APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
of all her property. Manuel and Francisca were already deceased, leaving Vicenta
CONCEPT, CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES THAT GIVE
RISE TO OWNERSHIP
DE GUIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by Primitiva Lejano and
Lorenza Araniego. The one half undivided portion owned by Araniego was later
purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo, the only heir of the original
owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to this sale, the whole fishpond was leased by
the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in
favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to possess the entire fishpond and derived
income therein despite the expiration of the lease contract and several demands to
vacate by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, Jose Abejo. Abejo filed a
complaint for recovery of possession with damages against De Guia. However, Abejo
failed to present evidence of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of the fishpond.
ISSUE:
Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner? Whether Abejo was
entitled to rent the property?
HELD:
Under Article 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. A co-owner of an
undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he
exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a
portion which is truly abstract.”
Article 487 also provides that ‘anyone of the co-owners may bring an
action for ejectment”. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession. Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only
against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property.
However, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership.
The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property
because as a co-owner he has a right of possession.
If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition from the
other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners
cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement
to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner
who dwells in the house.
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE
GUIA. After DE GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the
entire FISHPOND without paying rent.
PARDELL vs. BARTOLOME
FACTS:
Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882,
respectively. Prior to her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a
nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children, named Manuel,
Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been
and Matilda as heirs.
In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor
friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and
enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and
products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicenta’s interest. Despite repeated
demands to divide the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and
Matilde had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means
of unkempt promises and other excuses.
Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.
RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the revenues
and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant
party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any
other expense besides those aforementioned,
Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on
the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and
that the latter was contrary to law. That motion was denied by the lower court.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned
property.
RULING:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
“Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in
accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the
community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights.”
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use
as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof
that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the
community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said
upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower
floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the
whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation
than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, for the reason
that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder cannot be
determined and every one of the co-owners exercises together with his
other co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz,
plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur,
and were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff
Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part
of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not
at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts
made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common
and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during several years
when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil; and for this
reason, aside from that founded on the right of co-ownership of the defendants, who
took upon themselves the administration and care of the property of joint tenancy
for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged
derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much
less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the
storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants.
The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the
upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her co-owner,
her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but
merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a co-owner of the
property.
SALANTADOL vs. RETES
FACTS:
On January 17,1965, EUFEMIA OMOLE sold her one-third (1/3) share of said Lot No.
513 for P l,000.00 to defendant CATALINA RETES. On January l8, 1965 the Register
of Deeds or the Province of Negros Oriental wrote to plaintiff Flavia Salatandol which
letter was received on January 21, 1965 informing her about the document
presented for registration affecting the one-third (1/3) share of Lot No. 513 in favor
of Defendant Catalina Salatandol to surrender the owner's Duplicate Certificate of
Title. Plaintiffs were never notified by the late EUFEMIA OMOLE nor by Defendant
Catalina Retes about the proposed sale.
On January 30, 1965, Plaintiffs wrote to Defendant CATALINA RETES informing her
of their desire to repurchase the said one-third (1/3) share of Lot No. 513 which the
late Eufemia Omole sold to her and failing to get a favorable action from Defendant
Catalina Retes, Plaintiffs on February 5, 1965 deposited the amount of Pl,000.00 with
the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and who, on February 13,
1965 wrote Defendant Catalina Retes informing the latter about the deposit and of
Plaintiffs' desire to exercise their right of pre-emption as co-owners of Eufemia
Omole.
When Defendant Catalina Retes failed to get the deposit with the Clerk of Court, on
February 16, 1965 (plaintiffs) filed the instant action for Legal Pre-emption. on
February 22, 1965 while this case was still pending, Defendant Catalina Retes resold
the said one-third (1/3) share of Lot No. 513 back to EUFEMIA OMOLE.
On March 11, 1965 Eufemia Omole donated the said one-third (1/3) share of Lot No.
513 to Defendant Catalina Retes as evidenced by a Deed of Donation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SALANTADOL has a right of legal pre-emption, given that no notice
was given by Omole regarding the sale
RULING:
The Court ruled that Art. 1623 of the Civil Code clearly and expressly prescribes that
the thirty (30) days for making the pre-emption or redemption are to be
counted from notice in writing by the vendor. In the case at bar, the
plaintiffs have not been furnished any written notice of sale or a copy
thereof by Eufemia Omole, the vendor. Said plaintiffs' right to exercise the legal
right of preemption or redemption, given to a co-owner when any one of the other
co-owners sells his share in the thing owned in common to a third person, as
provided for in Article 1623 of the Civil Code, has not yet accrued.
But, even assuming ex gratia argurmenti, that the notice from the Register of Deeds
of Negros Oriental to co-plaintiff Flavia Salatandol of the document transferring the
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 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
one-third (1/3) share of Eufemia Omole to defendant, was equivalent to notice from
the vendor, still, it appears that, while the disputed one-third (1/3) portion of
Eufemia Omole and the one-third (1/3) share of the plaintiffs, (there is no mention
of the other third portion) are embraced in one certificate of title, there had been
an actual partition of the land described in the certificate of title and each
co-owner is in possession of his respective share. This is deduced from the
order of the trial court, dated 30 July 1966, where the court restrained the parties
from harvesting the nuts on the "and in question," referring to the one-third (1/3)
share of Eufemia Omole.
As expressed in Article 484 of the Civil Code, a co-ownership exists whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Under such
concept, a co-owner cannot point to a particular portion of the property
owned in common as his own, because his portion thereof is intangible
rather than identifiable. Here, the portion of Eufemia Omole as well as
those of the plaintiffs had been identified and localized, so that co-
ownership, in its real sense, no longer exists.
Hence, the right of redemption or pre-emption under Article 1620 of the
Civil Code can no longer be invoked by the plaintiffs over the portion
appertaining to Eufemia Omole.
RIGHT OF ANY CO-OWNER (TO
RECOVER)/LIMITATION OF RIGHT OF CO-OWNER
ADLAWAN vs. ADLAWAN
FACTS:
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the
father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of
Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself
the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his
father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came
when he demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment
suit against them.
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his
allegations claiming that the said lot was registered in their parents name and they
had been living in the said house and lot since birth. The only reason why the said
house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s name was when their parents were in
need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain
a loan and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they
executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of Dominador.
The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the settlement
of the estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since
Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their
share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the possession
of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which was opposed by
the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of
Graciana are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful
detainer. Thus the case at bar.
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit
HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is
not the sole heir of Dominador. Since he was survived was his wife, upon his
death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her
share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as
well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any
one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-
owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the co-owners
as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all
BUT if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should
be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and
his repudiation of the ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
RESUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Private respondent, the late Juanito Borromeo, Sr., is the co-owner and overseer of
certain parcels of land located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu, designated as Lots Nos. 2587
and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate. Respondent owns six-eighths (6/8) of Lot
No. 2587 while the late spouses Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja own two-
eights (2/8) thereof. On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by
respondent and the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the proportion of their
undivided shares was not determined a quo.
Prior to the institution of the present action, petitioners Tining Resuena, Alejandra
Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena resided in the upper
portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon
and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the other hand, petitioner Eutiquia Rosario
occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, allegedly with the permission of the heirs of
Nicolas Maneja, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Respondent claims
that all petitioners have occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his
own liberality.
Respondent developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 occupied by him into a
resort known as the Borromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to expand and extend the
facilities of the resort that he established on the subject properties, respondent
demanded that petitioners vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to
vacate their homes.
On 16 February 1994, respondent filed a Complaint5 for ejectment with the MTC
against the petitioners.
MTC
Found that Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were owned in common by respondent with
other persons. It ruled that respondent did not have a preferential right of
possession over the portions occupied by petitioners, since Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592
were not yet partitioned nor the disputed portions assigned to respondent as his
determinate share. Thus, the MTC held that respondent had no right to evict
petitioners therefrom. Consequently, respondent’s Complaint was dismissed.
Notably, the MTC held that respondent and the spouses Bascon were the owners in
common of Lot No. 2587 and their respective shares had not yet been determined by
partition as proven by a testimony given by respondent.
RTC:
The RTC reversed the Decision of the MTC.
It held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any one of the co-owners to
bring an action in ejectment, may successfully be invoked by the respondent
because, in a sense, a co-owner is the owner and possessor of the whole, and that
the suit for ejectment is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. The
RTC also ruled that assuming petitioners were authorized to occupy a portion of the
co-owned property, they could resume this occupation when the properties shall
have been partitioned and allocated to the ones who gave them permission to reside
therein.
CA: Affirmed the ruling of the RTC
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents have the right to evict the petitioners from the
property therefrom
RULING:
it is unmistakable that respondent has a right to eject the petitioners from Lot No.
2587.
Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that "[a]ny one of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment," is a categorical and an unqualified authority in
favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of Lot. No. 2587.
This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an action for
ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an
action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-
owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse
decision cannot prejudice their rights.
Respondent’s action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since petitioners
were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners’ lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondent’s
right under Article 487, clearly settles respondent’s prerogative to eject petitioners
from Lot No. 2587. Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy
the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that
they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
WITH REGARDS TO RESPONDENTS BEING ESTOPPED FROM FILING AN
EJECTMENT CASE:
"[e]stoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto or their successors in
interest;" thus, only the spouses Bascon or their successors in interest may invoke
such "estoppel." A stranger to a transaction is neither bound by, nor in a position to
take advantage of, an estoppel arising therefrom.
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 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
ARCELONA, ET AL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona are
natural-born Filipinos who are now naturalized Americans residing in California,
U.S.A. Petitioner Ruth Arcelona is the surviving spouse and legal heir of the deceased
Benedicto Arcelona, brother of Marcelino and Tomasa. Together with their three
sisters — Pacita Arcelona-Olanday, Maria Arcelona-Arellano and Natividad Arcelona-
Cruz (hereinafter collectively referred to as Olanday, et al.) — petitioners are co-
owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents.
The six Arcelonas (two brothers and four sisters) are named as co-owners in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34341 which evidences ownership over the fishpond.
On March 4, 1978, a contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between
Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al. The lease contract was for a period of three (3)
years but was renewed up to February 2, 1984.
Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-
tenant of the same fishpond, effective on the date the contract of lease was
executed. After the termination of the lease contract, the lessee (Tandoc)
surrendered possession of the leased premises to the lessors, Olanday, et al.
Three days thereafter, on February 7, 1984, Private Respondent Farnacio instituted
Civil Case D-7240 for "peaceful possession, maintenance of security of tenure plus
damages, with motion for the issuance of an interlocutory order" against Olanday, et
al. The case was intended to maintain private respondent as tenant of the fishpond.
On May 25, 1991, after remand of the case to the court of origin, private respondent
was placed in possession of the entire property covered by TCT 34341.
Petitioners then filed with Respondent Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of
the aforesaid judgment against private respondent and the implementing sheriff. The
case was docketed as CA GR SP No. 24846. On May 8, 1991, Respondent Court
issued a resolution directing petitioners "to implead as party defendant the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 50, Dagupan City."
ISSUES:
Whether or not the final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack jurisdiction for
not including petitioners who, as co-owners of the subject property, are
indispensable parties
RULING: YES.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-
interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such,
they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with
reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of
all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties
under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court
(that) the action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not deny this
fact, and the Court of Appeals did not make any contrary finding. The fishpond is
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the property is owned
by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to
show over which portion the tenancy relation of private respondent has been
established and ruled upon in Civil Case D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have
been properly impleaded as indispensable parties.
Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-
owners may bring an action in ejectment." It was subsequently held that a
co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the
other co-owners.
Clearly, the decision in Civil Case D-7240 cannot bind petitioners and cannot
adjudicate the entire co-owned property, not even that portion belonging to Olanday
et al., ownership of the property being still pro-indiviso. Obviously, the failure to
implead petitioners barred the lower court from making a final
adjudication. Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or
proceeding, a judgment therein cannot attain finality.
ALTERATION OF A PROPERTY UNDER CO-
OWNERSHIP
CRUZ vs. CATAPANG
“Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned
property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-
owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.”
“The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of
dominion.”
FACTS:
Leonor, Luz and Norma are co-owners of a parcel of land. Norma allowed Teofila to
build a house on a lot adjacent to their co-owned land. The house intruded on a
portion of their property.
Leonor was surprised to see a part of Teofila's house intruding unto a portion of the
co-owned property. She then made several demands to demolish the intruding
structure and to vacate the portion encroaching their property.
Leonor then filed a forcible entry against Teofila.
Leonor's contention:
She contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot
defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-
ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the
land or thing owned in common until partition.
Teofila's Contention:
She counters that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry
into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of
the co-owners. She further argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house
she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one of possession de jure
since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the property.
ISSUE:
WON the consent given by one of co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to
construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible
entry case filed by another co-owner against that person?
HELD: NO.
A co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the
prejudice of the coownership. A co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to
build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the
property to his or her exclusive use.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he
does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as
not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a
house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and
prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of
the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to
the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing
owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and
any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.
The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion.
Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being
no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on
the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the
absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any
right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under
the classification "through strategy or stealth".
Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-
owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent's act of
getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma, and allowing the latter
to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she
utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondent's acts
constitute forcible entry.
CRUZ vs. LEIS (132 SCRA 97)
Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to
the whole property subject of the co-ownership
FACTS:
Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired from the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources a parcel of land, which was titled in
her name, with the description that she was a “widow”. Leis only passed away in
1973 without executing a will.
Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) secured by a
mortgage on the land from DANR, but failed to pay on due date. Isidro executed 2
contracts in favor of Cruz: a Deed of Absolute Sale and a Contract indicating a pacto
de retro sale. Isidro still failed to repurchase the property within 1 year, so she
consolidated the ownership of the land in favor of Cruz.
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 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The heirs then
filed a complaint with the RTC averring that the land was conjugal property having
been purchased during their marriage. The RTC found in favor of the heirs. The case
was appealed to the CA, but the CA merely affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to
get a judicial order to have the land consolidated in his name after failure of Isidro to
comply with the requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore subject to
the rules on co-ownership?
HELD:
Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis’ death, the conjugal
property regime ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of Leis’ half of the
property to be divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership of the land then began.
However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to repurchase, the
ownership of the land transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT being void for non-
compliance with 1607, the ownership did not transfer back to the heirs, for
compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of registering the title in the Torrens
System.
SEGURA vs. SEGURA
No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon those who did not participate in it.
FACTS:
FACTS:
This involves a parcel of land owned by Gertrudes Zamora. She died intestate and
without debt and was suvived by her 4 children who never decided to divide the
property among themselves. The conflict arises when Gertrudes' grandchildren filed
a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the disputed inheritance.
On April 6, 1961, three of the nine grandchildren - Nicolas, Santiago and Gaudencio
Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating the entire property to
themselves alone as equal pro indiviso owners. The partition was not registered
immediately, but only 5 years later, in 1946.
Before such registration, the following developments transpired:
The land was sold to Amojido with right to repurchase. Such right was not exercised.
In November 28, 1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership
and obtained a TCT with a reservation of the rights of the other heirs annotated
therein. Amojito sold the land to Mirope Mascarenas vda. de Eliso who obtained the
TCT in her name, which did not retain the annotation. In turn, Elison sold the land to
Mildred Elison vda. de Javelosa. Mildred sold the land to Ernesto and Igmedio
Amojido.
On January 16, 1958, the Civil Case was dismissed on motion of the plaintiff's
counsel.
The complaint in the case at bar involves the six excluded children. They alleged that
the partition and all subsequent transfers of the subject land were null and void
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
insofar as these transactions deprived them of their shares as co-owners of the said
property.
The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred by prior
judgment and that in any even whatever rights might have pertained to the plaintiffs
had already been prescribed under the Rules of Court and the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are barred by prescription from questioning the alleged
extrajudicial partition
RULING:
The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the Rules of
Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been impugned within two years
from the date of its execution in 1941. As the challenge in the instant case was
made only in 1956, when Civil Case No. 3941 was filed, that first case, and more so
the case at bar which was commenced in 1968, should be and were properly
dismissed for tardiness under Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which
was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions.
The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs
who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not
affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right
to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.
RAUL ARAMBULO vs. GENARO NOLASCO
A co-owner may dispose a portion of his share without the need of consent from
other co-owners.
FACTS:
Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a 233sq.m. Land
in Tondo, Manila. When their mother died, she was succeeded by her husband,
Genero Nolasco and their children.
On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-owners,
except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective shares to the properties,
saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners shall withhold their consent to
the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Nolasco responded that they did not know about the intention to sell, because they
were not called to participate in the negotiations regarding the sale of the property.
RTC: ruled in favor with petitioners and ordered Nolasco to give their consent to
sale.
Nolasco filed a notice of appeal to the CA.
CA: reversed the RTc decision, saying that the petitioners cannot compel Nolasco to
give their consent.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and whether this withholding
is prejudicial to the petitioners.
RULING:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner without the consent
of the other co–owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co–
owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property.
To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every
recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the
circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and
enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the
interested parties be obtained.
EXTENT OF CO-OWNER’S RIGHT
PAULMITAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-
owners, only his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer.
FACTS:
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by Agatona
Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascual’s (7) children (Alicio,
Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the respondents and Donato and
his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot
757 claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled
and a TCT was issued in his name. He executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor
of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at
a public to the Provincial Gov’t of Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able to
redeem the property. Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a
complaint against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners’ defense
was that the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after
the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired exclusive ownership thru the
Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With respect to
Lot 1091, the court decided in favor of respondents. They are entitled to ½ of Lot
1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway prejudice their rights. The land
was ordered to be partitioned and the petitioners were ordered to pay the
respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the
redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pascual’s children and Donato and Juliana were co-
owners of their mother’s lot
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the
property
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 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
HELD:
(1) YES
When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that “Where
there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition,
owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased”.
Since Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died, they are co-owners of the
estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the
property.
When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus
he can only sell his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 states that “each co-
owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.”
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana) a
co-owner.
(2) NO
When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The right of
repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as
stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of the
repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes.
SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
A co-owner’s share of the property shall not be included if she did not consent to the
sale
FACTS:
Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-
in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners:
Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor
Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married
to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.
On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of
private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to
have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) co-owners in her favor.
Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and
subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action
for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the MeTC.
MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to the
extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on
account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a
forgery.
RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their pleadings.
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution in favor of private Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November
1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon petitioner
who however refused to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house without
any special permit of demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was
forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the house’s toilet
and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the
RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed
to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum.
RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit
ISSUE:
Whether or not the portion of the petitioner should be included in the sale,
notwithstanding the fact that she did not affix her signature in the alleged deed of
sale
RULING:
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property
the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly
lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.
But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the
thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota
or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and
bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the
Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to
1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her
right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such
partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia
Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
SALE OR MORTGAGE OF COMMON PROPERTY
AURORA DEL BANCO, ET AL vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ALEJANDRA PANSACOLA, ET AL
FACTS:
Pansacola Brothers (Benedicto, Jose and Fr. Manuel) entered into an agreement
which provided the following terms:
They will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising
- group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because until physical
the Island of Cagbalite which has an area of 1,600 hectares.
- The land shall be considered as their COMMON PROPERTY
- The co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors
at that time represented by their father, Fr. Manuel who will contribute
for them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island
- Whatever benefits may be derived from the island shall be shared equally
by the co-owners in the following proportion:
a. Benedicto – ¼ share
b. Jose – ¼ share
c. Domingo and Baldomera – 2/4 share (which shall be placed under
the care of their father, Fr. Manuel)
The co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the island. 2
years later, they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of the agreement
entered into. The new agreement provided for a new sharing and distribution of the
lands and whatever benefits may be derived therefrom:
- The first ¼ portion shall belong to Benedicto
- The second ¼ shall belong to Jose
- The third ¼ shall belong to the children of their deceased brother,
Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Mariano, Maria and Hipolita
- The fourth and last ¼ shall belong to their nephews and nieces –
Domingo, Baldomera, Marcelina, Francisca, Candelaria, Gervasia, who
being all minors, are still under the care of their brother, Fr. Manuel. The
latter is the real father of said minors
In 1907, the representative of the heirs of all the original owners of Cagbalite Island
intered into an agreement to partition the island, supplemented by another
agreement dated 1908.
100 years later, in 1968, private respondents (Alejandra Pansacola, et al) brought a
special action for partition, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of
the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the 2nd contract of co-ownership. In their
answer, the petitioners herein (Del Banco, et al) interposed such defenses as
prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the
heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Fr. Manuel
RULING:
YES.
There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition
of the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or
successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859 simply provides for the
sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island.
The agreement, in fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be considered as
their common property.
In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not only on the
sharing proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the distribution
of the Island each of the brothers was allocated.
With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole,
and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the
same time the sole owner of a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each
division is effected such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely
determined.
In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on
how the Island was to be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which
5
 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
supplements that of January 20, 1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908
agreement no actual partition of the Island had as yet been done.
Definitely, there was no physical partition of the Island in 1859. Neither could there
have been one in 1894 because the manner of subdividing the Island was only
provided for in the later agreements entered into by the heirs in 1907 and 1908.
There was a distribution of the Island in 1868 as agreed upon by the original co-
owners in their agreement of April 11, 1868. Any agreement entered into by the
parties in 1894 could be no more than another agreement as to the distribution of
the Island among the heirs of the original co-owners and the preparation of a
tentative plan by a practical surveyor, a Mr. Jose Garcia, mentioned in the first
paragraph of the 1907 agreement, preparatory to the preparation of the real plan to
be prepared by the surveyor Amadeo, mentioned in the agreement of April 18, 1908.
A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial
decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court,
adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in
common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners. It is a basic
principle in the law of co-ownership both under the present Civil Code as in the Code
of 1889 that no individual co- owner can claim any definite portion thereof. lt is
therefore of no moment that some of the co-owners have succeeded in securing
cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the Island occupied by them.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have
a subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive
possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them
accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of
actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court.
CORNELIA PAMPLONA vs. VIVENCIO MORETO, ET AL
FACTS:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage,
they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545 and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land
Estate, covered by certificates of title issued in the name of “Flaviano Moreto,
married to Monica Maniega”.
They had 6 children – Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all
surnamed Moreto.
More than 6 years after the death of his wife, Monica, Flaviano Moreto, without the
consent of the heirs of his deceased wife, and before any liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of
Geminiano Pamplona, the Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot No. 1495 for P900.00,
covered by a TCT in the name of “Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega”
although the lot was acquired during their marriage.
As a result of the sale, a new TCT was issued in the name of “Geminiano
Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte”.
After the execution of the Deed of Sale, Spouses Pamplona constructed their house
on the Eastern part of Lot No. 1496, as Flaviano pointed to it as the land which he
sold to Geminiano. Shortly thereafter, Rafael (Son of Spouses Pamplona), also built
his house within lot 1496 about 1 meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot.
Flaviano Moreto and vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the
portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction
was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
sale although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot
No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
Flaviano died and 5 years after, the plaintiffs demanded the defendants to vacate
the premises where they had their house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano
had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano as it belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Flaviano and wife Monica, and the latter was already dead when the
sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica.
Spouses Pamplona refused to vacate the premises occupied by them; hence, a case
was instituted by the heirs of Monica seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the
deed of sale as regards to the ½ of the property.
The defendants claimed that the sale made in their favor is valid as the lot sold is
registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in good
faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it
was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the
defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed recited
that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a
portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject
matter of their sale transaction.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation,
or only one-half of the same
RULING:
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE FULL OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY
The records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated,
settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary
proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the
heirs either in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant
to Act 3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial
partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor
was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the estate
became the property of a community between the surviving husband, Flaviano
Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-
ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the death
of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes the
property of a community, by operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or the widow,
it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full
ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and there is
no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as
well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery coral
adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the complaint by
the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over nine (9) years.
And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica Maniega
as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as
neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation,
possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are
persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by laches
to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule
of equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of
abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting
the same.
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was
already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership
between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife,
Monica Maniega.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership
when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of
the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built
their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his
house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land
area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to
dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was
still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question.
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as
vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over
which the fences were to be erected without objection, protest or
complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and
tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a factual
partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and
barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or
title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents
received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the
property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death.
And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by
the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private
respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area
of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their
predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents
must comply with said obligation.
SPOUSES DEL CAMPO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE
REGALADO, SR.
FACTS:
The Bornales were the original co-owners of Lot 162. The lot was divided in aliquot
shares among the 8 co-owners as follows:
1. Salome – 4/16
2. Consorcia – 4/16
3. Alfredo -2/16
4. Maria – 2/16
5. Jose – 1/16
6. Quirico – 1/16
7. Rosalia – 1/16
8. Julita – 1/16
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 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo.
Thereafter, Soledad immediately took possession of the land and built a house
thereon.
A few years later, Soledad and husband, Simplicio, mortgaged the subject portion of
Lot 162 as security for a P4000 debt to Jose Regalado Sr. This was evidenced by a
Deed of Mortgage.
Three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162 (Salome, Consorcia, and Alfredo) sold
portions of the said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr.
Simplicio, heir of Soledad, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged
portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr, who in turn executed a Deed of Discharge
of Mortgage in favor of Soledad’s heirs. On the same date, the said heirs sold the
redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500 to herein petitioners (Spouses Del Campo).
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado caused the reconstitution of OCT No. 18047. The
Reconstituted OCT initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162.
However, the title was transferred later to Jose Regalado Sr. who subdivided the
entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in his name.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for
"repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of the now deceased Jose
Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters
located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the
name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as
residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos way
back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the
corresponding taxes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale made by Salome in favor of Soledad be valid,
notwithstanding that it is a physical portion of the undivided co-owned property
RULING:
SALE IS VALID.
There can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad
could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even
exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact,
the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion
of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in
said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the
consent of the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest
in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine
that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since
Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our
view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to
the full extent.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a
particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners.
However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in
case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the
co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of
sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the
same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the
consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in ISSUE:
the property held in common.
Whether or not the plaintiffs are barred by prescription from questioning the alleged
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the extrajudicial partition
sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not
have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that RULING:
time, the ideal shares held by the three co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only
10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the Rules of
Soledad. Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not have," Court the deed of extrajudicial partition should have been impugned within two years
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad from the date of its execution in 1941. As the challenge in the instant case was
since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. We have made only in 1956, when Civil Case No. 3941 was filed, that first case, and more so
ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale the case at bar which was commenced in 1968, should be and were properly
will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not dismissed for tardiness under Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court.
consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of
the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which
the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of
the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad
The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs
retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in
who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no
1951. The logical effect on the second disposition is to substitute petitioners in the
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not
preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name in
affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right
1977.
to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.
FELIPE SEGURA, ET AL vs. NICOLAS SEGURA, ET AL
FACTS:
This involves a parcel of land owned by Gertrudes Zamora. She died intestate and
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO
without debt and was suvived by her 4 children who never decided to divide the
property among themselves. The conflict arises when Gertrudes' grandchildren filed
a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the disputed inheritance. FACTS:
On April 6, 1961, three of the nine grandchildren - Nicolas, Santiago and Gaudencio Respondents Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married. During their
Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating the entire property to marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated in San Pablo City from
themselves alone as equal pro indiviso owners. The partition was not registered Sandra Dalida. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of
immediately, but only 5 years later, in 1946. the late Marcelino Dailo as vendee to the exclusion of his wife.
Before such registration, the following developments transpired: Marcelino executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner (Homeowners Bank) to be
secured by Spouses Dalio’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
The land was sold to Amojido with right to repurchase. Such right was not exercised.
Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00. As security, Gesmundo
In November 28, 1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership
executed a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of the
and obtained a TCT with a reservation of the rights of the other heirs annotated
bank. The transactions entered into by Gesmundo took place without the knowledge
therein. Amojito sold the land to Mirope Mascarenas vda. de Eliso who obtained the
and consent of respondent (Miguela).
TCT in her name, which did not retain the annotation. In turn, Elison sold the land to
Mildred Elison vda. de Javelosa. Mildred sold the land to Ernesto and Igmedio
Amojido. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner (Homeowners
Bank) instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property.
After the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner (HB)
On January 16, 1958, the Civil Case was dismissed on motion of the plaintiff's
as the highest bidder.
counsel.
After the lapse of 1 year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through
The complaint in the case at bar involves the six excluded children. They alleged that
its Vice-President, consolidated the ownership by executing an Affidavit of
the partition and all subsequent transfers of the subject land were null and void
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
insofar as these transactions deprived them of their shares as co-owners of the said
property.
In the meantime, Marcelino died. In one of her visits to the property, Miguela
learned that HB had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises
The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred by prior
and that her car, a Ford Sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with
judgment and that in any even whatever rights might have pertained to the plaintiffs
fire within the premises.
had already been prescribed under the Rules of Court and the Civil Code.
7
 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
Miguela instituted a case for nullity of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale,
affidavit of consolidation of ownership, deed of sale, reconveyance with prayer for
preliminary injunction and damages against petitioner HB, claiming that she had no
knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property.
In its Answer, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is an exclusive property of Marcelino; hence, the sale
made in favor of HB was valid
RULING:
IT IS A CONJUGAL PROPERTY; THE SALE IS VOID.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the
Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the
entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the husband who contracted the sale. Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
Effects of Redemption of Co-Owned Property By One
Co-owner
Abille vs CA
Facts:
- the land in question is Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay originally
belonged to Felisa Alzul as her own private property
- she married twice (she had an only child Rustico Adille herein defendant and her
children to the 2nd marriage were the plaintiffs)
-
Felisa sold the property with a right to repurchase for a period of 3 years (she
died on 1942 without being able to redeem)
- during the period of redemption Abille repurchased by himself alone and
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition representing himself to be the only heir
and child of his mother Felisa
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
- after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-siblings filed the case for
partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an
implied trust when he redeemed
- trial court rendered decision in favor of Abille sustaining the position that the
defendant was and became the absolute owner
- CA reversed the decision of the trial court
Issue: WON a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in
common
Held:
- no, the right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his
share alone, though the records show that petitioner redeemed the property in
its entirety, it did not make him the owner of all of it. It did not put to end the
existing state of co-ownership (refer to Art 488)
- the other co-owners are liable to reimburse him for their shares in redemption
expenses since he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in
common
- there was fraud committed in registration of the property
- prescription cannot be applied in the case for prescription as a mode of
terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation
of the co-ownership
- in the instant case petitioner failed to comply with the requisites of repudiation
- petition is denied
TAN vs CA
“Consolidation of ownership by mortgagee after expiration of redemption
period terminates co-ownership. A co-owner who redeems a property with
her own funds after such consolidation becomes the sole owner thereof.”
FACTS:
Tan Tiong Tick, married to Tan Ong Hun was the registered owner of a parcel of
land and its improvements in Binondo Manila. They had six children George Laurel,
Teodora, Rosa, Rosita, Mauro Umali, and D. Annie Tan.
The land was mortgaged to China Bank to secure payment for several obligations.
Tan Tiong Tick and Tan Ong Hun died without paying their obligations.
China Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Two weeks before the redemption period
expired, China Bank and the Heirs of Tan Tiong Tick entered into a settlement. It
provided that the heirs were given right to repurchase even after the redemption
period but before August 3, 1973.
The heirs failed to redeem before the legal redemption period so China Bank
consolidated its ownership and was issued a new TCT. However, D. Annie Tan
exercised the right to repurchase pursuant to the settlement using her personal
funds. But the title to the land was registered in the name of all the heirs.
D. Annie Tan filed an action to reconvey the property to her and damages. RTC ruled
that the property was co-owned by the heirs. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership among the heirs was dissolved by the foreclosure and
consolidation of title by the bank after the redemption period has expired?
HELD:
Yes. Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by the deceased parents,
there can be no question that a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the
period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption by one during
this period would have inured to the benefit of all.
The records show, however, that when the petitioner purchased the disputed
property on August 30, 1974, any co-ownership among the brothers and sisters no
longer existed. The period to redeem had expired more than one year earlier, on
July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank consolidated its ownership and a new title
was issued in the bank's name. When the heirs allowed the one year redemption
period to expire without redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title, the co-ownership was
extinguished.
Since D. Annie Tan used her personal fund to repurchase the property, she is the
lawful sole owner. The respondent China Banking Corporation is ordered to execute
the deed of sale over the disputed property in favor of the petitioner alone.
TERMINATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP
MARIANO vs De Vega
Facts:
- sps Urbano Panganiban and Roberta Espino owned as conjugal property, during
their lifetime 29 parcels of unregistered land without improvements and all
situated in Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan
- both died intestate
- Mariano instituted an action with the CFI for partition and delivery of possession
of their corresponding shares in the conjugal estate of decedents-spouses
- petitioners filed the case because private respondents had taken possession of
the whole conjugal property and appropriated to themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners the products coming from the 29 parcels of land
- the trial court denied the petition
Issue: WON the trial court erred in deciding the case
Held:
- no
-
SC found the trial courts decision on the ground of prescription under Sec 40 of
PA No 190 to be inaccurate
- since under Art. 494 no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his
-
co-owners so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership
there’s no repudiation of co-ownership. In view of their lack of a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership, duly communicated to the petitioners (the
other co-owners), private respondents cannot acquire the shares of the
petitioners by prescription.
- assailed order is set aside
PAULMITAN VS CA
Facts:
- Agatona Paulmitan died in 1952 left 2 parcels of land located in the Province of
Negros Occidental
8
 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
- in 1963 the estate of Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to the 2 lots
remained in the name of Agatona.
- in August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of
heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim
that he is the only surviving heir of Agatona. TCT No. 35979 was issued in
-
Donato’s name
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over
the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter
- in 1952 Lot No. 1091 was forfeited for non-payment of taxes and was sold at a
public auction with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental being the
buyer
- in 1974, Fanesa redeemed the property
- -
the respondents filed before the CFI upon learning of the transactions
- CFI dismissed the complaint upon finding merit in petitioners’ affirmative
defense (Lot No. 757)
- as regard to Lot 1091, CFI decided in favor of respondents ruled that as
descendants of Agatona they are entitled to 1/2 of 1091 pro diviso
- Fanesa did not vest exclusive ownership over the entire land but only gave her
the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the property
- CA affirmed trial court’s decision
Issue: WON respondents are entitled to 1/2 of Lot 1091, pro diviso
Held:
- Yes
- the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter, petitioner
Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but
merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus
making her the co-owner of the land in question with the respondents, her first
cousins.
- the redemption of the land did not terminate the co-ownership nor give
her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership (same issue raised
in Adille vs CA)
- Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by
virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to
be reimbursed for half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners (Article 1613 of
CC)
- petition is denied
AGUILAR vs CA
Facts:
- Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers
- -
on October 28, 1969, the 2 brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque
where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful
neighborhood
- they initially agreed that Virgilio’s share was 2/3 while Senen was 1/3 but by
virtue of a written memorandum in 1970 they agreed that their interests in the
house and lot should be equal
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
- after the death of their father petitioner demand respondent to vacate the house
and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof shall be divided among them
- because of the refusal of Senen, Virgilio filed an action to compel the sale of the
house and lot so they could divide the proceeds
-
On July 26, 1979 trial court found both to be co-owners of the house and lot in
equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. But ruled that plaintiff has
been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's continued
enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and
continued maneuvers of defendant to delay partition.
- trial court ordered defendant to vacate the property for they could not agree to
the amount
CA set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed
judgment rendered by default.
Issue: WON CA erred in not holding that the motion of defendant through counsel to
cancel the pre-trail was dilatory in character
WON CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial
Held:
- -
first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-trial is
mandatory and a party who fails to appear may be considered as in default. In
the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the
scheduled pre-trial, the trial court has authority to declare respondent in default.
- the trial court is correct in denying the motion to postpone pre-trial for lack of
merit for pre-trial should be much more than mere perfunctory treatment. Its
observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective i.e speedy and
inexpensive disposition of cases
- SC uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the
effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which
we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to
vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.L
-
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co- ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time
partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned
- being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without
paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in
common so long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.
- when petitioner file an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial
court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-
ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly
also ceased
the respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family
vacate
- petition is granted
PRESCRIPTION AND REPUDIATION OF CO-
OWNERSHIP
DELIMA VS CA
Facts:
- Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in
Cebu by sale on installments from the government leaving as his only heirs his 3
brothers and a sister
- TCT 2744 was issued in the name of “The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased,
represented by Galileo Delima”
- On 1953 Galileo executed an affidavit of extrajudicial declaration of heirs, TCT
2744 was cancelled and TCT 3009 was issued in 1954 in the name of Galileo
Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs. He paid taxes from 1954 to
1965
- in 1968 petitioners who are surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita filed with the
CFI an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and annulment of
TCT 3009 against Galileo and Vicente (joined as party defendant for his refusal
to joint in their action)
trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioners
- respondents appealed to the CA, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s
decision and upheld the claim of Galileo that all the brothers and sister had
already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor,
considering that he alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of
the lot and the realty taxes
Issue: WON petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory period
provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership
by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the
disputed property
Held:
- the petitioners are already barred by prescription having only filed the action in
1968 (more than 10 years have already lapse)
- the moment when Galileo executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs, in effect
denying or repudiating the ownership, the statute of limitations started to run for
the purposes of the action instituted by Galileo seeking a declaration of the
existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder.
- since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes after 10 years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the
effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is
counted
- petition is denied
PANGAN VS. CA
FACTS:
The subject property is a 635 sq. meter lot owned by Leon Hilario. Petitioners are
Hilario’s grand children thru Silveria (daughter) and respondent, Teodora Garcia, thru
Catalina (daughter of Hilario).
9
 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
Petitioners filed an application of title on the ground of their continuous possession
of the property. There were no oppositors, so the application was approved.
Subsequently, respondent claims to have a right over the property as an heir of Leon
(since her mother is a daughter of Leon).
When the case reached the CA, the CA reversed decision of trial court saying that
petitioners have not acquired the land thru acquisitive prescription.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners have acquired land thru acquisitive prescription
HELD:
Petitioners claim that they have acquired acquisitive prescription by possessing and
paying the taxes of the land. SC said that tax declarations are not conclusive proofs
of ownership. SC said that tac declarations cannot be sole proof because the tax
declaration in their name could have been done out of convenience for the co-
owners.
According to the petitioners, there was such repudiation which was admitted by the
private respondent herself Testifying for herself at the hearing on her opposition in
the registration proceedings, she declared:
ATTY. CANLAS:
Q: After the death of Tomas Pangan, did you ask the heirs of Tomas Pangan of your
alleged share in the property in question?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did they tell you?
A: They said that I have no right to a share and they won't give me my share.
Q: How many years ago did you ask from them?
A: Immediately after the death of their father.
Q: That was some 20 years ago?
A: I do not know how many years ago.
Q: And during all that span of more than 20 years ago you did not file any action to
recover your share on the land in question?
A: No sir, it was only this time .
For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear
showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and that they
have been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the property
in question. It is only when such unequivocal notice has been given that the period
of prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest
them of their own title if they do not seasonably defend it.
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:
1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust;
2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que
trust; and
3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
SC said that the case at bar did not meet all 3 requirements.
MARITEGUI VS. CA
FACTS:
This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging to Lupo Mariategui,
who died without a will.
During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The first wife died, so he
contracted a second marriage. The second wife also passed away so he contracted a
third marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo in death.
The issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo left certain
properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Later, Lupo’s descendants
by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated unto themselves a certain lot of the Muntinglupa Estate and title
was issued. Now, Lupo’s children by his third marriage filed a complaint with the
lower court, contending that since they were co-heirs of Lupo’s estate they were
deprived of their respective shares in the lot mentioned. In answer, the other party
said that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial
partition but for recognition of natural children.
The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second marriage.
Thus, the case was elevated to the CA, where they raised the issue of their parents’
lawful marriage and their legitimacy as children.
CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the estate. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed
Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to successional rights over the
said lot
HELD:
The case is really one for partition. The question of the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the
deceased.
Existence of the Marriage
Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This
fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to his son who testified that
“when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his
mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal.” The
spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the
community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this
effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all the requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and
board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on
the following rationale:
“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law.
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married
must be admitted as a fact.
Filiation
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents.
Jacinto’s birth certificate was a record of birth referred to in Article 172 of the Code.
Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced
before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and
Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by
Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same
manner as their brother Jacinto.
Prescription of Action for Partition
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private
respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and therefore, the time
limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable
to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with
respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit
prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership.
10
 APGM [CASE DIGEST PRE-FINALS ON PROPERTY]CO-OWNERSHIP
In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the
co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner.
Petition dismissed.
HEIRS OF MANINGDING VS CA
Facts:
Heirs of Maningding and Bauzon claim that they own the disputed lots in common
and pro-indiviso. Bauzon aver that their father Roque was the owner of the lots by
virtue of a deed of donation.
According to the Maningdings, Roque repudiated the co-ownership over the
sugarland in 1965 and adjudicated it to himself and Maningding renounced and
quitclaimed their shares over the riceland in favour of Roque. Roque transferred the
Riceland to his son, Luis and the sugarland to his daughter, Eriberta, both evidenced
by deeds of sale.
Heirs of Maningding allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque Bauzon in
favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the
properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful.
Bauzon’s contentions:
* the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation over the riceland was executed not only
by Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding but also by Segunda Maningding.
* denied having executed the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with regard to the
sugarland.
* had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse and actual possession of the
subject properties.
Issue:
WON Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive
prescription.
Ruling:
YES.
Rogue Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive
prescription. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership
and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions
laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either
ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription
ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title
or of good faith.
Gallego|Gonzaga|Mali|Orapa|Tumulak|Sarucam|Sy
The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only by tax
declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now transferred to Luis and
Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case,
tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.
In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the
concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was
public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts
of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all. These acts
were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels of land are
located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly and
normally known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he
was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession
was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-founded belief that the
donation propter nuptias was properly executed and the grantors were legally
allowed to convey their respective shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to
himself the whole produce of the parcels of land to the exclusion of all others.
Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 11 Co-owners cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. In order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must
be clearly shown that he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were
apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive
period would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition, without specifying
the grounds for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice to the other co-owners
of the occupant's claim of title in himself in repudiation of the co-ownership. The
evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is
based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription
without any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the
possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights
of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie. 12
Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of
ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces
all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of
the rights of the other co-owners. As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his
heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who
were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they
demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their
shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36)
years to lapse before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the
consequence of their inaction.
11