EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-54881. July 31, 1984.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO
QUIBATE, Defendant-Appellant.

"4. Incised wound at the medial and posterior aspect of the left forearm, 1
cm. wide, gapping, (sic) involving the skin.
"5. Abrasions-hematoma at the right arms and forearms.
"The deceased died of shock secondary to profuse hemorrhage."

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David E. Calvario, for Defendant-Appellant.

The accused-appellant raised two assignments of errors in this appeal,

namely

DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Accused Rodolfo Quibate appeals the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Capiz finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of Prima Baltar-Quibate.
Around 4:00 in the early morning of July 22, 1978, the accused-appellant
stabbed his wife Prima Baltar to death in a fit of jealousy. The couples
ten-year old daughter, Imelda Quibate, testified that her father stabbed
her mother to death with a knife while the two were quarreling in the
balcony of their house at Aranguel, President Roxas, Capiz. The daughter
stated that the quarrel arose from her fathers jealousy of "Gabi" their
neighbor. Imelda ran to the house of her uncle, Alberto Baltar who
immediately went to his sisters house. Alberto saw his sister already
dead, the accused-appellant drumming the death weapon against the
window sill. When the police arrived at the scene, Quibate was still
holding the knife. The accused tried to kill himself with the knife pointed
at his chest but when Corporal Calixto Morales fired a shot with his
revolver, the accused surrendered the knife.
The wounds suffered by the deceased were stated by Dr. Manuel
Buenvenida, rural health physician of President Roxas, Capiz, in his
autopsy report as follows:
"1. Incised wound at the left side of the chest above nipple, perforating, 1"
wide.
"2. Incised wound at the right side of the chest below the nipple,
perforating, 1" wide.
"3. Incised wound at the left side of abdomen, at the iliac side, 4" below
the navel, perforating, 1" wide.

"I. THE COURT ERRED IN MOTO PROPRIO CANCELLING THE

PROMULGATION OF DECISION OF MARCH 4, 1980.
"II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME OF PARRICIDE."
The trial court promulgated its decision on March 4, 1980 sentencing the
accused to an indeterminate period of imprisonment of 12 years
minimum to 17 years maximum. However, immediately after
promulgating it on that day, the court had second thoughts and issued
the following order:
"After the promulgation of this case, the court moto proprio cancels the
promulgation upon nothing that the regular counsel de oficio, Atty.
Antonio Bisnar was not around at the time and the accused refused to
sign receipt of a copy of the decision and upon noting that there was a
typographical error in the decision consisting of the wrong penalty and
the court noting further that the decision have not been filed.
"Notifying accused and counsel of the new date of promulgation which is
hereby set for March 20, 1980."cralaw virtua1aw library
It may be noted that apart from cancelling the promulgation, the court
ordered that the accused and his missing counsel be notified of the new
date of promulgation which was set for March 20, 1980.
On March 20, 1980, the counsel de oficio was again absent so the court
appointed a well-known practitioner in the area, Atty. Jose Alovera, to
assist the accused in the promulgation and to coordinate with the other
counsel Atty. Antonio Bisnar. Promulgation was re-set to April 1, 1980.
On March 27, 1980, Atty. Alovera filed a motion to advance the date of
promulgation to March 31, 1980 as counsel had to leave for Iloilo City on
April 1, 1980. The motion to advance the date of promulgation was

considered on April 1, 1980. Promulgation was re-set to April 11, 1980.

On April 11, 1980, an oral motion to quash promulgation was made. No
memorandum in support of the motion was filed and the records fail to
indicate the grounds relied upon by counsel. On June 9, 1980, the motion
to quash promulgation was denied. The promulgation was reset to June
13, 1980 on which date the questioned decision imposing reclusion
perpetua instead of the earlier indeterminate period of imprisonment of
12 years as minimum and 17 years as maximum was rendered.
We resolve the second assignment of error first. The allegation that the
marriage of the accused-appellant and the deceased was not established
has no merit.
The marriage contract (Exhibit B) evidencing the marriage solemnized on
May 16, 1954 was introduced in evidence. Father Gaudioso Tropico of the
Roman Catholic church testified that he solemnized the marriage of the
accused and Prima Baltar and that the newly married couple, the
witnesses, and himself signed the said marriage contract in each others
presence. True, the contract shows that Prima Baltar was married to
"Teodulfo" Quibate but defense witness Atty. Jose Azarraga testified that
the accused used the name "Teodulfo" when they were classmates. The
accused himself admitted that he used to be called "Teodulfo." On the fact
of marriage, Alberto Baltar testified that he was present in church when
his sister and the accused were married. Father Gaudioso Tropico, on redirect examination was asked to go around the courtroom and identify
the "Teodulfo Quibate" whose marriage he solemnized. He did so and
picked out the Accused-Appellant. The accused-appellant did not deny the
marriage but admitted during trial that he and his late wife were
married, that they were married by Father Tropico who testified in the
case.
The appellant raises no issue in this appeal regarding his main defense
during the trial below that he acted in self-defense. We have
nonetheless examined the records on this point because of the serious
nature of the crime. We find no error in the courts rejecting this defense.
The allegation of self-defense has no basis.
The accused-appellant testified that two months before the fatal incident,
he caught his wife having sexual intercourse with their neighbor "Gabi"
or "Gabe" and that he called her to come up their house. He was so angry
that he boxed her. Gabi was not only bigger than the accused, but he also
had a gun. Yet when he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife,
she refused. When he insisted, she still refused. According to the accused,

he begged for almost two hours to have sex with his wife but she refused.
Later on, he noticed that she took a knife from a "baul" or clothes trunk
by her side and tried to stab him. They grappled for the knife and she
was hit. The trial court found the story of self-defense not believable. We
agree. The accused-appellant, in a fit of jealousy, stabbed his wife
inflicting the four separate incised wounds described in the autopsy
report, which resulted in shock, profuse hemorrhage, and death.
The appellant states in his first assignment of error that the lower court
erred in cancelling the March 4, 1980 promulgation because the grounds
given by the court do not warrant such a cancellation.
The appellant questions the cancellation and resetting of promulgation
stating that the counsel did not have to be present during the
promulgation of judgment and that there was no need to nullify a
promulgation already effected simply because the accused refused to sign.
According to the appellants brief, the appellant refused to sign because
he did not know how to write.
It is not required that counsel for the accused must be present when
judgment is promulgated for it to be valid and effective. However,
considering the level of intelligence of the accused and the serious nature
of the offense, the Court had reason to require counsels presence during
promulgation. The court, however, followed a manifestly strange
procedure when it pronounced the sentence of conviction and then
immediately afterwards, reconsidered and cancelled the whole thing on
the ground, among others, that the lawyer was not present. On noticing
that there was no lawyer for the accused, the Court should have deferred
the promulgation of the decision if it wanted counsel to be around.
It is obvious from the appealed decision that the presiding Judge had
conflicting feelings in his mind when the date for promulgation arrived. If
so, he should have resolved them before going ahead.
The decision reads, in part:
"The Court finds in accordance with Art. 13, of the Revised Penal Code,
mental weakness, and voluntary surrender. Likewise, the Court
considers the history of infidelity of the victims wife, coupled with her
refusal to perform her marital duties, after accused had begged for two
(2) hours, immediately preceding the stabbing, as analogous to an
aggression and should also be considered mitigating. The Court believes
that the attitude and behaviour of the accused, such as the tenderness he

showed to his daughter Imelda after the latters testimony, shows

remorse and lack of real malice.
"In view thereof, the Court recommends Executive Clemency, such as
would reduce the imprisonment to a lesser period."
The procedure followed by the lower court is not the most appropriate
under the circumstances but it does not constitute a ground to nullify the
decision later promulgated.
The second reason about the refusal to sign may have been insufficient to
warrant postponement of promulgation of judgment but, under the
circumstances, it is not a basis to set aside or modify the appealed
decision.
Regarding the last ground for the first assignment of error, it is unlikely
that the imposition of a sentence of 12 to 17 years imprisonment instead
of reclusion perpetua would be a typographical error. It was not. It was an
error of hasty judgment based on a misapprehension of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code applicable to the facts of the case. The lower
court made a mistake and it should have taken immediate steps to rectify
it instead of waiting for more than three months.
The more serious questions arising from the facts of this case are not
raised in the appellants brief but the Court has decided to resolve them
considering that a mans liberty is at stake and the lower court itself has
recommended executive clemency for the Appellant.
What was the effect of the cancellation of promulgation on March 4,
1980? Did the decision whose promulgation was cancelled become final
and executory fifteen days later on March 19, 1980? Did the court have
jurisdiction to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua on June 13, 1980?
Under Section 7 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before
the judgment becomes final or an appeal is perfected. In the instant case,
no appeal had been perfected when the trial court set aside its judgment
and cancelled its promulgation. But had the judgment become final? The
cited section provides:
"A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period
for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."

In the case at bar, the judgment of conviction and its promulgation were
set aside on the very day that the judgment was promulgated. At that
time, the period for perfecting an appeal had not lapsed; and the accused
had not waived his right to appeal. Only if he were deemed to have
commenced service of his sentence could the judgment be deemed final.
The law gives the accused 15 days after promulgation of a judgment of
conviction within which to decide whether he will take an appeal or not;
and unless he has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal or has
voluntarily commenced service of his sentence, the accused may yet take
an appeal within the 15-day period, (See People v. Valle, 7 SCRA 1025;
Mabuhay Insurance and Guaranty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA
245). The accused was returned to the same detention cell where he was
confined pending trial. He never intimidated acceptance of the judgment
or that he would no longer appeal.
From the above considerations, it follows that when the trial court
cancelled the promulgation it had just concluded, it were as if no decision
had been rendered and no judgment had been imposed. The promulgation
or the entire process had been set aside to be effected on a future date.
The decision promulgated on June 13, 1980 would not merely be an
amendment of the sentence imposed earlier but would be the decision
itself being promulgated in the case. Consequently, there was no
judgment to become final and executory except from June 13, 1980. If the
court had decided to commit the accused to jail on March 19, 1980, there
would have been no basis for the execution of judgment and the
commitment as the decision promulgated earlier had been cancelled and
set aside. The accused could not have accepted a judgment or commenced
to serve a sentence based on a cancelled and, therefore, non-existent
promulgation.
We find in this case an opportune occasion to remind all trial courts to
devote a little more time to the study of the penalty provisions of the
Revised Penal Code immediately before promulgating each decision, to
obviate the necessity of issuing amended or "repromulgated" decisions
increasing sentences of imprisonment. Trial courts should likewise note
the dictum in Flores v. Dalisay (84 SCRA 46, 48).
"What the trial court should have done was to have categorically asked
the counsel de oficio of the accused (who was not the counsel de oficio who
handled the defense of the accused) whether or not he would appeal.
Because the accused did not file any notice of appeal immediately after
the judgment was promulgated, the trial court jumped to the conclusion
that he had no intention of taking an appeal . . ."

Considering the factual circumstances of this case, the low intelligence of

the accused, and the gravity of the offense of parricide, it was the duty of
the lower court on March 4, 1980 to ascertain whether or not the
detention prisoner whose sentence of conviction had just been read
intended to appeal. Upon the answer would have depended its power to
modify the decision but within the period for the taking of an appeal.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Capiz
finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is hereby AFFIRMED. The accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Prima Baltar Quibate in the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, MelencioHerrera, Plana, Relova, De la Fuerte, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

A few hours later on that same day, March 4, 1980, Judge Leviste issued
an order cancelling the promulgation (1) due to the absence of Bisnar, the
regular counsel de oficio, (2) the refusal of accused to sign as proof that he
received a copy of the decision, (3) the imposition of the wrong penalty
and (4) the fact "that the decision has not been filed."
In fact, the said decision is in the record but it contains numerous
handwritten corrections made by Judge Leviste. It was retyped. The
retyped decision, imposing reclusion perpetua, dated March 5, 1980, and
the original decision of March 3, 1980 (with corrections) were both refiled
in court at 4:30 p.m. on March 5, 1980.
Later, or on April 11, 1980, there was an oral motion to quash the second
promulgation. It was denied by Judge Leviste in his order of June 9,
1980.
The corrected decision of March 5, 1980 was promulgated on June 13,
1980. The accused and his counsel signed the original copy of the said
decision. The clerk of court certified to the promulgation on June 13,
1980. This was also signed by the accused (pp. 126-7, Record).

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:

Written notices of the decision were sent to the fiscal, the warden and
Bisnar on June 16, 1980. Bisnar filed his notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals.

Judge Oscar Levistes decision dated March 3, 1980 was promulgated on

the following day, March 4, in the absence of accuseds counsel, Antonio
Bisnar. The accused (a registered voter who studied at the Elizalde
Academy) refused to sign on the original copy of the decision as proof that
he received a copy of the decision.

The minutes of the proceeding on June 13, 1980 show that Bisnar
objected to the promulgation of the corrected decision and insisted that
the promulgation of the first decision was valid.

It is stated in the handwritten minutes of the incident that "when this

case was called for promulgation of decision, the court interpreter read
the whole decision and after which the dispositive part of the decision
was translated to the accused. The Court sentences the accused (to) 12
years to 17 years. Later, the Court discovered that Atty. Bisnar, counsel
de oficio for the accused, was not present in court. The Court appointed
Atty. Jose Brotario as counsel de oficio for the purpose of promulgation.
The dispositive portion of the decision was read to the accused."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The said minutes were signed by the court interpreter. The deputy clerk
of court executed a certification as to the promulgation and the refusal of
the accused to affix his signature on the original copy.

Judge Leviste had the power and jurisdiction to correct his decision of
March 3, 1980 which was not yet officially filed. He corrected it on the
same day and filed the corrected copy on March 5, 1980 together with the
original decision of March 3, 1980.
"A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court
rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been
perfected. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal." (Sec. 7, Rule 120, Rules of Court.)
The accused or his counsel should expressly inform the court that he does
not want to appeal or is going to start serving his sentence. In the
absence of such manifestation, the judge can change his decision within

the reglementary fifteen-day period. It is not right to conjecture from the

silence of the accused-detainee in the absence of his counsel that he
started to serve his sentence. (People v. Espaol, G.R. No. 57597-99, June
29, 1982, 114 SCRA 911.)

The promulgation of March 4, 1980 was a valid promulgation. The

reasons advanced by the trial court for its cancellation has no basis in law
and in fact. The order of cancellation was issued in abuse of discretion,
which this Court should not countenance.

In this case, counsel de oficios absence during the first promulgation

rendered it uncertain whether or not the accused was going to appeal.
The fact that he was a detention prisoner does not justify the conjecture
that he did not appeal and that he had started the service of his sentence
on March 4, 1980.

The discrepancy in the penalty imposed under the first and under the
second promulgation can hardly be considered a typographical error.

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

Appellant herein assigns two errors,
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

one

of

which

is

That the decision promulgated on March 4, 1980 had not as yet been
filed, is not by itself a ground for withdrawing or canceling the first
promulgation, which was a valid and effective promulgation. Even an oral
promulgation of an unwritten decision is valid (Cinco v. Cea, 96 Phil. 131;
Catilo v. Abaya, 94 Phil. 1014).

the

I. The Court erred in motu proprio canceling the promulgation of decision

on March 4, 1980.
I dissent from the resolution of the said assigned error.
On March 4, 1980, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting
herein appellant of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to an
indeterminate period of imprisonment of 12 years minimum to 17 years
maximum. Thereafter, on the same date, the same court issued the
following order:
"After promulgation of this case, the court motu proprio cancels the
promulgation upon noting that the regular counsel de oficio, Atty.
Antonio Bisnar was not around at the time and the accused refused to
sign receipt of a copy of the decision and upon noting that there was a
typographical error in the decision consisting of the wrong penalty and
the court noting further that the decision has not been filed.
"Notifying accused and counsel of the new date of promulgation which is
hereby set for March 20, 1980."
After several subsequent resetting of the promulgation date, on June 13,
1980, the lower court promulgated a revised decision maintaining the
conviction, but sentencing appellant to suffer the greater penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased.
The majority opinion sustains this second promulgation. That is double
jeopardy.

The promulgation of March 4, 1980 complies with the requirements of

Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
"The judgment is promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in
the presence of the defendant and any judge of the court in which it is
rendered. The defendant must be personally present if the conviction is
for a grave offense; if for a light offense the judgment may be pronounced
in the presence of his attorney or representative. And when the judge is
absent or outside of the province or city, his presence is not necessary and
the judgment may be promulgated or read to the defendant by the clerk
of court.
"If the defendant is confined or detained in another province or city, the
judgment of conviction may be promulgated by the judge of the Court of
First Instance having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or
detention upon the request of the court that rendered the judgment. The
court promulgating the judgment shall have the authority to accept the
notice of appeal and to approve the bond."
Clearly, it is not necessary that defendants counsel be present at the
time of promulgation of the judgment. Where the judgment is one of
conviction for a grave offense, all that is required is that the defendant be
personally present in court at the time of promulgation. Where the
judgment is one of acquittal, the presence of the defendant during
promulgation is not at all required in any case (Cinco v. Cea, L-7075,
November 18, 1954, 96 Phil. 131). Here, all that is required is that a copy
of the judgment be served on said acquitted defendant (Ibid.). This
notwithstanding, it is noted from the records of this case that a counsel
de oficio for the purpose of promulgation (Atty. Jose Brotarlo) was in fact
afforded the defendant prior to the promulgation of judgment conducted

on March 4, 1980 (p. 108, CFI rec.).

Finally, there is no hint from the above-cited provision that the
defendants signature evidencing receipt of a copy of the decision is
necessary to effect a valid promulgation of judgment. In the case at
Talabon v. Iloilo Provincial Warden (44 No. 11 O.G. 4326), this Court
upheld the validity of a promulgation of a verbal judgment of conviction.
Failure on the part of the court to comply with Section 2, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court and the Constitution did not divest the lower court of its
jurisdiction acquired over the offense and the petitioner (Ibid.). By
inference, the lack of defendants signature evidencing receipt of a
written copy of a decision does not render invalid and inefficacious the
promulgation thereof.
Concededly, under Section 7 of the same Rule, "a judgment of conviction
may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before judgment
has become final or appeal has been perfected." But such "discretion"
afforded a judge means sound discretion exercised, not arbitrarily or
willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the
circumstances and the law, and directed by the judges reason and
conscience to just result (12A Words and Phrases 344). Evidently
however, the order of cancellation issued by the trial court above does not
conjure with the circumstances of and the law pertinent to the case as
above described. The discretion granted by the Rules, having been
exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, the order of cancellation
being clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found, this
Court should reverse the same (1 Words and Phrases 341). The order of
cancellation is null and void for having transpired from an improvident
exercise of discretion.
It is noted that the discretion provided the court under Section 7 of Rule
120 cannot be exercised in case of a valid promulgation of a judgment of
acquittal (Catilo v. Abaya, No. L-6921, May 14, 1954; 94 Phil. 1014). The
promulgation therein cannot be cancelled even on the ground of
misrepresentation of facts and misappreciation of evidence. Here, the
first jeopardy is terminated, and a subsequent modification of the said
judgment would result in double jeopardy.
Cabarroguis v. Judge San Diego (G.R. No. L-19517, November 30, 1962,
116 Phil. 1184) does not apply to the present case to validate the second
promulgation of June 13, 1980. In Cabarroguis, the respondent judge
dictated in open court her order of acquittal even before the direct
testimony of the lone witness for the prosecution could be completed.
Upon prompt oral motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, the

court "withdrew" its order. Thereupon, direct examination resumed.

Counsel for the defendant afterwards cross examined the witness. During
the days proceedings, no objection thereto was heard from the
defendants counsel. Thus, as ruled by this Court, "petitioners failure to
object, at that time, to the taking of said evidence for the prosecution, and
the cross examination of complainant by counsel for the petitioner
amounted therefore, to a waiver of her constitutional right against double
jeopardy (People v. Casiano, L-15309, February 16, 1961; 14 Am. Jur.
958).
Petitioner did not invoke such right until about a week later, or on March
7, 1962, when the hearing resumed for the reception of the evidence for
the defense. The objection then made by her came too late in view of her
aforementioned waiver" (Ibid.).
In the present case, however, the promulgation of judgment on March 4,
1980 was conducted after both the prosecution and the defense had rested
their case. Defendant, assisted by a counsel de oficio (although not his
regular counsel de oficio), was present during the promulgation.
Thereafter, said defendant promptly returned to his cell. Upon receipt of
the courts order canceling said promulgation, Atty. Bisnar, defendants
regular counsel de oficio, promptly and vehemently objected to the same.
He reiterated his objections to said order of cancellation and second
promulgation on June 13, 1980. Clearly, having promptly invoked his
right against double jeopardy, defendant should benefit therefrom.
Perforce, the promulgation of judgment on March 4, 1980 stands
undisturbed by the trial courts subsequent cancellation thereof. Fifteen
days after said date, and no appeal having been taken by the defendant,
the judgment thereby promulgated became final.
Some discussion was focused on whether or not the defendant, by
returning to his detention cell after promulgation of judgment on March
4, 1980, commenced to serve the sentence under said promulgation.
Consonant with OUR basic criminal law doctrine that doubts should be
interpreted in favor of the accused, the equivocal gesture of the accused
should be interpreted as an act to commence the service of his sentence.
The penalty imposed under the promulgation of March 4, 1980 was
clearly lighter than what is prescribed by the law. To immediately submit
to it, doubtless, would favor the accused.
This dissent notes the oral motion to quash the second promulgation of
Atty. Antonio Bisnar, regular counsel de oficio of the accused, on April 11,
1980 (p. 121, CFI rec.), and his subsequent objection to said second

promulgation on June 13, 1980 (p. 129, CFI rec.). These facts support the
position that the accused returned to his cell after the promulgation of
March 4, 1980 with the intention to commence the service of his sentence.
Nonetheless, the incontrovertible fact under the circumstances is that 15
days after the promulgation of March 4, 1980, with the defendant not
having taken an appeal from the decision promulgated, the same became
final. Thereafter, the trial court lost its control and jurisdiction over the
case, and the trial judge could no longer modify nor set aside the
judgment rendered therein (U.S. v. Vayson [1914], 27 Phil. 447). The
subsequent promulgation of a revised decision on June 13, 1980, three
months after the first promulgation, is null and void.
By sustaining the second promulgation, this Court countenances a second
jeopardy cutting deep into the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy. There is no question that a first jeopardy attached. The same
was terminated 15 days after judgment thereon was promulgated on
March 4, 1980. Any substantial modification by increasing the penalty
decreed in such decision after March 19, 1980 would amount to double
jeopardy (Gregorio v. Director of Prisons, 43 Phil. 650).
Teehankee, J., dissents.
ESCOLIN, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The records disclose that after the promulgation of the first
decision on March 4, 1980, petitioner did not manifest his desire to
appeal and was therefore committed to jail; that the 15-day period to
appeal lapsed without petitioner having perfected his appeal; and that
before the promulgation of the new decision on June 30, 1980, he
vehemently objected to the cancellation of the March 4, 1980
promulgation as well as the promulgation of the new judgment. Surely,
any doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn from this factual setting
should be resolved in favor of the petitioners posture that he immediately
commenced service of sentence after the promulgation of the first
decision, and that therefore the same became final in accordance with the
rule that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the sentence
has been partially served. [Section 7, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court].