THE SEEDBEDS OF CIVIC VIRTUE

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One approach would be to try to impose a legal duty on people to exhibit

these virtues. We might pass a law requiring everyone to vote, for example, or
attend monthly neighbourhood meetings to discuss political affairs. There are
a few countries which have such laws: Australia has a mandatory voting law;
South Korea has a mandatory neighbourhood meeting law. But these are
rather heavy-handed attempts to overcome 'civic privatism', and would do
nothing by themselves to ensure that people participate actively or responsibly. Indeed, forcing citizens to engage in political activities they dislike may
simply increase their resentment at the political process. In any event, it is
difficult to see how the more diffuse virtues of civility or public reasonableness could be legally codified.
One might hope that the very act of political participation itself will teach
people responsibility and toleration. Even if initially entered into involuntarily
or grudgingly, political participation will expose people to new ideas and
develop new sympathies and identities. This is a familiar theme in democratic
theory, going back at least to Rousseau and J. S. Mill, who believed that
political participation 'enlarges the minds of individuals, familiarizes them
with interests which lie beyond the immediacy of personal circumstance and
environment, and encourages them to acknowledge that public concerns are
the proper ones to which they should pay attention' (Oldfield 1990a: 184).
Unfortunately, this faith in the educative function of participation seems
overly optimistic. Emphasizing participation does not yet explain how to
ensure that citizens participate responsibly-i.e. in a public-spirited, rather
than self-interested or prejudiced, way (Mulgan 1991: 40-1). Empowered citizens may use their power irresponsibly by pushing for benefits and entitlements society cannot ultimately afford; or by voting themselves tax breaks and
slashing assistance to the needy; or by 'seeking scapegoats in the indolence of
the poor, the strangeness of ethnic minorities, or the insolence and
irresponsibility of modern women' (Fierlbeck 1991: 592).
It is true that successful political participation requires the ability to create
coalitions, which encourages a partial development of the virtues of justice
and public reasonableness. No one can succeed in political life if they make no
effort to listen to or accommodate the needs and views of others. But in many
cases, a winning coalition can be built while ignoring the claims of marginalized groups. Indeed, if a significant portion of the population is prejudiced,
then ignoring or attacking such groups may be the best route to political
success.
So merely compelling political participation is unlikely to be a satisfactory
solution to the problem of civic virtues. Instead, most scholars working on
this topic have assumed that civic virtue must be promoted indirectly. Rather
than have a state-imposed duty of participation or civic virtue, the approach
has been to try to locate and strengthen the 'seedbeds of civic virtue'. The goal