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GF EQUITY vs. VALENZONA

G.R. No. 156841
June 30, 2005
FACTS:
GF Equity, represented by Uytengsu, hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska basketball team in
the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) under a Contract of Employment.
Before affixing his signature, Valenzona consulted his lawyer about the last sentence of paragraph 3
of the contract which carried the following condition:
3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the
CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the
CORPORATION may terminate this contract.
His lawyer pointed out the one-sidedness of the contract. Valenzona still acceded to the terms of the
contract because he had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who had recommended him to the
management of GF Equity.
Valenzona was later advised by the management of GF Equity by letter of the pre-termination of his
services in this wise:
We regret to inform you that under the contract of employment dated January 1, 1988,
we are invoking our rights specified in paragraph 3.
Valenzona demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the arbitrary and
unilateral termination of his employment. GF Equity, however, refused the claim.
Thus, Valenzona, before the Manila RTC, challenged the condition in paragraph 3 of the contract as
lacking the element of mutuality of contract, a clear transgression of Article 1308 of the New Civil
Code, and he contended, did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary dismissal.
GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate Valenzonas
employment due to incompetence.
The RTC, upholding the validity of the assailed provision of the contract, dismissed the complaint of
Valenzona who, it held, was fully aware of entering into a bad bargain.
Valenzona appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the RTCs decision.
GF Equity argued that the CA committed a non-sequitur when it agreed with the findings of fact of the
RTC but reached an opposite conclusion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the termination of Valenzona was anchored on an illegal ground due to lack of
mutuality principle of Paragraph 3.
DECISION:
Yes. The Court of Appeals decided that termination of Valenzona was anchored on an illegal ground.
The assailed stipulation in paragraph 3, being violative of the mutuality principle underlying Article
1308 of the Civil Code, is null and void. The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is to nullify a
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contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment or pre-termination dependent exclusively
upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.
Further, while GF Equitys act of pre-terminating Valenzonas services cannot be considered willful as
it was based on a stipulation, albeit declared void, it, in doing so, failed to consider the abuse of rights
principle enshrined in Art. 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
UYPITCHING vs. QUIAMCO
G.R. No. 146322
December 6, 2006
FACTS:
In October 1981, a Honda XL-100 was sold on installment basis to Gabutero by Uypitching, the
petitioner. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. When
Gabutero could no longer pay, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments.
In 1982, Quiamco, the respondent, was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to amicably
settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by respondent against them. They
surrendered the motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for
the original certificate of registration but the three never came to see him again.
In September 1982, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner
corporations collector that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondents men."
In 1991, petitioner, accompanied by policemen, recovered the motorcycle at respondents
establishment, where he uttered, Quimco is a thief of motorcycle. Unable to find respondent,
petitioner instructed to take the motorcycle.
Peitioners filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against
respondent who moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had
neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the
complaint and denied petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioner at the Dumaguete RTC. He sought to hold
the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a
defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious
complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and
integrity.
RTC rendered a decision10 finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will
when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial courts decision with modification.
Petitioners sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner exercised an abuse of right by filing a complaint without merit.

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DECISION:
Yes. Article 19 of the Civil Code prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary
to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. Petitioner blatantly disregarded the
lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners acts
violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. The
manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faith
but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. They were held liable for damages not only for
instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for
taking the motorcycle from respondents establishment in an abusive manner
PANTALEON vs. AMEX
G.R. No. 174269
August 25, 2010
FACTS:
American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) is a provider of credit services through charge card
system. Polo S. Pantaleon has been an AMEX cardholder since 1980.
In 1991, Pantaleon, together with his family, went on a guided European tour. During the tour,
Pantaleon decided to purchase diamond pieces at Amsterdam for a total of US$13,826.00 using his
AMEX credit card, but attempted to cancel the transaction because the tour bus is already 10-minute
late for departure. However, Pantaleon was convinced by the store manager to wait a few more
minutes. AMEXs approval took a total of 78 minutes.
When the Pantaleons returned to the tour bus, they found their travel companions visibly irritated.
In the US, after the Europe trio, again, Pantaleon experienced delay in securing approval for two
purchases using his AMEX credit card.
Upon return to Manila, Pantaleon sent AMEX a letter demanding an apology for the humiliation and
inconvenience he and his family experienced due to the delays in his purchase approval. AMEX
responded by explaining that the delay in Amsterdam was due to the amount involved the charged
purchase of US$13,826.00 deviated from Pantaleons established charge purchase pattern.
Dissatisfied with this explanation, Pantaleon filed an action for damages against the credit card
company with the Makati RTC.
The RTC found AMEX guilty of delay.
AMEX appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA disagreed with the RTCs finding that AMEX had breached
its contract, noting that the delay was not attended by bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
Pantaleon questioned CA decision via a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not AMEX is guilty of culpable delay.
2. Whether or not AMEX has the obligation to act on the offer within a specified period of time.
DECISION:
1. No. The use of a credit card to pay for a purchase is only an offer to the credit card company
to enter a loan agreement with the credit card holder. Before the credit card issuer accepts
this offer, no obligation relating to the loan agreement exists between them. A demand
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presupposes the existence of an obligation between the parties. The demand of Pantaleon
obviously could not be classified as the demand required by law to make the debtor in default.
2. No. The SC ruled that: (a) AMEX had neither a contractual nor a legal obligation to act upon
Pantaleons purchases within a specific period of time; and (b) AMEX has a right to review a
cardholders credit card history but AMEX must take care not to abuse its rights and cause
injury to its clients and/or third persons as regard to Article 19, in conjunction with Article 21,
of the Civil Code.
Even if Pantaleon insists that his previous charges were approved within seconds, this is not
enough to establish a legally demandable right; as a general rule, a practice or custom is not a
source of a legally demandable or enforceable right.
GARCIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96126
August 10, 1992
FACTS:
On January 13, 1982, Esteria Garciano, the petitioner, filed an indefinite leave because her daughter
was taking her to Austria. The leave was duly approved by the school principal and President of the
Board of Directors.
On June 1, 1982, petitioners husband received a letter from the school principal informing her of the
decision of the school founder to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because
of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school due to her
refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one
would accept the position without a written contract.
Petitioner returned in the later part of June, 1982. The members of the Board, with the exception of
the school Founder, signed a letter notifying her that she was reinstated to report for duty effective
July 5, 1982, and to disregard any letter or notice of termination received by her.
On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and 3 members of the Board resigned for the
reason that the Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of the
petitioner.
On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in Cebu RTC, against school Founder,
school Principal, and some members of the faculty (defendants) for discrimination and unjust and
illegal dismissal.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the RTC decision.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied. CA gravely erred in absolving
the respondents from liability by faulting the petitioner for her failure to report back to her work.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are liable for damages.
DECISION:
No. The Supreme Court ruled the same with the CA that the respondents are not liable for damages.
The right to recover them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to court to demand
equity, must come with clean hands. The petitioner was at fault for: 1) she went on an indefinite leave
of absence and failed to report back in time for the regular opening of classes; 2) she refused to sign
a written contract of employment; 3) she ignored the Board's order for her to report for duty.
Further, the respondents disagreement to the Board did not make them liable to her for damages.
They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's
decision.
BPI EXPRESS CARD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120639
September 25, 1998
FACTS:
Atty. Ricardo Marasigan is a member of the BPI Express Credit Corporation (BECC) since February 1988.
While Marasigan was attending seminar in Quezon Province, he was informed by his secretary that
BECC was requiring him to issue check for P15,000.00 for payment of his P8,987.84 overdue balance
and for his future bills.
Marasigan issued check in the amount of P15,000.00, postdated December 15, 1989. Mr. Roberto
Maniquiz, head of the collection department of BECC, was formally informed of the postdated check
about a week after BECC employees receipt of the check on November 23, 1989.
On November 28, 1989, BECC, thru a letter, informed Marasigan of the temporary suspension of his
credit card and to refrain from further use of it to avoid any inconvenience/ embarrassment, and that
unless he settles his outstanding account within 5 days from receipt of the letter, his membership will
be permanently cancelled. There is no showing that the Marasigan received this letter before
December 8, 1989, when he entertained guests at Caf Adriatico and his credit card was dishonored.
One of his guests paid the bill by using her own credit card.
On December 12, 1989, Marasigan requested BECC that he be sent the exact billing due him and to
withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said check be returned to him because he had
already instructed his bank to stop the payment thereof as BECC violated their agreement.
On March 12, 1990, Marasigan sent another letter reminding BECC that he had long rescinded and
cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with BECC, and requesting for his correct billing, less
the improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation within five (5) days from receipt thereof
why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989.
On March 21, 1990, Marasigan received a letter of final demand, requiring him to pay within 5 days
from receipt thereof or face court action, and also to replace the postdated check with cash within the
same period or face criminal suit for violation of Bouncing Check Law.

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On April 5, 1990, Marasigan demanded defendant's compliance with his request in his letter dated
March 12, 1990 within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise he will file a case against BECC.
Thus, on May 7, 1990 Marasigan filed a complaint for damages against BECC at the Makati RTC.
The RTC ruled for Marasigan, finding that BECC abused its right in contravention of Article 19 of the
Civil Code. While it is true that terms and conditions that BECC can automatically suspend his credit
card, the reserved right should not have been abused. There was no actual communication that BECC
informed Marasigan of the suspension of his credit card. Further, the postdated check was kept by
BECCs employee for a few days until it became due.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC decision with modification.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not BECC abused its right to suspend the credit card of Marasigan.
2. Whether or not prior to the suspension of Marasigans credit card on November 28, 1989,
BECC and Marasigan entered into an agreement whereby the credit card could still be used
and would be duly honored by duly accredited establishments.
DECISIONS:
1. No. The Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner did not abuse its right. Under the provision of the
terms and conditions signed by BECC and Marasigan, BECC could automatically suspend his
credit card 30 days from the non-payment of his billing dated September 27, 1989. It was
Marasigan's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card.
2. No. The purpose of the agreement was for the immediate payment of Marasigans outstanding
balance, in order that his credit card would not be suspended. Settled is the doctrine that a
check is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument
especially in the case of postdated check, does not, by itself operate as payment.
SIMON vs. ELVIN CHAN AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 157547
February 23, 2011
FACTS:
In December 1996, Eduardo Simon willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issued to Elvin Chan, Landbank
Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of P336,000.00. Simon
was well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank.
When presented for payment, the check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, Simon failed to pay Chan.
More than 3 years later, Chan commenced in the Metropolitan TC a civil action for the collection of
the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge Chans
attachment bond for damages.
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
Chans attachment bond for damages, dismissing the complaint of Chan. After study of the
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arguments of the parties, the TC resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the application to
charge plaintiffs bond for damages.
The Pasay RTC found no error in the appealed decision.
Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals by petition for review the propriety of the dismissal of his
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed
decision, overturning the RTC. As a general rule, an offense causes 2 classes of injuries: 1) the social
injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the
corresponding penalty, 2) the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought
to be compensated through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Simon is entitled to file an independent civil case.
DECISION:
No. There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. An independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
YAKULT PHILS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 91856
October 5, 1990
FACTS:
A 5-year old boy, Roy Camaso was sideswiped by a motorcycle driven by Larry Salvado, an employee
of Yakult Philippines (Yakult). Salvado was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical
injuries docketed as Criminal Case No. 027184. Another complaint for damages was filed by Camasos
father with the Manila RTC docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27317.
RTC decision was rendered in the civil case ordering Yakult and Salvado to compensate Camaso.
Yakult appealed the judgment of the RTC but not its jurisdiction over the civil case. Yakults thesis is
that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being
without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action and such a separate civil action
may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. Hence, a motion for reconsideration was filed.
ISSUE:
Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no reservation
to file a separate civil action?
DECISION:
No. The petition is devoid of merit. The civil action in this case was filed in court before the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding
on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action, no damages
was awarded.
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SAN ILDEFONSO LINE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119771
April 24, 1998

FACTS:
In 1991, a van being driven by its owner, Annie U. Jao and a bus of the petitioner, San Ildefonso Lines
Inc. (SILI), figured in a vehicular mishap at an intersection, totally wrecking the van and injuring Ms.
Jao and her 2 passengers in the process.
A criminal case was filed with the Pasig RTC charging the driver of the bus, petitioner Eduardo Javier,
with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries. About 4
months later, private respondent, Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the
van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Manila RTC.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings grounded on the pendency
of the criminal case against petitioner in the Pasig RTC and the failure of respondent to make a
reservation to file a separate damage suit in said criminal action. This was denied by the Manila RTC,
which holds that plaintiff may legally institute the present civil action even in the absence of a
reservation in the criminal action. Further, a subrogee-plaintiff may institute and prosecute the civil
action, it being allowed by Article 2207 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari which was referred to
Court of Appeals. CA ruled that a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed to recover damages on both cases. The purpose of the rule requiring reservation
is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.
Hence, the petition for review was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2. Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency
of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was
made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively
participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
DECISION:
1. No. No satisfactory proof exists to show that private respondent PISC's damage suit was
instituted before the prosecution presented its evidence in the criminal case pending in
the Pasig RTC. Neither is there any indication that the judge presiding over the criminal
action has been made aware of the civil case.
2. No. Private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not
exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasidelict arising from the same act or ommission of petitioner Javier complained of in the
criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as
owner of the insured van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which
Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.
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HAMBON v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122150
March 17, 2003
FACTS:
The petitioner filed before the Baguio RTC, a complaint for damages for the injuries and expenses he
sustained after the truck driven by the respondent bumped him. Respondent contended that the
criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed, had already been provisionally dismissed by the Tuba MTC due to
petitioners lack of interest, and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities
of respondent.
The RTC ruled that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that
petitioner is entitled to damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, and dismissed
petitioners complaint for damages since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal
of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that
the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on
the merits.
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for damages be dismissed for failure to make reservation to file a separate
civil action in a criminal case.
DECISION:
Yes. The SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended in 1988 governs that, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Petitioner should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for damages in Criminal
Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him
without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever
civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted was likewise dismissed.
CANCIO vs. ISIP
G.R. No. 133978
November 12, 2002
FACTS:
Jose S. Cancio, Jr.,petitioner filed 3 criminal cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and 3 cases of estafa,
against Emeranciana Isip, respondent, for allegedly issuing 3 checks without sufficient funds.
The Provincial Prosecutor dismissed the first case for the check was deposited with the drawee bank
after 90 days from the date of the check. The second and third cases were also dismissed for failure
to prosecute.
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The 3 cases for estafa were filed with Pampanga RTC. After failing to present its second witness, the
prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases.
Petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the
checks subject of the estafa cases. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending
that petitioners action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent further prayed that
petitioner should be held in contempt of court for forum-shopping.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent and held the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent on
the ground that lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits which
amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection. It further held that the filing of said civil case
amounted to forum-shopping.
RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil
action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases.
2. Whether or not the filing of said civil action violated the anti-forum-shopping rule.
DECISION:
1. No. Dismissal of estafa cases does not bar institution of the civil action. It must be stressed that
the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct
from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Although the cases filed by petitioner
arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different
causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action
for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.
2. No. Being an independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution and which require no prior reservation for its institution, the anti-forum-shopping
rule is not violated.

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TAADA vs. TUVERA

G.R. No. 63915 December 29, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners demand for the disclosure of presidential decrees that had not been published as required
by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
The Court ordered respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration/clarification of the Courts decision and suggested that
publication must mean complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the
Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in effecting a law, the term unless otherwise provided refers to the requirement of
publication itself.
DECISION:
No. Based on Art. 2 of the Civil Code and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, the Court have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless
it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Thus, all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
TAADA v. TUVERA
GR L-63915
April 24, 1985
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential
Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUE:
Whether or not unpublished laws have binding force and effect.
DECISION:
No. The clause unless otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication in full should
be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignorantia Legis non excusat.

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The court, therefore, declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be
published in the Official Gazette immediately.
COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110308
August 28, 1996
FACTS:
07 April 1998: NBI filed with the RTC of Pasig 3 applications for SW against private respondent (Tube
Video Enterprises Edward C. Cham; Blooming Rose Tape Center Ma. Jajorie T. Uy; Video Channel
Lydia Nabong) charging them with violations of Sec. 56 of PD 49 (Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property) as amended by PD 1988.
RTC Judge Austria consolidated the 3 applications and conducted a joint hearing where she made a
personal examination of the applicant (NBI Agent Reyes) and his witnesses.
Finding just and probable cause, Judge Austria issued the search warrants.
Private Respondents filed their Motion to Quash the SW citing as grounds that there was no
probable cause; the films in question are not protected by PD 1988 in that they were never registered
in the National Library as a condition precedent to the availment of the protection; the Motion Picture
Association of America have not proven nor established their ownership over the films; etc.
Judge Austria reversed her former stand initially finding probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrants and ordered their quashal:

Private complainants uncertain of their ownership over the titles;

Complainants did not comply with the requirement that master tapes should be presented
during the application for search warrants;
Complainants failed to comply with the deposit and registration requirements of PD 49 as
amended by PD 1988.

Judge Austria also ordered the return of the items seized by virtue of the warrants.
CA affirmed the quashal of the SWs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SWs were issued with probable cause.
DECISION:
No. Basic Requirement for the validity of search warrants (in cases of this nature) is the presentation
of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films are supposed to have been
copied (20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655). The essence of a copyright infringement is
the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work.
Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an
unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films

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must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the
existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
According to the CA, in which the SC concurs:
It is not correct to say that "the basic fact" to be proven to establish probable cause in the instant cases
is not the "unauthorized transfer" of a motion picture that has been recorded but the "sale, lease, or
distribution of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films. In applying for the search warrants the NBI
charged violation of the entire provisions of Section 56 of P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D.No.1988.
This included not only the sale, lease or distribution of pirated tapes but also the transfer or causing
to be transferred of any sound recording or motion picture or other audio visual work. But even
assuming, as appellants argue, that only the sale, lease, or distribution of pirated video tapes is
involved, the fact remains that there is need to establish probable cause that the tapes being sold,
leased or distributed are pirated tapes, hence the issue reverts back to the question of whether there
was unauthorized transfer, directly or indirectly, of a sound recording or motion picture or other audio
visual work that has been recorded.
Petitions denied.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
GR No. 120295 June 28, 1996
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time.
The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial
Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
DECISION:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that
by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under
the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between
him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with
CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

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ELEGADo vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS

GR No. L-68385
May 12, 1989

FACTS:
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national, formerly resident of the Philippines,
died in Oregon, USA. As certain shares of stock are left in the Philippines, his son Ward Graham filed
an estate tax return. [Meanwhile, W. Graham designated executor, appointed Ildefonso Elegado as his
attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines.
On the basis of such return, the Commission of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the descendants
estate in the amount of P96,509.35. The assessment was protested by the law firm of Bump, Yang,
and Walker on behalf of the estate which was denied by the CIR.
Elegado, as an ancillary administrator, filed a second estate tax return. The Commissioner imposed an
assessment on the estate in the amount of P72,948.87 based on the SEC return, which was protested
by the Agrava Law Office on behalf of the estate. While the protest was pending, the petitioner filed a
motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35. He said that this liability had not yet
been paid although the assessment had long become final and executory. Petitioner was denied
contending that the first assessment is not binding on him because it was based on a return filed for
by lawyers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the first assessment is binding being filed for by lawyers.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that Elegados contention is flimsy. Elegado cannot be serious when he argues
that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based
were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim similar
preferences, it follows that foreigners cannot be any less bound by laws in our country.

D.M. CONSUNJI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR NO. 137873
August 28, 1998
FACTS:
On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, filed in the RTC of
Pasig a compalint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer
raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is negligent and should be liable.
DECISION:
The decision of the CA is affirmed. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all
further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because

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private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits
from the State Insurance Fund.
In re: SYCIP, SALARAZ, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO
GR No. X92-1. July 30, 1979
FACTS:
The surviving partners of the firm filed petitions that they be allowed to continue using the name of their
deceased partners, Atty. Alexander Sycip and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sycip and Ozaeta can still be considered name partners.
DECISION:
No. The Court ruled that the names Sycip and Ozaeta should be removed as name partners. Art. 1815 of
the Civil Code provides: Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners." Hence, those who, not being members of the

partnership include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability of a partner."
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. When the
Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from
including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against
which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our
civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. Customs
which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

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