Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173540

January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the
25 March 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint
for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
1

The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the
same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of
their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only
a Certification was issued by the LCR.
3

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco
H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa,
born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in
1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children
were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of
Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous an action
she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, essentially averring
that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City,
their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also
4

contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and
as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla
herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued
by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;
5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the

Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta
Mesa, Manila;
6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were
actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in
1932;
7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila;
8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;

10

11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish
Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;
12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they
cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco
Avenido;
13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to

spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;
14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.

15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place
in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he
already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a
common law wife of Eustaquio. Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate
her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
16

1) Marriage Contract between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage
on 3 March 1979;
17

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he

contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one
Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and
Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;
18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte; and
19

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.
20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith
so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence,
her entitlement to damages and attorneys fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision denying Teclas petition, as well as Peregrinas
counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
21

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA
HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.
22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial courts alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision, the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
23

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the
sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her
older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the
eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father,
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It
should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the
condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the
very evidence the trial court has disregarded.
24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), in its Memorandum dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
25

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the
validity of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to
prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being
presented to the witness stand.
26

Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves
the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Teclas
failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court
considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has
no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards
the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a
Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on
February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to
date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying
and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio]
and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.
27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof
of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children.
Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications
disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina AvenidoCeno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial
courts ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord
with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Aonuevo v.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, we said, citing precedents, that:
28

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded
as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can
be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals. Thus:
29

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting
the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by
the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due
execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court
clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the
instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is
the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or nonexistence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It
generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents
but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim
Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent
evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer,
by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the
parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may
be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers
of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court
that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidencetestimonial
and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established
by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage
ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the

certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been
held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is
also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the
sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her
older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the
eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father,
EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It
should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the
condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the
very evidence the trial court has disregarded.
31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court has elucidated on the rationale
behind the presumption:
32

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28)
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.
1wphi1

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest
of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in
a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in

Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be
in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or
the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of
their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen
fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name
or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude

the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of
first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;
or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was
not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance

of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife
in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is

no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error,30is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-tofemale transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners
petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the
marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I.
Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. 3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made
in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed
a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence
to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her
to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the
motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed
to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a

marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN
JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being
bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise,
the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard
is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity
or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding
that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really
agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood,
and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld
such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should
not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration,
the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely

give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage
for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter
into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial
or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real
and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent
to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further
their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
1wphi1

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to

establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if
it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by
the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they
have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already
misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION**
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167684

July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on
19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N.
Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain
Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of
Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license
after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at
the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A
certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father
accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil
wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on
May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never
applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March
11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he
and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed
another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and
indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly
shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided
in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his
parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time,
for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became
difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living
apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in
1978. It was during this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in
1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service
was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his
marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed
marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3,
1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994
(Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply
thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E")
and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued
by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified
copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of
Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious
ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under
Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic
relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she
was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who
was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff,
she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back
to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's
mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the
elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything, and
promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he
asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father
(TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign
documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On
May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and
arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in
the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation
during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She
learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that
plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some
traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual
behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures of.
Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called
"intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence,
abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant
attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a
bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then
would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep
plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home
since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during
all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while
defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did
nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her,
and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one
Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of
his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after
they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His
grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his
daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior
to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the
plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to
divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United
States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant
who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21).
During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000

(Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no.
2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is
inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial
court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or
absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various
certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage
license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh.
"A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value
under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May
19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan
B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601
(e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they"failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said
testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the
parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local
civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to
the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book
were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry
on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx

Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential
requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts
on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in
a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of
regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from
the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage
license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage." 9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the
marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and
void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the
parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null
and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the
Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and

explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar
should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it
was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names
of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and
deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11
March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards
(sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office
with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the
said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application
was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by
this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal
intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work
cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to
the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of
the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former
custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This
belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been
exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of
the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969.
Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT

Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the
number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued.
Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did
you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you
cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to
locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption
of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted
and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands,
or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable
presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x. 21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by
other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the
tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License
No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot
be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot
easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the
petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. 27 We
are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest
sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like
this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,

docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No.
269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued
at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was
at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-inlaw arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of
said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not
know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not
go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In
July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said certification reads
as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are
issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed

by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993,
and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to
any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and
Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is
familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage
license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that
office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin
to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993.19He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage
contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and
that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified
that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license,
and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the
application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also
testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the
sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing
a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she
did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese. 31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License
No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack
of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity
of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics
Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9,
1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same,
prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE

PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A
MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY
LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA
also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005
and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil
Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas
contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN

CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209,
or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply
to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal
requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor
is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2,
Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid
marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had
been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. 44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value,
as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and
Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967
was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do
not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply
with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and
since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting
that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage
license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a
diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The

presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or

failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption
must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage
License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria
and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where
the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present
this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license
issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is
that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by
the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a
copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were
validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and
appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by
the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before
he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only
after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
1wphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make
up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight
of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him,
as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201061

July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March
2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a nonexistent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that

on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together
as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of
their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered
in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice
and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents
against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the
partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his
petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court
denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any
evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The
trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July
2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November
2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence,
prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave
weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was
confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for
the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to
Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins
subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court
ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice
and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for
spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support
for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named
in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was
not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by
Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to
Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own
money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their
purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos.
61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units
were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under
TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal
state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in
the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while
Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982
at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT
Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949,
188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627,
194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638,
194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan
and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry
of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from
these thirty-seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioners money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties
of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these
five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from
these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the
petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under coownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared
FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner
shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution
of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of
March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-1110.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General
and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order
dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision
before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted
that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of
evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would
be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed
despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on
his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or
dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article
148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties

through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782
and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution
in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in
the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally.
However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage
with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof
of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the
case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification
declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be
solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by
them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to
the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall
accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts
ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and nonexistent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification
the trial courts decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her
right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and
Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence was
scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4
and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at
Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally
that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the
trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts
prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had
been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at her
instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she
still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed
to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued
failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of
interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she
was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial courts denial
of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary
restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial
proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties. 10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin
because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally
further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her
marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in
acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that
Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their
father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally
claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally
further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.

First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial
court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally
entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II
of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series
issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance,
the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record
was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; 14 and Lourdes J.
Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office. 15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and
Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected
social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as
Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a
proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant
in Bernices birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and
Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March
1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio
and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without
a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar
of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also
non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands." 22 While the Court of
Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the

decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The trial court
stated:
1wphi1

On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be
null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of
their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was
contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because
there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally
married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner
has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be
invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for
validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license.
The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired
by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and
their respective spouses which included Sally x x x." 25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more
in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered
in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to
Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name
of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a
spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove
co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no coownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from
hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her
evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his
decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence
to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself.32In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge
Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued refusal to
present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against
Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his
voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182438

July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging
the April 3, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
1

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry
each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown,
together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest,
to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that
they had no marriage certificate.
3

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.
4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecutions witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony.
Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne
testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their
wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. She heard the petitioner instructing the
principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch
and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to
her by Joey.
6

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony
that they take each other as husband and wife. Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal
local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was
given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.
8

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.
10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed
on him aP200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioners act of giving
a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. It further ruled that in performing a marriage
ceremony without the couples marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44
of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not
specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
11

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter
law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of P200.00.
12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of
the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired.
It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence
than the petitioners negative statements. The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should
be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
13

The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must
appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. According to the
CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage
certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.
14

15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioners criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350
of the same Code.
16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the
Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities
such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming
that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and
Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take
each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing
which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. The
petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. Second, under the principle of
separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony."
17

18

19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes
of giving moral guidance to the couple.
20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.
21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not
covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions
nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.
22

THE COURTS RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of
the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to
be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of
an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and
what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these
matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was
copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 6 of the Family
Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife." Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code
and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
23

24

25

26

27

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear
that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However,
as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that
they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact
was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioners
allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioners allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to
persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.
28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely
register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioners admission regarding
the circumstances of the ceremony, support Floridas testimony that there had indeed been the
declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey
disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces
of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary
Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the
petitioners allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This
pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital
rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end,
it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
29

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may
view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article
3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony
was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of
a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple
had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential
and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore,
was illegal. The petitioners knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of
good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The
penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly
provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the
Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without
being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing
marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or
parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or
minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both,
in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that
the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of
the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case. As correctly
found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the
provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which
was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
1wphi1

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of P200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the
Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141528

October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,

vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question of
law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition 1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha
Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family
Code, citing respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision2 dated November
11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the
grant of the relief he is seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed
in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999
another petition5for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time
alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to
dismiss6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res
judicata and forum shopping.
In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents motion to dismiss, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order 9 dated January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS
MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS
WIFES PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS
PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY
BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW.

B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF

HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL
COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES
AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM
SHOPPING.10
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was
distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon
which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because
there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the
second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on
forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that while the present
suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP
4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondents marriage, and prays for the same remedy,
that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated
the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on
multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a
marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be
raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a partys
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall
under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle
of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by
a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on points and matters determined in the former suit."11
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded
upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it
to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the
public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious
disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. 12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate of
a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or
the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting
of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its
concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar
to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the
other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains tores judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or
otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendantwhich ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment
obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an orderon the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the
second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the presence
of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical
is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in
the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain
both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the
subsequent action.16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence
necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is
anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action.
By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of

another.17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These
grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key
to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no
valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case
No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence
of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier
case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received
to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. 18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply
varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court
stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it
grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are
not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would
not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring
a second action after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories
of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is
mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began.
A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first
action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and
cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover
for the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either
by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment
in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal
or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and
leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no
end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain
judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate
all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same
controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred
by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that
the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is
barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil
Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits
gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office
and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's
"lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same
person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit
on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge
Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for
almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage
between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which
states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states
that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado,
Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by
respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they
knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after

thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in
Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby
giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and
simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated
into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance
with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling
under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized
the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction.
As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was
made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers
only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to
do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who
are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension
of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply

the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded
by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and
therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to
cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED
for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. 99-1211
January 28, 2000
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant,

vs.
Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse
of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge
Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar
alleging
a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and
our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence of J.P.R.
Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; . . .
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal
sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; . . .
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any
reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City
Civil Registrar to inquire my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my
marriage was not registered; . . .
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar; I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to
inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the
Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That not copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as:
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the
office of the Local Civil Registrar.
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be
solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge
of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and pressing circumstances:
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report
to his station in Sta. Margita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment,
complainant Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent
in said City, urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and
there, first, because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to fly
from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another
town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of
finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact
former Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member]
Ramon Dean were already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married
on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and
their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of
notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage,
complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other
alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the
parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid
marriage, which respondent found all in order.
1wphi1.nt

1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent

realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that
by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too
expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the duplicate
and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the
following circumstances beyond the control of respondent:
3.1. After handling to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate,
respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office
where the marriage ceremonies were held, intending later to register the duplicate
and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers
relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and
private files, all the three last copies of the certificate were missing. Promptly,
respondent invited by subpoena . . . . Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing
documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage
certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to
contract complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman's claim.

3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the
country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established facts
so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of complainant that after August 28,
1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any reason . . . but
that said husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" . .
. it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties probably
absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect
the public interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing
documents in some amicable way during the expected hearing of the above
mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would
confer with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted
copies of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found that
respondent Judge ". . . committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or future acts will be
dealt with more severely pointing out that:
As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority
to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly,
Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code,
wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other
than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when failed to
register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides:
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil register of the place where the marriage
was solemnized. . . . (emphasis ours)

It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed
non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the
basic social institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or
reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected to be
conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation that the missing copies of the
marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and
does not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof.
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report of the
OCA well-taken.
Jimenez v. Republic1 underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage
in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has
surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and
stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every
member of the community to prevent the bringing about a condition that would shake its foundation
and untimely lead to its destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others,
that
Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; . . . (Emphasis ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counsel-general, consul or viceconsul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at
the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or were
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
(Emphasis ours)
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers
or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to
this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fianc Yman was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting
parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place
other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more
by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas
worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present
Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question,

"[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that
it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married."
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it
and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.2 A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law;3 he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.4 Certainly,
judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of
their duties.5
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the
marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the
hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's cavalier proclivity on its
significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior
to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve so
sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid
down by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant
in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is,
furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his
court.6 Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized
to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by is Bishop. An appellate court
justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.7
Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. MargaritaTarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
City of Calbayog.8
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra
care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is
likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly
documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that

Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send
the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the
marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper
receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting
copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in

proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the
marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less
than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in
ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no
justification for missing records save fortuitous events.9 However, the records show that the loss was
occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court reiterates that judges must
adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and
filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge
of his official functions.11
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, 1 affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint 3 for declaration of nullity
of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City.
As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos
who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered
that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent
Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza
Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might
not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines
several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with
her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was
filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no

more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint
that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36,
in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that
she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While
she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely
refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she
was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent
Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of
sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could
not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely
left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning
as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all
of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well
as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for
one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to
sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed
by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was
presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of
misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of
their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage
to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely
the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, 5 the RTC afforded both
parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his
own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the
recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds,
such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding
of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname,
Micklus.9
Felys counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,
Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular
officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside.
Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York
and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a
single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year
since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the
case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, 14 considering Fely to have waived
her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As
observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as
striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married
to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that
sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply
with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has
been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant
Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital
stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and
void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein.
It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently
residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE
HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and
unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the
case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can
not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus
becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered
as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to
remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, 17 denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute psychological
incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity
was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because
the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition,
because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court
finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases,
this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated 21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony,
which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering
the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations;
not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and
her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration
of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent
Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 31 No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted
in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the
principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing
in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent,
rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before
this Court or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively

participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of

marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to
the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even
while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns
the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel
any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of
its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other

pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies
of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the
parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by
filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to
file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with
respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless
marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22,
in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and
by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts
its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the
case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the

parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article
26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce
them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee,
is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as

far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to
file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity
to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on

record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Chairman
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION

BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous
of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION

From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido
by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to
be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers
himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines
since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerberts
position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void15 and voidable16 marriages.
In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution
of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases,
the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign

divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van
Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse]
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the
alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse,
by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her
to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in
a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will
be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves
as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by

its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry
of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status
of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The
law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet
exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally
out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as
it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties
to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order.
We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No.
34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he
purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after
giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of
his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument
with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of
the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to
the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According
to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children
with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva
Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license.
Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony
with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko
abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage
before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which
is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of
marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963.
At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer.
Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in
his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a
marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior
as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life.
A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing
v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the

government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately

executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque
R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia BorjaManzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children
were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew
was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. 4 According to him, had he known that the
late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he
(Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the
affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member
of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that
since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge
alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. 6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and
Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits
which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree
of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize
the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the
case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not

severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to
judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the
law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure
to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.