DevelopmentontheMove

MeasuringandOptimisingMigration’sEconomicandSocialImpacts
EXECUTIVESUMMARY

LauraChappell withRamonaAngelescu-Naqvi,GeorgeMavrotas
andDhananjayanSriskandarajah
WWW.IPPR.ORG
MIGRATION
2 DevelopmentontheMove| Aboutippr|AboutGDN

Aboutippr

TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,
producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
sustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakinginthe
UK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchange
andprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedas
possible,whileourGlobalChangeprogrammeextendsourpartnershipsandinfluence
beyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.

ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.
T:+44(0)2074706100|E:info@ippr.org
www.ippr.org.

RegisteredCharityNo.800065

AboutGDN

GDN–theGlobalDevelopmentNetwork–isasmall,independentinternational
organisationthatalliesresearchersandinstitutesindevelopmentglobally.GDNaimsto
supportresearchersindevelopingandtransitioncountriestogenerateandshareapplied
socialscienceresearchtoadvancesocialandeconomicdevelopment.Itwasfoundedin
1999onthepremisethatgoodpolicyresearch,properlyapplied,canaccelerate
developmentandimprovepeople’slives.GDN’scorebusinessisresearchcapacity
building.Theaspirationistoachieveacriticalmassofresearcherswhoareglobally
interconnectedandproducegoodresearchtoinformpublicpolicy.
www.gdnet.org

ThisreportwasfirstpublishedinMay2010.
©ipprandGDN2010
 3

Foreword

ThisreportcapturesthemainresultsfromDevelopmentontheMove:Measuringand
OptimisingMigration’sEconomicandSocialImpacts,ajointprojectoftheGlobal
DevelopmentNetwork(GDN)andtheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr).We
believethatthisprojectisauniqueandimportantcontributiontothestudyofoneofthe
mostimportantphenomenaofourtime:internationalmigration.Itisaground-breaking
globalresearchprojectthathasgatherednew,comparativequalitativeandquantitative
dataaboutmigration’sdevelopmentimpacts.Ithasdonesothroughanambitious
methodologyinvolvingprimaryresearchinsevencountries,acrosssixcontinents.The
researchershavespokentoclosetoahundredthousandpeopleandgatheredcomparable
in-depthdatafromalmost10,000households.
Theprojecthasalsobeenambitiouslybroad,lookingatawiderangeofmigration’s
developmentimpacts,thinkingabouthowmigrationasawhole affectsdevelopmentasa
whole.Andtheprojectisuniquelypolicyfocused,withpolicymakerinputsatvariousstages
oftheresearchandwithfresh,workablepolicyideasasoneofthekeyprojectgoals.
Therangeofoutputstheprojecthasproducedisdiverse,includingworkshops,aworking
paperseries,ashortfilm,ahouseholddatasetandasetofin-depthcountrystudies,andthis
finalreport.InkeepingwiththespiritofGDN’sandippr’sobjectives,allmaterialsfromthis
project(includingoursurveyinstrumentsandthedata)willbemadeavailableinthepublic
domain,viaourwebsites.Thisreport,tobereadinconjunctionwiththeotheroutputs,
summarisestheworkofthelastthree-and-a-halfyears,settingoutwhatwasdone,whathas
beenfound,whatitmeansforpolicymakers,andwhatwehavelearntfromtheprocess.
Theprojectowesitssuccesstothehardworkofcountlesspeople.Whilemanyofthese
peoplearethankedintheacknowledgementssectionofthereport,wewouldliketonote
ourparticulargratitudetotwogroupsofpeople.First,totheinternationalgroupof
donors,withoutwhosesupportGDNandipprcouldnothaveembarkedonsucha
project.AndsecondlytothemanycolleaguespastandpresentatGDNandipprwhohave
contributedtothisprojectoverthelastfewyears.
AtGDN,weareparticularlygratefultoLynSquire(theformerPresident),whoplayeda
criticalroleingettingtheprojectofftheground;RamonaAngelescuNaqvi,whohasbeen
theintellectual,strategicandadministrativebackboneoftheprojectfromevenbeforeit
wasstarted;andGeorgeMavrotasforhisintellectualleadership,academicadviceand
econometricexpertiseduringthelifeoftheprojectandforbeinginstrumentalatthe
crucialdisseminationstage.AtipprweareincrediblygratefultoLauraChappellwhohas
workedtirelesslytocoordinateeveryaspectofthisverylargeproject,andneverlosingher
infectiousenthusiasmforthevalueofwhatwehavebeenworkingtowards.
Finally,wewantedtounderlinethecollaborativenatureofthisendeavour.GDNandippr
havetriedfromtheoutsettoensurethatDevelopmentontheMove hasbeenanopen
andcollaborativeendeavourbetweenpartnersfromallovertheworldhopingtolearn
fromoneanotherwhileaddingtotheglobalstockofknowledge.Wehopethatwhatwe
haveproducedwillbeofusetoresearchersandpolicymakersforyearstocome.Whilethis
reportmarkstheendofthisproject,wewouldbedelightedtohearfrompeoplewho
havecommentsandsuggestionsonhowtotakethisendeavourforward.Itisapromising
beginningbuthopefullymuchmorecanbelearned,takingadvantageofthispath-
breakingglobalresearchproject.
DhananjayanSriskandarajah
(ProjectDirector)
GerardodellaPaolera
(President,GDN)
CareyOppenheimandLisaHarker
(Co-Directors,ippr)
May2010
4
3.AnalysisfromFijiisnotincludedin
thismainreportastheFijidatasetand
reportwerenotcompleteatthetime
thisreportwasbeingprepared.We
anticipateitspublicationlaterin2010.
ExecutiveSummary
Projectbackgroundandaims
Thisreportpresentsthemainfindingsfromthemajorglobalresearchproject,
DevelopmentontheMove,carriedoutbetween2006and2010.Theprojecthas
examinedawiderangeofmigration’simpactsondevelopment,includingthrough
gatheringnew,comparabledatainColombia,Fiji3,Georgia,Ghana,Jamaica,Macedonia
andVietnam.Whilethealready-publishedcountrystudiesprovidedetailsoffindingsin
eachcountry,thisreportseekstodrawoutthemaincomparativelessons.
Theprojectaimedtomakefivekeycontributionstothestudyofmigration’s
developmentimpacts:
1. Todevelopbettermethodologiesforassessingmigration’simpacts.Theproject
designedanew,holisticapproachtothestudyofmigrationanddevelopment.Our
aimwastoexaminetherangeofvariouseffectsthatinternationalmigration–both
immigrationandemigration–hasoneconomicandsocialdevelopment.
2. Toimprovetheevidencebase.Theprojectcommissionedasetofnewcountry
studies,eachofwhichwasconductedinthesameway,combininganalysisofthe
existingliteraturewithnewdatatakenfromextensive,in-depthhouseholdsurveys
andstakeholderinterviews.
3. Tocarryoutcomparativework.Thereisaclearneedformoreanalysisthatexamines
similarresearchquestions,usingsimilardefinitionsofmigrationanddevelopment,
andgatheringsimilarkindsofdatainsimilarways.Thiskindofanalysisshouldgive
usamuchgreaterinsightintogenerallessonsandthefactorsthatappeartobeat
therootofdifferencesinimpacts.
4. Toanalysepolicyimpactsandoptions.Anexplicitfocusoftheprojectwascurrentand
potentialpolicyframeworksformanagingmigrationanditsimpacts.Wewantedto
explorehowpolicymakerscouldenhancepositiveimpactsandreducenegativeones.
5. Tobuildresearchcapacityonmigration.Inordertohelpbuildmigrationresearch
capacityandstrengthenresearchnetworks,especiallyindevelopingcountries,
teamsbasedinthecountriesstudiedconductedthemajorityofresearchforthe
project,withsupportandcoordinationfromGDNandipprstaffandadvisers.
6. Topromotemulti-disciplinaryanalysis.Byadoptingamulti-disciplinaryframework
andbyassemblingresearchersandadvisersfromdifferentmethodological
backgrounds,theprojectaimedtogobeyondthenarrowfocusofmuchcurrent
migrationresearch,andtopromoteholisticanalysis.
Methodology
Theprojecthasanalysedawiderangeofmigration’seffects.Theseinclude:
• Economicimpacts,educationalimpacts,healthimpacts,genderimpactsand‘wider’
socialimpacts
• Impactsforindividualmigrantsthemselves,plustheirfamilies,communitiesand
nations
• Impactsthatoccurbothdirectlyasaresultofmovement(throughimmigration,
emigrationandreturn)andindirectly(forexample,throughremittances,other
‘transfers’(likethetransferofinvestmentfundsorofideas),andthepotentialthat
migrationhastochangepeople’sbehaviour).
Ineachofthe‘casestudy’countriesweworkedwithlocalresearcherswhogathered
togethertheexistingevidenceonthisdiverserangeofimpactsandcomplementedit
withtwoadditionalkindsofnewdata–informationgatheredfromstakeholder
 5

interviews,andanew,nationally-representativehouseholdsurvey.Thesurveywasthe
mostimportantandinnovativeaspectofourapproach.Wedesigneditspecificallyfor
thisprojecttogiveusreliabledataonhowcommonmigrationisandtoinvestigatea
rangeofitsdevelopmentimpacts.
Ineachcountrythesurveywascarriedoutinsuchawaythatitprovidednationally
representativeresults(withtheexceptionofColombiawhich,forlogisticalandfinancial
reasons,wasrepresentativeofurbanareasonly),meaningthatthisprojectisableto
drawapictureofthescaleandimpactsofmigrationacrossthecountriesasawhole.This
meansthatpolicymakerscandrawonthefindingswithconfidence,knowingthatthey
depicttrendsfortheirentirecountry,notjustcertainspecificgroupsorareas.
Thefinaldatasetincludesinformationfromalmost10,000households,eachofwhich
wasaskedaround178questions.Thetopicscoveredincludedhouseholdmembers’
characteristics(suchasage,occupation,gender)andtheirexperiencesofmigration,as
wellasinformationonthehouseholdasawhole(suchastheirconsumptionpatterns
andreceiptofremittances).Householdsbothwithandwithoutmigrantswereincluded,
thelatterasabasisforcomparison,totrytounderstandmigration’seffects.
Attributingcausality–thatis,understandingwhenmigrationisgenuinelythecauseofa
particulartrend–isakeyissueininterpretingdataonmigration.Forexample,ifthe
datashowthathouseholdswithmigrantshavehigherincomesthanhouseholdswithout,
howcanwebesurethatmigrationhascausedtheincreaseinincomes?Analternative
explanationisthatmembersofricherhouseholdsaresimplymorelikelytobeableto
affordtomigrate.Toovercomethisproblem,wehaveusedarangeoftechniqueswhich
include:
(a) Advancedeconometrictools(suchaspropensityscorematchingandinstrumental
variableanalysis)
(b) Theuseofretrospectivequestionstoplothowthingshavechangedwithin
householdsovertime
(c) Askingmigrantsthemselvesaboutwhattheybelievewascauseandwhatwaseffect
(d) Drawingonourothermethodologies(suchasexistingliteratureandinterviewswith
experts)totrytocontextualiseandexplainfindings.

Findings1:Howcommonismigration?
Table1(overleaf)providesasummaryofexistingestimatesofmigration,aswellasour
owncalculations.
Twopointsinparticularemerge.First,itisinterestingtonotethatthekindofemigration
oftenassumedtohavethegreatestdevelopmentimpacts–thatis,recentemigrationin
whichthemigrantleavesotherhouseholdmembersbehind–doesnotconstituteas
largeaproportionofallemigrationfromthecountriesstudiedasmighthavebeen
expected:nomorethan60percentforthecountrieswehavedatafor,andinsome
placesfarlessthanthis,justabove10percentforGeorgia,forinstance.
Second,theprojectpresentsthefirstnationallyrepresentativeandcomparablestatistics
onreturnmigrationthathaveeverbeencollected,asfarasweareaware.When‘ratesof
return’arecalculatedwefindthatalthoughtheyvarysomewhatbetweencountries,in
nocasesaretheyveryhigh.InGeorgiaweestimateabout12outofevery100emigrants
havereturned,inVietnamabout16outofevery100,andinJamaicaabout20.Ghana
andMacedoniaseesomewhathigherlevelsofreturnwith34migrantsreturningto
Macedoniaforevery100whohavedeparted,and37outof100inGhana.
Evenwhereratesofreturnappearbroadlysimilar,thatdoesnotmeanthatreturn
migrationiscomposedofsimilarpeopleacrosscountries,orthatitisdrivenbysimilar
forcesorhasthesamedevelopmenteffects.Migration’snatureanditsimpactsneed
tobeexploredexplicitlyandseparatelyfromitsscale.
6 DevelopmentontheMove| ExecutiveSummary

Table1:Estimatesoffrequencyofmigration

Country Populationsize Totalemigrant Stockofemigrants Totalstockof Totalimmigrant

stock1 whodepartedwithin returnedmigrants3 stock4
lastdecadeleaving
somehousehold
membersbehind2

Colombia5 44,530,000 460,000– – – 110,000–

3,300,000. 115,000
Consensusis
above1,500,000

Georgia 4,680,000 196,000– 140,000 138,000 167,000–

1,500,000.Consensus 526,000
around900,000

Ghana 23,350,000 960,000– 541,000 877,000 614,000–

4,000,000 1,852,000

Jamaica 2,690,000 1,000,000+ 130,000 240,000 13,000–

30,000

Macedonia 2,040,000 3300–700,000. 163,000 159,000 33,000–

Consensusbetween 130,000
250,000and500,000

Vietnam 86,210,000 2,000,000– 1,200,000 479,000 22,000–

3,000,000+ 69,000

[1]Sources:UniversityofSussex’sGlobalMigrantOrigin(GMO)databaseandstatisticsusedin-country;[2]Source:DotM;[3]Source:DotM;[4]Sources:DotM,
GMOandUNpopulationdivision;iInmostcasestheDotMimmigrationestimatefallsbetweentheUNandGMOestimates;[5]NoDotMstatisticsareprovidedfor
Colombiabecausethesurveytherewasonlyrepresentativeforurbanareasandnotthecountryasawhole.

Findings2:Whydopeoplemigrate?
Oursurveygivesaninsightintothemotivationsdrivingemigrationandreturn
acrossarangeofcountriesinthedevelopingworld.Driversofemigrationappear
remarkablyconsistentacrosscountries,withthepursuitofeconomicopportunity
clearlyemergingasthemajorreasontodepart.Employmentopportunitiesand
higherwagesonofferabroadarebyfarthestrongestmotivatorsofmovement,
withhavingtheopportunitytoremitthethirdmostimportant.Theprominence
giventoremittancesdemonstratesexplicitlythatmigrantsdonotleavejustto
furthertheirowneconomicprospects,butalsotoimprovetheirfamilies’economic
welfare.
Aftertheseeconomicfactorscometwootherbroadcategoriesofmotivation–
learning(migrationforformalstudy,tolearnalanguageortoacquireotherskills)
andfamily(migratingalongsidefamilymembers,ortojointhosealreadyliving
abroad).Itisstrikingthatreasonsrelatingtosocialandpoliticalproblemsinthe
countryoforiginwererarelyidentified,evenincountriessuchasColombiawhich
haveexperiencedturmoilandinstabilityinrecentyears.Butthisdoesnotmean
thatsuchproblems arenot driversofemigration–politicalandsocialproblems
oftencreatetheeconomicconditionsthatdriveeconomicemigration.
Whilereasonsfordeparturewerebroadlyconsistentacrosscountries,reasonsfor
returnweremuchlesssobothbetweenandwithincountries,thoughfamilyand
personalreasonswerethemostcommonlyreported.Thedesiretobewithfamily
wasthebiggestdrivermotivatingmigrantstoreturn.Afterfamilyconsiderations
cometwosetsofreasons:‘completion’motivators(themigrantfinishestheirjobor
contract,theirstudy,ormakestheamountofmoneytheywentabroadtoearn)
andvisaandrelatedissues(peoplereturningbecauseofhavingabondplacedon
 7

them,4 peoplereturningvoluntarilybecausetheirhasvisaexpired,orpeoplewho
aredeported).Itwouldseemthatimmigrationregimesincountriesofdestination
dodrivesomereturnmigration,despiteassertionsbysomethattheyhaveno
effect.Anotherrelativelycommonsetofreasonsrevolvearoundthemigranteither
beingdisappointedwiththeirlifeoverseas,ormissingthecultureandlifestyleat
‘home’.
Neweconomicopportunitiesinthecountryoforigin,suchasanewjob,orwanting
tostartanewbusiness,andgovernmentorotherschemestomotivatereturn,are
mentionedrarely.Thisislikelytobedisappointingforpolicymakersinbothorigin
anddestinationcountrieswhohopetotemptreturneesbackbyhighlightingnew
economicopportunitiesorprovidingspeciallytailoredprogrammes,suchas
voluntaryreturnpackages.

Findings3:Remittancepatterns
Table2highlightstheproportionofabsentmigrantswhoremittothehousehold
theyleftbehindwhentheymigrated–somewherebetweenonethirdandthree
quarters,dependingonthecountryinquestion.Giventheinformationwehaveon
theproportionofhouseholdsineachcountrythathaveamigrant,weareableto
calculatetheproportionofthepopulationineachcountrythatreceives
remittancesfromtheirownabsentmigrant.Thisrangesbetween2and11percent.
Ourresearchalsoshowsthatitisverycommonforhouseholdstoreceivefunds
frommigrantswhowerenotpreviouslymembersoftheirhouseholds–typically
moredistantrelatives,orinsomecases(especiallyinJamaica),friends.Inthree
countries(Colombia,JamaicaandVietnam),morehouseholdsareestimatedto
benefitfromthiskindofremittancethanthosesentmoneybytheir‘own’absent
migrant.Those‘non-householdmember’remitterssendlessmoney,andsenditless
frequently,thanahousehold’sownabsentmigrant,butthedifferencestendnotto
beverygreat.Thismakesclearthatthedevelopmentimpactsofmigrationextend
beyondthemigrant’sownhouseholdintothewidercommunity:animportant
finding,challengingthecommonlyheldperceptionthatmigration’sbenefitsmay
onlygoasfarastheirimmediatehousehold.
Thereportalsoexploreshowthecharacteristicsofmigrantsinfluencetheir
remittingbehaviour.Neithergendernorthemigrant’slevelofeducationpriorto
departurehasaclearorconsistentinfluenceoverthelikelihoodthattheywillremit
ortheamountstheysend.Rather,patternsvarybycountry,withforexample

Table2:Frequencyofremittances

Country Proportionofabsent Est.proportionofall Est.proportionofall

migrantsthatremit householdsincountry householdsincountry
totheirhousehold whoreceivefundsfrom whoreceiveremittances
oforigin theirownabsentmigrant froma‘non-member
remitter’

Colombia1 43% 2% 4%

Georgia 72% 11% 10%

Ghana 66% 6% 4%

Jamaica 67% 7% 28%

Macedonia 36% 9% 7%
4.Bondsarearrangementswhereby
Vietnam 77% 4% 9% whenamigrantgoesabroadsupported
bythegovernmentoftheircountryof
origin(oftenforstudy),theyagreeto
Source:DotMhouseholdsurveys2007/2008 return,andiftheydonotreturnthey
[1]InColombiatheseareestimatesfortheproportionofhouseholdsinurbanareasreceivingremittancesfromeach havetopayacertainamounttothe
source. government.
8 DevelopmentontheMove| ExecutiveSummary

VietnamesewomenremittingmorethanmenwhileMacedonianwomenremitless
thantheirmalecounterparts.Othercharacteristicsappeartohavemoreconsistent
effects–forexample,ifthemigrantleavesclosefamilybehind(suchasapartner
orchildren),theyremitmore.Thisisunsurprising,butmayraiseawkwardtrade-off
questionsinpolicymakers’minds,especiallyincountriesoforigin,forwhile
extendedperiodsofseparationarenodoubtbadforfamilywelfare,theremaybea
temptationtopursuethatkindofmigrationtomaximiseremittanceflows.

Findings4:Theeconomicimpactsofmigration
Ourresearchfindsthatindividualmigrants’owndisposableincomeisimproved–
quiteoftendramatically–bymigration.Typicallybetween70and90percentof
migrantsarereportedtohaveexperiencedanincreaseintheirrealdisposable
incomeswhileabroad,themajorityseeinglargeincreases.Oftheremainder,the
majorityexperiencenochangeandonlyafewseetheirincomesdecline.
Ourresearchsuggeststhatnotonlydoesmigrationraiseindividualmigrants’
incomes:italsoraisestheincomesofhouseholdstheycomefromand/orremitto.
(Whilethereissomeoverlapbetweenhouseholdsthatreceiveremittancesandthose
withanabsentmigrant,theyarenotthesame–seeTable2).Forexample,in
Colombiahouseholdsthatreceiveremittancesare12percentlesslikelytobebelow
thenationalpovertylinethanthosewhodonot.InGeorgiahavinganabsent
migrantmakesahouseholdmorelikelytohavebuiltupitsassets,forexamplebeing
10percentagepointsmorelikelytohaveacquiredaDVDplayeroverthepreceding
fiveyears.
Wealsofoundthatreceivingremittancesseemstohaveapositiveimpactonbusiness
ownership.InColombia,forexample,receivingremittancesraisesthelikelihoodthata
householdhasabankaccountusedforrunningabusinessby5percentagepoints.
Ontheotherhand,havinganabsentmigrantinthehouseholddoesnotappearto
increasebusinessownership.Thegeneraltrendforhouseholdswithreturnedmigrants
suggeststhatonthewholethis,too,increasesthelikelihoodofthehousehold
owningabusiness.Here,resultsvarysignificantlybycountry,however:whilethe
presenceofareturnedmigrantinGeorgiaappearstohavenoeffectonbusiness
ownership,inMacedoniaitdramaticallyincreasesthelikelihood.Doingbusinessin
Georgiaisgenerallyregardedasrelativelyeasy,andinMacedonialessso,anditmay
bethatthismeansthatthereisrelativelylessneedinGeorgiafortheadvantagesthat
migrationbrings.
Receivingremittancesappears,onthewhole,tohavelittleimpactonhousehold
members’labourforceparticipationorunemployment.Nordoesreturnmigration
affecthouseholdmembers’employmentstatus,thoughthereturningmigrants
themselvestendtohaveagreaterchanceofbeingunemployedforthefirst12
monthsafterreturnthanwouldbeexpectedofpeoplewithsimilarcharacteristics
(afterthattheyappeartoadjustandthisriskdissipates).Theevidenceontheimpact
ofhavinganabsentmigrantismoredividedbutthemostnotableresultssuggest
thatmigrationincreasesemployment.InGeorgiahavinganabsentmigrantreduces
thelikelihoodthatanyoneinthehouseholdisunemployedby37percent,anda
resultofasimilarmagnitudeisfoundinJamaica.
Bothhouseholdsreceivingremittancesandthosewithabsentmigrantsseean
increaseintheirsavings.InColombia,forexample,householdsinreceiptof
remittancessaveUS$4morepercapitapermonththanotherwise,andhouseholds
withabsentmigrantsUS$3percapitapermonth(theWorldBankestimatesthe
averagemonthlypercapitaincomeinColombiaisUS$228).Returnmigrantsappear
tohavenoeffectonsavingsonewayortheother.

Findings5:Theeducationalimpactsofmigration
Theevidencesuggeststhatbeinginreceiptofremittancesandhavinganabsent
migranthaveapositiveimpactonhouseholdspendingoneducation.Householdsin
Ghanawithabsentmigrants,forexample,spendUS$107moreperyearoneducation
 9

thanthosewithout(theWorldBankestimatesaverageannualpercapitahousehold
incomeinGhanaisUS$670).Returnmigrantsappeartohavenoparticularimpact
onewayortheother.
Intermsofschoolattendance,however,onthewholemigrationseemsnottohave
anyeffects–whetherhouseholdexperienceisthroughthereceiptofremittances,
havingamigrantawayorhavingareturnedmigrantintheirhousehold.Puttingthese
tworesultstogethersuggeststhathouseholdswithmigrantsareprobablymaking
improvementstothequalityofchildren’seducation,investinginmaterialslikebooks,
orsendingthemtobetterschools,ratherthanmakinglargerchangessuchas “Householdswith
enrollingthemforanextrayear’sschooling. migrantsare
Thereis,however,anexceptiontothisgeneralstatement,as parentalmigration probablymaking
doesappeartohaveasubstantialimpact.Someevidencesuggeststhatwhena improvementsto
parentmigrates,thishasaconsiderableeffectonwhetherornottheirchildren,left
behindinthecountryoforigin,areineducation(thoughresultsvarysignificantly
thequalityof
bycountry).InJamaica,parentalabsenceisassociatedwithyoungerchildrenin children’s
particularbeingmuchlesslikelytobeinschool,whereasinVietnamand education,
Macedoniatheresultisreversed,withparentalmigrationbeingassociatedwith
childrenhavingasubstantiallygreaterchanceofbeinginschool.However,the
investingin
modelsthatexaminetheseimpactsdonotcontrolforcausality,andsoitisdifficult materialslike
toknowhowmuchofthisassociationisdrivenbymigration,andhowmuchby books,orsending
reversecausality.
themtobetter
Turningtotheeffectthatmigrationhason nationalskillsstocks,itseemslikely schools”
thatinsomeoftheDotMcountries(particularlyJamaica,butpossiblyalsoGhana
andMacedonia)migration’soveralleffectonacountry’sstockofskillsmaybe
negative.Inotherwords,thepositiveeffectsthatmigrationcanhaveonskills
stocks(throughimmigration,return,remittancesandincentiveeffects)arenotable
tocompensateforthedirectimpactofskilledpeopleemigrating.InVietnam,
GeorgiaandColombia,ontheotherhand,itseemspossiblethatwhileskillsare
beinglostthroughemigration,theyarebeingcompensatedforthroughmigration’s
otherchannels.Indeed,itmaybethatthesecountriesnowhavemoreskilled
peoplethantheyotherwisewouldhavehad,hadnoonebeenabletomigrate.

Findings6:Thehealthimpactsofmigration
Wherehouseholdsreceiveremittances,thereissomestrongevidencefromacross
thestudiesthatspendingonhealthincreases.InVietnam,forexample,regional
fixedeffectsanalysissuggeststhatnotonlydoesreceivingremittancesraise
healthcarespending,butremittancesalsoappeartoraisehealthspendingmore
dramaticallythanotherformsofincome.Andhavinganabsentmigrantonthe
wholeappearstoincreasespendingonhealthcare,althoughheretheevidenceis
thinnerandlessconsistent.
Havingareturnedmigrantseemstoaffecthealthcarespending.InJamaica,for
example,eachadditionalreturnedmigrantinahouseholdincreaseshealthcare
spendingbymorethan50percent.Thepatternsofspendingchangetoo,sothat
lessemphasisisplacedontraditionalJamaicanmedicinesandmoreonthekindsof
treatmentsthatmigrantswillhavebeenexposedtointhecountriestheyhavebeen
livingin(predominantlytheUSA,UKandCanada).Wesuggestthatwhilethis
analysisisbasedonOLSmodellingandthusdoesnotexplicitlyaddressquestionsof
causality,thesecombinedfindingsdopointtowardsmigrationbeingthecauseofthe
changedbehaviour.
Returningmigrants,whiletheyappeartoboosthealthcarespending,donotaffect
householdmembers’reportedhealthstatus,andneitheronthewhole(exceptforin
Colombia,whereeffectsarenegative),doabsentmigrantsorremittances.Asin
education,thereisadistinctionbetweenspendingpatternsandoutcomes–
migrationappearstohavepositiveimpactsonspendingonhealthandeducationbut
not,onthewhole,totheextentthatoutcomessuchashouseholdmembers’health,
orschoolattendance,improve.
10 DevelopmentontheMove| ExecutiveSummary

Thereportalsolooksintotheeffectthatmigrationhasonacountry’s healthcare
provision –anissuethatoftengainsattentionbecauseoffearsthat‘braindrain’
drawshealthcareprofessionalsoutofadevelopingcountry.Ourevidencesuggests
thatthedamagecausedbybraindraincanoftenbeoverstatedbecause
opportunitiestoemigratemayactuallydriveadditionalpeopleintohealthcare
professionsthrough‘incentiveeffects’.Theresultingneteffectonhealthcare
provisionseemstovaryacrosscountries.InJamaicaandGhana20percentand25
percentofmedicallytrainedpersonnelrespectivelyarelocatedabroad,whichmay
belevelsthatthesecountrieshavefounddifficulttocopewith.Ontheotherhand,
VietnamandpossiblyGeorgiamightactuallyhavemorehealthcarestaffthanthey
doatpresentiftheyhadhigherlevelsofmedicalmigration,asthemorepowerful
incentiveeffectsmightwelloutweighthenumbersofpeoplewhoactuallyleave.

Findings7:Thegenderandothersocialimpactsofmigration
Exposuretodifferentnormsandexperienceswhileabroadcan,itissuggested,
changepeople’sattitudestowardsgender roles.Amongreturnedmigrantsthiswas
indeedthecase:typicallymorethan70percentofmigrantsfromeachcountrysaid
thatasaresultoftheirexperiences,theyweremorecommittedtoeffortstoachieve
genderequalityintheircountryoforigin.However,changesinattitudesdonotseem
totranslateintochangesinbehaviourwithinreturnedmigrants’ownhouseholds(or
inhouseholdsinreceiptofremittancesorwithabsentmigrants).Noneofthe
evidencegatheredonthisissuesuggeststhatmigrationischangingwho–menor
women–undertakeshouseholdtasks(suchaschildcare,homerepairsorcooking).
Whenitcomestomigration’seffectsonfamilystructure,ourresearchsuggeststhat
whilesomemigrationdoessplitnuclearfamilies,thisdoesnotoccurasoftenasone
mightexpect.ForexampleestimatessuggestthatemigrationfromColombiamakesit
6percentlesslikelythatparentsandchildrenarelivingtogether.Thesenumbersare
solowpartlybecausemuchoftheemigrationthattakesplaceisofwholehouseholds.
Itdoesappearthatthetemporaryseparationoffamiliesmayleadtopermanent
breakdownsinrelationships,however,evenwhenmigrantsreturntotheircountryof
origin.Forexample,inVietnamratesofseparationanddivorcearehigheramong
returnedmigrantsthanthenon-migrantpopulation,asarenumbersofsingleparent
families,whomakeup4.5percentofnon-migrantfamiliesbut6.7percentof
returnedmigrantfamilies.Thatsaid,thereisnoinvestigationofcausalityhere(andit
maybethatpeoplemigratetoescapefromabadrelationship,orfeelfreertogo
becausetheirfamilylifeispoor),andtheratesarestillquitelow.

Policyimplications
ThefindingsfromDevelopmentontheMove providesomeusefulinsightsfor
policymakers.Wehopethataswellasprovidingsomeinsightintowhichspecific
policyleverscouldbeusedtomaximisemigration’scontributionstodevelopment,
thisreportalsohelpspolicymakerstolookbeyondtheimmediateimperativesthat
oftenseemtodrivemigrationpolicy.
Attheindividualandhouseholdlevel,thisprojectcontributesfurtherevidencethatin
almostallcasesmigrationcanbeanimportantwayofimprovinglivelihoodsand
expandingcapabilities.Thisisanimportantremindertopolicymakersand
practitionersthatmigrationshouldnotbeseenprimarilyasa‘problem’for
development.Whileitmaycreatechallengesmigrationdoesallowpeople–manyof
whommayhavefewalternatives–toimprovetheirownstandardoflivingandthatof
theirfamiliesandotherstowhomtheyremit.Theevidencesuggests,moreover,that
throughspillovereffectssuchasbusinesscreationitmayalsoimprovedevelopment
outcomes,evenforpeoplewithoutadirectrelationshipwithamigrant.
Thatsaid,pooreconomicopportunitiesindevelopingcountriesdrivemigrationand
mayalsomakereturnlessattractive.Plus,whilemigrationisimprovingmany
outcomesforpeopleindevelopingcountries,thesechangestendtobe
incremental.Nothinginthefindingsofthisprojectsuggeststhatmigrationis
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transformationalatthesocietallevel,orthataloneitcanbereliedontoactasa
nationalstrategyfordevelopment.Rather,thefactthatpeoplearemigratingin
ordertoachievecertaingoals(andarenotbeingattractedbackbyopportunitiesat
‘home’)shouldbetakenasareflectionofpeoplestrugglingtoachievetheiraims
andimprovetheirlivesintheircountryoforigin,andthatmoreneedstobedone
topromotesustainablenationaldevelopment.Thisisnotnews–policymakersdo
notneedmigrationtoremindthemoftheneedfordevelopment–butitis
importanttonotebecausethereisadangerthatmigrationanditsbenefitsare
usedasareasonfordevelopmenttobepursuedwithlessurgency,whenitshould
beseenasanotherindicatorthatsuccessfullong-termdevelopmentstrategiesmust
bedevisedandpursued.
Anequallyimportantimplicationofthisproject’sbroadframeworkhasbeento
underlinethecomplexityofimpactsthatmigrationcangenerate.Forexample,while
large-scaleemigrationfromoneparticularsector(suchashealth)caninsome
instanceshaveanegativeimpact,therearemanyotherwaysinwhichthedeparture
ofthosemigrantsmaybehavingpositiveimpactsonthesocietytheyhaveleft
behind.DevelopmentontheMovehascastlightonsomeofthebetterknownof
thoseimpacts(suchastheeconomicbenefitsofremittances)andthosethathave
notbeenstudiedasmuch(suchasattitudestogenderequality).Theresearch
suggeststhatanyattempttointervenebasedonanarroworshort-termviewof
migration’simpactscouldbecounterproductive.
Moregenerally,thefindingsemphasisehowpowerfulaforcemigrationis–itisvery
common;itissuccessfulinimprovingkeyaspectsofmigrants’andothers’lives;andthe
policiesputinplacearounditcanshapebutnotcontrolordetermineit.Thisimpliesthat
policiesthatacknowledgeandevenfacilitatepeople’smigrationambitionsarelikelyto
bemoreeffectivethanthosethatinhibitandfrustratethem.
Assuch,policiesthatopenlegalroutesformigrationthatmakeiteasierformigrants
toinvestandbuypropertyintheircountryoforiginwhileaway;orthatreduce
remittancecostsarelikelytoboostmigration’sdevelopmentimpacts,asareall
policiesthatrecogniseandworkwiththegrainofpeople’smigratoryintentionsand
migrants’interactionswiththeircountryoforigin.Incontrast,policiesthattrytostop
emigration,toinducereturnwithoutchangingthewiderpolicyenvironment,oreven
thosethataresimplypoorlyconnectedtothelivesmigrantslive(suchaspoliciesthat
trytoinducemigrantstoinvestincommunitydevelopmentprojectsoverwhichthey
havelittlecontrolortowhichtheyhavefewlinks)aremuchmorelikelytofail.Good
policyinterventionsshouldbebasedonasoundunderstandingofmigrants’
motivationsandreallifeexperiences,andshould‘gowiththeflow’ofmigrationasan
unstoppablefactoflifeinthe21stcentury.
Finally,bytakingawidedefinitionofinternationalmigration(examiningall
movementsofthreemonthsormorebothintoandoutofacountry),andlookingat
allsortsofinteractions(goingbeyondremittancestoconsiderideasandattitudes
transmittedfromabroad,forexample),thisprojecthasalsouncoverednewevidence
ofthescale,natureandeventheimpactsofmigration.Insomecountriestherehas
beenmuchmoreshort-termmigrationofadurationthatfallsbelowthegenerally
acceptedthresholdofwhatisdefined‘migration’.Italsomaynotbeofficially
recordedasmigrationbyimmigrationagencies.Forexample,whenaJamaicangoes
totheUnitedStatesandworkscash-in-handforafewmonthsbeforereturning
home,thisisgenerallynotclassedasinternationalmigration.Yetsuchbehaviour
doesseemtobecommoninsomecontextsandpotentiallyhasdevelopmentimpacts
asimportantasthosefromlonger-termmigration.Theprojectalsofindsthatnew
communicationtechnologiesappeartobetransformingthewaysthatmigrantscan
interactwiththeirhomecountries.
Policymakersinterestedinmanagingmigration,letaloneharnessingitsdevelopment
benefits,shouldrecognise,then,thattoday’smigrationpatternsdonotmirrorthose
ofyesterday.Whilemigrationmaybeanage-oldhumanstrategyforseeking
betterment,theconditionsunderwhichmigrationtakesplaceandthenatureofits
impactsseemtobeevolvingconstantly.