SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136803. June 16, 2000.]

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs. MA.
ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.
R.D. Tacorda & Associates for petitioner.
Teresita Dizon Capulong for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner filed a suit to be declared as co-owner
of real and personal properties registered solely
in the name of his common-law spouse and
eventually for partition. The trial court rendered
judgment summarily dismissing the case, finding
that the suit was a collateral attack on the titles
of real properties of the respondent. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case for trial, but
subsequently affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the case.
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court
cannot summarily dismiss the case which
presented genuine factual issues. Under the
Family Code, co-ownership may exist between a
man and a woman living together as husband
and wife even though they are not capacitated to
marry each other. Whether petitioner and
respondent cohabited and whether subject
properties are part of the alleged co-ownership
and acquired after the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988, are genuine and material issues
which require presentation of evidence by the
parties. The Court also ruled that based on the
premise that petitioner is a co-owner, his partition
suit did not challenge respondent's titles but he
validly sought partition of the properties in coownership and the conveyance to him of his
share. cHCIDE
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; PROPERTY
RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP DO NOT COVER
PARTIES
LIVING
IN
AN
ADULTEROUS
RELATIONSHIP. This provision of the Civil
Code applies only to cases in which a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage provided they are not
incapacitated or are without impediment to marry
each other, or in which the marriage is void ab
initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art. 144,
therefore, does not cover parties living in an
adulterous relationship.
2. ID.; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY RELATIONS
BETWEEN
HUSBAND
AND
WIFE;
COOWNERSHIP EXISTS WHERE PARTIES IN
UNION ARE INCAPACITATED TO MARRY EACH
OTHER; CASE AT BAR. Art. 148 of the Family
Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in
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cases where the parties in union are

incapacitated to marry each other. . . . It was
error for the trial court to rule that, because the
parties in this case were not capacitated to marry
each other at the time that they were alleged to
have been living together, they could not have
owned properties in common. The Family Code, in
addition to providing that a co-ownership exists
between a man and a woman who live together
as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties
acquired by them through their joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is
thus co-ownership even though the couple are
not capacitated to marry each other. In this case,
there may be a co-ownership between the parties
herein. Consequently, whether petitioner and
respondent cohabited and whether the properties
involved in the case are part of the alleged coownership are genuine and material. All but one
of the properties involved were alleged to have
been acquired after the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property
acquired before the Family Code took effect, if it
is shown that it was really acquired under the
regime of the Civil Code, then it should be
excluded.
3. ID.;
CIVIL
CODE;
PROPERTY;
COOWNERSHIP; TRUST RELATION INHERES IN A
CO-OWNERSHIP; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner
contends that an implied trust existed pursuant
to Art. 1452 of the Civil Code which provides that
"(I)f two or more persons agree to purchase
property and by common consent the legal title is
taken in the name of one of them for the benefit
of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of
the others in proportion to the interest of each."
We do not think this is correct. The legal relation
of the parties is already specifically covered by
Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the
properties acquired by the parties out of their
actual joint contributions of money, property or
industry shall constitute a co-ownership. Coownership is a form of trust and every co-owner
is a trustee for the other. The provisions of Art.
1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no
longer material since a trust relation already
inheres in a co-ownership which is governed
under Title III, Book II of the Civil Code.
4. ID.; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. No. 1529;
INDEFEASIBILITY
OF
TORRENS
TITLE;
ATTACK ON A TITLE, WHEN IT IS DIRECT OR
COLLATERAL. A Torrens title, as a rule, is

conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this,

P.D. No. 1529, 48 provides that a certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack and
can not be altered, modified, or canceled except
in a direct proceeding. When is an action an
attack on a title? It is when the object of the
action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and
thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which
the title was decreed. The attack is direct when
the object of an action or proceeding is to annul
or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain
a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. SCIacA
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTITION SUIT FILED BY
CO-OWNER IS NOT A COLLATERAL ATTACK
ON THE TITLE; CASE AT BAR. In his
complaint for partition, consistent with our ruling
in Roque regarding the nature of an action for
partition, petitioner seeks first, a declaration that
he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and
second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. He
does not attack respondent's titles. Petitioner
alleges no fraud, mistake, or any other
irregularity that would justify a review of the
registration decree in respondent's favor. His
theory is that although the subject properties
were registered solely in respondent's name, but
since by agreement between them as well as
under the Family Code, he is co-owner of these
properties and as such is entitled to the
conveyance of his shares. On the premise that he
is a co-owner, he can validly seek the partition of
the properties in co-ownership and the
conveyance to him of his share.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review of the amended
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 7,
1998 in CA G.R. CV No. 48443 granting
respondent's motion for reconsideration of its
decision dated November 7, 1996, and of the
resolution dated December 21, 1998 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as
follows:
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio
Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint 2 for "Partition and/or
Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and
Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo.
The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-656
at the Regional Trial Court in Makati City, alleged
that petitioner and respondent, both married and
with children, but separated from their respective
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spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship

sometime in 1979 while their respective
marriages still subsisted. During their union, they
set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage
Corporation, with petitioner as president and
chairman of the board of directors, and
respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The
business
flourished
and
petitioner
and
respondent acquired real and personal properties
which were registered solely in respondent's
name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences,
the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from
respondent his share in the subject properties,
but respondent refused alleging that said
properties had been registered solely in her
name. LLjur
In her Amended Answer, 3 respondent admitted
that she engaged in the customs brokerage
business with petitioner but alleged that the
Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was
organized with other individuals and duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1987. She denied that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife because the
fact was that they were still legally married to
their respective spouses. She claimed to be the
exclusive owner of all real and personal
properties involved in petitioner's action for
partition on the ground that they were acquired
entirely out of her own money and registered
solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, 4 in accordance with Rule
34 of the Rules of Court. 5 She contended that
summary judgment was proper, because the
issues raised in the pleadings were sham and not
genuine, to wit:
A.
The main issue is Can plaintiff validly claim the
partition and/or payment of co-ownership share,
accounting and damages, considering that
plaintiff and defendant are admittedly both
married to their respective spouses under still
valid and subsisting marriages, even assuming as
claimed by plaintiff, that they lived together as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage? In
other words, can the parties be considered as coowners of the properties, under the law,
considering the present status of the parties as
both married and incapable of marrying each
other, even assuming that they lived together as
husband and wife (?)
B.

As a collateral issue, can the plaintiff be

considered as an unregistered co-owner of the
real properties under the Transfer Certificates of
Title duly registered solely in the name of
defendant Ma. Elvira Castillo? This issue is also
true as far as the motor vehicles in question are
concerned which are also registered in the name
of defendant. 6
On the first point, respondent contended that
even if she and petitioner actually cohabited,
petitioner could not validly claim a part of the
subject real and personal properties because Art.
144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties
acquired by a man and a woman living together
as husband and wife but not married, or under a
marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if
the parties are not in any way incapacitated to
contract marriage. 7 In the parties' case, their
union suffered the legal impediment of a prior
subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact
being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived
together as husband and wife, was irrelevant as
no co-ownership could exist between them. prcd

there is an implied trust in favor of the person

whose benefit is contemplated.
On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its
decision 9 granting respondent's motion for
summary judgment. It ruled that an examination
of the pleadings shows that the issues involved
were purely legal. The trial court also sustained
respondent's contention that petitioner's action
for partition amounted to a collateral attack on
the validity of the certificates of title covering the
subject properties. It held that even if the parties
really had cohabited, the action for partition could
not be allowed because an action for partition
among co-owners ceases to be so and becomes
one for title if the defendant, as in the present
case, alleges exclusive ownership of the
properties in question. For these reasons, the trial
court dismissed Civil Case No. 93-656.

Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for

Summary Judgment. 8 He contended that the
case presented genuine factual issues and that
Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by
the Family Code which now allows, under Art.
148, a limited co-ownership even though a man
and a woman living together are not capacitated
to marry each other. Petitioner also asserted that
an implied trust was constituted when he and
respondent agreed to register the properties
solely in the latter's name although the same
were acquired out of the profits made from their
brokerage business. Petitioner invoked the
following provisions of the Civil Code:

On appeal, the Court of Appeals on November 7,

1996, ordered the case remanded to the court of
origin for trial on the merits. It cited the decision
in Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court 10 to
the effect that an action for partition is at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the properties involved. If the
defendant asserts exclusive title over the
property, the action for partition should not be
dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the
case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his
claimed status as a co-owner, the court should
dismiss the action, not because the wrong
remedy was availed of, but because no basis
exists for requiring the defendant to submit to
partition. Resolving the issue whether petitioner's
action for partition was a collateral attack on the
validity of the certificates of title, the Court of
Appeals held that since petitioner sought to
compel respondent to execute documents
necessary to effect transfer of what he claimed
was his share, petitioner was not actually
attacking the validity of the titles but in fact,
recognized their validity. Finally, the appellate
court upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of
the Civil Code had been repealed by Art. 148 of
the Family Code. cdrep

ARTICLE 1452. If two or more persons agree to

purchase property and by common consent the
legal title is taken in the name of one of them for
the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law
in favor of the others in proportion to the interest
of each.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the

decision of the Court of Appeals. On May 7, 1998,
nearly two years after its first decision, the Court
of Appeals granted respondent's motion and
reconsidered its prior decision. In its decision now
challenged in the present petition, it held

ARTICLE 1453. When the property is conveyed to

a person in reliance upon his declared intention
to hold it for, or transfer it to another grantor,

Prefatorily, and to better clarify the controversy

on whether this suit is a collateral attack on the
titles in issue, it must be underscored that

As to the second issue, respondent maintained

that petitioner can not be considered an
unregistered co-owner of the subject properties
on the ground that, since titles to the land are
solely in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer
would be to allow a collateral attack on the
validity of such titles.

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plaintiff-appellant alleged in his complaint that all

the nine (9) titles are registered in the name of
defendant-appellee, Ma. Elvira T. Castillo, except
one which appears in the name of Eloisa Castillo
(see par. 9, Complaint). However, a verification of
the annexes of such initiatory pleading shows
some discrepancies, to wit:
1. TCT No. 149046 (Annex A) = Elvira T. Castillo,
single
2. TCT No. 168208 ( Annex B) = -do3. TCT No. 37046 (Annex C) = -do4. TCT No. 37047 (Annex D) = -do5. TCT No. 37048 (Annex E) = -do

aside the decree, but respecting it as

incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to
bring an action for reconveyance or, if the
property had passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages. Verily,
plaintiff-appellant should have first pursued such
remedy or any other relief directly attacking the
subject titles before instituting the present
partition suit. Apropos, the case at bench appears
to have been prematurely filed.
Lastly, to grant the partition prayed for by the
appellant will in effect rule and decide against the
properties registered in the names of Steelhouse
Realty and Development Corporation and Eloisa
Castillo, who are not parties in the case. To allow
this to happen will surely result to injustice and
denial of due process of law. . . 11

6. TCT No. 30368 (Annex F) = Steelhaus Realty &

Dev. Corp.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his

motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated December 21, 1998. LLjur

7. TCT No. 30369 (Annex G) = -do-

Hence this petition.

8. TCT No. 30371 (Annex F) = -do-

Petitioner contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals,

in its first decision of November 7, 1996, was
correct in applying the Roque ruling and in
rejecting respondent's claim that she was the sole
owner of the subject properties and that the
partition suit was a collateral attack on the titles;
(2) the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in its first
decision that Art. 148 of the Family Code governs
the co-ownership between the parties, hence, the
complaint for partition is proper; (3) with respect
to the properties registered in the name of
Steelhouse
Realty,
respondent
admitted
ownership thereof and, at the very least, these
properties could simply be excluded and the
partition limited to the remaining real and
personal properties; and (4) the Court of Appeals
erred in not holding that under the Civil Code,
there is an implied trust in his favor. 12

9. TCT No. (92323) 67881 (Annex I) = Eloisa

Castillo
In this action, plaintiff-appellant seeks to be
declared as co-owner of the real properties
covered by the above listed titles and eventually
for their partition [ par. (a), Prayer; p. 4 Records].
Notably, in order to achieve such prayer for a
joint co-ownership declaration, it is unavoidable
that the individual titles involved be altered,
changed, canceled or modified to include therein
the name of the appellee as a registered 1/2 coowner. Yet, no cause of action or even a prayer is
contained in the complaint filed. Manifestly,
absent any cause or prayer for the alteration,
cancellation, modification or changing of the titles
involved, the desired declaration of co-ownership
and eventual partition will utterly be an indirect
or collateral attack on the subject titles in this
suit.
It is here that We fell into error, such that, if not
rectified will surely lead to a procedural lapse and
a possible injustice. Well settled is the rule that a
certificate of title cannot be altered, modified or
canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
In this jurisdiction, the remedy of the landowner
whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another name is, after
one year from the date of the decree, not to set
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The issue in this case is really whether summary

judgment, in accordance with Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court, is proper. We rule in the negative.
First. Rule 35, 3 of the Rules of Court provides
that summary judgment is proper only when,
based on the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, and after summary hearing, it
is shown that except as to the amount of
damages, there is no veritable issue regarding
any material fact in the action and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 13
Conversely, where the pleadings tender a
genuine issue, i.e., an issue of fact the resolution
of which calls for the presentation of evidence, as

distinguished from an issue which is sham,

fictitious, contrived, set-up in bad faith, or
patently unsubstantial, summary judgment is not
proper. 14
In the present case, we are convinced that
genuine issues exist. Petitioner anchors his claim
of co-ownership on two factual grounds: first, that
said properties were acquired by him and
respondent during their union from 1979 to 1992
from profits derived from their brokerage
business; and second, the said properties were
registered solely in respondent's name only
because they agreed to that arrangement,
thereby giving rise to an implied trust in
accordance with Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the
Civil Code. These allegations are denied by
respondent. She denies that she and petitioner
lived together as husband and wife. She also
claims that the properties in question were
acquired solely by her with her own money and
resources. With such conflicting positions, the
only way to ascertain the truth is obviously
through the presentation of evidence by the
parties. Cdpr
The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether
the parties actually lived together as husband
and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can
not be made to apply to them as they were both
incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was
impossible for a co-ownership to exist between
them.
We disagree.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to
cases in which a man and a woman live together
as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage provided they are not incapacitated or
are without impediment to marry each other, 15
or in which the marriage is void ab initio,
provided it is not bigamous. Art. 144, therefore,
does not cover parties living in an adulterous
relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family
Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in
cases where the parties in union are
incapacitated to marry each other. It states:
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In cases of cohabitation not falling under the

preceding article, 16 only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to another,
his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding article. LexLib
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
It was error for the trial court to rule that,
because the parties in this case were not
capacitated to marry each other at the time that
they were alleged to have been living together,
they could not have owned properties in
common. The Family Code, in addition to
providing that a co-ownership exists between a
man and a woman who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise
provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to
marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their contributions
which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership
eventhough the couple are not capacitated to
marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership
between the parties herein. Consequently,
whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and
whether the properties involved in the case are
part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine and
material. All but one of the properties involved
were alleged to have been acquired after the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With
respect to the property acquired before the
Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was
really acquired under the regime of the Civil
Code, then it should be excluded.
Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his
complaint that:

Due to the effective management, hardwork and

enterprise of plaintiff assisted by defendant, their
customs brokerage business grew and out of the
profits therefrom, the parties acquired real and
personal properties which were, upon agreement
of the parties, listed and registered in defendant's
name with plaintiff as the unregistered co-owner
of all said properties. 17
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied
trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of the Civil
Code which provides that "(I)f two or more
persons agree to purchase property and by
common consent the legal title is taken in the
name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust
is created by force of law in favor of the others in
proportion to the interest of each." We do not
think this is correct. The legal relation of the
parties is already specifically covered by Art. 148
of the Family Code under which all the properties
acquired by the parties out of their actual joint
contributions of money, property or industry shall
constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form
of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
other. 18 The provisions of Art. 1452 and Art.
1453 of the Civil Code, then are no longer
material since a trust relation already inheres in a
co-ownership which is governed under Title III,
Book II of the Civil Code. llcd
Second. The trial court likewise dismissed
petitioner's action on the ground that the same
amounted to a collateral attack on the certificates
of title involved. As already noted, at first, the
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner's action
does not challenge the validity of respondent's
titles. However, on reconsideration, it reversed
itself and affirmed the trial court. It noted that
petitioner's complaint failed to include a prayer
for the alteration, cancellation, modification, or
changing of the titles involved. Absent such
prayer, the appellate court ruled that a
declaration of co-ownership and eventual
partition would involve an indirect or collateral
attack on the titles. We disagree.
A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and
indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No. 1529,
19 48 provides that a certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack and can not be
altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding. When is an action an attack on a
title? It is when the object of the action or
proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment pursuant to which the
title was decreed. The attack is direct when the
object of an action or proceeding is to annul or
set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is
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indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain

a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 20
In his complaint for partition, consistent with our
ruling in Roque regarding the nature of an action
for partition, petitioner seeks first, a declaration
that he is a co-owner of the subject properties;
and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.
He does not attack respondent's titles. Petitioner
alleges no fraud, mistake, or any other
irregularity that would justify a review of the
registration decree in respondent's favor. His
theory is that although the subject properties
were registered solely in respondent's name, but
since by agreement between them as well as
under the Family Code, he is co-owner of these
properties and as such is entitled to the
conveyance of his shares. On the premise that he
is a co-owner, he can validly seek the partition of
the properties in co-ownership and the
conveyance to him of his share. LexLib
Thus, in Guevara v. Guevara, 21 in which a parcel
of land bequeathed in a last will and testament
was registered in the name of only one of the
heirs, with the understanding that he would
deliver to the others their shares after the debts
of the original owner had been paid, this Court
ruled that notwithstanding the registration of the
land in the name of only one of the heirs, the
other heirs can claim their shares in "such action,
judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to
partition the estate of the testator." 22
Third. The Court of Appeals also reversed its first
decision on the ground that to order partition will,
in effect, rule and decide against Steelhouse
Realty Development Corporation and Eloisa
Castillo, both strangers to the present case, as to
the properties registered in their names. This
reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the
majority of the properties involved in the present
case are registered in respondent's name, over
which petitioner claims rights as a co-owner.
Besides, other than the real properties, petitioner
also seeks partition of a substantial amount of
personal properties consisting of motor vehicles
and several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing
petitioner's complaint for partition on grounds of
due process and equity, the appellate court
unwittingly denied petitioner his right to prove
ownership over the claimed real and personal
properties. The dismissal of petitioner's complaint
is unjustified since both ends may be amply
served by simply excluding from the action for
partition the properties registered in the name of
Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo. cdrep

WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court

of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and
the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Makati City for further proceedings on
the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J.,took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.]
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,
QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZVALDES, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los
Angeles for petitioner.
Roco, Buag, Kapunan & Migallos for private
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL
LAW;
FAMILY
CODE;
VOID
MARRIAGES;
PROPERTY
RELATIONS
GOVERNED BY PROPERTY REGIME OF
UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE. In a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, as the case may be, of
the Family Code.
2.
ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
ARTICLE
147,
ELABORATED. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so
applied in previous cases. This peculiar kind of
co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no legal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
first paragraph of Art. 147 refers to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any
"male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family
household."
Unlike
the
conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the coownership. Article 147 of the Family Code, in
substance and to the above extent, has clarified
7|Family

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Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law

now expressly provides that (a) Neither party
can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or
her share in co-ownership property, without the
consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and (b) In the case of a void
marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or
her share in the co-ownership in favor of their
common children; in default thereof or waiver by
any or all of the common children, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation or
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 148,
ELABORATED. When the common-law
spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry
or when they do not live exclusively with each
other (as husband and wife), only the property
acquired by both of them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions
and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any
party who is married to another shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
as the case may be, if so existing under a valid
marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.
4. ID.; ID.; VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES;
ARTICLE 50, APPLICABILITY. The first
paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration
of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by
a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter
is judicially declared void. The latter is a special
rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and
an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish their nullity. In now
requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the
previously contracted void marriage, the present
law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage.
It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article
43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family
Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the

subsistence of a previous marriage to be made

applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not
to be assumed that the law has also meant to
have coincident property relations, on the one
hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void
marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case,
the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the
provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the
Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless,
even as it may merely state the obvious, that the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family
home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force
and effect regardless of the property regime of
the spouses.

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

5. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; COURT IN

NULLITY OF MARRIAGE CAN ALSO SETTLE
PARTIES' COMMON PROPERTY. On the
settlement of the parties' common property, a
court which has jurisdiction to declare the
marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise
clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Here, petitioner and
private respondent own the "family home" and all
their common property in equal shares. In the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code should aptly prevail.

"The petitioner and respondent shall have

visitation rights over the children who are in the
custody of the other.

DECISION
VITUG, J p:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a
question of law, an alleged error committed by
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-9212539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has
failed to apply the correct law that should govern
the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
where a marriage is declared void ab initio
because of psychological incapacity on the part of
either or both of the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are,
by and large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were
married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the
marriage were five children. In a petition, dated
22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-9212539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 102). After hearing the parties following
the joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its
decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:

8|Family

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"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes

and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby
declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations;
"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III,
Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose
which parent they would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in
the custody of their mother, herein respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.

"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to

start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of
the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same
code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local
Civil Register of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for
proper recording in the registry of marriages." 2
(Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that
portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion,
the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their
desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes,
herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court
made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the
Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
have been obtained through the joint efforts of
the parties and will be owned by them in equal
shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their
'family home' and all their other properties for
that matter in equal shares.

"In the liquidation and partition of the properties

owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant,
the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply." 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the
disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court
said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent
as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147,
the property regime of petitioner and respondent
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the
absolute community of property." 4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the
order. The motion was denied on 30 October
1995.

In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits

that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code
should be held controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to
cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102
and 129 of the Family Code govern the
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where
a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a
marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to
marriages declares void ab initio on the ground of
the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the
same may be read consistently with Article 129.
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with
whom majority of the children wish to stay." 5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period
9|Family

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of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of

Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so
applied in previous cases; 6 it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them
in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage
is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith
in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants.
In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a
man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together
as husband and wife under a void marriage or
without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity
of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-

ownership. Any property acquired during the

union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." 8 Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the coownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and
to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of
the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly
provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act
inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership
property, without the consent of the other, during
the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in
bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the coownership in favor of their common children; in
default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong
to the respective surviving descendants, or still in
default thereof, to the innocent party. The
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of
the cohabitation 9 or declaration of nullity of the
marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a
legal impediment to marry or when they do not
live exclusively with each other (as husband and
wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common
and
in
proportion
to
their
respective
contributions.
Such
contributions
and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, if so existing under a valid
marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue
on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently
nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to
declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed with authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it
commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
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and private respondent own the "family home"

and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the
Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation
to Articles 102 and 129, 12 12a of the Family
Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains,
the property regimes recognized for valid and
voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between
common-law
spouses.
The
first
paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to
voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
marriage before the latter is judicially declared
void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine
that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish their nullity. In now requiring for
purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity
by final judgment of the previously contracted
void marriage, the present law aims to do away
with any continuing uncertainty on the status of
the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41
15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the effects
of the termination of a subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In
all other case, it is not to be assumed that the law
has also meant to have coincident property
relations, on the one hand, between spouses in
valid and voidable marriages (before annulment)
and, on the other, between common-law spouses
or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in
the latter case, the ordinary rules on coownership subject to the provision of Article 147
and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be
stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely
state the obvious, that the provisions of the
Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the
provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
Family Code, remain in force and effect
regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05
May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Bellosillo, J ., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005.]
JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs.
MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION and ROBERTO V. ALEJO, Sheriff
IV, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
142, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. No. CV No. 59045, which reversed and set
aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Branch 260, in
Civil Case No. 94-2260 and the Resolution of the
CA
denying
the
petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration of the said decision.
Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she
and Eduardo G. Francisco were married on
January 15, 1983. 3 Eduardo was then employed
as the vice president in a private corporation. A
little more than a year and seven months
thereafter, or on August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural
Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of
absolute sale for P320,000.00 in favor of Josefina
Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco,
covering two parcels of residential land with a
house thereon located at St. Martin de Porres
Street, San Antonio Valley I, Sucat, Paraaque,
Metro Manila. One of the lots was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36519, with
an area of 342 square meters, while the other lot,
with an area of 360 square meters, was covered
by TCT No. 36518. 4 The purchase price of the
property was paid to the Bank via Check No.
002334 in the amount of P320,000.00 drawn and
issued by the Commercial Bank of Manila, for
which the Imus Bank issued Official Receipt No.
121408 on August 31, 1984. 5 On the basis of the
said deed of sale, TCT Nos. 36518 and 36519
were cancelled and, on September 4, 1984, the
Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 87976 (60550)
and 87977 (60551) in the name of "Josefina
Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G.
Francisco." 6
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On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds

made of record Entry No. 85-18003 at the dorsal
portion of the said titles. This referred to an
Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he
declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the
latter purchased two parcels of land, including
the house constructed thereon, with her own
savings, and that he was waiving whatever claims
he had over the property. 7 On January 13, 1986,
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila
Cando for a loan of P157,000.00. 8 It appears that
Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the
deed. 9
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the
General Manager and President of Reach Out
Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of
cement worth P768,750.00 from Master Iron
Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but
failed to pay for the same. On November 27,
1990, MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the
RTC of Makati City for the return of the said
commodities, or the value thereof in the amount
of P768,750.00. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 90-3251. On January 8, 1992, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and
against Eduardo. The fallo of the decision reads:
Accordingly, the Court renders judgment in favor
of the plaintiff Master Iron Works And
Construction Corporation against the defendant
[Eduardo] Francisco ordering the latter as follows:
1. To replace to plaintiff 7,500 bags at 50
kilos/bag of Portland cement or, in the
alternative, to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P768,750.00; HCDAcE
2. In either case, to pay liquidated damages by
way of interest at 12% per annum from June 21,
1990 until fully paid;
3. To pay P50,000.00 as actual damages; and
4. To pay attorney's fees of P153,750.00 and
litigation expenses of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 10
The decision in Civil Case No. 90-3251 became
final and executory and, on June 7, 1994, the
court issued a writ of execution. 11 On June 14,
1994, Sheriff Roberto Alejo sold at a public
auction one stainless, owner-type jeep for
P10,000.00 to MIWCC. 12 Sheriff Alejo issued a
Notice of Levy on Execution/Attachment over the
lots covered by TCT No. 87976 (60550) and
87977 (60551) for the recovery of the balance of

the amount due under the decision of the trial

court in Civil Case No. 90-3251. 13 On June 24,
1994, the sale of the property at a public auction
was set to August 5, 1994. 14
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of
Third Party Claim 15 over the two parcels of land
in which she claimed that they were her
paraphernal property, and that her husband
Eduardo had no proprietary right or interest over
them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a
copy of which she attached to her affidavit. She,
likewise, requested Sheriff Alejo to cause the
cancellation
of
the
notice
of
levy
on
execution/attachment earlier issued by him.
On July 7, 1994, Josefina filed the said Affidavit of
Third Party Claim in the trial court and served a
copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then
submitted an indemnity bond 16 in the amount of
P1,361,500.00
issued
by
the
Prudential
Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The sale at public
auction proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the
property for the price of P1,350,000.00. 17
On July 28, 1994, Josefina filed a Complaint
against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in the RTC of
Paraaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2260. She
alleged then that she was the sole owner of the
property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo in
Civil Case No. 90-3251; hence, the levy on
execution of the property was null and void. She
reiterated that her husband, the defendant in
Civil Case No. 90-3251, had no right or
proprietary interest over the said property as
evidenced by his affidavit of waiver annotated at
the dorsal portion of the said title. Josefina prayed
that the court issue a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
MIWCC from causing the sale of the said property
at public auction. Considering that no temporary
restraining order had as yet been issued by the
trial court, the sheriff sold the subject property at
public auction to MIWCC for P1,350,000.00 on
August 5, 1994. 18 However, upon the failure of
MIWCC to remit the sheriff's commission on the
sale, the latter did not execute a sheriff's
certificate of sale over the property. The RTC of
Paraaque, thereafter, issued a temporary
restraining order 19 on August 16, 1994. cEITCA
When Josefina learned of the said sale at public
auction, she filed an amended complaint
impleading MIWCC, with the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that,
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after hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of

the plaintiff and against the defendants and the
same be in the following tenor:
1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally,
to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:
A. The sum of P50,000.00 representing as actual
damages;
B. The sum of P200,000.00 representing as moral
damages;
C. The sum of P50,000.00 or such amount which
this Honorable Court deems just as exemplary
damages;
D. The sum of P60,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees.
2. Declaring the levying and sale at public auction
of the plaintiff's properties null and void;
3. To issue writ of preliminary injunction and
makes it permanent;
4. Order the cancellation of whatever entries
appearing at the titles as a result of the
enforcement of the writ of execution issued in
Civil Case No. 90-3251.
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs as
may be just under the premises. 20
In its answer to the complaint, MIWCC cited
Article 116 of the Family Code of the Philippines
and averred that the property was the conjugal
property of Josefina and her husband Eduardo,
who purchased the same on August 31, 1984
after their marriage on January 14, 1983. MIWCC
asserted that Eduardo executed the affidavit of
waiver to evade the satisfaction of the decision in
Civil Case No. 90-3251 and to place the property
beyond the reach of creditors; hence, the said
affidavit was null and void. ESTcIA
Before she could commence presenting her
evidence, Josefina filed a petition to annul her
marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, on the ground that when they were
married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was
already married to one Carmelita Carpio. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-0169.
Josefina and Carmelita testified in Civil Case No.
95-0169. Josefina declared that during her
marriage to Eduardo, she acquired the property
covered by TCT Nos. 87976 (60550) and 87977
(60551), through the help of her sisters and

brother, and that Eduardo had no participation

whatsoever in the said acquisition. She added
that Eduardo had five children, namely, Mary
Jane, Dianne, Mary Grace Jo, Mark Joseph and
Mary Cecille, all surnamed Francisco. jur2005cd
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Paraaque
rendered judgment 21 in Civil Case No. 95-0169,
declaring the marriage between Josefina and
Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.
In the meantime, Josefina testified in Civil Case
No. 94-2260, declaring, inter alia, that she was
able to purchase the property from the Bank
when she was still single with her mother's
financial assistance; she was then engaged in
recruitment when Eduardo executed an affidavit
of waiver; she learned that he was previously
married when they already had two children;
nevertheless, she continued cohabiting with him
and had three more children by him; and because
of Eduardo's first marriage, she decided to have
him execute the affidavit of waiver.
Eduardo testified that when his wife bought the
property in 1984, he was in Davao City and had
no knowledge of the said purchases; he came to
know of the purchase only when Josefina
informed him a week after his arrival from Davao;
22 Josefina's sister, Lolita Castillo, told him that
she would collect from him the money his wife
borrowed from her and their mother to buy the
property; 23 when he told Lolita that he had no
money, she said that she would no longer collect
from him, on the condition that he would have no
participation over the property, 24 which angered
Eduardo; 25 when Josefina purchased the
property, he had a gross monthly income of
P10,000.00 and gave P5,000.00 to Josefina for
the support of his family; 26 Josefina decided that
he execute the affidavit of waiver because her
mother and sister gave the property to her. 27

On December 20, 1997, the trial court rendered

judgment finding the levy on the subject property
and the sale thereof at public auction to be null
and void. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THIS
COURT finds the Levying and sale at public
auction of the plaintiff's properties null and void.
ETHCDS
The court orders the defendants to, jointly and
severally, pay plaintiff the following amounts:
a. The sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages;
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b. The sum of P50,000.00 representing as moral

damages;
c. The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d. The sum of P60,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees.
The court orders the cancellation of whatever
entries appearing at the Titles as a result of the
enforcement of the writ of execution issued in
Civil Case No. 90-3251.
SO ORDERED. 28
The trial court held that the property levied by
Sheriff Alejo was the sole and exclusive property
of Josefina, applying Articles 144, 160, 175 and
485 of the New Civil Code. The trial court also
held that MIWCC failed to prove that Eduardo
Francisco contributed to the acquisition of the
property.
MIWCC appealed the decision to the CA in which
it alleged that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE
AUCTION SALE ARE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES
OWNED
BY
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
JOSEFINA
FRANCISCO;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
RECEPTION OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE WITH
REGARD TO THE ANNULMENT OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE'S
MARRIAGE
WITH
EDUARDO
FRANCISCO;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
LEVY ON EXECUTION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S
PROPERTIES
SUBJECT
OF
THE
PRESENT
CONTROVERSY IS NULL AND VOID; TEAcCD
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO PAY DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE FOR ALLEGED IMPROPER
LEVY ON EXECUTION. 29
The CA rendered judgment setting aside and
reversing the decision of the RTC on September
20, 2001. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision,
dated 20 December 1997, of the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque, Branch 260, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0126.

SO ORDERED. 30
The CA ruled that the property was presumed to
be the conjugal property of Eduardo and Josefina,
and that the latter failed to rebut such
presumption. It also held that the affidavit of
waiver executed by Eduardo was contrary to
Article 146 of the New Civil Code and, as such,
had no force and effect. Josefina filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, which was,
likewise, denied by the CA.
Josefina, now the petitioner, filed the present
petition for review, alleging that:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS A CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP
BETWEEN
PETITIONER
AND
EDUARDO FRANCISCO;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
WERE NOT PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES OF
PETITIONER;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSION BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS
DECISION OF DECEMBER 20, 1997, THE SAME
BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE. 31
The threshold issues for resolution are as follows:
(a) whether or not the subject property is the
conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo
Francisco; and (b) whether or not the subject
properties may be held to answer for the personal
obligations of Eduardo. acADIT
We shall deal with the issues simultaneously as
they are closely related.

own money without any contribution from him;

hence, the subject property is her paraphernal
property. Consequently, such property is not
liable for the debts of Eduardo to private
respondent MIWCC.
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that
the appellate court was correct in ruling that the
properties are conjugal in nature because there is
nothing in the records to support the petitioner's
uncorroborated claim that the funds she used to
purchase the subject properties were her
personal funds or came from her mother and
sister. The respondents point out that if, as
claimed by the petitioner, the subject properties
were, indeed, not conjugal in nature, then, there
was no need for her to obtain marital (Eduardo's)
consent when she mortgaged the properties to
two different parties sometime in the first quarter
of 1986, or after Eduardo executed the affidavit of
waiver.
We note that the only questions raised in this
case are questions of facts. Under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised in and resolved by the Court. The Court
may, however, determine and resolve questions
of facts in cases where the findings of facts of the
trial court and those of the CA are inconsistent,
where highly meritorious circumstances are
present, and where it is necessary to give
substantial justice to the parties. In the present
action, the findings of facts and the conclusions
of the trial court and those of the CA are
opposite. There is thus an imperative need for the
Court to delve into and resolve the factual issues,
in tandem with the questions of law raised by the
parties. HEISca
The petition has no merit.

The petitioner asserts that inasmuch as her

marriage to Eduardo is void ab initio, there is no
occasion that would give rise to a regime of
conjugal partnership of gains. The petitioner adds
that to rule otherwise would render moot and
irrelevant the provisions on the regime of special
co-ownership under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, in relation to
Article 144 of the New Civil Code.

The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired

the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the
sole owner of the property. The evidence on
record shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed
of absolute sale over the property to the
petitioner on August 31, 1984 and titles over the
property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as
vendee on September 4, 1984 after her marriage
to Eduardo on January 15, 1983.

The petitioner avers that since Article 148 of the

Family Code governs their property relationship,
the respondents must adduce evidence to show
that Eduardo actually contributed to the
acquisition of the subject properties. The
petitioner asserts that she purchased the
property before her marriage to Eduardo with her

We agree with the petitioner that Article 144 of

the New Civil Code does not apply in the present
case. This Court in Tumlos v. Fernandez 32 held
that Article 144 of the New Civil Code applies only
to a relationship between a man and a woman
who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or
to one in which the marriage of the parties is void

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from the very beginning. It does not apply to a

cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to
concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a
co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the
man and his lawful wife. In this case, the
petitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo
cohabited, the latter was incapacitated to marry
her.
Article 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
on which the petitioner anchors her claims,
provides as follows:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under
the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

married before the effectivity of the Family Code

of the Philippines, the property still cannot be
considered conjugal property because there can
only be but one valid existing marriage at any
given time. 36 Article 148 of the Family Code also
debilitates against the petitioner's claim since,
according to the said article, a co-ownership may
ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance,
one party has a pre-existing valid marriage
provided that the parents prove their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry and
only to the extent of their proportionate interest
thereon. 37
We agree with the findings of the appellate court
that
the
petitioner
failed
to
adduce
preponderance of evidence that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of
the subject property and, hence, is not a coowner of the property:

Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in

Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly
regulating in Article 148 the property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Under Article 256 of the Family
Code, the law can be applied retroactively if it
does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. The
petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested
right over the property in question. 33

First of all, other than plaintiff-appellee's bare

testimony, there is nothing in the record to
support her claim that the funds she used to
purchase the subject properties came from her
mother and sister. She did not, for instance,
present the testimonies of her mother and sister
who could have corroborated her claim.
Furthermore, in her Affidavit of Third-Party Claim
(Exh. "C"), she stated that the subject properties
"are my own paraphernal properties, including
the improvements thereon, as such are the fruits
of my own exclusive efforts . . .," clearly implying
that she used her own money and contradicting
her later claim that the funds were provided by
her mother and sister. She also stated in her
affidavit that she acquired the subject properties
before her marriage to Eduardo Francisco on 15
January 1983, a claim later belied by the
presentation of the Deed of Absolute Sale clearly
indicating that she bought the properties from
Imus Rural Bank on 31 August 1984, or one year
and seven months after her marriage (Exh. "D").
In the face of all these contradictions, plaintiffappellee's uncorroborated testimony that she
acquired the subject properties with funds
provided by her mother and sister should not
have been given any weight by the lower court.

Since the subject property was acquired during

the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and
Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the same
should be presumed to be conjugal property. 34
Article 105 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides that the Code shall apply to conjugal
partnership established before the code took
effect, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws.
35 Thus, even if Eduardo and Carmelita were

It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married

at the age of 23. At that age, it is doubtful if she
had enough funds of her own to purchase the
subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit
of Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality,
she later claimed that the funds were provided by
her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a
desperate effort to shield the subject properties
from appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor.
38

If one of the parties is validly married to another,

his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise,
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
ADaSEH

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Aside from her bare claims, the petitioner offered

nothing to prove her allegation that she borrowed
the amount of P320,000.00 from her mother and
her sister, which she paid to the Imus Bank on
August 31, 1984 to purchase the subject property.
The petitioner even failed to divulge the name of
her mother and the sources of her income, if any,
and that of her sister. When she testified in Civil
Case No. 95-0169, the petitioner declared that
she borrowed part of the purchase price of the
property from her brother, 39 but failed to divulge
the latter's name, let alone reveal how much
money she borrowed and when. The petitioner
even failed to adduce any evidence to prove that
her mother and sister had P320,000.00 in 1984,
which, considering the times, was then quite a
substantial amount. Moreover, the petitioner's
third-party-claim affidavit stating that the
properties "are the fruits of my own exclusive
effort before I married Eduardo Francisco" belies
her testimony in the trial court and in Civil Case
No. 95-0169. cECTaD
We note that, as gleaned from the receipt issued
by the Imus Bank, the payment for the subject
property was drawn via Check No. 002334 and
issued by the Commercial Bank of Manila in the
amount of P320,000.00. 40 The petitioner failed
to testify against whose account the check was
drawn and issued, and whether the said account
was owned by her and/or Eduardo Francisco or
her mother, sister or brother. She even failed to
testify whether the check was a manager's check
and, if so, whose money was used to purchase
the same.
We also agree with the findings of the CA that the
affidavit of waiver executed by Eduardo on
February 15, 1985, stating that the property is
owned by the petitioner, is barren of probative
weight. We are convinced that he executed the
said affidavit in anticipation of claims by third
parties against him and hold the property liable
for the said claims. First, the petitioner failed to
prove that she had any savings before her
cohabitation with Eduardo. Second, despite
Eduardo's affidavit of waiver, he nevertheless
affixed his marital conformity to the real estate
mortgage executed by the petitioner over the
property in favor of Leonila on January 13, 1986.
41 Third, the petitioner testified that she
borrowed the funds for the purchase of the
property from her mother and sister. 42 Fourth,
the petitioner testified that Eduardo executed the
affidavit of waiver because she discovered that
he had a first marriage. 43 Lastly, Eduardo belied
the petitioner's testimony when he testified that
he executed the affidavit of waiver because his
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mother-in-law and sister-in-law had given the

property to the petitioner. 44
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional
Trial
Court
is
AFFIRMED.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 178044. January 19, 2011.]
ALAIN M. DIO, petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L.
DIO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1
assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision 2 and the
12 March 2007 Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court
of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil
Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio
(respondent)
were
childhood
friends
and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984
until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live
together again. On 14 January 1998, they were
married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias
City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged
that respondent failed in her marital obligation to
give love and support to him, and had abandoned
her responsibility to the family, choosing instead
to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with
her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not
faithful, and would at times become violent and
hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected
upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of
the petition, was already living in the United
States of America. Despite receipt of the
summons, respondent did not file an answer to
the petition within the reglementary period.

Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a

petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage
with petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001.
Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V.
Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias
prosecutor found that there were no indicative
facts of collusion between the parties and the
case was set for trial on the merits. ACcHIa
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical
psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative
years.
Dr.
Tayag
found
that
respondent's disorder was long-lasting and by
nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court
granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacited to
comply with the essential marital obligations at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence
presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondent's psychological incapacity. The trial
court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag's
psychological report, the allegations in the
complaint, substantiated in the witness stand,
clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court
found that respondent committed acts which hurt
and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the
family, and that respondent failed to observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her
under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial
court also ruled that respondent abandoned
petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad
and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN
M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the
law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community
of property.
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A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office
of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City,
for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
partial
reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the
absolute community of property and the ruling
that the decree of annulment shall only be issued
upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court
partially granted the motion and modified its 18
October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN
M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the
law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community
of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties' properties under Article
147 of the Family Code. SHAcID
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties,
the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local
Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their
information and guidance. 5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial
court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court

ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties'
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argues that Section 19 (1) of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages 6
(the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the
Family Code.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102,

Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of
its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. 7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, 8 such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them
in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is
in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or
Code

Art147

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the

following elements must be present: AEIDTc
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated
to marry each other;

We agree with petitioner.

18 | F a m i l y

waiver by any or all of the common children or

their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants.
In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

cases

2. They live exclusively with each other as

husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage,
or their marriage is void. 9
All these elements are present in this case and
there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred
in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties' properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling
has no basis because Section 19 (1) of the Rule
does not apply to cases governed under Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19 (1) of
the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited
in Section 19 (1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs
(2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44
shall also apply in proper cases to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. 10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery
of their presumptive legitimes, unless such

matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial

proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the
absolute community of the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot
on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102
and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of
the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property
or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of
their property, may ask for the enforcement of
the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein
prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon
the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under
the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall
be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that
Section 19 (1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the
Family Code does not apply to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a
situation where a second or bigamous marriage
was contracted. Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." Thus we ruled: IcCEDA
. . . where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis

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acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to

be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring a previous marriage void. 11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand,
refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages
which are valid until they are set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment. 12 In both instances under Articles 40
and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property 13 or conjugal
partnership of gains 14 unless the parties agree
to a complete separation of property in a
marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the
parties is governed by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is
a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be
issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent
was declared void under Article 36 15 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus,
what governs the liquidation of properties owned
in common by petitioner and respondent are the
rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled
that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code. 16 The rules on co-ownership
apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of
the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. . . . ." It is not necessary to liquidate
the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial
court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued
upon finality of the trial court's decision without
waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties' properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
Nachura, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.