Padilla vs.

Dizon
158 SCRA 127
Facts
On July 17, 1991, State Prosecutor of DOJ Manila, JovencitoZuo filed an administrative
complaint against Judge BaltazarDizon of RTC Pasay City because he acquitted the defendants
in four cases of illegal possession of firearms, all of them had been arrested at NAIA while
attempting to smuggle firearms into and out of the country.
One of the accused, Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guards at NAIA while attempting to
smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.
Lo Chi Fai was acquitted. Judge Dizon acquitted him saying that he had no willful intention to
violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least the amount of 3,000 USD
under the Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Issue
Thus, Custom Commissioner Padilla filed a complaint against Judge Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of
the law in holding the accussed Lo Chi Fai for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960
Held
Yes, Judge Dizon is guilty. Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and
foreign currency instruments found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at
the airport and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign
currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these currency declarations
were declarations belonging to other people.
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of
US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as
authority for the trial court to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.
ArtemioVillareal vs. People of the Philippines
Feb. 1, 2012 Gr. No. 121258
Facts
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites which lasted for three
days. They were tormented physically and psychologically.
Accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members FidelitoDizon and ArtemioVillareal
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino, initially
refused but he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the

ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
The trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The CA in set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal
liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Nineteen of the accusedappellants were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio
Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of
slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arrestomenor. Two of the accusedappellants FidelitoDizon and ArtemioVillareal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES
WON physical injuries inflicted on Villa was a felonious act
WON the accused fraternity members were guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
HELD
The intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under
Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code according to the trial court, although hazing was
not at the time punishable as a crime. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo
found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members
were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical
injuries they had intentionally inflicted.
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have
been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the
conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore,
were liable only for the consequences of their individual acts.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that
organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which
an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the
danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. Since the NBI medico-legal officer
found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the
infliction of physical injuries. Wherefore, the court ruled that the accused are guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
Intod vs. CA
215 SCRA 52

Facts
SuplicioIntod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, AvelinoDaligdig and Salvador Mandaya planned to
kill BernardinaPalampangan because of a land dispute between her and Intod. They then went
to Palampangans house one night, all armed with firearms. As soon as Mandaya pointed the
bedroom of Palampangan, his companions immediately fired at it. It turned out, however, that
their subject was in another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his
family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots.
The RTC convicted them of attempted murder, which was affirmed by the CAs decision. Thus
they filed a petition for review.
According to them, they cannot be held liable for attempted murder because Palangpangans
absence from her room on the night they riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently
impossible. On the other hand, the People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for
attempted murder.
Issue: Whether Intod is guilty of attempted murder or of impossible crime.
Held: The decisions of the inferior courts were based on American jurisprudence which cannot
be made to apply in the case at bar because in our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are
recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but
an act penalized by itself.
In order to qualify the act as an impossible crime, there must be either be legal impossibility or
physical impossibility. The factual situation in the case of bar presents a physical impossibility
which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. Such is sufficient to make
the act an impossible crime.
Petition granted. Decision is modified, finding the petitioner guilty of impossible crime.

People vs. Domasian

219 SCRA 245
Facts
On March 11, 1982, accused PablitoDomasian and Samson Tan kidnapped Enrico Agra, who was 8
years old; Enrico was detained for 3 hours before he was able to escape. Enrico was on his way
home in a passanger jeep when he met his parents, who were already looking for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agras father received an
envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico
and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note
was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the
police, which referred it to the NBI for examination.
The trial court found both accused guilty of kidnapping with serious illegal detention.
However, Tan (one of the accused) contends that the lower court erred in not finding the
sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime, which is not punishable.

Issue
Whether or not Domasian and Tan are only liable of impossible crime.
Held
No, they are not liable of impossible crime.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnaping with serious illegal
detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the employment of
inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the
victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian
deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only
of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too
would not have been possible under the new Constitution.

People vs. Lamahang

91 Phil 703
Facts
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on
Delgado and C. R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making
an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named
street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the
wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under
custody.
The provincial fiscal of Iloilo, trial judge and the OSG constituted the facts as attempted
robbery.
Issue
Whether or not Fuentes is liable of attempted robbery.
Held
No, he is not liable of attempted robbery but for consummated offense of trespass to dwelling.
The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is
no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by
means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in
order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not
develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of
imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of
execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural
relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop

into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence
another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be
shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from
which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and
stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in question was making an opening by
means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical
conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will
of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to
cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the
record to justify a concrete finding.
People vs. Pancho
416 SCRA 506
Facts
Two incidents of rape happened:
A. GR No. 136592
On August 1, 1994, at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning, Michelle, who was then only ten
years old, went home after spending the night at her aunt's house. While she was about to
undress, appellant (ManolitoPancho) suddenly dragged her and forced her to lie down on the
floor. Although frightened, she struggled by kicking and boxing him. However, he forcibly
removed her clothes and underwear. Then he took off his clothing. Appellant started kissing
and holding her breast and eventually had carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain when he
inserted his organ into her vagina which bled. She tried to resist but he held her both arms. He
was on top of her making push and pull movements for four (4) minutes. Then he dressed up,
threatening to kill her should she complain or tell anyone about the incident.
B. GR No. 136593
Sometime in December, 1995 at the family's new residence at Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
appellant arrived from work. When Michelle opened the door and saw him, she got scared.
While he was approaching her, she managed to hit him. Then she attempted to jump out of the
window, but he dragged her by her feet. At that instance, her uncle (Tito Onio) suddenly
arrived.[3] Immediately, appellant stopped, thus thwarting his bestial desire.
Issue
Whether or not he is liable of attempted rape in the second case.
Held
Under Art.6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, but does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.[34]

In this second case, the prosecution failed to prove that appellant started to rape the victim
and had commenced the performance of acts of carnal knowledge. He did not force her to lie
down or remove her garment. In short, there was no showing that he did commence at all the
performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. What he did was
to "drag" her and hold her feet. At this juncture, we cannot safely conclude that he was
attempting to rape her.
In the instant case, appellant was merely holding complainant's feet when her Tito Onio arrived
at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we
were to conclude that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape.

People vs.Orande
415 SCRA 699
Facts
Complainant Jessica Castro charged appellant ArnulfoOrande with raping her four times
between January 1994 and November 1996. Orande was convicted of simple rape, one count of
statutory rape and one count of frustrated rape.
In one of the Criminal Case,
The trial court convicted appellant of simple rape in Criminal Case No. 97-159185. However,
the factual basis thereof in the body of the decision reads:
With regard to Criminal Case No. 97-159185, the Court has gathered that sometime in April,
1994, at around 11:00 p.m., Jessica and her two siblings together with the accused were in
their house, while their mother, Girlie, was in Navotas buying fish. Jessica was watching TV in a
lying position beside her two sleeping siblings, when the accused held Jessica's right hand and
jabbed her palm with his finger. Then he told her to remove her short pants, panty and T-shirt,
after which the accused removed his pants and with a balisong in his hand, he began kissing the
sensitive parts of her body. Then he placed himself on top of her and tried to have sexual
intercourse with her. He succeeded in nudging her sex organ with the tip of his penis, but was
unable to accomplish penetration, due to the resistance offered by her by struggling and
kicking him. Nonetheless, the accused had orgasm and Jessica's sex organ was smeared with his
semen.
Thus, in Criminal Case No. 97-159187, the accused is convicted of frustrated rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of
prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the costs.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated raoe in CC No. 97-159187
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
appellants guilt for two counts of statutory rape and two counts of simple rape, there being no
such crime as frustrated rape in this jurisdiction.

The court didnt find any reason to deviate from the well-established rule that the credibility
of the witnesses is a matter best assessed by the trial court because of its unique opportunity
to observe firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. The Supreme Court
then affirmed the trial courts findings that the testimony of the victim is convincing, logical
and credible.
Valenzuela vs. People
525 SCRA 306
Facts:
Valenzuela and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the
ShoeMart complex, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing
an identification card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit, hauling a push cart with
cases of detergent of the well-known Tide brand. Valenzuela unloaded these cases in an open
parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket,
and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded
these boxes to the same area in the open parking space.
Valenzuela left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards
the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic
inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle.
Lago proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When Lago asked
Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise, Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by fleeing on
foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident.
Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise
recovered. The filched items seized were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of
Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value
of P12,090.00.
Valenzuela and Calderon were charged with the crime of theft. Valenzuela argued that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft based on two decisions rendered many years ago
by the Court of Appeals: People v. Dio and People v. Flores.
ISSUE: WON, under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely
frustrated.
HELD: Theft in the case at bar is deemed consummated. Theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Unlawful taking is
the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. Furthermore, recognizing
that the elements which constitute a theft as provided for in art. 308 of RPC, were all
established that there be taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, it cannot be denied that the petitioner is guilty of consummated
theft. These being said, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated.
People vs. Recones et al
310 SCRA 809
Issue

Whether or not the accused were liable of conspiracy

FACTS and HELD (highlighted the facts that the court considered)
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Proof of a previous agreement to commit a felony is not
necessary to establish conspiracy, it being sufficient that the acts of the accused, before,
during, and after the commission of the felony, demonstrate its existence.5 [People v. Vicente
Antonio, et al., G.R. No. 118311, February 19, 1999.]
Conspiracy was appropriately inferred from the following circumstances, to wit:
(1) accused-appellant was in the company of Recones and Wahing in the afternoon of July
7, 1993. (2) upon seeing Garate at the waiting shed, the trio alighted from the motorcycle
and ganged up on Garate with Recones and Wahing raining blows on Garate in the presence
of accused-appellant who did nothing to stop his companions; (3) when Garate attempted
to flee, accused-appellant, together with Recones and Wahing, pursued him; (4) when
accused-appellant caught up with Garate, he gripped the latter tightly, thereby effectively
preventing any possible escape; (5) he, likewise, blocked the path of Garate when the
latter attempted to flee towards the safety of his house; (6) accused-appellant was holding
Garate while Recones and Wahing were raining blows on the victim; (7) accused-appellant
did not stop Recones when the latter hit Garate on the head with a stone marker; and
finally, (8) accused- appellant fled from the crime scene together with the two assailants.
Taken collectively, these circumstances clearly and satisfactorily provide the bases for this
Court's finding that Recones, Wahing and accused-appellant acted in concert with each other in
killing Garate. Although accused-appellant did not deliver the fatal blow, he remains
accountable for the death of the latter on the principle that the act of one is the act of all.
People of the Philippines vs. ArnelVillaba and Randy Villalba October 22, 2014 GR No.
207629
Facts
Maximillian and Frederick, followed by Josephine, Homer, and Marilou, chanced upon accusedappellant Arnel, his girlfriend Jenny, and two other companions, somewhere along Capitol
Drive, near the vicinity of Gaisano Mall in Butuan City, at around 2:30 in the morning of April
29, 2006. These two groups did not know each other prior to April 29, 2006. Maximillian
addressed an insulting remark towards Jenny causing tension between Maximillian and accusedappellant Arnel. A scuffle ensued between the two men and accused-appellant Arnel eventually
stabbed Maximillian on the chest with a sharp instrument, causing a puncture wound that
penetrated Maximillian's heart and ultimately caused Maximillian's death.
Prosecution witnesses Josephine and Frederick had positively identified both accusedappellants at the police station soon after accused-appellants' arrest. The same prosecution
witnesses, together with Homer, would again positively identify both accused-appellants in
open court during trial. Hence, accused-appellant Randy's presence at the time and place of
Maximillian's stabbing was duly established.
Accused-appellant Randy was not able to attribute any ill motive on the part of the three
prosecution witnesses that could have impelled them to testify against him. Where there is

nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive,
their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand, under the solemnity of an
oath, deserve full faith and credence. It necessarily prevails over alibi and denial, especially
when neither alibi nor denial is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.30 Nonetheless,
accused-appellant Randy's presence at the time and place of Maximillian's stabbing does not
necessarily mean that the former should bear criminal liability for the latter's death, as the
Court will subsequently discuss herein.
The Information charged accused-appellants with Maximillian's murder, alleging that accusedappellants, acting in conspiracy with each other, and with abuse of superior strength,
treachery, and/or evident premeditation, stabbed Maximillian with an icepick.
Issue
Whether or not conspiracy can be considered.

Held
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may
be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more
persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is
that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his
part to fulfil the common design to kill the victim.31
There is no clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To
recall, Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group completely met by chance that fateful
early morning of April 29, 2006 near Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this
meeting. The events swiftly happened, in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two
groups, to Maximillian's insulting remark to Jenny, to the scuffle between Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel, and to accused-appellant Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian.
In fact, there is no strong evidence of the weapon accused-appellant Arnel used in stabbing
Maximillian. None of the prosecution witnesses actually saw accused-appellant use an ice pick
or any other weapon. Josephine, Homer, and Frederick did not even know that Maximillian was
stabbed, believing that he was just punched by accused-appellant Arnel.
For his part, accused-appellant Arnel admitted stabbing Maximillian but asserted that he used
only a barbecue stick which he found in the area. A barbecue stick, with a sharp end, could
cause a puncture wound consistent with that which killed Maximillian. That accused-appellant
Arnel used a barbecue stick he found in the area as weapon shows that he acted
instantaneously and spontaneously in stabbing Maximillian, thus, further negating the
possibility that he conspired with accused-appellant Randy to commit the stabbing.
Angelita Cruz Benito, Petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, Respondent
G.R. No. 204644 February 11, 2015
Facts:
Assorted jewelries were given to Rebecca Agbulos by Dorie Cruz Abadilla to be sold or
returned if not sold. Angelita Cruz Benito, a housekeeper of the brother of Rebecca Agbulos

was there when the jewelries were handed over by Dorie Cruz Abadilla. The checks issued
bounced and the land title certificate was spurious as well.
Issue:
Whether or not Angelita Cruz Benito should be charged with estafa?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that it should be proven beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner Angelita Cruz Benito conspired with RebaccaAgbulos in committing estafa. The
witnesses cannot prove that the petitioner was the one who pawned the jewelries. The
admission of Rebecca Agbulos that the petitioner did not know anything about the estafa is
enough reason to acquit Angelita Cruz Benito.
People vs Cantuba
G.R. No. 79811
Facts:
Atty. Adolfo Celera was murdered on December 23, 1981. A witness saw PioCantuba
approaching the victim with a gun and Ricardo Baco rushed from behind and stabbed him. A
suspect tried to run over Atty. Celera while he was lying down on the ground with a tricycle. He
was later identified to be PedritoLalaguna by a witness.
Issue:
Whether or not PioCantuba should be charged with murder even if the gunshot was not
the reason for the death of the victim?
Whether or not PedritoLalaguna is not guilty for the murder because it just so happen
that he was driving a tricycle to the direction of the suspect?
Held:
The Supreme Court found the petition to be untenable. On the account of the
testimony of the witnesses, they all had a part in the murder of Atty. Adolfo Celera. They acted
in unison with the goal of eventually killing the victim. It does not matter on the degree of
their participation in the actual crime because when conspiracy is present, the liability of one
is the liability of all conspirators.
People vs. IreneoTumlos
G.R. No. 46428 April 15, 1939
Facts:
IreneoTumlos stole 13 cows on November 21, 1937. Eight (8) of which is owned by
MaximianoSobervaga and the other five (5) belongs to AmbrocioPecasis. He stole all 13 cows at
the same time not knowing that they are owned by two individuals. He was convicted and
sentenced for stealing the eight (8) cows but was also subsequently charged and sentenced for
the remaining five (5) cows that he stole.
Issue:
Whether or not IreneoTumlos should be charged and sentenced for stealing the five (50
cows of AmbrocioPecasis?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that IreneoTumlos should be charged for one criminal act
which is the stealing of the thirteen (13) cows. The fact that the cows were owned by 2
individuals does not mean that he must be charged twice. He is only criminally liable for the
taking of the 13 cows.
People vs Jaranilla
G.R. No. L-28547 February 22, 1974
Facts:
The accused went on their way to steal six (6) fighting cocks from the chicken coop of
Valentin Baylon. As they were trying to escape two policemen who were trying to apprehend
them, Jaranilla fired his gun hitting a policeman who eventually died at the hospital.

Issue:
Whether or not everyone who stole the fighting cocks should be charged with homicide
for the death of the policeman?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that the group conspired to steal the fighting cocks from
the chicken coop of Valentin Baylon but not for the killing the policeman. It is only Jaranilla
who should be liable for the crime of homicide but the other individuals should only be liable
for stealing the six (6) fighting cocks.

Santiago vs Garchitorena
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
Facts:
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago during her time as Commissioner of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation accepted 32 aliens under the Alien Legalization Program who
were found not to have enough qualifications to become citizens of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not Senator Santiago should be charged thirtytwo times or only once for all
instances mentioned?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that the Senator should only be charged with one
information. She is being charged under Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which is a special
law and the doctrine of delitocontinuado can be applied. Therefore, only one information can
be charged to the senator because it was a continuous crime.
Ilagan vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110617
Facts:
On the period covering July 1990 to December of 1991, petitioners GeruncioIlaga, Claro
Pinon and RosendoPinon represented themselves as authorized agents to sell, collect and
receive money in behalf of Hometrust Development Corporation. The petitioners defrauded and
collected money from seven (7) individuals who assumed that they are buying properties from
the said corporation. Hometrust Development Corporation charged the petitioners with for
estafa and the individuals charged them with a case per person totaling 7 estafa cases as well.
Issue:
Whether or not the buyers can still charge the petitioners with individual estafa cases?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that the individual buyers can file their respective estafa
case. The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against each lot buyer on different dates
and separate places. Each case originated from separate criminal intent, therefore separate
felonies should result.

People vs Castromero
G.R. No. 118992
Facts:
CelerinoCastromero entered the room of Josephine Baon and tried to have carnal
knowledge with her. Respondent was in the process of forcing his penis to her vagina but she
was able to push him away. The victim was able to jump off the window causing her to have
physical injuries.
Issue:
Whether or not Castromero is liable for the serious physical injuries suffered by the
victim?

Held:
There is no doubt that the rape was consummated because the mere touching of the
labia by the male organ is already consummated rape. The Supreme Court decided that the
respondent is liable to the serious physical injuries incurred by the victim. The fact that
Castromero created the sense of danger in the mind of the victim which caused her to jump off
the window is enough reason to make him liable for serious physical injuries.
People vs Comadre
G.R. No. 153559 June 8, 2004
Facts:
Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano passed by the house of the
victims who are having a drinking spree. Antonio Comadre threw a hand grenade to the victims
resulting to the death of Robert Agbanlog and injuring four other people.
Issues:
Whether or not George Comadre and Danilo Lozano are liable for the death of Robert
Agbanlog and the attempted murder of the other four victims?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano are not liable for
the criminal act committed by Antonio Comadre. It was Antonio Comadre who threw the hand
grenade so he is the only one liable. Furthermore, Antonio Comadre was found guilty for the
murder of Robert Agbanlog and attempted murder of the four other victims and will serve the
greater penalty for murder under Article 48 which define complex crimes.

People vs. MelecioRobinos

G.R. No. 138453 May 29, 2002
Facts:
On May 25, 1995, spouses Melecio and LorenzaRobinos had an argument resulting to
Melecio stabbing her wife multiple times which caused her death. MelecioRobinos was later
apprehended and upon checking the medico legal found out that LorenzaRobinos was six
months pregnant prior to her death.
Issue:
Whether or not MelecioRobinos should be charged of Parricide with unintentional
abortion as one crime or should it be considered as a complex crime?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that the accused is guilty of Parricide with unintentional
abortion as a complex crime because the parricide gave rise to the unintentional abortion
which was not part of the criminal intent of the accused. Therefore, the penalty imposed will
be for parricide which is the heavier crime punishable by Reclusion Perpetua as compared to
parricide with unintentional abortion as a single crime which is punishable by death penalty.
People vs Balotol
84 Phil 289
Facts:
On the afternoon of May 24, 1942, the appellant saw PotencianoSabasido for the first
time since the latter was released from jail, at a cockpit in the barrio of Silaga, municipality of
Santa Rita, Samar. According to the witnesses for the prosecution Sabasido was standing outside
the ring close behind Bernardino Lacambra with his two hands holding the shoulders of the
latter, witnessing a cockfight. The appellant approached Sabasido from behind and stabbed him
with a bolo in the back. The weapon pierced thru the body of Sabasido at the abdominal region
and wounded Lacambra also. Sabasido fell face downward and the appellant stabbed him again
in the back near the right shoulder, the bolo again piercing thru his body. Sabasido died
instantaneously and Lacambra, seven days later.
Issue:

Whether or not EladioBalotol should be charged for double murder even if it was not
his intention to kill Bernardino Lacambra?
Held:
The Supreme Court decided that EladioBalotol is liable for double murder. Article 48
provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since
under article 48 this penalty must be applied in its maximum period, the appellant should be
sentenced to death.
People vs Talo
G.R. No. 125542 October 25, 2000
Facts:
That on or about the 12th day of May, 1995, at about 2:00 o'clock dawn, in barangay
GataDaku, municipality of Clarin, province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused ERLINDO TALO, entered the dwelling by
destroying some portion of the toilet of the offended party, armed with a bolo and hunting
knife, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats, did then and there, with lewd
and unchaste designs, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take and carry away MISS DORIS
SAGUINDANG against her will from the house of her parents, and upon reaching the ricefield,
by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had carnal knowledge of her against her will.
Issue:
Whether or not accused should be charged of rape or forcible abduction with rape?
Held:
The Supreme Court found accused-appellant guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. As provided in Arts. 342 and 335, in relation to Art. 48, of the Revised
Penal Code, the elements of this crime are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman,
regardless of her age, civil status or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; (3) that
the abduction is with lewd design; and (4) that the abducted woman is raped under any of the
circumstance provided in Art. 335.The evidence shows that, at knifepoint, accused-appellant
forcibly took complainant from her parents' house and, in a ricefield about 800 meters away,
forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.

People vs Sabredo
Facts : Appellant is the uncle of complainant. He is the younger brother of her father. In 1993,
Jimmy arrived from Masbate to reside with Judeliza's family in Cagtagong, Caguyong, Borbon,
Cebu, where he stayed with them for more than a year.
On June 27, 1994, Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy
grabbed and forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her board a
truck for Bogo, Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy continuously poked a knife
under cover of his jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat to Placer,
Masbate. Thence he brought her to Estampar, Cataingan, Masbate, where they stayed at the
house of Conchita Tipnit. Conchita was Jimmy's sister and Judeliza's aunt, though aunt and
niece did not know each other. In Estampar, Judeliza tried to escape but was caught by Jimmy,
who severely mauled her until she lost consciousness. Scedp
Suspecting that Conchita would report the matter to the police, Jimmy took Judeliza by
jeepney to Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. They stayed with Roberto Sabredo, his nephew and
Judeliza's first cousin. The two cousins, however, had not met before and Jimmy was able to
pass her off as his wife. They stayed in Cagba from June 29 to July 5, 1994, with Jimmy closely
guarding Judeliza. Calrspped

On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assaulted Judeliza.
He covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. After satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted
three fingers into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pinched it. Judeliza screamed and cried for
help. Their host, Roberto, was awakened but could not do anything to assist her. Later, Jimmy
struck Judeliza with a piece of wood, rendering her unconscious. Much later, he brought her to
the house of his sister, Nilda Polloso, also at Cagba.
Nilda noticed the victim's weak and wan condition and offered her medicine. Catching Jimmy in
the act of boiling water, she asked what it was for and was told that it would be poured over
Judeliza to finish her off. Nilda, however, stopped him. On July 8, 1994, Judeliza recovered
sufficiently from her injuries. Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her
ordeal. That same day, while Jimmy was sleeping, Nilda managed to take away from him the
blade, made of stainless steel, which he had used in the rape of Judeliza. After the initial
police investigation, Judeliza was brought to Masbate Provincial Hospital, where she was
confined for four days. The medico-legal officer, Dr. Artemio Capellan, examined her. Sccalr
On August 11, 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate filed an information for forcible
abduction with rape,
Jimmy admitted having sexual relations with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He
claimed that they were lovers and had been engaging in sexual intimacies for three months
before running away. He explained that they had gone to Masbate after Judeliza had revealed
to him that she was not really her father's daughter. They then lived together as husband and
wife. He admitted having boxed and kicked her but claimed that he got mad at her after she
confided that she really was his niece, contrary to what she earlier told him. He likewise
admitted having pinched the victim's vagina, but only to punish her for deceiving him about
their kinship. He claimed the instant case was filed against him because of the maltreatment
she received. Appellant likewise admitted that he was facing another rape case before Branch
45 of the same court, which a certain Juanita Turing had filed against him in 1992. He,
however, denied having fled to Cebu to escape prosecution for said case. Sppedsc
The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous and his defense
untenable. Choosing to believe the prosecution, the trial judge convicted appellant, and
sentenced him
ISSUE: WON the accused should be convicted of the complex crime of forcible abduction
HELD: NO, the elements of rape and sexual assault were not all proven.
GR: When a complex crime under art 48 of the RPC is charged, such forcible abduction with
rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the
elements of the crime of rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant
for the purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb
forcible abduction. Hence the crime committed is simple rape only.

People vs Barbas
Facts: In these two cases the defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros with the crime of malversation of public funds through the falsification of
public documents. Cedula certificates are prepared in triplicate. The original is delivered to
the purchaser, and the duplicate and triplicate, which are carbon copies of the original, are
retained by the internal revenue officer. Because the defendant accounted to the municipal
treasurer of Sagay for the cedulas received, the lower court found that the defendant was not
guilty of malversation but of estafa through the falsification of public documents.
ISSUE: WON there is a complex crime of malversation through falsification of documents.
HELD: yes, It is clear, however, that the defendant, acting as special deputy of the provincial
treasurer, collected from Policarpo Palmares and Marciano Salazar P2 each in payment of their
cedula tax and delivered to them what he represented to be the corresponding cedulas. This
money was clearly received by the defendant in his capacity of a public officer, and in our
opinion constituted a valid payment of the cedula tax of Palmares and Salazar, and the
defendant who misappropriated it is guilty of the malversation of public funds. The evidence
shows that the defendant altered the duplicates of the cedulas in question as alleged in the
informations. These duplicates are public documents, and the alterations made by the
defendant constituted the falsification of public documents. The evidence shows that the
duplicates of the cedulas in question were falsified by the defendant in order that he might sell
them to Palmares and Salazar. The falsification was therefore the means which the defendant
availed himself of in committing the crime of malversation. As the acts of the defendant
constitute a complex crime, the penalty applicable thereto is that to the more serious offense,
or the falsification of a public document. The corresponding penalty therefore is the maximum
degree of prision mayor, or from ten years and one day to twelve years ofprision mayor, and a
fine of not more than P5,000. The medium degree of prision mayorin its maximum period is
from ten years, eight months, and one day to eleven years and four months.

PEOPLE VS ABRAZALDO
FACTS: In July 1995, at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, accused-appellant
Abrazaldo, then intoxicated, attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but
instead, hit the post of the latters house.The incident was reported to the
barangay authorities, prompting barangay tanods victim Guban, Fajardo, and
Loceste to rush to the scene. Upon reaching theplace, Fajardo heard accusedappellant shouting at his uncle,
I will kill you!
Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant coming out of Quintos house with blood
oozing from his forehead. At that time, the place was well lighted by a
flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist accused-appellant. However, for unknown
reason, accused-apellant and Guban shouted at each other and grappled face to
face.Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at the abdomen and
ran away. When Fajardo got hold of Guban, the latter said,
I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo .
GUban was rushed to the hospital but died after a fewhours. The victims father,
testified that he was the one who spent for his sons funeral expenses.On trial,
the accused appellant invoked self defense saying that it was Guban who, armed
with aknife, was the one who attacked him. According tohim, it was GUban who
accidentally stabbed himself. However, accused appellants very own sister
testifiedagainst him. The trial court appreciated treachery inthe event and
consequently found Abrazaldo guilty of murder with the aggravating circumstances
that thecrime was committed while the public authorities wereengaged in the
discharge of their duties and was committed at nighttime. He was sentenced to
suffer death and pay the heirs of Guban their actual expenses.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not self-defense can be invoked by the accused-appellant
HELD: NO, Ingrained in jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of self-defense
cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any
separate competent evidence but in itself is extremely doubtful. In the present
case, accused-appellan ts showed ambivalence in invoking a melange of defenses.
While he admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own life,
he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. Certainly, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense] or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be
appreciated considering accused-appellants flight from the crime scene and his failure to
inform the authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife to the
authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability of the
crime charged.

PEOPLE VS TAC-AN
FACTS: Tac-an 18 years old, killed his classmate Francis Escano. The former claimed self
defense because the latter uttered some threatening words against him.
ISSUE: WON the threatening words can be regarded as unlawful aggression.
HELD: NO, Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized
or at the very least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist in oral threats or a merely
threatening stance or posture. 15 Further as pointed out by the Solicitor General, Francis was
obviously without a firearm or other weapon when Renato returned and burst into Room 15
demanding to know where Francis was and forthwith firing at him repeatedly, without the
slightest regard for the safety of his other classmates and of the teacher. There being no
unlawful aggression, there simply could not be self-defense whether complete or
incomplete, 16 and there is accordingly no need to refer to the other requirements of lawful
self-defense.

PEOPLE vs PATOTOY
FACTS: That on or about February 7, 1990 in the afternoon thereof, at Barangay Sawang,
Municipality of Uson, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the said accused confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation, treachery and superiority of strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife one Manuel Verano, hitting the latter on
the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his
instantaneous death. The victim appeared to draw something from his waist during the
confrontation.
ISSUE: WON the drawing something of the victim can be classified as unlawful aggression
HELD: NO, unlawful aggression meant in the law that would justify a fatal strike at him and no
veritable physical force on the part of the later has been shown that could have really
endangered the life of the accused. Hence, NO SELF DEFENSE

PEOPLE vs GENEBLAZO
Facts:
Alex Obien, testified that on January 15, 1988, at around 12:00 midnight he and
Domingo Opalsa
Were walking along Quezon Street, Calauag, Quezon, bound for home when Maximino Geneblazo and around six
unknown companions stoned them. Obien and Opalsa retaliated by also throwing stones at Geneblazo and
company. However, upon seeing that Geneblazo was about to draw his knife, they ran away. Maximino
Geneblazo caught up with Domingo Opalsa and stabbed the latter twice

the first stab landed on the left sideof the body in the area of the armpit, while the second landed on the left side
of the face.SPO1 Emmanuel Quiogue was at home on the night in question. He heard a commotion
outside. Peeping out the window he saw some men throwing stones at each other. He got his gun and went
outside. Noticing the chase which ensued, he went after the men. At the scene of the incident, SPO1 Quiogue
saw two men almost locked in an embrace. He fired his gun but the two did not draw apart so he stood between
them so as to separate them. One of the men fell to the ground while the person who was left standing
stabbed him. Only his finger was hit. He recognized the person who stabbed him as Maximino Geneblazo.
Thereafter SPO1
Quiogue, Obien and Barangay Captain Torres of Pinagtalyeran brought Opalsa to St. Peters Hospital where
the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.
Crime Committed:
Murder
Contention of the State:
The accused
c o m m i t t e d
u n l a w f u l
a g g r e s s i o n
, Geneblazo attacked and stabbed Domingo Opalsa suddenlyand unexpectedly without giving the latter any
opportunity to defend himself or to escape which caused hisdeath.
Contention of the Accused:
Accused-appellant Maximino Geneblazo alleges that he killed the victim Domingo Opalsa in

s e l f - d e f e n s e
.
Ruling:
For self-defense to prosper, it must be established that: (1) there was unlawful aggression by the victim;(2) that
the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression was reasonable; and (3) that therewas lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
It is quite apparent that it was not the victim who committed the unlawful aggression but the accused-appellant
himself.
Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude -- there has to exist a real danger to the lifeor personal safety of
the person claiming self-defense.

PEOPLE vs ESCARLO
FACTS: On the night of July 1, 2000, accused Timoteo Escarlos was watching
a benefit dance. While there at,Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk,
passed in front of accused and told him, 'You are here again to create trouble.'
Escarlos was offended so he answered back saying 'Why do you say that to me
when I am notdoing any trouble here.' Antonio Balisacan told him, 'Okinnam ketdi' (vulva of
your Mother) and without warning boxed him. Timoteo was hit on the forehead. He intended
to box back but he noticed that the victim was pulling out a kitchen knife, so for fear of his
life, he grabbed the weapon from Antonio Balisacan and used the knife in stabbing the latter
who was hit at the side below the left armpit. He stabbed him twice and when the victim was
about to fall down, he was able to hit him for the third time. CRIME COMMITTED:
Murder CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Appellant invokes self- defense. Escarlos asserts that it
was the victim whoinitially approached and assaulted him and he had no choice but to defend
himself. He argues that in the heat of t h e e n c o u n t e r, h e w a s n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o
calculate or determine the effects of his blows, and that it was
nevertheless necessary for him to inflict them in order to save his own life.
ISSUE: WON there is self defense
HELD: NO, the imminent danger had already ceased the moment the accused disarmed the
victim by seizing the knife from the latter. After the accused had successfully seized it, there
was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill
the victim. Hence, no self defense.

People vs. Baustista

Facts: The appellant together with the others had a drinking spree. Three other
went home ahead and left the appellant and the deceased, armed with a
b o l o , behind. A r o u n d 9 p m a n e i g h b o r s a w t h e a p p e l l a n t
r u n n i n g a f t e r t h e d e c e a s e d thought his window. At around midnight the accused
went to Hilario's house together with his brother and confessed that he killed the
deceased and requested if they can sleepin the house which was granted by Hilario. The
accused and his brother left the house in the morning. Hilario then wrapped the bolo and
surrendered it to the authorities.He then went to his friend Buyagan and confessed the
incident, thus he was compelled to report the matter to the police. The appellant interposed
self-defense in
his behalf.H e n a r r a t e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e d r i n k i n g s p r e e t h e d e c e a s e d t o l d a b
o u t t h e hacking of his uncle by the appellant's cousin. He reacted saying that he is not like his
cousin.After their companions went home the deceased followed and
badmouthedh i m . R a i s i n g h i s b o l o h e e m b r a c e d t h e d e c e a s e d a n d g r a
b b e d t h e b o l o . T h e deceased however threw a stone at him as he ran. The
deceased caught up with him and he then confronted and struck him with his own bolo. H
Issue:Whether or not there was self defense
Held: NO, there is no self defense in this case because even ig the accused believed that the
victim did try to kill him, raise his bolo, such aggression ceased when accused succeded in
grabbing the bolo and he was not hit by the stone hurled at him by the victim. Hence the
accused no longer faced any danger to his life and limb. Therefore no self defense.

PEOPLE vs APOLINAR
FACTS: Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant and appellant Anastacio Apolinar alias
Atong was at that time the occupant of a parcel of land owned by Joaquin Gonzales in
Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan. Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking over said
land when he observed that there was a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing that
he was a thief (of palay), the defendant called his attention but he ignored him. The defendant
fired in the air and then at the person.The man, identified as Domingo Petras, was able to get
back to his house and consequently narrated to Angel Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had
been wounded in the back by a shotgun. He then showed the two wounds - one in each side
of the spinal column - which wounds were circular in form and a little bigger than a quarter of
an inch, according to the medical report of Dr. Mananquil. Petras died of the wounds he
sustained. The defendant surrendered to the authorities immediately after the incident and
gave a sworn statement (Exhibit F) before the Justice of Peace of Umingan on December 23,
1936.
Issue
: WON the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property
Held:

No; the right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property can
be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of
one entrusted with said property.

People vs LALOG et al
FACTS: On September 29, 1999 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Ryan Gain , Roswel
Mercado [Mercado], Rex Rey [Rey] and Jayson Manzo [Manzo] were strolling at the Municipal
Park of Poblacion, Municipality of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, when they were blocked by
four (4) persons, namely Erwin Lalog [Lalog], Roosevelt Concepcion [Concepcion], Edwin
Ramirez [Ramirez] and Ricky Litada. Lalog angrily talked to Gain, but Mercado intervened and
apologized to the group of LALOG.
Later, Gain and Mercado went down the stairs of the park locally known as the RAINBOW[.]
Mercado [was] walking ahead of Gain by six (6) arms length[;] when he looked back, he saw
Gain being ganged upon by the group of the accusedappellants [held] both the hands of Gain,
while Lalog stabbed Gain. [Fearing for his life,] Roswel immediately fled the scene.
Sensing that the assailants had left the scene, Mercado approached Gain and brought him to
the hospital but it was already too late for he was declared [d]ead on [a]rrival .
On the other hand, Lalog admitted stabbing Gain in selfdefense, while the other three
appellants, Concepcion, Ramirez, and Litada denied their participation in the stabbing
incident, claiming that the three of them were in a drinking session, in the house of [Ramirezs
aunt] in Quezon Street, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
ISSUE: WON there is self defense
HELD: NO, To avail of selfdefense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any criminal
liability, it must be proved with certainty by satisfactory and convincing evidence which
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be
entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is
also doubtful. If the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof, his conviction, shall of
necessity follow on the basis of his admission of the killing.
The claim of Lalog that he stabbed Gain at the back portion of the latters body (Lumbar area)
while the former was lying down is not only uncorroborated by any other evidence but it is
improbable and contrary to the physical evidence because how could Lalog [stab] Gains back
when the former was lying on the ground while the latter was on top and at the same time
choking him. The testimony of prosecution witness Mercado that Gain was stabbed at his back
by Lalog while [both his hands were being held by the other appellants] is more logical,
believable and [in] consonance with the physical evidence. Gain could not have been easily
stabbed at his back if his hands were not being held considering that Gain is much taller and
bigger in built than the accused particularly Lalog unless Gain just simply let his back (lumbar
area) [be] stabbed without any resistance or struggle on his part which is impossible under any
state of circumstances. Furthermore, the number of wounds [sustained by Gain] (Exh. A) [is]
indicative of Lalogs desire to kill the former and not really defend himself because not a single
moment of the incident was his life and limb being endangered which is the essence of self
defense. The fact that the deceased Gain was not armed all the more negates selfdefense.

1) US vsDela Cruz
Facts:
The accused, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been his querida
(concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance.
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either aggravating or
extenuating circumstances, and sentenced the convict to fourteen years eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, the medium degree of the penalty prescribed by the code.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to a mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
Held:
In this a case, the accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation. The facts in this case must be distinguished from the case of U.S. vs. Hicks where
it was found that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection resolved to kill the woman
who had left him for another man. With a clean and well-prepared weapon, he entered the
house, disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility,
doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design. In this case, the cause of the
alleged passion and obfuscation of the accused was his vexation, disappointment and anger
engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which
she had a perfect right to do. In the present case, however, the impulse was caused by the
sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms
of another.
Judgment: Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the
extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, penalty is reduced from 14 yrs 8 mos and
1 day of reclusion temporal to 12 yrs and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
2) People vsRabao
Facts:
The defendant and the deceased SalvacionAgawa were married before the justice of the peace
of Naga on January 15, 1936 and had since been born to the marriage. Since their marriage
they had made their home in the house of UrbanoRellora, who lived maritally with the mother
of the accused. On the morning of December 15, 1937, when the defendant was hardly awake
after staying up late the previous night on account of the elections held in the municipality of
Naga, he noticed that his wife was preparing water with which to give the child a bath. He told
his wife not to bathe the child because it had a cold, but the wife insisted and a quarrel arose
in the heat of which the accused punched his wife on the abdomen. She fell seated on a sack of
rice nearby and immediately suffered an attack of which she died in spite of the aid rendered
her by the accused himself and other persons who had arrived. The following morning Dr.
Vicente Roxas performed an autopsy and found that the spleen of the deceased had been
hypertrophied due to an acute and chronic malaria from which she had been suffering, and

that death was caused by the hemorrhage of the spleen when it was ruptured as a consequence
of an external blow on the abdomen which might have been that delivered by the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to a mitigating circumstance.
Held:
After reviewing the facts, we are convinced that the defendant did not really have the
intention of committing so grave a crime as parricide. The quarrel that led to the aggression
had its origin from the natural and justifiable desire of the defendant, as a father, to prevent
his child, which was then ill, from being given a bath. If, under the circumstances, he
transgressed the law by an unjust attack on his wife, he is, nevertheless, deserving of the
mitigating circumstances allowed in his favor. We invoke, for this reason, article 5, paragraph
2, of the Revised Penal Code, and recommended to his Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, the commutation of the penalty imposed on the defendant in this decision.
Modifying the appealed judgment, we declare the defendant CatalinoRabao guilty of the crime
of parricide and hereby sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and to the accessory penalties
provided in article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs in both instances. So ordered.
3) People vsDawaton
Facts:
EDGAR DAWATON was found by the trial court guilty of murder qualified by treachery and
sentenced to death, ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 plus the accessory
penalties provided by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs of suit.
An Information for murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation was filed against
Edgar Dawaton on 11 March 1999. When first arraigned he pleaded not guilty, but during the
pre-trial on 7 May 1999, he offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide but was
rejected by the prosecution, hence, the case proceeded to trial.
On 20 September 1998, LeonidasLavares and several companions,including Dawaton were
drinking in the house of the accuseds uncle. Already drunk, LeonidasLavares decided to sleep
while the accused and his companions continued drinking. Dawatona wa ke ne d L a va re s b y
st a bb i n g hi m a t th e ba se o f t he n ec k. Da wa to n c on ti nu e d st ab b in g Lavares until
the victim died. Dawaton then ran away to the house of his other relative, where he was later
on arrested.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty despite the attendance of
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
Held:

We find that the trial court erroneously imposed the penalty of death. The accused was
charged with murder for which the law provides a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when the commission of
the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating circumstance attended the killing but
there existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be sentenced
only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
4) People vs. Viernes
Facts:
Three criminal Complaints, all dated August 21, 1997, were filed by Catherine Linatoc
(assisted by her mother LinaDela Cruz-Linatoc) before Second Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo
S. Sandoval. The Complaint in Criminal Case No. 0532-97 charged appellant with rape
committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 1996 at about 10:00 oclock in the morning at
BarangayTibig, Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the common law husband of the mother of the victim, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant who is a minor below 12 years old, against
her will and consent to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her
under the provision of the Civil Code.
The Complaint in Crim. Case No. 0534-97 likewise charged him with consummated rape:
That on or about the 18th day of August 1997 at about 12:00 oclock noon, at BarangayTibig,
Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the common law husband of the mother of the victim, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge
of the undersigned complainant who is a minor of 12 years old against her will and consent to
her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under provisions of the
Civil Code.
Finally, in Criminal Case No. 0533-97, appellant was charged with attempted rape:
That on or about the month of March 1997, around noon time, at BarangayTibi, Lipa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then the common law husband of the mother of the victim, by means of force and
intimidation and with lewd design pursuant to his carnal desire, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the felony of rape directly by overt
acts against the undersigned complainant who is a minor below 12 years old, by then and there
undressing her and going on top of her with his exposed private organ but did not perform all
the acts of execution which should have produced the said felony because the undersigned
offended party resisted.
Issue: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender could be appreciated.
Held:
Appellant pleads for leniency on account of his alleged voluntary surrender.

We disagree. The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an acknowledgment

of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that search and
capture would require. Going to the police station to clear his name does not show any intent
of appellant to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.
5) People vs. Abolidor
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision dated January 31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 40948, convicting Claudio Barcimo, Jr. @ Noc-noc, Ronnie
Abolidor and Francisco Comoda of the crime of murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetuaand ordering them to pay P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P16,000.00 as
actual damages and P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
The victim, Thelma Subosa, was the mother of 14 children with her deceased husband,
Primo Subosa. Subsequently, she cohabited with her common-law husband WarlitoHuesca and
lived together with some of her children in Brgy. Janipa-an, Oeste, New Lucena, Ilo-ilo.
Thereafter, WarlitoHuesca also died.
In the early morning of June 14, 1993, a day after Warlito was buried, the victim, her children
namely, Ellyn, Roselyn, Evelyn, Manilyn, Leopoldo and Lilibeth, and Milagros Huesca, the
younger sister of WarlitoHuesca, were awakened by the forcible opening of the door of their
house. Four men entered the house and declared a hold up. The victim pleaded not to be
harmed. Instead, accused Ronnie Abolidor tied her mouth with a handkerchief to silence her.
Then appellant Claudio Barcimo, Jr. shot the victim several times causing her instantaneous
death.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had
lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim.
This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the
government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at
the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should
not be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
Held:
Yes. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender
has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority;
and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing
the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because
he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture.
Aggravating Circumstances
6) People vsCaliso

Kindly refer to the syllabus, the original text is in Spanish. Thanks!

7) People vs Lora
Facts:
That on or about May 28, 1976, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused being then a private person, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and for the purpose of extorting ransom from spouses Ricardo Yap
and Myrna Yap, illegally detained their three (3) year old child Oliver Yap, a minor, from May 28
to 29, 1975 and with treachery, evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted Oliver Yap by tying his mouth with stocking,
placing him inside a Pallmall cigarette box, covering the said box with a mat and piece of sack
and filing the same with other boxes in the third floor (bodega) of the house owned by said
spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap, thereby inflicting upon said Oliver Yap the following to wit:
Asphyxia due to suffocation" which caused the death of said Oliver Yap.
Issue:
Whether or not the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the following
aggravating circumstances: (1) taking advantage of superior strength; (2) disregard of the
respect due the offended party on account of his age; (3) that the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the offended party; (4) that the crime was committed with abuse of confidence,
she being a domestic helper (maid) or obvious ungratefulness; (5) that craft, fraud and disguise
was employed; and (6) that the crime was committed with cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim.
Held:
There being three aggravating circumstances, namely, lack of respect due to the tender age of
the victim, cruelty and abuse of confidence and only one mitigating circumstance in favor of
the defendant, she deserves the death penalty imposed upon her by the lower court.
WHEREFORE, the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified
with treachery and appreciating the aggravating circumstances already indicated above, We
hereby impose the penalty of death with costs de oficio.
8) People vsLaguardia
Facts:
On September 6, 1979, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, Dante Bartulay and
BaltazarBeran, the herein accused-appellant, signaled to a stop a truck owned by Fortune
Tobacco Corporation then being driven by Miguel Chua on the zigzag road in Kilometer 36 inside
the Iwahig Penal Colony at Puerto Princess in Palawan City. Beran approached one side of the
truck and pretended to borrow a screwdriver and while Chua looked for the tool Bartulay
shouted from the other side of the truck, "This is a hold-up!" With guns drawn, the two men
ordered Chua and his three companions, BenignoCaca, Frank Morante, and Eduardo Aniar, to
alight. Bartulay forced Chua to lie face down on the ground about 3 meters away from his
companions. Bartulay was pointing a gun at Chua's head. On orders of Bartulay, Beran got the
wallets and watches of the four. Bartulay asked about the money they were carrying and Chua
pointed to its location. Beran got it and gave it to Bartulay. The money amounted to about
P100,000.00. Then, again on orders of Bartulay, Beran herded the three companions inside the

panel where they were locked. It was while they were still inside the panel that Beran and the
others heard two gunshots. When Beran got off the truck, he saw Chua still lying on the ground
but now bleeding in the head. Thereafter, Beran drove the truck from the scene of the crime
while Bartulay followed in a motorcycle. Somehow, Caca and Morante managed to escape by
jumping from the truck through a secret exit of the panel. They subsequently reported the
occurrence to the law-enforcement authorities who, returning to the scene of the crane the
following day, found Chua already dead. Beran was arrested on September 8, 1979, with the
amount of P4,500.00 in his possession and upon questioning pointed to the place where he had
hidden the pistol he had used during the hold-up. Further investigation disclosed that the
motorcycle and guns by Bartulay and Beran were owned by RosalioLaguardia, who was
Identified by Beran as the mastermind of the crime. The money stolen was supposed to have
been divided in the house of RaymundoBartulay Dante's brother.
In finding Beran guilty and sentencing him to death, the trial court made the following
conclusion:
It is undisputed that the crime committed by the accused was robbery with homicide, and the
killing of the victim was done with the use of a gun. The heinous act was preceded by taking of
the wallets, the watches and the money from the victim of the robbery. Whenever a homicide
has been committed as a consequence, or on the occasion, of a robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide (Pp. v. Darwin Veloso y Militante, alias CarlitoVillareal,
accused-appellant, G.R. No. 32900, Feb. 25, 1982). In the case at bar, evidence is strong and
clear that BaltazarBeran did not endeavor to prevent the homicide of the killing (sic) of Mike
Chua by Dante Bartulay ... 6
The accused-appellant now faults the trial court for holding inter alia that Beran should be
held guilty of the homicide committed on the occasion of the robbery notwithstanding that he
was not the one who actually killed Chua; that he should have tried to prevent the killing of
Chua but did not; and that the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
nighttime and use of a motor vehicle should not have been appreciated against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime
and use of a motor vehicle should not have been appreciated against him.
Held:
Concerning the aggravating circumstances which the accused-appellant insists should not have
been taken against him, the Court notes that no specific finding regarding such circumstances
was made by the trial judge, who simply meted out the penalties without explanation. The
trial judge, notably, did not say why, after finding both Beran and Laguardia guilty, the former
should be sentenced to death and the latter only to life imprisonment. If any error has been
committed with respect to Laguardia's penalty and the circumstances so indicate it is too
late to correct it now as the same has long since become final. By withdrawing his appeal,
Laguardia may have benefited from the trial judge's carelessness.
The trial court also does not clearly impute to Beran any aggravating circumstance and merely
hints at nighttime and use of motor vehicle almost in passing. This is another censurable flaw in
the decision. It is no wonder that the case itself is perplexed over the accused-appellant's
assignment of error that the trial court had taken the said several aggravating circumstances
against him.

9) People vs. Zeta

Facts:
That on or about the 28th day of October 1995, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while armed with a gun, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one JOSE ZETA JR. thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds which directly caused his
death.
The evidence shows that at around 4:00 in the morning of October 28, 1995, Jan Ryan S. Zeta
was listening to the radio inside his room at the second floor of their residence along Beige
Street, Concepcion, Marikina City. He heard his father, Jose Zeta Jr., and his uncle, accusedappellant Angelo Zeta, exchanging invectives against each other. Apparently, accusedappellant went outside the house and Jose followed him. Suddenly, Jan Ryan heard three
gunshots. He rushed downstairs and saw his father bloodied and lying on his side on the
ground. He approached his father and found him barely breathing. He also saw his Aunt Glazy
and her son downstairs. Meanwhile, accused-appellant boarded the company car assigned to
Jose, a two-door Toyota. Before driving away, accused-appellant opened the door of the car
and shot Jose once more on the left side of his abdomen. Accused-appellant then sped
towards Beige Street and turned left on the corner.
Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is present in this case.
Held:
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by
cool thought and reflection on the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To justify the inference of deliberate
premeditation, there must be a period sufficient in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity
for meditation and reflection and to allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the
resolution of his will if he desires to hearken to its warning. Where no sufficient lapse of time
is appreciable from the determination to commit the crime until its execution, evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated.
10) People vs. Barcela
Facts:
Barcela was charged with the following crimes: 1] Qualified Rape, docketed as Crim. Case No.
5517-SPL; 2] Violation of Article 266-A(2) in relation to R.A. No. 7610, docketed as Crim. Case
No. 5526-SPL; and 3] Violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of Lasciviousness), docketed as Crim.
Case No. 5527-SPL, in three (3) separate Informations which read:
Crim. Case No. 5517-SPL
That sometime in the year 2002, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused being the stepfather of
AAA by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

have carnal knowledge with AAA, a minor, nine (9) years of age, against her will and to her
damage and prejudice.
The crime is qualified by minority and relationship between the offender and offended party.
Crim. Case No. 5526-SPL
That on or about November 12, 2004, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused being then the
stepfather of BBB, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual
assault and/or subject to sexual abuse the latter by inserting his finger into the genital or
private part of the said BBB, a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, against her will and consent,
which act being detrimental to her normal growth and development.
Crim. Case No. 5527-SPL
That sometime on 2003 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon his
stepdaughter BBB, a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, by touching the private part of the said
minor, against the latters will and consent, which act is detrimental to the normal growth and
development of the said minor child.
Issue:
Whether or not the special aggravating circumstance such as the minority of the victim and
relationship with the offender beallged in the criminal complaint.
Held:
In the crime of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with
the offender is a special qualifying circumstance and raises the penalty to the supreme penalty
of death. It is essential that this circumstance must be alleged in the criminal complaint or
information and must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the
crime shall be considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The aforesaid qualifying circumstance, however, could not be appreciated in Criminal Case No.
5517-SPL. To begin with, AAA was under 12 years old (only 7 years old) when she was raped in
2002. More importantly, the prosecution failed to prove the allegation in the information that
Barcela was the step-father of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime. It bears
stressing that a stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship,
which in this case is the valid marriage between Barcela and the natural mother of AAA (also of
BBB), and the best evidence to prove the same is the marriage contract. Nowhere in the
record, though, does it show that such certificate of marriage was submitted in evidence by
the prosecution.
TOPIC: QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.MATIMANAY WATAMAMA a.k.a. AKMAD
SALIPADA, Accused-Appellant, TENG MIDTIMBANG (at large), Accused

FACTS: Around eight in the morning on 26 October 1998, Francisco Arobo, Jr. (Arobo), Calim,
and five other farmers were at the farm of Ali Samad (Samad) located in SitioMatingao,
Malapag, Carmen, Cotabato. They were ploughing the unplanted area, while Samad was
tending his corn plants. Arobo was five meters ahead of Calimwhen the former heard gunfire
coming from behind. Arobo immediately looked to the rear and saw Midtimbang and appellant
firing gar and rifles at Calim, who was then slumped near his plow. Midtimbang and appellant
were positioned ten (10) meters apart and five meters obliquely behind Calim. Because of the
successive gunshots, Arobo and the rest of their group scampered to take cover in the
shrubbery, while Samad ran towards the nipa hut at the other side of the farm where his
children were staying. Appellant and Midtimbang also fired at Samad, but he was not hit.
Thereafter, the two fled. Samad then reported the incident to a barangay kagawad. The
defenses alibi was that the appellant was simply mistaken for TengMidtimbang because of their
physical and facial resemblances. Appellant claimed that his real name was AkmadSalipada, not
MatimanayWatamama.
ISSUE: WON the respondent was correctly convicted of the crime of murder
HELD: NO, as the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish treachery in the killing of Calim.
Appellant argues that treachery cannot be appreciated in this case, because no evidence was
presented showing how the attack commenced. For treachery to be considered, it must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are
known as to how the killing began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot be
presumed. Without evident premeditation, and without any evidence to appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of treachery in the killing of Calim, respondent can only be held
liable as principal for the crime of homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JENNY LIKIRAN alias "Loloy", AccusedAppellant.
FACTS: The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19,
2000 in BarangayBugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance
was being held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses CelsoDagangon (Dagangon),
Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and ConstancioGoloceno(Goloceno) testified that on said night,
they were at the dance together with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m. After a few hours, while
Mercado and Goloceno were inside the dance area, Jerome Likiran (Jerome), the accusedappellants brother, punched Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado
when he saw that Jerome was armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was
holding a hunting knife, so he backed off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the dance
area, heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several
times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon
who saw the incident first-hand as he was only three meters from where Sareno was. Dagangon
was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but
Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab
wound at the left scapular area. The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in
the crime. While he admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the
commotion happened. He and Jerome stayed within the area where the sound machine was
located and they only heard the gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in the accusedappellants defense, with Edgar Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing incident and that it
was some other unknown person, and not the accused-appellant, who was the culprit; and
EleuterioQuiopastating that he was with the accused-appellant and Jerome inside the dance
hall at the time the commotion occurred.
ISSUE: WON the respondent was correctly convicted of the crime of murder

HELD: No, the Court cannot agree with the RTC and CAs conclusion that the killing of Sareno
was attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to murder. Treachery is appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance when the following elements are shown: a) the malefactor employed
means, method, or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity for selfdefense or retaliation; and b) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender. Treachery is not present when the killing is not
premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is
just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative
act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment. However, the accusedappellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical consequence resulting from his act of
stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it is nevertheless true that the stab
wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latters death. If a person inflicts a wound
with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a
consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to
prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally
liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the
death of the victim.
MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
FACTS: This case arose out of two (2) information for frustrated murder filed against
petitioner. Romeo Austria testified that at around 8:30 a.m. on April 20, 2000, he was playing a
lucky nine game ata wake on Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. Miguel arrived, asking money from
Austria so he could buy liquor. In response, Austria asked Miguel "to keep quiet." Gerardo Naval
"arrived and asked [Austria] to go home." There was an exchange of words between Naval and
Miguel. Austria "stood up [and] felt that he was stabbed." As he ran home, he noticedMiguel
"armed with a knife," this time chasing Naval. Austria was "hospitalized . . . and was . . .
confined for more than a month. He spent around P110,000.00 for his hospitalization. On crossexamination, Austria testified that he saw Miguel attempt to stab him again.
Gerardo Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go home. After he and
Miguel had an exchange of words, he "felt a hard blow on his back." Naval retaliated. However,
he ran away when he saw Miguel holding a knife. Miguel chased Naval who fell on the ground.
When Naval saw that Miguel was "about to stab him again, he hit [Miguel] with a bench" and
left him lying on the ground, unable to stand. According to Naval, "he did not see the [knife]
land on his back." Naval was also confined at the hospital but only for six (6) days.
Dr. Carlos Angeles testified that "he treated [Austria] for [the] stab wound at his back. He
declared that Austria could have died without an emergency operation. According to him, "a
long and sharp instrument, probably a knife, could have been used to stab the victim. Dr.
Arnold Angeles, Navals doctor, testified that "continuous blood loss" could have caused Navals
death.
ISSUE: WON the respondent was correctly convicted of the crime of frustrated murder
HELD: NO, the Court found that treachery did not exist and, hence, petitioner may only be
convicted of two counts of frustrated homicide. Article 248 provides the following
circumstances where the qualifying circumstances, if not present or cannot be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused may only be convicted with homicide, defined in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender "performs all
the acts of execution which could produce the crime]but did not produce it for reasons
independent of his or her will. In convicting petitioner of frustrated murder, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals found that petitioner intentionally tried to kill private complainants. He

was the author of the stab wounds obtained by private complainants. However, for reasons
independent of his will, he was unable to fully execute the crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: On September 12, 2004 at around 5:45 p.m., Anselmo, Aurelio, and the victim Romeo
were walking on their way to Sampol Market in San Jose Del Monte City. Maricris and her son
were tailing them about four meters behind. As they were making their way to the market,
they saw appellant in his store located on the right side of the street. Suddenly, appellant
rushed towards them and stabbed Romeo twice - one on the chest and another on the
abdomen. They were all caught by surprise due to the suddenness of the attack. Romeo fell to
the ground while appellant quickly ran away from the scene. Aurelio chased appellant but
failed to catch up with him. Maricris went to Romeos house to inform his wife Linda about
what had just happened.
Upon hearing the news from Maricris, Linda rushedto the scene of the crime but did not find
her husband there as Romeo was already brought by Anselmo to the SapangPalay District
Hospital. Later on, he was transferred to East Avenue Medical Center where he died after three
days. Linda testified that before Romeo passed away, he told her that appellant was his
assailant.
Due to Romeos injuries and eventualdeath, Linda spent P16, 770.69 for hospital expenses,
P35,000.00 for funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as expenses for the wake.
Dr. Porciuncula testified that Romeo died due to two fatal stab wounds. The first stab wound
penetrated his chest and pierced his heart while the wound on his abdomen pierced the
pancreas and his small intestines. Both stab wounds appeared to have been caused by a singlebladed weapon.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery
HELD: NO, the court ruled that the appellants sudden attack on the victim amply
demonstrates that treachery was employed in the commission of the crime. It further held that
it is of no consequence that appellant was in front of the victim when he the thrust the knife
to his torso for even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an
unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it.
GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, v. ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, ElpidioMalicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the house
of his sister IsabelitaIguiron (Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a sudden, he heard
Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio confronted Isabelita but she
also cursed him, which prompted the former to slap the latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was
under
the
influence
of
alcohol.
The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the commotion
was taking place in order to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was eventually persuaded
to go home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter, Elpidio went back to the house of

Isabelita to offer reconciliation. On his way there, he passed by the house of Kagawad Andy
Antonio and requested the latter to accompany him, but was instead told to go back home,
leaving
Elpidio
to
proceed
alone.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus) and her sonin-law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find their parents. Titus and
Gary
responded,
putanginamo,
and
kulitmo,
lumayaska,
punyetaka.
In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and saw
Isabelita's elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a rattan stick or arnis.
Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the latter to bow his head but
Salvador delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow. Salvador attempted to
hit Elpidio for the third time but the latter got hold of the rattan stick and the two wrestled on
the floor and grappled for the possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the
two and sprayed something on Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches
of
Salvador
and
to
extricate
himself,
Elpidio
bit
Salvador's
head.
Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter was about to
go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to take the tomahawk axe
from Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still armed with the tomahawk axe and
Salvador,
with
hisarnis,
including
Titus,
chased
him.
Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head with a lead
pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his assailants to stop, but to
no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs, legs and knees using the rattan stick.
While he was simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and
Tommy, he tried to cover his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his
right leg, between the knees and the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and
knees. Rollyhit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, while Tommy hit him with a piece of wood on
the
back
of
his
shoulder.
Thereafter, a certain Mang Gil tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at him:
Huwagmakialam, away ng mag-anakito and the two continued to maul Elpidio. The people
who witnessed the incident shouted maawana kayo but they only stopped battering him
when a bystander fainted because of the incident. Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was
then that concerned neighbors approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the
Philippine
General
Hospital
(PGH).
Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus MalicseIguiron, SaliganMalicseIguiron,
Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and
Rolando Villanueva.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in charging the petitioners with attempted murder
HELD: NO, although treachery cannot be appreciated in the case. The unexpectedness of an
attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the attack was intended to kill
another as long as the victims position was merely accidental. The means adopted must have
been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the crime. In this case, no
evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or reflected on the means,
method, or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage. However, the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present. Abuse of superior strength is present
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime." "The fact that there

were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was
committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim." The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought
the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. "To take advantage
of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked." The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance
depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL MATIBAG Y DE VILLA @ DANI OR
DANILO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: At around 8:40 in the evening of March 27, 2005, Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan (Duhan),
who just came from a meeting with the other officers of the homeowners association of Twin
Villa Subdivision, was walking along Iron Street in Brgy. KumintangIbaba, Batangas City when
Matibag confronted Duhan, and asked, ano bang pinagsasasabimo? Duhan replied wala, and
without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and causing him
to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan, who fell face-first on the
pavement. While Duhan remained in that position, Matibag shot him several more times. PO2
Tom Falejo, a member of the Philippine National Police, positively identified Matibag and
stated on record that he arrested the latter on the night of March 27, 2005. Dr. Antonio S.
Vertido who conducted an autopsy on Duhan confirmed that the latter suffered gunshot wounds
in the head and chest which led to his death.
ISSUE: WON CA correctly upheld the conviction of Matibag for murder
HELD: Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove
that Matibag, who was armed with a gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation,
punched and shot him on the chest. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and
unexpected manner by which it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself,
adding too that he was unarmed. Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should
be appreciated in the imposition of penalty. Presidential Decree No.(PD) 1866, as amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission
of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating circumstance
TOPIC: ACCESORIES
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BLAS ORTIZ and MODESTA ZAUSA, defendants-appellants.
FACTS: About noon on September 8, 1930, the deceased, accompanied by three laborers,
companions of his, was returning from a plantation belonging to PioBrionson carrying some corn
which he had gathered; on reaching the house preceding that of the defendants, as he felt
thirsty he attempted to ask the occupants for water, but as they happened to be absent, he
went to the defendant's house, situate in the barrio of Malapoy, municipality of Pilar, Province
of Capiz, and while in front of the house, called out to the male appellant for a drink of water.
The latter answered from within that they had no water, and could not serve him, to which the
deceased replied: "May we not drink your water?" The appellant rejoined, "But we have no
water. How can you compel us to give you some water?" And immediately afterwards, he
descended from the house carrying his shotgun, which he pointed at the deceased. When the
latter saw the appellant's aggressive attitude, he flung himself upon him, caught hold of the

weapon, and they both struggled for it. At this juncture ModestaZausa, the female appellant,
companion of Blas Ortiz, took a spear from within the house, rushed down and with it attacked
the deceased, stabbing him on the left side of the abdomen, so that the intestines protruded.
(Dying declaration.) The deceased fell to the ground unconscious, was assisted, and that night
died of peritonitis.
ISSUE: WON Blas Ortiz should be acquitted because he did not take part in the attack
HELD: YES, the Court holds that he cannot be convicted of homicide committed on the
deceased SoteroBancoyo, either as principal or as accessory before the fact, for it has been
shown that there was neither plan nor agreement between him and his companion, the
appellant ModestaZausa, to commit the crime, and that he took no part in the latter's attack
with the spear; and this notwithstanding the fact that the said appellant began by pointing his
shotgun at the deceased, but without any consequences.
LITO VINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house
at Burgos Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch
television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard
two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been
shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside
from Ernesto and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went
down to meet Roberto who was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The
neighbor responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their
houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a
bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying
an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his
armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta
took his ante-mortem statement. In the said statement which the victim signed with his own
blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as his assailant. Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were
charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial
Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the
case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of
the military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an information
charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.
ISSUES:
(1) WON petitioner can be convicted as an accessory notwithstanding the fact that he was
charged in the information as a principal for the crime of murder?
(2) WON the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate
charge against the principal
HELD:

(1) YES, while the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the
evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The
greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an
accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.
(2) YES, the corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are
distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in
evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal.
PEOPLE V. FERNANDEZ
183 SCRA 511
GR. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990
FACTS: TeofiloMalong employed 15 year-old Rebecca Soriano, a virigin, as a house helper.
Rebecca resided in Teofilos house together with his wife and daughters Amelita and Ma.
Theresa. On January 13, 1982 at 2:00 in the afternoon, after Rebecca had just finished taking a
bath, still naked, the two accused, Melquiades Fernandez and Federico Conrado surreptitiously
entered the bathroom. To prevent her from making an outcry, a piece of cloth was tightly tied
around her neck, after which she was forcibly laid down. Conrado then held her hands behind
her while Fernandez sexually abused her. Immediately after Fernandez had raped her, Conrado
in turn went on top of her and likewise succeeded in having sexual congress with her against
her will. Thereafter, Fernandez got a handful of mud near the bathroom and placed it on her
vagina. Thereupon, Rebecca ran to the upper floor of the house to report the tragic incident to
AmelitaMalong.
On appeal, the accused claimed that the lower court erred in convicting them for two counts
of rape whereas only one crime of rape was alleged in the information and for appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of ignominy.
ISSUE:
1. WON the lower court erred in convicting the accused for two counts of rape
2. WON the lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy.
HELD:
1. NO. It has been held that in multiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the
rape personally committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because
each of them (accused) cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated by the others,
by acts without which it would not have been accomplished (Art 17 Principals)
2. NO. The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy
because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. (Art 14 par. 17)
People V. Castillo
GR No. L 19238
July 26, 1966
FACTS: Sometime in October 1959, appellant Marincho Castillo was slapped in the face by now
deceased Juan Vargas as a result of an altercation which arose between them because a cow
belonging to the former had gone astray and destroyed some plants of the latter. In the
afternoon of December 1959, in Barrio Malibago, Oriental Mindoro, while appellant, holding a
gun in his right hand, was talking face to face with Juan Vargas, Marincho Carlos Castillo, his
son, came from behind and hacked the latter on the head. As Marincho was about to strike the
victim a second time, appellant said: "You kill him".
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty as principal by inducement for his utterance.

HELD: NO. The court held that in determining whether the utterances of an accused are
sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear that the
inducement was of such nature and was made in such a way as to become the determining
cause of the crime and that such inducement was uttered with the intention of producing the
result.(Art 17 Principals, par. 2) In this case appellant was, armed with a revolver while
talking with the deceased Vargas, but the firearm was not pointed at the latter. Then he is
alleged to have uttered the words "You kill him" only after his son had already fatally hacked
Vargas on the head. Therefore, the alleged inducement to commit the crime was no longer
necessary to induce the assailant to commit the crime.
Appellant was ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE VS DUMANCAS
G.R. Nos. 133527-28
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder under two
Informations: one for the kidnapping and murder of Rafael Gargar and another for Danilo
Lumangyao.
Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transaction losing P352,000 to
Danilo Lumangyao. Acting in conspiracy, the plan to abduct the victims was put into action.
The first nine accused-appellants were found guilty by the trial court as principals, with Cesar
Pecha as accessory in the crime. The ten accused-appellants appealed the decision of the lower
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas was guilty as a principal by inducement
HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted Yanson-Dumancas.
See Art 17, RPC
The Court has to examine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any of the following acts: (a) directly forcing
the killers to commit the crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.
There are two ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime: (i) by using irresistible
force or (ii) by causing uncontrollable fear. Based on the factual findings of the trial court, the
plan to abduct the victims was hatched without Jeanettes participation, therefore, there was
no evidence to show that she directly forced the participants to come up with such plan using
force or uncontrollable fear.
There are again two ways of inducing another to commit a crime: (i) by giving a price, or
offering a reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command. Again, there were no
evidence in this regard. The order given by Jeanette to accused-appellant Geroche to take
care of the two (victims) does not constitute a command to justify the finding that she was
guilty as a principal by inducement. The phrase was merely a chance word, which does not
even precede the commission of the crime itself. Abduction, which is an essential element of
the crime of kidnapping, has already taken place before she told Geroche to take care of the
two.

CARINO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-14752
FACTS:
Appellant appealed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty as
accomplice in the crime of rebellion. In an information dated April 28, 1952, appellant was
charged with rebellion with murders, arson, robberies, and kidnappings for having agreed in
conspiracy with 31 others as an officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines and of the
Hukbong Magpalaya ng Bayan (Hukbalahaps / Huks).
Investigation showed that the appellant was a close friend of Dr. Jesus Lava, a top leader of the
communists and a wanted man. It seemed that the appellant owes a lot to Dr. Lava, as he
treats everyone in the family of illnesses for free. Starting May 1949, the appellant would send
some food and supplies to Dr. Lava through a boy messenger. Such arrangement would last until
1952, when the appellant was arrested and detained.
In addition, the appellant, a ranking employee of the National City Bank of New York, was
found to have assisted in the changing of USD 6,000 to pesos, an amount which was part of the
proceeds of raids and hold-ups made by the communist party. He likewise assisted in the
opening of current accounts for two top-level communists.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant was guilty of being an accomplice in the crime of rebellion
HELD: Appellant was absolved from the crime charged in the information.
"ART. 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
"ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection - How committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine
Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving
the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives." (Revised Penal Code).
There are two elements required in order that a person may be considered as an accomplice to
a criminal act: (1) that he takes part in the execution of the crime by previous and
simultaneous acts and; (2) that he intends by said acts to commit or take part in the execution
of the crime.
The appellant did not take arms against the government, nor was he a member of the
Hukbalahap. The acts of sending or furnishing cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk do
not prove intention to help the latter in committing rebellion or insurrection. Neither was the
act of having $6,000 changed to Philippine money or in helping Huks to open accounts, by
themselves show intent or desire to participate or help in an uprising or rebellion. The law is to
the effect that good faith is to be presumed. No presumption of the existence of a criminal
intent can arise from the above acts which are in themselves legitimate and legal. Said acts are
by law presumed to be innocent acts while the opposite has not been proved.

People vs dela Cerna

G.R. No. L-20911
Facts:
Sixteen people were indicted by the provincial fiscal for the CFI of Cotabato for the murder of
Rafael and Casiano Cabizares, father and son. The present appeal, however, only involves
Sulpicio dela Cerna as principal for killing both victims, and the rest of the appellants as
accomplices for the killing of Rafael.
Rafael was with his family when they passed by the house of appellant Sulpicio. Appellant fired
at Rafael and then asked his companions to burn his own house so they could use that as an
excuse for the defense. The wounded Rafael was brought to the house of his father 100 meters
away.
Appellant Sulpicio arrived with the other accused and proceeded to attack the house with
bolos, firearms and canes. In the ensuing violence, Serapio Maquiling climbed up the window of
the kitchen and shot at Rafael using the carbine he got from Sulpicio. Casiano was then shot by
Serapio as he was running away from the scene. Rafael was finally killed by Sulpicio using the
same carbine he got back from Serapio.
Issue: Whether or not appellant Sulpicio dela Cerna was guilty as principal for the killing of
Casiano Cabizares
Held: Sulpicio was dela Cerna was acquitted for the killing of Casiano Cabizares, but held guilty
as principal in the murder of Rafael. The aggravating circumstance of treachery was mitigated
by his voluntary surrender.
The killing of Rafael Cabizares was attended by treachery due to the sufficient lapse of time
from the first shot, and the intervening events which led to the killing of the victims.
Appellant Sulpicio is chargeable for the treacherous shooting of Rafael by Serapio since both
were acting as co-conspirators. Further, it is found that it was the third shot, that of Sulpicio,
which killed Rafael.
Evident premeditation was also present in the case. Witness Maximo Cana testified to a
meeting wherein the purpose was to plan the killing of Rafael. It should be noted that Sulpicio
and Rafael were involved in a land dispute which was a supposed motive in the killing. With the
actions of the accused overtly showing his determination to end Rafael's life, the killing was
then properly qualified as murder.
However, Sulpicio will not be held liable for the killing of Casiano, notwithstanding the
conspiracy between him and Serapio. The plan was to kill Rafael only and no one else. Coconspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For acts done outside the
agreed conspiracy or which are not necessary and logical consequences of the intended crime,
only the actual perpetrators are liable. Hence, only Serapio killed Casiano.
Although Serapio got the carbine from Sulpicio, there is no proof that Sulpicio was aware that
the former would kill Casiano nor did he abetted such shooting. Therefore, Sulpicio must be
acquitted for the killing of Casiano Cabizares.
All five co-appellants are guilty as co-principals in the murder of Rafael.

Mariano vs. People

G.R. No. 178145
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Mariano was charged with frustrated murder for hitting and bumping
Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the latters owner type jeep. Petitioner and victim
Ferdinand had a traffic altercation after which the two went separate ways. The victim then
proceeded to his mothers house, parked his jeep in front of the house and alighted therefrom.
However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four meters away, and lost
consciousness. The vehicle turned out to be the pickup being driven by petitioner. The
petitioner then surrendered and reported the incident in Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos.
The trial court ruled the crime as a frustrated homicide under Article 249 of the RPC,
sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) years and four (4) months of
Prision Correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum
and is hereby directed to pay the complainant, Ferdinand de Leon, the amount of P196,043.25
less P50,000.00 (already given) as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and the
costs of the suit.
The CA, on the other hand, modified the felony to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in
the amount of P58,402.75 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was guilty for any crime
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the CA and affirmed the conviction of
petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show the
direct causal connection between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
The petitioners act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be
a less grave felony under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinands physical
injuries were those under Article 263 (3) for having incapacitated him from the performance of
the work in which he was habitually engaged in for more than 90 days. Conformably with
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As earlier mentioned, the rules in
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in reckless imprudence, and considering
further that the maximum term of imprisonment would not exceed one year, rendering the
Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable, the Court holds that the straight penalty of two
months of arresto mayor was the correct penalty for the petitioner.

Manolito Gil Zafra vs People

G.R. No. 176317
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of
documents. Petitioner was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR in Revenue District 3 in
San Fernando, La Union. An audit made by the central office of the BIR showed that there was
a discrepancy totaling P 614,151.93 between the Revenue Official Receipts (RORs) submitted by
petitioner to COA and the RORs issued to PNB San Fernando, La Union branch.
The petitioner denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as Revenue
Collection Officer of San Fernando, La Union, he never accepted payments from taxpayers nor
issued the corresponding RORs and that it was his subordinates who collected the taxes and
issued the corresponding RORs.
The RTC convicted the petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through
falsification of documents and imposed the indeterminate penalty depending on the amount
involved per case. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime
HELD: The SC denied the petition for lack of merit.
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petitioner was correctly
convicted of the crimes charged because such findings of fact by the trial court, being affirmed
by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now binding and conclusive on the Court.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Prosecution sufficiently established that the petitioner had
been the forger of the falsified and tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of
the public documents had been necessary to commit the malversations of the collected taxes.
The SC did not give merit to petitioners claims that it was his subordinates who directly dealt
with the taxpayers and issued the falsified receipts, because even if such was true, as the
Revenue Collection Officer he would be negligent in his duties and would still not avoid liability
for the governments loss.
At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only
of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for
the intentional crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents
because his appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is
axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy,
leaving him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude
from the records to have been actually committed by him within the terms of the allegations in
the informations under which he had been arraigned. (copied verbatim from the decision,
hirap i-summarize eh)
However, the penalty imposed on the petitioner needs to be corrected. He was convicted of
complex crimes, which under Article 48 of the RPC, would be penalized on that prescribed for
the more serious offense to be imposed on its maximum period.
Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed P5,000.00, while the penalty for malversation ranges from prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount of the
funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled (see Art 217, RPC). Therefore,

the SC modified the penalties imposed (hindi na ko mag-dwell dito kasi di naman ito ang topic
sa syllabus).
The petitioner was also directed to return the amount of P614,151.93 plus 6% interest per
annum from the time of finality of this decision until full payment.

People vs. Baraga y Arcilla

G.R. No. 208761 | 2014-06-04
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Baraga was charged with three counts of acts of lasciviousness under Section
5(b), Art III of RA 7610, also known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and two counts of rape under Art 266-A of the RPC.
Apr 2, 2007 victim was 11 days shy of her 12 th bday, act of lasciviousness; Apr 8, 2007 rape ;
Apr 15, 2007 rape
Apr 19 act of lasciviousness (victim already 12 y/o)
The RTC found Baraga guilty of 2 counts each of acts of lasciviousness and rape. RTC imposed
the indeterminate penalty of 6 yrs + 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 15 yrs, 6 mos, 20
days of reclusion temporal as maximum plus damages for each act of lasciviousness. For each
act of rape Baraga was charged with reclusion perpetua plus damages.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed Baragas guilt but imposed a modified penalty: as regards the
charge of acts of lasciviousness in Case No. 07-0685, in as much as AAA was already 12 years old
when the acts alleged therein were committed by Baraga, the CA, applying Article 336 of the
RPC, imposed the penalty of 6 mos of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 6 yrs of prision
correccional, as maximum. On the charge of acts of lasciviousness in Case No. 07-0864, since
AAA was merely 11 years old at that time, the CA applied Sec 5(b) of RA No. 7610 and meted
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 13 yrs, 9 mos, 11 days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to 16 yrs, 5 mos, 10 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The CA
affirmed the decision of the acts of rape, clarifying that the sentence was meted without
eligibility of parole.
ISSUE: Whether or not Baraga was guilty of the crimes charged
HELD:
The SC held that the lower courts were correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility of parole for the 2 counts of rape.
Acts of lasciviousness - sexual abuse under RA 7610 has three elements: (1) the accused
commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18
years old. Prosecution was able to establish these facts for the two counts charged. The
offense is chargeable with the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. However, when the victim of the sexual abuse is under 12 years old, the imposable
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The CA correctly imposed the penalty of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 13 yrs, 9 mos, 11 days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 16 yrs, 5 mos, 10 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, to the lascivious conduct perpetrated when the victim was
still 11 years old. However, the CA erred in applying the provisions of Art 336 of the RPC in Case
No. 07-0685 just because the victim was already 12 yrs old at the time the second act of
lascivious conduct was perpetrated. It should be stressed that the information charged Baraga
for violation of RA 7610, and therefore he should be penalized based on the said act. The
penalty for sexual abuse performed on a child under 18 years old but over 12 years old under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The
Court likewise considers the alternative circumstance of relationship against Baraga as an
aggravating circumstance. Since there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua.

Besides, Section 31 of RA 7610 expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period when the perpetrator is, inter alia, the parent of the victim.

Rosal Hubilla vs People

G.R. No. 176102 | 2014-11-26
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the death of his cousin. The petitioner was then a
minor during the commission of the crime, being 17 yrs, 4 mos and 28 days old when he
committed the homicide back in 2000. The RTC rendered petitioner guilty as charged, and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
On appeal, the modified decision of the CA held that petitioner should serve the indeterminate
penalty of six months and one day of prison correctional, as minimum, to eight years and one
day of prision mayor.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty
2. Whether or not petitioner was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of
sentence under RA 9344
HELD: The SC affirms the modified decision of the CA.
Art 249 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering that
the petitioner was a minor during the time, such privileged mitigating circumstance lowered
the imposable penalty to prision mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision
correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence, prision mayor in its medium period - eight years and one day to 10 years -was proper
because there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA
imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists that the maximum penalty be reduced to six years of reclusion
correccional so he may apply for probation. This is bereft of legal basis. There is no law that
could justify the further reduction of the maximum of the sentence, therefore, doing so would
be imposing an illegal penalty.
The petitioner likewise was not eligible to apply for probation in conformity with Sec 9a of PD
968, which disqualifies from probation an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years.
As for his claim that he is entitled to suspension of sentence, Sec 38 of RA 9344 allows the
suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime,
only until the child offender turns 21 years of age. The petitioner is already 23 years old when
the RTC convicted him of homicide in 2006. Hence, suspension of sentence is no longer
possible.

People vs Alvarado
G.R. No. 117402 | 1997-07-21
FACTS:
In 1991, Zosimo Estao was stabbed dead by one of five men who arrived at his house. Four
men held his arms while one of the men stabbed him. Appellant Rollie Alvarado was charged
with the crime of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation. The other four coaccused remained at large.
Appellant denied involvement in the killings and averred he was also a victim in the incident at
question. He claimed he was hacked by a drunk man using a bolo. He said he was implicated in
the crime just because he knows the other suspects.
The trial court held that the appellant be convicted of murder, such being qualified with the
aggravating circumstance of of abuse of superior strength. He was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not Zosimo was guilty of the crime of murder
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts decision.
The Court affirmed the conviction of appellant of the crime of murder, but changed the
qualifying circumstance to treachery, which was also alleged in the information. Zosimo was
already in a helpless condition when stabbed, and as eyewitnesses claim, his hands were held
by the appellants companions. Granting abuse of superior strength was also alleged, it was
nonetheless absorbed by treachery.
The Court, however, observed that a modification in the penalty imposed is called for in light
of the amendment of Art 27 of the RPC by RA 7659. According to RA 7659, the duration of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from a period of from twenty years and one day to forty
years. Therefore, a judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua should specify a
straight penalty with the range of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court then
recommended the penalty of 34 years of reclusion perpetua.

People vs Mantalaba
G.R. No. 186227 | 2011-07-20
FACTS:
Seventeen-year-old Allen Mantalaba was arrested for selling shabu in a buy-bust operation in
2003. A physical search of Mantalaba revealed in his possession 2 packets of shabu weighing
0.0412 grams and 0.6131 grams. He was then charged with two criminal cases in violation of RA
9165 for unlawful selling and illegal possession of dangerous drugs respectively.
The trial court found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt. For selling drugs which was
penalized in RA 9165 with life imprisonment to death, he was sentenced with reclusion
perpetua, being a minor during the time of commission of the act. For illegal possession of
shabu which was penalized in RA 9165, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he was
sentenced to 6 years 1 day, minimum, to 8 years, as miximum of prision mayor.
Upon appeal, the Court affirmed in toto the RTCs ruling. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mantalaba was guilty of the crimes charged and if so, whether or not the
correct penalty was assessed
HELD: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts, assailing Mantalaba as guilty
beyond reasonanle doubt of violations of RA 9165, and modified the penalty therewith to 6
years 1 day of prision mayor as minimum and 14 years 8 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
It should be noted that Mantalaba should have been entitled to suspension of sentence under
RA 9165, being only 19 when the RTC decision was promulgated and appealed to the CA. RA
9165 was enacted at year after, but the same having retroactive effect, the CA should have
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of
Section 38 of the same law which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless
of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603 (which was the
law in effect for children and minors during the time of the promulgation of the decision of the
RTC).
A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however,
in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable
by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Basically, this means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical
nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The Court ruled that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case
should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph
of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest
penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness
of drug offenses.
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in
fixing the penalty that should be imposed. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper
penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be

taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case
because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to
death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue
of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable
penalty.
People vs Escares
G.R. No. L-11128-33 | 1957-12-23
FACTS:
In 1950, six different informations for robbery were filed against Rene Escares and two other
co-accused. With Escares still at large in 1951, the two other co-accused were found guilty of
the crimes and convicted accordingly. Escares was arraigned in 1954 wherein he pled not guilty.
Later he asked to withdraw the said plea and pled guilty to the six crimes.
The trial court therefore rendered a decision as such: finding him guilty of the crimes charged
in all cased, he was sentenced to 12 years, 6 months, and 1 day in all cases.
The case was brought up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriate penalty was imposed on the accused
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the penalty imposed should be modified to an
indeterminate penalty of not less than 4 months, 1 day of arresto mayor, and not more than 4
years, 2 months, and 1 day of prision correccional.
The imposable penalty for robbery is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period. This should be applied in its minimum period in view of the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, not offset by any aggravating circumstance, or from 4
years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years one month and 10 days.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be sentenced for each crime to
an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall not be less than 4 months and 1 day of
arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and the maximum
shall not be less than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional nor more than 6 years
1 month and 10 days of prision mayor.
TOPIC: ACCESORIES
PENALTIES
MEJORADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR. Nos. L -51065-72
June 30, 1987
FACTS:Arturo Mejorada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section3(E) of
RA. 3019, aka Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.Mejorada was a right-away agent whose
duty was to process the claims for compensation of damages of property owners affected by
highway construction and improvements. He required the claimants to sign blank copies of
Sworn Statements and Agreements to Demolish, where it appeared that the properties of the
claimants have highervalues than the actual value being claimed by them. However, the
claimants didnot bother reading through the paper because they very much interested in

thecompensation of damages. After processing the claims, instead of giving to theclaimants the
proper amount, Mejorada gave one of them Php 5,000 and the rest,Php 1,000 each, saying that
there are many who would share in said amounts. The claimants were not able to complain
because they were afraid of the accusedand his armed companion. The Sandiganbayan
sentenced Mejorada penalties for theeight (8) information filed against him which totaled to 56
years and 8 days of imprisonment.Section 3 of RA 3019 states that Mejorada should bepunished
with imprisonment for not less than 1 year nor more than 10 years asstated in Sec 9 of the
same Act. In this case, there are 8 charges against him andeach charge should be served with
the penalty prescribed by the law.Mejorada states that the penalty imposed upon him
iscontrary to the three-fold rule under Art. 70 which provide that the duration of sentences
should not exceed 40years.
ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed upon Mejoradais excessive and contrary the three-fold rule
underArticle 70 of the RPC.
RULING:NO. Article 70 of the RPC is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the
penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed. It should be interpreted
that the accusedcannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of
thesepenalties the maximum of which is forty (40) years. The courts can still impose as many
penalties as there are separate and distinctoffenses committed, since for every individual
crime committed, a correspondingpenalty is prescribed by law. With these reasons, Mejorada
cannot correctlycontend that his penalty is excessive.
PEOPLE V. ALFREDO BON
GR. No. 166401
October 30, 2006
FACTS:8 informationwere filed against Alfredo Bon, charging him with the rape of AAAand BBB,
the daughters of his older brother, both minors at the time of commission. The rapes were
alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of 6years. The Court of
Appeals held and established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of 6 counts of
rape and 2 counts of attempted rape punishable by death.
ISSUE:WON enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (disallowance of death penalty) resulted in
the statutory interdiction of the death penalty.
HELD:YES.By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. In the case of
appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two
degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
PROBATION LAW (P.D. No. 968)
FRANCISCO V. CA
GR. No. 108747
April 6, 1995
FACTS:Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon publicly humiliating his employees, was accused of
multiple grave oral defamationin five 5 separate Information instituted by five of his
employees.The MeTC found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in 4 out of 5 cases (the
fifth case dismissed due to the failure of the offended party to appear in trials) thereby
sentencing him to a prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of
prisioncorreccionalin each crime committed. Francisco appealed his case in the RTC but later
applied for probation.

ISSUE:WON petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation

HELD:**Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender.
It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately
admit his liability and save the
state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. Consequently,
probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be
reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) may avail of probation.
No. The Court held that the accused is no longer eligible for probation for the following
reasons: (1)Sec. 4 of the Probation lawprovides that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of the
conviction. The petitioner did not file his application for probation before the finality of the
RTC-appellate judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt at probation was filed too late
(2)petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were
already probationable (prisioncorreccional). Whereas, there was no need to appeal if only to
reduce the penalties to within the probational period (multiple prison terms should not be
added up).
SORIANO vs. CA G.R. No. 123936 March 4, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Ronald Santiago was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
homicide, serious
physical injuries and damage to property on December 7, 1993. 2 His application for probation
was granted on
March 8, 1994 with terms and conditions.
On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of court
for his failure to
comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994, ordering him to submit a program
of payment of
the civil liability imposed upon him as indemnification of the heirs of the victim
IsidrinoDaluyog. The court had
likewise revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to
servethe sentence
originally imposed upon him. According to the trial court, among the violations committed by
petitioner as
regards his probation are his failure to (1) meet his responsibilities to his family, (2) engage in a
specific
employment, and (3) cooperate with his program of supervision.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of his probation warrant its
revocation
HELD:
Yes. First, we fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to furnish the trial
court with a
program of payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the
reason why the trial
court gave him the chance to make his own program of payment. Knowing his own financial
condition, he is in
the best position to formulate a program of payment that fits his needs and capacity. In
addition, no justifiable
reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders. The trial court could not be
faulted for citing

him in contempt for his failure to comply with its orders. Nor did it abuse gravely its discretion
in issuing said
orders. Hence, we are in full agreement with respondent appellate court's decision as well.
Further, it is evidently
factual that he had violated the other terms of his probation, he himself admits in his petition
that he is
unemployed and only depends on his parents for support. He can barely support his family.
Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion
of the trial
court. Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may be imposed by the trial
court. Having the
power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper
case and under appropriate circumstances. The petitioner has squandered the opportunity
granted him by the
trial court to remain outside prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of those
aforecited violations.
PETITION DENIED.
TOLENTINO V. JUDGE ALCONCEL
GR No L. 63400
March 18, 1983
FACTS:Petitioner was charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 after being
caught in the act of selling marijuana cigarettes. After the prosecution has presented part its
evidence, petitioner manifested his desire to change his plea of not guilty to guilty to the
lesser offense of POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA which the court allowed. Petitioner was thereupon
sentenced to imprisonment of 6 months and one 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, to pay a fine of
P1,000,00, and to pay the costs, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Thereafter
petitioner applied for PROBATION. After conducting an investigation, the probation officer of
the City of Manila submitted itsreport, recommending that petitioner be placed on two-year
probation upon the claim that the latterwas already on his way to reformation and that a
prison cell would turn him into a hardened criminal. Respondent judge however DENIED
petitioners application on the ground that it will depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed. (Sec. 8, par. C)
ISSUE:WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
probation.
HELD:NO. The Court upheld the decision of the respondent judge and held that the potentiality
of the offender to reform is not the sole factor that should be considered and that the
demands of justice and public interest must be observed in the grant of an application for
probation. Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the discretion of the
court
CABATINGAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR. No. L-55333
January 22, 1981
FACTS:Sandiganbayan, in denying the application for probation of the petitioner relied mainly
on the inaccurate Post-Sentence Investigation Report as well as the Supplemental Report
submitted by the Probation Officer, both of which recommended disapproval of the application
for probation on the ground that (a) during the period of her probation there is 'undue risk' that
she will again commit another crime and that (b)probation will depreciate the seriousness of
the offense committed. Likewise, respondent did not give the petitioner a chance to be heard
before it issued its resolution denying the application.

The reports indicated that Mrs. Cabatingan and her husband jointly operate an illegal jai-alai
betting station known as 'masiao' and that she is facing another charge for malversation of
P12,350.40 before the Tanodbayan.
ISSUE:WON the respondent court erred in denying the application for probation of the
petitioner based merely on the probation report.
HELD:YES. The Court agreed with the petitioner's claim that respondent court appears to have
wholly relied on the probation report and did not make its own determination as to whether or
not probation would serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and the
applicant.
It was not enough for the respondent court to deny petitioner's application solely on the report
that she was involved in 'masiao' and that she was facing another preliminary investigation for
the 'additional shortage' of the funds of which she had already pleaded guilty. Likewise, the
fact that there is a pending preliminary investigation against her for the additional shortage
does not also constitute a sufficient basis for a conclusion that she was already guilty thereof.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the Sandiganbayan which is ordered to conduct
further
hearings on the application for probation.
BALA vs. JUDGE MARTINEZ G.R. No. L-67301 January 29, 1990
FACTS: The petitioner had been charged guilty of the crime of falsification of a public
document, for removing and
substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa CrissDiazen which had been attached to her United
States of America
passport, with that of FlorenciaNotarte. On the trial court order dated August 12, 1982, he was
granted
probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein.
During his
probation, he had transferred residence, which the probation officer had verbally approved.
Upon expiry of his
probation period, the order of final discharge was not issued because the respondent probation
officer had not
yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge.
On December 8, 1983, the respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City Fiscal
Jose D.
Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner alleging that he
had violated the
terms and conditions of his probation. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the
motion to revoke
probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his probation
period had already
expired.
ISSUE: WON the probation of the petitioner is revocable.
HELD: Yes. The Court finds no merit in the petition. Probation is revocable before the final
discharge of the probationer
by the court, contrary to the petitioner's submission, as provided for under Sec. 16 of PD 968.
The expiration of
the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso
facto termination of

probation found in the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its
period. There must
first be issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the
probation officer. Only from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed
terminated. PETITION
DISMISSED and PROBATION REVOKED.
NEIL SUYAN vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 189644 July 02, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner was first arrested for violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425. He
pleaded guilty to the charge,
hence, the RTC sentenced him to a prison term of six years of prision correctional. He filed his
application for probation on the same day. The RTC thus issued a Probation Order covering a
period of six years. While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate occasions, both
for violations of Section 16 of RA 6425.
Corresponding Information were filed against him. Because of this, the chief of the Parole and
Probation Office recommended the revocation of his probation, citing recidivism. He also
pointed out Neil is not in a position to comply with the terms of his probation, in view of his
incarceration. The RTC ordered the revocation of his probation and for him to serve his
sentence. Neil then interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. According to him, he was
not accorded due process when his probation was revoked without giving him an opportune to
dispute the allegations. Finding merit in his petition, the CA ordered
the RTC to conduct a hearing on the Motion to Revoke Provocation. Thus the RTC conducted a
full-blown trial to
determine the necessity of revoking his probation. The PPO filed a Violation Report where it
stated that Neil
showed negative attitude towards rehabilitation and instead continued with his illegal drugs
activities. It also
filed its Formal Offer of Evidence where it attached a certification from another court that Neil
has already
served his sentence on the other drug charges against him. Neil filed his Comment to the
formal offer but did not contest the certification.
After hearing, the RTC revoked his probation. Neil appealed this revocation to the CA citing
lack of procedural and substantial due process, but the same was denied by the CA.
ISSUE: WON the probation was properly revoked.
HELD: Yes.On the procedural grounds, we do notsubscribe to his contention that his right to
due process was violatedafter the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion
to Revoke, in compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample
opportunity to refute the allegations contained in the Violation Report. On substantive grounds,
we believe that there was sufficient justification for the revocationof his probation. Petitioner
does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence for
another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is adirect
violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order,33 and the effects are clearly outlined in
Section 11 ofthe Probation Law. Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the
probation of petitioner and ordering him to serve the penalty for the offense for which he was
placed on probation.PETITION DENIED.
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (RA 9344)
PEOPLE vs. SARCIA G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
FACTS:The petitioner, Richard Sarcia, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of
AAA, who was 5 yearsold at that time while the former was 18 years old, a minor, at that time.
Under Art 335 of the RPC, as amendedby RA 7659, the penalty of death shall be imposed when
the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was
five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in

the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which
showed her date of
birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
ISSUE: WON death penalty may be imposed on the accused despite the fact that he was a
minor at the time he
committed the crime.
HELD: No. Despite the fact that the Prosecution was not able to prove the exact date when the
crim took place in year1996, and that it is not certain that the crime was committed on or
after he reached 18 years of age in 1996, in assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code,
when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining
the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty
of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the
accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua. To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age,
and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No.
9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and
academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec.
51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children in agricultural
camps and other training facilities.
PEOPLE vs. JACINTO G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
FACTS: The accused, Hermie Jacinto who is 17 years old, was found guilty by the lower courts
for the rape of a 5 yearold child, AAA. He was sentenced to the penalty of death by the RTC on
March 26, 2004. The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence
stating that appellant was apparently born on 1 March1985 and that he was only seventeen (17)
years old when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003. Thetrial court appreciated the
evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmedthe lower
court's decision but modified the penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
ISSUE: WON the accused is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of RA 9344 due to the fact
that he was a
minor when he committed the crime.
HELD: In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
Republic Act No. 9344(Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the
crime three (3) years beforeit was enacted on 28 April 2006. The Court also believes that the
fact that the accused chose an isolated anddark place to perpetrate the crime and that he
boxed the victim to weaken her defense, are indicative that he had acted with discernment.As
to the suspension of sentence provided under Sec. 40 of RA 9344, we find that the benefits of a
suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only
until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old. Be that as it may, to give meaning
to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the
law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so
long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. Thus, appellant may be
confined inan agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of the
Act.