueblos already
established, barrios, which ordinarily served as a
basis for the formation of other new pueblos that
became a populated as the centers on which they

were dependent.
The executive authorities and other officials who
then represented the Spanish Government in
these Islands were obliged to adjust their
procedure, in the fulfillment of their duties with
regard to the establishment and laying out of
new towns, to the Laws of the Indies, which
determined the course that they were to pursue
for such purposes, as may be seen by the
following:
Law 6, title 5, book 4, of the Recompilation of
the Laws of the Indies, provides, among other
things:
That within the boundaries which may
be assigned to it, there must be at least
thirty residents, and each one of them
must have a house, etc.
Law 7 of the same title and book contains this
provision:
Whoever wishes to undertake to
establish a new town in the manner
provided for, of not more than thirty nor
less than ten residents, shall be granted
the time and territory necessary for the
purpose and under the same conditions.
It may be affirmed that years afterwards all the
modern pueblos of the Archipelago were formed
by taking as a basis for their establishment the
barrios already populated by a large number of
residents who, under the agreement to build the
church of the new pueblo, the court-house, and
afterwards the schoolhouse, obtained from the
General
Government
the
administrative
separation of their barrio from the pueblo on
which it depended and in whose territory it was
previously comprised. In such cases procedure
analogous to that prescribed by the Laws of the
Indies was observed.
For the establishment, then, of new pueblos, the
administrative authority of the province, in
representation
of
the
Governor-General,
designated the territory for their location and
extension and the metes and bounds of the
Page 2 of 104
same; and before alloting the lands among the

new settlers, a special demarcation was made of
the places which were to serve as the public
square of the pueblo, for the erection of the
church, and as sites for the public buildings,
among others, the municipal building or
the casa real, as well as of the lands which were
to
constitute
the
commons,
pastures,
and propios of the municipality and the streets
and roads which were to intersect the new town
were laid out, as many be seen by the following
laws:
Law 7, title 7, book 4, of the Recompilation of the
Laws of the Indies, provides:
The district or territory to be given for
settlement by composition shall be
allotted in the following manner: There
shall be first be set apart the portion
required for the lots of the pueblo,
the exido or public lands, and pastures
amply sufficient for the stock which the
residents may have, and as much more
as propios del lugar or common lands
of the locality; the rest of the territory
and district shall be divided into four
parts one of them, of his choice, shall
be for him who takes upon himself the
obligation to fund the pueblo, and the
other three shall be apportioned equally
among the settlers.
Law 8, of the same title and book, prescribes,
among other things:
That, between the main square and the
church, there shall be constructed
the casas reales or municipal buildings,
the cabildo, concejo, customs buildings,
etc.
Law 14 of the said title and book, also directs
among other things:
That the viceroys shall set aside such
lands as to them appear suitable as the
common lands (propios) of the pueblos
that have none, therewith to assist in the
payment
of
the
salaries
of
the corregidores, and sufficient public

lands (exidos) and pasture lands as
provided for and prescribed by law.
Law 1, title 13 of the aforesaid book, provides the

following:
Such viceroys and governors as have due
authority
shall
designate
to
each villa and lugar newly founded and
settled the lands and lots which they
may need and may be given to them,
without detriment to a third party, as
propios, and a statement shall be sent to
us of what was designated and given to
each, in order that we may have such
action approved.
The municipality of Catbalogan, as the
provincial seat of Samar, must have been the
first and oldest pueblo established in the said
province and has been occupying, if not since
time immemorial, as affirmed in the application,
at least for a long period of years, some forty or
forty-five years according to the evidence given
at trial, the lot in litigation on which it had built
the successive court-house buildings constructed
for the public service of the head municipality
authority and his council. Some of these
buildings were burned and others were ruined
by typhoons. The court-house building aforesaid
has been used and enjoyed quietly and peaceably
and without any opposition up to the present
time, wherefore it is to be presumed that, on
founding the pueblo and on proceeding to
designate and demarcate the area of land to be
occupied by the town of Catbalogan, with its
square, streets, church, and other public
buildings, the said lot was also designated as a
site for the municipal or court building, in
accordance with the laws hereinbefore
mentioned, and that the adjudication of the lot
to the municipality for its court-house was duly
confirmed by the Spanish Government, as must
be inferred, in view of the continuous possession
for so long a time up to the present; nor does the
record show that the court-house of the said
pueblo was ever built on any other lot than the
one in question.
It is to be noted that, in former times, the courthouse buildings of the pueblos were called casas
reales (royal buildings), undoubtedly for the
Page 3 of 104
purpose of giving greater dignity to the principle

of authority represented in them and inculcating
respect among the inhabitants of the pueblo
toward the building where the chief local
authority exercised his governmental duties and
at the same time administered justice, for the
old pedaneos or
petty
mayors,
later
called capitanes or gobernadorcillos, while they
had governmental powers, at the same time
administered justice as local judges.
In paragraph 92 of the royal ordinances of
February 26, 1768, the following appears, among
other things:
And because, while there is a notable
excess of pomp in the buildings of the
ministers and parish priests, there is, on
the other hand, great abandonment of
the casas reales which, as a general rule,
are not habitable on account of their
uncomfortable and ruinous conditions,
etc., . . . it is ordered that in all the
pueblos, and especially in those of the
seats of government, the native
inhabitants thereof shall erect decent
and convenient municipal buildings
modeled after the plans to be furnished
by the central government, and that
therein the gobernadorcillos shall have
their court rooms and their jails for the
security of prisoners, and all leaks and
other damages shall be repaired in time
in order that, through neglect they may
not cause greater detriment and
expense.
If the inhabitants of a pueblo, at the time of its
foundation, were obliged to erect their casa
real of municipal building, it is to be supposed
that they built it on their own ground after a
designation of the site had been made by the
governmental authority of the province a
designation which had to be made, according to
the Laws of the Indies, at the same time as that
of the main plaza and of the site to be occupied
by the temple of church, which latter building is
so necessary and indispensable for every pueblo
as well as the casa real or court-house, since in
them, respectively, divine worship is had and the
local authorities perform their duties. The land
designated for the church is considered to
belong thereto, and likewise the land intended

for the court-house should be deemed to be the
property of municipality, since no pueblo was
able to exist administratively without having a
church of its own and a court-house which
should be the seat of its local authority and its
municipal government.
It should be remembered that the court-house
and the church of every pueblo were always
built, in accordance with the provisions of the
Laws of the Indies, on one of the sides of
the plaza mayor or main square of the town,
either together or the same side, or each
buildings on an opposite side; but the said
square nearly always occupies a central site
within the territory of the pueblo, with the
frequent exception of where the town has
extended toward only one end or side of the
territory, in which event its main square ceased
to be in the center of the town. However, the
said square was never located outside of the
inhabited place, as were the commons and
pasturages. (Law 13, title 7, book 4,
Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies.)
It is of course to presumed, in accordance with
the provisions of the laws aforementioned, that
the main square of the pueblo of Catbalogan
occupies nearly the central part of its territory,
and that the lot on which were successively
constructed the several court-houses which the
said pueblo has and, in situated on one of the
sides of the said square and consequently in a
central point and not outside the town. It can
not, however, on account of this circumstances,
be concluded that the said lot formed a part of
the commons, exido, or the pasturage lands of
the said pueblo, but consisted of land which
belonged to the pueblo and was legally acquired
through the distribution and adjudication of lots
made at the beginning of its foundation, as
proved by the laws hereinbefore quoted.
In technical administrative terms bienes
propios are:
Cultivated
real
properties,
pasturage, houses or any other property which a
city, village, or hamlet has for the payment of the
public expenses. The administration of this class
of property lay with the municipalities, and they
could be alienated after proper procedure and
authorization of the competent superior
authorities
in
accordance
administrative laws.
Page 4 of 104
with
the
It is therefore unquestionable that the assets of

each pueblo comprised its bienes propios and
the revenues or products derived therefrom, and
this fact is recognized in the Ordenanza de
Intendentes of 1786, the forty-seventh article of
which reads:
The funds which any pueblo may have
left over as an annual surplus from the
products of its property and its taxes,
after meeting the expenses specified in
its own particular ordinance, shall be
invested in the purchase of real estate
and revenue-bearing investments, so
that, having a sufficient income for the
payment of its obligations and to aid in
defraying its ordinary needs, the excise
taxes, which are always a burden to the
public, may be abolished; and in case it
should have no such taxes, nor annuities
to
redeem
on
its
common
properties (propios), the said surplus
shall
be
applied
to
promote
establishments useful to the pueblo and
to its province, or by investments to be
previous
proposed
by
the intendentes and
approved
by
the junta superior.
From the foregoing it is concluded that the land
in question is the common property of the
pueblo and is comprised within the patrimonial
property of the municipality of Catbalogan, to
which it was awarded for the construction
thereon of the court-house, on the demarcation
and distribution being made of the lands which
were to be occupied by the town in its
development, in accordance with the provisions
of the Laws of the Indies, and other
complementary laws, at a time when there was
an excess of land and a few inhabitants to
occupy them. It was for this reason that the royal
cedula of October 15, 1754, directed that neither
the possessors of unappropriate crown lands,
nor their successors in interest, should be
disturbed or denounced, although they had no
titles, it being sufficient for them to prove their
prior possession to obtain a title by just
prescription.
The said municipality is today in possession of

the land in litigation, as the owner thereof,
under the protection of the civil and
administrative laws which guarantee the right of
ownership of the corporations that are capable
of contracting, acquiring, and possessing real
and personal property.
Article 343 of the Civil Code reads:
The property of provinces an of towns is
divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property.
Article 344 of the same codes prescribes:
Property for public use in provinces and
in towns comprises the provincial and
town roads, the squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters, the
promenades, and public works of
general services supported by the said
towns or provinces.
All other property possessed by either is
patrimonial, and shall be governed by
the provisions of this code, unless
otherwise prescribed in special laws.
Section 2 of Act No. 82, entitled "The Municipal
Code," is as follows:
(a) Pueblos incorporated under this Act
shall be designated as municipalities
(municipios), and shall be known
respectively by the names heretofore
adopted. Under such names they may
sue and be sued, contract and be
contracted with, acquire and hold real
and personal property for the general
interest of the municipality, and exercise
all the powers hereinafter conferred
upon them.
(b) All property and property rights
vested in any pueblo under its former
organization shall continue to be vested
in the same municipality after its
incorporation under this Act.
Page 5 of 104
By this last-cited administrative Act the rights of

the old municipalities to acquire real and
personal property, in accordance with their
former organization, are recognized, and it is
declared that the said property and rights shall
continue to pertain to the municipalities created
in harmony with the provisions of the Municipal
Code, on account of such property being the
patrimonial property of the municipalities.
Under these principles, perfectly in accord with
both the old and the mother legislation of this
country, the municipality of Catbalogan ought to
be considered as the owner of the land in
question, on account of the same having been
awarded to it as its own, under its exclusive
ownership, on the founding of the pueblo, for
the erection of the courthouse, the record of the
case showing no proof nor data to the contrary.
As the plaintiff municipality, the applicant, has
been occupying the property on which its courthouse is situated during such a long space of
time, much longer than that required for
extraordinary prescription (art. 1959 of the Civil
Code), it can not be denied that the presumption
exists, in its favor, that it has been holding the
land in its character of owner, since the trial
record exhibits no proof that any other parcel of
land, distinct from that in controversy, was
awarded to the said municipality for the erection
thereon of its court-house, a court-house and the
land on which to build it being necessary and
indispensable for the existence of the pueblo.
The title under which the municipality of
Catbalogan holds and enjoys the said lot is the
same as that under which it is recognized as a
pueblo and under which the municipality is
justified in its present occupancy of the territory
where the town is established with its streets,
squares, and common lands (terreno comunal),
a title identical with that now held by the church,
as a religious institution, to the land now
occupied by the temple that exists in the said
pueblo. 1awph!l.net
At the time of the beginning of the foundation of
the pueblo mentioned and of the distribution or
allotment of the lands among its first
inhabitants, who, in accordance with the Laws of
the Indies, must have numbered at least thirty
men with their respective families, for the
purpose of founding a pueblo, perhaps none of

them was provided with any particular title to
accredit the fact that this or that parcel of land
had fallen to him in the allotment. Possibly the
facts pertaining to the distribution of the lands
were entered in the record kept of the
organization of the pueblo, if one such was
made, for it must be remembered that, in
ancient times and up to the years immediately
preceding the beginning of the nineteenth
century, fewer records were made than in
modern times, and, besides, the Laws of the
Indies themselves recommended that, in
administrative proceeding, the institution of
suits should be avoided in so far as possible
where verbal information and investigations
could be had to enable proper action to be taken.
Besides the reasons hereinabove noted, there is
that of the continuous and constant renovation
of the personnel which composed the officials of
a municipality in the Philippines, for
the pedaneo or gobernadorcillo, his tenientes,
judges, and other subordinates were first chosen
and appointed annually, and after every two
years; and, though in the beginning the capitan
pedaneo of the pueblo may have had in his
possession the record of the necessary
concession and award of the land on which the
court-house was built, and that of the pueblo of
Catbalogan was constructed of stone, it would in
nowise be strange that, in spite of the zeal and
diligence which may have been exercised by his
many successors, the said record or title should
have disappeared or been destroyed in the case
of Catbalogan, during the lapse of so long a time;
indeed, it would be marvelous and extraordinary
that such a document should exist, intrusted to
the more or less diligent care of so many
municipal officials who, at the most, occupied
their offices but two years. It is certain, however,
that the successive court-houses which the said
pueblo has had have occupied the land in
question without opposition on the part of
anyone, or of the state, and including the
building which served as a court-house, together
with the land on which it is built, as one of the
properties which form the assets of the pueblo of
Catbalogan, as they should be classed, it is
incontrovertible that the right of the said
municipality therein must be respected, as the
right of ownership is consecrated and sanctioned
Page 6 of 104
by the laws of every civilized county in the

interest and for the benefit of society, public
order, and civilization itself.
As has been shown in the preceding paragraphs,
the land in litigation, which is a lot occupied by
the court-house, anciently termed the casa real,
of the pueblo of Catbalogan, pertains to the said
pueblo, awarded to the same, not gratuitously,
but on account of the necessity arising from its
organization, and forms a part, as a patrimonial
property, of its municipal assets, and therefore it
is not comprised within the common land
(terreno comunal) which may have been granted
to the said pueblo. Law 8, title 3, book 6 of the
Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, is not
applicable to the question at issue with respect
to the said land or lot, nor are the provisions of
article 53 of the ordinances of good government,
before cited, of February 26, 1768, nor the
subsequent royal decrees of February 28, August
1, 1883, and of January 17, 1885, relative to
the legua or terreno
comunal;
and,
consequently, the doctrine laid down in the
decision rendered in the case of The City of
Manila vs. The Insular Government (10 Phil.
Rep., 327) is likewise inapplicable, for the reason
that the land in dispute is not that of a common,
but of a building lot of which the pueblo of
Catbalogan had absolute need at the beginning
of its organization for the erection thereon of its
court-house. This was duly proved at trial,
without possible contradiction.
Notwithstanding the number of years during
which the municipality of Catbalogan has been
in possession of the lot, once it has been shown
by unquestionable evidence that the property
was assigned to it as its own, in order that it
might erect its court-house thereon, as it did do
at the beginning of its foundation, and its
possession of the said land not being by mere
unlawful occupation, the municipality has no
need to rely upon the right of prescription,
although, being entitled to acquire and possess
property in the character of owner, according to
its organic law, it is not understood why it could
not acquire such right by prescription in
accordance with law, it being, as it is, a juridical
person susceptible of rights and duties.
The present case has nothing to do with any

contract made by the old municipality of
Catbalogan, nor administrative acts or
procedure of the applicant herein, but relates to
its right of ownership in a parcel of land vested
with the character of bien propio of its own, or
patrimonial property; for which reason the
doctrine established in the decision rendered in
the case of Aguado vs. The City of Manila (9
Phil. Rep., 513) is also inapplicable, inasmuch as
the said municipality, in the exercise of the right
of ownership in its own property, has an
independent personality of its own, recognized
by law, and does not act as a mere delegate of
the central authority.
For the foregoing reasons, and considering that
the municipality of Catbalogan is the owner of
the land occupied by its court-house and that it
is entitled to have the said property registered in
its name in the Court of Land Registration, it is
proper, in our opinion, to affirm and we hereby
affirm the judgment appealed from in its present
form.
G.R. No. L-7708
May 30, 1955
JOSE
MONDANO, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO
SILVOSA,
Provincial
Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and
OLIMPIO
EPIS,
Members
of
the
Provincial Board, respondents.
D. Avila and C. H. Lozada for petitioner.
Olimpio R. Epis in his own behalf and for his
co-respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified
mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of
Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda.
de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee
accusing him of (1) rape committed on her
daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage
for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other
than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the
Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the
complaint to the respondent provincial governor
Page 7 of 104
for immediate investigation, appropriate action

and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared
before the provincial governor in obedience to
his summons and was served with a copy of the
complaint filed by the provincial governor with
provincial board. On the same day, the
provincial governor issued Administrative Order
No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office.
Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to
hear the charges preferred against the petitioner
over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
respondents from further proceeding with the
hearing of the administrative case against him
and for a declaration that the order of
suspension issued by the respondent provincial
governor is illegal and without legal effect.
On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for was issued after filing and
approval of a bond for P500.
The answer of the respondents admits the facts
alleged in the petition except those that are
inferences and conclusions of law and invokes
the provisions of section 79 (c)of the Revised
Administrative Code which clothes the
department head with "direct control, direction,
and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction . . ." and to that end "may
order the investigation of any act or conduct of
any person in the service of any bureau or office
under his Department and in connection
therewith may appoint a committee or designate
an official or person who shall conduct such
investigations; . . ."and the rule in the case
of Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 452,
which upheld "the power of the Secretary of
Interior to conduct at its own initiative
investigation of charges against local elective
municipal officials and to suspend them
preventively," on the board proposition "that
under the presidential type of government which
we have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and
continued in force by paragraph 1, section 11,
Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Departments, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents

of the Chief Executive."
The executive departments of the Government of
the Philippines created and organized before the
approval of the Constitution continued to exist
as "authorized by law until the Congress shall
provide otherwise."1 Section 10, paragraph 1,
Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The
President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments
as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed." Under this
constitutional provision the President has been
invested with the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but
not of all local governments over which he has
been granted only the power of general
supervision as may be provided by law. The
Department head as agent of the President has
direct control and supervision over all bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for
in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, but he does not have the same control of
local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation
of any act or conduct of any person in the service
of any bureau or office under his department is
confined to bureaus or offices under his
jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which, as already stated, the
President exercises only general supervision as
may be provided by law. If the provisions of
section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control,
direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for the reason he may
order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the
provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII,
of the Constitution. If "general supervision over
all local governments" is to be construedas the
same power granted to the Department Head in
Code, then there would no longer be a
distinction or difference between the power of
control
and
that
of
supervision.
In
administrative
law
supervision
means
Page 8 of 104
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer

to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of
Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has
expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the
provincial governor who is authorized to "receive
and investigate complaints made under oath
against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by
final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude."2 And if the charges are serious, "he
shall submit written charges touching the matter
to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such
charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case
suspend the officer (not being the municipal
treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question." 3 Section 86
of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing
to the power of supervision to be exercised by
the Department Head over the administration of
. . . municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it
does and such additional power is the same
authority as that vested in the Department Head
by section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, then such additional power must be
deemed to have been abrogated by section 10 (1),
Article VII, of the Constitution.
In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court
held that the power of the President to remove
officials from office as provided for in section 64
(b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be
done "conformably to law;" and only for
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he
"may at any time remove a person from any
position of trust or authority under the
Government of the (Philippine Islands)
Philippines." Again, this power of removal must
be exercised conformably to law.
In the indorsement to the provincial governor

the Assistant Executive Secretary requested
immediate investigation, appropriate action and
report on the complaint indorsed to him, and
called his attention to section 2193 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides for
the institution of judicial proceedings by the
provincial fiscal upon direction of the provincial
governor. If the indorsement of the Assistant
Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of
the provincial governor to investigate the
petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent
of the Executive, but the investigation to be
conducted by him would not be that which is
provided for in sections 2188, 2189 and 2190 of
the Revised Administrative Code. The charges
preferred against the respondent are not
malfeasances or any of those enumerated or
specified in section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, because rape and
concubinage have nothing to do with the
performance of his duties as mayor nor do they
constitute or involve" neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or any other form of
maladministration of office." True, they may
involve moral turpitude, but before the
provincial governor and board may act and
proceed in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code referred to, a
conviction by final judgment must precede the
filing by the provincial governor of charges and
trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial
fiscal cannot file an information for rape without
a sworn complaint of the offended party who is
28 years of age and the crime of concubinage
cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn complaint
of the offended spouse.4 The charges preferred
against the petitioner, municipal mayor of
Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or
any of those specified in section 2188 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the investigation
of such charges by the provincial board is
unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the
petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit
is, consequently, unlawful and without authority
of law.
The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted,
without pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996]
Page 9 of 104
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ,

SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR.
NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P.
GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM,
LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S.
ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL
ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of
Local Government, HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as
Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON.
CHARITO MANUBAY, HON. VICTORINO
MIRANDA,
JR.,
HON.
ARTEMIO
ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA,
HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA
NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and
HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR.
RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as
Municipal
Treasurer,
and
ATTY.
ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as
Municipal Administrator, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Of main concern to the petitioners is
whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently
passed by Congress and signed by the President
into law, is constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners
assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720,
entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of
Santiago, mainly because the Act allegedly did
not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as mandated by Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Also,
petitioners
claim
that
the Municipality of Santiago has not met the
minimum average annual income required
under Section 450 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a

component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the
metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into
Republic Act No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An
Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
an Independent Component City to be known as
the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of
Representatives with Representative Antonio
Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors
included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor,
Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino
Dy. The bill was referred to the House
Committee on Local Government and the House
Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November
28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings
on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House
Committee on Local Government. The
committee submitted to the House a favorable
report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was
passed by the House of Representatives on
Second Reading and was approved on Third
Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28,
1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the
Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817,
Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An Act Converting
the
Municipality
of Santiago into
an
Independent] Component City to be Known as
the City of Santiago, was filed in the Senate. It
was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as
principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was
just after the House of Representatives had
conducted its first public hearing on HB No.
8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a
month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the
Senate, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB
No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee
submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No.
8817, with the recommendation that it be
Page 10 of 104
approved without amendment, taking into

consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was
on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson
T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners,
indicated his approval thereto by signing said
report as member of the Committee on Local
Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No.
378 was passed by the Senate on Second
Reading and was approved on Third Reading
on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the
House of Representatives, upon being apprised
of the action of the Senate, approved the
amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the
President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the
Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act
No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held
onJuly 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of
the conversion of Santiago into a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic
Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin
issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue
Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for purposes of its conversion into
an independent component city, and (II)
Whether or not, considering that the Senate
passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No.
8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have
originated in the House of Representatives.
I
The
annual
income
of
government unit includes the IRAs
local
---------------------------------------------------------Petitioners claim that Santiago could not

qualify into a component city because its average
annual income for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices falls below
the required annual income of Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into
Page 11 of 104
a city, petitioners having computed Santiagos

average annual income in the following manner:
prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by

the Department of Finance.2
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for

1991 P20,379,057.07
Resolution of the controversy regarding

compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with
the aforecited income requirement hinges on a
correlative and contextual explication of the
meaning of internal revenue allotments
(IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local
government unit and the principles of local
autonomy and decentralization underlying the
institutionalization
and
intensified
empowerment of the local government system.
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for

1992 P21,570,106.87
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47
By dividing the total income of Santiago for
calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting
the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at
would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991
constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid
Twenty Million Pesos average annual income
requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance of the Department of
Finance, which indicates Santiagos average
annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly
not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments
were not excluded from the computation.
Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not
actually income but transfers and! or budgetary
aid from the national government and that they
fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on
factors like population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners
asseverations are untenable because Internal
Revenue Allotments form part of the income of
Local Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be
converted into a component city, it must, among
others, have an average annual income of at least
Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant
A Local Government Unit is a political

subdivision of the State which is constituted by
law and possessed of substantial control over its
own affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not
intended, however, to be an imperium in
imperio,4 the local government unit is
autonomous in the sense that it is given more
powers,
authority,
responsibilities
and
resources.5 Power which used to be highly
centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated,
enabling especially the peripheral local
government units to develop not only at their
own pace and discretion but also with their oWn
resources and assets.6
The practical side to development through a
decentralized local government system certainly
concerns the matter of financial resources. With
its
broadened
powers
and
increased
responsibilities, a local government unit must
now operate on a much wider scale. More
extensive operations, in turn, entail more
expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty,
responsibility and accountability in every local
government unit is accompanied with a
provision for reasonably adequate resources to
discharge its powers and effectively carry out its
functions.7 Availment of such resources is
effectuated through the vesting in every local
government unit of (1) the right to create and
broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right
to be allocated a just share in national taxes,
such share being in the form of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given
its equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national
wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.8.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs

and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue
to the general fund of the local government and
are used to finance its operations subject to
specified modes of spending the same as
provided for in the Local Government Code and
its implementing rules and regulations. For
instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of
the IRAs must be set aside for local development
projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget
preparation, which budget should reflect the
estimates of the income of the local government
unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in
the national wealth utilization proceeds are
considered items of income. This is as it should
be, since income is defined in the Local
Government Code to be all revenues and receipts
collected or received forming the gross
accretions of funds of the local government
unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they
form part of the gross accretion of the funds of
the local government unit. The IRAs regularly
and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of
the local government unit.11 They thus constitute
income which the local government can
invariably rely upon as the source of much
needed funds.
For
purposes
of
converting
the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the
Department of Finance certified, among others,
that the municipality had an average annual
income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices. This, the Department of Finance
did after including the IRAs in its computation
of said average annual income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local
Government Code provides that the average
annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income. To
reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of
income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the
same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs
have a technical definition and meaning all its
own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special
Page 12 of 104
funds or transfers referred to when the Code

speaks of funding support from the national
government,
its
instrumentalities
and
government-owned-or-controlled corporations. 12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No.
359313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of
the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL
INCOME to be revenues and receipts realized by
provinces, cities and municipalities from regular
sources of the Local General Fund including the
internal revenue allotment and other
shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and
291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring
receipts, such as other national aids, grants,
financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed
assets, and similar others (Italics ours).14 Such
order,
constituting
executive
or
contemporaneous construction of a statute by an
administrative agency charged with the task of
interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to
full respect and should be accorded great weight
by the courts, unless such construction is clearly
shown to be in sharp conflict with the
Constitution, the governing statute, or other
laws.15
II
In the enactment of RA No. 7720,
there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
---------------------------------------------------------Although a bill of local application like HB
No.
8817
should,
by
constitutional
prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that
Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives
because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243,
was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it
cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in
the House of Representatives first before SB No.
1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners
themselves cannot disavow their own admission
that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18,
1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19,
1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus
precursive not only of the said Act in question
but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was

the bill that initiated the legislative process that
culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No.
7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of
the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the
circumstances attending the instant controversy.
Page 13 of 104
Senates power not only to concur with

amendments but also to propose amendments.
It would be to violate the coequality of legislative
power of the two houses of Congress and in fact
make the House superior to the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore,
petitioners
themselves
acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already
approved on Third Reading and duly
transmitted to the Senate when the Senate
Committee on Local Government conducted its
public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817
was approved on the Third Reading on
December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the
Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a
month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the
Senate Committee on Local Government
conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243.
Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action
on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817,
already approved on the Third Reading, from the
House of Representatives. The filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, does not
contravene the constitutional requirement that a
bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the
Senate does not act thereupon until it receives
the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the
case
of
Tolentino vs. Secretary
of
Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a
revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally
required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, we explained:
x x x To begin with, it is not the law-but the
revenue bill-which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. It is important to
emphasize this, because a bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in
the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of
the whole. x x x as a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a
revenue statute-and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in
the enactment of the law-must substantially be
the same as the House bill would be to deny the
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was

passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of
another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and
that what the Senate did was merely to take [H.
No. 11197] into consideration in enacting S. No.
1630. There is really no difference between the
Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the
enacting clause and then writing its own version
following the enacting clause (which, it would
seem petitioners admit is an amendment by
substitution), and, on the other hand, separately
presenting a bill of its own on the same subject
matter. In either case the result are two bills on
the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is
that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public
debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives
on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear
on the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in
the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill. x x x18
III
Every
law,
including
has
in
its
favor
of constitutionality
RA
the
No.
7720,
presumption
-------------------------------------------------------------------
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule

that on the side of every law lies the
presumption
of
constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No.
7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there
is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and
equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt.20Those who petition this court to declare
a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and
fully establish the basis that will justify such a
declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail.
Taking into consideration the justification of our
stand on the immediately preceding ground
raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court
stands on the holding that petitioners have failed
to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of
this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against
petitioners.
G.R. No. 91649
May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS
HUMBERTO
BASCO,
EDILBERTO
BALCE,
SOCRATES
MARANAN
AND
LORENZO
SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENTS
AND
GAMING
CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for
petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent
PAGCOR.
PARAS,.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR responding through
responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why,
they filed the instant petition seeking to annul
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869,
Page 14 of 104
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public

policy and order, and because
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right
prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. It waived the Manila
City government's right to impose taxes
and license fees, which is recognized by
law;
B. For the same reason stated in the
immediately preceding paragraph, the
law has intruded into the local
government's right to impose local taxes
and license fees. This, in contravention
of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause
of the constitution in that it legalizes
PAGCOR conducted gambling, while
most other forms of gambling are
outlawed, together with prostitution,
drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the
Cory
government
away
from
monopolistic and crony economy, and
toward free enterprise and privatization.
(p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners
also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the
declared national policy of the "new restored
democracy" and the people's will as expressed in
the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have
a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary
to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of
Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of
the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended
Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as
taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner
Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee
on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can
question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on
the alleged grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of
P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was
granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated
January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and
maintain gambling casinos on land or water
within the territorial jurisdiction of the

Philippines." Its operation was originally
conducted in the well known floating casino
"Philippine Tourist." The operation was
considered a success for it proved to be a
potential source of revenue to fund
infrastructure and socio-economic projects,
thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for
PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was
created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games
of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law, under the following declared
policy
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to centralize and integrate all
games of chance not heretofore
authorized by existing franchises or
permitted by law in order to attain the
following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right
and authority to operate and conduct
games of chance into one corporate
entity to be controlled, administered and
supervised by the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and
casinos, for amusement and recreation,
including
sports
gaming
pools,
(basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and
such other forms of amusement and
recreation including games of chance,
which may be allowed by law within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines
and which will: (1) generate sources of
additional
revenue
to
fund
infrastructure and socio-civic projects,
such as flood control programs,
beautification, sewerage and sewage
projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers,
Nutritional
Programs,
Population
Control and such other essential public
services; (2) create recreation and
integrated facilities which will expand
and improve the country's existing
tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if
not totally eradicate, all the evils,
malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent on the conduct and
operation of gambling clubs and casinos
Page 15 of 104
without direct government involvement.

(Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given
territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations,
inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed,
amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest
source of government revenue, next to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of
Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43
Billion, and directly remitted to the National
Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of
franchise tax, government's income share, the
President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share.
In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other sociocultural and charitable projects on its own or in
cooperation with various governmental agencies,
and
other
private
associations
and
organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation
under the present administration, PAGCOR
remitted to the government a total of P6.2
Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was
employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9)
casinos nationwide, directly supporting the
livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred
Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity
of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is
"null and void" for being "contrary to morals,
public policy and public order," monopolistic
and tends toward "crony economy", and is
violative of the equal protection clause and local
autonomy as well as for running counter to the
state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal
Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13
(Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a
searching and thorough scrutiny and the most
deliberate consideration by the Court, involving
as it does the exercise of what has been
described as "the highest and most delicate
function which belongs to the judicial
department of the government." (State v.
Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146
SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the

validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the government We need not be
reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply
ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is
presumed to be valid. Every presumption must
be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This
is not to say that We approach Our task with
diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the
legislature or the executive for that matter, has
over-stepped the limits of its authority under the
constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the
axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the
offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,
et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice
Zaldivar underscored the
. . . thoroughly established principle
which must be followed in all cases
where questions of constitutionality as
obtain in the instant cases are involved.
All presumptions are indulged in favor
of constitutionality; one who attacks a
statute alleging unconstitutionality must
prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that
if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be
upheld and the challenger must negate
all possible basis; that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy or expediency of a statute and
that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution
in
favor
of
the
constitutionality of legislation should be
adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194
N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton,
106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA
66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46
SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v.
Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30,
55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes,
125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in
Citizens
Alliance
for
Consumer
Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board,
162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue.
The respondents are questioning the legal
personality of petitioners to file the instant
petition.
Page 16 of 104
Considering however the importance to the

public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities
of procedure and has taken cognizance of this
petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA
371)
With
particular
regard
to
the
requirement of proper party as applied
in the cases before us, We hold that the
same is satisfied by the petitioners and
intervenors because each of them has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining
an immediate injury as a result of the
acts or measures complained of. And
even if, strictly speaking they are not
covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court
to waive the requirement and so remove
the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases,
ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality
of several executive orders issued by
President Quirino although they were
involving only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the
public. The Court dismissed the
objection that they were not proper
parties
and
ruled
that
"the
transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be
settled
promptly
and
definitely,
brushing aside, if we must technicalities
of procedure." We have since then
applied the exception in many other
cases. (Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will
now discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law,
is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of
gambling does not mean that the Government
cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police

power.
The concept of police power is well-established
in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v.
Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists
of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common
good. It is not capable of an exact definition but
has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
(Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies
of the times, even to anticipate the future where
it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuming the greatest
benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the
plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
charter. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental
attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been
credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary
power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The
police power of the State is a power co-extensive
with self-protection and is most aptly termed the
"law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708)
It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40
Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the
state to meet the agencies of the winds of
change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of
P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of
the government to "regulate and centralize thru
an appropriate institution all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by
law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was
subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing
gambling operations in one corporate entity
Page 17 of 104
the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the

Government but to society in general. It is a
reliable source of much needed revenue for the
cash strapped Government. It provided funds for
social impact projects and subjected gambling to
"close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and
control of the Government" (4th Whereas
Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR
and the direct intervention of the Government,
the evil practices and corruptions that go with
gambling will be minimized if not totally
eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a
waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption
clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of
local autonomy. They must be referring to
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying
any "tax of any kind or form, income or
otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. a)
Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or
form, income or otherwise as well as
fees, charges or levies of whatever
nature, whether National or Local, shall
be assessed and collected under this
franchise from the Corporation; nor
shall any form or tax or charge attach in
any way to the earnings of the
Corporation, except a franchise tax of
five (5%) percent of the gross revenues
or earnings derived by the Corporation
from its operations under this franchise.
Such tax shall be due and payable
quarterly to the National Government
and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes,
levies, fees or assessments of any kind,
nature or description, levied, established
or collected by any municipal, provincial
or national government authority
(Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without
merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal
corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City
of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v.
Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus,
"the Charter or statute must plainly show an

intent to confer that power or the municipality
cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12
SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must
always yield to a legislative act which is superior
having been passed upon by the state itself
which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas,
the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol.
1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to
control by Congress. It should be stressed that
"municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909,
January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create
and abolish municipal corporations" due to its
"general legislative powers" (Asuncion v.
Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5
SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power
of control over Local governments (Hebron v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the power
to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license
fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As
early as 1975, the power of local governments to
regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise,
licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No.
771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the authority
of chartered cities and other local
governments to issue license, permit or
other form of franchise to operate,
maintain and establish horse and dog
race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of
gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or
franchises to operate, maintain and
establish, horse and dog race tracks, jaialai and other forms of gambling shall
be issued by the national government
upon proper application and verification
of the qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has
the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the
operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to
demand or collect license fees which is a
consequence of the issuance of "licenses or
Page 18 of 104
permits" is no longer vested in the City of

Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, PD 1869.
All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
National Government. In addition to its
corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it
also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The
Corporation shall maintain a Registry of
the affiliated entities, and shall exercise
all the powers, authority and the
responsibilities vested in the Securities
and Exchange Commission over such
affiliating entities mentioned under the
preceding section, including, but not
limited to amendments of Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in
corporate term, structure, capitalization
and other matters concerning the
operation of the affiliated entities, the
provisions of the Corporation Code of
the Philippines to the contrary
notwithstanding, except only with
respect to original incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to
regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of
an agency or instrumentality of the Government.
Being an instrumentality of the Government,
PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from
local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a
mere Local government.
The states have no power by taxation or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or
in any manner control the operation of
constitutional laws enacted by Congress
to carry into execution the powers
vested in the federal government. (MC
Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L
Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of
the
National
Government
over
local
governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Supreme Court, made reference to the

entire absence of power on the part of
the States to touch, in that way
(taxation) at least, the instrumentalities
of the United States (Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be
agreed that no state or political
subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to
prevent it from consummating its
federal responsibilities, or even to
seriously
burden
it
in
the
accomplishment of them. (Antieau,
Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p.
140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat

National policies thru extermination of what
local authorities may perceive to be undesirable
activities or enterprise using the power to tax as
"a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US
42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice
Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch
v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat
an instrumentality or creation of the very entity
which has the inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local
Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be
violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless
argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on
Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall
have the power to create its own source
of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
other charges subject to such guidelines
and limitation as the congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy
on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the
local government. (emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes
and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869
remains an "operative" law until "amended,
repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as
an exception to the exercise of the power of local
governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot
therefore be violative but rather is consistent
with the principle of local autonomy.
Page 19 of 104
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under

the
1987
Constitution
simply
means
"decentralization" (III Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as
cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p.
374). It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an "imperium in
imperio."
Local Government has been described as
a political subdivision of a nation or
state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs. In a
unitary system of government, such as
the government under the Philippine
Constitution, local governments can
only be an intra sovereign subdivision
of one sovereign nation, it cannot be
an imperium in imperio.
Local
government in such a system can only
mean a measure of decentralization of
the function of government. (emphasis
supplied)
As to what state powers should be
"decentralized" and what may be delegated to
local government units remains a matter of
policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a
political question. (Citizens Alliance for
Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory
Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating,
taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a
State concern and hence, it is the sole
prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it
to local governments.
As gambling is
usually
an offense
against the State, legislative grant or
express charter power is generally
necessary to empower the local
corporation to deal with the subject. . . .
In the absence of express grant of power
to enact, ordinance provisions on this
subject which are inconsistent with the
state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden,
Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon,
9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re
Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am
St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc
Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates

the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
because "it legalized PAGCOR conducted
gambling, while most gambling are outlawed
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this
contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the
well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal
protection of the laws." The clause does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155).
A law does not have to operate in equal force on
all persons or things to be conformable to Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San
Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit
the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The
Constitution does not require situations which
are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same (Gomez v.
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling
conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in the
petition. The mere fact that some gambling
activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse
racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as
amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not
render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one,
unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where
it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
because there are other instances to
which it might have been applied.
(Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the
14th Amendment does not mean that all
occupations called by the same name
must be treated the same way; the state
may do what it can to prevent which is
deemed as evil and stop short of those
cases in which harm to the few
concerned is not less than the harm to
Page 20 of 104
the public that would insure if the rule

laid down were made mathematically
exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249
US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary
to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government
away from monopolies and crony economy and
toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice
it to state that this is not a ground for this Court
to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs
counter to the government's policies then it is for
the Executive Department to recommend to
Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what
the law is and not what the law should
be.1wphi1 Under our system of
government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of
government and of the people
themselves as the repository of all state
power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170
SCRA 256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the
Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or
prohibit monopolies when public
interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition
shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National
Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is
worded, monopolies are not necessarily
prohibited by the Constitution. The state must
still decide whether public interest demands that
monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again,
this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to
decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates
Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and
13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are
merely statements of principles and, policies. As
such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to
clearly define and effectuate such principles.
Page 21 of 104
In general, therefore, the 1935

provisions were not intended to be selfexecuting
principles
ready
for
enforcement through the courts. They
were rather directives addressed to the
executive and the legislature. If the
executive and the legislature failed to
heed the directives of the articles the
available remedy was not judicial or
political. The electorate could express
their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the
language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II,
p. 2)
speculate and to imagine how the

assailed legislation may possibly offend
some provision of the Constitution. The
Court notes, further, in this respect that
petitioners have in the main put in
question the wisdom, justice and
expediency of the establishment of the
OPSF, issues which are not properly
addressed to this Court and which this
Court may not constitutionally pass
upon. Those issues should be addressed
rather to the political departments of
government: the President and the
Congress.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of

constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47
Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734;
Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v.
Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869
to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a
clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and
equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish
the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their
petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised
by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality
of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The
dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable.
But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise
legislation considering the issues of "morality,
monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization
as well as the state principles on social justice,
role of youth and educational values" being
raised, is up for Congress to determine.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling

is generally immoral, and this is precisely so
when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This
excessiveness necessarily depends not only on
the financial resources of the gambler and his
family but also on his mental, social, and
spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact
that some persons may have lost their material
fortunes, mental control, physical health, or
even their lives does not necessarily mean that
the same are directly attributable to
gambling. Gambling may have been the
antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the
cause. For the same consequences could have
been preceded by an overdose of food, drink,
exercise, work, and even sex.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for

Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory
Board, 162 SCRA 521
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as
amended by Executive Order No. 137
has, in any case, in its favor the
presumption
of
validity
and
constitutionality
which
petitioners
Valmonte and the KMU have not
overturned. Petitioners have not
undertaken to identify the provisions in
the Constitution which they claim to
have been violated by that statute. This
Court, however, is not compelled to
United States Supreme Court

VILAS v. CITY OF MANILA, (1911)
No. 53
Argued:
Decided: April 3, 1911
[220 U.S. 345, 346] Messrs. Frederic R.

Coudert, Howard Thayer Kingsbury, Paul Fuller,
and Harry Weston Van Dyke for plaintiffs in
error and appellants.
[220 U.S. 345, 349] Messrs. Paul Charlton
andIsaac Adams for appellee.
[220 U.S. 345, 351]
Mr. Justice Lurton delivered the opinion of the
court:
The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below,
are creditors of the city of Manila as it existed
before the cession of the Philippine Islands to
the United States by the treaty of Paris,
December 10, 1898 [30 Stat. at L. 1754]. Upon
the theory that the city, under its present charter
from the government of the Philippine Islands,

is the same juristic person and liable upon the
obligations of the old city, these actions were
brought against it. The supreme court of the
Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the
present municipality is a totally different
corporate entity, and in no way liable for the
debts of the Spanish municipality. [220 U.S.
345, 352] The fundamental question is whether,
notwithstanding the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the United States, followed by a
reincorporation of the city, the present
municipality is liable for the obligations of the
city incurred prior to the cession to the United
States.
We shall confine ourselves to the question
whether the plaintiffs in error are entitled to
judgments against the city upon their several
claims. Whether there is a remedy adequate to
the collection when reduced to judgment is not
presented by the record. But whether there is or
is not a remedy affords no reason why the
plaintiffs in error may not reduce their claims to
judgment. Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S.
514, 530 , 25 S. L. ed. 699, 703. The city
confessedly may be sued under its existing
charter, and that implies at least a right to
judgment if they establish their demands.
The city as now incorporated has succeeded to
all of the property rights of the old city and to
the right to enforce all of its causes of action.
There is identity of purpose between the Spanish
and American charters and substantial identity
of municipal powers. The area and the
inhabitants incorporated are substantially the
same. But for the change of sovereignty which
has occurred under the treaty of Paris, the
question of the liability of the city under its new
charter for the debts of the old city would seem
to be of easy solution. The principal question
would therefore seem to be the legal
consequence of the cession referred to upon the
property rights and civil obligations of the city
incurred before the cession. And so the question
was made to turn in the court below upon the
consequence of a change in sovereignty and a
reincorporation of the city by the substituted
sovereignty.
This disposes of the question of the jurisdiction
of this court, grounded upon the absence from
the petition of the plaintiffs of any distinct claim
under the treaty of Paris, since, under 10 of the
Philippine organic act [220 U.S. 345, 353] of
Page 22 of 104
July 1, 1902 [32 Stat. at L. 695, chap. 1369, U. S.

Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 226], this court is
given jurisdiction to review any final decree or
judgment of the supreme court of the Philippine
Islands where any treaty of the United States 'is
involved.' That treaty was necessarily 'involved,'
since neither the court below nor this court can
determine the continuity of the municipality nor
the liability of the city as it now exists for the
obligation of the old city, without considering
the effect of the change of sovereignty resulting
from that treaty. See Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U.S.
16, 22 , 54 S. L. ed. 72, 75, 30 Sup. Ct. rep. 1.
The historical continuity of a municipality
embracing the inhabitants of the territory now
occupied by the city of Manila is impressive.
Before the conquest of the Philippine Islands by
Spain, Manila existed. The Spaniards found on
the spot now occupied a populous and fortified
community of Moros. In 1571 they occupied
what was then and is now known as Manila, and
established it as a municipal corporation. In
1574 there was conferred upon it the title of
'Illustrious and ever loyal city of Manila.' From
time to time there occurred amendments, and,
on January 19, 1894, there was a reorganization
of the city government under a royal decree of
that date. Under that charter there was power to
incur debts for municipal purposes and power to
sue and be sued. The obligations here in suit
were incurred under the charter referred to, and
are obviously obligations strictly within the
provision of the municipal power. To pay
judgments upon such debts it was the duty of the
ayuntamiento of Manila, which was the
corporate name of the old city, to make
provision in its budget.
The contention that the liability of the city upon
such obligations was destroyed by a mere change
of sovereignty is obviously one which is without
a shadow of moral force, and, if true, must result
from settled principles of rigid law. While the
contracts from which the claims in suit resulted
were in progress, war between the United[220
U.S. 345, 354] States and Spain ensued. On
August 13, 1898, the city was occupied by the
forces of this government, and its affairs
conducted by military authority. On July 31,
1901, the present incorporating act was passed,
and the city since that time has been an
autonomous municipality. The charter in force is
act 183 of the Philippine Commission, and now
may be found as chapters 68 to 75 of the
compiled acts of the Philippine Commission. The
1st section of the charter of 1901 reads as

follows:
'The inhabitants of the city of Manila, residing
within the territory described in 2 of this act, are
hereby constituted a municipality, which shall be
known as the city of Manila, and by that name
shall have perpetual succession, and shall
possess all the rights of property herein granted
or heretofore enjoyed and possessed by the city
of Manila as organized under Spanish
sovereignty.'
The boundaries described in 2 include
substantially the area and inhabitants which had
theretofore constituted the old city.
By 4 of the same act, the government of the city
was invested in a municipal board.
Section 16 grants certain legislative powers to
the board, and provides that it shall 'take
possession of all lands, buildings, offices, books,
papers, records, moneys, credits, securities,
assets, accounts, or other property or rights
belonging to the former city of Manila, or
pertaining to the business or interests thereof,
and, subject to the provisions herein set forth,
shall have control of all its property except the
building known as the ayuntamiento, provision
for the occupation and control of which is made
in 15 of this act; shall collect taxes and other
revenues, and apply the same in accordance with
appropriations, as hereinbefore provided, to the
payment of the municipal expenses; shall
supervise and control the discharge of official
duties by subordinates; shall institute judicial
proceedings to recover property and [220 U.S.
345, 355] funds of the city wherever found, or
otherwise to protect the interests of the city, and
shall defend all suits against the city,' etc.
Section 69 of the charter expressly preserved 'all
city ordinances and orders in force at the time of
the passage of this act, and not inconsistent
herewith,' until modified or repealed by
ordinances passed under this act.
Section 72 is the repealing clause, and provides
for the repeal of 'all acts, orders, and regulations'
which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
act.
The charter contains no reference to the
obligations or contracts of the old city.
Page 23 of 104
If we understand the argument against the

liability here asserted, it proceeds mainly upon
the theory that inasmuch as the predecessor of
the present city, the ayuntamiento of Manila,
was a corporate entity created by the Spanish
government, when the sovereignty of Spain in
the islands was terminated by the treaty of
cession, if not by the capitulation of August 13,
1898, the municipality ipso facto disappeared for
all purposes. This conclusion is reached upon
the supposed analogy to the doctrine of principal
and agent, the death of the principal ending the
agency. So complete is the supposed death and
annihilation of a municipal entity by extinction
of sovereignty of the creating state that it was
said in one of the opinions below that all of the
public property of Manila passed to the United
States, 'for a consideration, which was paid,' and
that the United States was therefore justified in
creating an absolutely new municipality, and
endowing it with all of the assets of the defunct
city, free from any obligation to the creditors of
that city. And so the matter was dismissed in the
Trigas Case by the court of first instance, by the
suggestion that 'the plaintiff may have a claim
against the Crown of Spain, which has received
from the United States payment for that done by
the plaintiff.' [220 U.S. 345, 356] We are unable
to agree with the argument. It loses sight of the
dual character of municipal corporations. They
exercise powers which are governmental and
powers which are of a private or business
character. In the one character a municipal
corporation is a governmental subdivision, and
for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of
the sovereignty of the state. In the other
character it is a mere legal entity or juristic
person. In the latter character it stands for the
community in the administration of local affairs
wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes
for which its governmental powers are
conferred.
The distinction is observed in South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437, 461 , 50 S. L. ed.
261, 269, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 A. & E. Ann.
Cas. 737, where Lloyd v. New York, 5 N. Y. 369,
374, 55 Am. Dec. 347, and Western Sav. Fund
Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175, 72 Am. Dec. 730,
are cited and approved. In Lloyd v. New York,
supra, it is said:
'The corporation of the city
possesses two kinds of
governmental and public, and to
are held and exercised, is
of New York
powers: one
the extent they
clothed with
sovereignty; the other private, and to the extent

they are held and exercised, is a legal individual.
The former are given and used for public
purposes, the latter for private purposes. While
in the exercise of the former, the corporation is a
municipal government; and while in the exercise
of the latter, is a corporate legal individual.'
See also Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. 66; Petersburg
v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321, 343, 26 Am. Rep.
357, and Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 3
Am. Rep. 485.
In view of the dual character of municipal
corporations there is no public reason for
presuming their total dissolution as a mere
consequence of military occupation or territorial
cession. The suspension of such governmental
functions as are obviously incompatible with the
new political relations thus brought about may
be presumed. [220 U.S. 345, 357] But no such
implication may be reasonably indulged beyond
that result.
Such a conclusion is in harmony with the settled
principles of public law as declared by this and
other courts and expounded by the text-books
upon the laws of war and international law.
Taylor, International Pub. Law , 578.
That there is a total abrogation of the former
political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded
region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in
force which are in confiict with the political
character, constitution, or institutions of the
substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also
plain. Alvarez y Sanchez v. United States, 216
U.S. 167 , 54 L. ed. 432, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367.
But it is equally settled in the same public law
that that great body of municipal law which
regulates private and domestic rights continues
in force until abrogated or changed by the new
ruler. In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v.
McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 , 29 S. L. ed. 270,
271, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1005, it was said:
'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and
acted upon by the United States, that whenever
political jurisdiction and legislative power over
any territory are transferred from one nation or
sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the
country, that is, laws which are intended for the
protection of private rights, continue in force
until abrogated or changed by the new
government or sovereign. By the cession, public
property passes from one government to the
other, but private property remains as before,
Page 24 of 104
and with it those municipal laws which are

designed to secure its peaceful use and
enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws,
ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the
political character, institutions, and constitution
of the new government are at once displaced.
Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and
legislative power-and the latter is involved in the
former-to the United States, the laws of the
country in support of an established religion, or
abridging the freedom of the [220 U.S. 345,
358] press, or authorizing cruel and unusual
punishments, and the like, would at once cease
to be of obligatory force without any declaration
to that effect; and the laws of the country on
other subjects would necessarily be superseded
by existing laws of the new government upon the
same matters. But with respect to other laws
affecting the possession, use, and transfer of
property, and designed to secure good order and
peace in the community, and promote its health
and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal
character, the rule is general, that a change of
government leaves them in force until, by direct
action of the new government, they are altered
or repealed.'
The above language was quoted with approval in
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 298 , 45 S. L.
ed. 1088, 1110, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770.
That the United States might, by virtue of its
situation under a treaty ceding full title, have
utterly extinguished every municipality which it
found in existence in the Philippine Islands, may
be conceded. That it did so, in view of the
practice of nations to the contrary, is not to be
presumed, and can only be established by cogent
evidence.
That during military occupation the affairs of the
city were in a large part administered by officials
put in place by military order did not operate to
dissolve the corporation, or relieve it from
liability upon obligations incurred before the
occupation, nor those created for municipal
purposes by the administrators of its affairs
while its old officials were displaced. New
Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co. 20 Wall. 387,
394, 22 L. ed. 354, 358. During that occupation
and military administration the business of the
city was carried on as usual. Taxes were assessed
and taxes collected and expended for local
purposes, and many of the officials carrying on
the government were those found in office when
the city was occupied. The continuity of the
corporate city was not inconsistent with military
occupation or the constitution or institutions of

the occupying power. This [220 U.S. 345,
359] is made evident by the occurrences at the
time of capitulation. Thus, the articles of
capitulation concluded in these words: 'This city,
its inhabitants, . . . and its private property of all
descriptions, are placed under the special
safeguard of the faith and honor of the American
Army.' This was quoted in President McKinley's
instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Philippine
Commission, and touching this he said: 'I believe
that this pledge has been faithfully kept.' And the
commission was directed to labor for the full
performance of this obligation. This instruction
was in line with and in fulfilment of the 8th
article of the treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898. Under the 3d article of that treaty the
archipelago known as the Philippine Islands was
ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to
pay to Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the
first paragraph of the 8th article, Spain
relinquished to the United States 'all the
buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures,
public highways, and other immovable property
which, in conformity with law, belong to the
public domain, and as such belong to the Crown
of Spain.' It is under this clause, in connection
with the clause agreeing to pay to Spain
$20,000,000 for the cession of the Philippine
group, that the contention that all of the public
rights of the city of Manila were acquired by the
United States, which country was therefore
justified, as absolute owner, in granting the
property rights so acquired to what is called the
'absolutely new corporation' created thereafter.
But the qualifying words touching property
rights relinquished by Spain limit the
relinquishment
to
'property
which,
in
conformity with law, belonging to the public
domain, and as such belong to the Crown of
Spain.' It did not affect property which did not,
in 'conformity with law, belong to the Crown of
Spain.' That it was not intended to apply to
property which, 'in conformity with law,'
belonged to the city of Manila as a municipal
cor- [220 U.S. 345, 360] poration, is clear. This
is demonstrated by the second paragraph of the
same article, which reads: 'And it is hereby
declared that the relinquishment or cession, as
the case may be, to which the preceding
paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair
the property or rights which by law belong to the
peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of
provinces, municipalities, public or private
establishments . . . having legal capacity to
acquire and possess property in the aforesaid
Page 25 of 104
territories renounced or ceded, or of private

individuals.' Thus, the property and property
rights of municipal corporations were protected
and safeguarded precisely as were the property
and property rights of individuals.
That the cession did not operate as an extinction
or dissolution of corporations is herein
recognized, for the stipulation against
impairment of their property rights has this
plain significance.
The conclusion we reach, that the legal entity
survived both the military occupation and the
cession which followed, finds support in the
cases which hold that the Pueblos of San
Francisco and Los Angeles, which existed as
municipal organizations prior to the cession of
California by Mexico, continued to exist with
their community and property rights intact.
Cohas v. Raisin, 3 Cal. 443; Hart v. Burnett, 15
Cal. 530; Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326, 18 L.
ed. 547; Merryman v. Bourne, 9 Wall. 592, 602,
19 L. ed. 683, 686; Moore v. Steinbach, 127 U.S.
70 , 32 L. ed. 51, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1067; Los
Angeles Farming & Mill. Co. v. Los Angeles, 217
U.S. 217 , 54 L. ed. 736, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452.
Were corporate identity and corporate liability
extinguished as a necessary legal result of the
new charter granted in 1901 by the Philippine
Commission? The inhabitants of the old city are
the incorporators of the new. There is
substantially identity of area. There are some
changes in the form of government and some
changes in corporate powers and methods of
administration. the new corporation is endowed
with all of the property and[220 U.S. 345,
361] property rights of the old. It has the same
power to sue and be sued which the former
corporation had. There is not the slightest
suggestion that the new corporation shall not
succeed to the contracts and obligations of the
old corporation. Laying out of view any question
of
the
constitutional
guaranty
against
impairment of the obligation of contracts, there
is, in the absence of express legislative
declaration of a contrary purpose, no reason for
supposing that the reincorporation of an old
municipality is intended to permit an escape
from the obligations of the old, to whose
property and rights it has succeeded. The juristic
identity of the corporation has been in no wise
affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every
legal sense, the successor of the old. As such it is
entitled to the property and property rights of
the predecessor corporation, and is, in law,

subject to all of its liabilities. Broughton v.
Pensacola 93 U.S. 266 , 23 L. ed. 896; Mt.
Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 520 , 25 L. ed.
699; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 , 29 L. ed.
620, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398; Shapleigh v. San
Angelo, 167 U.S. 646, 655 , 42 S. L. ed. 310, 313,
17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 957; O'Connor v. Memphis, 6
Lea, 730; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866,
1870, in which case, when a municipality
became disabled to act and obtained a new
charter, in an action upon an obligation of the
old corporation, there was judgment for the
creditor, Lord Mansfield saying:
'Many corporations, for want of legal
magistrates, have lost their activity, and
obtained new charters. Maidstone, Radnor,
Carmarthen, and many more are in the same
case with Colchester. And yet it has never been
disputed but that the new charters revive and
give activity to the old corporation; except,
perhaps, in that case in Levinz, where the
corporation had a new name; and even there the
court made no doubt. Where the question has
arisen upon any remarkable metamorphosis, it
has always been determined 'that they remain
the same as to debts and rights."
Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728, 730. [220 U.S. 345,
362] In Shapleigh v. San Angelo, supra, this
court said in a similar case:
'The state's plenary power over its municipal
corporations to change their organization, to
modify their method of internal government, or
to abolish them altogether, is not restricted by
contracts entered into by the municipality with
its creditors or with private parties. An absolute
repeal of a municipal charter is therefor effectual
so far as it abolishes the old corporate
organization; but when the same or substantially
the same inhabitants are erected into a new
corporation, whether with extended or restricted
territorial limits, such new corporation is treated
as in law the successor of the old one, entitled to
its property rights, and subject to its liabilities.'
The cases of Trigas and Vilas went off upon
demurrers, and no question of remedy arises
here.
The appeal of Aguado is from a decree upon a
final hearing denying him all relief.
That all three of the plaintiffs in error are
entitled to proceed to judgment when they shall
establish their several claims is obvious from
Page 26 of 104
what we have said. But in the Aguado Case it is

sought to establish his claim as a charge against
certain property and funds held by the city as
trustee, known as the Carriedo fund. In 1734 one
Don Francisco Carriedo y Perodo bequeathed to
the city a fund for the establishment of
waterworks, to be kept as a separate fund and
devoted to the erection and maintenance of the
works. This fund was loyally kept and greatly
increased, and was enlarged by a special tax
upon meat, devoted to that purpose. The works
were finally completed in 1878, and have been
since operated by the city, the income and
special tax going to maintenance. Certain
securities belonging to the fund are now held by
the city, the income being applied to the
operation of the works. Aguado took a contract
to supply coal for the use of the [220 U.S. 345,
363] Carriedo works, and made a deposit to
guarantee the contract. When the city was
occupied by the American Army it was indebted
to him for coal so supplied, as well as for the
deposit so made. That the coal was bought for
and used in the operation of the Carriedo works
is not denied. But there is no evidence that the
credit was given to the Carriedo fund so held in
trust under the will of Carriedo. The contract
was made with the ayuntamiento of Manila, just
as all other contracts for city supplies or works
were made. The contract not having been made
with special reference to the liability of the fund
held in trust by the city, but apparently upon the
general credit of the city, we are not disposed to
reverse the judgment of the court below, holding
that the claim of Aguado did not constitute a
charge upon the Carriedo fund.
Aguado is, nevertheless, entitled to a judgment.
The designation of the city in the petition as
trustee may be regarded as descriptive. The debt
having been incurred by the city, it must be
regarded as a city liability. Taylor v. Davis
(Taylor v. Mayo), 110 U.S. 330, 336 , 28 S. L. ed.
163, 165, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147.
Our conclusion is that the decree in the Aguado
Case must be reversed and the case remanded,
with direction to render judgment and such
other relief as may seem in conformity with law.
The judgments in the Trigas and Vilas Cases will
be reversed and the cases remanded, with
direction to overrule the respective demurrers,
and for such other action as may be consistent
with law, and consistent with this opinion.
G.R. No. L-28089
October 25, 1967
BARA
LIDASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay
for
Barrios and Fule for respondent.
petitioner.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the
Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic
Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios
located in another province Cotabato to be
spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that "No bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative.
Offshoot is the present original petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed
into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act
4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute,
reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum,
Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan,
Magabo,
Tabangao,
Tiongko,
Colodan,
Kabamakawan,
Kapatagan,
Bongabong,
Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung, in the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated
from said municipalities and constituted
into a distinct and independent
municipality of the same province to be
known as the Municipality of Dianaton,
Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of
government of the municipality shall be
in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and
councilors of the new municipality shall
be elected in the nineteen hundred sixtyseven general elections for local officials.
Page 27 of 104
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its

approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and
Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon,Province of Cotabato,
and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel
of another municipality, the municipality
of Parang, also in theProvince of Cotabato and
not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec
adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the
pertinent portions of which are:
For purposes of establishment of
precincts, registration of voters and for
other
election
purposes,
the
Commission RESOLVED that pursuant
to RA 4790, the new municipality of
Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise
the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung,
Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung
situated in the municipality of
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of
Togaig and Madalum situated in the
municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the
barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan
situated in the municipality of Parang,
also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios
in two municipalities in the province of
Cotabato are transferred to the province of
Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in
the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7,
1967, the Office of the President, through the
Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to
Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until "clarified by correcting
legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967,
stood by its own interpretation, declared that the
statute "should be implemented unless declared

unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for
certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a
resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of
Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the
1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790
be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's
resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September
20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral
purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional
requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that
the constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration,
under
one
statute,
of
heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of
the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The
subject of the statute must be "expressed in the
title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement
"breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance
is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.
In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read
from its introduction to its final approval in the
House of Representatives4 where the bill, being
of local application, originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and
the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its
Page 28 of 104
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into

the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus,
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the
title of a statute conforms with the constitutional
requirement, the following, we believe, may be
taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is
whether or not it is misleading; and,
which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be
stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that
the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular

title its substance rather than its form
should be considered, and the purpose
of the constitutional requirement, of
giving notice to all persons interested,
should be kept in mind by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a
hard look at the disputed statute. The title "An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the
Province of Lanao del Sur"8 projects the
impression that solely the province of Lanao del
Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not
the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del
Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao
del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the
known fact is that the legislation has a twopronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it
creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig
and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del

Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different
from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here
presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as
to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise
the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away
from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill.
These are the pressures which heavily weigh
against the constitutionality of Republic Act
4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in
boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the
substantial diminution of territorial limits" of
Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal
results of the definition of the boundary" of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore,
reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato
are taken away "need not be expressed in the
title of the law." This posture we must say
but emphasizes the error of constitutional
dimensions in writing down the title of the bill.
Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from
one province to another of necessity involves
reduction of area, population and income of the
first and the corresponding increase of those of
the other. This is as important as the creation of
a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect
this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here.
The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the
title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An
Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That
title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the
averment that the provisions of the law (Section,
8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of
the provinces thus created, were not set forth in
the title of the bill. We there ruled that this
pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act
creating said provinces must be expected to
Page 29 of 104
provide for the officers who shall run the affairs

thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the
subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title.
The statute now before us stands altogether on a
different footing. The lumping together of
barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under
one statute is neither a natural nor logical
consequence of the creation of the new
municipality of Dianaton. A change of
boundaries of the two provinces may be made
without necessarily creating a new municipality
and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our
attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of
Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute
in controversy bears the title "An Act to
Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the
County of Muskegon." The statute, however, in
its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of
Michigan enact, that the following described
territory in the counties of Muskegon and
Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is
hereby constituted a village corporate, by the
name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute
was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of
Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the
Village from exercising jurisdiction and control,
including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his
claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan
State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall
embrace more than one object, which shall be
expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree
voided the statute and defendant appealed. The
Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the
decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume,
may well apply to this case:
It may be that words, "An act to
incorporate the village of Fruitport,"
would have been a sufficient title, and
that the words, "in the county of
Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do
not agree with appellant that the words
last quoted may, for that reason, be
disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding
surplusage, a court cannot reject a part
of the title of an act for the purpose of
saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56
N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.

A purpose of the provision of the
Constitution is to "challenge the
attention of those affected by the act to
its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of
Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts
the operation of the act of Muskegon
county. The act goes beyond the
restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs.
Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in
the worst degree, for it is misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of

political subdivisions, which legislative purpose
is not expressed in the title, were likewise
declared unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790
may still be salvaged with reference to the nine
barrios in the municipalities of Butig and
Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere
nullification of the portion thereof which took
away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of
Buldon and Parang in the other province of
Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the
limited title of the Act still covers those barrios
actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on
reason and of long standing, that where a
portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional
and the remainder valid, the parts will be
separated, and the constitutional portion
upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to
this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are
so mutually dependent and connected,
as
conditions,
considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each
other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole,
and that if all could not be carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then, if some
parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent,
Page 30 of 104
conditional, or connected, must fall with

them,11
In substantially similar language, the same
exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of
this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a
statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic Law, while another part is valid,
the valid portion if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. But
in order to do this, the valid portion
must be so far independent of the
invalid portion that it is fair to presume
that the Legislature would have
enacted it by itself if they had supposed
that they could not constitutionally
enact the other. . . Enough must remain
to make a complete, intelligible, and
valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. . . . The language used
in the invalid part of the statute can
have no legal force or efficacy for any
purpose whatever, and what remains
must express the legislative will
independently of the void part, since the
court has no power to legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that
Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the
restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the
town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the
towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to
be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in
the negative.
Municipal
corporations
perform
twin
functions. Firstly.
They
serve
as
an
instrumentality of the State in carrying out the
functions of government. Secondly. They act as
an agency of the community in the
administration of local affairs. It is in the latter
character that they are a separate entity acting
for their own purposes and not a subdivision of
the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in
the consideration of whether a group of barrios
is capable of maintaining itself as an
independent municipality. Amongst these are
population, territory, and income. It was

apparently these same factors which induced the
writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town
of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twentyone
barrios which
comprise
the
new
municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill
1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive
community; the aggregate population is
large; and the collective income is
sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable
the inhabitants concerned to govern
themselves and enjoy the blessings of
municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in
Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the
twenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in
the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is
so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill
itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the
seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a
barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato.
And then the reduced area poses a number of
questions, thus: Could the observations as to
progressive
community,
large
aggregate
population, collective income sufficient to
maintain an independent municipality, still
apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out
of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the
inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would
have agreed that they be formed into a
municipality, what with the consequent duties
and liabilities of an independent municipal
corporation? Could they stand on their own feet
with the income to be derived in their
community? How about the peace and order,
sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This
Court may not supply the answer to any of these
disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to
these problems, or to answer them in the
negative and still cling to the rule on
separability, we are afraid, is to impute to
Congress an undeclared will. With the known
premise that Dianaton was created upon the
basic considerations of progressive community,
large aggregate population and sufficient
income, we may not now say that Congress
Page 31 of 104
intended to create Dianaton with only nine of

the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured. For, this
unduly stretches judicial interpretation of
congressional intent beyond credibility point. To
do so, indeed, is to pass the line which
circumscribes the judiciary and tread on
legislative premises. Paying due respect to the
traditional separation of powers, we may not
now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a
Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally
intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these
nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is
the function of Congress, not of this Court, to
spell out that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is
accordingly null and void in its totality.14
3. There remains for consideration the issue
raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner
has no substantial legal interest adversely
affected by the implementation of Republic Act
4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is
that petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the
ground that it violates the constitutional
requirement that the subject of the bill be
expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore,
hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights
or interests are impaired by lack of notification
in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato,
where he is residing has been transferred to a
different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a
community affected by legislation creating a
town to ascertain that the law so created is not
dismembering his place of residence "in
accordance with the Constitution" is recognized
in this jurisdiction.15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote
in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own
barrio before it was annexed to a new town is
affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to
vote in a town different from his actual
residence. He may not desire to be considered a
part of hitherto different communities which are
fanned into the new town; he may prefer to
remain in the place where he is and as it was
constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and

benefits he acquired therein. He may not even
know the candidates of the new town; he may
express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of
them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for
the officials in the town before dismemberment.
Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a
bill must be shown in its title for the benefit,
amongst others, of the community affected
thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when
the constitutional right to vote on the part of any
citizen of that community is affected, he may
become
a
suitor
to
challenge
the
constitutionality of the Act as passed by
Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare
Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit
respondent Commission from implementing the
same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002]
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
represented by HON. HEHERSON
T. ALVAREZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), CLARENCE
L. BAGUILAT, in his capacity as
the Regional Executive Director of
DENR-Region XI and ENGR.
BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his
capacity as the Regional Director
of the DENR-ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT BUREAU (DENREMB), Region XI, petitioners, vs.
THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented
by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN,
City Mayor, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review [1] on
certiorari assailing the decision[2] dated May 28,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 33, which granted the writ of mandamus
Page 32 of 104
and injunction in favor of respondent, the City of

Davao, and against petitioner, the Republic,
represented by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). The trial court
also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of
Non-Coverage in favor of respondent.
The antecedent facts of the case are as
follows:
On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an
application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City
Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental
Management
Bureau
(EMB),
Region
XI. Attached to the application were the required
documents for its issuance, namely, a) detailed
location map of the project site; b) brief project
description; and c) a certification from the City
Planning and Development Office that the
project is not located in an environmentally
critical area (ECA). The EMB Region XI denied
the application after finding that the proposed
project was within an environmentally critical
area and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2,
Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise known
as the Environmental Impact Statement System,
in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No, 1151, also known as the Philippine
Environment Policy, the City of Davao must
undergo the environmental impact assessment
(EIA) process to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can
proceed with the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate
of Non-Coverage, respondent filed a petition for
mandamus and injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Davao, docketed as Civil Case No.
28,133-2000. It alleged that its proposed project
was neither an environmentally critical project
nor within an environmentally critical area; thus
it was outside the scope of the EIS
system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the
DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a
CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of
the required documents.
The Regional Trial Court rendered
judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be

meritorious, judgment granting the writ of
mandamus and injunction is hereby rendered in
favor of the petitioner City of Davao and against
respondents Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and the other respondents
by:
1) directing the respondents to issue in favor of
the petitioner City of Davao a Certificate of NonCoverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1586 and related laws, in connection with the
construction by the City of Davao of the Artica
Sports Dome;
2) making the preliminary injunction issued on
December 12, 2000 permanent.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The trial court ratiocinated that there is
nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and
Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing
guidelines for compliance with the EIA system),
which requires local government units (LGUs) to
comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and
instrumentalities of the national government,
including government owned or controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations,
firms and entities are mandated to go through
the EIA process for their proposed projects
which have significant effect on the quality of the
environment. A local government unit, not being
an agency or instrumentality of the National
Government, is deemed excluded under the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The trial court also declared, based on the
certifications
of
the
DENR-Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from the
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the
Artica Sports Dome was not within an
environmentally critical area. Neither was the
project an environmentally critical one. It
therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR,
through the EMB Region XI, to approve
respondents application for CNC after it has
Page 33 of 104
satisfied all the requirements for its

issuance. Accordingly,
petitioner
can
be
compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue the
CNC, if it refuses to do so.
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration, however, the same was
denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.
With
the
supervening
change
of
administration, respondent, in lieu of a
comment, filed a manifestation expressing its
agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs
to secure an ECC for its proposed project. It thus
rendered the instant petition moot and
academic. However, for the guidance of the
implementors of the EIS law and pursuant to
our symbolic function to educate the bench and
bar,[4] we are inclined to address the issue raised
in this petition.
Section 15 of Republic Act 7160, [5] otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, defines a
local government unit as a body politic and
corporate endowed with powers to be exercised
by it in conformity with law. As such, it performs
dual functions, governmental and proprietary.
Governmental functions are those that concern
the health, safety and the advancement of the
public good or welfare as affecting the public
generally.[6] Proprietary functions are those that
seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn
pecuniary profit and intended for private
advantage and benefit.[7] When exercising
governmental
powers
and
performing
governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the
national government.[8] When engaged in
corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the
community in the administration of local affairs.
[9]
Found in Section 16 of the Local

Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to
promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology.
[10]
Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of
Davao, can not claim exemption from the
coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed
with governmental functions, an LGU has the
duty to ensure the quality of the environment,
which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
Further, it is a rule of statutory construction

that every part of a statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e., that every part
must be considered with other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the
enactment.[11] The trial court, in declaring local
government units as exempt from the coverage
of the EIS law, failed to relate Section 2 of PD
1586[12] to the following provisions of the same
law:
WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and
integrated environmental protection program
necessitates
the
establishment
and
institutionalization of a system whereby the
exigencies of socio-economic undertakings can
be reconciled with the requirements of
environmental quality; x x x.
Section 1. Policy. It is hereby declared the policy
of the State to attain and maintain a rational and
orderly balance between socio-economic growth
and environmental protection.
xxxxxxxxx
Section
4. Presidential
Proclamation
of
Environmentally
Critical
Areas
and
Projects. The President of the Philippines may,
on his own initiative or upon recommendation of
the National Environmental Protection Council,
by proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as
environmentally critical. No person, partnership
or corporation shall undertake or operate any
such declared environmentally critical project or
area without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the President
or his duly authorized representative. For the
proper management of said critical project or
area, the President may by his proclamation
reorganize such government offices, agencies,
institutions, corporations or instrumentalities
including the realignment of government
personnel, and their specific functions and
responsibilities.
Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no
person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance
Page 34 of 104
Certificate issued by the President or his duly

authorized representative.[13] The Civil Code
defines a person as either natural or juridical.
The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the
local government units[14] are juridical persons.
[15]
Undoubtedly therefore, local government
units are not excluded from the coverage of PD
1586.
Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586
that said law intends to implement the policy of
the state to achieve a balance between socioeconomic development and environmental
protection, which are the twin goals of
sustainable development. The above-quoted first
paragraph of the Whereas clause stresses that
this can only be possible if we adopt a
comprehensive
and integrated environmental protection progra
m where all the sectors of the community are
involved, i.e., the government and the private
sectors. The local government units, as part of
the machinery of the government, cannot
therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the
EIS system.[16]
The
foregoing
arguments,
however,
presuppose that a project, for which an
Environmental Compliance Certificate is
necessary, is environmentally critical or within
an environmentally critical area. In the case at
bar, respondent has sufficiently shown that the
Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant
negative environmental impact because it is not
an environmentally critical project and it is not
located in an environmentally critical area. In
support of this contention, respondent
submitted the following:
1. Certification from the City Planning and
Development Office that the project is not
located in an environmentally critical area;
2. Certification
from
the
Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO-West) that the project area is within
the 18-30% slope, is outside the scope of the
NIPAS (R.A. 7586), and not within a declared
watershed area; and
3. Certification from PHILVOCS that the project
site is thirty-seven (37) kilometers southeast of
the southernmost extension of the Davao River

Fault and forty-five (45) kilometers west of the
Eastern Mindanao Fault; and is outside the
required minimum buffer zone of five (5) meters
from a fault zone.
The trial court, after a consideration of the
evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome is
not within an environmentally critical
area. Neither is it an environmentally critical
project. It is axiomatic that factual findings of
the trial court, when fully supported by the
evidence on record, are binding upon this Court
and will not be disturbed on appeal. [17] This
Court is not a trier of facts.[18]
There are exceptional instances when this
Court may disregard factual findings of the trial
court, namely: a) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; b) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; c) where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; e) when the findings
of fact are conflicting; f) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; h) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; i)
when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
but is contradicted by the evidence on record;
and j) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.[19] None of
these exceptions, however, obtain in this case.
The Environmental Impact Statement
System, which ensures environmental protection
and regulates certain government activities
affecting the environment, was established by
Presidential Decree No. 1586. Section 2 thereof
states:
There is hereby established an Environmental
Impact Statement System founded and based on
the environmental impact statement required
Page 35 of 104
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1151,

of all agencies and instrumentalities of the
national government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, as well as
private corporations, firms and entities, for
every proposed project and undertaking which
significantly affect the quality of the
environment.
Section 4 of PD 1151, on the other hand,
provides:
Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to
the above enunciated policies and goals, all
agencies and instrumentalities of the national
government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as private
corporations, firms and entities shall prepare,
file and include in every action, project or
undertaking which significantly affects the
quality of the environment a detailed statement
on
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, project or undertaking
(b) any adverse environmental effect which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented
(c) alternative to the proposed action
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of
the resources of the environment are consistent
with the maintenance and enhancement of the
long-term productivity of the same; and
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of
depletable or nonrenewable resources, a finding
must be made that such use and commitment
are warranted.
Before an environmental impact statement is
issued by a lead agency, all agencies having
jurisdiction over, or special expertise on, the
subject matter involved shall comment on the
draft environmental impact statement made by
the lead agency within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the same.
Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and

Regulations Implementing PD 1586, the
declaration of certain projects or areas as
environmentally critical, and which shall fall
within the scope of the Environmental Impact
Statement System, shall be by Presidential
Proclamation, in accordance with Section 4 of
PD 1586 quoted above.
Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146
was issued on December 14, 1981, proclaiming
the following areas and types of projects as
environmentally critical and within the scope of
the Environmental Impact Statement System
established under PD 1586:
A. Environmentally Critical Projects
I. Heavy Industries
a. Non-ferrous
industries
metal
b. Iron and steel mills

c. Petroleum and petrochemical
industries
including oil and gas
II. Resource Extractive Industries
b. Forestry projects
1. Logging
4. Forest
occupancy
5. Extraction
of
mangrove products
6. Grazing
c. Fishery Projects
1. Dikes for/and fishpond development projects
III. Infrastructure Projects
a. Major dams
b. Major power plants
(fossil-fueled,
nuclear
fueled,
hydroelectric
or
geothermal)
c. Major reclamation projects
d. Major roads and bridges
B. Environmentally Critical Areas
d. Smelting plants
a. Major
mining
quarrying projects
Page 36 of 104
and
1. All areas declared by law as

national parks, watershed
reserves,
wildlife
preserves and sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential
tourist spots;
2. Major
wood
processing projects
3. Areas which constitute the

habitat for any endangered
or threatened species of
indigenous
Philippine
Wildlife (flora and fauna);
3. Introduction of
fauna
(exoticanimals)
in
public/private
forests
4. Areas
of
unique
historic,
archaeological, or scientific interests;
5. Areas which are traditionally
occupied by cultural communities or
tribes;

6. Areas frequently visited and/or
hard-hit
by
natural
calamities
(geologic
hazards, floods, typhoons,
volcanic activity, etc.);
Page 37 of 104
e. on which
dependent
livelihood.
people are
for
their
12. Coral reefs, characterized by one or any

combinations of the following conditions:
7. Areas with critical slopes;

8. Areas
classified
agricultural lands;
as
prime
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;

10. Water bodies characterized by one or any
combination of the following conditions;
a. tapped
purposes
for
domestic
b. within the controlled

and/or
protected
areas declared
by
appropriate
authorities
c. which support wildlife and fishery activities
11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any
combination of the following conditions:
a. with primary pristine and
dense young growth;
b. adjoining mouth of major
river systems;
c. near or adjacent to
traditional productive fry or
fishing grounds;
d. which act as natural
buffers
against shore
erosion,
strong winds
and
storm
floods;
a. with 50% and above live

coralline cover;
b. spawning and
grounds for fish;
nursery
c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.

In this connection, Section 5 of PD 1586
expressly states:
Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. All
other projects, undertakings and areas not
declared by the President as environmentally
critical shall be considered as non-critical and
shall not be required to submit an
environmental impact statement. The National
Environmental Protection Council, thru the
Ministry of Human Settlements may however
require non-critical projects and undertakings to
provide additional environmental safeguards as
it may deem necessary.
The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not
come close to any of the projects or areas
enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any
of them. It is clear, therefore, that the said
project is not classified as environmentally
critical, or within an environmentally critical
area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but
to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It
becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of
which can be compelled by writ of mandamus,
such as that issued by the trial court in the case
at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
33, in Civil Case No. 28,133-2000, granting the
writ of mandamus and directing the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources to issue
in favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of NonCoverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1586 and related laws, in connection with the

construction of the Artica Sports Dome, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92299
April 19, 1991
REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION,
DEPARTMENT
OF
BUDGET
AND
MANAGEMENT
and
CECILIA
ALMAJOSE,respondents.
Legal Services Division for petitioner.
Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano
Law Offices for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section
7, Article IX (A) of the present Constitution, the
petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal,
prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated
November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90150 dated February 9, 1990.
The dispositive portion of the questioned
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,
foregoing
premises
considered, the Commission resolved to
dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the
appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan
of Rizal. Accordingly, the approved
appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is
upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)
The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150
reiterates CSC's position upholding the private
respondent's appointment by denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial
Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal
was left vacant by its former holder, a certain
Henedima del Rosario.
Page 38 of 104
In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner

informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed
office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988
pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the
petitioner who further requested Director Abella
to endorse the appointment of the said Ms.
Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO
of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal
Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she
discharged the functions of acting PBO.
In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988
addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director
Abella of Region IV recommended the
appointment of the private respondent as PBO
of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all
Municipal Budget Officers of the said province
which included three nominees of the petitioner.
According to Abella, the private respondent was
the most qualified since she was the only
Certified Public Accountant among the
contenders.
On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary
Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment
papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal
upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella.
In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to
Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his
request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to
the contested position unaware of the earlier
appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.
On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director
Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that
Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did
not meet the minimum requirements under
Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a
local budget officer. Director Galvez whether or
not through oversight further required the
petitioner to submit at least three other qualified
nominees who are qualified for the position of
PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.
On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after
having been informed of the private
respondent's appointment wrote Secretary
Carague protesting against the said appointment
on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM
Undersecretary is not legally authorized to
appoint the PBO; that the private respondent
lacks the required three years work experience
as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and

that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the
Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director
or a Congressman, who has the power to
recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through
its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative
Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a
Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letterprotest is not meritorious considering that
public respondent DBM validly exercised its
prerogative in filling-up the contested position
since none of the petitioner's nominees met the
prescribed requirements.
On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.
On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary
denied
the
petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration.
On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public
respondent CSC protesting against the
appointment of the private respondent and
reiterating his position regarding the matter.
Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the
questioned resolutions which prompted the
petitioner to submit before us the following
assignment of errors:
A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE
APPOINTMENT
BY
DBM
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CABUQUIT
OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF
RIZAL.
B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT
CECILIA
ALMA
JOSE
POSSESSES ALL THE REQUIRED
QUALIFICATIONS.
C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE
NOT QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT
POSITION.
D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY
ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT
ALLOWING PETITIONER TO SUBMIT
NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET
Page 39 of 104
THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATION

(Petition, pp. 7-8,Rollo, pp. 15-16)
All the assigned errors relate to the issue of
whether or not the private respondent is lawfully
entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of
Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by
public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon
the recommendation of then Director Abella of
DBM Region IV.
The petitioner's arguments rest on his
contention that he has the sole right and
privilege to recommend the nominees to the
position of PBO and that the appointee should
come only from his nominees. In support
thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order
No. 112 which provides that:
Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces,
cities and municipalities shall be
appointed henceforth by the Minister of
Budget
and
Management
upon
recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned, subject to civil
service law, rules and regulations, and
they shall be placed under the
administrative control and technical
supervision of the Ministry of Budget
and Management.
The petitioner maintains that the appointment
of the private respondent to the contested
position was made in derogation of the provision
so that both the public respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion in upholding
Almajose's appointment.
There is no question that under Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's power
to recommend is subject to the qualifications
prescribed by existing laws for the position of
PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall
short of the required standards, the appointing
authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public
respondent DBM is expected to reject the same.
In the event that the Governor recommends an
unqualified person, is the Department Head free
to appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the issue
before us.
Before the promulgation of Executive Order No.
112 on December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, otherwise known as the Local Government

Code vested upon the Governor, subject to civil
service rules and regulations, the power to
appoint the PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP
337). The Code further enumerated the
qualifications for the position of PBO. Thus,
Section 216, subparagraph (2) of the same code
states that:
(2) No person shall be appointed
provincial budget officer unless he is a
citizen of the Philippines, of good moral
character, a holder of a degree
preferably in law, commerce, public
administration or any related course
from a recognized college or university,
a first grade civil service eligibility or its
equivalent, and has acquired at least five
years experience in budgeting or in any
related field.
The petitioner contends that since the
appointing authority with respect to the
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was vested in
him before, then, the real intent behind
Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to
recommend nominees to the position of
Provincial Budget Officer is to make his
recommendation part and parcel of the
appointment process. He states that the phrase
"upon recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned" must be given mandatory
application in consonance with the state policy
of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X,
Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power
to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a
mere administrative issuance of public
respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to
fill-up any existing vacancy in case the
petitioner's nominees do not meet the
qualification requirements as embodied in
public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular
No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
The questioned ruling is justified by the public
respondent CSC as follows:
As required by said E.O. No. 112, the
DBM Secretary may choose from among
the recommendees of the Provincial
Governor who are thus qualified and
eligible for appointment to the position
of the PBO of Rizal. Notwithstanding,
the recommendation of the local chief
Page 40 of 104
executive is merely directory and not a

conditionsine qua non to the exercise by
the Secretary of DBM of his appointing
prerogative. To rule otherwise would in
effect give the law or E.O. No. 112 a
different interpretation or construction
not intended therein, taking into
consideration that said officer has been
nationalized and is directly under the
control and supervision of the DBM
Secretary or through his duly authorized
representative. It cannot be gainsaid
that said national officer has a similar
role in the local government unit, only
on another area or concern, to that of a
Commission on Audit resident auditor.
Hence, to preserve and maintain the
independence of said officer from the
local government unit, he must be
primarily the choice of the national
appointing official, and the exercise
thereof must not be unduly hampered or
interfered with, provided the appointee
finally selected meets the requirements
for the position in accordance with
prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules and
Regulations. In other words, the
appointing official is not restricted or
circumscribed to the list submitted or
recommended by the local chief
executive in the final selection of an
appointee for the position. He may
consider other nominees for the
position vis a vis the nominees of the
local chief executive. (CSC Resolution
No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)
The issue before the Court is not limited to the
validity of the appointment of one Provincial
Budget Officer. The tug of war between the
Secretary of Budget and Management and the
Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a
seemingly innocuous position involves the
application of a most important constitutional
policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We
have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power
in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor
of autonomy.
The exercise by local governments of meaningful
power has been a national goal since the turn of
the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional
provisions and, as in this case, legislation
mandating greater autonomy for local officials,

national officers cannot seem to let go of
centralized powers. They deny or water down
what little grants of autonomy have so far been
given to municipal corporations.
President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7,
1900 to the Second Philippine Commission
ordered the new Government "to devote their
attention in the first instance to the
establishment of municipal governments in
which natives of the Islands, both in the cities
and rural communities, shall be afforded the
opportunity to manage their own local officers to
the fullest extent of which they are capable and
subject to the least degree of supervision and
control which a careful study of their capacities
and observation of the workings of native
control show to be consistent with the
maintenance of law, order and loyalty.
In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the
Commission which combined both executive and
legislative powers was directed to give top
priority to making local autonomy effective.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on
local autonomy. However, in distinguishing
between presidential control and supervision as
follows:
The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11,
Article VII, 1935 Constitution)
the Constitution clearly limited the executive
power over local governments to "general
supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The
President controls the executive departments.
He has no such power over local governments.
He has only supervision and that supervision is
both general and circumscribed by statute.
In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970),
this Court stated:
. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175
[1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief
Justice, Concepcion as theponente,
clarified matters. As was pointed out,
the presidential competence is not even
Page 41 of 104
supervision in general, but general

supervision as may be provided by law.
He could not thus go beyond the
applicable statutory provisions, which
bind and fetter his discretion on the
matter. Moreover, as had been earlier
ruled in an opinion penned by Justice
Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil.
143 [1955]) referred to by the present
Chief Justice in his opinion in the
Hebron case, supervision goes no
further than "overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties." (Ibid,
pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand,
"means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate
had
done
in
the
performance of their duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter." It would follow
then, according to the present Chief
Justice, to go back to the Hebron
opinion, that the President had to abide
by the then provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code on suspension and
removal of municipal officials, there
being no power of control that he could
rightfully exercise, the law clearly
specifying the procedure by which such
disciplinary action would be taken.
Pursuant to this principle under the 1935
Constitution, legislation implementing local
autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act
No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing
Local Governments by Increasing Their
Autonomy
and
Reorganizing
Local
Governments" was passed. It was followed in
1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the
Decentralization Law was enacted, giving
"further
autonomous
powers
to
local
governments governments."
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved
the country further, at least insofar as legal
provisions are concerned, towards greater
autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic
principle of government:
Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and
promote the autonomy of local

government units, especially the
barangay to ensure their fullest
development
as
self-reliant
communities.
An entire article on Local Government was

incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a
local government code defining more responsive
and accountable local government structures.
Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial
boundary alteration cannot be done except in
accordance with the local government code and
upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to
create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was
specifically settled upon local governments.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even
more marked in the present Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments
The 14 sections in Article X on Local
Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines
but give in greater detail the provisions making
local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections
2 and 3 of Article X provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted
the recommending power of the Provincial
Governor as purely directory, it went against the
letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions
on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary
jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary
Page 42 of 104
powers and ignores the right of local

governments to develop self-reliance and
resoluteness in the handling of their own funds,
the goal of meaningful local autonomy is
frustrated and set back.
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31
which states:
Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right
to fill up any existing vacancy where
none of the nominees of the local chief
executive
meet
the
prescribed
requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified
recommendees nominated by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of
nominees to the Governor explaining why no
one meets the legal requirements and ask for
new recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.
The PBO is expected to synchronize his work
with DBM. More important, however, is the
proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local
level. Provincial and municipal budgets are
prepared at the local level and after completion
are forwarded to the national officials for review.
They are prepared by the local officials who must
work within the constraints of those budgets.
They are not formulated in the inner sanctums
of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed
on local governments whether or not they are
relevant to local needs and resources. It is for
this reason that there should be a genuine
interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a
harmonization of proposals from both the local
and national officials. It is for this reason that
the nomination and appointment process
involves a sharing of power between the two
levels of government.
It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the
procedure followed in the appointments of
Justices and Judges.1wphi1 Under Article VIII
of the Constitution, nominations for judicial
positions are made by the Judicial and Bar
Council. The President makes the appointments
from the list of nominees submitted to her by the
Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure,
reject all the Council nominees, and appoint
another person whom she feels is better
qualified. There can be no reservation of the
right to fill up a position with a person of the

appointing power's personal choice.
The public respondent's grave abuse of
discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director
Galvez required the Provincial Governor to
submit at least three other names of nominees
better
qualified
than
his
earlier
recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise.
The appointment of the private respondent was
formalized before the Governor was extended
the courtesy of being informed that his nominee
had been rejected. The complete disregard of the
local government's prerogative and the smug
belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom,
authority, and discretion are manifest.
In his classic work "Philippine Political Law"
Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of
local governments as institutions of democracy
is measured by the degree of autonomy that they
enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local
assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of
free nations. . . . A people may establish a system
of free government but without the spirit of
municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit
of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law,
Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).
Page 43 of 104
Secretary of the Department of Budget

and Management, respondents.
ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution vests the President with
the power of supervision, not control, over local
government units (LGUs). Such power enables
him to see to it that LGUs and their officials
execute their tasks in accordance with
law. While he may issue advisories and seek
their cooperation in solving economic
difficulties, he cannot prevent them from
performing their tasks and using available
resources to achieve their goals. He may not
withhold or alter any authority or power given
them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a
portion of internal revenue allotments legally
due them cannot be directed by administrative
fiat.
The Case
Our national officials should not only comply

with the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit
of liberty upon which these provisions are based.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby
GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The
appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is
nullified. The Department of Budget and
Management is ordered to appoint the
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among
qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial
Governor.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner,

vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon.
EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as
Before us is an original Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to
annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO)
No. 372, insofar as it requires local government
units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent
of their authorized regular appropriations for
non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin
respondents from implementing Section 4 of the
Order, which withholds a portion of their
internal revenue allotments.
On
November
17,
1998,
Roberto
Pagdanganan, through Counsel Alberto C. Agra,
filed a Motion for Intervention/Motion to Admit
Petition for Intervention,[1] attaching thereto his
Petition in Intervention[2] joining petitioner in
the reliefs sought. At the time, intervenor was
the provincial governor of Bulacan, national
president of the League of Provinces of the
Philippines and chairman of the League of
Leagues of Local Governments. In a Resolution
dated December 15, 1998, the Court noted said
Motion and Petition.
The Facts and the Arguments
On December 27, 1997, the President of the

Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with
emphasis on the assailed provisions, is as
follows:
"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN
GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties
brought about by the peso depreciation requires
continued prudence in government fiscal
management to maintain economic stability and
sustain the country's growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government
agencies adopt cash management measures to
match expenditures with available resources;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments
and agencies, including state universities
and colleges, government-owned and
controlled
corporations
and
local
governments units will identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will
reduce total expenditures for the year by
at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services
items, along the following suggested
areas:
1. Continued implementation of the
streamlining policy on organization
and staffing by deferring action on
the following:
a. Operationalization of new agencies;
b. Expansion of organizational units and/or
creation of positions;
c. Filling of positions; and
Page 44 of 104
d. Hiring
of
additional/new
consultants,
contractual and casual personnel, regardless of
funding source.
2. Suspension
activities:
of
the
following
a. Implementation
of
new
capital/infrastructure projects,
except those which have already
been contracted out;
b. Acquisition of new equipment and
motor vehicles;
c. All foreign travels of government
personnel,
except
those
associated with scholarships
and trainings funded by grants;
d. Attendance in conferences abroad
where the cost is charged to the
government except those clearly
essential
to
Philippine
commitments
in
the
international field as may be
determined by the Cabinet;
e. Conduct
of
trainings/workshops/seminars,
except those conducted by
government
training
institutions and agencies in the
performance of their regular
functions and those that are
funded by grants;
f. Conduct of cultural and social
celebrations
and
sports
activities,
except
those
associated with the Philippine
Centennial celebration and
those
involving
regular
competitions/events;
g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases
where it constitutes the only
source of compensation from
government received by the
person concerned;
h. Publications, media advertisements
and related items, except those
required by law or those already

being undertaken on a regular
basis;
i. Grant of new/additional benefits to
employees,
except
those
expressly
and
specifically
authorized by law; and
j. Donations, contributions, grants and
gifts, except those given by
institutions to victims of
calamities.
3. Suspension of all tax expenditure
subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs
4. Reduction in the volume of
consumption of fuel, water, office
supplies, electricity and other
utilities
5. Deferment of projects that are
encountering
significant
implementation problems
6. Suspension of all realignment of
funds and the use of savings and
reserves
SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to

identify the specific sources of cost-savings,
provided the 25% minimum savings under
Section 1 is complied with.
SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings
generated from these measures shall be
submitted to the Office of the President, through
the Department of Budget and Management, on
a quarterly basis using the attached format.
SECTION
4. Pending
the
assessment and evaluation by
the
Development
Budget
Coordinating Committee of
the emerging fiscal situation,
the amount equivalent to 10%
of
the
internal
revenue
allotment
to
local
government units shall be
withheld.
SECTION 5. The Development Budget
Coordination
Committee
shall
conduct a monthly review of the
fiscal position of the National
Government and if necessary, shall
Page 45 of 104
recommend to the President the

imposition of additional reserves or
the lifting of previously imposed
reserves.
SECTION
6. This
Administrative
Order shall take effect January 1,
1998 and shall remain valid for the
entire year unless otherwise lifted.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 27th day of
December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety-seven."
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998,
President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43,
amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to
five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue
allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in
issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the
power of control over LGUs. The Constitution
vests in the President, however, only the power
of general supervision over LGUs, consistent
with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner
further argues that the directive to withhold ten
percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and
of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
providing for the automatic release to each of
these units its share in the national internal
revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the
respondents, claims on the other hand that AO
372 was issued to alleviate the "economic
difficulties brought about by the peso
devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise
of the President's power of supervision over
LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal
autonomy, because it merely directs local
governments to identify measures that will
reduce their total expenditures for non-personal
services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the
withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does
not violate the statutory prohibition on the
imposition of any lien or holdback on their
revenue shares, because such withholding is
"temporary in nature pending the assessment
and
evaluation
by
the
Development
Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation."
The Issues
The Petition[3] submits the following issues

for the Court's resolution:
"A. Whether or not the president committed
grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering all LGUS
to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in
violation of the LGU[']S fiscal autonomy
"B. Whether or not the president committed
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
withholding of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA"
In sum, the main issue is whether (a)
Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs
to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and
(b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which
withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue
allotments, are valid exercises of the President's
power of general supervision over local
governments.
Additionally, the Court deliberated on the
question whether petitioner had the locus
standi to bring this suit, despite respondents'
failure to raise the issue. [4] However, the
intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has
rendered academic any further discussion on
this matter.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.

Main Issue:
Validity of AO 372
Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned
Before resolving the main issue, we deem it

important and appropriate to define certain
crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the President's
power of general supervision over local
governments and (2) the extent of the local
governments' autonomy.
Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution

confines the President's power over local
governments to one of general supervision. It
reads as follows:
Page 46 of 104
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall

exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x"
This provision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control. In Mondano v.
Silvosa,[5] the Court contrasted the President's
power of supervision over local government
officials with that of his power of control over
executive officials of the national government. It
was emphasized that the two terms -supervision and control -- differed in meaning
and extent. The Court distinguished them as
follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them,
or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s]
done in the performance of his duties and to
the latter."[6]
In Taule v. Santos,[7] we further stated that
the Chief Executive wielded no more authority
than that of checking whether local governments
or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the fundamental law and by
statutes. He cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as they act within the
scope of their authority. "Supervisory power,
when contrasted with control, is the power of
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such
body,"[8] we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,[9] the
difference between control and supervision was
further delineated. Officers in control lay down
the rules in the performance or accomplishment
of an act. If these rules are not followed, they
may, in their discretion, order the act undone or
redone by their subordinates or even decide to
do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision
does not cover such authority. Supervising
officials merely see to it that the rules are
followed, but they themselves do not lay down
such rules, nor do they have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or
redone, but only to conform to such rules. They
may not prescribe their own manner of

execution of the act. They have no discretion on
this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed.
Under our present system of government,
executive power is vested in the President.[10] The
members of the Cabinet and other executive
officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President,
at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions
changed, suspended or reversed.[11] In contrast,
the heads of political subdivisions are elected by
the people. Their sovereign powers emanate
from the electorate, to whom they are directly
accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are
subject to the Presidents supervision only, not
control, so long as their acts are exercised within
the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the
same token, the President may not withhold or
alter any authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.
Extent of Local Autonomy
Hand in hand with the constitutional

restraint on the President's power over local
governments is the state policy of ensuring local
autonomy.[12]
In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,[13] we said
that local
autonomy signified
"a
more
responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of
decentralization."The grant of autonomy is
intended to "break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local
governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation
of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government
units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are
still subject to regulation, however limited, for
the purpose of enhancing self-government.[14]
Decentralization simply
means
the
devolution of national administration, not
power, to local governments. Local officials
remain accountable to the central government as
the law may provide.[15] The difference between
decentralization of administration and that of
power was explained in detail in Limbona v.
Mangelin[16] as follows:
Page 47 of 104
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of

administration
or
decentralization
of
power. There
is
decentralization
of
administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make
local governments 'more responsive and
accountable,'[17] and
'ensure
their
fullest
development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social
progress.'[18] At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises
'general supervision'[19] over them, but only to
'ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.'[20] He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.[21]
Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event,
the
autonomous
government
becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to
its constituency."[22]
Under the Philippine concept of local
autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments,
including
autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local
affairs
are
delegated
to
political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and
effective at the local levels. In turn, economic,
political and social development at the smaller
political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the
programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common
national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire
country still lies in the President and
Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments
are still agents of the national government.[23]
The Nature of AO 372
Consistent
with
the
foregoing
jurisprudential precepts, let us now look into the
nature of AO 372. As its preambular clauses
declare, the Order was a "cash management
measure" adopted by the government "to match
expenditures with available resources," which
were presumably depleted at the time due to
"economic difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation." Because of a looming financial
crisis, the President deemed it necessary to
"direct
all
government
agencies,
state
universities and colleges, government-owned
and controlled corporations as well as local
governments to reduce their total expenditures
by at least 25 percent along suggested areas
mentioned in AO 372.
Under existing law, local government units,
in addition to having administrative autonomy
in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that
local governments have the power to create their
own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released by
the national government, as well as the power to
allocate their resources in accordance with their
own priorities. It extends to the preparation of
their budgets, and local officials in turn have to
work within the constraints thereof. They are not
formulated at the national level and imposed on
local governments, whether they are relevant to
local needs and resources or not. Hence, the
necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the
harmonization of proposals from both local and
national officials,[24] who in any case are partners
in the attainment of national goals.
Page 48 of 104
Local fiscal autonomy does not however

rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to
ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise,
are consistent with national goals. Significantly,
the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head
of the economic and planning agency of the
government,[25] primarily
responsible
for
formulating and implementing continuing,
coordinated and integrated social and economic
policies, plans and programs[26] for the entire
country. However, under the Constitution, the
formulation and the implementation of such
policies and programs are subject to
"consultations with the appropriate public
agencies, various private sectors, and local
government units." The President cannot do so
unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code
provides:[27]
"x x x [I]n the event the national government
incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the
President of the Philippines is hereby
authorized, upon the recommendation of [the]
Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government and Secretary of Budget
and Management, and subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make
the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units but
in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites
before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit
of the national government; (2) consultations
with the presiding officers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the presidents of
the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding
recommendation
of
the
secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in
the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents
failed to comply with these requisites before the
issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At
the very least, they did not even try to show that
the national government was suffering from an
unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did
they claim having conducted consultations with
the
different
leagues
of
local
governments.Without these requisites, the
President has no authority to adjust, much less
to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal
revenue allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that
AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued
by the President consistent with his power of
supervision over local governments. It is
intended only to advise all government agencies
and instrumentalities to undertake costreduction measures that will help maintain
economic stability in the country, which is facing
economic difficulties. Besides, it does not
contain
any
sanction
in
case
of
noncompliance. Being merely an advisory,
therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the
powers of the President. Since it is not a
mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of
control.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372
have a rather commanding tone, and while we
agree with petitioner that the requirements of
Section 284 of the Local Government Code have
not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the
solicitor
general's
assurance that the directive to "identify
and
implement measures x x x that will reduce total
expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized
regular appropriation" is merely advisory in
character, and does not constitute a mandatory
or binding order that interferes with local
autonomy. The
language
used,
while
authoritative, does not amount to a command
that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory
to prevail upon local executives to recognize the
need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic
difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to
heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and
teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is
understood, however, that no legal sanction may
be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who
do not follow such advice. It is in this light that
we sustain the solicitor general's contention in
regard to Section 1.
Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA
Page 49 of 104
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be

upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy
is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in
the national internal revenue. This is mandated
by no less than the Constitution. [28] The Local
Government Code[29] specifies further that the
release shall be made directly to the LGU
concerned within five (5) days after every
quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to
any lien or holdback that may be imposed by
the national government for whatever
purpose."[30] As a rule, the term "shall" is a word
of command that must be given a compulsory
meaning.[31] The
provision
is,
therefore,
imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the
withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10
percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging
fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding
clearly contravenes the Constitution and the
law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a
holdback, which means "something held back or
withheld, often temporarily."[32] Hence, the
"temporary" nature of the retention by the
national government does not matter. Any
retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be
upheld as an advisory effected in times of
national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of
validity at all. The latter provision effectively
encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concededly, the President was
well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold
the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires that
even the best intentions must be carried out
within the parameters of the Constitution and
the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.
Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent
Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents

from our Decision on the grounds that,
allegedly, (1) the Petition is premature; (2) AO
372 falls within the powers of the President as
chief fiscal officer; and (3) the withholding of the
LGUs IRA is implied in the President's authority
to adjust it in case of an unmanageable public
sector deficit.
First, on prematurity. According to the

Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred
and the challenged construction has not yet been
adopted by the agency charged with
administering the administrative order, the
determination of the scope and constitutionality
of the executive action in advance of its
immediate adverse effect involves too remote
and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of
judicial function."
This is a rather novel theory -- that people
should await the implementing evil to befall on
them before they can question acts that are
illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered
that the real issue here is whether the
Constitution and the law are contravened by
Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are
violated by the acts implementing it. In the
unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara,[33] this
Court held that when an act of the legislative
department is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, settling the controversy
becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval
of the challenged action, the dispute is said to
have ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act. Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the
Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy
of
the
Constitution
is
upheld.'[34] Once a 'controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional
provision is raised before this Court x x x , it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound
by constitutional mandate to decide.'[35]
xxxxxxxxx
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly
emphasized in many cases,[36] it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and
authority to uphold the Constitution in matters
that involve grave abuse of discretion brought
Page 50 of 104
before it in appropriate cases, committed by any

officer, agency, instrumentality or department of
the government."
In the same vein, the Court also held in
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:
[37]
"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty

of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also the duty to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. The courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted
by the legislature transcends the limit imposed
by the fundamental law. Where the statute
violates the Constitution, it is not only the right
but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act
unconstitutional and void."
By the same token, when an act of the
President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the
present case, settling the dispute becomes the
duty and the responsibility of the courts.
Besides, the issue that the Petition is
premature has not been raised by the parties;
hence it is deemed waived. Considerations of
due process really prevents its use against a
party that has not been given sufficient notice of
its presentation, and thus has not been given the
opportunity to refute it.[38]
Second, on the President's power as chief
fiscal officer of the country. Justice Kapunan
posits that Section 4 of AO 372 conforms with
the President's role as chief fiscal officer, who
allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers
to ensure the observance of safeguards and
auditing requirements, as well as the legal
prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs,
taking into account the constitutional and
statutory mandates."[39] He cites instances when
the President may lawfully intervene in the fiscal
affairs of LGUs.
Precisely, such powers referred to in the
Dissent have specifically been authorized by law
and have not been challenged as violative of the
Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4 of AO
372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit
provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC)

and the Constitution. In other words, the acts
alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized
by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO
372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis.
Third, on the President's authority to adjust
the IRA of LGUs in case of an unmanageable
public sector deficit. It must be emphasized that
in striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this Court
is not ruling out any form of reduction in the
IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may
make necessary adjustments in case of an
unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in
the main part of this Decision, and in line with
Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan
cites. He, however, merely glances over a specific
requirement in the same provision -- that such
reduction is subject to consultation with the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress
and, more importantly, with the presidents of
the leagues of local governments.
Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the
need for "interaction between the national
government and the LGUs at the planning level,"
in order to ensure that "local development
plans x x x hew to national policies and
standards." The problem is that no such
interaction or consultation was ever held prior to
the issuance of AO 372. This is why the
petitioner and the intervenor (who was a
provincial governor and at the same time
president of the League of Provinces of the
Philippines and chairman of the League of
Leagues of Local Governments) have protested
and
instituted
this
action. Significantly,
respondents do not deny the lack of
consultation.
In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section
287[40] of the LGC as impliedly authorizing the
President to withhold the IRA of an LGU,
pending
its
compliance
with
certain
requirements.Even a cursory reading of the
provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable to
the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate
in their annual budgets 20 percent of their
respective IRAs for development projects. It
speaks of no positive power granted the
President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at
all.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors
are hereby permanently PROHIBITED from
implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372
and 43, respectively dated December 27, 1997
Page 51 of 104
and December 10, 1998, insofar as local

government units are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion.
Purisima, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., join J.
Kapunan in his dissenting opinion.
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991
RODOLFO
T.
GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in
his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the
Department of Local Government and
SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
RODOLFO
T.
GANZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as
the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, respondents.
Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.
SARMIENTO, J.:p
The petitioners take common issue on the power
of the President (acting through the Secretary of
Local Government), to suspend and/or remove
local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R.

Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No.
93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a
series of administrative complaints, ten in
number, filed against him by various city
officials sometime in 1988, on various charges,
among them, abuse of authority, oppression,
grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the
Constitution, and arbitrary detention. 1 The
personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a
clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna,
her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant
City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, ViceMayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German
Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia
Redondo members of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay
tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set
forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of
Appeals. 2 We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
Page 52 of 104
In her verified complaint
(Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a
clerk assigned to the City
Health, Office of Iloilo City
charged that due to political
reasons, having supported the
rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0.
Caram, the petitioner City
Mayor, using as an excuse the
exigency of the service and the
interest of the public, pulled her
out from rightful office where
her qualifications are best suited
and assigned her to a work that
should be the function of a noncareer service employee. To
make matters worse, a utility
worker in the office of the Public
Services, whose duties are alien
to the complainant's duties and
functions, has been detailed to
take her place. The petitioner's
act are pure harassments aimed
at luring her away from her
permanent position or force her
to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad
Ortigoza, she claims that the
petitioner handpicked her to
perform task not befitting her
position as Assistant City Health
Officer of Iloilo City; that her
office was padlocked without
any explanation or justification;
that her salary was withheld
without cause since April 1,
1988; that when she filed her
vacation leave, she was given
the run-around treatment in the
approval of her leave in
connivance with Dr. Rodolfo
Villegas and that she was the
object of a well-engineered
trumped-up charge in an
administrative complaint filed
by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex
B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo
Malabor is the duly elected ViceMayor of Iloilo City and

complainants Rolando Dabao,
Dan Dalido, German Gonzales,
Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia
Pedondo are members of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of the
City of Iloilo. Their complaint
arose out from the case where
Councilor Larry Ong, whose key
to
his
office
was
unceremoniously and without
previous notice, taken by
petitioner. Without an office,
Councilor Ong had to hold office
at Plaza Libertad, The ViceMayor
and
the
other
complainants sympathized with
him and decided to do the same.
However,
the
petitioner,
together with its fully-armed
security men, forcefully drove
them away from Plaza Libertad.
Councilor Ong denounced the
petitioner's
actuations
the
following day in the radio
station and decided to hold
office
at
the
Freedom
Grandstand at Iloilo City and
there were so many people who
gathered to witness the incident.
However, before the group
could reach the area, the
petitioner, together with his
security men, led the firemen
using a firetruck in dozing water
to
the
people
and
the
bystanders.
Another administrative case was
filed by Pancho Erbite, a
barangay tanod, appointed by
former mayor Rosa O. Caram.
On March 13, 1988, without the
benefit of charges filed against
him and no warrant of arrest
was issued, Erbite was arrested
and detained at the City Jail of
Iloilo City upon orders of
petitioner. In jail, he was
allegedly mauled by other
detainees
thereby
causing
injuries He was released only
the following day. 3
Page 53 of 104
The Mayor thereafter answered 4 and the cases

were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the
Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding
events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the
Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases
were set for hearing on June 2021, 1988 at the Regional Office
of the Department of Local
Government in Iloilo City.
Notices, through telegrams,
were sent to the parties (Annex
L) and the parties received
them, including the petitioner.
The petitioner asked for a
postponement
before
the
scheduled date of hearing and
was represented by counsel,
Atty. Samuel Castro. The
hearing officers, Atty. Salvador
Quebral and Atty. Marino
Bermudez had to come all the
way from Manila for the twoday hearings but was actually
held only on June 20,1988 in
view of the inability and
unpreparedness of petitioner's
counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to
July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same
venue-Iloilo City. Again, the
petitioner attempted to delay
the proceedings and moved for a
postponement under the excuse
that he had just hired his
counsel.
Nonetheless,
the
hearing officers denied the
motion to postpone, in view of
the fact that the parties were
notified by telegrams of the
scheduled hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner's
counsel cross-examined the
complainants
and
their
witnesses.

Finding probable grounds and
reasons, the respondent issued a
preventive suspension order on
August 11, 1988 to last until
October 11,1988 for a period of
sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was
set on September 21, 1988 and
the petitioner again asked for a
postponement to September
26,1988. On September 26,
1988, the complainants and
petitioner
were
present,
together with their respective
counsel. The petitioner sought
for a postponement which was
denied. In these hearings which
were held in Mala the petitioner
testified in Adm. Case No. C10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued
regarding the Malabor case and
the
complainants
testified
including their witnesses.
On
October
10,
1988,
petitioner's
counsel,
Atty.
Original
moved
for
a
postponement of the October
24, 1988 hearing to November 7
to 11, 1988 which was granted.
However, the motion for change
of venue as denied due to lack of
funds. At the hearing on
November 7, 1988, the parties
and counsel were present.
Petitioner reiterated his motion
to change venue and moved for
postponement
anew.
The
counsel discussed a proposal to
take the deposition of witnesses
in Iloilo City so the hearing was
indefinitely
postponed.
However, the parties failed to
come to terms and after the
parties were notified of the
hearing, the investigation was
set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
Page 54 of 104
The petitioner sought for
another postponement on the
ground that his witnesses were
sick or cannot attend the
investigation due to lack of
transportation. The motion was
denied and the petitioner was
given up to December 14, 1988
to present his evidence.
On
December
14,1988,
petitioner's counsel insisted on
his motion for postponement
and the hearing officers gave
petitioner up to December 15,
1988 to present his evidence. On
December
15,
1988,
the
petitioner failed to present
evidence and the cases were
considered
submitted
for
resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie
evidence was found to exist in
the arbitrary detention case filed
by Pancho Erbite so the
respondent
ordered
the
petitioner's second preventive
suspension dated October 11,
1988 for another sixty (60) days.
The petitioner was able to
obtain a restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33 of Iloilo City. The second
preventive suspension was not
enforced. 5
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor

Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition
against the respondent Secretary of Local
Government (now, Interior) in the Regional
Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in
obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction.
Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417,
an action for prohibition, in the respondent
Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent
Secretary issued another order, preventively
suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty
days, the third time in twenty months, and
designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto

Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor
Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of
the Court of Appeals, a petition for
prohibition, 6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of
the complainants, and hence, he is interested in
seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a
decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a
Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a
Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann
Artieda, who had been similary charged by the
respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary
Restraining Order, barring the respondent
Secretary from implementing the suspension
orders, and restraining the enforcement of the
Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we
consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions
of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No.
93252), that the Department of Local
Government in hearing the ten cases against
him, had denied him due process of law and that
the respondent Secretary had been "biased,
prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7 arising
from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
party 8 and the running political rivalry they
maintained in the last congressional and local
elections;9 and his alleged refusal to operate a
lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he
requested the Secretary to lift his suspension
since it had come ninety days prior to an election
(the barangay elections of November 14,
1988), 11notwithstanding which, the latter
proceeded with the hearing and meted out two
more suspension orders of the aforementioned
cases. 12 He likewise contends that he sought to
bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in
Manila) in order to reduce the costs of
proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his
request. 13 He states that he asked for
postponement
on
"valid
and
justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was
Page 55 of 104
suffering from a heart ailment which required

confinement; that his "vital" 15 witness was also
hospitalized 16 but that the latter unduly denied
his request. 17
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos.
93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local
Government is devoid, in any event, of any
authority to suspend and remove local officials,
an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary
Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due
process, the records do not show very clearly in
what manner the Mayor might have been
deprived of his rights by the respondent
Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary LuisSantos were (are) political rivals and that his
"persecution" was politically motivated are pure
speculation and although the latter does not
appear to have denied these contentions (as he,
Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his
word for it the way we would have under less
political circumstances, considering furthermore
that "political feud" has often been a good excuse
in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to
substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos
had attempted to seduce him to join the
administration party and to operate a lottery in
Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed
to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them,
at face value, much more, as judicial admissions
as he would have us accept them 18 for the same
reasons above-stated and furthermore, because
his say so's were never corroborated by
independent testimonies. As a responsible
public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an
official function, is presumed to be performing
his duties regularly and in the absence of
contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed
to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had
requested the respondent Secretary to defer the
hearing on account of the ninety-day ban
prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the
Court finds the question to be moot and
academic since we have in fact restrained the
Secretary from further hearing the complaints
against the petitioners. 19
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the

Court is afraid that he has not given any
compelling reason why we should overturn the
Court of Appeals, which found no convincing
reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying
his requests. Besides, postponements are a
matter of discretion on the part of the hearing
officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon's above
story, we are not convinced that the Secretary
has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these
circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations
deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not
the Secretary of Local Government, as the
President's alter ego, can suspend and/or
remove local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987
Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise
the power of suspension and/or removal over
local officials. According to both petitioners, the
Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen selfrule by local government units and second, by
deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law
to strip the President of the power of control
over local governments. It is a view, so they
contend, that finds support in the debates of the
Constitutional Commission. The provision in
question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the
Philippines
shall
exercise
general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to
component barangays shall
ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers
and functions. 22
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in
the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:
Page 56 of 104
Sec. 10. The President shall have
control of all the executive
departments,
bureaus,
or
offices,
exercise
general
supervision over all Local
governments
as
may
be
provided by law, and take care
that the laws be faithfully
executed. 23
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as

may be provided by law") is significant, as their
argument goes, since: (1) the power of the
President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no
law may provide for it any longer.
It is to be noted that in meting out the
suspensions under question, the Secretary of
Local Government acted in consonance with the
specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the
Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.
Within seven days after the
complaint is filed, the Minister
of local Government, or the
sanggunian concerned, as the
case may be, shall require the
respondent to submit his
verified answer within seven
days from receipt of said
complaint, and commence the
hearing and investigation of the
case within ten days after
receipt of such answer of the
respondent. No investigation
shall be held within ninety days
immediately
prior
to
an
election, and no preventive
suspension shall be imposed
with the said period. If
preventive suspension has been
imposed prior to the aforesaid
period,
the
preventive
suspension shall be lifted. 24
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.
(1) Preventive suspension
may be imposed by the Minister
of Local Government if the
respondent is a provincial or
city official, by the provincial

governor if the respondent is an
elective municipal official, or by
the city or municipal mayor if
the respondent is an elective
barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may
be imposed at any time after the
issues are joined, when there is
reasonable ground to believe
that
the
respondent
has
committed the act or acts
complained of, when the
evidence of culpability is strong,
when the gravity of the offense
so warrants, or when the
continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. In
all cases, preventive suspension
shall not extend beyond sixty
days after the start of said
suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty
days, the suspended official
shall be deemed reinstated in
office without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings
against
him
until
its
termination. However ' if the
delay in the proceedings of the
case is due to his fault, neglect
or request, the time of the delay
shall not be counted in
computing
the
time
of
25
suspension.
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists

of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution,
in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by
law" intend to divest the President of the power
to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or
remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution
repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local
Government Code? (3) What is the significance
of the change in the constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that
notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
Page 57 of 104
language, the charter did not intend to divest the

legislature of its right or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation
to provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of
"as may be provided by law") signifies nothing
more than to underscore local governments'
autonomy from congress and to break Congress'
"control" over local government affairs. The
Constitution did not, however, intend, for the
sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature
of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate
making mini-states out of local government
units, as in the federal governments of the
United States of America (or Brazil or Germany),
although Jefferson is said to have compared
municipal corporations euphemistically to
"small
republics." 26 Autonomy,
in
the
constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding
star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit
the legislative responsibility under the
Constitution and as the "supervision clause"
itself suggest-is to wean local government units
from
over-dependence
on
the
central
government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local
autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but
subject to, among other things, the passage of a
local
government
code, 27 a
local
tax
28
law, income distribution legislation, 29 and a
national
representation
law, 30 and
31
measures designed to realize autonomy at the
local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of
autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the
Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the
Charter allows Congress to include in the local
government code provisions for removal of local
officials, which suggest that Congress may
exercise removal powers, and as the existing
Local Government Code has done, delegate its
exercise to the President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact
a local government code which
shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable
local government structure

instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among
the different local government
units
their
powers,
responsibilities and resources,
and
provide
for
the
qualifications,
election,
appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials, and
all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of
the local units. 32
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as

may be provided by law" was meant to
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers
to strengthen local autonomy by severing
congressional control of its affairs, as observed
by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local
legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing
more, however, and insofar as existing
legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed
against local officials administratively, the
Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that
the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes
the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority as this Court has
held, 34 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of
Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off.
Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court
had occasion to discuss the
scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President
over local government officials
in contrast to the power of
control given to him over
executive officials of our
government wherein it was
Page 58 of 104
emphasized that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one
from the other in meaning and
extent. Thus in that case the
Court has made the following
digression: "In administration
law
supervision
means
overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control,
on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside
what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that
of the latter." But from this
pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the
President over local government
officials does not include the
power of investigation when in
his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, as
postulated in Section 64(c) of
the Revised Administrative
Code. ... 35
xxx xxx xxx
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an

officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for test of the
latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other hand means
"overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their
duties. 37 As
we
held, 38 however,
"investigating" is not inconsistent with
"overseeing", although it is a lesser power than
"altering". The impression is apparently
exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at
least three cases, Lacson v. Roque, 39 Hebron v.
Reyes, 40 and Mondano

v.
Silvosa, 41 and
possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor
General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that the
President enjoyed no control powers but only
supervision "as may be provided by law," 43 a
rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano.
In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may
not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action
against him, except on appeal from a decision of
the
corresponding
provincial
board." 44 However,
neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano catego
rically banned the Chief Executive from
exercising acts of disciplinary authority because
she did not exercise control powers, but because
no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary
authority. Thus, according to Lacson:
The
contention
that
the
President has inherent power to
remove or suspend municipal
officers is without doubt not
well taken. Removal and
suspension of public officers are
always controlled by the
particular law applicable and its
proper construction subject to
constitutional limitations. 45
In Hebron we stated:
Accordingly,
when
the
procedure for the suspension of
an officer is specified by law, the
same
must
be
deemed
mandatory and adhered to
strictly, in the absence of
express or clear provision to the
contrary-which does not et with
respect
to
municipal
officers ... 46
In Mondano, the Court held:
... The Congress has expressly
and specifically lodged the
provincial supervision over
municipal officials in the
provincial governor who is
authorized to "receive and
investigate complaints made
Page 59 of 104
under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other
form of maladministration of
office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude." And if the
charges are serious, "he shall
submit written charges touching
the matter to the provincial
board, furnishing a copy of such
charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail,
and he may in such case
suspend the officer (not being
the
municipal
treasurer)
pending action by the board, if
in his opinion the charge by one
affecting the official integrity of
the officer in question." Section
86
of
the
Revised
Administration
Code
adds
nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by
the Department Head over the
administration
of
...
municipalities ... . If it be
construed that it does and such
additional power is the same
authority as that vested in the
Department Head by section
79(c)
of
the
Revised
Administrative Code, then such
additional power must be
deemed to have been abrogated
by Section 110(l), Article VII of
the Constitution. 47
xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not

impose disciplinary measures on local officials
except on appeal from the provincial board
pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the
President the power (to suspend/remove) it was
not because we did not think that the President
can not exercise it on account of his limited
power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law
gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v.
Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining

him. 49
The Court does not believe that the petitioners
can rightfully point to the debates of the
Constitutional Commission to defeat the
President's powers. The Court believes that the
deliberations are by themselves inconclusive,
because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo
would exclude the power of removal from the
President, 50Commissioner Blas Ople would
not. 51
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that
the new Constitution has repealed the Local
Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said,
"supervision"
and
"removal"
are
not
incompatible terms and one may stand with the
other notwithstanding the stronger expression of
local autonomy under the new Charter. We have
indeed held that in spite of the approval of the
Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and
effect. 52
As the Constitution itself declares, local
autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountable
local
government
structure
instituted
through
a
system
of
decentralization." 53 The Constitution as we
observed, does nothing more than to break up
the monopoly of the national government over
the affairs of local governments and as put by
political adherents, to "liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila."
Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and inter-dependence
between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to user in a
regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken
such a radical step. Local governments, under
the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance selfgovernment.
As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization
means devolution of national administration but
not power to the local levels. Thus:
Now,
autonomy
is
either
decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is
Page 60 of 104
decentralization of administration when

the central government delegates
administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the
process to make local governments
"more responsive and accountable," and
"ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social
progress." At the same time, it relieves
the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The
President
exercises
"general
supervision" over them, but only to
"ensure
that
local
affairs
are
administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
Decentralization of power, on
the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments
units
declared
to
be
autonomous, In that case, the
autonomous government is free
to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum
intervention
from
central
authorities. According to a
constitutional
author,
decentralization
of
power
amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the
autonomous
government
becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its
constituency. 55
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed
on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another
matter. What bothers the Court, and what
indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the
Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the
Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days
of suspension, in the event that all ten cases
yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of
course tolerating misfeasance in public office
(assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of

misfeasance) but it is certainly another question
to make him serve 600 days of suspension,
which is effectively, to suspend him out of office.
As we held: 56
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal
mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His
term of office does not expire until 1986.
Were it not for this information and the
suspension
decreed
by
the
Sandiganbayan according to the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, he
would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such
municipal mayor. He was elected
precisely to do so. As of October 26,
1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic
assumption of the electoral process
implicit in the right of suffrage that the
people are entitled to the services of
elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them
could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, Ms culpability
must be established. Moreover, if there
be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional
presumption
of
innocence. A preventive suspension may
be justified. Its continuance, however,
for an unreasonable length of time raises
a due process question. For even if
thereafter he were acquitted, in the
meanwhile his right to hold office had
been nullified. Clearly, there would be in
such a case an injustice suffered by him.
Nor is he the only victim. There is
injustice inflicted likewise on the people
of Lianga They were deprived of the
services of the man they had elected to
serve as mayor. In that sense, to
paraphrase
Justice
Cardozo,
the
protracted
continuance
of
this
preventive suspension had outrun the
bounds of reason and resulted in sheer
oppression. A denial of due process is
thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such
an unconstitutional application that the
order of suspension should be lifted. 57
Page 61 of 104
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at

ease with suspensions, for the above
reasons, 58 and so also, because it is out of the
ordinary to have a vacancy in local government.
The sole objective of a suspension, as we have
held, 59 is simply "to prevent the accused from
hampering the normal cause of the investigation
with his influence and authority over possible
witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and
other evidence. 61
It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors
in firming up a case, if any, against an erring
local official. Under the Local Government Code,
it can not exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say
that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a
shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which
is also to say that it ought to be lifted if
prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a
shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike
preventive imprisonment in which the accused is
held to insure his presence at the trial. In both
cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a
presumption of innocence unless and until
found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local
Government Code provides, it may be imposed
for no more than sixty days. As we held, 63 a
longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable,
and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of
suspension which is not a remote possibility
Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to
make him spend the rest of his term in
inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite
of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been
proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught
because needless to say, the length of his
suspension would have, by the time he is
reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing
the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see
that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly
Page 62 of 104
any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon

successive suspensions when apparently, the
respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to
gather the necessary evidence to build a case
against the Mayor without suspending him a day
longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent
Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak,
on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him
down ten times the pain, when he, the
respondent Secretary, could have pursued a
consolidated effort.
In resume the Court is laying down the following

rules:
We reiterate that we are not precluding the

President, through the Secretary of Interior from
exercising a legal power, yet we are of the
opinion that the Secretary of Interior is
exercising that power oppressively, and needless
to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
3. The change in constitutional language (with

respect to the supervision clause) was meant but
to deny legislative control over local
governments; it did not exempt the latter from
legislative regulations provided regulation is
consistent with the fundamental premise of
autonomy;
The Court is aware that only the third

suspension is under questions, and that any talk
of future suspensions is in fact premature. The
fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has
been made to serve a total of 120 days of
suspension and the possibility of sixty days more
is arguably around the corner (which amounts to
a violation of the Local Government Code which
brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended
to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural
tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what
appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to
perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of
affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third
suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the
Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are
concerned, we are urging the Department of
Local Government, upon the finality of this
Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the
same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies
of appeal, judicial or administrative, or
certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are
precluding the Secretary from meting out further
suspensions based on those remaining
complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima
facie evidence.
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution,

involves
a
mere
decentralization
of
administration, not of power, in which local
officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe
federalism;
4. Since local governments remain accountable

to the national authority, the latter may, by law,
and in the manner set forth therein, impose
disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not
inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not
signify "control" (which the President does not
have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may
serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no
longer be suspended for the offenses he was
charged originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of
those charges "due to his fault, neglect
or request, (the time of the delay) shall
not be counted in computing the time of
suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration
of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other
crimes and abuses for which proper
charges are filed against him by the
aggrieved party or parties, his previous
suspension shall not be a bar to his
being preventively suspended again, if
warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63
of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The
suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED,
provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon, may not be made to serve future
suspensions on account of any of the remaining
administrative charges pending against him for
acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The
Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate
all such administrative cases pending against
Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner,
Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990
CORDILLERA
PETITIONER,
AUDIT,
BROAD
COALITION,
VS. COMMISSION ON
RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 82217. JANUARY 29, 1990]

LILIA YARANON AND BONA BAUTISTA,
ASSISTED
BY
THEIR
SPOUSES,
BRAULIO D. YARANON AND DEMETRIO
D. BAUTISTA, JR., RESPECTIVELY;
JAMES BRETT AND SINAI C. HAMADA,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG,
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY,
HON.
VICENTE JAYME,
SECRETARY OF
FINANCE,
HON.
GUILLERMO
N.
CARAGUE, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND
MANAGEMENT,
AND
HON.
ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC NATIONAL
TREASURER,
RESPONDENTS.
Page 63 of 104
of an organic act by the Congress and the

creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act
through a plebiscite.
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions,
the Constitution, in Article X, provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general
supervision over autonomous regions to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec.
17.
All
powers,
functions,
and
responsibilities not granted by this Constitution
or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act
for each autonomous region with the assistance
and participation of the regional consultative
commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of
nominees from multisectoral bodies. The
organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units.
The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family and property
law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws.
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
In
these
consolidated
petitions,
the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220,
dated July 15, 1987, which created the Cordillera
Administrative Region, is assailed on the
primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment
The creation of the autonomous region shall be

effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this

Constitution shall, within eighteen months from
the time of organization of both Houses, pass the
organic acts for the autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1)
Administrative
organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning
development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7)
Educational
policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the
cultural
heritage;
and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by
law for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order
within the regions shall be the responsibility of
the local police agencies which shall be
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized
in accordance with applicable laws. The defense
and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.
A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete
without reference to its historical background.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution,
Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on
ideological grounds from the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm
the New People's Army (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed into office
by People Power, she advocated a policy of
national reconciliation. She called on all
revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The
CPLA heeded this call of the President. After
preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and
some members of her, Cabinet flew to Mt. Data
in the Mountain Province on September 13, 1986
and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (as
Commander of the CPLA) and Ama Mario Yagao (as President of Cordillera Bodong
Administration, the civil government of the
CPLA) a ceasefire agreement that signified the
Page 64 of 104
cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O.

220).
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle:
the Cordillera people shall not undertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle
but by peaceful means, such as political
negotiations. The negotiations shall be a
continuing process until the demands of the
Cordillera people shall have been substantially
granted.
On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting
as Chief Negotiator of the government], in
pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement,
flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and
signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the
Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, paragraphs
2 and 3 of which state:
Par. 2 - Work together in drafting an Executive
Order to create a preparatory body that could
perform policy-making and administrative
functions and undertake consultations and
studies leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3 - Have representatives from the Cordillera
panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in
drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220
was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of the
Cordillera people.
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino
signed the joint draft into law, known now as
E.O. 220. [Rejoinder, G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3.]
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the
President in the exercise of her legislative
powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution,
created
the
Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, KalingaApayao and Mountain Province and the City of
Baguio [secs. 1 and 2.] It was created to
accelerate economic and social growth in the
region and to prepare for the establishment of
the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec.
3.] Its main function is to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and
services in the region, particularly, to coordinate
with the local government units as well as with
the executive departments of the National

Government in the supervision of field offices
and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and
accepting projects and activities in the region
[sec. 5.] It shall also monitor the implementation
of all ongoing national and local government
projects in the region [sec. 20.]. The CAR shall
have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policyformulating body and a Cordillera Executive
Board as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and
10.] The CAR and the Assembly and Executive
Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established
and organized [sec. 17.]
Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O.
No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first
Congress and the enactment of the organic act
for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an
urgent need, in the interest of national security
and public order, for the President to reorganize
immediately
the
existing
administrative
structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the
existing political realities therein and the
Government's legitimate concerns in the areas,
without
attempting
to
pre-empt
the
constitutional duty of the first Congress to
undertake the creation of an autonomous region
on a permanent basis.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act
No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region," was enacted and signed into law. The
Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and
agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its
transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of
R.A. No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the
Cordillera Regional Assembly, as well as all
offices and agencies created under Executive
Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately
upon the ratification of this Organic Act.
All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera
Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional
Assembly shall automatically be transferred to
the Cordillera Autonomous Government.
I
Page 65 of 104
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that

respect for the inherent and stated powers and
prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as
faithful adherence to the principle of separation
of powers, require that its enactment be
accorded the presumption of constitutionality.
Thus, in any challenge to the constitutionality of
a statute, the burden of clearly and
unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality
always rests upon the challenger. Conversely,
failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the
challenge.
We shall be guided by these principles in
considering these consolidated petitions.
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that
by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the
exercise of her legislative powers prior to the
convening of the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress
from its mandated task of enacting an organic
act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the
Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we have
come to the conclusion that petitioners'
assertions are unfounded. Events subsequent to
the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out this
conclusion.
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal
that what it actually envisions is the
consolidation and coordination of the delivery of
services of line departments and agencies of the
National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a step preparatory to
the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does
not create the autonomous region contemplated
in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of
an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the
ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily
conflict with the provisions of the Constitution
on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure
for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission
shall first be created. The President shall then
appoint the members of a regional consultative
commission from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The commission shall
assist the Congress the in preparing organic act
for the autonomous region. The organic act shall
be passed by the first Congress under the 1987

Constitution within eighteen months from the
time of its organization and enacted into law.
Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the
approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18.] Only
then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the
autonomous region be created.
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The
President, in 1987 still exercising legislative
powers as the first Congress had not yet
convened, saw it fit to provide for some
measures to address the urgent needs of the
Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act
had not yet been passed and the autonomous
region created. These measures we find in E.O.
No. 220. The steps taken by the President are
obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly
petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No. 220 as
capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation
Army (CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but the
Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the
measures taken by the President. We can only
inquire into whether or not the measures violate
the Constitution. But as we have seen earlier,
they do not.
2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR
does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner
Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim
autonomous region in the Cordilleras" [Petition,
G.R. No. 79956, p. 25.]
The Constitution provides for a basic structure
of government in the autonomous region
composed of an elective executive and legislature
and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18.] Using
this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not
establish an autonomous regional government.
It created a region, covering a specified area, for
administrative purposes with the main objective
of
coordinating
the
planning
and
implementation of programs and services [secs.
2 and 5.] To determine policy, it created a
representative assembly, to convene yearly only
for a five-day regular session, tasked with,
among others, identifying priority projects and
development programs [sec. 9.] To serve as an
implementing body, it created the Cordillera
Executive Board composed of the Mayor of
Baguio City, Provincial governors and
representatives of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and
non-governmental organizations as regular
members and all regional directors of the line
Page 66 of 104
departments of the National Government as exofficio members and headed by an Executive

Director [secs. 10 and 11.] The bodies created by
E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
governmental
structure,
nor
are
they
autonomous government agencies. They merely
constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that
brings together the existing local governments,
the agencies of the National Government, the
ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and nongovernmental organizations in a concerted effort
to spur development in the Cordilleras.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of
administrative coordination is underscored by
the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President
and appropriate national departments and
agencies to make available sources of funds for
priority development programs and projects
recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the
power given to the President to call upon the
appropriate executive departments and agencies
of the National Government to assist the CAR
[sec. 24.]
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220,
the Congress, after it was convened, enacted
Republic Act No. 6658 which created the
Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission.
The President then appointed its members. The
commission prepared a draft organic act which
became the basis for the deliberations of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. The
result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act
for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was
signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite
for the approval of the organic act, to be
conducted shortly, shall complete the process
outlined in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force
and effect for more than two years and we find
that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras is still to be created,
showing the lack of basis of petitioners'
assertion. Events have shown that petitioners'
fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the
creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras was totally unfounded.
Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has
failed.
II
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the

nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a
territorial and political subdivision.
The Constitution provides in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the
autonomous
region
in
the
Cordilleras
contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now
address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No. 220
contravenes the Constitution by creating a new
territorial and political subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O.
No. 220, we find that it did not create a new
territorial and political subdivision or merge
existing ones into a larger subdivision.
1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or
a territorial and political subdivision. It does not
have a separate juridical personality, unlike
provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it
vested with the powers that are normally
granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to
sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose
of property, the power to create its own sources
of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was
created primarily to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the
covered areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the
purpose of expediting the delivery of services is
nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization
Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law
of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1,
established eleven (11) regions, later increased to
Page 67 of 104
twelve (12), with definite regional centers and

required departments and agencies of the
Executive Branch of the National Government to
set up field offices therein. The functions of the
regional offices to be established pursuant to the
Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws,
policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations
of the department or agency in the regional
areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and
effective service to the people in the area; (3) to
coordinate with regional offices of other
departments, bureaus and agencies in the area;
(4) to coordinate with local government units in
the area; and (5) to perform such other functions
as may be provided by law. [See Part II, chap.
III, art. I, of the Reorganization Plan.]
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same
genre as the administrative regions created
under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O.
No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the
participation not only of the line departments
and agencies of the National Government but
also the local governments, ethno-linguistic
groups and non-governmental organizations in
bringing about the desired objectives and the
appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
2. Then, considering the control and supervision
exercised by the President over the CAR and the
offices created under E.O. No. 220, and
considering
further
the
indispensable
participation of the line departments of the
National Government, the CAR may be
considered more than anything else as a regional
coordinating
agency
of
the
National
Government,
similar
to
the
regional
development councils which the President may
create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14.]
These councils are "composed of local
government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and
representatives
from
non-governmental
organizations within the region for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen
the autonomy of the units therein and to
accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region" [Ibid.] In
this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more
sophisticated
version
of
the
regional
development council.
III
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the

creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for
the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, KalingaApayao and Mountain Province) and city
(Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
We find first a need to clear up petitioners'
apparent misconception of the concept of local
autonomy.
It must be clarified that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
[Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in
more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R.
No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1.] Local
autonomy is not unique to the 1987
Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the
1973 Constitution [Art. II, Sec. 10.] And while
there was no express guarantee under the 1935
Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local
Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the
Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which
ushered the irreversible march towards further
enlargement of local autonomy in the country
[Villegas v. Subido, supra.]
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy
to these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of
an executive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction in each of
the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18.]
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere
transitory coordinating agency that would
prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent
territorial and political subdivisions already
enjoying local or administrative autonomy into
an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy.
Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious
failure to show how the creation of the CAR has
actually diminished the local autonomy of the
Page 68 of 104
covered provinces and city. It cannot be overemphasized that pure speculation and a resort to
probabilities are insufficient to cause the
invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA,
PETITIONER, VS. CONTE MANGELIN,
SALIC
ALI,
SALINDATO
ALI,
PILIMPINAS
CONDING,
ACMAD
TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS
ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO
PALOMARES, JR., RAKIL DAGALANGIT,
AND BIMBO SINSUAT, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region
XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent
facts
are
as
follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan
Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member
of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional
Autonomous
Government,
Region
XII,
representing
Lanao
del
Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected
Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly
for
brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18)
members. Two of said members, respondents
Acmad Tomawis and Rakil Dagalangit, filed on
March 23, 1987 with the Commission on
Elections their respective certificates of
candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional
elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but
they later withdrew from the aforesaid election
and thereafter resumed again their positions as
R
members

of
the
Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu

Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul,
Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City
and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of
the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which
reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs will
undertake Consultations and dialogues with
local government officials, civic, religious
organizations and traditional leaders on the
recent and present political developments and
other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and
dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous
governments of the two regions as envisioned
and may prod the President to constitute
immediately
the
Regional
Consultative
Commission as mandated by the Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the
Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly
on November 1 to 15, 1987; with venue at the
Congress
of
the
Philippines.
Your presence, unstinted support and
cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner
sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny
Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all
Assemblymen that there shall be no session in
November as "our presence in the house
committee hearing of Congress take (sic)
precedence over any pending business in
batasang
pampook
x
x
x."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction
of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao
sent to the members of the Assembly the
following telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM
SPEAKER
LIMBONA
QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN
JIMMY
MATALAM
CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO
ASSIST
SAID
COMMITTEE
IN
THE
DISCUSSION
OF
THE
PROPOSED
AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15.
HENCE WIRE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT
THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE
Page 69 of 104
HOUSE
COMMITTEE
HEARING
OF
CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
PENDING
BUSINESS
IN
BATASANG
PAMPOOK
OF
MATALAM
FOLLOWS
UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held
session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with
the following assemblymen present:
1.
Sali,
Salic
2.
Conding,
Pilipinas
(sic)
3.
Dagalangit,
Rakil
4.
Dela
Fuente,
Antonio
5.
Mangelen,
Conte
6.
Ortiz,
Jesus
7.
Palomares,
Diego
8.
Sinsuat,
Bimbo
9.
Tomawis,
Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the
Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside
in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of
the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in
attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the
chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.
8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the
Assembly
resumed
with
the
following
Assemblymen present:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Mangelen
Conte -- Presiding Officer

Ali
Salic
Ali
Salindatu
Aratuc,
Malik
Cajelo,
Rene
Conding
Pilipinas
(sic)
Dagalangit,
8.
Dela
Fuente,
9.
Ortiz,
10.
Palamares,
11.
Quijano,
12.
Sinsuat,
13.
Tomawis,
14. Tomawis, Jerry
Rakal
Antonio
Jesus
Diego
Jesus
Bimbo
Acmad
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of

said
session
reads:
HON. DALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable
Members of the House, with the presence of our
colleagues who have come to attend the session
today, I move to call the names of the new
comers in order for them to cast their votes on
the previous motion to declare the position of
the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move
also that the designation of the Speaker

ProTempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr.
Johnny Evangelista as Acting Secretary in the
session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in
today's
session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or
objections on the two motions presented? The
Chair hears none and the said motions are
approved.
x
x
x.
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the
motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant;
one abstained and none voted against.[1]
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment
as
follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that
(a)
This
Petition
be
given
due
course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ

of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
respondents from proceeding with their session
to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day
thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered
declaring the proceedings held by respondents of
their session on November 2, 1987 as null and
void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker
of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan
Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987
valid
and
subsisting;
and
(e)
Making
the
injunction
permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as

may
be
just
and
equitable.[2]
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on
January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by
the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPELLING
ALIMBUSAR
P.
LIMBONA
FROM
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PAMPOOK, AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,"[3] on
the grounds, among other things, that the
petitioner "had caused to be prepared and
signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and
emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was
Page 70 of 104
considered resigned after filing his Certificate of

Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District
of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections ...
and nothing in the record of the Assembly will
show that any request for reinstatement by
Abdula was ever made ...[4] and that "such
action of Mr. Limbona in paying Abdula his
salaries and emoluments without authority from
the Assembly ... constituted a usurpation of the
power of the Assembly,"[5] that the petitioner
"had recently caused withdrawal of so much
amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to
the non-payment of the salaries and
emoluments of some Assembly (sic) ," [6] and that
he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on
question which should have been resolved
within the confines of the Assembly,"[7] for which
the respondents now submit that the petition
had
become
"moot
and
academic".[8]
The first question, evidently, is whether or not
the expulsion of the petitioner (pending
litigation) has made the case moot and
academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered
moot and academic by reason simply of the
expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the
petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to
make this petition moot and academic, and to
preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due
process alone, we hold that the expulsion in
question is of no force and effect. In the first
place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian
had conducted an investigation and whether or
not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
assuming that there was an investigation, or
otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the
other hand, what appears in the records is an
admission by the Assembly (at least, the
respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to
this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the
Sangguniang Pampook."[9] To be sure, the
private
respondents
aver
that
"[t]he
Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted
him to come to Cotabato City," [10] but that was
"so that their differences could be threshed out
and settled."[11] Certainly, that avowed wanting
or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how
conciliatory it may be, cannot be a substitute for
the notice and hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term
is known in administrative law, does not

absolutely require notice and that a party need
only be given the opportunity to be heard, [12] it
does not appear herein that the petitioner had,
to begin with, been made aware that he had in
fact stood charged of graft and corruption before
his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that
he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their
accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot
warrant
expulsion.
In the second place, the resolution appears
strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other
Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from
what the former perceive to be obduracy on the
part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution)
speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the
petitioner] before the Supreme Court ... on
question which should have been resolved
within the confines of the Assembly -- an act
which some members claimed unnecesarily and
unduly assails their integrity and character as
representative of the people,"[13] an act that
cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to
judicial remedies is guaranteed by the
Constitution,[14] and, unless the recourse
amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may
be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the
caution that should the past acts of the
petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the
Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings
therefor in line with the most elementary
requirements of due process. And while it is
within the discretion of the members of the
Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues,
their acts are nonetheless subject to the
moderating hand of this Court in the event that
such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the
Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous", the
courts may not rightfully intervene in their
affairs, much less strike down their acts. We
come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the socalled autonomous governments of Mindanao,
as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts? In other
words, what is the extent of self-government
given to the two autonomous governments of
Regions
IX
and
XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao
Page 71 of 104
were organized in Regions IX and XII by

Presidential Decree No. 1618[15] promulgated on
July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree
established "internal autonomy"[16] in the two
regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
and
its
Constitution,"[17] "with legislative and executive
machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities"[18]
specified
therein.
It
required
the
autonomous
regional
governments to undertake all internal
administrative matters for the respective
regions,[19] except to "act on matters which are
within the jurisdiction and competence of the
National Government,[20] which include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(1)
National
defense
and
security;
(2)
Foreign
relations;
(3)
Foreign
trade;
(4)
Currency, monetary affairs, foreign
exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and
external
borrowing;
(5) Disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation or utilization of all natural
resources;
(6)
Air
and
sea
transport;
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8)
Customs
and
quarantine;
(9)
Immigration
and
deportation;
(10)
Citizenship
and
naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational
planning;
and
(12) General auditing."[21]
In relation to the central government, it provides
that "[t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over the
Autonomous
Regions
xxx."[22]
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in
the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable",[23] and "ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress."[24] At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision"[25] over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are

administered according to law."[26] He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. [27]
Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in favor
of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation", since in that
event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to
its
constituency.[28]
But the question of whether or not the grant of
autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to
decentralize
power
rather
than
mere
administration is a question foreign to this
petition, since what is involved herein is a local
government unit constituted prior to the
ratification of the present Constitution. Hence,
the Court will not resolve that controversy now,
in this case, since no controversy in fact exists.
We will resolve it at the proper time and in the
proper
case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government
units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter
provided.[29]
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions
shall enjoy local autonomy.[30]
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous

regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic
of
the
Philippines.[31]
Page 72 of 104
An autonomous government that enjoys

autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987),
art. X, sec. 15] is subject alone to the decree of
the organic act creating it and accepted
principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy". On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted,
under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and
the Department of Local Government). [32] If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably, beyond the domain of this Court in
perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say,
of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond
our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the
former category only, it comes unarguably under
our
jurisdiction.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government
commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential
Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates
that "[t]he President shall have the power of
general
supervision
and
control
over
Autonomous Regions."[33] In the second place,
the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm,
is made to discharge chiefly administrative
services,
thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local
legislative powers over regional affairs within
the framework of national development plans,
policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative
system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development
of
the
Autonomous
Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial
programs for the Autonomous Region;
(4)
Infrastructure
Autonomous
(5) Urban and
Autonomous
(6)
Taxation
development
rural
and
planning
other
for the
Region;
for the
Region;
revenue-raising
measures as provided for in this Decree;

(7) Maintenance, operation and administration
of schools established by the Autonomous
Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance
of health, welfare and other social services,
programs
and
facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs,
traditions, languages and culture indigenous to
the
Autonomous
Region;
and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by
law, including the enactment of such measures
as may be necessary for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people in the Autonomous
Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may
be necessary to assure that enactment and acts
of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with
this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans
and
programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain
liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.[34]
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can
make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion
in question, with more reason can we review the
petitioner's
removal
as
Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his
ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the
Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5,
1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office
of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the
Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the
Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming
that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective
nevertheless
for
lack
of
quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the
November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid.
It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of
the Sangguniang Pampook,"[35] but it provides
likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his
discretion, declare a recess of short intervals."[36]
Of course, there is disagreement between the
protagonists as to whether or not the recess
called by the petitioner effective November 1
Page 73 of 104
through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals"

referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the
respondents insist that, to all intents and
purposes, it was an adjournment and that
"recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a
recess when arguments get heated up so that
protagonists in a debate can talk things out
informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and
disunity."[37] The Court agrees with the
respondents on this regard, since clearly, the
Rules speak of "short intervals". Secondly, the
Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not
have validly called a recess since the Assembly
had yet to convene on November 1, the date
session opens under the same Rules.[38] Hence,
there can be no recess to speak of that could
possibly interrupt any session. But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own,
we still invalidate the twin sessions in question,
since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess", it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could do so. In the second place, the
invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided
a plausible reason for the intermission sought.
Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not
be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake.
What appears is that instead, they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an
apparent
act
of
mutiny.
Under
the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the
ground
of
good
faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the
petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess"
in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing
about his ouster. This is not apparent from the
pleadings before us. We are convinced that the
invitation
was
what
precipitated
it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid,
we are not to be taken as establishing a
precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be
validly declared without a session having been
first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein,
we are not giving him a carte blanche to order
recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or
otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging
the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself
pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it
can do so at the proper time. In the event that
the petitioner should initiate obstructive moves,
the Court is certain that it is armed with enough

coercive
remedies
to
thwart
them.[39]
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on
the
issue
of
quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang
Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1)
REINSTATE the petitioner as Member,
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2)
REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955
JOSE
MONDANO,
PETITIONER,
VS.
FERNANDO
SILVOSA,
PROVINCIAL
GOVERNOR OF SURIGAO, JOSE ARREZA
AND OLIMPIO EPIS, MEMBERS OF THE
PROVINCIAL BOARD, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified
mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of
Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda.
de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee
accusing him of (1) rape committed on her
daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage
for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other
than the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the
Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the
complaint to the respondent provincial governor
for immediate investigation, appropriate action
and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared
before the provincial governor in obedience to
his summons and was served with a copy of the
complaint filed by the provincial governor with
the provincial board. On the same day, the
provincial governor issued Administrative Order
No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office.
Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to
hear the charges preferred against the petitioner
over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
respondents from further proceeding with the
hearing of the administrative case against him
Page 74 of 104
and for a declaration that the order of

suspension issued by the respondent provincial
governor is illegal and without legal effect.
On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for was issued after the filing
and approval of a bond for P500.
The answer of the respondents admits the facts
alleged in the petition except those that are
inferences and conclusions of law and invokes,
the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code which clothes the
department head with "direct control, direction,
and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction * * *" and to that end "may
order the investigation of any act or conduct of
under his Department and in connection
therewith may appoint a committee or designate
an official or person who shall conduct such
investigations; * * *" and the rule in the case of
Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451,
which upheld "the power of the Secretary of
Interior to conduct at its own initiative
investigation of charges against local elective
municipal officials and to suspend them
preventively," on the board proposition "that
under the presidential type of government which
we have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and
continued in force by paragraph 1, section 11,
Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Departments, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents
of the Chief Executive."
The executive departments of the Government of
the Philippines created and organized before the
approval of the Constitution continued to exist
as "authorized by law until the Congress shall
provide otherwise."[1] Section 10, paragraph 1,
Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The
the laws be faithfully executed." Under this

and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for
in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, but he does not have the same control of
local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation
of any act or conduct of any person in the service
of any bureau or office under his department is
confined to bureaus or offices under his
jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which, as already stated, the
President exercises only general supervision as
may be provided by law. If the provisions of
Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control,
direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may
order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the
provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII,
of the Constitution. If "general supervision over
all local governments" is to be construed as the
same power granted to the Department Head in
control
and
that
of
supervision.
In
administrative
law
supervision
means
provincial governor who is authorized to "receive
and investigate complaints made under oath
Page 75 of 104
against municipal officers for neglect of duty,

oppression, corruption or other form of
turpitude."[2] And if the charges are serious, "he
integrity of the officer in question." [3] Section 86
of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing
the Department Head over the administration of
* * * municipalities * * *. If it be construed that it
does and such additional power is the same
authority as that vested in the Department Head
by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, then such additional power must be
deemed to have been abrogated by section 10(1),
Article VII, of the Constitution.
In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court
held that the power of the President to remove
officials from office as provided for in section
64(b) of the Revised Ad- ministrative Code must
be done "conformably to law;" and only for
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he
"may at any time remove a person from any
position of trust or authority under the
Philippines." Again, this power of removal must
be exercised conformably to law.
In the indorsement to the provincial governor
the Assistant Executive Secretary requested
immediate investigation, appropriate action and
report on the complaint indorsed to him, and
called his attention to section 2193 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides for
the institution of judicial proceedings by the
provincial fiscal upon direction of the provincial
governor. If the indorsement of the Assistant
Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of
the provincial governor to investigate the
petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent
of the Executive, but the investigation to be
conducted by him would not be that which is
provided for in sections 2188, 2189 and 2190 of
the Revised Administrative Code. The charges
preferred against the respondent are not

malfeasances or any of those enumerated or
specified in section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, because rape and
concubinage have nothing to do with the
performance of his duties as mayor nor do they
constitute or involve "neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or any other form of
maladministration of office." True, they may
involve moral turpitude, but before the
provincial governor and board may act and
proceed in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code referred to a
conviction by final judgment must precede the
filing by the provincial governor of charges and
trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial
fiscal cannot file an information for rape without
a sworn complaint of the offended party who is
28 years of age and the crime of concubinage
cannot be prosecuted but upon a sworn
complaint of the offended spouse.[4] The charges
preferred against the petitioner, municipal
mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being
those or any of those specified in section 2188 of
the
Revised
Administrative
Code,
the
investigation of such charges by the provincial
board is unauthorized and illegal. The
suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the
municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful
and without authority of law.
The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted,
without pronouncement as to costs.
G. R. No. L-9124, July 28, 1958
BERNARDO HEBRON, PETITIONER, VS.
EULALIO
D.
REYES,
RESPONDENT.
Page 76 of 104
the
aforementioned
offices.
Petitioner
discharged the duties and functions of mayor
continuously until May 22 or 24, 1954, when he
received the following communication:
"OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
PHILIPPINES
OF THE
Manila, May 14, 1954

"Sir: "
Please be advised that the President has decided
for the good of the public service, to assume
directly the investigation to the administrative
charges against you for alleged oppression,
grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct
in office, and has designated the Provincial
Fiscal of that province as Special Investigator of
the said charges. Copy of his designation is
enclosed for your information.
In view of the serious nature of the.
aforementioned charges against you, and in
order to promote a fair and impartial
investigation thereof, you are hereby suspended
from office, effective immediately, your
suspension, to last until the final termination of
the administrative proceedings against you
aforementioned. In this connection, please be
advised that the Vice-Mayor has been directed
to assume the office of Acting Mayor during the
period of your suspension, in accordance with
the provisions of Section 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The Provincial Governor and the Special
Investigator have been advised hereof.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a quo warranto case involving the Office
of Mayor of the Municipality of Carmona,
Province of Cavite.
In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner
Bernardo Hebron, a member of the Liberal
Party, and respondent Eulalio D. Reyes, of the
Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and vicemayor, respectively, of said municipality, for a
term of four (4) years, beginning from January 1,
1952, on which date they presumably assumed
Respectfully,
By authority of
the President:
(Sgd.)
FRED
Executive Secretary
RUIZ
Mr.
BERNARDO
Municipal
Carmona,
(Record, pp. 1-2)
CASTRO
HEBRON
Mayor
Cavite"
Thereupon, respondent Eulalio D. Reyes acted

as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal
of Cavite investigated the charges referred to in
the above-quoted letter. After holding hearings
in connection with said charges, the provincial
fiscal submitted his report thereon on July 15,
1954. Since then the matter has been pending in
the Office of the President for decision.
Inasmuch as the same did not appear to be
forthcoming, and the term of petitioner, who
remained suspended, was about to expire, on
May 13, 1955, he instituted the present action for
quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent
was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of
Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still
refused to surrender said office to petitioner,
who claimed to be entitled thereto.
Respondent and the Solicitor General, who was
allowed to intervene, filed their respective
answers admitting substantially the main
allegations of fact in petitioner's complaint, but
denying the alleged illegality of petitioner's
suspension and alleging that respondent was
holding the office of the mayor in compliance
with a valid and lawful order of the President.
Owing to the nature and importance of the issue
thus raised, Dean Vicente G. Sinca of the College
of Law, University of the Philippines, and
Professor Enrique M. Fernando, were allowed to
intervene as amid curiae. At the hearing of this
case, the parties, as well as the Solicitor General
and said amid curiae, appeared and argued
extensively. Subsequently, they filed their
respective memoranda, and, on September 2,
1955, the case became submitted for decision.
The case could not be disposed of, however,
before the close of said year, because the
members of this Court could not, within the
unexpired portion thereof, reach an agreement
on the decision thereon. Although the term of
office of petitioner herein expired on December
31, 1955, his claim to the Office of Mayor of
Carmona, Cavite, has not thereby become
entirely moot, as regards such rights as may
have accrued to him prior thereto. For this
reason, and, also, because the question of law
posed in the pleadings, concerns vital feature
of the relations between the national
government and the local governments, and the
Court has been led to believe that the parties,
specially the executive department, are earnestly
Page 77 of 104
interested in a clear-cut settlement of said

question, for the same will, otherwise, continue
to be a constant source of friction, disputes and
litigations to the detriment of the smooth
operation of the Government and of the welfare
of the people, the members of this Court deem it
necessary to express their view thereon, after
taking ample time to consider and discuss full
every conceivable aspect thereof.
The issue is whether a municipal mayor, not
charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, may be removed or suspended
directly fry the President of the Philippines,
regardless of the procedure set forth in sections
2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code.
1.
At the outset, it should be noted that,

referring to local elective officers, we
held, in Lacson vs. Roque (92 Phil., 456;
49 Off. Gaz., 93, 98), that the President
has no "inherent power to remove or
suspend" them. In said case, we
declared, also:
"* * * Removal and suspension of public officers

are always controlled by the particular law
applicable and its proper construction subject to
constitutional limitation.
*******
* * * "There is neither statutory nor
constitutional provision granting the President
sweeping authority to remove municipal
officials. By article VII, section 10, paragraph (1)
of the Constitution the President 'shall * * *
exercise general supervision over all local
governments', but supervision does not
contemplate control. (People vs. Brophy, 120 P.,
2nd., 946; 49 Cal. App., 2nd., 15.)
Far from implying: control or power to remove
the President's supervisory authority over
municipal affairs is qualified by the proviso as
may be provided by law', a clear indication of
constitutional intention that the provisions was
not to be self-executing but requires legislative
implementation. And the limitation does not
stop here. It is significant to note that section
64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code in
conferring on the Chief Executive power to
remove specifically enjoins that the said power

should be exercised conformably to law, which
we assume to mean that renewals must be
accomplished only for any of the causes and in
the fashion prescribed by law and the
procedure."
What are "the causes and * * * the fashion * * *
and the procedure" prescribed by law for the
suspension of elective municipal officials? The
aforementioned sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Revised Administrative Code read:
"SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial
governor
over
municipal
officers.The
provincial governor shall receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of mal-administration
of office, and conviction by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude. For minor
delinquency, he may reprimand the offender;
and if a more severe punishment seems to be
desirable, he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused
either personally or by registered mail, and he
may in such case suspend the officer (not being
the municipal treasurer) pending action by the
board, if in his opinion the charge be one
affecting the official integrity of the officer in
question. Where suspension is thus effected the
written charges against the officer shall be filed
with the board within five days."
SEC. 2189. Trial of municipal officer by
provincial board.When written charges are
preferred by a provincial governor against a
municipal officer, the provincial board shall, at
its next meeting, regular or special, set a day,
hour, and place for the trial of the same and
notify the respondent thereof; and at the time
and place appointed, the board shall proceed to
hear and investigate the truth or falsity of said
charges, giving
the accused official full opportunity to be heard
in his defense. The hearing shall occur as soon as
may be practicable, and in case suspension has
been effected, not later than ten days from the
date the accused is furnished or has sent to him
a copy of the charges, unless the suspended
Page 78 of 104
official shall, on sufficient grounds, request an

extension of time to prepare his defense.
"The preventive suspension of a municipal
officer shall not be for more than thirty days. At
the expiration of the thirty days, the suspended
officer shall be reinstated in office without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until their completion, unless the
delay in the decision of the case is due to the
fault, neglect, or request of the accused, in which
case the time of the delay shall not be counted in
computing the time of the suspension: Provided,
That the suspension of the accused may continue
after the expiration of the thirty days above
mentioned in case of conviction until the
Secretary of the Interior shall otherwise direct or
the case shall finally be decided by said
Secretary."
"SEC. 2190. Action by provincial board.If,
upon due consideration, the provincial board
shall adjudge that the charges are not sustained,
the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall
adjudge that the accused has been guilty of
misconduct which would be sufficiently
punished by reprimand or further reprimand, it
shall direct the provincial governor to deliver
such reprimand in pursuance of its judgment;
and in either case the official, if suspended, shall
be reinstated.
"If in the opinion of the board the case is one
requiring more severe discipline, and in case of
appeal, it shall without unnecessary delay
forward to the Secretary of the Interior, within
eight days after the date of the decision of the
provincial board, certified copies of the record in
the case, including the charges, the evidence,
and the findings of the board, to which shall be
added the recommendation of the board as to
whether the official ought to be suspended,
further suspended, or finally dismissed from,
office; and in such case the board may exercise
its direction to reinstate the official, if
suspended.
"The trial of a suspended municipal official and
the proceedings incident thereto shall be given
preference over the current and routine business
of the board."
SEC. 2191. Action by Secretary of the Interior.

Upon receiving the papers in any such
proceedings, the Secretary of the Interior shall
review the case without unnecessary delay and
shall make such order for the reinstatement,
dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of
the official, as the facts shall warrant and shall
render his final decision upon the matter within
thirty days after the date on which the case was
received. Disciplinary suspension made upon
order of the Secretary of the Interior shall be
without pay. No final dismissal hereinunder
shall take effect until recommended by the
Department Head and approved by the
President of the Philippines."
As regards the effect of these provisions, suffice
it for us to quote the opinion of Mr. Justice
Tuasonformer Secretary of Justicein the case
of Villena vs. Roque (93 Phil., 363, decided on
June 19, 1953), referring, particularly, to said
section 2190 of the Revised Administrative
Code:
"By all canons of statutory construction and, I
might say with apology, common sense, the
preceding sections should control in the field of
investigations of charges against, and
suspension of, municipal officials. The
minuteness and care, in three long paragraphs,
with which the procedure in such investigations
and suspensions is outlined, clearly manifests a
purpose to exclude other modes of proceeding
by other authorities under general statutes, and
not to make the operation of said provisions
depend upon the mercy and sufferance of
higher authorities. To contend that these by
their broad and unspecified powers can also
investigate such charges and order the
temporary suspension of the erring officials
indefinitely is to defy all concepts of the
solemnity of legislative pronouncements and to
set back the march of local self-government
which it has been the constant policy of the
legislative branch and of the Constitution to
promote."
Indeed, it is, likewise, well settled that laws
governing the suspension or removal of public
officers, especially those chosen by the direct
vote of the people, must be strictly construed in
their favor.[1]
Page 79 of 104
Accordingly, when the procedure for the

suspension of an officer is specified by law, the
same must be deemed mandatory and adhered
to strictly, in the absence of express or clear
provision to the contrarywhich does not exist
with respect to municipal officers. What is more,
the language of sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Revised Administrative Code leaves no room for
doubt that the lawin the words of Mr. Justice
Tuason"frowns upon prolonged or indefinite
suspension of local elective officials" (Lacson vs.
Roque, 92 Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., 93). Pursuant
to said section 2188,
"* * * 'the provincial governor shall receive and
investigate complaints against municipal officers
for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or
other form of maladministration of office.' It
provides that in case suspension has been
effected, the hearing shall occur as soon as
practicable, in no case later than ten days from
the date the accused is furnished a copy of the
charges, unless the suspended official on
sufficient grounds asks for an extension of time
to prepare his defense. The section further warns
that the preventive suspension shall not be for
more than thirty days,' and ordains that at the
end of that period the officer should be
reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings against him
until their completion, unless the delay in the
decision of the case is due to the defendant's
fault, neglect or request and unless in case of
conviction the Secretary of the Interior shall
otherwise direct.
*******
"The policy manifested by section 2188 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which is
consecrated policy in other jurisdictions whose
republican institutions this country has copied,
requires speedy termination of a case in which
suspension has been decreed, not only in the
interest of the immediate party but of the public
in general. The electorate is vitally interested,
and the public good demands, that the man it
has elevated to office be, within the shortest
time possible, separated from the service if
proven unfit and unfaithful to its trust, and
restored if found innocent. Special proceedings
alone, unencumbered by nice technicalities of
pleading, practice and procedure, and the right

of appeal, are best calculated to guarantee quick
result." (Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz., 93, 103194, 105.)
In the case at bar, petitioner was suspended in
May 1954. The records of the investigation by
the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite, with the report of
the latter, were forwarded to the Executive
Secretary since July 15, 1954. Yet, the
administrative decision on the charges against
petitioner was not rendered, either before the
filing of the complaint herein, on May 13, 1955,
or before the expiration of petitioner's term of
office, on December 31, 1955. Manifestly,
petitioner's continued, indefinite suspension can
not be reconciled with the letter and spirit of the
aforementioned provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code.
2. Respondent and the amici curiae invoke
sections 79 (C) and 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which are of the
following tenor:
"SEC. 79 (C).
supervision.-
Power
of
direction
and
The Department Head shall have direct control,

direction, and supervision over all bureaus and
offices under his jurisdiction and may, any
provision of existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions
of the chief of said bureaus or offices when
advisable in the public interest. "The
Department Head may order the investigation of
any act or conduct of any person in the service of
any bureau or office under his Department and
in connection therewith may appoint a
committee or designate an official or person who
shall conduct such investigations, and such
committee, official, or person, may summon
witnesses by subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum, administer oath, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation."
Page 80 of 104
"SEC. 86. Bureaus and offices under the

Department of Interior.-The Department of "the
Interior shall have executive supervision over
the administration of provinces, municipalities,
chartered cities, and other local political
subdivisions, except the financial affairs and
financial agencies thereof, * * *."
Referring to these provisions, we postulated in
Mondano vs. Silvosa (97 Phil, 143; 51 Off. Gaz.,
2884, 2887) :
"The executive departments of the Government
of the Philippines created and organized before
the approval of the Constitution continued to
exist as 'authorized by law until the Congress
shall provide otherwise. Section. 10, paragraph
1, Article VH, of the Constitution provides: 'The
the laws be faithfully executed.' Under this
and offices under his jurisdiction' as provided
for in section 79(C) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the
same control of local governments as that
exercised by him over bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to
order the investigation by any act or conduct of
under his department is confined to bureaus or
offices under his jurisdiction and does not
extend to local governments over which, as
already stated, the President exercises only
general supervision as may be provided by law.
If the provisions of Section 79(C) of the Revised
Administrative Code are to be construed as
conferring upon the corresponding department
head direct control, direction, and supervision
over all local governments and that for that
reason he may order the investigation of an
official of a local government for malfeasance in
office; such interpretation would be contrary to
the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article

VII, of the Constitution. If 'general supervision
over all local governments' is to be construed as
the same power granted to the Department Head
in section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative
control
and
that
of
supervision.
In
administrative
law
supervision
means
section "79(C) of the Revised Administrative
provincial governor who is authorized to
'receive and investigate complaints made under
oath against municipal officers for neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
turpitude.' And if the charges are serious, 'he
integrity of the officer in question.' Section 86 of
the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing
the Department Head over the administration
of * * * municipalities * * *. If it be construed
that it does and such additional power is the
same authority as that vested in the Department
Head by section 79 (C) of the Revised
Administrative Code, then such additional
power must be deemed to have been abrogated
by section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution."
(51 Off. Gaz., pp. 2884, 2887-2888.)
Page 81 of 104
In fact, said section 79 (C) was inserted in the

Administrative Code by Act No. 3535, passed by
the Philippine Legislature, during the American
regime, in line with section 22 of the Jones Law,
pursuant to which "all Executive functions of the
Government must be directly under the
Governor General or within one of the Executive
departments under the supervision and control
of the Governor General." As already stated,
however, this authority of the Executive has
been constricted in our Constitution, which
maintains the presidential "control of all the
executive departments, bureau and offices," but
limits the powers of the Executive over local
governments to "supervision" of a "general," not
particular, character, and this only "as may be
provided by law."
If said section 79(C) were fully applicable to local
governments,
the
Presidentwho
now
discharges the functions of the former Secretary
of the Interiorcould "alter or modify or nullify
or set aside" any duly enacted municipal
ordinance or resolution of a provincial board, or
"substitute" his judgment in lieu of that of
municipal councils or provincial boards. Yet, it is
well settled that lie cannot even disapprove any
said ordinance or resolution, except when the
same is illegal (Gabriel vs. Gov't of Pampanga,
50 Phil., 686; Rodriguez vs. Montinola,* 50 Off.
Gaz., 4820), Thus, despite the "direct control"
and "supervision" of every Department Head
over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction, and his specific power to "repeal or
modify the decisions of the * * * bureaus and
offices" under his department, pursuant to said
section 79 (C), and the fact that "provinces,
municipalities, chartered cities and other local
political subdivisions" were among the "bureaus
and offices under the Department of Interior",
according to the above-quoted section 86, the
word "offices", as used in section 79 (C), was
not deemed to include local governments, even
before the adoption of the Constitution. Greater
adherence to this view is, obviously, demanded
by the provision of the fundamental law
reducing the presidential authority over local
governments, from "control" to mere "general
supervision."
3. Section 64 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, likewise, relied

upon by respondent and the amid
curiae, provides that the President shall
have authority "to order, when in his
opinion the good of the public service so
requires, an investigation of any action
or conduct of any person in the
government services and in connection
therewith, to designate the official
committee or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted."
Notwithstanding
this,
apparently,
unqualified grant of said authority, it is
obvious that the President may not
apply it to members of Congress and
those of the Supreme Court, in view of
the principle of separation of powers, as
to both, and of the constitutional
provisions on impeachment (Article IX
of the Constitution), as to members of
this Court. In other words, said section
64 (c) cannot be construed literally
without violating the Constitution.
Indeed, the opening paragraphs of said
section 64 read:
"In addition to his general supervisory authority,

the (Governor General) President of the
Philippines shall have such specific powers and
duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on
him by law and also, in particular, the powers
and duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall
be:" (Italics ours.)
Since the powers specified therein are given to
the President, "in addition to his general
supervisory authority", it follows that the
application of those powers to municipal
corporations-insofar as they may appear to
sanction the assumption by the Executive of the
functions of provincial governors and provincial
boards, under said sections 2188 to 2190-would
contravene
the
constitutional
provision
restricting the authority of the President over
local government to "general supervision."
4. The foregoing considerations are equally
applicable to paragraph (b) of said
section 64similarly stressed by the
respondent and the amici curiae
empowering the Executive:
Page 82 of 104
"To remove officials from office conformably to

law and to declare vacant the offices held by
such removed officials. For disloyalty to the
(United States), the Republic of the Philippines,
the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines may at any time remove a person
from any position of trust or authority under the
Philippines."
Besides, it is not claimed that petitioner falls
under the second sentence of said provision,
pursuant to which the President may "at any
time remove a person from any position of trust
or authority under the Government" for
"disloyalty" to our Republic. There is no
question of "disloyalty" in the present case.
Upon the other hand, the power of removal of
the President, under the first sentence of said
paragraph 64 (b), must be exercised
"conformably to law", which, as regards
municipal officers, is found in sections 2188 to
2191 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Accordingly, in Lacson vs. Roque, supra, we
declared:
"The contention that the President has inherent
power to remove or suspend municipal officers
is without doubt not well-taken. Removal and
suspension of public officers are always
controlled by the particular law applicable and
its proper construction subject to constitutional
limitations.
(2
McQuillen's
Municipal
Corporations [Revised], section 574.) So it has
been declared that the governor of a state, (who
is to the state what the President is to the
Republic of the Philippines) can only remove
where the power is expressly given or arises by
necessary implication under the Constitution or
statutes. (43 Am. Jur. 34.)
"There is neither statutory nor constitutional
provision granting the President sweeping
authority to remove municipal officials. By
Article VII, section ID, paragraph (1) of the
Constitution the President 'shall * * * exercise
general supervision over all local governments',
but supervision does not contemplate control.
(People vs. Brophy, 120 P., 2nd., 946; 49 Cal.
App., 2nd., 15.) Far from implying control or
power to remove, the President's supervisory
authority over municipal affairs is qualified by

the proviso 'as may be provided by law,' a clear
indication of constitutional intention that the
provision was not to be self-executing but
requires legislative implementation. And the
limitation does not stop here. It is significant to
note that section 64 (b) of the Revised
Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief
Executive power to remove specifically enjoins
that the said power should be exercised
conformably to law, which we assume to mean
that removals must be accomplished only for
any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed
by law and the procedure."
Again, petitioner herein was suspended for more
than a year and seven (7) months (representing
over three-eighths [3/8], or almost one-half
[1/2] of his full term) and, presumably, would
have remained suspended up to the present, had
his term not expired on December 31, 1955. In
Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83), it was held
that the power of removal does not imply the
authority to suspend for a substantial period of
time, which, in said case, was only one (1) year.[2]
5.
If there is any conflict between said

sections 64(6) and (c), 79 (c) and 86 of
the Revised Administrative Code, on the
one hand, and sections 2188 to 2191 of
the same code, on the other, the latter
being specific provisions, setting forth
the procedure for the disciplinary action
that may be taken, particularly, against
municipal officials-must prevail, over
the former, as general provisions,
dealing with the powers of the President
and the department heads over the
officers of the Government.[3]
Such was the view adopted in Laxamana vs.

Baltazar (92 Phil, 32; 48 Off. Gaz., 3869). The
issue therein was whether, in case of suspension
of a municipal mayor, his duties shall be
discharged by the vice-mayor, as provided in
section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code,
[4]
or by an appointee of the Provincial Governor,
with the consent of the Provincial Board,
pursuant to section 21 (a) of Republic Act No.
180 (The Revised Election Code).[5]
Page 83 of 104
It was held that, although subsequent in point of

time, section 21 (a) of Republic Act No. 180,
should yield to said section 2195.[6]
6. The alleged authority of the Executive to
suspend a municipal mayor directly,
without any opportunity on the part of
the provincial governor and the
provincial board to exercise the
administrative powers of both under
sections 2188 to 2190 of the
Administrative Code, cannot be adopted
without conceding that said powers are
subject to repeal or suspension by the
President. Obviously, this cannot, and
should not, be done without a legislation
of the most explicit and categorical
nature, and there is none to such effect.
Moreover, as stated in Mondano vs.
Silvosa (supra), said legislation would,
in effect, place local governments under
the control of the Executive and
consequently
conflict
with
the
Constitution (Article VII, section 10[1]).
That such would be the effect of
respondent's pretense, is admitted in the
very answer of the Solicitor General, on
page 5 of which he avers:
"Truly impressive in the intention to make the
Constitutional grant 'real and effective' and not a
mere splendid bauble is the significant fact that
* * * the deliberations of the Constitutional

Convention show that the grant of the
supervisory authority to Chief Executive in this
regard was in the nature of a compromise
resulting from the conflict of views in that body,
mainly between the historical view which
recognizes the right of local self-government
(People ex rel. Le Roy vs. Hurlbut [1871], 24
Mich., 44) and the legal theory which sanctions
the possession by the state of absolute control
over local governments (Booten vs. Pinson,
L.R.A. [N.S., 1917-A], 1244; 77 W. Va., 412
[1915]). The result was the recognition of the
power of supervision and all its implications and
the rejection of what otherwise would be an
imperium in imperio to the detriment of a
strong national government.' (Planas vs. Gil. 67
Phil., 62, 78.)
"Such a compromise must have contemplated

certain measure of control to be attached to the
power of 'general supervision, equivalent to the
degree of local autonomy that may be
determined by Congress, which under the
aforestated constitutional provision, possesses
final authority in applying it."
In this connection, the case of Rodriguez vs.
Montinola (94 Phil., 964; 50 Off. Gaz, 4820) is
most illuminating. The issue therein was
whether the Secretary of Finance could validly
disapprove a resolution of the Provincial Board
of Pangasinan abolishing the positions of three
special counsel in the province. Counsel for the
Secretary of Finance maintained the affirmative
view invoking, among other things, Executive
Order No. 167 ( October 8, 1938), section 2 of
which provides:
"The Department of Finance is the agency of the
National Government for the supervision and
control of the financial affairs of the provincial,
city and municipal governments". (Italics ours.)
and Executive order No. 383 (December 20,
1950) transferring the supervision and control of
the personnel and finances of provincial
governments from the Secretary of the Interior
to the Secretary of Finance. In a unanimous
decision, this Court, however, resolved the
question in the negative. Speaking for the Court,
Mr. Justice Labradora member of our
constitutional conventionlucidly stated:
"We must state frankly at the outset that the use
of the word 'control in Executive Order No. 167
finds no support or justification either in the
Constitution (which grants the President only
powers of general supervision over local
governments), or in any provision of the law.
Any effect or interpretation given to said
executive order premised on the use of the word
'control therein would be of doubtful validity.
*******
"Is the suppression of the position of three
special counsel a financial matter falling under
the supervisory power of the Secretary of
Finance over provincial governments? Whether
Page 84 of 104
or not funds are available to pay for a newly

created position is evidently a financial matter;
but the suppression of positions is not a financial
matter. The problem before the provincial board
was, Should not the services of the three special
counsel be stopped and the funds appropriated
for them used for other services? This is not a
financial matter. It is so only in the sense that
the sum appropriated for the abolished positions
reverts to the general funds to be thereafter
appropriated again as the provincial board may
provide. Were we to consider all changes in the
purposes of appropriations as financial matters,
because they may have relation to the annual
appropriations, there would be no form of
activity involving the expenditure of money that
would not fall within the power of the Secretary
of Finance to approve or disapprove. Such an
interpretation can not be held to be within the
intendment of the executive order on the
approval of the budget of the provincial board.
"Having arrived at the conclusion that the
suppression of the positions of three special
counsel is not a financial matter, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Finance, we now
proceed to examine the issue from another
angle, i.e., whether the Secretary of Finance, as
an alter ego of the President of the Philippines,
may not have the authority to disapprove the
resolution in question under the general
supervisory authority given to the President of
the Philippines in sub-paragraph (1), section 10,
of the Constitution. The supervisory authority of
the President is limited by the phrase 'as
provided by law' but there is no law in
accordance with which said authority is to be
exercised. The authority must be exercised,
therefore, in accord with general principles (of
law).
*******
"The Secretary of Finance is an official of the
central
government,
not
of
provincial
government, which are distinct and separate. If
any power of general supervision is given him
over local governments certainly it can not be
understood to mean or to include the right to
direct action or even to control action, as in
cases of school superintendents or supervisors
within their respective districts. Such power (of
general supervision) may include correction of

violations of law, or of gross errors, abuses,
offenses, or maladministration. Unless the acts
of local officials or provincial governments
constitute maladministration, or an abuse or
violation of a law, the power of general
supervision can not be exercised. In synthesis,
we hold that the power of general supervision
granted the President, in the absence of any
express provision of law, may not generally be
interpreted to mean that he, or his alterego, the
Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and
manner in which local officials shall perform or
comply with their duties.
"The act of the provincial board in suppressing
the positions of three special counsel not being
contrary to law, or an act of maladministration,
nor an act of abuse, the same may not be
disapproved by the Secretary of Finance acting
as a representative of the President by virtue of
the hitter's power of general supervision over
local governments" (Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 94
Phil., 964 50 Off. Gaz., 4820, 4825-27; Italics
ours.)
If neither the Secretary of the Interior nor the
President may disapprove a resolution of the
Provincial Board of Pangasinan, passed within
the
jurisdiction
thereof,
because
such
disapproval would connote the assumption of
control, which is denied by the Constitution, it is
"manifest that greater control would be wielded
by said officers of the national government if
they could either assume the powers vested in
said provincial board or act in substitution
thereof, such as by suspending; municipal
officials, without the administrative proceedings
prescribed in sections 2188 to 2190 of the
Administrative Code, before said board. As
stated in People vs. Brophy (120 P. [2nd series],
pp. 946, 953).
"As will be seen from an examination of the
above section of the Constitution, the powers of
the Attorney General are not without limitation.
Manifestly, 'direct supervision over every
district attorney and sheriff and over such
other law enforcement officers as may be
designated by law' does not contemplate
absolute control and direction of such officials.
Especially is this true as to sheriffs and district
Page 85 of 104
attorneys, as the provision plainly indicates.

These officials are public officers, as
distinguished from mere employees, with public
duties delegated and entrusted to them, as
agents, the performance of which is an exercise
of a part of the governmental functions of the
particular political unit for which they, as
agents, are active. Coulter vs. Pool, 187 Cal. 181,
201 p. 121. Moreover, sheriffs and district
attorneys are officers created by the
Constitution. In that connection it should be
noted that there is nothing in section 21 of
article V that indicates any intention to depart
from the general scheme of state government by
counties and cites and counties, as well as local
authority in cities, as provided by sections 71/2,
71/2a, 8 and 81/2, of Article XI. By interpreting
section 21 of article V in the light of the abovementioned provisions, it is at once evident that
'supervision does not contemplate control, and
that sheriffs and district attorneys cannot avoid
or evade the duties and responsibilities of their
respective offices by permitting a substitution of
judgment. The sole exception appears to be that
whenever 'in the opinion of the AttorneyGeneral any law of the State is not being
adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the
duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute,' in
which cases 'he shall have all the powers of a
district attorney. But even this provision affords
no excuse for a district attorney or a sheriff to
yield the general control of his office and duties
to the Attorney General." (Italics ours.)
7.
The philosophy upon which our system

of local governments is hinged rejects
the theory of respondent herein.
"The starting point from which the Question

may be considered is article VII, section 10, of
the
Constitution
of
the
Philippines,
subparagraph (1) of which provides as follows:
'(1) The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'
"It might be helpful to recall that under the
Jones Law the Governor General had both
control and supervision over all local
governments, (Section 22, Jones Law) The

evident aim of the members of the
Constitutional Convention in introducing the
change, therefore, must have been to free local
governments from the control exercised by the
central government, merely allowing the latter
supervision over them. But this supervisory
jurisdiction is not unlimited; it is to be exercised
'as may be provided by law.'
"At the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
provincial governments had been in existence
for over thirty years, and their relations with the
central government had already been denned by
law. Provincial governments were organized in
the Philippines way back in the year 1901 upon
the approval of Act No. 82 by the Philippine
Commission on January 31, 1901. The policy
enjoined by the President of the United States in
his Instructions to the Philippine Commission
was for the insular government to have 'only
supervision and control over local governments
as may be necessary to secure and enforce
faithful and efficient administration by local
officers.' (McKinley Instruction to Philippine
Commission, April 7, 1900.) The aim of the
policy was to enable the Filipinos to acquire
experience in the art of self-government, with
the end in view of later allowing them to
assume complete management and control of
the adminstration of their local affairs. This
policy is the one now embodied in the above
quoted provision of the Constitution."
(Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 94 Phil., 964, 50 Off.
Gaz., 4820, 4823-4824.) (Italics ours.)
As early as April 7, 1900, President McKinley, in
his Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission, laid down the policy that our
municipal governments should be "subject to the
least degree of supervision and control" on the
part of the national government; that said
supervision and control should be "confined
within the narrowest limits"; that in the
distribution of powers among the governments
to be organized in the Philippines, the
presumption is always to be in favor of the
smaller subdivision"; that the organization of
local governments should follow "the example
of the distribution of powers between the states
and the national government of the United
States"; and that, accordingly, the national
Page 86 of 104
government "shall have no direct administration

except of matters of purely general concern."
If such were the basic principles underlying the
organization of our local governments, at a time
when the same were under the control of the
Governor-General (the direct representative of
the United States, which has delegated to us
some governmental powers, to be exercised in
the name of the United States), with more
reason must those principles be observed under
the Constitution of the Philippines, pursuant to
which "sovereignty resides in the (Filipino)
people and all government authority emanates
from them" and the power of the President over
local governments is limited to "general
supervision * * * as may be provided by law."
Thus, commenting on the executive power over
municipalities, Dean Sinco, in his work on
Philippine Political Law (10th ed., pp. 695-697),
expressed himself as follows:
"Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over the supervised party.
Hence, the power of general supervision over
local governments should exclude, in the strict
sense, the authority to appoint and remove
local officials.
"The Congress of the Philippines may pass laws
which shall guide the President in the exercise of
his power of supervision over provinces and
municipalities; but it may not pass laws
enlarging the extent of his supervisory
authority to the power of control. To do 60
would be assuming the right to amend the
Constitution which expressly limits the power of
the President over local governments to general
supervision.
"The question then arises: How should
disciplinary action be taken against a, local
official who might be guilty of dereliction of
duty? The legal procedure in such cases will
have to be judicial, not administrative. An
action will have to be presented in court
charging the official with violation of law or
neglect of his duties. The Constitution in this
respect does not establish anything novel; it
Page 87 of 104
merely revives the rule of law in place of

administrative discretion.
the Courts are veering away from its early

pronouncements." (Italics ours.)
"Local autonomy may thus be established to a

limited degree. In the deliberations of the
committee on provincial and municipal
governments of the Constitutional Convention
held in Manila in 1934, there was practical
unanimity of opinion among the delegates that
provincial and municipal governments should
enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. The first
drafts prepared by the committee on provincial
and municipal governments included provisions
intended to protect the local governments
against the absolute control of the central
government. Some difficulty was, however,
encountered in expressing objectively the
necessary provisions protective of local
autonomy. This was due to the other desire of
many of the delegates of establishing a strong
central government. Concretely the problem was
how to keep some degree of local autonomy
without weakening the national government.
The draft of the committee on provincial and
municipal governments was not considered
satisfactory, and so it was not incorporated in
the Constitution. But the idea of giving local
governments a measure of autonomy was not
completely given up. It is, therefore, logical to
conclude that the Constitution in limiting
expressly the power of the President over local
governments to mere general supervision
expresses a concession to the general demand
for some local autonomy. This idea of a
compromise or concession should serve as a
guide in construing the extent of the powers of
the President over local governments.
8. It is urged that the authority of the

President
over
our
municipal
corporations is not identical to that of
State Governors in the United States, for
the former is the Executive, with more
comprehensive powers than those of the
latter, who are merely chief executives,
and in Severino vs. Governor General
(16 Phil., 366, 386), it was held:
"The Supreme Court of the Philippines, however,

while admitting that the power of supervision
over local governments given by the Constitution
to the President is not coextensive with control,
before the last war declared that the totality of
executive powers constitutionally vested in the
President and the adoption of the Presidential
type of government for the Philippines gave the
President a comprehensive authority over all
local officials. This broad interpretation of
Presidential powers would stultify the specific
limitation
expressly
provided
in
the
Constitution. Fortunately, newer decisions of
"* * * Governors of States in the Union are not

the executives' but are only the 'chief
executives. All State official associated with the
governor, it may be said as a general rule, are,
both in law and in fact, his colleagues, not his
agents nor even his subordinates. * * * They are
not given him as advisers; on the contrary they
are coordinated with him. As a general rule he
has no power to suspend or remove them. It is
true that in a few of the States the governors
have power to appoint certain high officials, but
they can not be removed for administrative
reasons. These are exceptions to the general
rule. The duties of these officials are prescribed
by Constitutional provisions or by statute, and
not by the governor. The actual execution of a
great many "of the laws does not lie with the
governors, but with the local officers who are
chosen by the people in the towns" and counties
and bound to the central authorities of the
States by no real bonds of responsibility. In
most of the States there is a significant
distinction between the State and local officials,
such as county and city officials over whom the
governors have very little, if any, control; while
in this country the Insular and provincial
executive officials are bound to the GovernorGeneral by strong bonds of responsibility. So
we conclude that the powers, duties, and
responsibilities' conferred upon the GovernorGeneral are far more comprehensive than those
conferred upon State governors. (Italics ours.)
Although accurate, this view is immaterial to the
issue before us. The Severino case referred to the
authority of the American Governor-General
over local governments established in the
Philippines, as an unincorporated territory or
insular possession of the United States, which
local governments had been placed by
McKinley's
Instructionsratified
in
the
Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of the U. S. of
July 1, 1902)and the Jones Law (Act of
Congress of the U. S. of August 29, 1916), under
the "control" of said officer. The case at bar deals
with the authority of the President of the
Philippines, as a sovereign state, over local
governments created by Philippine laws,
enacted by representatives of the Filipino
people, who elected said representatives and are
the ultimate repository of our sovereignty (Sec.
1, Art. II, of the Constitution), in the exercise of
which they adopted and promulgated a
Constitution, and ordained therein, that, in lieu
of the power of control of the former GovernorsGeneral, our Executive shall merely exercise
"general supervision over all local governments
as may be provided by law." (Article VII,
Section 10[1], of the Constitution.)
Obviously, this provision vests in the President
of the Republic less powers over municipal
corporations than those possessed by our former
Governors-General.[7]
9. It has, also, been pointed out that
municipal corporations in the United
States have the power of "local selfgovernment", which is not given to our
political sub-divisions. This means
simply that, whereas the former may not
be deprived of their right to local "selfgovernment", the latter have only such
autonomy, if any, as the central
government may deem fit to grant
thereto, and that said autonomy shall be
under the control of the national
government, which may decree its
increase, decrease, or, even, complete
abolition. But, who shall exercise this
power, on behalf of the State? Not the
Executive,
but
the
Legislative
department, as an incident of its
authority to create or abolish municipal
corporations, and, consequently, to
define its jurisdiction and functions.
Hence, after noting the difference
between the power of control of the
Executive, under the former organic
laws, and that of general supervision,
under the Constitution, Dean Sinco
stated in his above-cited work:
Page 88 of 104
"* * * It is, therefore, obvious that local

governments are subject to the control of
Congress which has the authority to prescribe
the procedure by which the President may
perform his constitutional power of general
supervision." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law,
10th ed., p. 294; (Italic ours.)
10. It is next said that, although the power
of general supervision of the President
imposes upon him the duty of noninterference in purely corporate affairs
of local governments, such limitation
does not apply to its political affairs. To
bolster up this proposition, the following
has been cited:
'A municipal corporation, being recognized as an
appropriate
instrumentality
for
the
administration of general laws of the state within
its boundaries and appointed and empowered
for that purpose, thereby becomes an agent of
the state for local administration and
enforcement of its sovereign power. This is the
governmental aspect of the municipal
corporation. In their public and governmental
aspects municipal corporations are referred to as
arms of the state government, auxiliaries of the
state, branches of the state government,
subordinate divisions of the state government,
delegates of the sovereign state, local divisions of
the state, parts of the state government, parts of
the civil government of the state, parts of the
governmental machinery of the state, parts of
the machinery by which the state conducts its
governmental affairs, political subdivisions of
the state, political or governmental portions of
the state in which they are situated, public
agencies. They are not only representatives of
the state, but portions of its governmental
power. They represent no sovereignty distinct
from the state itself. The government exercised
by a municipal corporation is exercised as an
agency of the whole public, and for all the people
of the state. A municipal corporation is, within
its prescribed sphere, a political power. In its
governmental capacity it may command; it is a
municipal government; a public corporation.'
(43 C. J., 69-70)
The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines is a term which refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which

the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as
the contrary appears from the context, the
various arms through which political authority
is made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the central Government or to the
provincial or municipal branches or other form
of local government.' (Art. I, Sec. 2, Rev. Adm.
Code; (Italics ours.)" (See Answer of the Solicitor
General, pp. 9-10)
These authorities are good law, but its
implications have seemingly been misconstrued,
for they refer to the power of the State, exercised
through its law-making body, not the Executive.
In the Philippines, the constitutional provision
limiting the authority of the President over local
governments to general supervision is
unqualified and, hence, it applies to all powers
of municipal corporations, corporate and
political alike. Thus, for instance, municipal
ordinances, enacted under the police power
delegated to municipal corporations, involve the
exercise of not corporate, but political authority.
Yet, admittedly, such ordinances are not subject
to presidential control. The Executive may not
repeal, modify or even disapprove said
ordinances-no matter how unwise-the same
being within the powers conferred by law upon
local governments.
In fact, there was no need of specifically
qualifying the constitutional powers of the
President as regards the corporate functions of
local governments, inasmuch as the Executive
never had any control over said functions.[8]
What is more, the same are not, and never have
been, under the control even of Congress, for, in
the exercise of corporate, non-governmental or
non-political functions, municipal corporations
stand practically on the same level, vis-a-vis the
National Government or the State-as private
corporations.[9] Consequently, the aforesaid
limitation of the powers of the President over
local governments from "control to "general
supervision", could have had no other purpose
than to affect his authority with regard precisely
to political functions.
Page 89 of 104
In Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil.,

451), the Solicitor General invoked the
distinction between the governmental and the
corporate powers of municipal corporations in
support of the alleged direct authority of the
Secretary of the Interior to suspend a municipal
mayor. The argument was rejected by this Court
in the following language:
"* * * if the power of suspension of the Secretary
of the Interior is to be justified on the plea that
the pretended power is governmental and not
corporate, the result would be more disastrous.
Then and thereunder, the Secretary of the
Interior, in lieu of the mayor of the municipality,
could directly veto municipal ordinances and
resolutions under section 2229 of the Revised
Administrative Code; he could, without any
formality, elbow aside the municipal mayor and
himself make appointments to all non-elective
positions in the municipal service, under section
2199 of the Revised Administrative Code; he
could, instead of the provincial governor, fill a
temporary vacancy in any municipal office under
subsection (a), section 2188, as amended, of the
said Code; he could even directly appoint
lieutenants of barrios and wrest the authority
given by section 2218 of the Revised
Administrative Code to a municipal councilor.
Instances may be multiplied but it is
unnecessary to go any further. Prudence, then,
dictates that we should hesitate to accept the
suggestion urged upon us by the SolicitorGeneral, especially where we find the path
indicated by him neither illumined by the light
of our own experience nor cemented by the
virtuality of legal principles but is, on the
contrary, dimmed by the recognition however
limited in our own Constitution of the right of
local self-government and by the actual
operation and enforcement of the laws
governing
provinces,
chartered
cities,
municipalities and other political subdivisions.
It is not any question of wisdom of legislation
but the existence of any such destructive
authority in the law invoked by the Government
that we are called upon to pass and determine
here." (Villena vs. Sec. of the Interior, 67 Phil.,
451, 461-462.)
11. The case of Planas vs. Gil, supra, cited in
favor of respondent herein, is not in

point, for Planas was a councilor of the
City of Manila, which-for administrative
purposes-has, also, the status of a
province (see section 2440, Revised
Administrative Code; Republic Act No.
409, section 14). As such, it was under
the direct supervision of the Department
of
Interior,[10]
unlike
regular
municipalities, such as that of Carmona,
Cavite, which are under the immediate
supervision of the Provincial Governor
(section 2082, Revised Administrative
Code). In short, sections 2188 to 2191 of
the Administrative Code have never
been, and are not, applicable to the City
of Manila, the charter of which contains
no counterpart thereof.
12. The case of Villena vs. Roque (93 Phil.,
363)likewise
relied
upon
by
respondentis substantially different
from the one at bar. Administrative
charges were filed, against Mayor
Villena, with the office of the President,
which referred the matter to the
Provincial Governor of Rizal, but the
Provincial Board thereof failed to act
on said charges for an unreasonable
length of time. Under such facts it is
understandable that the power of
supervision of the President was
invoked, either to compel action, which
the Provincial Board had the duty to
take, or, in view of its obvious
unwillingness to comply therewith, to
cause the charges to be investigated by
somebody else, in line with the
responsibility of the Executive "to take
care that the laws be faithfully
executed."
In the present case, however, the Provincial

Board of Cavite never had a chance to
investigate the charges against petitioner
herein. From the very beginning, the office of
the Executive assumed authority to act on said
charges. Worse still, such assumption of
authority was made under such conditions as to
give the impression that the Provincial Governor
and the Provincial Board were banned from
exercising said authority. Frankly, we are unable
to see, how the aforementioned assumption of
authority may be justified, either under the
power of "general supervision," or under the
duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully
Page 90 of 104
executed." As held in Mondano vs. Silvosa (51

Off. Gaz., 2888), in line with settled principles in
administrative
law,
"supervision
means
duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step as
power of an official to alter or modify or nullify
the latter." When the office of the Executive
Department acted, in the case at bar, in lieu, or
in substitution, of the Provincial Board of Cavite,
the former sought, therefore, to "control" the
latter. What is more, instead of compelling the
same to comply with its duties under sections
2188 to 2191 of the Administrative Code, the
former, in effect, restrained, prevented or
prohibited it from performing said duties.
13. Let us now examine the case of Villena
vs. The Secretary of the Interior (67
Phil., 451). It involved the same Mayor
of Makati, Rizal, Jose D. Villena, whom
the Secretary of the Interior suspended,
allegedly with the authority of the
President, who, it was claimed, had
verbally expressed no objection thereto.
Then Villena was advised of the charges
against him and of the designation of a
given official to investigate the same.
Thereafter notified of the date set for the
hearing of the aforementioned charges,
before said official, Villena applied for a
writ of prohibition to restrain the
Secretary of the Interior and his agents
from proceeding with said investigation.
The issues raised were whether the
Secretary of the Interior had authority
(a) to order the investigation and (b) to
suspend Villena.
The first question was resolved in the
affirmative, upon the ground that the power of
supervision of department heads, under section
79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code,
"implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render the power real and
effective," as held in Planas vs. Gil (67 Phil., 62).
The Court was divided on the second question.

The majority opinion, subscribed by four (4)
Justices, including its writer, used the following
language:
"* * * the question, it may be admitted, is not
free from difficulties. There is no clear and
express grant of power to the secretary to
suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under
investigation. On the contrary, the power
appears lodged in the provincial governor by
section 2188 of the Administrative Code * * *.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension
is expressly granted by section 2188 of the
Administrative Code to the provincial governor
does not mean that the grant is necessarily
exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the
Interior from exercising a similar power * * *
"After serious reflection, we have decided to
sustain the contention of the government in this
case on the broad proposition, albeit not
suggested, that under the presidential type of
government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization
established and continued in force by paragraph
1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all
executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads
of the various executive departments, are
assistance and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in
person or in exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive." (Villena vs. The Secretary of
the Interior, 67 Phil., 451, 459-460, 463.)
Concurring in the result, Associate Justice
Villareal observed:
"* * * The Secretary of the Interior is nowhere
given the power to suspend a municipal elective
officer pending charges, and in the absence of
Page 91 of 104
such power he may not suspend him. The power

to suspend cannot be implied even from an
arbitrary power to remove, except where the
power to remove is limited to cause; in such
case, the power to suspend, made use of as a
disciplinary power pending charges, is regarded
as included within the power of removal Corpus
Juris, sec. 142, page 982). Provincial governors
alone are expressly empowered to suspend
municipal officers under certain conditions by
section 2188 of the Revised Administratice Code,
and the President of the Philippines by section
2191, as amended, of the same Code. Though the
suspension of the petitioner by the Secretary of
the Interior was unauthorized, the implied
approval by the President of the Philippines
validated such suspension." ( Id., 67 Phil., 465466.)
Likewise, Associate Justice Imperial concurred
in the result, upon the ground that:
"* * *(1) the President of the Philippines, under
sections 64(b), and 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as the later has been
amended, and section 11(1), Article VII, of the
Constitution, is vested with the power to expel
and suspend municipal officials for grave
misconduct, and it appears that the suspension
was ordered by virtue of that authority; and (2)
the Secretary of the Interior acted within the
powers conferred upon him by section 79(c), in
connection with section 86, of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, in ordering
an administrative investigation of the charges
against the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of
the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal."
( Id., 67 Phil., 466.)
He dissented, however, insofar as the majority
held that the acts of department secretaries are
"presumptively the case of the executive" and
that the suspension directed by the Secretary of
the Interior should be considered as one
"decreed by the President" himself.
Then Associate Justice, later Chief Justice,
Moran, similarly, dissented from said view of the
majority and concurred in the result.
It is interesting to note that the authority of the
President to suspend Mayor Villena was not
Page 92 of 104
even discussed. It was taken for granted. The

reason may be gleaned from the following
passage of the majority opinion:
Sanges, 144 U.S., 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146

U.S., 82; Louisville Trust Co. vs. Knott, 191 U.S.,
22).
"* * * counsel for the petitioner admitted in the

oral argument that the President of the
Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner
from office in virtue of his greater power of
removal
(Section
2191,
as
amended,
Administrative
Code)
to
be
exercised
conformably to law. Indeed, if the President
could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove
a municipal official, it would be a legal
incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser
power of suspension.
14. It is but fair to note that the action of the

Executive
Department
of
our
Government against petitioner herein
was evidently taken in the earnest belief
that public interest demanded and
justified it and had, in all probability,
been premised upon the seeming
implication of some of the former
decisions of this Court. However, in the
words of Mr. Justice Labrador, "the
question before us is not one of necessity
or usefulness, but exclusively one of
authority or prerogative" (Rodriguez
vs. Montinola, 50 Off. Gaz., 4820,
4828).
Furthermore,
paraphrasing
Lacson vs. Roque (49 Off. Gaz., 93, 99),
"it may be true, as suggested, that the
public interest and the proper
administration of official functions
would be best served" by granting the
Executive original authority to suspend
a municipal mayor. However,
And the incongruity would be more patent if,

possessed of the power both to suspend and to
remove a provincial official (section 2078,
Administrative Code), the President were to be
without the power to suspend a municipal
official. Here is, parenthetically, an instance
where, as counsel for petitioner admitted, the
power to suspend a municipal official is not
exclusive." ( Id.; 67 Phil., 460; Italics supplied.)
More important still, said majority opinion and
the aforementioned separate opinions cited
section 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code
as the source of the power of the Executive to
suspend and remove municipal officials.
However, said provision deals with such power
of suspension and removal on appeal from a
decision of the Provincial Board in proceedings
held under sections 2188 to 2190 of the said
Code. Nowhere in said opinions was anything
said on the question whether said appellate
authority implies a grant of original power to
suspend, either without an appeal from said
decision of the Provincial Board, or without any
proceedings before said Board calling for the
exercise of its disciplinary functions under said
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
In other words, the Court passed this question
sub silentio. Hence, the decision in Villena vs.
Secretary of the Interior (supra) does not come
within the purview of the rule of stare decisis,
insofar as the aforesaid question is concerned,
and, as regards the same, neither binds this
Court nor bars it from passing thereon (McGirr
vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568-569;
U.S. vs. More, 3 Cranch, 159, 172; U.S. vs.
"* * * The answer to this observation is that the

shortcoming is for the legislative branch alone
to correct by appropriate enactment. It is trite to
say that we are not to pass upon the folly or
wisdom of the law. As had been said in Cornejo
vs. Naval, supra, anent identical criticisms, 'if
the law is too narrow in. scope, it is for the
Legislature rather than the courts to expand it.
It is only when all other means of determining
the legislative intention fail that a court may
look into the effect of the law; otherwise the
interpretation becomes judicial legislation.
( Kansasex rel. Little vs. Mitchell, 70 L.R.A.,
306; Dudly vs. Reynolds, 1 Kan., 285.)" (Lacson
vs. Roque, supra.; Italics supplied.)
Then again, the issue submitted for our
determination has never been squarely
presented and decided. Referring to a similar
situation, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
"* * *It may be frankly admitted that there are
expressions in some of the decisions relied upon
that lend support to counsel's position that the
court has heretofore intimated that section 2 of
the Vacation Act is unconstitutional, but in our
Page 93 of 104
judgment this is the first time that the

constitutionality of this act has been squarely in
the record and necessary for the consideration
and decision of this court, and we are
confronted with the proposition whether we
should follow what is dicta in those cases in
construing section 2 of the Vacation Act, and
thus follow an erroneous construction of said
Act. This court has said:
that the court has made a mistake it 'will not

decline to correct it, even though it may have
been reasserted and acquiesced in for a long
number of years.' In Paul vs. Davis, 100 Ind.
422, the court said (page 427):
'It is highly important that the decisions of the

court affecting the right to property should be
uniform and stable; but cases will sometimes
occur in the decision of the most enlightened
judges where the settled rules and reasons of the
law have been departed from, and in such cases
it becomes the duty of the court, before the error
has been sanctioned by repeated decisions, to
embrace the first opportunity to pronounce the
law as it is. Frink vs Carat 14 III. 304, 58 Am.
Dec. 575.
"In Propeller Genesee Chief vs. Fitsnugh, 53 U.S.

(12 How.) 443 456, 13 L. Ed. 1058, the court
said:
"The McNeer Case, supra, is a case particularly

in point in support of the reasoning just given.
In that case the court overruled the decision of
Russell vs. Rumsey, 35 III. 362, which had been
followed in Rose. vs. Sanderson, 38 III. 247, and
Steele vs. Gellatly, 41 III. 39, notwithstanding
the decision in the Russel Case had stood
unchallenged for 28 years and notwithstanding
the opinion in that case squarely decided the
question involved that inchoate dower, although
only an expectancy, was as completely beyond
legislative control as an estate. In Chicago,
Danvilla & Vincennes Railroad Co. vs. Smith, 62
111. 268, 14 Am. Rep. 99, the court discussed at
some length the doctrine of stare decisis and
authorities in other jurisdictions that bear on
that subject where a constitutional question is
involved, and from that discussion we think it
may be fairly said that the conclusion of the
court was that the rule of stare decisis will not
prevent the courts from reviewing a
constitutional question where the facts in the
instant case are slightly different from those in
former decisions. In Arnold vs. Knoxville, 115
Tenn. 195, 90 S. W. 469, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 837, 5
Ann. Cas. 881, the court considered the same
doctrine as to the necessity of recognizing to the
fullest extent and adhering to that doctrine in
passing upon and construing the provisions of
the organic law, but stated that when it is clear
'The law is a science of principles, and this

cannot be true if a departure from principle can
be perpetuated by a persistence in error.'
'It is the decision in the case of The Thomas

Jefferson which mainly embarrasses the court in
the present inquiry. We are sensible of the great
weight to which it is entitled. But at the same
time we are convinced that, if we follow it, we
follow an erroneous decision into which the
court fell, when the great importance of the
question as it now presents itself could not be
foreseen; and the subject did not therefore
receive that deliberate consideration which at
this time would have been given to it by the
eminent men who presided here when that case
was decided." (Prall vs. Burckhartt, 132 N.E.
280, 287-288; Italics ours.)[10]
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present
law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to
2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the
suspension and removal of the municipal
officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that,
in the absence of a clear and explicit provision to
the contrary, relative particularly to municipal
corporationsand none has been cited to us
said procedure is exclusive; that the executive
department of the national government, in the
exercise of its general supervision over local
governments, may conduct investigations with a
view to determining whether municipal officials
are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the
administrative action referred to in said
sections, as a means only to ascertain whether
the provincial governor and the provincial board
should take such action; that the Executive may
take appropriate measures to compel the
provincial governor and the provincial board to
take said action, if the same is warranted, and
they failed to do so; that the provincial governor
and the provincial board may not be deprived by
the Executive of the power to exercise the

authority conferred upon them in sections 2188
to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code; that
such would be the effect of the assumption of
those powers by the Executive; that said
assumption of powers would further violate
section 2191 of the same code, for the authority
therein vested in the Executive is merely
appellate in character; that, said assumption of
powers, in the case at bar, even exceeded those
of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board,
in whom original jurisdiction is vested by said
sections 2188 to 2190, for, pursuant thereto, "the
preventive suspension of a municipal officer
shall not be for more than 30 days" at the
expiration of which he shall be reinstated, unless
the delay in the decision of the case is due to his
fault, neglect or request, or unless he shall have
meanwhile been convicted, whereas petitioner
herein was suspended "until the final
determination of the proceedings" against him,
regardless of the duration thereof and cause of
the delay in its disposition; [11] and that so much
of the rule laid down in Villena vs. Secretary of
the Interior (67 Phil., 451) and Villena vs. Roque
(93 Phil., 363), as may be inconsistent with the
foregoing views, should be deemed, and, are
hereby, reversed or modified accordingly.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring that the suspension of herein
petitioner was null and void, for non-compliance
with the provisions above referred to, with costs
against respondent Eulalio D. Reyes. It is so
ordered.
G. R. No. L-11336, August 30, 1958
RODOLFO GANZON, PETITIONER AND
APPELLANT, VS. UNION C. KAYANAN,
RESPONDENT
AND
APPELLEE.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On August 25, 1956, Ernesto V. Rosales lodged a
verified complaint against petitioner with the
President reading as follows:
"Complainant Ernesto V. Rosales most humbly
and respectfully submits to the President of the
Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay, for investigation
and
appropriate
action,
the
following
Page 94 of 104
administrative charges against the respondent

Rodolfo Ganzon incumbent Mayor of Iloilo City,
which
charges
are:
Count 1. That on August 22, 1956 the respondent
taking advantage of his public position as Mayor
of Iloilo City and accompanied by his armed
body-guards and henchmen, stormed into the
broadcasting station of DYRI of Iloilo City, and
with violence and intimidation, unjustifiably and
unlawfully stopped the radio-press interview
program People's Forum' of said station, thus,
suppressing and curtailing for about a quarter
hour the complainant's right to free speech, the
radio station's right to broadcast, and the
people's right to listen to a radio-press
interviews, which acts constitute oppression or
unjust exercise of authority or power and/or
grave
misconduct
in
office.
Count 2. That during the occurrenae of the acts
mentioned in Count 1, the respondent Mayor of
Iloilo City arrogantly took the law in his Own
hands by personally pushing away the
microphones and hitting on the back of the neck
the complainant, who is a radio commentator
and program director of Station DYRI of Iloilo
City, and a member of the panel of interrogators
of the 'People's Forum', a public service press
interview program of said nature, constitutive of
oppression and shameful misconduct in office.
Count 3. That during the occurrence of the acts
above-stated in Counts 1 and 2, the respondent
Mayor of Iloilo City, in a fit of devouring fury,
unrestrainedly hurled invectives at the
complainant, calling the latter indecent badmannered, dammed-no-good-Cebuano who
should evacuate to Cebu and other similar
names, which verbal acts constituted oppression
and oral defamation, highly unbecoming of Iloilo
City's supposedly No. 1 public official and model
citizen.
In view of the foregoing, the complainant most
respectfully prays:
1.
That an investigation of the

administrative charges above
specified be ordered by the
President of the Philippines,
after which the corresponding
and proper action be taken
against the respondent who has
demonstrated his unfitness to
continue
exercising
governmental power; and,

2. That in the interest of public
welfare
and
safety,
the
respondent be immediately
suspended from office, so as to
prevent the further misuse of
authority and power pending
such investigation, particularly
on witnesses to the abovespecified charges."
On September 13, 1956, the Executive Secretary,

by authority of the President, designated
respondent to conduct the investigation of said
complaint pursuant to the provisions of Section
64 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code
granting said respondent all the powers given to
an investigating officer by Sections 71 and 580 of
the
same
Code.
On September 18, 1956, respondent served a
copy of the complaint on petitioner and set the
investigation of the charges on September 20,
1956. Petitioner, having filed a motion for
postponement, respondent definitely set the
investigation for September 25 and 26, 1956. On
September 24,1956, petitioner instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Uoilo an action for
prohibition
with
preliminary
injunction
questioning the authority of the President to
order his investigation and praying that
respondent be enjoined to suspend and desist
from proceeding with the investigation and that,
pending decision of the case on the merits, a
preliminary injunction be issued against
respondent. On September 26, 1956, the lower
court declined to issue the writ and instead set
the case for hearing on the merits on September
28, 1956. At the hearing, both parties agreed to
admit all the facts Bet forth in the pleadings and
submitted the case for decision. And on October
2, 1956, the lower court rendered decision
dismissing the petition. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
took
the
present
appeal.
The issues posed by petitioner are:
"1. That the President of the Philippines has no
authority under the Constitution or under any
law to order the investigation of petitionerappellant on the charges averred in the
administrative complaint for the purpose of
suspension
and/or
removal.
2. That the charges averred in the administrative
complaint are penal in nature and the remedies
sought for are punitive and/or disciplinary in
Page 95 of 104
character;
3. That the charges against petitioner-appellant
do not allege acts constituting disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines as provided for in
Section 64(6) of the Revised Administrative
Code which is the only ground for the
suspension and/or removal of an elective city
mayor,
and
4. That granting arguendo that the grounds
enumerated in Section 2078 of the Revised
Administrative Code for the removal of
provincial officials are applicable by analogy
and/or implication to an elective city mayor, the
administrative complaint in question does not
allege facts constituting oppression or
misconduct in office and dishonesty, much less
disloyalty."
The present appeal involves the paramount issue
of whether the President of the Philippines has
the power and authority under our Constitution
and the laws at present in force in this
jurisdiction to investigate the mayor of a city
and, if found guilty, to take disciplinary action
against him as the evidence and law may
warrant.
At the outset, it should be stated that petitioner
is the duly elected mayor of the City of Iloilo
whose charter, speaking of his removal, merely
provides that he "shall hold office for six years
unless removed" (Section 8, Commonwealth Act
No. 158, as amended). The charter does not
contain any provision as regards the procedure
by which he may be removed. Nevertheless, as
this Court ,has once said, "the rights, duties, and
privileges of municipal officers (including city
officials) do not have to be embodied in the
charter, but may be regulated by provisions of
general application specially if these are
incorporated in the same code of which the city
organic law forms a part" (Lacson vs. Roque, 92
Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz., No. 1, pp. 93, 97). The
code herein referred to is the Revised
Administrative
Code.
Now, the charter of Iloilo City, as we have
already stated, says that the mayor "shall hold
office for six years unless removed." It does not
say that he shall hold office at the pleasure of the
President unlike similar provisions appearing in
other city charters. The idea is to give the mayor
a definite tenure of office not dependent upon
the pleasure of the President. If this were the
case, he could be separated from the service
regardless of the cause or motive. But when he

was given a definite tenure, the implication is
that he can only be removed for cause.
"'An inferential authority to remove at pleasure
can not be deduced, since the existence of a
defined term, ipao facto, negatives such an
inference, and implies a contrary presumption,
i.e. that the incumbent shall hold office to the
end of his term subject to removal for cause.'
(State ex rel Gallaghar vs. Brown, 57 Mo. Ap.,
203, expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in
States ex ret. vs. Maroney, 191 Mo. 648; 90 S.
W., 141; States vs. Crandell, 269 Mo., 44; 190 S.
W., 889; State vs. Salval, 450, 2d, 995; 62 C. J.,
S., 947,)" (Lacson vs. Roque, supra)
The question that now arises is: Does the
President have power and authority to
investigate petitioner with a view to his removal
under the above provision of the charter of Iloilo
City? If so, for what causes may he authorize
such
investigation?
The pertinent provisions governing the power of
the President over local officials, be they
provincial, city or municipal, are embodied in
Section 64(6) and (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, in connection with the
provisions of Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII
of the Constitution. For ready reference, we will
hereunder quote said provisions:
"(b) To remove officials from office conformably
to law and to declare vacant the offices held by
such removed officials. For disloyalty to the
(United States), the Republic of the Philippines,
the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines may at any time remove a person
from any position of trust or authority under the
Philippines.
(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, an investigation of
any action or the conduct of any person in the
Government service, and in connection
therewith to designate the official, committee, or
person by whom such investigation shall be
conducted."
"SEC. 10. (1) The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
It may clearly be inferred from the above that
the President may remove any official in the
government service "conformably to law" and to
Page 96 of 104
declare vacant the office held by the removed

official. And to this end, the President may order
"an investigation of any action or the conduct of
any person in the Government service, and in
connection therewith to designate the official
committee, or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted." Note that the
provision refers to any official in the government
service, which must necessarily include the
mayor of a chartered city. It cannot therefore be
disputed that in the particular case under
consideration the President is vested with the
authority to order the investigation of petitioner
when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires, and such being the case,
petitioner cannot now contend that the
designation of respondent as the official to
investigate him in connection with the charges
lodged against him by Rosales has been done
without the authority of law. This of course is
upon the premise that the charges involved in
the investigation refer to those for which
petitioner may be suspended or removed under
the law, a question which we will take up later in
this
decision.
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs.
Silvosa,* 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 2884, this Court
had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of
the power of supervision by the President over
local government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over executive
officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ
one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus
in that case the Court made the following
digression: "In administration law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to
the latter." But from this pronouncement it
cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power
of investigation when in his opinion the good of
the public service so requires, as postulated in
Section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative
Code. In fact, this matter has been clarified
when, in a subsequent case, this Court made the

following pronouncement:
"In conclusion, we hold that, under the present
law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to
2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the
suspension and removal of municipal officials
therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the
absence of a clear and explicit provision to the
contrary, relative particularly to municipal
corporations-and none has been cited to us
said procedure is exclusive; that the executive
department of the national government, in the
exercise of its general supervision over local
government, may conduct investigations with a
view to determining whether municipal officials
are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the
administrative action referred to in said
sections, as a means only to ascertain whether
the provincial governor and the provincial board
should take such action; that the Executive may
take appropriate measures to compel the
provincial governor and the provincial board to
take said action, if the same is warranted, and
they failed to do so; that the provincial governor
and the provincial board may not be deprived by
the Executive of the power to exercise the
authority conferred upon them in sections 2188
to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code; that
such would be the effect of the assumption of
those powers by the Executive; that said
assumption of powers would further violate
section 2191 of the same Code, for the authority
therein vested in the Executive is merely
appellate in character; that, said assumption of
powers, in the case at bar, even exceeded those
of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board,
in whom original jurisdiction is vested by said
sections 2188 to 2190, for, pursuant thereto, 'the
preventive suspension of a municipal officer
shall not be for more than thirty (30) days, at the
expiration of which he shall be reinstated, unless
the delay in the decision of the case is due to his
fault, neglect or request, or unless he shall have
meanwhile been convicted, whereas petitioner
herein was suspended 'until the final
determination of the proceedings' against him,
regardless of the duration thereof and the cause
of the delay in its disposition; and that so much
of the rule laid down in Villena vs. Secretary of
the Interior (67 Phil., 451) and Villena vs. Roque
(93 PhiL, 363), as may be inconsistent with the
foregoing views, should be deemed, and are
hereby reversed or modified accordingly."
(Hebron vs. Reyes, supra, p. 175; Italics
supplied)
Page 97 of 104
The final question to be determined is: For what

cause or causes may the President order the
investigation of petitioner "conformably to law?
For this, suffice it to quote hereunder what we
have said in Lacson vs. Rogue, supra:
"Four Justices who join in this decision do not
share the view that the only ground upon which
the Mayor may be expelled is disloyalty. The
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice
Jugo, three of the Justices referred to, reason
that, as the office of provincial executive is at
least as important as the office of mayor of the
City of Manila, the latter officer, by analogy,
ought to be amenable to removal and suspension
for the same causes as provincial executives,
who under Section 2078 of the Revised,
Administrative Code, may be discharged for
dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office,
besides disloyalty."
And Chief Justice Paras, in concurring in the
foregoing opinion, made the following
interesting observation:
"It is hard and illogical to believe that, while
there are express legal provisions for the
suspension and removal of provincial governors
and municipal mayors, it could have been
intended that the mayor of Manila should enjoy
an over-all immunity or sacrosanct position,
considering that a provincial governor or
municipal mayor may fairly be considered in
parity with the city mayor insofar as they are all
executive heads of political subdivisions.
Counsel for petitioner calls attention to the fact
that the peculiarly elevated standard of the City
of Manila and its populace might have prompted
the lawmakers to exempt the city mayor from
removal or suspension. Much can be said about
the desirability of making the executive head of
Manila as strong and independent as possible
but there should not be any doubt that
awareness of the insistence of some sort of
disciplinary measures has a neutralizing and
deterring influence against any tendency toward
officials' misfeasance, excesses or omission."
Considering that the position of mayor of a
chartered city may be fairly compared in
category and stature with that of a provincial
governor, we are of the opinion that the former,
by analogy, may also be amenable to removal
and suspension for the same causes as the latter,
which causes, under Section 2078 of the Revised
Administrative Code, are: disloyalty, dishonesty,
oppression and misconduct in office. And
considering the allegations in the complaint to
the effect that petitioner took advantage of his
public position as mayor of Iloilo City in

committing the acts of violence and intimidation
upon respondent in order to stop the radio
program he was then conducting in his station
thus suppressing and curtailing his right to free
speech, we are of the opinion that said acts
constitute misconduct in office for which he may
be ordered investigated by the President within
the meaning of the law. There is therefore no
plausible reason to disturb the decision rendered
by the lower court which we find to be in
accordance
with
law.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellant.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112497, August 04, 1994
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
PETITIONER, VS. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,
VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY
TREASURER
ANTHONY
ACEVEDO,
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE
CITY
OF
MANILA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The principal issue in this case is the
constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code reading as follows:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax
Ordinances
And
Revenue
Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure
for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That public
hearings shall be conducted for the purpose
prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
further,
That
any
question
on
the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or
revenue measures may be raised on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall
render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however,
That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and
the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
Page 98 of 104
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period

without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had,
on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code,
null and void for non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.[1]
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of
Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained
the ordinance, holding inter alia that the
procedural requirements had been observed.
More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the
Local Government Code as unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice
of the power of control over local governments
in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific
provision therein conferring on the President of
the Philippines only the power of supervision
over local governments.[2]
The present petition would have us reverse that
decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled
Section 187 is constitutional and that the
procedural requirements for the enactment of
tax ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been
observed.
Parenthetically, this petition was originally
dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with
Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed
to submit a certified true copy of the challenged
decision.[3]
However,
on
motion
for
reconsideration with the required certified true
copy of the decision attached, the petition was
reinstated in view of the importance of the issues
raised therein.
We stress at the outset that the lower court had
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
Section 187, this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws
by the criterion of their conformity to the

fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in
the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil
cases in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation,[4] even as the
accused in a criminal action has the right to
question in his defense the constitutionality of a
law he is charged with violating and of the
proceedings taken against him, particularly as
they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
Article X, Section 5 (2), of the Constitution vests
in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments and orders of lower courts in all
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts
are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection,
bearing
in
mind
the
consequences
of
a
declaration
of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no
less than on the doctrine of separation of
powers. As the questioned act is usually the
handiwork of the legislative or the executive
departments, or both, it will be prudent for such
courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to
defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better
determined after a thorough deliberation by a
collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its
discussion.[5]
It is also emphasized that every court, including
this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure
was first carefully studied by the executive and
the legislative departments and determined by
them to be in accordance with the fundamental
law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to
sustain. The presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the clearest showing
that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is
reached by the required majority may the Court
pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot
escape, that the challenged act must be struck
down.
Page 99 of 104
In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao

declared Section 187 of the Local Government
Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered
the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances
and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the
familiar distinction between control and
supervision, the first being "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for the latter," while the second is
"the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law."[6] His conclusion was that
the challenged section gave to the Secretary the
power of control and not of supervision only as
vested by the Constitution in the President of the
Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not
only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, [7]
and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
governments,[8] and the policy of local autonomy
in general.
We do not share that view. The lower court was
rather hasty in invalidating the provision.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to
review only the constitutionality or legality of the
tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. When he alters
or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is
not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary
Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code,
but he did not replace it with his own version of
what the Code should be. He did not pronounce
the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis
for its annulment. He did not say that in his
judgment it was a bad law. What he found only
was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the
said measure was determine if the petitioners
were performing their functions in accordance
with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the
grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was
an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the
doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may,
in his discretion, order the act undone or re-
done by his subordinate or he may even decide

to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but
he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to
the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his
own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that
the rules are followed. In the opinion of the
Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no
more nor less than this, and so performed an act
not of control but of mere supervision.
The case of Taule v. Santos[9] cited in the
decision has no application here because the
jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local
Governments over election contests in the
Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong
to the
Commission on
Elections by
constitutional provision. The conflict was over
jurisdiction, not supervision or control.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187
appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which
provided in its Section 2 as follows:
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the
fifteenth day after its passage, unless the
ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided,
however, That the Secretary of Finance shall
have authority to suspend the effectivity of any
ordinance within one hundred and twenty days
after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his
opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed
is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory,
or when it is contrary to declared national
economy policy, and when the said Secretary
exercises this authority the effectivity of such
ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or
as a whole, for a period of thirty days within
which period the local legislative body may
either modify the tax ordinance to meet the
objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court
of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax
ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared
suspended, shall be considered as revoked.
Thereafter, the local legislative body may not
reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as
the grounds for the suspension thereof shall
have ceased to exist.
Page 100 of 104
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to

suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in
his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust,
excessive,
oppressive
or
confiscatory.
Determination of these flaws would involve the
exercise of judgment or discretion and not
merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been
observed; hence, it would smack of control
rather than mere supervision. That power was
never questioned before this Court but, at any
rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the
same latitude under Section 187. All he is
permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality
or legality of the tax measure, without the right
to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no
discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only
on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of
certain ultra vires provisions and noncompliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality,
not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax
measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code is another matter.
In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that
there were no written notices of public hearings
on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were
sent to interested parties as required by Art.
276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local
Government Code nor were copies of the
proposed ordinance published in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general
circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes
were submitted to show that the obligatory
public hearings had been held. Neither were
copies of the measure as approved posted in
prominent places in the city in accordance with
Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code.
Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not
translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and
disseminated among the people for their
information and guidance, conformably to Sec.
59(b) of the Code.
Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared
that all the procedural requirements had been
observed in the enactment of the Manila

Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had
not been able to prove such compliance before
the Secretary only because he had given it only
five days within which to gather and present to
him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits)
later submitted to the trial court.
To get to the bottom of this question, the Court
acceded to the motion of the respondents and
called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits.
We have carefully examined every one of these
exhibits and agree with the trial court that the
procedural requirements have indeed been
observed. Notices of the public hearings were
sent to interested parties as evidenced by
Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings
are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3.
Exhibits B and C show that the proposed
ordinances were published in the Balita and the
Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993,
respectively, and the approved ordinance was
published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the
Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of
Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the
ordinance as approved but this omission does
not affect its validity, considering that its
publication in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due
process. It has also not been shown that the text
of the ordinance has been translated and
disseminated, but this requirement applies to
the approval of local development plans and
public investment programs of the local
government unit and not to tax ordinances.
We make no ruling on the substantive provisions
of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has
not been raised in issue in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby
rendered REVERSING the challenged decision
of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared
Section 187 of the Local Government Code
unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding
that the procedural requirements in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have
been observed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Page 101 of 104
G.R. No. 139813, January 31, 2001

JOELBITO-ONON, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
JUDGE NELIA YAP FERNANDEZ, R.T.C. BR.
50 - PUERTO PRINCESA CITY AND
PALAWAN, AND ELEGIO QUEJANO, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and writ of injunction seeks
the reversal of the Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, [1]
Branch 50 in SPL. PROC. NO. 1056 entitled
"Elegio F. Quejano, Jr., petitioner vs. Joel BitoOnon, et. al., respondents" which denied herein
petitioner's motion to dismiss the Petition for
Review of the Resolution of the Board of
Election Supervisors dated August 25, 1997 in
case number L-10-97 filed by herein private
respondent
with
said
court.
It appears from the records that the petitioner,
Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan
and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for
the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private
respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other
hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the
Municipal Liga Chapter President for the
Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon
and Quejano were candidates for the position of
Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997
election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial
Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was
proclaimed the winning candidate in the said
election prompting Quejano to file a post
proclamation protest with the Board of Election
Supervisors (BES), which was decided against
him
on
August
25,
1997.
Not satisfied with the decision of the BES,
Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the
decision of the BES with the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City
(RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to
dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue
of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered
by the BES in any post proclamation electoral
protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga
Barangay election of officers and directors. In

his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the
Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng
mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on
August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No.
97-193, providing for review of decisions or
resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of
law is an ultra vires act and is void for being
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its
issuance is not a mere act of supervision but
rather an exercise of control over the Liga's
internal
organization.
On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onon's
motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC
ratiocinated that the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government[2]
is vested with the power "to establish and
prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances
and implementing laws on the general
supervision of local government units and the
promotion of local autonomy and monitor
compliance thereof by said units." [3] The RTC
added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued
by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rulemaking power as provided for under Section 7,
Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code.
[4]
Consequently, the RTC ruled that it had
jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by
Quejada.[5]
Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Order was denied[6] prompting the petitioner to
file the present petition wherein the following
issues are raised:
A. WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
QUESTIONED
PROVISION
IN
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 97-193
WAS
ISSUED
BY
THE
DILG
SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS
AUTHORITY.
B.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ISSUING
THE
QUESTIONED
ORDERS.[7]
In support of his petition, Onon argues that the

"Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997
Synchronized Election of the Provincial and
Metropolitan Chapters and for the Election of
the National Chapter of the Liga ng mga
Barangay" contradicts the "Implementing Rules
and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of
the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers and
Page 102 of 104
Directors" and is therefore invalid. Onon alleges

that the Liga ng mga Barangay (LIGA) is not a
local government unit considering that a local
government unit must have its own source of
income, a certain number of population, and a
specific land area in order to exist or be created
as such. Consequently, the DILG only has a
limited supervisory authority over the LIGA.
Moreover, Onon argues that even if the DILG
has supervisory authority over the LIGA, the act
of the DILG in issuing Memorandum Circular
No. 97-193 or the supplemental rules and
guidelines for the conduct of the 1997 LIGA
elections had the effect of modifying, altering
and nullifying the rules prescribed by the
National Liga Board. Onon posits that the
issuance of said guidelines allowing an appeal of
the decision of the BES to the regular courts
rather than to the National Liga Board is no
longer an exercise of supervision but an exercise
of
control.[8]
In his comment to the petition, private
respondent Quejano argues that the Secretary of
the DILG has competent authority to issue rules
and regulations like Memorandum Circular No.
97-893. The Secretary of DILG's rule-making
power is conferred by the Administrative Code.
Considering that the Memorandum Circular was
issued pursuant to his rule making power,
Quejano insists that the lower court did not
commit any reversible error when it denied
Onon's
motion
to
dismiss.[9]
On the other hand, the public respondent
represented herein by the Solicitor General, filed
a separate Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Comment agreeing with the position of
petitioner Onon. The Solicitor General affirms
Onon's claim that in issuing the questioned
Memorandum Circular, the Secretary of the
DILG effectively amended the rules and
guidelines promulgated by National Liga Board.
This act was no longer a mere act of supervision
but one of control. The Solicitor General submits
that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in not dismissing the petition for
review of the BES decision filed before it for
failure of the petitioner to exhaust the rightful
remedy which was to appeal to the National Liga
Board.[10]
On October 27, 1999, this Court denied
petitioner Onon's motion for the issuance of
restraining
order
for
lack
of
merit.
After a careful review of the case, we sustain the

position
of
the
petitioner.
The resolution of the present controversy
requires an examination of the questioned
provision of Memorandum Circular No. 97-193
and the Implementing Rules and Guidelines for
the 1997 General Elections of the Liga ng mga
Barangay
Officers
and
Directors
(GUIDELINES). The memorandum circular
reads, insofar as pertinent, as follows:
"Any post-proclamation protest must be filed
with the BES within twenty-four (24) hours from
the closing of the election. The BES shall decide
the same within forty-eight (48) hours from
receipt thereof. The decision of the BES shall be
final and immediately executory without
prejudice to the filing of a Petition for Review
with the regular courts of law."[11] (emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, the GUIDELINES provides
that the BES shall have the following among its
duties:
"To resolve any post-proclamation electoral
protest which must be submitted in writing to
this Board within twenty-four (24) hours from
the close of election; provided said Board shall
render its decision within forty-eight (48) hours
from receipt hereof; and provided further that
the decision must be submitted to the National
Liga Headquarters within twenty-four (24)
hours from the said decision. The decision of the
Board of Election Supervisors in this respect
shall be subject to review by the National Liga
Board the decision of which shall be final and
executory."[12] (emphasis supplied)
Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by
the DILG Secretary pursuant to the power of
general supervision of the President over all
local government units which was delegated to
the DILG Secretary by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992. [13] The
President's power of general supervision over
local government units is conferred upon him by
the Constitution.[14] The power of supervision is
defined as "the power of a superior officer to see
to it that lower officers perform their functions
in accordance with law."[15] This is distinguished
from the power of control or "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the
former
for
the
latter."[16]
On many occasions in the past, this court has
had the opportunity to distinguish the power of
Page 103 of 104
supervision from the power of control. In Taule

vs. Santos,[17] we held that the Chief Executive
wielded no more authority than that of checking
whether a local government or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. He cannot interfere with
local governments provided that the same or its
officers act within the scope of their authority.
Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining
authority over such body.[18] Officers in control
lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to
order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it
himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it
that the rules are followed, but he himself does
not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules
are not observed, he may order the work done or
re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He
cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing
of
the
act.[19]
Does the President's power of general
supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay,
which is not a local government unit? [20]
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41,
Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled
that the liga ng mga barangay is a government
organization, being an association, federation,
league or union created by law or by authority of
law, whose members are either appointed or
elected government officials. The Local
Government Code[21] defines the liga ng mga
barangay as an organization of all barangays for
the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians,
and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing
issues
affecting
barangay
government
administration and securing, through proper
and legal means, solutions thereto.[22] The liga
shall have chapters at the municipal, city,
provincial and metropolitan political subdivision
levels. The municipal and city chapters of the
liga shall be composed of the barangay
representatives of the municipal and city
barangays respectively. The duly elected
presidents of the component municipal and city
chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter
or the metropolitan political subdivision
chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly
urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the
Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan

political subdivision chapters shall constitute the
National
Liga
ng
mga
Barangay. [23]
The liga at the municipal, city, provincial,
metropolitan political subdivision, and national
levels directly elect a president, a vice-president
and five (5) members of the board of directors.
The board shall appoint its secretary and
treasurer and create such other positions as it
may deem necessary for the management of the
chapter.[24]
The ligas are primarily governed by the
provisions of the Local Government Code. [25]
However, their respective constitution and bylaws shall govern all other matters affecting the
internal organization of the liga not otherwise
provided for in the Local Government Code
provided that the constitution and by-laws shall
be suppletory to the provisions of Book III, Title
VI of the Local Government Code and shall
always conform to the provisions of the
Constitution
and
existing
laws.[26]
Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule
that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the
DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition
for Review of the decision of the BES with the
regular courts in a post proclamation electoral
protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree
with both the petitioner and the Solicitor
General that in authorizing the filing of the
petition for review of the decision of the BES
with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in
effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES
promulgated by the National Liga Board and
adopted by the LIGA which provides that the
decision of the BES shall be subject to review by
Page 104 of 104
the National Liga Board. The amendment of the

GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the
power of supervision but is an exercise of the
power of control, which the President does not
have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given
the power to prescribe rules, regulations and
other issuances, the Administrative Code limits
its authority to merely "monitoring compliance"
by local government units of such issuances. [27]
To monitor means "to watch, observe or check"
and is compatible with the power of supervision
of the DILG Secretary over local governments,
which is limited to checking whether the local
government unit concerned or the officers
thereof perform their duties as per statutory
enactments.[28] Besides, any doubt as to the
power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with
local affairs should be resolved in favor of the
greater autonomy of the local government. [29]
The public respondent judge therefore
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing
the respondent's Petition for Review for failure
to exhaust all administrative remedies and for
lack
of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial
Court dated June 22, 1999 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Petition for Review filed by
the private respondent docketed as SPL. PROC.
NO. 1056 is DISMISSED.

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R

G.R. No. L-5631

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writing opposing the registration solicited and

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became a populated as the centers on which they

same; and before alloting the lands among the

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Law 1, title 13 of the aforesaid book, provides the

purpose of giving greater dignity to the principle

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belong thereto, and likewise the land intended

It is therefore unquestionable that the assets of

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The said municipality is today in possession of

By this last-cited administrative Act the rights of

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purpose of founding a pueblo, perhaps none of

by the laws of every civilized county in the

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The present case has nothing to do with any

May 30, 1955

for immediate investigation, appropriate action

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executive departments are assistants and agents

overseeing or the power or authority of an officer

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In the indorsement to the provincial governor

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ,

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Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a

approved without amendment, taking into

---------------------------------------------------------Petitioners claim that Santiago could not

Local Government Fulltext

a city, petitioners having computed Santiagos

prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for

Resolution of the controversy regarding

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for

A Local Government Unit is a political

Local Government Fulltext

The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs

funds or transfers referred to when the Code

Local Government Fulltext

but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was

Senates power not only to concur with

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was

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It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule

May 14, 1991

because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public

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within the territorial jurisdiction of the

without direct government involvement.

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As We enter upon the task of passing on the

Considering however the importance to the

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cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police

the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the

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"the Charter or statute must plainly show an

permits" is no longer vested in the City of

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