Professional Documents
Culture Documents
112
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
(01) PEOPLE
vs.
YECYEC
Definition
and
purpose
of
Preliminary
investigation
FACTS:
Pioneer
is
engaged
in
the
buying
and
selling
of
rubber.
Sison
was
the
supervisor
of
Pioneer's
rubber
processing
plant,
who
was
tasked,
among
other
things,
with
the
acquisition
of
rubber
coagulum
and
rubber
cup
lumps
in
Bukidnon.
Sison
bought
rubber
cup
lumps
which
were
alleged
to
be
stolen
from
FARBECO
Multi-purpose
cooperative.
Such
were
stored
inside
his
fenced
premises.
At
a
certain
date,
respondent
Yecyec
(manager
of
the
FARBECO)
together
with
co-
respondents
Yecyec
demanded
that
Sison
give
them
the
rubber
lumps/coagulum
he
bought
from
Edon
(seller).
When
Sison
asked
if
they
had
any
written
authority
and/or
Court
order
authorizing
them
to
take
the
rubber
cup
lumps
from
his
house,
Yecyec
answered
in
the
negative.
For
said
reason,
Sison
refused
to
accede
to
their
demands.
Yecyec
ordered
his
men
to
seize
the
items.
Sison
warned
them
that
they
will
be
reported
to
the
police
once
they
forced
their
way
in.
Sison
then
left
to
fetch
the
police
and
barangay
officials.
ISSUE:
WON
the
RTC
and
the
CA
erred
in
dismissing
the
information
against
the
respondents
for
the
crime
of
Theft
for
want
of
probable
cause.
HELD:
YES
In
Crespo
v.
Mogul,
the
Court
held
that
xxx
the
institution
of
a
criminal
action
depends
upon
the
sound
discretion
of
the
fiscal.
He
may
or
may
not
file
the
complaint
or
information,
follow
or
not
follow
that
presented
by
the
offended
party,
according
to
whether
the
evidence,
in
his
opinion,
is
sufficient
or
not
to
establish
the
guilt
of
the
accused
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
The
reason
for
placing
the
criminal
prosecution
under
the
direction
and
control
of
the
fiscal
is
to
prevent
malicious
or
unfounded
prosecutions
by
private
persons.
The
primary
objective
of
a
preliminary
investigation
is
to
free
respondent
from
the
inconvenience,
expense,
ignominy
and
stress
of
defending
himself/herself
in
the
course
of
a
formal
trial,
until
the
reasonable
probability
of
his
or
her
guilt
in
a
more
or
less
summary
proceeding
by
a
competent
office
designated
by
law
for
that
purpose.
Secondarily,
such
ISSUE:
1. WON
the
city
court
has
the
power
and
authority
to
conduct
anew
a
preliminary
examination
of
charges,
which
were
previously
the
subject
of
a
preliminary
investigation
conducted
by
the
Office
of
the
City
Fiscal
and
thereafter
dismissed
by
the
latter.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Roallos
should
be
acquitted
on
the
ground
that
he
was
denied
due
process
when
he
was
not
given
a
preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
NO.
Roallos
should
not
be
acquitted
on
the
ground
that
he
was
denied
due
process.
The
accused
is
estopped
from
assailing
any
irregularity
attending
his
arrest
should
he
fail
to
move
for
the
quashal
of
the
information
against
him
on
this
ground
prior
to
arraignment.
At
the
outset,
it
is
apparent
that
petitioner
raised
no
objection
to
the
irregularity
of
his
arrest
before
his
arraignment.
Considering
this
and
his
active
participation
in
the
trial
of
the
case,
jurisprudence
dictates
that
petitioner
is
deemed
to
have
submitted
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
trial
court,
thereby
curing
any
defect
in
his
arrest.
An
accused
is
estopped
from
assailing
any
irregularity
of
his
arrest
if
he
fails
to
raise
this
issue
or
to
move
for
the
quashal
of
the
information
against
him
on
this
ground
before
arraignment.
Any
objection
involving
a
warrant
of
arrest
or
the
procedure
by
which
the
court
acquired
jurisdiction
over
the
person
of
the
accused
must
be
made
before
he
enters
his
plea;
otherwise,
the
objection
is
deemed
waived.
Likewise,
the
absence
of
a
proper
preliminary
investigation
must
be
timely
raised.
The
accused
is
deemed
to
have
waived
his
right
to
a
preliminary
investigation
by
entering
his
plea
and
actively
participating
in
the
trial
without
raising
the
lack
of
a
preliminary
investigation.
Moreover,
the
absence
of
a
proper
preliminary
investigation
must
be
timely
raised
and
must
not
have
been
waived.
This
is
to
allow
the
trial
court
to
hold
the
case
in
abeyance
and
conduct
its
own
investigation
or
require
the
prosecutor
to
hold
a
reinvestigation,
which,
necessarily
"involves
a
re-examination
and
re-
evaluation
of
the
evidence
already
submitted
by
the
complainant
and
the
accused,
as
well
as
the
initial
finding
of
probable
cause
which
led
to
the
filing
of
the
Informations
after
the
requisite
preliminary
investigation."
(05) PEOPLE
vs.
BULURAN
FACTS:
On
May
16,
1993,
shortly
before
7:15
in
the
evening,
the
Meyer
family
was
celebrating
the
birthday
of
their
mother
at
their
residence
in
Area
4,
Barangay
Amaparo,
Capri,
Novaliches,
Quezon
City.
It
appears
that
Dominador
Meyer,
Jr.,
had
an
altercation
with
a
cousin.
The
victim,
Edilberto
Meyer,
Sr.,
tried
to
pacify
them,
and
brought
Dominador
outside
the
house
to
cool-off.
However,
while
the
victim
and
Dominador,
were
talking
outside
their
residence,
Reynaldo
Danao
approached
them
and
warned
them
not
to
make
any
trouble
because
the
community
was
celebrating
its
fiesta.
The
victim
denied
making
any
trouble
and
said
that
the
matter
was
a
family
problem.
Suddenly,
Reynaldo
boxed
the
victim
who
also
retaliated
with
a
fistblow.
The
two
exchanged
blows
and
grappled
with
each
other.
Reynaldo
managed
to
run
away
but
returned
after
about
two
minutes.
Now,
accompanied
by
his
barkadas
or
gangmates
(Cielito
Buluran,
Leonardo
Valenzuela
and
Jaime
Danao),
Reynaldo
was
armed
with
a
12-inch
stainless
knife.
Cielito
had
also
a
knife.
Leonardo
and
Jaime
each
carried
slingshots,
with
sharp-pointed
arrows
made
of
five-inch
nails
with
abaca
tails.
Without
warning,
Reynaldo
stabbed
the
victim
at
the
left
side
of
his
lower
back.
All
the
while,
his
three
companions
were
pointing
and
brandishing
their
weapons
at
the
Meyer
brothers
and
the
other
people
present
in
order
to
prevent
them
from
interfering.
Cielito
poked
his
knife
at
the
Meyer
brothers
and
stood
guard
to
prevent
other
people
from
rendering
help
to
the
victim.
Leonardo
likewise
held
his
slingshot
against
the
Meyer
brothers
and
prevented
people
from
going
near
the
victim
by
pointing
his
loaded
slingshot
at
them.
Thereafter,
ISSUE:
WON
THE
COURT
ERRED
BY
FAILING
TO
INQUIRE
WHETHER
APPELLANTS
WERE
REPRESENTED
BY
COUNSEL
IN
THE
CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED
BY
THE
POLICE
WHICH
LATER
ON
PRESENTED
THEM
FOR
INQUEST
TO
THE
CITY
PROSECUTOR
OF
QUEZON
CITY
WON
THE
COURT
ERRED
IN
FAILING
TO
CONSIDER
THE
FACT
THAT
APPELLANTS
WERE
ARRESTED
BY
THE
POLICE,
WITHOUT
ANY
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
BY
THE
CITY
PROSECUTOR
WON
THE
COURT
ERRED
IN
CONVICTING
THE
APPELLANTS
WHO
INSTEAD
ARE
ENTITLED
TO
ACQUITTAL
ON
GROUNDS
OF
VIOLATION
OF
THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
AND
ISSUE:
WON
Sen.
Estrada
was
not
denied
due
process
of
law.
WON
the
petition
for
certiorari
is
procedurally
infirm.
WON
the
petitioner
is
not
entitled
to
a
wirt
of
preliminary
injunction
and/or
temporary
restraining
order.
HELD:
NO,
it did not violate Sen.
Estradas right to due process.
It
is
a
fundamental
principle
that
the
accused
in
a
preliminary
investigation
has
no
right
to
cross-examine
the
witnesses
which
the
complainant
may
present.
Section
3,
Rule
112
of
the
Rules
of
Court
expressly
provides
that
the
respondent
shall
only
have
the
right
to
submit
a
counter-
affidavit,
to
examine
all
other
evidence
submitted
by
the
complainant
and,
where
the
fiscal
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
complaint
were
sufficient
pursuant
to
the
Rules
of
Court
considering
the
fact
that
no
evidence
were
adduced
to
show
that
the
medical
attendance
rendered
on
private
complainants
actually
and
in
fact
lasted
for
a
period
exceeding
ten
(10)
days.
Whether
or
not
the
MTC
committed
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
the
denial
of
said
motion
to
quash.
HELD:
Yes.
The
presentation
of
the
medical
certificates
to
prove
the
duration
of
the
victims
need
for
medical
attendance
or
of
their
incapacity
should
take
place
only
at
the
trial,
not
before
or
during
the
preliminary
investigation.
According
to
Cinco
v.
Sandiganbayan,
the
preliminary
investigation,
which
is
the
occasion
for
the
submission
of
the
parties
respective
affidavits,
counter-
affidavits
and
evidence
to
buttress
their
separate
allegations,
is
merely
inquisitorial,
and
is
often
the
only
means
of
discovering
whether
a
person
may
be
reasonably
charged
with
a
crime,
to
enable
the
prosecutor
to
prepare
the
information.
It
is
not
yet
a
trial
on
the
merits,
for
its
only
purpose
is
to
determine
whether
a
crime
has
been
committed
and
whether
there
is
probable
cause
to
believe
that
the
accused
is
guilty
thereof.
The
scope
(09)
AGDEPPA
vs.
OMBUDSMAN
Nature;
a
preliminary
investigation
is
held
before
an
accused
is
placed
on
trial
to
secure
the
innocent
against
hasty,
malicious,
and
oppressive
prosecution;
to
protect
him
from
an
open
and
public
accusation
of
a
crime,
as
well
as
from
the
trouble,
expenses,
and
anxiety
of
a
public
trial.
It
is
also
intended
to
protect
the
state
from
having
to
conduct
useless
and
expensive
trials.
FACTS:
Iluminado
L.
Junia,
Jr.
(Junia),
then
Group
Manager
for
the
Project
Technical
Services
Group
of
the
National
Housing
Authority
(NHA),
filed
on
May
25,
1999
a
Complaint
before
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
against
several
NHA
officials,
together
with
Rodolfo
M.
Agdeppa
(Agdeppa)
and
Ricardo
Castillo
(Castillo),
resident
auditors
of
the
Commission
on
Audit
(COA)
at
the
NHA.
Junias
Complaint
was
docketed
as
OMB-0-99-1015.
Junia
alleged
that
Supra
Construction
(SupraCon),
the
contractor
for
the
NHA
project
denominated
as
Phase
IX,
Packages
7
and
7-A
in
Tala,
Caloocan
City
(NHA
Project),
was
overpaid
in
the
total
amount
of
P2,044,488.71.
The
overpayment
was
allegedly
facilitated
through
the
dubious
and
confusing
audit
reports
prepared
by
Agdeppa
and
endorsed
by
Castillo,
to
the
detriment,
damage,
and
prejudice
of
the
Government.
There
is
therefore
no
question
that
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
has
the
power
to
investigate
and
prosecute
a
private
person
who
conspired
with
a
public
officer
or
employee
in
the
performance
of
an
illegal,
unjust,
improper,
or
inefficient
act
or
omission.
In
this
case,
though,
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
excluded
Junia
from
the
Order
dated
June
6,
2000,
not
because
it
did
not
have
jurisdiction
over
a
private
individual,
rather,
because
it
found
no
merit
in
Agdeppas
accusations
against
Junia
in
OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470.
The
Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
(OSG)
as
counsel
for
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman,
Jarlos-Martin,
and
Laurezo
explains
that
the
allegations
in
Agdeppas
Affidavit-Complaint
basically
focused
on
the
purported
violations
of
the
provisions
of
R.A.
No.
3019
by
public
respondents
Martin
and
Laurezo
as
graft
investigating
officers
and
a
reading
of
the
complaint
shows
that
Junias
alleged
participation,
if
ever,
was
peripheral
and
secondary,
thus,
the
investigating
officer,
after
evaluation,
considered
the
complaint
against
Junia
as
not
warranting
further
proceedings.
In
effect,
the
exclusion
of
Junia
from
the
Order
dated
June
6,
2000
was
an
outright
dismissal
by
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
of
Agdeppas
Affidavit-Complaint
insofar
as
said
Affidavit-Complaint
involved
Junia.
(Preliminary
Investigation
Part)
Furthermore,
the
SC,
citing
Angeles
vs.
Gutierrez,
said
that
the
Ombudsman
has
the
discretionary
power
to
dismiss
a
complaint
outright
or
proceed
with
the
conduct
of
a
preliminary
investigation.
The
determination
by
the
Ombudsman
of
probable
cause
or
of
whether
there
exists
a
reasonable
ground
to
believe
that
a
crime
has
been
committed,
and
that
the
accused
is
probably
guilty
thereof,
is
usually
done
after
the
conduct
of
a
preliminary
investigation.
However,
a
preliminary
investigation
is
by
no
means
mandatory.
The
Rules
of
Procedure
of
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
(Ombudsman
Rules
of
Procedure),
specifically
Section
2
of
Rule
II,
states:
Evaluation.Upon
evaluating
the
complaint,
the
investigating
officer
shall
recommend
whether
it
may
be:
a)
dismissed
outright
for
want
of
palpable
merit;
b)
referred
to
respondent
for
comment;
c)
indorsed
to
the
proper
government
office
or
agency
which
has
jurisdiction
over
the
case;
d)
forwarded
to
the
appropriate
officer
or
official
for
fact-finding
investigation;
e)
referred
for
administrative
adjudication;
or
f)
subjected
to
a
preliminary
investigation.
Thus,
the
Ombudsman
need
not
conduct
a
preliminary
investigation
upon
receipt
of
a
complaint.
Should
investigating
officers
find
a
complaint
A
preliminary
investigation
is
held
before
an
accused
is
placed
on
trial
to
secure
the
innocent
against
hasty,
malicious,
and
oppressive
prosecution;
to
protect
him
from
an
open
and
public
accusation
of
a
crime,
as
well
as
from
the
trouble,
expenses,
and
anxiety
of
a
public
trial.
It
is
also
intended
to
protect
the
state
from
having
to
conduct
useless
and
expensive
trials.
While
the
right
is
statutory
rather
than
constitutional,
it
is
a
component
of
due
process
in
administering
criminal
justice.
The
right
to
have
a
preliminary
investigation
conducted
before
being
bound
for
trial
and
before
being
exposed
to
the
risk
of
incarceration
and
penalty
is
not
a
mere
formal
or
technical
right;
it
is
a
substantive
right.
To
deny
the
accuseds
claim
to
a
preliminary
investigation
is
to
deprive
him
of
the
full
measure
of
his
right
to
due
process.
The
SC
further
cited
the
case
of
Cabahug
v.
People
where
the
Court
directly
addressed
agencies
tasked
with
preliminary
investigation
and
prosecution
of
crimes,
which
includes
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman,
reminding
them
as
follows:
We
cannot
overemphasize
the
admonition
to
agencies
tasked
with
the
preliminary
investigation
and
prosecution
of
crimes
that
the
very
purpose
of
a
preliminary
investigation
is
to
shield
the
innocent
from
precipitate,
spiteful
and
burdensome
prosecution.
Clearly,
the
right
to
preliminary
investigation
is
a
component
of
the
right
of
the
respondent/accused
to
substantive
due
process.
A
complainant
cannot
insist
that
a
preliminary
investigation
be
held
when
the
complaint
was
dismissed
outright
because
of
palpable
lack
of
merit.
It
goes
against
the
very
nature
and
purpose
of
preliminary
investigation
to
still
drag
the
respondent/accused
through
the
rigors
of
such
an
investigation
so
as
to
aid
the
complainant
in
substantiating
an
accusation/charge
that
is
evidently
baseless
from
the
very
beginning.
Lastly,
the
fact
alone
that
the
investigating
officer
of
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
who
issued
the
resolution
was
not
the
one
who
conducted
the
preliminary
investigation
does
not
render
said
investigating
officers
resolution
erroneous
or
irregular.
The
investigating
officer
may
rely
on
the
pleadings
and
evidence
on
record
and
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
creation
of
COMELEC-DOJ
Joint
Panel
is
valid?
Whether
or
not
Joint
Order
No.
001-
2011
violates
the
equal
protection
clause?
HELD:
DISMISSED
The
creation
of
COMELEC-DOJ
Joint
Panel
is
valid.
Section
2,
Article
IX-C
of
the
1987
Constitution
enumerates
the
powers
and
functions
of
the
Comelec.
The
grant
to
the
Comelec
of
the
power
to
investigate
and
prosecute
election
offenses
as
an
adjunct
to
the
enforcement
and
administration
of
all
election
laws
is
intended
to
enable
the
Comelec
to
effectively
insure
to
the
people
the
free,
orderly,
and
honest
conduct
of
elections.
The
constitutional
grant
of
prosecutorial
power
in
the
Comelec
was
reflected
in
Section
265
of
Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
881,
otherwise
known
as
the
Omnibus
Election
Code.
Under
the
above
provision
of
law,
the
power
to
conduct
preliminary
investigation
is
vested
exclusively
with
the
Comelec.
The
latter,
however,
was
given
by
the
same
provision
of
law
the
authority
to
avail
itself
of
the
assistance
of
other
prosecuting
arms
of
the
government.
Thus,
under
the
Omnibus
Election
Code,
while
the
exclusive
jurisdiction
to
conduct
preliminary
investigation
had
been
lodged
with
the
Comelec,
the
prosecutors
had
been
conducting
preliminary
investigations
pursuant
to
the
continuing
delegated
authority
given
by
the
Comelec.
Thus,
Comelec
Resolution
No.
9266,
approving
the
creation
of
the
Joint
Committee
and
Fact-Finding
Team,
should
be
viewed
not
as
an
abdication
of
the
constitutional
bodys
independence
but
as
a
means
to
fulfill
its
duty
of
ensuring
the
prompt
investigation
and
prosecution
of
election
offenses
as
an
adjunct
of
its
mandate
of
ensuring
a
free,
orderly,
honest,
peaceful
and
credible
elections.
Joint
Order
No.
001-2011
does
not
violate
the
equal
protection
clause.
Petitioners
claim
that
the
creation
of
the
Joint
Committee
and
Fact-Finding
Team
is
in
violation
of
the
equal
protection
clause
of
the
Constitution
because
its
sole
purpose
is
the
investigation
and
prosecution
of
(011)
SALUDAGA
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
Filing
of
the
amended
information
without
preliminary
investigation;
The
case
may
be
reviewed
by
the
State
within
the
time-bar
either
by
the
refilling
of
the
Information
or
by
the
filing
of
a
new
information
for
the
same
offense
or
an
offense
necessarily
included
therein.
FACTS:
Saludaga
and
Genio
entered
into
a
Pakyaw
Contract
for
the
construction
of
Barangay
Day
Care
Centers
without
conducting
a
competitive
public
bidding
as
required
by
law,
which
caused
damage
and
prejudice
to
the
government.
An
information
was
filed
for
violation
of
Sec.
3
(e)
of
RA
3019
by
causing
undue
injury
to
the
Government.
The
information
was
quashed
for
failure
to
prove
the
actual
damage,
hence
a
new
information
was
filed,
now
for
violation
of
Sec.
3
(e)
of
RA
3019
by
giving
unwarranted
benefit
to
a
private
person.
The
accused
moved
for
a
new
preliminary
investigation
to
be
conducted
on
the
ground
that
there
is
substitution
and/or
substantial
amendment
of
the
first
information.
ISSUE:
WON
there
is
substitution
and/or
substantial
amendment
of
the
information
that
would
warrant
a
new
preliminary
investigation.
Requiring
counter-affidavit
not
mandatory.
FACTS:
Respondent
Atty.
Magdaleno
M.
Pena
(Atty.
Pena)
instituted
a
civil
case
for
recovery
of
agents
compensation
and
expenses,
damages,
and
attorneys
fees
against
Urban
Bank
and
herein
petitioners,
before
RTC.
Atty.
Pea
claimed
for
compensation
on
the
Contract
of
Agency,
wherein
he
undertook
to
perform
such
acts
necessary
to
prevent
any
intruder
and
squatter
from
unlawfully
occupying
Urban
Banks
property
located
along
Roxas
Boulevard,
Pasay
City.
Petitioners
filed
a
Motion
to
Dismiss
and
argued
that
they
never
appointed
the
respondent
as
agent
or
counsel.
They
presented
documents
to
show
that
respondent
was
appointed
as
agent
by
Isabela
Sugar
Company,
Inc.
(ISCI),
the
original
owner
of
the
subject
property,
and
not
by
Urban
Bank
or
by
the
petitioners.
Respondent
filed
his
Complaint-Affidavit
with
the
Office
of
the
City
Prosecutor
and
claimed
that
the
documents
were
falsified
because
the
alleged
signatories
did
not
actually
affix
their
signatures,
and
the
signatories
were
neither
stockholders
nor
officers
and
employees
of
ISCI.
City
Prosecutor
found
probable
cause
for
the
indictment
of
ISSUE:
W/N
petitioners
were
deprived
of
their
right
to
due
process
of
law
because
of
the
denial
of
their
right
to
preliminary
investigation
and
to
submit
their
counter-affidavit.
HELD:
NO
The
crime
to
which
petitioners
were
charged
was
defined
and
penalized
under
second
paragraph
of
Article
172
in
relation
to
Article
171
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code.
The
penalty
is
prision
correccional
in
its
medium
and
ISSUE:
WON
CA
erred
in
upholding
the
RTC's
grant
of
respondents'
motion
and
eventually
dismissing
the
case
based
on
lack
of
probable
cause
HELD:
YES
Section
2,
Rule
117
of
the
Revised
Rules
on
Criminal
Procedure
plainly
states
that
in
a
motion
to
quash,
the
court
shall
not
consider
any
ground
other
than
those
stated
in
the
motion,
except
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged.
The
RTC
judge's
determination
of
probable
cause
should
have
been
only
limited
prior
to
the
issuance
of
a
warrant
of
arrest
and
not
after
the
arraignment.
Once
the
information
has
been
filed,
the
judge
shall
then
"personally
evaluate
the
resolution
of
the
prosecutor
and
its
supporting
evidence"
to
determine
whether
there
is
probable
cause
to
issue
a
warrant
of
arrest.
At
this
stage,
a
judicial
To
establish
probable
cause,
Araullo,
being
the
complainant,
then
should
have
proved
the
elements
of
the
crimes
alleged
to
have
been
committed.
In
addition,
there
should
have
been
a
clear
showing
of
the
respective
participation
of
the
respondents,
to
at
least
support
a
ruling
that
would
call
for
their
further
prosecution.
In
violation
of
Article
206
of
the
RPC,
it
was
necessary
to
show
that,
first,
the
orders
issued
by
the
respondents
to
his
complaint
were
unjust,
and
second,
the
said
orders
were
knowingly
rendered
or
rendered
through
inexcusable
negligence
or
ignorance.
Araullo
failed
to
establish
that
the
labor
officials
were
impelled
by
any
motive
other
than
the
correction
of
this
error.
Without
a
finding
of
probable
cause
against
these
labor
officials,
the
dismissal
of
the
charge
against
Atty.
Balbin,
Atty.
Tabao
and
Atty.
De
Leon,
being
private
individuals
who
did
not
appear
to
conspire
with
their
co-
respondents
for
the
commission
of
a
criminal
offense,
was
also
warranted.
(016)
Vergara
v.
Ombudsman,
G.R.
No.
174567.
(Main
part
is
the
Meaning
of
Probable
Cause)
FACTS:
On
June
2001,
the
City
Council
of
Calamba
issued
a
resolution
authorizing
Mayor
Lajara
to
negotiate
with
landowners
in
Barangays
Real,
Halang,
and
Uno,
for
the
new
city
hall
site.
During
the
public
hearing,
the
choice
for
the
new
city
hall
was
limited
to
the
properties
of
Pamana
and
a
lot
in
Barangay
Saimsim,
Calamba.
On
November
2001,
City
Government
of
Calamba,
through
the
Mayor,
entered
into
agreements
with
Pamana
and
Prudential
Bank
regarding
the
sale
of
their
respective
properties.
Some
days
after,
the
documents
were
endorsed
by
the
City
Council.
Petitioner
alleged
that
these
documents
were
not
ratified
by
the
City
Council.
Petitioner
further
alleged
various
defects
with
the
said
agreements.
On
March
2004,
the
Ombudsman
issued
a
resolution
finding
no
probable
cause
to
hold
any
of
the
respondents
liable
for
violation
of
Section
3(e)
of
RA
3019
(Anti-Graft
and
Corrupt
Practices
Act).
On
September
2004,
petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration
questioning
the
lack
of
ratification
by
the
City
Council
of
the
contracts,
the
overpricing
of
lots,
the
inclusion
of
roads
lots
and
creek
lots,
and
a
lack
of
a
relocation
survey.
ISSUE:
Is
Sistoza
guilty
of
violating
the
Anti-
Graft
and
Corrupt
Practices
Act
based
on
his
mere
signatures
in
the
purchase
orders?
Should
the
SC
order
the
Sandiganbayan
to
dismiss
the
case
against
Sistoza?
HELD:
Under
Sec.
3,
par.
(e)
of
the
Anti-Graft
and
Corrupt
Practices
Act,
manifest
partiality,
evident
bad
faith
or
gross
inexcusable
negligence
must
be
committed
in
so
blatant
and
shocking
a
manner.
Mere
procedural
lapses
and
slight
negligence,
while
relying
in
good
faith
on
ones
subordinates,
do
not
fall
within
the
purview
of
this
crime.
The
absence
of
probable
cause
is
a
ground
for
the
dismissal
of
a
criminal
case,
in
order
to
save
the
defendant
from
the
costs
and
strain
of
a
senseless
litigation.
This
applies
to
the
Ombudsmans
Office
in
relation
to
the
Supreme
Court.
No,
Sistoza
is
not
guilty
of
the
crime
charged
based
merely
on
his
signatures.
To
begin
with,
before
manifest
partiality,
evident
bad
faith
or
gross
inexcusable
negligence
may
even
be
considered,
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
should
determine
with
certainty
the
facts
indicative
of
the
modalities
of
committing
a
transgression
of
the
statute.
Simply
alleging
each
or
all
of
these
methods
is
not
enough
to
establish
probable
cause,
for
it
is
well
settled
that
allegation
does
not
amount
to
proof.
Good
faith
on
the
part
of
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
respondents
were
accorded
with
their
right
to
due
process.
Whether
or
not
the
CA
erred
in
giving
credence
to
the
findings
of
the
investigating
NBI
agent
and
the
City
Prosecutor,
over
the
SOJ.
HELD:
Yes.
The
respondents
were
accorded
with
their
right
to
due
process.
Due
process
is
simply
the
opportunity
to
be
heard.
What
the
law
prohibits
is
not
the
absence
of
previous
notice,
but
its
absolute
absence
and
lack
of
opportunity
to
be
heard.
Right
to
be
heard
is
deemed
to
have
been
complied
with
when
a
party
was
heard
through
the
motion
of
reconsideration
he
had
filed.
Assuming
that,
if
in
the
beginning,
there
is
a
defect
in
due
process,
its
deemed
cured
by
the
subsequent
filing
of
the
motion.
In
the
allegation
of
there
was
also
a
denial
of
due
process
during
the
NBI
investigation,
the
Court
stresses
that
the
functions
of
the
agency
is
merely
investigatory
and
informal
in
nature.
It
has
no
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
powers
and
is
incapable
of
granting
any
relief
to
any
party;
it
cannot
even
determine
probable
cause.
Its
findings
are
merely
recommendatory,
and
it
renders
assistance
when
requested
in
the
investigation
or
detection
of
crimes
in
order
to
prosecute
the
Complainant
is
a
senior
police
officer
who
charged
respondent
with
partiality,
miscarriage
of
justice
and
knowingly
rendering
an
unjust
decision
in
connection
with
the
dismissal
of
Criminal
Cases
Nos.
9210
(Illegal
Possession
of
Explosives
Intended
for
Illegal
Fishing)
and
9211
(Illegal
Possession
of
Illegally
Caught
Fish).
The
accused
moved
to
quash
Criminal
Case
No.
9210
on
the
ground
that
the
evidence
of
the
prosecution
was
the
product
of
a
warrantless
and
illegal
search
and
seizure.
Respondent
granted
the
motion
citing
the
admission
of
the
prosecution
that
the
search
and
seizure
was
not
covered
by
a
search
warrant,
and
that
the
search
warrant
presented
in
court
was
issued
after
the
fact.
Complainant
contended
that
the
confiscation
of
the
fish
in
the
absence
of
a
search
warrant
was
allowed
under
Circular
No.
130
(s.
1967)
of
the
Office
of
the
President.
The
accused
moved
to
quash
Criminal
Case
No.
9211
on
the
ground
that
the
information
failed
to
charge
the
offense
of
illegal
possession
of
fish
caught
by
explosives
for
its
failure
to
allege
the
element
"for
profit."
The
City
Prosecutor
admitted
the
omission
in
the
information
of
the
phrase
but
claimed
that
said
omission
was
a
mere
technicality.
Respondent
granted
the
Motion
because
it
failed
to
allege
two
(1)
(2)
The
case
record
will
show
that
your
Office,
in
the
determination
of
probable
cause
vis--vis
the
attending
set
of
facts
and
circumstances,
failed
to
consider
the
application
of
the
procedure
laid
down
under
Section
3
paragraph
(d)
of
Rule
112
of
the
If
the
respondent
cannot
be
subpoenaed,
or
if
subpoenaed,
does
not
submit
counter-affidavits
within
the
ten
(10)-day
period,
the
investigating
officer
shall
resolve
the
complaint
based
on
the
evidence
presented
by
the
complainant.
In
the
instant
case,
the
Investigating
Prosecutor
found
ground
to
continue
with
the
inquiry,
which
is
why
he
issued
subpoenas
to
the
respondents
to
submit
their
counter
affidavit
within
the
10-day
period,
since
he
could
have
dismissed
it
initially
if
indeed
there
was
really
no
evidence
to
serve
as
a
ground
for
continuing
with
the
inquiry.
For
failure
of
the
respondents
to
file
their
respective
counter-affidavits,
they
are
deemed
to
have
forfeited
their
right
to
preliminary
investigation
as
due
process
only
requires
that
the
respondent
be
given
the
opportunity
to
submit
counter-
affidavit,
if
he
is
so
minded.
The
conclusion
reached
by
the
Regional
State
Prosecutor
is
manifestly
wrong
as
the
CA
was
correct
when
it
observed
that
the
issuance
of
a
subpoena
would
become
unceremoniously
clothed
with
the
untoward
implication
that
probable
cause
is
necessarily
extant.(3)
CA
found
that
the
Regional
State
Prosecutor
acted
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
when
he
ordered
the
City
Prosecutor
to
file
the
Information
for
perjury
against
respondents.
It
was
because
of
the
CA
Decision
that
the
City
Prosecutor
eventually
filed
two
the
City
Prosecutor's
Department
of
Justice.
Office,
HELD:
SC:
DENIED.
Under
Rule
65,
a
special
civil
action
for
certiorari
lies
where
a
court
has
acted
without
or
in
excess
of
jurisdiction
or
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
and
there
is
no
appeal,
nor
any
plain,
speedy
and
adequate
remedy
in
the
ordinary
course
of
law.
De
Castro
failed
to
allege
any
circumstance
which
would
show
that
in
issuing
the
assailed
orders,
the
trial
court
acted
without
or
in
excess
of
jurisdiction
or
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
Following
hierarchy
of
courts,
it
should
be
filed
with
the
CA,
Under
rule
45,
if
the
petition
is
to
be
treated
as
petition
for
review,
it
would
fail
because
only
judgment
or
final
orders
that
completely
dispose
of
the
case
can
be
the
subject
of
a
petition
for
review.
Here,
the
assailed
orders
are
only
interlocutory
order.
De
Castro
should
have
proceeded
with
the
trial
of
the
case
and
if
the
trial
court
renders
an
unfavorable
verdict,
he
should
assail
the
orders
as
art
of
an
appeal
that
may
eventually
be
taken
from
the
final
judgment
to
be
rendered
in
this
case.