Professional Documents
Culture Documents
THE MEANING OF
TEN ~uS,. ..AND" ,,,MOODS
~u
"
f';
'
-.
,";.'
',.
by
j
JAYASHREE A. GUNE
Assistant Editor, Sanskrit Dictionary,
Deccan College, Pune
r
.j'
~.
I
I
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';
I'UNE
!1978
.-~
:.
: : '.
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Professor
S. D .
.Joshi
-_...
---------------~
'."
'8
To
lunkar Road
Postgraduatl'
Professor
. Professor
S. D.
Joshi
George
Cardona
Doctor
Vijayendra
Pratap
~~---~~
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------------------------------
FOREWORD
I,
~ ~;
",
notes on the various sections of the book in which it has been intelligently divided afresh.
To a modern linguist what appeals most are the basic semantic
problems more than the clever use of a methodology current in earlier
days' and the arguments based on views then current. In'the field
of Sanskrit tenses and moods two such problems stand out clearly,
the concept of time or tense and the modality
of vidh'i ,or
.
. Iili, the exact
significance of which is as much relevant to the present_day thought
as it was. to the ancient grammarians and philosophers, More than
the systematic explanation of the grammatical forms in wl)ich they
excel, what IS more pertinent to us is their attitude towards language
and the daring they show in dealing. with the exact relation between
the lhlguistic expression and the. reality of experience as they. COIlceived. it. As such, no demarcation is made between linguistic meaning and' semantic level and the writers have boldly accepted the resulting problems and have attempted solutions some of which are acceptable even today. One cannot but come to the same conclusion as
the author, that time is not much different from our ideas of the
occurrence of events, a view which .coD;les close to the attitude of. a
modern philosopher like Bergson. Such an attitude alone is likely
. to explain satisfactorily the' usual gnimmatical categories of tense
based on cOnuTIon sense and daily usage. The analysis of the meaning of lin is remarkable in its subtility and its implications to such
philosophical and pragmatic systems as Nyliya and MimlitpSli. One
only wishes that the attempt to explain them - and the author has
done an excellent job in clarifying them-' should have gone a step
further by classifying and correlating them with the 'motives of
action', which are psychological like i$tasiidhanatva, circumstantial
like krtisiidltyatva or pragmatic like blalavadani$tiinanubandhitva and
their role in action. The difficulty which is felt by all the schools in
this regard is probably due to their insistance on having only ac,ingle
motive of one type or the other. Some new light can be thrown on
it by bringing in consideration of the historical development of the'
meanings of the lin forms of'Sanskrit and Greek. Of the. three uses
to which they .are put, optativus, potentiaJls arid prescription, the
hist one is of later' origin and has probably developed' from either
ofnie two,which are independent or each other $rid of.equal antiquity. Air attempt to derive one from: the other is not likely to
il
Ii
:1
The reading
ing and pleasant
studies on the 01
material is avail a
of explanation, if
to compress the
limitations put 0
the reader of sorr
to be printedha!
indulgence of tht
- - - - _ . _ .. -
succeed and the same holds good for the two notions of i$tasiidhan.atva
and krtisiidhyatva.
The reading of this monograph, besides being a thought-provoking and pleasant experience, only whets one's desire to expect similar
studies on the other aspects of, Sanskrit semantics for which ample
material is available. I should like to conclude with two more points
of explanation, if not of justification. At my request the author had
to compress the explanations to the maximum extent because of the
limitations put on the number of pages, which may have deprived
the reader of some nicer points and the hurry in which the work had
to be printed has caused some insignificant misprints for which the
indulgence of the reader is solicited .
to
's
'.'
This book d
the ten sets of ,
Here I must em)
distinction betw{
which was not dl
Grammarians an
New (navya) G
Ritualists etc. ar
scholar.
Considerable
works are appea
work has been de
successors who a
Nyaya and Mimi
sian and therefon
who have not stu
wiII be of some 1
nin).aya, which di:
Mimaqlsa, and {
opinions of some
suffixes, is very i
I am thankf1
authorities of th
of this work
I wish to e:
the Department
has been very ge
word of an earli{
suggestions.
I am also ~
of Sanskrit, Unb
field and has gil
_..
........
-----~-~---
j
?
PREFACE
This book discusses the meanings of the lakiiras (I-members),
the ten sets of verbal endings representing the tenses and moods.
Here I must emphasize that R1Wihi and his followers make a ~c1ear
distinction between forms - even abstract lakiira - and meanings
which was not done in the West. Semantic theories of the Indian
Grammarians and their development in the later schools of the
New (navya) Grammarians, as well as the Neologicians arid the
Ritualists etc. are therefore of tremendous interest to the modern
scholar.
Considerable work has been done on Ral.lini and many new
works are appearing on Patafijali and Bhartrhari. But not much
work has been done on the theories of meaning propounded by their
successors who as a help in their interaction with the schools of
Nyaya and Mimaqlsa have adopted thenavyanyiiya style of expression and therefore have remained inaccessible to students of grammar
who have not studied Nyaya. The present monograph, it is hoped,
.will be of some help in tbis direction. Kaun.(l<ibha~~a's Lakar,arthanirl.laya, which discusses the semantic theories of the schools of Nyaya,
Mimaqlsa, and of course Vyakaral)a, while also bringing in the
opinions of some Vedanta writers, concerning the tense and mood
suffixes, is very important from this standpoint.
/.
'I.
.-
~-
---.--
~-
"i,
I would also like to thank : Prof. Ludo Rocher of the Department of Oriental Studies, University of Pennsylvania, who has .alwaysbeen encouraging;
Prof. C. G. Kashikar and Pandit Shrinivasasastri whom I consulted on various maitters concerning Srauta and. Nyaya. res~ctively
with great profit;
.
. ..
My colleague, Shri. D. B. Polkam, who was a great help in
proof-reading and preparing the index;
Dr.. Vijayendra Pratap, Dr. V. W. Paranjape, Pandit. N. M.
Chirputkar and many other coJIeagues and friends who also helped
. me in various ways;
Shri. M. S. Latkar of SMS Letter Press, who has been very
co-operaitve throughout in spite of the very short time available
for printing.
]AYASHREE GUNE
f
1
Page Line
17
24
26
29
ST'
*.
31
,ab
3lT
30
38
"p{c
34
37
38
42
47
47.
47
49
50
56
67
68
12
37
an
thi
haree
imi
prg
iini
Ka
ind
28
22
26 .
29
4
24
27
..
m:
27
lA~
10
hOD
74
75
37
4
acc!
79
.icfcr.
8i
4
32
95
96
101
32
20
32
abt~
106
prec
<rr~
W-ir
bet
lj~
Studies, U niver:ing';
ri whom I coniya respectively
I
great help in
Pandit N. M.
Iho also helped
has been very
time available
SHREE GUNE
ERRATA
Page Line
. For,
Read
sr<;fi'l't'l
* **ji1iinabhava
abhidhii
17
24
26
31
11
***jiHibhava
,abidhii
29
srT~IW!<iT~"'l \UJ<i:cr
30
5
38 .
34
12
. anekathakatva
37
38
42
47
47
47
49
37
4
thin
hat
reconniling
imitor
prgtiyogita .. '.
iitlited
28
22
26
29
Fr-o<ct
Kau~abhatta
sr~+rl'1<ilfk"Hl~~J<i:cr
'PT>{,;;t .'
anekarthakatva
. this
that
reconciling
limitor
pratiyogita ...
Umited
KaU!):c;labhatta
individual
4
24
indivisual'
27
1l1<:'Iltfflll{
m<:'IT~l\l
TAT
housand
llT
68
27
10
thousand
74
37
accusatice
accusative
75
1fIt<! ~c<rTartt
1fI,~~~ijT~rtt:; ., . .
79
~cF!
8i
32
~1o'11<'r
95
32
96
101
20
abtained
be specifically be
32
'1W1~~
iij '"
106
preceds
preredes
50
56
67
'Wr#r
W1JOl!lQ{
H'
_obtained
specifically be
'1q;ii:q 1'.(
-,,~
:'.'.
Page
Read
For
Line
anvayitavaccheka
anvayitiivacchedaka
12
sakyatavaccheka
sakyatavacchedaka
Foreword
114
10
~'il<!mlif'<!"
l;'I<f<!T'i!rt<9~Cf
Preface
116
26
<!l'if.1l1fiRiT
<!l'ilrtl1G1fq
t1G.'rtf+l'i!Trtl?!l~Gf~RRr
Ix!longs
<J<!IRlIDi'lrt
109
1I2
Table of Contents
Introduction
127
17
129
37
Clll:rtm'ilTrtT?!l!};CfRl'lRfd
belong
130
32
<ftfaIDi'lrt
138
13
Cll;'ill!fcr"F'il'fiClT<!
t1~IlRr<r;:'il'liQl<!T
[A]
[B]
[C]
141
148
sabdakJu:t<;la
sabdakha:I).<;la
[D]
19
153
29 .
~?llg'iT~rtFJ:.
~~<!~1'l:.
154
34
llT<:~Ur
~,~Ur
155.
Jyotf~tma
]yotil?toma
156
. 160
2
. 13
inlination.
inclination
<!T~,\
<!T~TG:
175
13
mw-r.'lJfT~ll:I1S[ I
111~Ur~lq-
179
15
mgl1~m .
m'~~fQ
l;'Ill'IiTii'r
'.
l;'I.rifiT111
I.
!
lakiirWz
Is 'timE
Two pr
The M
The Ny
The Bh
[E]
[F]
[G]
[H]
The Pr~
The vie'
r 1] Refutati
ilft,Gsii .
. [J J Some p:
ilftasii,
[K] Analysis
nasti G
The aut!
[L]
.)....
Text, Translation ar
."
Section
"
"
"
. -L.. :
"
"
Bibliography
Index
L ..
1.'['
II.
III
IV
V
VI
VII
11
II
II
[e
l}
G
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
Foreword
Preface
Table of Contents
Introduction
1--50
lakiirfilJ, '[-members'
[A)
[B)
[C]
- [D)
[E)
[F)
[G)
[H)
[I]
. [J J'
[K]
[L]
1M]
1
5
12
16
21
25
29
32
36
41
45
48
49"_
. 51,-203' .
'
.
II. lIT
. \
5i.....
76.
~II IUT aridl1!-T
"
'78' .
. .
. IV lET (lIiir)
"
197
V lOT
"
198
VI lAiv, lIN, IUN.and 11!-N
" VII General
201'
"
204-,.214
Bibliography
Index
213-216
,)
INTRODUCTION
[A]
lakariil; 'I-members'
as
j,
j
~
)
of it, and the bases and suffixes that fonn the inflected words. According to the particular bias of the..oe different schools, their theories
differed, and thus there is a great deal of controversy about the meaning of all these parts of a sentence. Kaui,JJc;iabhatta's Lakiiriirthanir,I,laya, translated here, is devoted to a detailed analysis of these
theories of meaning concerning the I-members, i.e., the ten sets of
verbal endings representing tenses and modalities.
[A-2]lakiiralJ 'I-members' are the ten Pa:Q.inian symbols:
IAT, lIT, IUT, llq, lET, lOT, lAN, lIN, IUN, and IJ]N, used in
grammar. These endings do not occur in actual utterances. They
belong to Par;tini's metalanguage. The endings actually used are
ti (third person singular present), t (third person sinl1;ttlar imperfect) etc. But, for grammatical purposes, these are considered to be
the replacements (iideStis) of the I-members. Thus all the verbal
endings are subsumed under the single symbol I, to which J""al).ini
assigns the general meanings kartr 'agent', karnzan 'object', and
bhiiva 'action', by P. III.4.69 lalJ karma1ji ca bhiive ciikarmukebhyal}
[Z- (members are introduced after a verbai root, when) karman
'object', (or kart! 'agent' is to be denoted); and if (the verb is)
intransitive, (when) bhiiva 'action' (is to be denoted)] .
[A-3] Ten separate members aredistiriguished by the use of '
markers. The function of I is to group toget.her all' these, different
'endings. 'The markers T and N distinguish primary endings from
'
secondary endings.
[A-4] We now consider the particular meanings of these
,suffixes. I-members denote not only kartT, karman and bhiiva, but
,also are used with reference to time and modalities. The function
of the vowel markers following l's is to disting-uish affixes introduced
for particular tenses or modalities. Six I-members an; used when
actions are re.ferred to particular times: IAT (present); lIT (past
beyond the "ken of the speaker); IAN (past exclusive of today);
IUN (past in general) ; IUT ,(future exclusive of today) ; IJ]T (future
in general). The other four I-members have no reference to time,
They are: liN (optative or potential + precative); lOT (imperative); IJ]N (conditional) and lET (subjimctive).
,
[A--5] As explained in [A...:2] , the meanings assigned to these
l~members are really expressed by the actual endings' ti, t etc. But
Pi'inini
. does not need to say specifically that these meanings belong
to the replacements (iidesas) , because of, the assumption that a re,
INTRODUCTION
placement has tt
Just the introdt
Thus KaUlJ~abl:
'Q;'Iil'l:
>!~ 'Q;~
denotative funct
of conveying a
(prrakalp- ) to ,
(k,aipita, assum
I-members are ir
(karman),' and:
Thus it is (
to denote a mean
assumed to exist
Grammarians. 1
such as P. IlIA
having the deno
taking recour~e
ments on it" sur
The early L
ingto them, the
placements like .
mind the Z-meml
brevity. Assumi
replacements lea<
the 1-IIl"JI1ber COl
This cannot
uttered C3n be s
it is the non-ul;ter
The Grammarian
mount. Their al
grammar. Thus
~.<D" s"ht'f['f'I'i:
that expresses m
(This seems to '
R~"'l~ ~~
'it
is uttered', in tl
P. I.1.68 (M.B.'
Moreover, if
,S AND MOODS
INTRODUCTION
nian symbols:
:l llJ.J.iT, used in
:erances. They
:ually used are
sing"'l!lar imper:onsidered to be
l ali the verbal
:> whiCh PaJ).ini
n 'object', and
likarmakebhyah
when) karman
f (the verb is)
;.:1) 1.'
:l by the use of
I these different
"y endings from
mings of these
and bhiiva, but
. Tlfe function
ffixeiftiltroduced
are used when
:ent); lIT (past
lsive of today);
lY) ; IlJ.T (futur,e
=ference to time.
I; lOT (imperalssigned to the&e
(s ti, t etc. But
meanings belong
lPtion that a re-
,,
-.-~-------~~- ~-
---~-
---
INTRODUCTIOJ'.
pectively. As
meaning 'locus'
case suffix.
The Gramr
the Ritualists.
sthiininyapi ma,
suffixes when a
'you'. If, inste:
vity, it cannot 1
the system of n
will not operatl
Moreover, .
sentences: '.
(a)
~""
base devadatta
mental proper
that meaning, s<
mental case calli
saka view is ace
'agent.' Since,
P. 11.3.18 wiII :
the undesirable
(b) The s
also. If object
then the namim
case by P. 11.3
~'!tt
CI~:
,.
To avoid tl
considered as th
About bhiit
verb is intransiti'
schools. For a
see Joshi 1960,
[BJ Is 'time' ~
[&-1] In
another meanin~
discussing the n
raised: is this
AND MOODS
:hem to mind,
f. thus has no
;e their meanremember the
e cognition of
s not remem, replacements
is not at all
e achievecl in
ead of all the
ning that the
heard, rather
!rned to mind,
INTRODUCTION
cussion of'. this question concerns all the six I-members that have
reference to time.
The theory of the co-significative function is controversial. The
grammarians use it in various degrees in their meaning analysis of
particles (nipiittas) , and nominal, verbal and feminine endings. According to this theory, particles and these suffixes do not denote an
independent meaning of their own. Where does the additional meaning come from then? For example, in the sentence, \l+r.a:r ~1l:'1"U].a:r
'Rfuna and Lak$matl).a', the particle ca 'and' brings in the additional
meaning of collocation. This is explained by saying that the meaning
collocation also belongs to the words 'Rllima and Laki!mm;Ja', but
these worns are not capable of expressing it unless they are accom. panied by the particle ca. The function of the particle .ca is then
to help the words 'Rama' and 'Lak$mmJa' to express their particular
meaning, i.e., collocation.' In other words, collocation is not the denoted (vacya) but co-signified (dyotya) meaning of the particle CiIl_
The example involving feminine ending and a particle used as a
verbal prefix are as follows: deva can denote a god or a goddess.
In the latter case, the. feminine suffix i is used as a co-signifier.
Similarly, the root bhu 'become,. be' can also be used transitively in'
the meaning 'experience'; in this case the particle siikt is used as a
co-signifier. Thus a co-signifier can be likened to light, that while
, not creating things, only indicates those things that already are in a
room_ A co-signifier just brings to mind the meaning denoted by
the word that accompanies it, while not possessing any meaning of
its own. (Co-signifier~ness has been'defined as ~U+nlrc<rr~f.rWl
~m'ii'li<'fB:.
in P.L.M., p.1l3). The same theory has been used
to explain the meaning of the nomin81 endings. Depending on which
of the five or six different views about the meaning of the nominal
base was adopted, one or more of the following five meanings would
be considered to be belonging to the base, and the rest would be
denoted by the nominal ending. These five meanings are Hili 'generic
property', vyakti 'individual', li1iga 'gender', sa1JZkhya 'number', and
kiiraka 'participant in activity'. In the last view, where all five are
considered to belong to the base, the suffix is still not meaningless,
because it co-sIgnifies these meanings. Now the question under Onsideration is whether to apply .the same prinCiple to the meaning
'time' in a verbal form. Thus it is asked, is this 'time' co-signified
INTRODUCTION
or dene
According to
the meaning 'timE
however, this me;
I-members (as il
praises', ek., whe
sary to help brinf
of I-members. T
noted meaning 0
meaning of the I
can be said to be
ing is not create(
to be the denoted
'needs the use of
can be said to bE
the accompanyin!
[B-2] Mea
The meaninB
varthaniI1l).aya 'I
According to Ka\
(v yapiira) , and i
separate denotati1
Nagffiabhatt
are 'not two sepe
single combined
combined in such
active sentence, a
ordinate' qualifieI
result is predomi
according to the
have to be consi
according to the
sentence meaninf
meaning 'time',
.also denotes 'tin
its result.
[B-3] I{m
namely, that l-rr.
'time', separatel:
(dyotya)
t,
-----
AND MOODS
"'&;"l'r[~
;he additional
,t the meaning
k~mar:J.3', but
:y are accom:le ,ca is then
ieir particular
is not the dele particle w.
Ie used as a
or a goddess.
a cosignifier.
ransitively in
t is used as a
Lt, that while'
eady are in a
g d.enoted by
y meaning of
'rc<nt>;d~;;:Pr~ lasb'een used
ling on which
the nominal
,anings would
est would be
e jati 'generic
number', and
:e all' five are
meaningless,
III under Onthe meaning
e' cosignified
INTRODUCTION
i,
Ij
~
Ii
INTRODUCTION
4
1
I.'.,
i
J
1;-
meaning. In eit
verbal root signif
ficative function,
I-member can be
I t does not deno
[B-4] Agai
establish that th,
signify it. The j
to be the denote(
function will hay
for this one mea
by the suffix alon
tative function. '
ment is based 0:
I-members to del
lA T to denote
P. II1.2.123 are
denote specific n
There should be
. preted.' AS,we h
to mean that 1-ri1.
'agent' etc. Thel
interpreted to m.
Thus it is the I-I
not a verbal roo1
mean that lAT (
who maintain th
P.III.4.69 wouk
meaning agent (,
would also be co
signified by the ,
these two faults 1
of I-members.
[B~5]'But
. _ - - _--....
,S AND ",'I00DS
INTRODUCTION
lefined as (a)
brings out the
ignifier), or as
:onveyer of in-
I
J
L.
..
--_.
"---"--~- ..".-----.,.-~.--
-.-
.. -..
,----.--~.--
-_.
---------------------------
10
INTRODUCTION
-time. And, if, in spite of this, it does so apply itself to this meaning,
then since 'time' is a specific meaning of that particular I-member,
as opposed to the meanings 'agent" and 'object', which belong to all
the I-members the general meaning will be set aside to make room
for the specific meaning. In sUpport of this, the 't.akrakauIJrJinyanyiiya is brought in. (This has been explained in detail in my notes
on [1.7] also see note 2 on [I.17] for comments). Thus, if time is
accepted to be the denoted meaning of the I-members that have reference to it, then the general meanings agent etc., will not be denoted
by them. To avoid this undesirable eventuality, the view saying
that time is denoted by l-members has to be set aside.
[B-6] , After thus first discussing both the alternatives, and
. showing how _there are difficulties in accepting either of these,
.Katll.l9-abhaHa shows how both of these alternatives have support
in the Bha~ya. The same passage (M.B. vol. 2: p. 123) has been
utilised to givesuppon to both the views. This has been made clear
in the text, and need: not be repeated here.
In order to avoid the fault that all the roots will have to have
an additional denotative function to denote 'time,' if 'time' is accepted
as a meaning of the verbal root, it is suggested that 'time' is hothing
but the series of activities. "IiT<'5I ~ C<f[(rrH!;:(jT~Tfufhn) - kala 'time'. is
generally considered to be the measurer of action fs!;<n<[Ko~G;'fi: "lire:
.But at the same time, it can also be -said that time is measured by
action, since division of time cannot be made without the help of some
action. Time cannot be the measurer of action without having divisions, and it cannot be divided without being associaied with some
action. Thus the more basic notion of time is that it has action as a
determinant. ~N"Ii: 'liT<5: Thus just as a crystal looks red when
it IS in the proximity of a red hibiscus flower, time evep though it is one
and undivided, seems to have divisions when associated with action.
_ According to grmnmarians, this is still on a popular level and has
D_O reference to actuality. According to them, time and action are
one and the same because time has no reference to anything outside
the domain of action. Order in time. is the order of the different
moments of action or activities. There is an activity for every stage
of time, and thus kala itself may be called vyapara. ( 'liT<5 Q;'l' ~ f'l'''''T<<!T
o'lT<[T~ '{Rf 'li~'la
V.P., II1.9.12). Kaiyata also says that action
----
I'li<{Tra<:<fR~a:R"IiT<5
vol. 3, p. 281) .
I
)
. I
That vyapiira
already been diSCl
Thus since time h
activities (Le. acti
meaning of the vel
by the verbal root
signifier of the me
tative function for
Thus prolixity
the root and then
can be accepted.
But the other
ing 'time' can alsc
bhatta takes recour
lAT to denote the
has gone- against .t
by Bhattoji DIk~itl
a root when the 2
present. Thus lA
present, but merel)
the meaning of the
grammarian who
Another argument
and thus not deno1
ment that describl
111.9.2.) . This ca:
same. Thus time
be prolix to attrit
since an additiona:
root to denote it.
What of the (
taken to denote thE
such as the agEmt
This objection has
of that which sets a
__ ....oil
"'-,._.
IS AND MOODS
o this meaning,
:ular I-member,
:h belong to all
to make room
akrakaw:ujinya:ail in my notes
rhus, if time is
s that have re. not be denoted
he vie", saying
de.
ternatives, and
ither of these,
s have support
123) has been
been made clear
n have
to have
ime' is accepted
time' is nothing .
kala 'time' is "
i<!TqR~~: 'fire:
is measured by
the help of some
)ut having diviated with'i some
has actiori as a
I looks red when
though it is one
ted with action.
.r level and has
and action are
mythirig outside
of the different
. for every stage
'fil<il' 11:'1 ~ f'l'flT.+n
INTRODUCTION
---
11
vol. 3, p. 281).
That vyaparasantiina is the meaning of the verbal root has
already been discussed and justified in the DhatvarthanirI).aya II.
Thus since time is considered to be nothing more than a series of
activities (i.e. action), and action has already been accepted as the
meaning of the verbal root, it naturally follows that time is denoted
by the verbal root. Thus the objection that IAT cannot be the cosignifier of the meaning time, unless the verbal root has the denotative function for it, is removed.
Thus prolixity is avoided, and the view that time is denoted by
the root and therefore only co-signified by the I-members concerned
can be accepted.
But the other alternative, i.e., that l ..members denote the meaning 'time' can also be shown to be justifiable. For this, KaUl!~a
bhana takes recourse to the wording of P. III.2.123, which introduces
lAT to denote the meaning present. In doing this, KaUiI).Q.abhatta
has gone against the traditional interpretation of this rule accepted
by Bhattoji Dik~ita etc., accordingto whidi, IAT isintroduceo. after.
a root when the action that is the meaning of that root is in the
present. Thus lAT seems' to' be used not to denote the meaning
present, but merely introduced when that meaning already exists in
the meaning of the root. As far as I know, Kam.t;labhtta is the only
grammarian who went. against this traditional. interpretation.
Another argument in favour of taking time as separate from action
and thus not denoted by the verbal root, is the V'akyaparuya statement that describes time as being the measurer of action (V.P.,
111.9.2.) . This cannot be true if time and action are one and the
same. Thus time must be separate from action. Therefore, it will
be prolix to attribute this additional meaning to the verbal root,
since an additional denotative function will be necessary in every
root to denote it.
What of the objection mentioned in [B-5]? If tAT etc. are
taken to denote these specific meanings, then their general meanings
such as the agent etc. will not be denoted. This is undesirable.
This objection has been answered by saying that there is no relation
of that which sets aside and that which is set aside (biidhyabiidhaka-
. _ - - - _..
12
--------
b.hiiva) between these two meanings, since both can exist together.
Thus 'time' can be the denoted meaning of the I-members.
[B-7] , After showing that both. the alternatives that time is
denoted by the I-members and that time is cosignified by them can
be justified, and can be shown to have support in the Bha~ya,
KaUil).Qabhatta finally states his own view, which combines the features from both of these views as stated so far. Thus time is accepted
by him as being one and the same as action. The general notion of
time is thus denoted by the verbal root, when it denotes action.
But the specific aspect of time such as presentness etc., are denoted
by the I-member concerned. Thus while accepting that action and
time are one and the same, KaUIQ.Qabhat;!:a still manages to follow the
strict wording of the rule P. III.2.l23, which introduces IAT to ex. press the meaning present. . 'The traditional interpretation of this
.ule does not strictly follow the wording of the rule, though it; is
accepted by all the commentators. The doubt raised in the Bha~ya
about the usages (!+[ 31Hr1tJ:
etc. is also set to rest if this view is
accepted.
[C] Two problems about vlartamiinatva
[C-l] Katyayana has discussed the meaning of vartamiinatva
in five viirttikas on P. nt2.123. Two problems are niised. In the .
text (see [UOJ etc.), reference is made to the discussion of one of
them, namely, how to account for the use of present suffixes when
an action goes on continuously without stopping (nityapravrtta) ,
so that it is difficult to characterise it as either past, present, or
'future. This pmblem actually concerns all the six I-members referring to time. Thus IDityayana says f.wlll"~ 'q 'liTO!n~'lWlltJ: vt. 2 ad
P. III.2.123. lAT is to be used to express presentness which has
been explained as the time characterised by an action which has begun
but not ended. (see [1.2] note 1). In that case, how can we justify
the use of lAT in sentences such as 'the mountains stand', or 'the
self exists'? The action in question here has no conceivable beginning or end. The existence of the self is eternal without beginning
or end. How can we then speak of it as having' existed, existing
now, or about ;to take place? The use of present, . past, and .of
future will be equally hard to explain in this case. It is with this
background that the Bha~ya raises the question regarding the justification.of the use of IAT in these sentences.
Kaiyata goes even further. In the Pradipa on Vt. 2 (vol. 3,
...
~~
INTRODUCTION
'to
I
I
(1
I!
I
Ira
'q
"!il<?fe1+!ll
r.
19 of iJ'artamiinatva
. are raised. In the'
liscussion of one of
esent suffixes when
g (nftyapravftta) ,
r past, present, or
p. 280), it has been explained that since the eternal action cannot
be associated with the three divisions of time, it cannot really be an
action either. An action is supposed to be siidhya 'an entity which
is about to be brought about', and since the standing of the mountains and the existence of the self are eternal, they are not siidhya
'to be brought about'. Whatever is siidhya has to come into being,
i.e., it has to have existence in future, and after destruction, In past.
Both of these are not possible in the case of the standing of the
mountains' or the existence of the self. Since presentness is merely
the counterpositive of the past and the future, it (presentness) is not
possible either. Since all three' divisions of time cannot thus be
associated with the standing of the mountains, it cannot be an action,
.because an aGtion is invariably an object of usage in terms of these
three divisions. . (~lifi~<{~11T<JC<{'1~l.:]qq'1<'l~'1111'11~~<{T: ~fu liTO:Uddyota on Vt. 2 ad P. III.2.123, vol. 3, pp. 279-280).
"'RI :q '!il<'l']q111'n: Vt. 5 answers this objection by asserting that
there are divisions of time even in 'these actions that go on eternally.
The B~ya explains the existence of these divisions by adding a
qualification to the eternal action in the form of the limiting factor
of the actions onhe kings belonging to different times. The actions
of the kings are cOllsidered' to be the locus of the standing of the
mountains.. The standing of the mountain:s as limited by its locus,
i.e., the actions of different kings belonging to different times does
have kiilavibJUigii/;L 'division/, in time'.
.
Now, since the standing of the mountains as limited by its locus,
(the existence of the kings) can be associated with the three divisions
of time, it can be called an action. (<fQ: '!il~~r.r: 5!C!: f'li~'l'<'lfli",'.l:
Uddyota on Vt. 5 ad P. III.2.123, vol. 3, p. 282).
. [C-2] The other problem raised in the Bha~ya (not mentioned
in our text) is the use of the present tense in cases where there are
.
,
breaks in the action. The examples are:. ~ s!"l111~ 'here we are
studying', ~l!: '1~11: 'here we are living', and the last but very
famous one is . ~l!: :J;0'!l'l:f,r '!lw:!l+!: 'here we make Pu~yamitra
sacrifice' (i.e., we act as sacrificers at sacrifices initiated by Pu~ya
mitra). All these actions 'go on for an extended amowt of time.
While they lire going on, that is, when they have begun but not
ended, various breaks occur, a~, for example, taking a meal etc.
14
We are not actually studying while taking a meal. But the action
of studying has not ended and the sacrifice is not finished. The
I-member lAT cannot be introduced by P. III.2.123 to derive adhimahe etc., since studying does not actually occur when one is eating, etc., and III.2.123 introduces lAT with reference to an action actually
taking place (vartamiina).
This objection is met in two viirttikas :
(1) t~'1P:"lT <9T<:+l1Ff,!911f<J.:
(The present endings [bhavantil
are) justified, since (an action) has begun and has not ended.
8TI~
't[
I1'fClWIT't Fl<:T+r:
I
iI
I
II
i
I
~
I
~
1
j
!
I
I
I
i
i
!
I
i
INTRODUCTION
~Ef919'19f.t;'f[ I ~l~<n<
pravrUoj
denote an activity
has now abandoned
of ~~\a '1<:lilifiUr ;:
spots of others now'
sa1'flPraii, but reall
activity denoted b3
(2)
vrUiivim
the Bha~ya. It wa
in [C-2] was stan
(3) nityapro
This explains usag
where the action i
been discussed in [
(4) Siil'nipye
past are covered b:
for example,_
'fl'
from the town'?
KriyaRaSa p. 2).
-[C-4] In th
important. Pa:Q.in:
out giving any de!
explanation is att,
time is that by wb
is indicated. ~ 1
P. II.2.5, M.B. vo:
that when associa
called by various t
of the time into d
ciation of action w
or longer duratior
INTRODUCTION
ndings [bhavantiJ
IS not ended.
: even in such clear
tense as
"fI'S'-fa
,
_eating here is not
may laugh, talk
lre going on, there
tions are not conle, they are merely
~
( ,,1"CI;:l'l"'li<'91'<111JT;:r
called obstacles
are accepted as
se suffix, although
t constant, hence,
)ted'. In this case
I does not cause a
~akrtt'l!(l. Kaiyata
Ipossiple to go on
eal cail be said to
[f":Pf.'Wf'l1'P1'ff,p~fcr
, p. 280). These
lddesa. He notes
d with something
:I (b) The actions
, should be taken
;f they contribute
action, even if it
as a part of the
t. (<I'\"CR:l<"n!l l!
15
16
INTRODUCTION
teach (my)
( e)
sar(tprasna 'iT
'should I stue
(f) priirthana're
II
;
I
~
I
\
I
l,
,
ii
I.
According to 1'.
four' of these' mear
According to NageS
. pravartalla. This n
stead of saying just
he does in P. III.3.:
(a) in order to ;
(llyiiyavyutp,
(b) in order to e:
of the. suffix
:po 160, Laghl
p. 33), also I
that lIIir shOD
tcmii, and tha
sake of expar
Once one has d
question follows: '
[D-2] pravaro
pravartana 'ills1
which leads to anot
by X of an optative
0'111f[~: );{gc\9if;!ir ~
thus the person who
him: X is a pra
(pravartakatva) is
perty of uttering ar
INTRODUCTION
!,
. lIN in P. I1I.3.
'iirthane$U
lin) .
r introducing lIN.
17
-.-.-_ .. -- - -------,..... _-
...
.
-------_. - - - -
18
INTRODUCTION
LaghuMafi. p. 959.
(a) an iif1b,a is a person qualified as follows: he is devoid of
confusion, anger, etc., he does not indulge in certain actions
which would lead 'to undesiredresuits, or preclude one's reach- .
ing desired results. (LaghuMa:n. pp. 959-960).
(b) as n9ted in (2) above, a prava'rtana is to be. qualified by an
absence of any inhibitory factor.
.
On account of the conditions described above by (a) and (b),
a person Y does not perform the act he is commanded to do in the
following instances :
(1) If an enemy of Y says, 'eat poison', Y does not do this.
1'he enemy is not iipta. Hence, Y infers that his eating will lead
to no desired results, nor does he consequently eat.
(2) even if an ,apba says, 'eat poison, but do not eat in this
person's house'-, Ydoesrtot immediately proceed to eat poison.. For,
':h~re there is an inhibitory faCtor : . Y knows that eating poison isa
means to an undesired result, namely, his death. This conclusion
produces an aversion (dvle~a), which is an inhibitory factor (p7atib,andhaka). In effect, the sentence uttered is intended to convey
that Y should not eat in this person's house, because it would lead
to undesired result~.
[D..:31 The inference mentioned above (3), that leads to Y
I
I-
'I:
Jyoti~toma
\
i!
i
sacrifice'
of as the statement 0:
of Indian philosoph
'not composed by .rr
prav.artakagiveiiin.
, Therefore, for t
pravartanii isa state:
perty of the words ,
~~ lTemrrl fu~qR;Qi'l~q
[D-5] We ha\
I. As regards]
(a) lIN denot
- ._-........
] he is being asked
Ie desires, and that
he has been instiJ"frl;{'f,Tl:r19for~<rr ~
fa ) (fer: ll"'lRr: I
" he is devoid of
in certain actions
'eclude one's reachc960) .
be qualified by an
, by (a) and (b),
mded to do in the
. does'!'not do this.
:s. eating will lead
3.t.
do
. that leads. to y
19.
INTRODUCTION
of
'.
. . ----.. '-----~---.--.-----,... --
"."
20
INTRODUCTION
an
(2)
I
!
I
I
,,
!
I
I
1
one know
one kno~
There is desire
cause of desiring th(
absence of misery) ,
desiring to perform
knowledge that the
can be performed,
leads to excessivel~
14648) .
[D-7] In ace
are held regarding
of which leads to :
(1) It is pra:
factor. From this i
desired; and feasib
activity. This is th
[D-2 to D'-6J.
(2) It is a c
y,atva, and .( c)ba,
the Naiyayikas, an
(3) It is b.ha
and has been acce]
(4) It is kiir
(5) and fina'
believe that the or
means to a desired
Xnandatirtha and
In the followil
[E] The Nyaya .
[E-IJ This
meaning of lIN ac
vidhi is then defir
desire to do, which
precisely, that pro!
to do (p. 142). T
'feasibility' , (b) ~
something desired'
(3)
INTRODUCTION
21
(2)
).
.
.
I
~
~
I
I
_.-'---
"--'-~-'-<,"-
'.--.
_ , _
----------
INTRODUCTION
22
[E-3]
kitisiidhyatv,a
The Naiyayikas argue that the agent does not become inclined
to act unless he knows that the action concerned can be accomplished
by him with effort. He does not proceed to perform such impossible
tasks as bringing the peak of the golden mountain Meru, or to produce rain (vr~tikara1Ja), or to create or bring the moon, even thougJ:!
these actions might be able to-produce some-desired resultS for him.
It is only when it is-known that the activity in question can be performed, that the agent becomes inclined towards it.
An objection has been raised, that, this property of being
feasible, may have once existed in some particular activity, and tow'ards which then there would be inclination to act, even though, the
action is not possible now. Thus creating the moon was possible
once, when the moon was first created. It has been proven to be
not impossible to do, and thus feasible. Therefore, there will be
inclination towards thIS activity, if feasibility is considered to be a
meaning of lIN, and thus an instigator (see [IV.B.13]). This objection has been met by adding the qualification idiinim 'now' to
feasibility. The action in question has to be feasible 'n~w' for this
property to be the instigator. Since the creating of the moon is not
possible 'now', there will no inclination towards this act. Thus there
is no fault.
.
Further, another argument used in favour of accepting feasibility
as a meaning of lIN, is as follows: There are negative injunctions such as ~: ~ ;or a'tl:. 'a cripple should not cross the sea
1.l
\.
4tasiidlza
23
INTRODUCTION
:: The dharmin of
Z, yiiga etc., for ex)rm ending in lIN,
(by swimming) '. The negative particle here negates the injunction,
which in this case, will not make any sense, if only the property of
being a means to a desired end is accepted as the instigator. Crossing
the sea might fulfill the fondest wish of the cripple, and thus definitely
be a means to a desired end. Therefore, the negative particle must
here be taken as negating feasibility. It is not possible for a cripple
to swim across the sea. It is necessary for this reason,to accept
feasibility as one of the three meanings of lIN (sabdasaPra. p. 143).
~T'.;'1:
W:!ml;J;of <!<"'1q:-
aeans to something
i greatly undesired
Ig according to the
tioned above. To
~ing instigated, the
y necessary; None
es that all three of
nsidered as causes
ot become inclined
be accomplished
rm such impossible
n Meru, or to promoon, even though
oed results for him.
lestion can be perit.
;>roperty of being
:1' activity, and to~, even though, the
noon was possible
Jeen pr6ven to be
'ore, there will be .
~onsidered to be a
B.13] ). This ob- idiinim 'now' to
ible 'now' for this
)f the moon is not s act. Thus there
:In
;cepting feasibility
, negative injuncnot cross the sea
[E-3]
4tasiidhanatva
The other property necessary for causing an inclination to actis i~t,asiidhanatva 'the property of being a means to something desired' .
Mere knowledge of an injunction will not make a person act, even
after he has ascertained the feasibility of the activity in question,
unless he knows that this will achieve something that he desires.
It is because lIN has the property of being a means to a desired end
as its denotatum, that an injunction Can instigate the agent
to act.
If an action is of no use in producing a desired result, then the agent
is not inclined towards performing it.
It is necessary to accept 4tasiidhanatva as a meaning of lIN, to
account for the following negative injunction. Q:1WJ;Tii'r 'Jf~ 'rclT:S'l _
'one desirous of satisfaction (from hunger), should not thrash
the water'. Here. the negative particle -negates the injunction. It
will not make sense, if, the injunction meant feasibility only. The
action in question is perfectly feasible. But for a person who desires
satisfaction of his hunger and thirst, this useless activity will bring
no desired result. Thus it is the property of being a means to a
desired end, that is being negated here. It is because of the absence
of this property that there is no inclination to act.
A problem has been raised as to how two properties such as
feasibility and the property of being a means to a desired end, can be
cognised at the same time as existing in the same thing. -A means
(sfidhana) has to be a finished thing (siddhadharma) , whereas sfidhya
meanS something which is to be accomplished yet. These two are
thus contradictory. A solution to this problem has been found by
stating that the cognition of the property of being a means (sfiiihanatva) and the property of being possible to accomplish "(sadhyatva) ,
are not both cognised in the same instant. Thus there is no contradiction. What is cognised is that this thing which will be a means
INTRODUCTION
24
b.alavadan4tananubandMtva:
vadan4tananub,andhit
of
I
1
L ..
INTRODUCTION
i, is feasible now..
'<rr~Mal).iDa. p. 54)
iesired result is the
iT. The Naiyayikas
, desired result were
inclination towards
;11 accomplish satist a desirable taste.
: desired, i.e., trpti.
se death due to the
towards the eating
.: entailing a greatly
us there is nQ voHSince this property
lsidered to be the
'N is also necessary
'one'should not
note 1 .on section
sfy hunge!;", and is
eans to hell. Thus
fed result of satisly undesired result,
lut what balavada~
.y taken to be the
;anakatvajnana or
) mean the absence
,I cause something
a negative condiof what has been
t accept the third
he causes of voH)me fruit, he has
II
-----~
----
--~
-----
2S
(a) the desire for the fruit (phaleccha). For this, the knowledge of the fruit concerned is the cause.
(b) the desire for a means to gain this fruit (upayeccha). For
this, the knowledge of the property of being a means to something desired, is the cause (on kiirika 146). The desire to do (cikira) results
from this icc.ha, which according to Mukta. on kiirika 147, comes from
the knowledge of feasibility and the property of being a means to
something desired. In this, Visvaniatha's view is the same as the
general Naiyayika view. However, Visvanatha does not accept balavadan4tiinanubandhitva 'the property of not entailing a greatly undesired result', as one of the causes of volitional activity. How then
is the inclination to eat food mixed with honey and poison avoided?
It is certainly feasible, and being capable of satisfying hunger, it is
. also a means to something desired. To get out of this difficulty,
. instead of accepting bahavadani$tananubandhitva as a cause of the
inclination to do, Visvanatha has a pratibandhaka 'deterrent' to this
activity, namely, balavaddvitasiidhantitiijiiiina 'cognition of the
property of being a cause to something very much undesired' (kiirikii
148). Knowing that the activity in question will result in som~thing
for which the agent has great aversion prevents the desire to do.
Alternatively; the deterrent is'said to be 'great avtrsion' (balavaddv,ealJ) itself (Muk!a. p. 508).
[F] The Bhati;a Mimarp.sa view '
[F-l] The Bhat1;a Mim~sakas analyse the 'sentence ~Q
'a person desirous of heaven should sacrifice', as follows:
In this sentence, sacrifice is prescribed for a man with heaven as a
goal. The form ending in lIN, namely, yajeba, has two parts: the
verbal root yaj 'to sacrifice', and the suffix. This suffix also has two
properties: suffiimess in general, and the property of being lIiV
(lintvla) . The property of being a verbal ending (iikhyiitatva) is
common to all the ten I-members. li1itva is proper only to lIN. Both
of these aspects express bhavanii 'bringing about'. bhiiVlanii has been
defined as follows: <=rf;!gir'l<lr::i'fi<'lT m'lf<lgei:{fq]'~~lq: ['bhavanii]
is the activity on the part of the instigator, which is conducive to the
bringing about of what is being produced' (ArthaSaip.. p. 18). Thus
in the case of a simple sentence such as 3l1~ q'ilfu ~'<!; 'Devadatta
is cooking rice', rice is being produced (bhavitub = 'utpadYamiinasya). The activity on the part of Devadatta, which is conducive
26
"
INTRODUCTION
. (b) is satisfied h.
What is meant by thi!
tion of lIN cannot rn
explaining this. (1)'
f;fibdi bhiivanii. It doe
but not known to the:
of llN. lIN so to say 1
we see a blue pot, and
011 it, that does not me
of the eye and the p<
know it only when ou
of the eye and the pot
ledge of the blue COI01
does not create the col
the cognition of llN
iibdi b.hfivanii.
agent.
(2)
It
the other
iibdi bhiivanii is not (
However the goal of
no prior existence. 1'1
(c) is satisfied
of the activity concel
In this way, thi
[i.e., (a), (b), and
inclined to act. iiitl
and they are satisfi~
(a) the goal:
(b) the means
(c) how to :
prayaja etc.
Thus the. wholE
INTRODUCTION
produce a desired result. , If the agent has a desire for such a result,
there is inclination to act. sabdi bhiivanii causes this iirthi bhiivanii.
Thus KUJ:Illirilabhat\a says :
CfSfT~hfW!iI1:ft f<'s6'IfG:~~l"li <r: ~q Q"fcr ,Fil;;'[9iC<fl'lI1:: ~ W:Cl1'l": ~Q,,'i!ms
ii'r<!n~!l"lil <=fl'l;:rl f~f~I~<~~'1~ \ (TantraVilL p. 378) .
nil.
27.
I
I
I
I
I
,
1
,J
~
.28
yajeta svargak{ima~!
I
dh{itu
pratyaya
yaj
I
yaga
lin/va
akhYatatva
I
fdbdi bhavana
'firlhi bh?ivana
pravartana
vy7wara
sadhana
arthi
bh'avana
linadijftiina
itikarlavyala
karmaprasastyaviSi~ta li,i(idijfiana
s'adhana
svarga
yaga
The Prabhakara
rG-ll
(
sadhya
stidhya
INTRODUCTION
itikartavyalii
I
prayajadi
angajala
i~tasjjdhal
to the prabhakaras.
It ceases to' exist the :
supposed to result f:on
'of the sacrifice, until a
position of the sacri!iI
as the means of achle'
cannot be the means
inclination to perforn
of being a means to a
Well, in that cas(
direct cause to heave!
generates apurva ar:(
Through this, connect!
to achieve the desired
The Prabhi.ikaras
according to them, for
means either, since
1:f<:+q~1<rt'il'1'9~fq il;1
word dviira is here u
(for definition of vyi
29
INTRODUCTION
,
"-
r
akhyalalva
arlhi bhav7ina
vyap7ira
~'
I
'
sastya7,..
iidi-
/
\
itikarlavyafii
I
pray7ijadi
a1;gaj7ila
'
.'
"'i-:" ':' -.
.:... -.: "
" ': - ,;- .
.,-., .: "-"
toachleve the deSIred heaven.: . , ..,,,,' ,"';(<:,';:
','it" ': ,'C '~"i'
The Prabhakaras deny this
alternative
also.
It
is
:ri6t
p6ssi):l1i~;'
',.
. ;. . ' . . . ...,
..!
according to them, for lIN, to den9te the property of being'an irirlirect
means either;' since the interconnecting link is not :present.,'
q<:.q<:Tm<:{;:r"'~lfit
"il:m~q~>lCiT
<I\~+r;;JiflHql<I.
[IV:C.2] The
word dvara is here used in the technical sense.' It means vyiipara
(for definition of vyapara, see note 2 on section [IV.C.2]).. The
''',.~ ,.~_.,
.~. ~_
~.'
'I,
<
30
INTRODUCTION
~Tlif.!'ij"1{'
~1'?l~ <il<
~,"T1iW-ll'
(4)
~'lil1TT
>.:[
Prabhakaras insis
visis,tatii). This has :
oth~~ view. (The ste!
ings of lIN above, are
in the P.L.M. pp. 15'
[G-3] This stiIl
kiirya has to be conne:
of heaven. The worc
nominative .case. Tht
svargakama~l kiiryal!!'
and the goal of. actiol
The. Prabhiikaras
connection is ..possible
. nominative case. Tc
form svargakiimalJ, to
ending with the geniti
in connecting svargak
INTRODUCTION
31
(4)
~'lil+T[ '1TlT'licrf
It is the person desirous of heaven
who is the performer of the sacrifice.
(5)
ait ~9ir9il+Tlscl'r +Ti'[.m"l~'!: I I am desirous of heaven.
be accomplished by my effort.
Therefore,
this
(sacrifice)
is to
.
. .
.
.'
.
.
Prabhakaras insist on the element of self reference (mada1J1.savisi$,tatii). This has not. been given that much importance in any,
other view. (The. steps in the process of the cognition of the meanings of lIN above, are based of the summary of the Prabhakara view
in the P.L.M. pp. 159-160).
[G-3J This still leaves the problem as to how this meaning
kiirya has to be connected with its locus, namely, the person desirous .
of heaven. The word svargakiimalJ expressing this locus is in the
nominative case. Thus it cannot be connected with the word kiirya,
svargakiimail kiirYI{[1.n makes no sense. The peisoiidesirous of hea,Yen .
and the goal of action cannot'be c6ref~i~ntiat;:~itheach oth~l"; .
The Prabhakar<)s gelaut of. this difficultjby admitting that no "
connection is possible as ,long as the word svargakiim-dlJstays in the
nominative case. To help the cons'truction then, they change the
form svargakiima{z to svargakii.m!fJsya, thus replacing the nominative
ending with ti'1e genitive one. Once this is done, there is no difficulty
in connecting svargakiimasya with the meaning kiir)liam.
--------~-~-~-~----
32
---
.--------~----.----.---~
But how can this be done? The Prabhakaras here take recourse
to a device called the upadana pramaIJa, with the help o{which, lIN
itself provides this chi!ngeotcase ending in order to help the ton-.
struction of the sentence: (For a discussion of the upiidana pramii7pa,
see note 2 on [IV.C.6] and the sections following it).
[G-4] Another argument brought forth by the PrabhIikaras in
support of apiirva being the instigator, and not the property of being
the means to a desired result, is as follows. There are certain obligatory rites prescribed by the Veda. The performance of these rites
does not bring any specific fruit. However, the nonperformance of
them brings in demerit. Now, the Prabhakaras argue, these rites
cannot be said to be performed in order to gain any desired fruit,
since they do not produce any fruit. If the property of being. a means
to a desired result were the only instigator, there would be no inclination towards these rites. But we do see people perform them.
How is this inclination to perform these fruitless rites to be explained
then? However, they point out that if apiiTva is said to be the
meaning of lIN, there is no such difficulty. Every Vedic rite yields
apiirva. And it is with this lapurva in view, that people perform
these rites.. Even in the case of the optional rites,. which do yield
specific fruits, say the Piabhftlmras; the inclination to a~t is not really
with this fruit in view, though of course, secondarily, the fruit is also
. achieved. Generally everyone believes that in the case of optional
rites, gaining the object of desire is the main thing. According to the
Prabhakaras, however, the inclination there also is due to apiirva
the fruit being a sort of fringe benefit and entirely by the way. In
the case of the obligatory rites of course, there is no other fruit. Thus
the .inclination to act is only for the sake of apiirva. Therefore, it
is apiirva, towards which all activities are directed, that is the meaning of liN. .. ~ml,~,~~q'1l'!~9 9iT"il1.[IV .C.121 .
[HJ The view 6fKaill!\fabhatta[H--I] KilUl,lQabhatta mostly follows Mal)!<;lrinamisra arid his
view agrees with those of AnandauIrtha (Madhv3.oarya) and
Nrsirphararila. According to these scholars, there is only one meaning
of lIN, and that is the property of being the means to a desired result
(4tasiidhanatvla or hitasiidhanatva). No one performs an action
unless there is some beneficial result for him. Therefore, the cause
of performing such aJ;l action is the knowledge that this is arrieans
INTRODUCTION
to something desired
agreed upon is the IT
is conducive to voliti
siidhanatva. Furthel
result is the cause for
to activity without i
property of being thE
the suffix lIN. One c
involved in this proc
the injunc
should sacrifice', is 11
(2). from this ~
to heaven, which is d~
, (3) the Inclina
The object of tll
the contentness of thi
to a desired result.
A slight variati(
. which, the goal of 3
(i~lasiidhanlfJ), it it:
[IV.B.7]. Of course,
and the desired mean
(1)
~l-er<rr1rnBf +!rr<nf;'r!?!~q~
[H-2J Now til
to know specifically
scribed act. In day
respected and autho
Nothing. specific is k:
the persOn concerned.
said this, knowing tl
without knowing wh~
ever, says Nrsirphasl
Veda, since theY de~
world, and need a 10
the fruit specifically.
to act. Thus in the (
is not the vague pr<
L
..
33
INTRODUCTION
'
----~----------,
34
INTRODUCTION
. .- ..- -
I
I,
I
different meanings, is (
and the fault is avoid,
of the use of lIN, the
the object of desire. '
of the property of beiJ
since this cannot be ob
property that must be '
<'<<'110:. '>:FP':{1'l:. \ [IV.B.t
[B-3] The Pra
sadhaliatvla as a mean
- not be an instigator i
means to an unspecifi.
meaning of lIN . . It i
specified desired end
fault of having too r
answer provided for t
The case of lIN is not
case of tad, the use c
there is a l;mitor to 1
character. . This limi
cognition. If in the
there is a lit:nitor, at
arises. Those who b
of the limitor, be a
istasiidhanatva cann
.. This objection 1
out that both in th
the knowledge of tb
the area of denotati
'knowledge of the ,
saktigraha 'signific;
for that which is Ii
speaker's thought,
to that which is lim'
thing. In the case
the words such a,
sp~cify, the object
In a way, thi
---------------------
this is to. be
:tUI;Ir;iabhatta agrees
ng problem: this
111, liN will have a
neans the property
mces Df the use of
a means to. getting
'ne suffix will have
: association (same able to. know ~ll
35
INTRODUCTION
"-
--,--~ -~~,,--
36
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
:atva view.
f lIN.
lity' as one of the .
'. The arguments
E--2] ) . Kaundaor Jayatirtha; 'a'nd
accomplished by
viII be inclination
. For, the killing
ccomplished with
fault; it is neces-
3tivator.. If only'
ld not arise, since
: desired. Ori the
ely lead to hell
, irrelevant, since
3 the means to a
led a "fimlt at all ,
known and thus
ion like adultery,
has the property
pleasure, inclinaof being a means
jection therefore,
, since both the
w is that if that
ty in connecting
(prasajyaprati-
J
I
37
---.~,.-----
38
--
-~--
-~---
._--_._._-
-~---~----------.---
~,---
INTRODUCTION
----~
INTRODUCTION
~itiin,antCbandhitva
39
-----"--------------~--------.
40
INTRODUCTION
able in [IV.D.7J.
The Prabhakan
that the knowledge'
gator. And, accordil
(see [G-2J). Sino
that the knowledge'
be the instigator, ar
KaUl,lQabhatta
'produced by effort'.
KaUl)Qabhatta, is al
Thus for example, 1
action of eating (bh
it is this action of e;
thus karya. In the
root in 'question is
to be done' is the sa
Prabhakaras have
The refutation
as a meaning of IIi
of having too man)
Other arguments ~
detail in my notes'
here. Thus a/fUrva
is made clear for tl
[J] Some problen
[J-1J If it~a
desired result' is a(
culty in explaining
obligatory rites, sil
used by the Pr;abh .
that lapurva is the
produce apurva (s<
view of course do I
it is with that end
according to these
. apurva is accepted
the desired result.
something fruitless
INTRODUCTION
is less prolix to
ans to a desired
fIe Prabhakaras
eing the means
is no evidence
, necessary for
e can either be
In (1) also,
I the form that
a (svarupatah
o be unaccej)t~
I:{
,
1
I1
I
,II
41
able in [IV.D.7].
The Pr;abhakaras have said. that in common experience, we see
that the knowledge 'this is to be done' ~<i: "'l~ll:. acts as an instigator. And, according to them, apiirva is kiirYla 'the thing to be done'
(see [G--2J). Since apurva is kiirya, and since experience shows
that the knowledge 'this is to be done' leads to activity, apurva must
be the instigator, and thus the meaning of lIIV.
KaUl).~abha1;ta refutes this by pointing out that karya means
'produced by effort'. The property of being prodw;ed by effort, says
KaUl).~abhat1;a, is always located in the meaning of the verbal root_
Thus for example, bhok~ 'to eat' is a verbal root. It expresses the
action of eating (bJv.ak:W1Ja), which is produced by effort. Therefore,
it is this action of eating (bhai?$d!./Ja) that is the result of effort, and
thus karyo. In the case of the sentence ~lr'lill1[ 'filer the verbal
root in 'question is ya; 'to sacrifice', and therefore, the karya 'thing
to be done' is the sacrifice as explained above, and not ajYarva, as the
Prabhlikaras have claimed [IV.D.8].
The refutation of the Prlibhakara objection that i$tasiidhanatva
as a meaning of lIIV is hard to justify, since there .will be the fault
, of having too many meanings, has already been discussed in. [H-3J.
Other arguments against the Prabhakaras have been explained in
detail in my notes on section [IV.D.1-12], and need not be repeated
here,. Thus apiirva as the meaning of lIIV is also refuted and the path
is made clear for the i$tasadhanatva view.
'
[JJ Some problems in accepting the i~tasiidhanatva view.
[J-l] If it$asadJv.anatva 'the property of being a means to a
desired result' is accepted as the only meaning of lIIV, there is difficulty in explaining the inclination towards performing the fruitless
obligatory rites, since, no desired fruit is involved. This has been
used by the Pr;abhakaras as an argument in support of their view
that lapurva is the meaning of lIIV, because after all, these rites do
produce apurva (see [G-4]). The opponents of the i~tasadhana'tva
view of course do not admit that .apiirva results from these rites, and
it is with that end in view that these acts are performed. These acts,
according to these people, are completely and utterly fruitless. If
apiirva is accepted as resulting from them, even that will suffice as
the desired result. Even an ignorant man does not feel inclined to do
something fruitless. How then is the performance of these rites to be
- - - _ . ----_..
42
explained?
Kaul,lc;labhatta, in support of his view, brings in several smfti
verses (BhagGi. 18.5,6 etc.) , which do attribute some sort of fruit to
these rites. Thus these rites cause purity according to the Gila verses
mentioned above. They are the basis of briihmatJa-ness etc., according
to several floating s;lnrti verses [IV.E.5]. This justifies the inclination towards the performance of these rites. Otl(erwise, i.e., if the
obligatory rites are considered to be fruitless, Veda would end up
being unauthoritative [lV.E.9].
Strangely enough, in all this discussion, KaUl):c;labhatta argues
in a way that makes it look as if he considers these various smrti
verses on par with Vedic injunctions. The whole argument that the
Veda would not be worthy of belief (.asraddheya) , if we do not accept
that these verses state the fruit for the obligatory rites, is astounding.
I t utterly loses its force when we consider that in fact, these are not
Vedic sentences. Orthodox pundits such as Vasudevasastn Abhyan.kar have spoken out against this tendency of considering smrti
statements as arthaviidas etc. to a Vedic prescriptive sentence (see
PrabM on i\.padevi, p. 200).
. '
. [J.,2] The second problem to be raised is. also indicative of this
same tendency on the part of the later writers to put smrti verses on
par with Vedic injunctions. Thus it is said that the Vedic injunction
"3l1;fltitl=it;t Qa!m.,1:ta- prescribes the sacrificing of an animal for the
-deities Agni and Soma. Since there is an injunction for this act of
sacrifice, it must be a means to something desired. However, there
is a prohibition;r ~<:lfr'( 'one should not kill'. This is in direct
,contradiction to the injunction mentioned above, and creates the
problem of reconniling the two. Now, this prohibition';r ~<:lfr'(
occurs in the Mahabha. santi parva, 269.5. It is not found anywhere
directly in the Vedic literature itself. Thus it is surprising that a
smrti verse should be brought forward as contradictory to the Vedic
sentences and treated as if it were itself a Vedic sentence. This shows
the later bias against the killing of animals in a sacrifice, and can
'always be justified by the device of taking recourse to some lost sruti
as a base for the smrti statement's authority. This is not at all unusual, and as a matter of fact, is quite typical of the later writers of
all the schools.
INTRODUCTION
(
\
\
\
At least three
meet this objection
(a) the verb
meaning for this ,
brought in the sta
not mean 'to kill'
(b) The pre
prescribed. Any I.
Various smyti and
this positi.on.
(c) It is hi1?1
the sacrifice, the d,
.involved, is slight,
fruit.
Since in the (1
blem, and I have !
valved in my not<
account of all the;
[J-3] Anoth
islaslidhanatva vie'
kite! P. II.3.1. 1
expressed [elsewhe
fore, the rule <P~
strumental case is
[when these mean
in the sentence] .
<{~cr
'the persc
Jyoti 9\oma' (i.e., I
the Jyoti~oma is .
mental case is uSt'
objected that, if i
something desired'
jyot4tomena will :
karm]a 'the main
therefore, instrum
meaning. The we
have to take on th
used where the mE
.-~-~----
-- ---- ---
-.~---.
~:-
INTRODUCTION
:s in several smfti
me sort of fruit to
: to the 'GIta verses
Jess etc., according .
.stifies the inclinaerwise, i.e., if the
da would end up
,..
i
I
l'l.lQabhatta argues
lese various smr ti
lrgurnent that the
f we do not accept
tes, is astounding.
'act, these are not
;vasastn Abhyanconsidering smrti
;ive sentence (see
) indicative of this
lt smrti verses on
! Vedic injunction
m animal for the
on for this act of
However, there
This '.1s in direct
and 'creates the
ilibition ;r ~~1FI:.
t found anywhere
surprising that a
tory to the Vedic
mee. This shows
;acrifice, and can
to some lost sruti
is not at all un.. Ie later writers of
I
f
I
t
...t.._
43
44
INTRODUCTION
;e in question is to be
irable sentence *jyotdifferent explanations
w:
:faslidhanatva view
INTRODUCTION
45-
-----------------
46
ing. Given that there is a blue pot on the ground; one should not be
\
able to say of this situation: . (SJ (-.::r) erzr ;:rJmr 'there is no
pot here'. For this is false in the situation.
Now consider the following paraphrases of (S.)
and (Sa)
(S.) erz<'1T'Ifi;w;r!fR'rltfrraJ'IlT1'lJ'I'I'r.- ~<i>B:. [this is a paraphrase of
(S,)] The ground is qualified by an absence which has its counterpositiveness limited by potness.
;:fi<i>"iZi9J'Ifi;9;;r!fRr'-!rfirCiT'liT1iT'I'i'r. 'LQ(i)+!.
are distinguished in terms of their connotations, by means of different anvayitaVlacchedakas: (S) - km'(lbugrlvltdimattva, (S,) - ghatatva. However, (S,) and (S,) both
denote an absence which has as its counterpositive a pot. Hence,
the pnatiyogiUivacchedaka of both the sentenoes would be the same,
i.e., ghatatva 'potness'.
Therefore, the principle is accepted: whenever possible, the pratiyogiUivacchedaka should not be a prolix property (gurudharma).
- Alternatively, one can, on account of sentences such as (S,) and
(S.l) insist that, an absence always has as its counterpositive, what
is limited by the anvayitiivacchedaka. In short, in these cases, the
following is true : anvayitiivacchedaka =' prati yo gitiivacchedaka.
INTRODUCTION
[K-4] Analysis
Assume that lIN
(a)
<;'lir~+!HTf<I
"~<::<f,<'1<'1i'l~;;J!ffW!f
positiveness delimitec
imitor of counterpc
distinct heaven : (s
reading ).
The meaning UI
property of being the
as h ea ven <;'1~+!FlT
the relation of the pr'
im ited by the state <
lhedaka of absolute:
Simply put, jYOtiStOII'
i n the same locus as
being absent when tl
In (S. ) etc.. th
'the proprty of be
Bhattadirya does TIC
daka. vaijiitya thus
lIN according him.
INTRODUCTION
(S.)
and (S,)
; is a paraphrase of
!(;h has its counter-
is
,hell-like neck etc.'.
'prolix property'),
ngs which have ali
the sake of brevity
'f ghatatva 'potness'
V.GAl) .
of their connota: (S,r' - kalJlbuS,) and (S.)
both
:ive a pot. Hence,
would be the same ,
1S
pratirty (gurudharma).
r possible, the
47'
I
1
(al
~qfrt!+lFfTN'll~UJ1+Tl'1J;Jrcrnl<rcr19'O~C::'ll<9l{
'the property of
being the limitor of counterpositiveness of an absence coreferentiaI
'absence'.
with heaven', and (b) 31+119:
In effect, the absence of (a) is conveyed for jy(Jti~t(Jmatva :
this property does not delimit a class of things (sa{;rifices), which
are absent in the same locus as an absence of svar gao
Further, through the intermediary of jyoti$tomatva, this absence
is predicated of the sacrifice, which is then said to be absent in the
same locus as heaven.
.Now, to get around vyabhicara 'discrepancy' (see note 2 on
[IV.G.1]), without admitting vaijiitya as denoted by lIN, consider
again (8.) The pot is related to the ground through the relation
conjunction (sa1!1yoga) , e.g., (S,) bhutale ghrtta~ 'there is a pot
on the ground'. Hence, for (S.) the ground is the anuyogin
'subjunct of a relation', of absence of a pot through conjunction.
Similarly, (a) and (b) denoted by UN are related through a
particular relation. this is (c) feI;;jl~frt!m'l1f'C{9i~UJ1<!lralm"J;J:Rr~mCl19:-
'O~G;9i"'''''9R'3;;{J;JRr1'lmCll'li'''l{ 'the property of having the counterpositiveness delimited by .the state of being the property of being the
imitor of counterpositiveness of absolute absence coreferential with a
distinct heaven : (see note 3 on [IV. G. 4] for a discussion of this.
readillg ).
The meaning understood from (S, ) is then: the absence of the
property of being the prgtiyogitavccchedaka of absence in the same locus
as heaven "'lir~+lFnN'f.~UJ1Bi"Cll'119>rI<1<llmal<j"'~'f.<"1'i\s+lI'l: , through
the relation of the property ofhavillg the counterpositiveness of absenee.
lim ited by the state of being the property of being the pratiyogitiivacchedaka of absolute absence in the same locus as a particular heaven.
Simply put, jyotistomaiva does not delimit a class of that which is absent
in the same locus asheaven; this through the relation of Jyoj~toma not
b eillg absent when there is a partioular heaven.
In (S, ) etc.. the anvayitlivacched~aka pas to be vijiitiyasvargatva
'the property of being a particular heaven'. However, RIil.makr~a
Bhattaoarya does not wish to accept vaijiitya as a pratiyogitiiva.cchedaka. vaijiitya thus does not form a- part of the denoted meaning of
lIN according him. If the alternative mentioned in [K--3l, i.e. that
,,~."
. - ..
~
. .
- ,----
48
even a prolix property has to be taken as a limitor of counterpositiveness ~~\Of+T~'l" ~ra'l"ltmrl'l~(9qaj is .a~cepted, t.hen .~he. absence i?
question must have as a counterposItrve what IS dehlll1ted by thIS
anvlayiti'ivacchedaka, namely, vijiitiy,asvargatva. Therefore the alternative, according to Rarnakr~a Bhattacarya, is to be accepted only
when a negative particle (naii) is actually used. That is not the case
in the sentence ;;1flmmi'r., ~9lr'fll+!1 <!~q Thus there is no difficulty.
[L] The authors
.
[L-1] Bhattoji mk~ita, the author of the ki'iriki'is, and.his nephew
Kaurrdabhatta
"
.. , the author of the Vaiyakaral)abhu$aJ;la, belonged to a
very illustrious family, wellknown for its scholarship in various
fields of sastric learning. Bhattoji Dik~ita's commentary on Pal)ini's
AstadhyaYl, with the rules arranged in different sedions according'
to' their use in various derivations, supplanted all previous works of
that nature, and is used in traditional schools in India to this day.
His other two works on grammar (the sabdakaustubha and his autommmentary on the Vaiyakaral)asiddhantakaumudii, called the
Praudhamanorama) are also very much respected. But it is with
his f~urth work on grammar that we are concerned with now. This
work is variously referred to by. the following two names: Vaiyaka;'amimato~majjana and Vaiyakaraa;tasicldhantakarika. It is the
latte; name that is more common. The ki'iriki'is of Bhattoji DIkliita .
summerise in a very condensed form, the views of the Grammarians
concerning the problems of philosophical and semanic doctrines. Not
all of these karikas are Bhattoji's own. Out of the total number of
seventy-six ki'irikiis, at least twelve can be traced directly to the
Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari. As S. D. Joshi has shown, there are
other kiirikas that can also be traced to various different sources (see
Joshi 1960, p. X). The Vaiyakaral)asiddhantakiirika is thus a colJection of verses taken from various sources. Bhattoji put this collection together, adding some karikas of his own to it.
Katmdabhatta was the son of Bhattoji's brother RaIi.goji, who
himself ~~s a w'~ll known Vedanta writ~r. KallIJ.Qabhatta refers to
two of his works in this text: the Advaitasaroddhara (see [IV.G.18]),
and a Vrtti on the Brahmasiitra (see. [IV.J.17]). RaIi.gojibhatta
enjoyed the patronage of a kelasIi ruler of Ikkeri in the present Mysore
state. This king's name was VeIi.katappa, and he ruled from 1560
to 1630 A.D. KaUl)r;labhatta, in his Tarkapnidipa has ref~rred to
. another ke!aQl king, called Virabhadra. He ruled froin 1629 to 1645
INTRODUCTION
Thus KaUljr;lab:
seventeenth century.
A.D. (see Code 1954).
[L--3] Kau9:r.lal
all of them dealing wi
shown his mastery
the views of other si'is
KallJ)Qabhatta, as we
taries on the Vaiyaka
Vaiyakaral).abhii.lla!l).a:
bhiisail).a. The bigge
published twice: fil
then in the Bombay:
edition ralso includes
unfortunately are. ain
is no commentary a
abridged version has
they are. of liinited 1
and abstruse argumel
have been omitted it
of the Grammarians
to interprete this te~
As stated aboVE
condensed form. E
semantic concepts iJ
marians'. views agair
of the Naiy1lyikas, :
sakas etc.
[M] The Lakiarar1
[Moo'!] Thep
Lakarathanir]l}.aya .
version) . This sec
theories about the
verbai endings repn
. the arguments of tho
some Ve&.nta writl
views are defended:
cular section was t
of the lakaras so fal
A.D.
0,
---~.----
INTRODUCTION
Ir of counterpositive_
hen .the absence in
is delimited by this
Therefore the alterto be accepted only
That is not the case
ere is no diffkulty.
49
A.D.
. - --.---
--
.------~''''-
.. - .. _"----.
---
50
"
"
"
"
lOT
VI
VII
TEX
[I.1]
l<.'i
Q<~ c::~
q<\l11;'t qD~
'"
fo!>:<ilC::l
QP~
[The author1
by one as follows :
"lAT etc., are to b
pre~ent; [past1 no
going to happen tc
reque3t etc." //22/
1. dasalakiirii1}iin
, symbols: . lA
llY-N. For a c
2. pratyeka1!!:
I-memberS [ka
in the first cha
cular meaning
individually.
the marker T
3. vidhyiidaU:
UN (fol;s:if ~
'trana 'summa
so~ething wh
sam pr.asna 'ir
Se~ P. III.3.1
As KaUl)
explanations,
to elaborate 1:
'i,
SECTION ONE
meanings of these
mentioned in the
t passages, marked
uneJ;1tsclear.
Thus
pIe; [I.ll, [VII.2]
19 of lET (i.e., of
ning conditions as'
hirds of the entire
eleven s\1bsections,
I are again further
15 here are marked
ages of. the fourth
finally [IV.J.34].
v-ed by translation
explanatory notes
) in which these
scussedin detail.
3 not necessary in
,t been attempted
~ l-members talces
; time as well as
schools. Thus a
nding of the con;emantic theories,
T the schools of
this goal in view
! various theories
[1.1
"11
':nf9;:<{~ <1f'i~<!fu
\\
-_. ,- - ..
~--
-....
52
[ I.2 ]
me,,)
[1.3 1
a:r'.:n<l
SECTION ONE
the meaning of
.that which brin
to the signifier]
root does not (
1. 'For a discu
of a verbal
2. dhiitvartha
refers to th
-meaning.
cepted by ~
4. For lAT to
verbal root
root does I
it is not pc
[I.4 ]
SECTION ONE
. I CI"I "'1'OfRr"
:r<!ln: I
- Il
,
on the strength
is defined as
has begun but
r than past and
stood in normal
1 putting a pot
uses fonns like]
.[activity] that
~ss
ml:&1iI1'11~
action which is
ml:&IiI['fR"HlT(f ,
lcterised by an
se given above
~ll known that
i' :
m\&1iI1'fK-
''If:'!l'f'l~~''ll<r. I
gun' has been
3 the object of
; x, while not
ities conducive
ia as well as
[ained' as being
for its locus
vity conducive
itamiinatva in
, of these, see
~''l1l'f1'll<r. I
l'f'lm I
xl [by tAT]? .
[time] is not
53
u:or
or1'Of'li<~lRrl1~ I l~ 'Of 'l<i+n~ 05f:sfu fqfut<[ fq'ill~sfit <>,~'3([~'q,~
'limfit 'l1"'~ ;or ~'ll<r. I 1;<[1'" ;;ir,<[1l;'! I 8lfq~lS[1<r. I
tf
<Oa'
54
SECTION ONE
1. The alternative
co-signified but
2. The general ffiI
and in the case
peeled to have
tancy (iiklink~a
Since lAT is .
additional mea:
ing time. The
IAT must be I
~
[I.7]
(f~Tlq ~~'QT
'
,erT;:rl'i~f\fu '
If there is apl
general meaning by
milk and Kaundin'
agent will not be d
Both of these alter
and can also be pr
~. tnllmkaWJ:ufiny
Katl1)!~inya. '
(Bh~ya on P.
his Uddyota or
course has use(
exoeptions (a
nyaya exempl:
even after the
of anav,akasat
to operate on
applied in the
rules can appl
rule permittin
2. 9i;'!Mfl<fTtRr
whereas if fA1
meanmg.
3. ~sf1:rftcr,<n;
M.B. vo!' 2, r,
intepreted in t
.-
.-'--
..._-
.---~
.....-
ng separate deno
~ 'time.' On the
nqtator, only one
for that meaning.
AT should be the
ieiit 'because of
argument which
~]
Clnq<lm~'li<c!~c! 'C!
efuted] : Verbal
Iresentness, while
speaker]. This
[of the speaker]
dicated or secon
modified version
.resentness is the
.the attributor of
So in this view,
the second view,
. Time however
;he attiibutor of
&econd view, it
speaker. Since,
intention of the
rather than the
o belong. to the
fqB!l11~: I
IAT is without
[its possession]
.t [IAT] cannot
55
SECTION ONE
mille and Kai.Jl)!t;linya, the general is set aside by the particular, the
agent will not be denoted [by lAT]. It cannot be argued like this.
Both of these alternative views have been mentioned in the Bha~ya,
and can also be proven by reasoning.
1.. . tallr.akau1J4iny,anyiiyiit: 'By the principle of the buttermilk and
Kai.Jl)!t;linya. This maxim' first appears in the MahabliiCi~ya
(Bh:?ya on. P. 1.1.47, M.B. vol. 1, p. 115). Nagesa refers to it in
his Uddyota on the sivasutra hayavarat (vol. I, pp. 96-97) and of
course has used it in the Paribha~endusekhara while dealIng with
exoeptions (apavada). (P.S., p. 136). The takrakau1J4inyanyiiya exemplifies' the kind of exception which can take place
even after the general rule is applied. Thus the usual maxim
of anavlakiisatva (where the exception does not have any scope
to operate once the general rule has been applied) cannot be I
applied in these cases. Since both the general and particular
rules can apply t.his rule prevents the application of the general
rule permitting only the exception to take place.
2. 'lil!<IT,",,<C!1<r1<ffi: kart! 'agent' etc. is the general meaning .of IAT
. whereas if lAT is applied to denote time, that will be the specific
meamng ..
3. ~Sf~ff~:CI<'l1<f, iikara here means the Bha~ya. (on P. III.2.l23,
M.B. vol. 2, p. 123). The same passage in the Bha~ya has been
intepreted in two different ways to get support for both the views.
. . -....... _-,",
---
----- --
,_. - -
... _....," .- .
::'
56
-.'
SECTION ONE
1. kriya = vyiipi
entity, but a c
activities (v yii.
words kriyii aJ
basically there
- v yiipiira refers
many such ac1
activities 1 + :
idea that actio
uses the word
(who does use
. It has to be in
Action as a w]
only the indivi
this. In a pro
sequence in til
ception also t2
next activity i
perished. HOl
we perceive ar
idea of superin
to a circle of fI
( SWilC1"1"~q
( .mcr~~) 'lRlJ:, I
[ 1.9 ]
Nor can it be said that there will be the fault stated above
[in 1.4] , if it [time] is denoted by the verbal root. For time different
from a series of activLties [Le., action] is not accepted, and that
[series of activ~ties] .has been explained as the meaning of averbal .
root. Thus, time is not distinct from a series of activities, as there
is no proof ~to accept it as being separate from a series of activities].
If it is to be theorized as separate, then it will lead to the assumption
[that the verbal root has] a significative function for that [time]
also, and this results in prolixity.
:!'>
:r1T[~~'f'f'l: ~
(V.P., III.8A
pravrttiinli 1[t
to the parts 1
Bhartrhari la
concept in th
the distinctio
ingfully] : present
It the propert.y of
fier-ness in lA Tl ,
root, and because
:ness is co-signified
:ioned and refuted
property of being
ible for TAT unless
he meani~g time.
lin and in support,
eaning of a verbal
ng is not cognised
f capacity, i.e:, it
stood in t.his, sen~Ff\'1l"Ten'-f-!i~9
"f
't[
cr"''3'ffi'9~'lTfq
1. kriya = vyiipiiras.antii1lia:
o7.fjqH<:R11'lTmR'ffi_
57
SECTION ONE
ffii'-tRi, ;;,!Gl~~,!~ II
--'
..
-~-
.. -
",-_.,",
"---- ...
_------
.---_.-.- - _ . - - - - -
58
---_.-------------
SECTION ONE
than that of the basic nature. Thus he points out that it is not
only an action such as cooking that can be analysed into constituent parts, for example, to put the pot on a stove, to pour
water in it etc. An activity forming a part of this action of
cooking, such as putting the pot on a stove, can also be shown
to have further parts like picking the pot up, carrying it to the
stove, etc. (V.P., IlLS.9). Thus when one is to be called an
action (kriya) and when one is to be called an activity (vyapara) very much depends on the subjective element, i.e., the
desire of the speaker. Thus if the speaker views the activity of
putting the pot on a stove as a part of the bigger process of cooking, it will be considered to be an activity, whereas if the same
putting the put on a stove is viewed as a whole consisting of
different parts, jt will be considered to be an action. Of course
here Kau:t:lgabhatta does not go into all these details. But it is
clear that he considers action to be a series of activities which
form constituent parts of it. Thus he has used the word vyaparasantana 'a series of activities' to denote action, which is the
meaning of the verbal root.
2. kiila= vyapamsantana see introduction [B:"()].
3. gauravat: see note 1 on [1-4].
[1.10 1
.~
B!l~ Q'i;[<'fiT~'f.U~t ~.
l'fr<::T"!lmR~ re~F'i;[+!T'l.[l'ffit q~T I qT'I'~;ci ~ "l19'1l~qq~: I
"'1'<1:. I
1. The passage in (
(M.B. vo!' 2, p.
2. sii.ryiidina1!t kriy
amples: 'the Sel
is the meaning c
or the standing
or an end, and (
sent or future.
which the divisi,
and it can be ta!
ment of the Su
If the meaning
(i.e. the meanin
need be no cont
the existence of
time with refen
longing to diffe
from the meani
diction between
and the eternal
Thus, sinc~
cases can be ex:
the SlID, the B
. and if the quest
by referring to
will be meanin!
find an explam
divisions of tim
lUI]
SH!l,qit!.
=or
~<9="'q"''lri<dm.,<o
nm fii;'11l'flG:
.. In our view, n
fied since the actio
does not have a bel
being that which i1
answer [of the Bhi
sideration the begi
of a degree rather
out that it is not
nalysed into cona stove, to pour
of this action of
an also be shown
:arrying it to the
.s to be called an
m activity (vyaelement, i.e., the
liS the activity of
r process of cookereas if the same
lole consisting of
ction. Of course
letails. But it is
: activities which
he word vyapiiraon, which is the
Cl"l'<'llT~'Ii~f~"t
'," gnmr~" iti<!l<l:l
"l'~'-liU~t f.!;'{l.
~ 1ol1'l;:n~qq%: I
:onsidered to be]
of the examples]
at set aside, and
)lej taking that
i<)ya bringing up
ied in [sentences
. be meaningless.
lAT etc. in such
1 the actions of
;he same [meanr [afield].
SECTION ONE
59
amples : 'the Self exists', 'the mountains stand' the action that
is the meaning of ,the verbal root, i.e., the existence of the soul
or the standing of the mountains does not have any beginning
or an end, arid cannot thus be distinguished as being past, present or future. But the action belonging to the Sun etc., on
which the divisions in time are based, is going on all the time
and it can be tagged as past, present, or future, since each movement of the Sun does have a perceptible beginning and end.
If the meaning 'time' is considered to be different from action
(i.e. the meaning of the root) and thus separately denoted,there
need be no contradiction. The meaning of the verbal root, i.e.,
the existence of the Self etc., can be said to have divisions in
time with reference to this action [movemen~l of the Sun belonging to different times. Since time is something different
from the meaning of the verbal root, there would be no contradiction between i:ts divisions based on the action of the Sun,
and the eternal existence of the Self.
Thus, since the question regarding the use of lAT in: these
cases can be. explain~d away by taking reco.urse to the action of
the Sun, the Bha~ya raising this question will be meaningless,
. and if the question is raised, the Bhii~ya answering this question
by referring to the action of kings belonging to different times
will be meaningless, since there is no need to run so far afield to
find an explanation. It can easily be done by referri.'1g to the
divisions of time made by the moving of the Sun.
KIll
3HR<'W
~am"<'l<?:rllj+ll'llGJ~~lj~: I
ffl4l:F(I<?:rlN
Cl"l'<<iiIT0'll1"r
In our view, moreover, the doubt [in the Bha~yal can be justified since the action conducive to the continued existence of the Self
does not have a beginning, and presentness, which is 'the property of
being that which is begun but not ended,' is not possible. The final
. answer [of the Bh~yal also has a good justification taking into consideration the beginning etc .. even of the activity conducive to the.
60
m-
Kaiyata has also explained the Bha;;ya giving the final answer
in the same way. Taking [~he Bhii:$ya passage] 'here the actions
belonging to the Icings past, future, and present, are the locus of the
[action of] standing [of the mountains] as a heading [Kaiyata says]
that the conclusion [from this passage] is that the existence of the
kings is divided [qualified] by the divisions past etc., and divides
[qualifiesJ the standing of the mountains etc. Thus its [the standing
of the mountains] being an action, and association with the three
times is justified. Thus, the Boo;;ya [pas~age is written] taking into
consideration the division [of time] only in a qualified [action].
. 1. The reference to Kaiyata is of course to the Pradipa explaining
the Bha9ya on Vt. 5 ad P. III.2.123. (vol. 3, pp. 281-282).
See Introduction [C-I] for an explanation.
SECTION ONE
2. viSi'ftabhedamiidiiy
I U 3 J ~ci fu Cfl'f<['f'i{
~CT1ST1:fIT<~~qlJ
~<;5Rl"l1:q. ~ql!!B:. I
.+r1G:I~oj\'f'fRlifiaIt is alsiysaid in
{distingUished} in rel~
[or substance]_ itself i
standing of the 'mount,
something else." It i~
the distinction here is
That is why in sabda
[cases] such as 'the 0
taking into account tl
1. The verse quated
2. The reference to I
(vol. CXVI, p. 8
3. KaUi!):Q.abhaV;a i~
P. III.2.I23. '<:
~f<lcrf~1<r.1 ~abd~
11.14]
Cl1:flrn:r+!1<T'!il<5'r
<WCT'!if Wl~ai't
,,'t<'-l <;5'5IG;<[ ~R
,justified. Though
beginning taken by
when it is qualified
:erent times. Thus
ted by a particular
and an end. Thus
is begun but not
be justified.
rl1r.r~<lrlm<{l;TI <:l:(lT
~
~ra.tc!lfa:ilit"l
\}m
"
SECTION ONE
61
I L13]
11.14]
62
.,~ ~QR:'O~<::'Ii<'f
SECTION ONE
the traditional
by Bhattoji Dil
traditional intel
root, when the
present. As fat
who went agai
2. In sUPIX>rt of 1
is quoted V.P.,
&ii'1T ~~f.lt<n
according to :t"
Bha~ya. (M.B
[I.l 6]
i'Ii 'i.f I J;i;'11
. 'cr<::rq "'lWi9'~
m:) <Rilf["~
f;i;'l1'l1~ ~fu
qT'i.f'Ii<9i'lofI'O<j
Moreover, sine
the presentness resil
also will have to Ix
of thus theoreticall)
, roots, why not say
sentness. [In that
you have to say tha
is the re?-son for t
'Since it amounts t
denotator?
1. lA T is not nel
Even 'when IA
or lIT is the 0:
action is cogn:
out the meani:
[1 17J 8iitoi cr"'f q
~qlI. I s!~i
'i.f 13"1191 <r~
[If it is objecu
meaning of IATJ,
general will be sei
1 is the established
mvaya 'concurrent
Tent non-occurence
lction [A-I]. The
;0 express different
md futureness, the
res such as IAT, or
nd vyatireka, these
)-signifiers of these
ich is the denoted
'll'i'f'li<'li'lti\~Cl11{
Il:'l 'l(h:n~
T wtBr 1'rfG:'lil" ~fcr
\ '1'i'f ~'I':rR;;~~'lii:
m: .
[1.1 6J
:r Ol~~
63
SECTION ONE
-~.--
.-....
--
~--~-
-.
- - - - - - -- - - -
64
-------~----
------
relation of that which is set aside and that which sets it aside does
not exist here, since both the meanings are possible. Thus it is said,
'it is possible that both should apply'.
1. See Introduction [B~5J.
2. vie:j.ena samanyasya biidhiit: This is the same objection
brought in iri [1-7]; This basis of this objection there was the
"takrakaUr(.l4inyanya)1a (see [1-7]; note 1). But the whole
argument bringing in takrakau,1J4inyanyiiya is false and does not
apply here, The arguments involved are clear in the Uddyota
on Vt. 7 ad P. III.1.22, where the two rules concerned are
P. III.1.21, and P. III.1.23. (vo!. 3, p. 78-9) .
[118J
f'i; '"f I 0:<[ ~ <'>: ~lJjtrcr f<!~9'1lT,ftj'l <!-Tlq: I ~<9FQ~Sjq- foi~'lT?!>:t<rf"ilI~: I Q~I '"fFl'~'f'!trRrO:QI;:ri foiqtffi <rel<reff1fu "'fp:TT~'1fu
~il1T"'fq'[ffl:
I
..
' .'
..
.
. ' ",
""c"
,.
Also: in ~hat case [if agent etc. is not denoted] , the rule that
1- [members should be introduced after averhal root] when object
[agent, and in the case of intrasitive roots, action] is to be expressed,
will be without scope, as in other places also it will be set aside by
the meanings such as injunction etc. Thus the general rule also
takes .place by the maxim ,that the relative strength and' weakness'
of tllOse rules threatened by uselessness is reversed.
1. P. IIIA.69 is a general rule. If every time a specific meaning
is.taught the general rule is set aside, it will have no scope left.
In this case, it is ,to be superceded by P. III,2.128.. In other
places, it will be then superceded by o.ther rules giving specific
meanings such as P. IIL2.115, III.3.13, 15, 162, 173 and
III.4.7, etc. Thus P. III.4.69 will be useless. This cannot be
allowed. Any rule which is threatened by this sort of uselessness
automatically becomes stronger according to the popular maxim,
since every rule must have its own sphere where it can apply.
To provide scope for P. III.4.69, as weI! as the specific rules,
it is necessary that EAT should denote both the general meaning
of the I-members as well as its own specific meaning, i.e., prEsentness.
II.19] apnfcrR'fC!'lilOOBr 'IT"'l,'q ~!F!J&:<i m1;<ll1<9~'t\ BTTfijij ~;;[ 1
ITCflir'la:rl1TG:T<l qc::~"ilFITq: 1 ~~g 'lil<'-<?'1Ifcrf~cRErSjq- q~l1F1T
QS[ m~;;;"ilT'1RlJ.m=rIsi;'llq'<9Mcrrll. 1 Q~H111m1TT<il f'li<ll<rr: J:TI .... "il<'flm'fl;;[ ~fl:l1ifQlfcr 'Il~ 9c111T<!rmrcr ~T~<r: 1 W:!T'l1 Sl~"il<'it sjq-
SECTION ONE
A-'"'
"r...
I '!> ~rn:T>J\
fu:&:lrcrI~'l
q~: 'liT<
<ffill!,,<'1TfG;
'"f " SlT,lll
" g;'O~<!T+9
~~al
In reality, til
etc., of the form (
belonging to it, is
presentness is ind
exists', 'the moun
'that which come
NarayaI;ta alone 1
1. This is the f
denotator or I
considered tl
Ka1.l,l).9abhatt:
of the root.
verbal root,
denoted mear
...--------
~ -,~
------------
n<reflifu ;:'11'11""EiRr
'/
specific meaning
ave no scope left.
:.2.128. ' In other
i les giving specific
l ), 162, 173 and
~.
This cannot be "'_
sort of uselessness
e popular maxim,
lere it can apply.
the specific rules,
~ general meaning
neaning,i.e., pre~'!\
~lfu:fu ii(~
rft9:cr~slit Cjchn~<'i
~l f'li'1I'1T: ~m:;;;"i
SECTION ONE
<'l<flI. I
1,'
66
[ILl]
~:g~hn~ I (
rn:~'i1: I it
~<lR!C!;'j '!.~
Past
Any definiti,
, Kau:ndabhai
.. . '
about the 1:
cannot be u
ditions givel
usage. Thu
1
today, whle.
dition, I.e., 1
apply to fu'
be exclusive
.~-.---
.-~--
------._--.---'-
SECTION TWO
~:s'.h:n~ I ({"{raj ~fu I q{'raj ~fsm ~,;{l<r. I 'f.l<'ml19<::;;qc!~1~~~i:!~~
[Il.1]
fB:f<l'il:
ffi:f9-4t slit
w;t,gm
'119: I
today
exclusive of today
\
Past
future
future
past
I
witnessed
not witnessed
.,;
SECTION TWO
68
'the property of not being the object of the kriowledge that has
its contentness defined (or conditioned) by the consciousness
. of knowledge such as '1 perceive' ..
.'. 2. vi~ayatii: According to the Neologicians, the property of having
an object (savi$ay,Gtv'a) belongs only to knowledge, and that
property thought of as belonging to anything other than cogni. tion, i.e.,' desire etc:, is merely like borrowed finery (yiicita-
ma1J4.anany.iiYl
The term vi~a
from vi~aya.
stracts. vi~ay,
cognition. It
cognition whic
[II.3]
~:1 qUa:!ci! c
"];l;'lr
<fri:o
f;F~oJfilIT'C
But impercep'
action is unperceiv,
is very much not ~
temporal order. ]
If [this is your 0 b
1. The objection
is that the tel
eluded in the
and lIT shou
But all actio]
carinot . serve
(rdivyiipti) iE
2. kriyii niimeym
the word an
oncurs. Kau:r:
purviiparibhut
poral order'.
whole. Ever)
the action of
the .fire, putti
Because these
co-exist and t
as a whole.
that time, th>
the following
[1I,4]
Cl<::,!,OJP-f;
];l;!!F!lfci~~l
[The objectic
speakerJ is the
lith content such
, :rr~IC'f.~l'!1<i'\Cll~
:e of the property
T
the'~ontentnens
mentary Parlksa
e' as referring to
" i.e., knowledge
ie comes to mean
:'1ll:.
Dwledge that has
he consciousness
roperty of having
~Iedge, and that
)ther than cogni1 finery (yiicita-
SECTION TWO
69
<T~ q-aJ~ <C!Cl:fl<rc'i'f.+I.. B~~'-lT Olfri f;i;'-fI'-lI: q~aJ<C!rq: I Cl~'fCi +:r1 1ii'\ I
"iiii'-li <Tl~'-l!i<'-l.alqRE:!'!l
R~~[i:ri'!+(' 1<:fQ ~?! I
~f'R1'i..m'l'-lql
<T ilFf'-ll
fq o:s1'iclT
70
SECTION TWO
the action
engaged in ;
there is no
cooked'. E~
does perceiv
perceive the
ing. If he
cooking, the:
[II. 5]
q:01
~~0'iT'1
'fi1'!1Tfl:]; fl:r<
f-ii<7.[~+t '
Thus lIT is
ceived by oneself
then is inferred :
babbled a lot bE
1. Since it has
the action 01
that action
that UT car
. one does. on
impereeptibi
difficulty in
2. The sentenc
first person
see PLM. p
3. Not all sehe
the imperc<
people, the
the rule IJai
cause of thE
in the first :
rule can be'
ful, llT is u
view as bel<
'"'~
eo!
'-1.:::l 'Ipn
'~ .
~l+!fq #>,
(VyutpaVal
(P.L.M. p.
71
SECTION TWO
cm:
11'<11
I"
1'll<?1i[~
'\,<!::
I"
~lq 'l~l"q
Thus lIT is applied when even one's own activity is not perceived by oneself due to one's being absorbed in something etc., and
then is inferred from its result. For example, people say, 'mad me
babbled a lot before him.'
1. Since it has been established that liT is to be used only when
the action or according to the other view, the means of achieving
that action is not perceived by the narrator, it becomes clear
that lIT cannot be used in the first person. Of course whatever
. one does oneself must be perceived and thus the condition of
imperceptibility is not fulfilled. . KaUil)!~abhatta answered thIS
difficulty in this passage.
.
2. The sentence quoted here as an instance of the use of iIT in
first person is taken from SisuVa. 11.39. For other examples
see PLM. p. 155.
3. Not all scholars agreed thus explaining away the difficulty about
the imperceptibility in ~he first person. . According t.o these
people, the usage in the first person can be justified by taking
the rule 1}aluttamo viii P. VII.1.91 as a jfiiipaka. Thus if be
cause of the abovementioned difficulty, there is no use of lIT
in the first person, then P.VII.1.91 will be useless. No Pfu;linian
rule can be without a purpose. Thus to malce this rule meaningful, lIT is used in the first person. Vyutpattivada mentions this
view as belonging to the Upayakara and his followers. Thus:
~R'2 '!'fi!B=r;;{li~li,'!l:r'! q'U'lIc'!l{ I 3lq ~'l
arcrT'1f+!{q
m:
Rle:
3"'<Ili!!~q1~.<'['t;:nq,:T:
,~~
.."
.., .....
__
.........
72
[I1.6J
"o<na~
'!nn
~K<'!
SECTION TWO
SAND MOODS
kn
SECTION TWO
<[~'liijRrtJ:.
<[~R;;rr~f.ioT <[~I
.vall" however
, can be somethe action of
tmost con temrds giving the
lOt be pastness
lot apply here.
tence vyiitene
ing of Kirana:eptibility can
(aU'l).9abhatta,
the beginning
is engaged in
be in the past,
I
I
Ij
usage ,vyiitene
~ pastness, im-.
iis of superimunicatihg how
Jdayana. Aciew. (sanka.
:qaT
'41c1lR',=![-
rT ~ororl~m'<l.,<'i
;ion. Because
follows] :. lIT
n the heading
. by indicative
dicated mean:1. But when
by indicative
means of the
a,:r''!1tJ:. I alC! 11;or fc[u;ltwrr ;or f.ia::~'r[ 'OJ9'ltR(m1Sltsfc[ I grcr 11;'1 " q<['
1I~ '<IT'!fu'' '<:,'f'[ '<IT,!.,f,j;=![l<rT 11;'1 qlt<=!f?[ 'li~Coi 1J~fu~?!'! I
i
I
I(
,
'Y.
.1
. .Ji8J4-._.
74
SECTION TWO
;r 'Of :q,~~'
+!T~'fij J;t'U'
Nor should om
[which is by defini'
impediment to [aci
ceptibility spoken (
action. It appears
1. Nage.sa rejects
q~ij,di sq'iq~iJ
.--.-~
-----,------------- - - -
~SES
AND MOODS
SECTION TWO
3S
deer is running',
in hIS refutation
nition."of the sen1 nominative case
epted, in this senative case instead
M., pp. 110-111).
, does not arise,
lutits action of
g. Since dhiivati
T only after nomi;ice case tenninased this usage to
action of running
!
75
I.
SECTION THREE
. SECTION THREE
S36,hlT\[ I 'ifl" lilf<i"'1>l" ~Rr I gr<l;;rC!~ +nler;'n<<[~: I gr<l;;rC!~ S3~fq
<L"!l<J:. I <[2:!T " 'ifl" lif<lcrl ~<'1T<tl I
[Now the author proceeds to] state the meaning of IU,!, [with
[ IlL I J
[Now the author] states the meaning of llf.'!', [with the words
'to express] future'. Future in general is meant, on the strength of
the rule ITt se$e ca [Po III.3.13) , as in the example 'the pot wiII corne
into existence' etc. That means having the property of corning
into existence in a time which is the counterpositive of the prior
absence [existing] in the present.
1. ITt se$e cal P. I1L3.13. dhiirto/:t comes in from that heading in
P. I1L1.91, whereas bhavi!jyaiti is taken from P. I1L3.3. The
'rule anadya~ane lull P. I1I.3.15 introduces the suffix IU,!, in the
sense of future action not taking place in the course. of the
current day.
after a verb wi
to express acti
The rule in qu
the sense of th
pure and simp:
taining to this
action for ithe
action for the ~
says that fu.tu
2. tattvaJrt refers
. of which the I
used in the te:
l3+1'1'f''f~ I ). i
though there
commentary F
'i+!:q:
~M'li<::1Jf
in this contex1
since d/:tVlt1!ISa
with future. ,
. itself to def
(see [VI.4]).
action which CI
present. Non-:
to here as its :
ledge 'there is
action is the (
Thus the defin
action, of whi,
to the present
is that time w
SECTION THREE
19 of lUT [with
Future
rule anadydtane
norrow' etc.
rd bhavi~yati 'to
'rom P. III.3.3,
'comes in from
~atana 'exclusiye
IJ note 2). The
explained by the
101TOW'.
;her limiting. If
when ,,something
, ~thing happening
ly KaUl).Q.abhatta
usive of, today' .
I~ in the kiirikii
ture exclusive of
77
SECTION FOUR
SECToJON FOUR
[IVA.l] ~its~m~ I f<r~'11GJf<rm I foos>'r~~ <1,~m:: I 3!T~~T RWSlITfTl!;:~lTfl\;\rg:TG({T 'l~;.Fcr I f<rN~fli ~{ITfll. I +l''111tR~g:~ lFI<I~mrn
<[T'Iil: I Rl1;:~tJf R<!rl"FHITfll. I 3!wt<['t; '-'ll;&:l1r;;r;:cT<tl <Df~'n1t: ~'Ia-
;:rm!a <[T'Iil: I 3!lW;!!Jf 'lill1T"fFl:J;'!fT I. 3!\;{rg:: ~''-iiR~'-iiT O<flrn{: :
[Now the author] states the meaninK of lET, [with lhe words]
'injunction etc.', on the strength of the rule li'liart.he let [Po III.4.7].
By 'etc.', summons, permission, respectful command etc., are to be
taken. The word vidhi means injunction, i.e., inducing [or commanding]
subordinate person such as' a' servant etc. . The vi'Ord
nimantra1Ja means assigning a duty, i.e., direding a person like a
grandson etc., on the occasion of the necessary Sriiddha ceremonial
meal. The word iimantr,aIJa means permission to do as one likes.
The word adhi$ta means a respectful command.
. 1. liiwrthe let! P. IIL4.7 provides for the use of lET in the Veda
to express the same meanings as lIN. The meanings of lIN are
given in P. III.3.161.Seelntroduction [D-l].
[IVA21 ~'Ia;:n<li ~fu 1f R~'li~: I "fl.!uif 'l~~rnl;l ~~l'~ll. I ~n::Ts: I
"3!~Q ~'1r;:n~ql1:1'~ "f2~~fq I cr~ f<'>~ f<r\;\'R!c<:n i'lili",'1.'{ fcI'Ia;l'lT II
. ;:'11'1C~,q'''C::;:Cl~ 'IT ~~T'~l!'11f<t 'IT I f<r'<'11G:r;:rTl1rnG:l;l 'OfglTffm~:
l,Clll. II " ~Icr I 3!Q ~Qil: fu:&:Fcr~~l;'~!ll1r.~'q.ll. I
The conclusion is that lIN expresses instigation. The separate
mention of the four (meanings] is [just] for the sake of the expansion . [of the basic meaning]. Thus it is said, "[question]: In all
the four, the [common aspect of] instigation is closely connected.
[Therefore] lIN should be prescribed in that [general sense] alone.
Why then is the difference [in the four meanings] intended?
[answer]: The mention of the four [meanings]vidhi etc., was
made in the first place to make the details clear, or to expatiate
[the basic meaning]." That is why this is stated in tile Siddhiintakaumudi also..
1. The two verses quoted here sound like Vakyapadiya verses, and
and in LaghuMafi. (p. 983), one of them (asti pr,avaitaniirupartt . .. ) has been quoted with the introduction uktartt ca hari1Jii.
But neither of
The Siddhiinta
2. See introducti(
[IVBI1CR ~cT;:CT
ml1T;:l'I ~g<<{T
Instigation is ;
means [to achieve]
perty of being the r
being the cause of
[the cognition that
should be the deno
1. pravartanii ha:
activity. In 1
5f'[fu:;f;:C'-ii~HfilS('
of the conteni
activity.' The
thing desired i
contentness of
means of the d
of the suffix 11
knowledge of
knows' that th
he desires. In
is the propert)
Thus in the se
should sacrifice
means of the (
does not denoi
It denotes the
i$!asiidhanartt
,9,
SECTION FOUR
a:n~;!T Rl1;:'11Jff-
~R'!5![~<:[ ~'1<'i.,fl'rru
;.,
11
~;,.
~lIil:'1h,:
Il'lCf'lil<':~'liT Ol:fl'll<':: :
w:I:;;'n~+I. \ ~l~: \ .
1<:[: i'f;ilt::~ foI'laJ<n \I
aQTt::lo1 'i:@1Jff111~;
feiNRR'!
.. _.. ,'-.-.0.
so
addition, there is the aphorism of J aimini that fruit assodated with [acts prescribed in Vedic] injunction resides in the
[person] who carries it out, since it [the Vedic injunction] is characterised by that [agent]. This has been explained in BhamatI
.in the section, ' [the individual self] is the agent, since the [Vedic]
injunctions are meaningful', as follows: the fruit heaven etc.,
connected with [Vedic] injunction resides in the person who carries
it [the action prescribed by the injuction] out, i.e., in the agent,
since injunction means the property of being the means of achieving
what the agent expects.
~n
the
[IV. B.3]
3m
1l;'I +rcr:S<j~~<i<fq'I.
"i<:ri
'?;Rr I
,
That is why it has been stated by MaI,lc;ianamiSra that there is
nothing other than the property of being the means to a desired end
that instigates men to [perform] actions. This property, [since it is]
the cause of volitional activity, is called instigation.
SECTION FOUR
answer, karik.
property of t
<fTC~'!r<jl):q f;n;
that KaUlJ.lQab:
2. any,al;: by tl
siidhyata) am
(balavadani'itii
be discussed Ie
[IV.B.4]
;:J::!
~!!<ll\;f
a:r;ft'fci
~~~
"j\;f;:rqT J;t<j
f,j;'11 'lil~ ~
"wnit'!
fi'if.
In this [matter]
chapter of the Anuv
SECTION FOUR
1. The verse quoted here is taken from Mlll}Ic;lanami:sra's Vidhiviveka .. ' (VidhiVi. kiirikii 27; MK, p. 3612): The purvapa~in
brings forward the objection that lIN denotes instigation,and
not the property of heing the means to a d'esired end
"@
~IR.l:f: Q'<Rr'llql1l=l:fa [ ;or :O;'l: ~1S[1~'lTl:fm ] M.K. p. 3612). In
answer, kiirikii 27 says that instigation is the same as the
property of being the means of achieving the desired end.
~n(Q'q~'lI)T.f f;nl:[11lTT+!'tfu,il'ITl:fijq MK, p. 3612). This is the view
that KaUJJ;lr;iabhatta has followed.
2. any,a/J: by the word 'other', the property of feasibility (krtisiidhyatii) and the property of not entailing a stronger evil
(balavadani~tiinanubandhitva) are meant. Both of these will
be discussed later.
[IV.B.4] ":1 '(IHn'i!'l<q~'i.tq ~Rr<fl~l:f<~l:flfq Q"!#r'llCll:f1 'O]9'l:f<Ei ~Rfu ~<l:. I
Now [if it is claimed that] the properly of being feasible can also
be denoted [by lIN] ,since, like the property of being the means 10 a
desired end, [it] also [acts as an] instigator; [that is not acceptable] .
1. The view of the Nai)layikas has been brought in here, later to be
rejected. According to the Naiyayikas, inj1IDction has a threefold meaning and it consists of i~;<asiidhanatva 'the property of
being the means to a desired end, krtisiidhymtva .'the property of .
feasibility', and balavadani${iinanubandhitva 'the property of
not entailing a stronger evil'. All three of these are necessary
to cause volitional activity. Thus Jagadisa says in his sabdasaktiprakasika," foil~~g . 5[qij'f.f'<[9itlSff"t ",Q"llI~9im;or~ ~iF'i <r
3. II.3:33 describes'
Otherwise (if the
tion!> such.as yajeta
ive oblations' etc.,
5 all this section,
[plains it, (Bham.
'iew which is later
trapek~itopaYia:tii
hi
ew that injunction
achieving what the
itopaydta is to be
;8 kaTtarape~ita +
meanIng.
the Bombay edition
n. The explanation
:i siistrarthavattviit,
1 brought in in the
81
(p..
'1Ta
In this [matter] it has been said in the first section of the first
chapter of the Anuvyakhyana, "the property of being the goal of
..---------------
82
action is none othE!r than the property of being the means to a desired
[end]. That whiGh~hould be. doneis hot invariably connected with
[covered 'by] action "(ingepenill, sinc~lhe prdhibited[action] will
alSo be':ihe'kme [Le.'action,' and so akllrya]. Neither is future
action then the goal of action; because that wiII apply to 'God will
create' also; nor can it be said that that which is' impossible not to
do [i.e., that which is possible to do, i.e., feasible], is the goal of
action, for [the same reason of its] similarity with that which ig
prohibited. Thus it [i.e., the goal of action] is the desired means."
1. The verses quoted are taken from the Anuvyakhyana of AnandatIrtha on B.S. 1.1.1 (Anuvya. 43cd, 44, and 45). Of course the
desired end in that context is the liberation and the means to
it the desired Godhead (4tade1 1ata). Thus verse 46 says "kiirya1JZ
siidhantami!ftasya bhagavan4tadevatii" Since Kaul!c;Iabhatta is
going to quote the commentary on these verses, it is not necessary to explain them here.
[IV .B.6]
SECTION FOUR
significatory ,
guageor the
involving the
action by a
These two elc
of the three, ;
i.e., older thai
the command
'bring a cow',
cow', aSvam :
so performed,
these sentenc{
'insertion anc
sentence aCCOl
the meaningi
Then when tl
by the action
meaning as a
the sentences
action of brin!
and each time
the indivi~ual
3. kiiryiinvlle ev,
meanings -of w
junctive sente:
after the sP-llte
in accordance
tence with tlie
stands'its mea
cow is an anirr
,would be .rn~a
general cqnGlq~
thing to be cior
and anything' t
any meaning.
4. Now the dout
not convey an]
cate pure Bra:
does not chanj
"'-----'----. - - -
leans to a desired
yconnected with
:ed[action] will
~either is future
.ply to 'God will
mpossible not to
J, is the goal of
;h that which is
, desired means."
lyana of Ananda). Of course the
nd the means to
46 says" karya1JZ
Kau'J!Qabhatta is
" it is not neces-
irr'l '1T'f<T'1"!'!<fTrrTi'(
.:::..
.'il'll<'11i'( 'll>l 'len-a;
~
qfu I
9il~aT ~fu I
llways considered
iy one) factor in
cognition of the
SECTION FOUR
83.
significatory. association', which is imperative in learning a languageor the mean{ng of .apew\vord. :it i\l always describd as
involviJ;ig the observation of it'c0l1v~rsation ,and the resulting
. action by .a biila'ac'nild' ," in, whith' two elders .are invoived.
These two elders are referred to as the i;,fJtortrUlvrddka, the eldest
of the three, and the madhyamavrd~ha, who is the middle one,
i.e., older than the child, but younger than the person who gives
the command. When a child hears ,the commands giimanaya
'bring a cow', asvamlinya 'bring a horse', gii1!l badhiina 'tie the
cow', asvarrz naya 'take the horse away'; and sees the actions
so performed, it learns the meaning of the individual words in
these sentences. In this procedure, the method of iivapodviipa
'insertio,n and extraction' is used. When ,the child hears the
sentence accomganied by the action of bringing a cow, at first,
the mea!ling is understood as belonging to the entire sentence.
Then when the second sentence 'bring the horse' accompanied
by the action of bringing a different animal is heard, and its
meaning as a whole is understood, ithe child sees that in both
the sentences the word .anaya 'bring' is common, and so is the
. action,of bringil).g; bu;t the words 'cow' and 'horse' are different,
and each time a different animal is brought. It is this way, 'that
the individual word-meanings are isolated.
3. karyiinvz!e eva vyutpaUe!J: According to the Prabhiikaras,
meanings of words are properly comprehended only through Injunctive sentences which involve some act to be done. Thus
after the sentence 'bring a cow' is uttered, and a cow is brought
in accordance with tha,t command, the child connects the sentence with tne visible action resulting from it, and thus under~
stands'its meaning. On the other hand, some fact such as 'a
cow is an animal', which does'not.involve something-to.bedo.ne,
,wo.uldbe !11~aningless tothe.~hild. ,FrplIl, this, -they draw the
general cqJ;J.(~\qsion th~t Ru,ly t~Q~~,seti~~\'!c~s, wh!Ghjnwlvesome- "
thing to be done, i.e.,mainlyinjuctiYe~ntences; are meaningful,
and anything tha.t expresses an acco~~lish~d fadcani'tot convey
any m e a n i n g . , . " .
4. Now the doubt arises'l;hat if'thus an accomplished fact does.
not convey any meaning, how is it that the Vedanta texts advocate pure Brahman ( The Brahman always' has existed and
does not change. It does not involve any action to be done:
.<
SECTION FOUR
84
lI"f<i~l:{i
[The state]
follows]: The
means that beca
absence of the I'
does have futui.
that future acti
claimed that] it
create'] is karya
kiiryatii] is the
1. This is the
gives the ree
karya. If f
of creating i
a kiirya. Bl
2. linviicyatiin&
since it is d
caita:t kiirya;
. However, th
before linva(
of creating .
kiirydtii has
sra~yalJi dOl
f<i~fcr ~lS[:
I ~'l~~ Cftllm'i{Hle( I
[In the verse], along with the property of being the means
to the desired [end], [the words] 'also except the property of being
the desired' are to be understood, since that is what is said in the
conclusion.
1. The commentator ]ayatlrtha is here referring to AnuVya. 43.
The verse itself just says 4tasiidha1'liatal!t vinii. But in the con. clusion, the adjective, 4ta 'desired' is also applied to the means
(AnuVya. 45). That is why it is being suggested that 4tatvarjz
ca vinii should also .be understood in AnuVya. 43).
.
[IV.B.7]
1{!!<:IT'i{;rCfIf4<'l"l 1{!!<<l
[IV.B.8]
'q
[The statement beginning with] 'kiiryam' [is explained as follows]: Invariably associated [with i.e.] produced [by]. [If
that invariably associated with action is considered to be kiirya] ,
killing a brahmin etc., which is prohibited, will also be the same
[i.e., kiirya] , as that also is produced by action. Hence, this [that
which is invariably associated with or in other words is produced by
action] isnbt the thing to be done ..
1. This. is the explanation of '!ili[;r W~'1io<lir.>t f.tfiiR;:l.O'l Ul'Itolcr: I
(AnuVya. 44). Thearg1,lIrient here is quite dear.
.
..
~..
'f.lil
[IV.B.II] "'[i<l:fH
'!iFl-m ,'1
~,91q
The krtya [1
[by the rule] krt
doubt that kiirya
must be done, the
words] kiirya1'JZ
cepted] , adultery
etc.] being impos:
has been expres:sel
1. The word kl.
lfyaT to the
.-.-.--~
SECTION FOUR
85
IS AND MOODS
lili"lFI1<J: I
~ing the means
operty 'Of being
t is said in the
AnuVya. 43.
But in the CDnd to the means
d that 4tatva11!
43) :
'0
n;;{<ij~", ~11<'11~-
~ar.
al
THE MEANING
86
OF TENSES
AND MOODS
ruh~
krtyiisca/ P. III.3.171 prescribes krtya suffixes when necessity . ~r obligation is to be expressed. (The word iivasy;aka
'necessary' or 'obligatory' has come from the preceding ,iivaoyakiidha.nw17;lyayor1Jini};J P. III.3.170). Thus the word kiirya should .
mean something which must be done, i.e., scmething which it is
impossible not to do. TIle argument here is the same as in
[IV. B.8] .
'Ill4,,!fgf~12maqlO:'f.<'t s Pl
SECTION FOUR
SECTION FOUR
is past, you also will have this fau!,t of the inclination to activity
Iconoerning the orb of the moon].
.
1. I am taking this passage as connected to the view that the
property of being feasible is also to be taken as an instigator,
against which the AnuVya. verses and the commentary on them
were quoted in support of the view th<'\t only the property of
being the means to a desired end is to be considered as an instigator. Now the krtisiidhyataviid'i is making a comeback with
another objec~ion, i.e., that .since the property of being the means
to a desired end exists in the orb of the moon, there will necessarily be an inclination to an activity concerning it, and such an
activity is not possible. Thus the condition of feasibility not
being fulfilled, there wm be no such fault if the view that feasibility is the instigator is accepted.
2. vV11at is this a~tivity concerning the orb of the moon? Because
of the reference to its being sorriething which is past (atitakiirya) ,
and not possible now (since later on the fault has been removed
by adding the adjective idiini1'(t 'now' ~o feasibility ill the next
passage [IV.B.14]), it seems to me that the activity concerned
might be the creating of the moon (candrama1J.l/alanirmii~za).
Cardona suggests that it is also possible to think of it as the
bringing of the moon (candra;ma:IJl/aliinaYlana). In this case
idiiniiJ!z 'now' must be taken to refer to daytime when bringing
of the moon is not possible, whereas atita 'past' in this case
would refer to the night. Since the reference to the oandmma:~u!ala is'rather cryptic in the text, and there are no commentaries, there is rio clue to :the exact intention of the author.
3. The orb of the moon gives pleasure, and is thus the means of
something desired. If the property of being the means to a desired end is accepted as the only instigator, this would lead to
an inclination to activity (pravrttij.: i.e.; creating or bringing
of the moon. But this is not possible, and thus this view is
faulty. Therefore it cannot be accepted.
4. i${asiidhtmatvaviidi answers this objection by showing that .it
can be true even if feasibility is accepted as an instigator: This
is taking recourse to the maxjm thata fault which is common
to both sides cannot be held against either. Creating of the
moon was possible once (i.e., when the moon was first created) ,
and thus it did have the property of feasibility. Since that is
I ~f~<l:fl!G: I Q'-11
foIfu2!!TaQT<{'Ii<'t s fq
lroperty of being
;ired end], [with
of being the deot be denied [as
. us eVen though
i.
~lq~: I
87
88
SECTION FOUR
is not removed.
moon [pleasure]
property now-ne<
being the means.
inclination to do
For us [krtisiidh;
. adjective of actio
1. The fault is
of desire. N
object of desi
injunction st
sacrifice' inst
fonn a sacrifi
But this hea'
the sacrifice ~
exist 'now', i
if now-ness c
additional dil
There will bE
avoided at al
2. In the caSe 0
being feasiblE
Now-ness is i:
Since creatin
feasible now,
does not ariSE
fruit of heave]
now, -the acti<
feasible now.
[IV.B,16] fiI; '<f 'P1
of the property of being the goal of action 'now' is like that [i.e.,
instigqtor], [we can] equally [say] that the knowledge of the property of being the means to a desired end 'now' is 'that way [the
instigator]. Therefore, since it is impossible to explain the property
of being the goal of action as other than the property of being the
means to a desired end, and since there is no evidence to [support
that anything else] is the de,noted meaning [of lIN] ; that [anything
other than the property of being the means to a desired end] is not
the meaning of injunction. [All this argument in favour of ~tasjjdha
natva as the only instigator] is inane.
1. The fault mentioned in [IV.B.13] is removed here.
2. The i$tasiidhanatvaviidi tries 'to imitate the s~metactics. The
reason for this being an empty argument will be explained in ,
the' next passage.
lIV.B,l5] ~liu:g<lTr;j ~~<nq~T 'liRrm>:'1<rT;ul<lli'1 ~'1r9i<'ll<r.1 ., ~<::1;:r1f~12'-1N<l<r1;u1;f ~'1rO!P <r~ <r?f ;:rr~fu 9l"'1l{ I ~a:Rf<R<'Im"~l'1H<r
rn:"f'lli'1 <iT fo\~"f11jl{ I an;q ";:~liu:S<l'fjiil ~"m'1T ~O:T<ll '-1~~91<r.
. tD"fIR'lffl: I 3!<r 1l:'1 ., \1T"li't '-11"l<l~ 'IT I 3!"'i\ '1FT1<D ~'lffi~
li'1l<r.
li9fJli1i<n;ffCf<l<9Tlil'l1<r. I 3!lili1'!i :9;<l: 'liCflfolGJ<lffi<l,et
fqffi~fu ;r ~"f: I
fq'o'1;'<2t ;
'-1~2t;r
,
lJ.
cil
~\1'f('tl;~
Moreover, the
the goa! of action
is [in the context
either (1) the ins
[alternative], that
SECTION FOUR
is not removed The desire relative to the fruit of the orb of the
moon [pleasure] now is evident for all. For the same reason [the
property now-ness cannot qualify] the means or the property of
being the means. In the last alternative [no. 2], there will be no
inclination to do sacrifices etc., since' heaven does not exist now_
For us [krtisiidhyatiivlidina~] however the property now-ness is the
adjective of actiori .. Hence there is no fault.
1. The fault is not removed by taking 'now-ness' as the adjective
of desire. Nor can now-ness be taken as the adjective of the
object of desire in order to ge;G out of this difficulty. The Vedic
injunction svargakiimo y,aj.eta 'one desirous of heaven should
sacrifice' instigates the person with a desire for heaven to perform a sacrifice. In this case, the object of desire is the heaven.
But this heaven is produced by the merit which results after
the sacrifice and as far as the sacrificer is concerned, does not
exist 'now', i.e., when he becomes inclined to sacrifice. Thus
if now-ness of the object of desire is insisted upon, it creates
additional difficu~ty, instead of removing the one in question.
There will be no inclination to sacrifice, a fault that must be
avoided at all costs.
In the.case. of those whoacceP[t. the view that the property of
being feasible is also an instigator, this fault does not arise.
Now-ness is in this case taken to be an adjective of the action.
SInce creating or bringing of the moon is not an action that. is
feasible now, the fault tha.t there will be inclination towards it
does not arise. In the case of the sacrifice that produces the
fruit of heaven, even thongh the heaven may not be in existence
now, the action leading to it, i.e., performing the sacrifice, is
feasible nj)w. Thus there will be no difficulty in that case either ..
~ C!~fC! <:!l1Fl+J:. 1
~~ l1HTl1l91~ ;or
8St
ES AND MOODS
the [existence]
, like that [Le.,
odge of the pro,that waY [the
iin the property
rty of being the
nce to [support
; that [anything
ired end] is not
our of 4tasiidha.ere.
ne tactics. The
be explained in
OJ ~o.l;:jlfli1'!
ofi<lOj<'lfir<i91'1T<:<l-
I
,
'9I<J:.1
~'8'11'w1~<91<J:.
:;:<~
r:
<l'Tm<i:1 ~'lRR
~<lT~QOj<<i
V.B.14 is inane]
)therwise] there
lcerning the orb
:nowledge of the
is the instigator
:ning the orb of
iTe either (1) of
lative, the fault
1
I
2: .
'90
SECTION FOUR
$edha. The
between these
"is equal [in fault with the view that the instigator is anything pnr'
duced by action], [for ,the following reasons] : There is no inclination to activity without the property of being the means to a desired
end, and that [the property of being the means to a desired end]
also exists in [prohibited actions such as] adultery etc.. Since the
inclination to do prohibited things is well established, overapplication
of the instigator in that [direction] cannot be a fault. Therefore,
the objection [brought against the view that the goal of action is
anything produced by action] is irrelevant.
1. Here the opponent to the i~t,asiidhanatva view is referring back to
the objection stated in AnuVya. 44. See [IV.B.8].
S"F<lt RiSrliltfllilRu'1 Rq"i!l;:1l<\"r ;r ~~1l <rl~ 'fi~1l:.1 Cli[
'1!'1llllJf<;:lo1:[1 Cl'lTfiT '1"+!Hl+ro1:[oi" ~''1WCf'!;~''IGt;,fu ~'l'i I
In the last [alternative, i.e., if kiiryiitii (in this case, being anything that is produced by action) is taken to be the meaning of IDy] ,
the only' objection that results is that in ordinary negation, there
y;'ilIbeno connection [of UN] ,vith'the negative. But this [objection] is equally [true] for you also, as will be explained later.
111erefore, enough of [bringing up these] faults which are c()nfusing.
. [only] to a disciple. This is the [general} direction [thrust, of the
argument] .
1. ,If 'being produced by adion' . (kriyiijanydtva) is taken to be
the meaning of lIlv, there will be difficulty in connecting it with
the negative particle in the ordinary negation. By ordinary
negation, here prasajyaprati:!edha is meant, as prasajyapratisedha is generally considered to be the normal type of negation,
the other kind being the eXception. see Introduction [I-I].
2. prasajyaP7l!lti~edha: In P8!t).iniarr tradition, Patai'ijali was the
first who has shown the distincion between the two kinds of
negation, namely, prasajyaprat4edha and paryudiisa. (M.B.
vol. 1, p. 101 etc.). The I\tIimarp.sakas in their diEcussion of the
tli~edhavidh'i 'negative injunction' go in great detail about the
function and characteristics of these two kinds of negation.
Out of thes~ two prasajyapr:dti~edha is considered to be the
nOrn1al or ordinary negation, and only when it cannot be applied,
is the second kind of negation, namely, paryudiisa is accepted.
That is why, in our text, the word ni~.edhasiidhiira~~ye 'in the
case of the ordinary negation' is .used to refer to prasajyaprati-
~ I J;fRriStor: '1"
known as par:
[IV.B.I7]
ClQf.''1(';':
Nrsirph,asr~l1na
I
~
[IV.B.I9J
~:ST~f~m
'1"J[m-5<f!j!:'
is anything pro
ere is no inclinaeans to a desired
)
a desired endJ
etc.. Since the
:, overapplication
ault. Therefore,
goal of act;on is
referring back to
r.B.8J .-
.+r.
'lll~
r;jfu ~'fi I
I C!~
1-
is taken to be
)llllecting it with
n. By ordinary
_s prasajyaprati:-ype Of negation,
juction [I-IJ.
atafijaJi was the
he ,two kinds of
yudasa. (M.B.
discussion of the
detail about the
Ids of negation.
dered to be the
mnot be applied,
liisa is accepted.
ihara~~ye 'in the
:0 prasajyaprati-
SECTION FOUR
91
[IV.B.IS]
[IV.B.19J
92
SECTION FOUR
I
I
verb
I
#!asiidhanatva
'I
krti (action)
yZiga (sacrifice)
I______________~------
Here by the cc
object, it is cogn
thing that' can 1
[IV,l'.20]
r[
'" . lJ1'"
'ifC[
'iJT~;;~>li: <3
'Gfal''l~9T'5f
q~T 'if Rrof,t~
will
In
is common to all
,ferred to as tiittva
to determine the
he suffix. Here it
gives the meaning
it is necessary to
But the knowledge
f the tifltv,a aspect
II the :ten lakaras.
)bject is provided
d along with the
!Iva (=tii1tva)
I
(action)
93
Nor should [one object ,by] saying the following: In this way,
desire to do cannot be justified, since feasibility etc. are not now cognised as qualifiers, but as relational [vi~ayata]. It has been explained
elsewhere that the cognition and the desire have the cause-effect
relationship when they both have the same qualifier. In addition,
as in pacati 'he cooks', here also, the cognition will be that of ac:ion
conducive to sacrifice, and not that in which sacrifice is the qualificando Thus also desire to do cannot be justified. [The whole argument] is unjustifiable also because the vidhikrt etc., do not have the
denotative function for action.
L ,These are some objections to 'the, view put forward in the pre- _
vious passage, according to which, the meaning element feasi-_ bility can be obtained ~rom the tifltva aspect of the verbal
endings. The first objection is as follows : _ vi~ayata can be of
two kinds: (a) prakaratakhyavi~ayata: which is a denoted
meaning such as ghatatva 'potness', is of the word ghata 'pot'.
In a qualificative cognition, this occupies the place of a qualifier.
(b) sa'/flsargatakhylCl vi~ayata : which on the other hand, is not
denoted by linguistic elements directly, hut can he obtained by
the connection or the joining together of these linguistic dements.
Hence it can be called relatiohalvi~ayatg.The meaningieasihility cannot be cognised ftom ycijetl1- 'li_eshouldsacritice'dir~tly. , 'The' denoted meanings -ate';acrj.fice,+"acHon :iishown' above.
(iririote 1, IV.B:T9)'. It is-~fhroughjoining' these two together
. that the meanIng feasibliity is obtained. Thus the meaning
feasibility will not be a qualifier of :the cognition. Now it has
been explained elsewhere that in order for desire to be generated
as a result of a cognition, both the desire and the cognition must
have the same qualifier. Thus it has been said in the Nyayamanjari that the cause of the inclination to act is the desire which has
),
c,
SECTION FOUR
interpretatioI
. general aspec'
NaiyG.yil$a in
rule lalJ, krm
been accepte(
denote the m
the other han
and thus obt
etc. It is ve
base in a gr:
as brought in
Incidentally, i
tattvaviveka :
buted to him
view that the
bility, since f
. verbal root en
The rest of tl
tions and ans'
srama by ou
nrsi1JZ/z.iismma
is no trace of
are available .
[IV.B.21) IF,%'1 '1"
fo!u~'<l*
~fuffi~'f<
):f~'1'<~
fo!~Q"{
. .
. 'IT'f<f<'11""
[The aboverhl
afterwards to have
abtained. by .the in
[sacrifice] ispottl
of being flO?-sible fa
intention is as foIl
Veda, it by itself i
do sometb
able
qualified by the "p:
to
-----------------------~--------------------
at (desire) is the
yayMaii. p. 248J.
ld_ in)he. exa.mple
for the desire -and
neaning feasibility
, but only as relaf cause and effect
desire. Therefore
-lIe meaning feasiqualificand. The
1t!qtisiidhyalJ 'the
possible. Just as_
on is piikanukulii
'action or effort
is a subordinate
; be obtained, and
e very base of the
~ined -'through" the
is taken to mean
! word krti is here :e with the Naiyiaians means kriyiimerally mean the
According to the
nleati' effort, since
(krti). But the
, and :meGln bhiiva
:lot. dl<note,krti in
It 9fy.i~w. Thus,
;he first place, the
ction between the
easibility does not
ltaining the meanl not attribute it
95,
SECTION FOUR
~6
[to get] by common sense also.. Thus lIN does not have the deno-
tative function with respect :to it, since it can be obtained otherwise,
and since it is impossible for the Veda to denote [feasibility] including the part 'me'.
.
.
1. in this passage, the objections mentioned in the previous passage
. are answered. Even if the cognition connecting action and its
object is as a relational vi~ayatii and not as a qualifier, and eve?
if the cognition resulting from yajeta would not have the sa;;nfice as the qualificand originally; the mind can make the connection and later a cognition in which sacrifice is the qualificand is
possible. But this does not remove objection no. 3,which points
out that the vidhikrt suffixes do not have the denota:tive function for krti. Thu~ an alternative answer to the problem has
been pro~sed in the form of ,the' inference that the sacrifice is
feasible for me because it is not a locus of any property contradictory of its being feasible for me. Here for the first time,
personal' elemenjl; has been introduced along with feasibility.
Thus the sacrifice should not only be feasible, which it can be
called even if only one person was capable of'performing it; but
it should be specifically. be feasible for me, the person who is
supposed to have the desire ~o Perform it: If :his. were not s.o,
even a person nqt able to perform it would be mclmed to do. It.
It will be like a cripple deciding to swim across the EnglIsh
Channel, because after all it has been proved to be feasible by
other people. The addition of personal eleme~t is a~o~~er
argument in favour of not attributing the meanmg feasIbIlIty
to lIN. After all the Veda cannot cause the cognition of the
element 'me'. It is intended for all, and not just for one person.
Thus we have to look elsewhere for the means to obtain this
meaning. KaUlJ"abhatta thinks that it 'is possible. ~o obtain
it even by common sense. ". Sirice it cah thus be obtamed elsewhere, lIN cannot'be said'to have -a denotative function ,for it;2 ... As has already' blien pOinted out, this whole argument cannot
be found in the works of Nrsirp.hasrama available to us. .
.
{IV.B.22] ~: ~Rrm<<rcl1m~ ;or' ~'1ci<i; ~''RIri~ ~~'f~'1~(!(! ~ml~;or
'pnwl'f"!;or'f.foj;or ~l('{. I ;orlcRCI";p:j'l:, I ;or "f R'I>'l'-ll~D~;or CI~;p:j'l:,1
~'liCl~"'1lTlil~'lftql"'i~'Il('{. I
SECTION FOUR
non-inclination towe
by the aversion [to
anything desired;al
. Hence it [feasibilit:
[can itbe said ~hat]
with the desire to do
can be cognised by
1. Here KaUl.l~abl
alone is !the im
it cannot be th
agreed upon ~h
the instigator. '
is that even the
perty of being 1
the instigatorm
made to obtain
by resorting to
in [IV.B.21]. 4
passage, the in:
is it then that
something not I
non-inclina.tion
. is from. aversiO! .
definitely does I
labour. The r
bhiiva) betweel
established by,
comitance', wh
tasmin sati tal
occurs, Y also (
'absent. Thus 1
. an averSion tCi
is an' absence I
[IV. B.23]
~ ~1'!m"F
q;iifu
;:'f1~;or' ~
~11W-!i'-'1i'r
<'!l'JO:Wf"~
Nor [should on
--c-'-----.-.-~
.. - . .
---~.--
97
SECTION FOUR
ENSES AND M()ODS
aa ~1+Tl~
'Il1q]!!D1rr CI"v'P1+{ I
le instigator. The
..
---.-- ....
;,-
be the. instigator.
s<;a;,! ~I
Moreover, the property of being the means of the desired end
is (the same as) being the means to the object o'f desire. It is
the denoted meaning through being )the means of achieving heaven
etc., since it is only in that form that the cognition [of the property
of being the means to a desired -end] is. the' instigator. [It is not
an instigator ,in )the form of being the means] of just something
"desired, since the .cognition of desire is: not ,necessary.. It is an
.' instiga~or \)Yo: its ver~J1.at11fe.' . .Even tho~g~ ~r.i comrpQ~ ex,\lerience,
[a man] does become mclmed. to.. act at it~e ,cpmmand,qfone res. p{;ted, knowing that [this perwri] is instigating me knowing some-thil!g which is good [for me] ; in the case of [activity] concerning
the' other world, which is to be accomplished at much expense and
trouble, there is no inclination to activity without the specific cognition of it [the object of desire]. So lIN must signify it specifically.
Therefore, the denotative function of that [lIN] should be accepted
SECTION FOUR
Cf'f' ~,,~
a'<'1l'L, I
In that, in or
desire is the consec
iug-ness; as in the c
1. ak)l1afavaccheG
.denoted meani
pravrtti1VimittG
word to denot
denoted meanil
the denoted m
property. All
of being a den
of their indiviC
of a word. Th
both thedenoi
of the property
on the other h"
accepted as th
the property 0
Thus the word
individual pot,
denoted meanin
'one desirous oj
"the denoted mel
the means of, ac
2. in this case, tl
different meanin
befOte[in Iv.Ii
. is necessary. T
. being the mean~
heaven, will ari&
(sa'lJ'lketagraha)
be able to know
t be the instigator.
3f something which
iS~I1,eutral; .becau,qe
lr, as is exen).pllfi~d
ry [to consider1 it
Iccount theuniver;y] which may not
:, even when there
lse the same argu(lec;Iabhatta has used
order to object to
lI,}c;Iabhatta answers
! the cause of non-',
:'l<iT~~"R"T1R<lT ~;:r
:T>JFn<lq~1J[lQ. I Ql;>:[l:
n 'll,,;:f1<Ifl:Ifufq~'~q
r.~clll':~~i'; cnfu"l'll-
99.
SECTION FOUR
Cf?[
CI~'!B:.
------------ - - - - - - - - -
100
3. It ii! in order to avoid this fauljt that it has been suggested that
desire should be taken as' the consecutive character of all the
-different -limitors- of the property' of being the denoted meaning
of lIN. The case of the third person pronoun tad has been'cited
as an illustration of the use of the idea of the consecutive
character.
4. In the case of the pronoun tad, the same fault of having too
many meanings exists. It might pervade such properties as tigerness, heaven-ness, student-ness as the occasion may be. If all these
pervaded properties (vyapyadhar:ma) are accepted as the limitors
of denoted meaningness, it will result in tad having innumerable
denoted meanings, -which is undesirable. Thus it is that a
search is made for a consecutive character (anugam,aka dharma) ,
which will be common to all these different possible meanings of
tad. This property has to be a pervasive one (vyapaka dharma).
which will pervade all the limitors of individual meanings that
are the vyapyadharmas. In the case of tad, such consecutive
character is the property of being the object of the speaker's
intellect (vaktrbuddhivi$ayatva) , which is common to all the
individual' inst;mces such as tiger-ness or student-ness etc. Thus
there is only one denoted meaning, i.e., that which has the property of being the object of. the speaker's intellect, and the fault
of having too many meanings is avoided. In the same way,
in all the differel1;t individual meanings of lIN, such as the property of being the means of achieving a son, heaven etc., the
consecutive character is that all of those are objects of desire
(i$ta). Thus it is that the pervasive property of being the
means of achieving a desired end, will be considered the meaning
of lIN, in order to avoid the fault of having many meanings. In
spite of this, -in every individual instance of the use of lIN, the
_cognition of me,aning must be -specific regarding the' object of
desire. See Introdudion'[1I':'2j., \ _ '
-'
[IV.B:26] Q;<T 'r.f ~'fnlfu:(11~;r''fl'!~'11<'3~11''flG:: 'OJ'F!~~ I ;r ~"'Hjq~ir'!iTmfu:
'I'<::(1Hf+To111ml~p~C! ~I'l1<'l~<!<'fll: I 'fiTllT"CI'I'<::1G:: <:'f<ii~I<?-@<!fit
mocr.:r''filTer'!iT+TT'IlG:: I for~~~ - <:'fir'liT+nfu:(1Hf'ic'11&:HBlJr.<!+lT'Il~m <'-1<!'l, I
SECTION FOUR
meaning [ofllN]
also1 is obtainabl
together with [at
etc. [It cannot t
ing element] 'hea
_'desirous of', it st
it should also be
etc., there is even
svmgakama 'one
1. The argumer
the property
of desire, ane
than llN, it
2. Even though
ti:tined with 1
ment 'properl
of lIN. - AIs(
tences is the
Thus in the i
there is an ;
should sacrifi
6,7, and it I
it is not din
the property
which there'
meaning is J
since there i,
[1Y.B. ')7]
81~ +r~
't!T~
Wi,'
~ "fC!<:
81'1'TC!"f<'3'
);[m;r;:er'!i
~Rrmm~
-,--~
,.
ii
lor
SECTION FOUR
,n suggested that
racter of all the
:lenotedmeaning
zd has beeri' ci ted
the consecutive
It of having too
roperties as tigeray be. If all these
ed as the limitors
.ing innumerable
us it is that a
ramaka dharma),
lible meanings of
yiipaka dharma).
al meanings that
such consecutive
of the speaker's
.nmon to all the
It-ness etc. Thus
~ichhas the proect, and the fault
1 the same way,
such as the proheaven etc., the
objects of desire
rty o'f being the
.ered the meaning
my meanings. In
.e use of lIN, the
ing the'object of
. '
:;
~<;"l'!fti ~iT'liTl'!TiG:
~<i:. <:q~l~q~~crTorfti
If'l1O"ll~n~ir."l+nql-
a:ttaining heaven
,8t be the denoted
Now [if you say that] in order to avoid inclination towards the
eating of food in which honey and poison are mixed, the property
of not entailing a greatly undesired result should also be the denoted
meaning due to its being a means of causing inclination; [that is]
102
not [so]. For [that way] there will not be any volition in the case
of anything to be accomplished with much effort, due to the generation of a lot of suffering in that. Even a little suffering [is considered
to be] intense for some reason. The quantity.of intensity [of suffering] is hard to determine. Therefore it is not right to assume that
[balavadan4!iinanubandhitva, is ~he denoted meaning of UN]. Strong
aversion about a particular [activity] is independently a deterent.
That is why someone who has great aversion to the effort involved
does not feel inclined [to perform] Jyoti,~toma etc., whereas someone
else does [feel inclined to perform it]. This should be kept in mind.
1. Here again as before [in IV.B.4] , the Naiyayika view has been
brought in, later to be rejected. According to the Naiyayikas,
injunction has threefold meaning consisting of i~tas,(jdhanatva;
krtisiidhydtva, which has already been rejected; and lastly balavadani~tiinanubandhitva 'the property of not entailing a great
evil', which has been brought into discussion now.
2. See Introduction [Ei--4] and [1-2] for a detailed discussion.
",.
[IV. B.28]
(>
,..."
('...,......
(>
,...
9<O<!G,Hi!!~T\;f.'!'<!:ijT;:r;'1
SECTION FOUR
Aversion need I
he does not acc
2. janakavighatlak
vighataka is to
which destroyer
means that whi
(pratibandhakl
NiKa, p. 200-::
the absence wl
fire to burn, tl
Thus the coun
1nmji is the prai
in order for em.
the fire, it is no
i.e., the fire. 1
cause Um~akii~
hand, the jewel
of the result (t
and not becaw
3. In this w~y, th
sideration tlte c
ing great evil at
it is easier to a
deterent in the
4. The view attril
in his works a
[IV.B.29]
CI~~''1B:,1
,~
~'r<!: ~<!T~:a:,i
~T~q~ql
5J'f'1B:, 1
That is doubtf
in such instances a
[this will] result in
aversion. Since tha
desired end is the [
reasons] : when th
This non-inc1inatiol
which has been acc<
ES AND MOODS
d discussion.
iG:f.rn<Ii'if.11'1fT<R"f
111'!~1<j~r:>wan I
""HEllO: I 81;:'l~
I
, of not entailing
lis is the followneans to a great
le inclination to
IOwledgeil of the
is expected' [as
, 'e concomitance,
:ause can be a
it will not be a
ise only due to
ndent deterent,
of not entailing
the other hand,
~rty of entailing
t to all activity..
SECTION FOUR
103
[IV. B.29]
I
That is doubtful. It is well established that there is volition
in such instances as adultery, even when there is knowledge tha~
[this will] result in. great evil, provided that there is an absence of
aversion. Since that is so, only the property of being a means, to a
desired end is the [one] denoted meaning [of lIN, for the following
reasons] : when there is aversion, there is a deterent to volition.
This non-inclination can be explained only as due to the aversion
whkh has been accepted as the deterent. There is' no reason why
\u'f'l+I,
104
/
<rl'lf>.rgli-
~FP{<'lI<J: I
As to what :the Prabhlikaras [say] that the property of being
the means to a desired end is not lthe meaning of injunction. It is
not possible to, denote that [i$iasiidhanatva] , since the momentariness
of the sacrifice is known.
1. Here starts the discussion of the view belonging to the Prabhakara school of Mi!llfup.sa. See' Introduction [G-l].
[IV.C.2]
SECTION FOUR
cause-ness (parl
link is not pre!
.,
~
[IV. C.3l
<{
'q'fl'fl'l'
l3T11Fl:[~IFI'
Nor should it b
generally should be (
particular aspect ha
ricted to be somethil
1. Even though th
be present, why
of heaven in a
this also. To t
must be brougr.
gha(ena jalamiil
clear that a pot
compatibility tc
a pot with a hi
chidvetarlMJa gh
a hole'. The co
than the kind :
principle will h:
seen that the ~
compatibility ir
sacrifice cannot
hole cannot be
restrict the sacr
heaven, or heav
fice, just as thE
without a hole.
[IV. CAl 1'5 'q I <wr:
'lim') 9ifo'~ q:
Moreover, the ~
It has been decided
, stands as the thing
from the thing desir
desired end.
1. Here the very
sacrifice is chal
1I
,SES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR
; evil] should be
cause-ness (pam1]1parasadhanatva) of the sacrifice, because thelink is not present. See Introduction [G-I] for explanation ..
[IV. C.3l rr ~'1lj"rq ~!<{;:r<~ ~l+rl~'fli\qlJf "iT~'f(jlmfcr 91"'ill:. I ll;'fif<!~r~
;>roperty of being
injunction. It is
he momentariness
19 to the Prabha[G-l].
"<'1I'l:. <fl''icn~r~'f
''f(lI<'ll'l:. I
105
It has been decided elsewhere that the person who desires, under, stands as the thing to be done, only that which though different
from the thing desired, is the means which immediately precedes the
desired end.
1. Here the very applying of the word kiiry.a or kartavya to the
sacrifice is challenged as sacrifice is not the means that imme-
"'"-.
~------.
--"-'-'---~--"
-.--.~
..
1106
. ,(IV. C.S]
of
<!lm~'f.mUl~<r+!'i~
'fi1~~1r ITll1l'fi\1: I
[IV.C.6] ~>:'-i<ei 'i:f 1;[+!l~cr~l'rq Cf'~l 'tf 'fill! crR~<:~i[9il+!<:<! IPl+!Fa~I~<!'
Unrql~'1l"I<j}f+!lot;:r crfu:l~'.lJ~q i~'l'\~<!l <:qii'fil+!<:i:tm U~1;[: 9iliffi I
SECTION FOUR
upadiinapramii1pa t:
meaning elemt:nt~
meaning.
[IV, C.7] G~'fCl'I, '1<!\q~
"
G1<'l'! G<:<!
G~ ~
f'i 'lil~l~qur
;l~llT
I 'lilit,<i
l~qllCI'11
'1FT
+ll'll~"'l'lil~cnqBllN
[~1'11
31"'1'11=;:!'1](1:' I
that it is the
the. meaning of
.d apitrva are conr the Prabhakaras
rom the following
Je
n"CRlrn'G~''lT'''i_
~W-f.~Uf'1fu-a~ ~;;jl<i
(sastraPraPa. of
'1FTl~~Rrel~<[+r'i~
ll'lBl 11'1l!l;:C!BlF'l'1i<ltfu Woi(r'<{: q;l~~ I
)n] is a different
,hat is denoted by
.ch ends in nomikiirya. Therefore
itself with the aid
,Q that one underires heaven'_
SECTION FOUR
107
meaning.
This has been said in the commentary on Nayaviveka by Varadaraja: as the form svargakiimasya 'of the person desirous of heaven'
[though seperated by being] on a different level, [still] denotes the
person for whom the activity in question is meant, [by the denotative function]; the word signifying the primary meaning does
have the main significatory function [Le., the denotative function],
for the meaning which is intended [by the word] .
1. The PrabbJakaras here bring in Varadaraja in support of their
view that it is the denotative function of lIN itself that effects
the change of svargakiimal} into svargakiimasya, without affecting its own denoted meaning. Thus Varadamja says that not
,only the primary meaning, but also the intended meaning is to
be considered as denoted. To understand this, the Prabhakara
. theory of the cognition of sentence-meaning must be taken in-
108
Thus, the person desirous of heaven has the cognition that thue is
duty for me which has the sacrifice as its object. The duty [apurva]
has as its object ~he sacrifice by virtue of being the goal of effort
[krtyuddeSya], which has the sacrifice as its object.. The sacrificial
act is the object of an activity and has as its locus a man. The
properties which delimit the relation of the sacrifice to these are:
the property of being a means for carrying out a duty [apurvakara1}atvaj, and the property of being the agent of the duty. That
itself is compatibility. Similarly, the property of not having a hole,
in the sentence 'bring water in a jar', [delimits the jar's being related
to the act of bringing water]. The limitor of compatibility is brought
in by taking that meaning for granted in [the sentence] 'bring water' .
etc., and in the .present case, [in the sentence sv;argakiimo yajetaj,
by the denotative function itself on the strength of the aupiidiinika
pran!iiIJa.
1. anvayitiivacchedaka is the same as compatibility.
It is the
justifier of syntactic relation. It is the factor that determines
that X is compatible with Y if certain conditions are assumed.
Since 'the property of the jar being without a hole. has to be'
SECTION FOUR
~;
" <f.T'r:+<lf
'f'f G:[q: 1
.---~
znvitiibhidhiinaviida.,
words exist only as,
Thus the meaning
their proper context.
n the process of the
, related meaning is,
iividual meaning of
lis related meaning
Ie words in addition
:ir relation with the
;ative function. tiitrelates the different
~Ic! <IT1ol: I
3i'fl'i.'h<r
1'fl;1f Qf~fulW1fot
<r,'li~'~ :q I <r~ :q
8:. I '11nml~<f'lilq
'fi~11ll'l\Ul~9 r
SECTION FOUR
10~
assumed iIi order for the jar to be compatible with the action of
bringing water; the property of being without a hole, is 'to be
called the limitor of the syntactic relalion, ie.,anvayitiJvaccheka.
Since apurva is the link, between the .sacrifice and heaven
(yaga ---'> apurva' -"7 svarga), and ,apurva is the only direct means
,of heaven, the only way the sacrifice can be the object of activity
js by being the means of gaining apurva. Thus being the means
{)f gaining apurva is the limitor of the syntactic relation for
the sacrifice to be the object of activity.
1
1
c. 9]
.. ,.
"
llO
2:' The Pmbh~karas r~j~ctmi~ hbjectibn by' pointini()ut the difference between' the' instances where' the indicative function will
have jurisdiction, and where the denotative function itself will
have an expanded power to denote something in addition to the
primary denoted meaning. The expanded power of the denotative function is accepted only in such cases where the additional meaning is necessary to justify the syntactic relation of
the denoted primary meaning. The primary meaning is never
rejected. It is on the other hand, justified with the aid of the
additional me.aning. On the other hand, in the examples of the
indicative function such as the sentence gmigayit1!Z gho~a!J, it is
not possible to justify the syntactic relation of the primary
meaning. A cowherd colony cannot be on the water of the river.
Thus the primary meaning 'the stream or the current of the
river Ganga' is utterly rejected, and the meaning 'the bank of
the river GangIi' is brought in by the indicative function. The
meaning brought in ,here by the in~icative function does not
justify the syntactic relation of the primary meaning of the .
word ganga with the meaning of the word glw$,a. .On the, ot),ier
hand, it brings in a connected but entirely different meaning.
Since thus it carr be shown that the jurisdictions of the indiCative
function and the expanded denotative function are entirely different, and that both have in their separate spheres, it cannot be
claimed that the expanded denotative function will take over
the functions of lakWIJit and thus destroy it.
3. Even though. this answer takes -care. of the instances of. the
.indicative function where,the primary meaning !is entirely abandoned, what about the other kind 6fdhdicative function; in which
the primary meaning is not rejected, but additional meaning is
brought in by the indicative fundion? This kind of 'indicative
function is called the ajahatsvitrthalak~.a1Jit. The stock example
cited here is 'protect the curds from tli,e crows'. Here the primary
meaning of the word 'crow' is not rejected, but in addition to it,
other animals or birds are also understood as things from which
the curds should be protected. The Prabhlikaras an~wer that
SECTION FOUR
'u;<i :~'1:'~
~<'1~ ,'31cr:
" ~~qlF~,fq<iq
~<'1'~: I
foi;
[IV C. 11]
:q
cr;;mrrBHl
3l~'1iT'~cr,(
Moreover, [if il
lIN, lIN] would ha'
i.e., it would denote
of achieving the objE
being the means of ,
acceptable, since the
object,of some unspe
ing.of vidhi is upiqu
produces' activity.. )
being the' means of
would undesiredly, 1
1. This in. essence
[IV.B.24], and
and [H-2] , ex(
, against the viev
--
--.---.-~
the'Yordgmiga
.F:it4out the aid of
SECTION FOUR
Ill
will
-0
_ . _ ' _ . _ _ _ _ .......--.~-------- - .
-~--
------- --
----~----------~---- ~---
-- --------
----------~---------
112
SECTION FOUR
;[ IV.
---
c. 12]
--f+rom~~!J[t;;il"lT;:ntRl:
I
. .' .
.
-
';'lllflt: mll!);qfulC!~"~'fc<[>!il:1~ra
,
- I
. '
[If you claim that] as in the case of tad et!;.,desire'is the con:secutive character for the limitors of the property of being the denoted
meaning, that is not so. In the case [of tad], the limitor is the
intention [of the speaker] that is to be cognised. If in the present
case also the limitor is taken to be the desire to be cognised, then
ihere will be no cognition [of the meaning of lIN] for the renunciasts
who are devoid of desire. Also, there will be no significatory asso'dation since heaven etc., are not previously present.
1. For detailed explanations of sakyatiivaccheka, and the consecutive charaCter as illustrated in the use oJ the pronoun tad,
see my notes on [IV.B.25].
2. See Introduction [H~3].
;[IV.C.13]
~ra ~f.i:rfoi~CI"fiT<o~fcr;r~
lili ~Fll3'~"'nfoil3['l'!il R'lill ~fu <!1"l1"1 'li<'llq~l f"lf"l'l1'f~ 'li<"l1W"I!Jf1"l a'l 'li<'lFIT9: I ~~'li'li<lU~~'lc~" <itNCI+l~~l;i~~'l ~
ms:
1. I have translat
out the contrast
the word svargG
expedient. WI
devoid of all n
2. One of the maje
and the others
rG-4].
[IV.D.l] _81~ f.i:r;
'liH!J[l~Cll
.,<'ljJ[<11~
afo:Cl1:'lJ["l
-----c,-------~------------
IcI
il1~'I'll't ~<rr
:Cliilrr~q:il1>r~I~IcII.
.)(1,
~Rrf<i~CI'IiT.,.nfqrr ~
i'illq~l f<lfl;{<II'f't 'f.i'ill-
<ftNCI<l~!;i~it'l ~
ll'!RI: I
SECTION FOUR
113
--------
114
SECTION FOUR
N'
'liT'lllTsl~:S:lG:'1:
1
<:!l'ill""i{>f\l:IlT'i'f'll<'f1
~
Alternatively, y
other, establish you
saying): it is im!
optative form as a
argmnentat'on, my I
denotes the propert)
became it is impossi"
form as a means of
1. tvaduktarityii:
taking advantal
SECTION FOUR
direet means. (The same applies) if one adopts the view that:
aparva is denoted ,[by lIN], since there can be nQ significatory association in the absence of its previous appearance, and it [apurva}'
cannot be got even from a Vedic utterance, [as a direct m~ntionJ.
e a means of any
perty of being the
I is the possibility
neans. In such a
1. The Pnabhiikaras object that it is hard to understand the sacrifice being an indirect means without the link, i.e., aparva. In
answer, KaUl)lt;iabhatta points out that there is just as big a
fault present in the Prabhakara view also. Even if aparva is
considered to be the denoted meaning of lIN, how is one first to>
grasp the relation of aparVia and lIN? It does not occur anywhere else, and so the significatory association does not takeplace. salikanatha brings up the same point
'f.~ m~FCln~q
, is rejected. This
Cl'tlT'nwi+I. I Cl'TI:q
ifqRl:l#'1 <f Cl&:l"''1+I. I
~ ''1~FJ~~ fu I
Ie linking factor is
:sent case], is the
it can be brought
.karasj yourselves
,irable consequence
;ed meaning every-
iw'{j:!lsi~:sf<{'1: I __ . >:j'il
);P:!llJll;Cll,:J>:jll1i+I., Cl"Sf <:f+'FiillO:IJl+!~'f'1+I. I
,,[l:'1P911O:IJ]'i~'fi'91'<T~'! I (PraKaPafi. p~ 417). Unless both the relata
It the' Prabhiikaras
tern (see Introduc-
~~,~qijTTfq- Cl~'fi
l:laT QFQU<:fl'<1<f<FJl'!N
n:!~"~o<;"l<::~qrm?-f-
of being a means
, reet means. Why
d meaning in order
, in the absence of
lice can be] an in-
~.~-.~.~--------~--~--~-
~-----
-----~-~-------
116
Similarly, it is also not proper [to say that] only that which is
other than the desired object, but is a means directly preceding it is
understood as the thing to be done [by the agent]. Just the knowledge of being the means to the desired object is the instigator, since
it is more simple that way. Nor can it be claimed that the cognition
of the part 'that which immediately pr'ecedes it' is also like that [i.e.,
simple], because it is prolix. There is no support [for such ~state, ment either] .
1. The Prabhakaras had said that only the means which directly
precedes the desired object and is not the same as the desired .
object, can be the goal of action. [IV.C.4]. This was their
justification for saying that even though the sacrifice is a means
to heaven, it is not the direct means, and thus cannot be understood as the goal of action. Only apurva which is a means
directly preceding to heaven in the link of causation [i.e., sacrifice ---'> ~ apurva ---'> heaven], thus can be a goal of action, and
therefore, the meaning of lIN. Kam:t9abhat1;a here objects t6
this on the basis, .that there is more prolixity involved in this.
It is more simple to 'say thart just the knowledge of the
property of being a means to a desired end, is sufficient as an
instigator,instead of adding the additional qualifier: 'only that
means which directly precedes the desired object'.
[IVD.7J
ri> "'f
~~-~
..
~-~.
SECTION FOUR
;or,fit ~~
<;FRlo'pr,er;
,,'l1TCfr[Tfit
SECTION FOUR
:rn~cftil!f't ., ~CllI. I
r-.....
O<f<frfl:Clm~'in<r CI'-11
<,
I
I
117
s:fu
~'fCllI. I
118
~f.l;;f;jq'1<'1";q!]i'r
r-,
. q'11;?-1C1"l,;<,!qZ"l1l~}J11('l~ ~i:&:i'l'l'l"Cll~o<::'f.'1rCl '.lJ'fCl CTG;l1~G:mill'! ClC:Ill:: '.lJffir>i~: 1 ~fu:fqq'l""I!!qft~Gl9!l,<[W!i111Sr ;or g
Cl~0 '.lJ~Cl:1
1l;'!l1''fllrr f<'o;S;I~~'Olf~q'l"Cll'l'O~1;'!ir"lI~'1clJl\;{;:rc~91'if'f, ~~ Cl"! \lJFfCl>i;a: 1 .
......
f'.;T
...... ,..."
r-.
SECTION FOUR
;:r 'ifl"! Cl
'-TClI9~C:'
~
"-
q,<l~lql1;'
'1R'<;;r;;it~
<:P:1i'I1\'( 1
Further, desire
denotatum [of lIN]
part of the denotat
association is possit
to be cognised, or (
denotation] , as folIc
which has the.limit(
[lIN] has the dena
the property of heir
particuJar meaning
context etc., there .
limitor of being th.
[in the case of IIJi
possible, on the str
1. This is in ans
that the knowl
the case of tad
of the limitors i
are devoid of d
has been explai
2. In answer, Kat
of cognition or "
How can the pi
bhat\a goes on
of the speaker'
--
by effort, so that
.e root meaning is
)f an effort. This
~ to be done is the
le meaning of the
)ugh it has been
by activity is an
g of lIN. As has
[IV.B.22j'), this
,rience.
R(:qr.g'fCf+J:. I
the property
denoted meaning
iVS] :
the Pdibhakaras,
11].
~I
3~f<i<s!:q<q~qoil
--_.
----------
SECTION FOUR
119
;or "fT'!" <r?:IcD 'II "I1~'13~~'<m '11 );from1 I ~;or foi;orlJct 3f;&J~
:qCfI'l~"W{m ~"~I~q:q<lT'l~({'f,'lm ~"if(ifirr1r ~f'f<fJ;f~Bnl'lla:
120
~3;
~:~'2::nfct
~'>!~"'m~IS['{'9<TH191q:
qrnT'if~'9.liq
~Ff>t
will be the denoted meaning [of lIN]. This is a desirable result for
us,. as will be explained later. Therefore, since the cognition of the
property of being a means to something desired, is necessary as an
instigator, that alone is the meaning of injunction, and not a/ntrva.
For, in common everyday situations, that [apiirva] is not the goal.
1. In this passage, one basic difference between the Prabhakaras,
and their opponents, becomes evident. The others try to account
for the meaning of lIN, in both the common and the Vedic usage,
whereas, the Prabhakaras always assign priority to Vedic utterances in their analysis.
[IV. E. I]
SECTION FOUR
~ 'q1':f~E(l~~;
C9rqq~: I i
., 'q
q<::tf~lO
'"
~~'1C9~<r :q~
~ 'q ~<::<TtRl
<'1m~'1f
----- -- "-.- -
,-,~
--------------------------
SECTION FOUR
;hedakiivacchinna.
~s
The property of
in the pot. Tl;J.e
, (buddhividyaUi
tor of buddhivia-
:rm1'il.,mN ~'fir
J<:l1l]G;~ ,,1 'o{.,<l1$1 <:'l'
Ml'li1<ri GG~3Jr<1:_ I
, since suffering is
, f that [suffering],
lesirable result for
,e cognition of the
is necessary as an
I, and not ajn'trva.
1] is not the goal.
the Prabhakaras,
'lers try to account
td the Vedic usage,
tty to Vedic utter,~'l'>l ~fcr I <1;;[ I <I~T
W-<'l1"l I
J:!'lR!l::r1~
~,
t [itasadhanatva]
:n the instances of
le meaning of lIN
121
Nor [can one claim that] even if som"thing has no fruit, one'
will still be impelled to activity, merely by virtue of what a Vedic-
U2
SECTION FOUR
" lJr'<"iI:rT
13 ;:r1Q<!ll:. "
Moreover, if ritt
sidered to be fruitless
ingless : 'these are th
ffi3lJ.l.a-ness [of a mar
no resped for these,
are praised, always p'
away, they go to the
1. Thege are fioatir
brahma.J:J.a-ness ir
next, to the sari<.
port of his view
[IV. E. 6]
~[W!l<"l*q
" lJ~1''f: ~
lITlJl1''fT '"
'fo<'lT'ii~T f.r\
If [it is claime(
sandhyii] are just use
sentences will also [u
praise]: 'Darsa al1(
for all desires', 'the J
[the fulfilment of] al
the expectancy regar,
tences: 'One desirO!
and Piim.l.amasa [sacr
flee with the Jyotisto
[IV. E. 7J ., '<f' 13~~
" <Ii'>!] S9<i~
SECTION FOUR
'uitlessness, even a
t feel impelled to
a
<mcl".f~~fu
+l<!:
"l".f:U<::T~CI'1:'f.il <!
+I:~l,iSrijnB:. II 11: ClTrl".ffq
1
n~Tfci ~ ([p.r
frrfuci
m'Ri
'1Tlllu>:[
IlllUf ~'Ol".fa"
~~
:~'1Top:i
123
Moreover, if rites such as worshipping sandhya etc., are considered to be fruitless, then the following statements would be meaningless : 'these are the three sandhyas prescribed, on which the brahmllil)a-ness [of a man] is founded [Le., is dependent]. He who has
no respect for these, is not called a brahmal)a.' 'Those whose vows
are praised, always perform sandhya. Having their demerits washed
away, they go to the ancient brahmaloka.'
'
1. These are floating smrti verses' which attribute such fruits as
bnihma.na-ness in this life and an entry in the brah.malok;a in the
next, to the sandhya rite. KaUl)lQabhatta quotes them in support of his view that sandhya does have a fruit.
[IV. E. 6J
124
-~~--~~-~-~-~--
~-~------
SECTION FOUR
Wl
<;q
rn"-I+~q7
1;~'"
;;
<l,<!,q;.,T;;f
,!G:~~'-TaT
~'l1~'Ta "
'(n"l,qfu~
:J.<;oi~'lf~<'tmf+rfcI
I 'l"i:G:'~ 'lllRRt
~~
e considered useful
1ce praise itself is
lise is just in order
" even that is not
! of making people
mot be justified in
has no prescriptive
ho knows that the
e, [cannot be justi-
SECTION FOUR
125
8l?l"
[And if you say that] even if these statements are not authoritative qua showing that the rites iJ1 question are intended for the
attainment of heaven, they can still be meaningful as signifying the
praiseworthiness [of these rites]: That is not ac.:eptable. Except
for the generating of the specific fruit, no other kind of praiseworthilless has anywhere been assumed. And any other kind of praiseworthiness [except the one which generates the specified fruit] is not
an instigator. If even that which does not produce the said fruit, .
i.s still to be considered a:s praiseworthy, by way of signifying it
[the fruit, which in reality is not going to be generated] , then, just
like the statement of a bad poet, the Veda also would not be believed.
Therefore, these sentences are meaningful in their own meaning
[Le., they say, that sandhyii does produce brahmaloka etc.]. Thus
even though something desired [as a fruit] is understood from the
prescriptive sentence 'one should worship sandhyii', [the statements
in question] are to be considered as an arthavlida, for the sake of
especial inclination, through their signifying [the same thing] in a
different -way, or by implying that (these fruits] will be produced
soon.
1. Strangely enough, in this passage, KaUl~~labhatta argues in a
way, which makes it look as if he considers these floating Smrti
verses as Vedic oentences. The whole argument that, if we do
not accept this, Veda would not be worthy of belief, really loses
it", force, .when we consider the fact that these are not Vedic
verses. The tendency of considering the Smrti sentences as an
arthaviicf.a to a Vedic sentence, is not approved of lly some
orthodox pundits. (see PrabM on Apadevi, p. 200).
126
SECTION FOUR
optional rites, sh
the optional ritE
entirity, there h
to perform then
about the routin
in support of K
do have fruit, aJ
applies here witl
2. Kau:ryc;labhatta rVI.3.1.1. occurs,
in M.K. the sect
VI.3.2.S.
[IV. F. 1]
al;w.:~l'iFR
<r ~'ni'( I 9
>TIS'lN<;~
~9'~-%fl<!11r
(fc:<rfl1'ill<rl
<!~
+rl'il'll
sP=!~~sfq
~crl'IT ;jT:l,q.
As to what Mad!
, ~Rr ~'OJ'f",Rl'fi1::!Jf
" ~"''fci l'fZ~'<flif:
1
...
'1+lqlRi 'l"l1~:" ~Ri 1
,
SECTION FOUR
127'
optional rites, should apply to the routine rites also.' Thus; since:
the optional rites can be fruitful only when performed in their
entirity, there is inclination to act only when there is ability
to perform them with every detail. The same should be true:
about the routine rites also. This passage has been brought in,.
in support of KaUl)!gabhatta's view that the routine rites also
do have frtiit, and thus i$:asiidhanatva as the meaning of lIN
applies here without difficulty.
2. KaUl).Qabhatta refers to the section where this aphorism M.S.
VI.3.1.1. occurs, by the name sarv.a,aktyadhikara~za. However,
in M.K. the section referred to by that name, starts with M.S.
VI.3.2.8.
[IV. F. 1J 8T~Brer~<:r~'1 M~'1>l~ ",""IRrmi'l;r 1;Q"!'f.l+l1 'l~G"~iln<::1 iictl<rf
;r 1;'11<1:.1 <f,1::Ujl;rf+l"!1~ It'! Grn:"!l;rl~fG ~<I.. 1 s;-,n'<'l~ 1 "a<1~
<rlserN<i~'1: Bl'ir;:,,!: 'OJf'i:G~'! 'IT" ~fu 9~'1'llUj1::I<<rl 8T:~'11;'
'OJ'f~,m;rm'Cjl~ iicfi'11<;"'1 ~Ri R'-1~S"3nfrt Bl\Hc'!lf+l~l~Sfit
G<::;rf+l"!Fn<;[l~qfuqRrG I
SECTION FOUR
THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
128
. is as follows]
The use of the instrumental is not unjustified. For,
even though, llN expresses the property of being the means to a
desired end, located in the meaning of its own [verbal] base yaj,
which is immediately connected with it; it does. not express the
[same property in the] specific sacrifice, which is the meaning of
the nomUlal base 'jyoti~toma'. That is not acceptable.
.
1. Here Kaul}!;labhatta brings in another explanation of the use
of the instrumental in this sentence, given by Mli.dhavaciirya,
the author of JaiminiyanyayamaIa. See Introduction [J-3]-(b).
According to Miidha.vacatya, llN is closer to the verbal rooi yaj,
which is its own base, in the form yajeta. This it is natural
for liN to express the means located in the meaning of the verbal
root, i.e., yaga 'sacrifice in general', as the means, is denoted by
liN. But Jyoti~toma is a specific sacrifice, denoted by a seperate nominal base. lIN, denoting i~tasiidh(mdtva located in a
sacrifice in general, contained in the meaning of yaj, does not
express it as located in a specific sacrifice Jyotit~oma. Thus,
the instrumental use jyoti$tomena is justified, since the specific
means is not expressed elsewhere. Katu:l4abhatta does not accept
this explanation.
[IV. F. 3]
~i~f't
"Tmr ,(a"RtI;s:[
9iif1:!'i!Ti:tSfG'fortq~qUfT~'i!H[<J:: <perf{
l>:nqirf{m I
[Madhavacarya's view is not correct], because [one can] not
avoid [considering. that] the meanings [of the items] yaj and
jYl!t4toma are [contextually] the same. Otherwise [if this identity
ll:qG:'q:
of reference were not accepted], instead of [the sentence]
G'"fm
'Devadatta is cooking' ,- [which contains the nominative
devadattalJ] ,- [one would desire *devadatt.ena. paeati, with the
instrumental devadattena]. For, although the ending [tiJ denotes
an agent in a general way, the specific agent is not denoted [by this
ending] , so that the instrumental would, undesirably, be introduced,
to express the agent [specifically].
1. In this passage Katu:l\labhatta rejects Madhav,acarya's view that
even if liN expresses the property of being the means, it is only
the sacrifice in general, as the meaning of the verbal root yaj.
Thus, in order to express the specific sacrifice Jyoti~t0ma, the
3l""
:!
'Ii~ iEfI?;f;:rfl:!;
'RUf<EfI<im l
SECTION FOUR
,NSES AND MOODS
,t unjustified. For,
19 the means to a
[verbal] base yaj,
~s not express the
is the meaning of
ltable.
anation of the use
by Madhavacarya,
duction [J-3]- (b) .
the verbal root yaj,
This it is natural
;aning of the verbal
eans, is denoted by
denoted by a sepe:na'tv,a located in a
19 of yaj, does not
Jyotit~oma. Thus,
:1, since the specific
atta does not accept
ll;q~ "~'l~:
Q"R"
q~itun;n~"!FHa:. '!l<lR
129
130
SECTION FOUR
port reference is made to the Vivara:t:\aprameyasarpgraha. However the view of the author of the VivaraiI).a is not quite correctly
represented here. See ViPraSarp. p. 135.
[IV. F. 5]
to express the main means and the locus. Thus a krt suffix such
as LyuT denotes the kara1Ja, but not its number.
2. Both the Benan;a and the Bombay editions have the reading
;or 'if
.,
~,
QH'1'r q'
l1F!l<;f <f
R:Wc'liG:,
>!ffj~~:1+J
131
SECTION FOUR
llt.
r-.
""
~"n:<cr.GJ~'n'llTI'1
;"!1fir
'fire wilh
one cooks']'
::I, instead achieve],
mental and locative
lUmber]. To avoid
des for the introducits number has not
cepted, here also [in
is hard to justify.
acano~gnil}
whicl~:-:
~.-.,-~
132
ap.{
att!l+[,1fu
I 'n;;jq~lC::Jq
SECTION FOUR
~Tff I
~'Il11-
,q~oi! 8:i'<rT~1<J: I
81'5fi'01:[ij
CRI<tTTt(;r
On this we sa
being the means to
perties. There cam
exist here. This e[,
the denoted meanir
been accepted that
denotative function
means to particular
1. See [IV.B.24].
2. Inthis way, the
has been accep,
previous objecti
is also put asid
+rT'lmCPTIf
[IV. G.4]
'f.l;>I'I'ITf<
1:[rfi'ral~
M~1JjT+rT
gr;:'IrqaT'f
t!;~Rr rr Q
According to tl
is not a limitor [of ~
terpositiveness limit
cognition which aris
ject] possessed of a
[from a sentence sue
understood : an abse
positiveness of abse:
component meaning~
terpositiveness of ab
are coimected] by
limited by the stat
positiveness of absoll
Further, the princi]
SECTION F9UR
'a I
'Il"lQ<rr<::Jcr <:'!:rT\-
~ signified as being
:ble. There is dislpeya also.
e relation of cause
., p. 824) . This disir,a: nonproduction
) vyaUrekavyabhistated <::ause is not
.cy, with which we
)ints out, that the
the performance of
cause of heaven in
from the Vajapeya
~ <!i"Cfl<r<'!TfG:fu ~<r. I
. of ~ing the means
ince this [distinct]
e meaning of Il]'i].
says that this disV. G.I], cannot be
is prpduced by the
duced'by the Vajaa general property
rga; that is there is a
perties, one for each
~ Mimfup.sakas, who
~rty distinct-heavenachieved from the
:I the object of the
~n limited by this
ward the objection
only after the meanhas been cognised,
"
I
I
133
134
[IV. G. 5J
SECTION FOUR
R<i
'l,~~;r
;i{N'fi~
._---_._----------_.
class of things
an absence] is
. items. Hence,
~ view presented
3hattacarya.
;hen this absence
belongs to the
delimi ts related;he thing absent
,ing a parti cular
ence, the restricis used ..
ept the widing
~;;r~Rr:il Fral""'1:ntions another
in g is fei;;na1<r
er both of these
bsence or abh'iva
:l;9ir<:!m.nM~1T[1ratiyogin of that
. re~ides in this
... avacchedakatv:rpositiveness or
il'[l'l~R!<rl f<Rri'l~~
19lyto fei;;rra1<rl'i'rmC!l'li<'l<:!l'i[rt.,1
ml1<:!l~;q<'t 'i[l''''~ I
C!~"Fo/lRl''l1G;re-
the following] :
:., doeB not C011venness, is what
is incapable of
the delimitor
~rty. heavenness
SECTION FOUR
135
Instead [of the meaning refuted in the last passage] , the Vedic
sentence signifies only the co-occurrence in the same locus of heavenness and of the property of being produced byhSvamedl1a. Nor
can the cognition of discrepancy refute this. Only that cognition
of discrepancy which has the same qualifier can be contradictory to
nondiscrepant knowledge. Thus, since one sees that there is discrepancy if [a sacrifice such as Jyoti~toma is considered the cause of
heaven]. ~hrqugh the delimitation of heavenness [Le.. with respect
to any heaven] , let the [Jyoti~tomas' etc.]. property [of being cause
by] occurring immediately hefore [its effect)., not be accepted
through this delimitation. . [Nevertheless], there is nothing to bar
one's accepting that l.Jyoti~toma etc.] is a cause with respect to a
propertypossessor, which is the locus of that [property heavenness] .
1. This silmardidhikarmJya view is also quoted in VyutpaVaLaVi.
p.177.
2. This view (svargatvavacchedena niyatapurvavrtfitvagraha) also
belongs to the Naiyayikas. It has. been presented more
dearly in the Vyutpattiviada. [see VyutpaVaLaVi. p. 165].
In order to avoid discrepancy, it is necessary to choose the Iimitor
carefully. According to this view, the property of being a means
to heaven consists of having the property (PI) that i~ the
limitor of the property (p,) of being invariably preceding in
relation to the property (P3) which has heaven for its locus.
Thus it is that X that is the cause of heaven, which is possessed
of the property which limits the class of all X which immediately.
precede [in effect, a cause] .
~~~~~~~~~-
136
2. tadiiSraye dharmit;ti is in the translation above, a niTupaka saptami. Thus the result is: sVlargalviisrayanirupitii hetutii
jyotilftomel
[IV. G. 7]
this has already been explained before. Here, the opponent says
that the doubt about whether the fault of discrepancy may not
be found here,- if we say that heaver) is produced by Jyoti$toma
(since heaven is also produced by other 'sacrifices), is not really
, a deterent at all. The doubt here is only as 'follows: Since heaven
is produced by more than one cause, it will be discrepant to
delimit the heaven being produced by Jyotl$toma by heaven.
ness. This kind of doubt should be no deterent to volition however since, even with the doubt, it is taken for granted that JyotiI?toma does produce heaven. Though other sacrifices may produce
it also, there is no definite knowledge that Jyoti$toma does not
. produce it. And only such a definite knowledge can be a deterent
to volition. By doubting about the discrepancy,. as a matter
of fact; you are accepting the fad that Jyoti$toma does produce
heaven, since otherwise the discrepancy will not arise. Thus
the doubt regarding the discrepancy is a help rather than a
deterent.
[IV. G. 8] C!~fq 'lil<iQl'l'<~"9il>f~ 9i~ 9iH:lJfClT
>!1l[irffi ~<r. I
i1 I ~1l!HT
._---
SECTION FOUR
~~9ilr
~l:f[fueft
q~fu I
Nevertheless [t:
property of being a
perty which delimit
[In the case of a par
smoke by fire], fro
actually have a dire(
[of smoke and fire] .
of a fire or that J yo
of results [a fire, he1
reason, in some case
vasion of an effect b]
makes causation knc
of grass, rubbing sti<
caused by each of tl:
have grasped the lirr
grasp, on the streng
etC.]. This' gnispir
occurs and is seen iJ
the above reasoning]
a cognition of petv
,knowledge of the lirr
the absence of result
of the Jyoti$toma e
[IV. G. 9J
sr;{~
Rrr<
'il111lI.1c:!
This is to be c(
perty of being pro(
limits it [the proper
without grasping the
it, when there is th
of discrepancy.
1.' From here on,
view stated in
statement is tha'
SECTION FOUR
f discrepancy arises,
~, the opponent says
.iscrepl:lncy may not
.11ced by Jyoti 9toma'
'ifices), is not really
)llows: Since heaven
ill be discrepant to
>ti~toma by heaven.
ent to'volition how~ granted that Jyoticrifices may produce
Jyoti~toma does not
.ge can be a deterent
pancy, as a matter
i~toma does produce
ill not arise. Thus
help rather than a
~<r. I ~ I <:TI+!l~l
;.,~~ crm ~1'1i1<::1<r. I
~~~~ I cr~l Q:<Jfl<::fur-
i:\
137
~l<::<l:o:RT
qfflRRl I
Nevertheless [the following objection is raised]: how can the
property of being a cause be grasped if one does not grasp the property which delimits what is caused? This objection is not valid.
[In the case of a pararthiinumana] , one grasps the pervasion [of e.g.,
smoke by fire], from a verbal statement, although one may not
actually have a direct knowledge of the co-occurrence in a given locus
[of smoke and fire]. Similarly, one accepts [that grass is the cause
of a fire or that Jyoti~toma is the cause of heaven] on the strength
of results [a fire, heaven as. conveyed by Vedic statement]. For this
reason, in some cases of direct perception also, one accepts 'the [pervasion of an effect by a cause] , given that the element [result] which
makes causation known is available. Thus, for example, in the case
of grass, rubbing sticks, or a fire jewel [where fire is considered to be
caused by each of these]. Hence it is that, although one might not
have grasped the limitor of the property of being pervaded, one does
grasp, on the strength of the result, a pervasion [of smoke by fire
etc.']. This grasping of pervasion with respect to smoke which
occurs and is seen in different ways, is established and correct [by
the above reasoning]. For, given the necessary elements to'produce
a cognition of pervasion, namely, co-occurrence etc., even if the
Iknowledge of the limitor of the property of being pervaded] is absent,
the absence of result is not observed. Hence, the [above knowledge
of the Jyoti~toma etc., as the cause of heaven] is not unjustified.
[IV. G. 91
This is to be considered concerning this argument: The property of being produced is being possessed of the property that
limits it [the property of being produced]. How can it be grasped
without grasping the limiting property and it is impossible to grasp
it, when there is the deterent present in the form of the cognition
of discrepancy.
.
1.' From here on, KaUl).~abhatta starts to refute the opponent's
view stated in [IV.G.8]. The whole point of the opponent's
statement is that it is possible to grasp the relation of cauSe and
,138
being caused, without having to grasp the limitor of the property of being caused or produced. Thus even without grasping ,
heavenness as the kliryattiVlacchedaka (= janyatavacchedaka
'limitor of the property oJ being produced), it is still possible
to grasp the causation between lyoti~toma and heaven. Now
KaUl,lJQabhana points out that janyatva (= kiiryatva 'the property of being caused or produced) cannot possibly be grasped
without also grasping its limitor, because janyatva is the same
as janyatavachhedakadharmavattvam 'having the property that
limits the property of being produced'. And grasping this limitor
is not possible in the present case due to the discrepancy already explained.
'[IV. G. 10J ';or "i ~l;;~ ;or tf ;;)1;[: Igl'n'<!G1R~'l~q~
G~'ll5[RP;F'l'f.Gl'l
Nor [can it be claimed] that this fauLt is not valid in the case of
the Vedic statement. It is impossible to say that the doubt regarding
.fitness. is not deterent. Nor should one say that there is no definite
:knowledge, just a doubt, imd a doubt is not a deterent. It is impossible not to have definite knowledge [that lyoti9toma is not the
-cause of heaven qua heaven] , after first hearing [a Vedic statement]
about heaven caused by Agnihotra, even without lyoti 9toma. For,
in. your view [the concept of] the property of being a distinct
[heaven}' does not come in first even superficially.
[IV- G. II] 1<lJP,:'T<r1<!rq ~~<>ilq~~ciT fq;jflGl'11.'1'lo'lfu~'lil~:'li 'IT (j\~: I
'1fi'1(t "i 'rfITfT.a<:+!qr''ll~ ~'-l'1+r, I
Even in the case of the grass etc., the grasp of that [causation]
takes place, when the property of being a distinct [fire] is taken into
consideration, or by the positive and negative concomitance of the
"distinct [Le. grass and the distinc:t fire resulting from it]. It should
-also be borne in mind that another fault is also going 1;0 be stated.
1. In this passage, Kauwabhana also shows that the example of
the, fire resulting from different causes such as grass, rubbing
wood, etc., does not really help the opponent. Fire is produced
by grass, as well as by the fire jewel, or the ritual rubbing, wood.
SECTION FOUR
fe!0!
SECTION FOUR
;vithout grasping
~ya~avacr:hedaka
is still possible
:I heaven. Now
'ryatva 'the piosibly be grasped
rtva is the same
1e property that
tping this limitor
discrepancy al(j <'n);ri~<r'~'f. Cll<!'
q 'lAA"n~CI~ra
q~~1.lTl1Fl<<n
[Q<'Il<I: I
;hat [causation]
reJ is taken into
omitance of the
1 it]. It should
ng to be stated.
the example of
l graSS, rubbing
Pire is produced
tl rubbing wood.
n.
H
I
139
140
ven to be the locus of jyoti$(omavadanya (i.e. vajapeyavad)vrttitva also, the problem of discrepant reasoning arises if jyou.
$(omavad,anyiivrtflitva is said to be the vyapaka of svargatva. In
order to get around this fault, it has been suggested that there
should not be a limiting relation here with the limitor of the
property of being a locus. Merely the co-occurence of heavenness
with jyoti$tom[lVadanyavrttitva is' sufficient for the syntactic
relation. In order to prove that such cooccurence is sufficient
for the grasp of the syntactic relation, the following example is
given. The sentence 'there is no fish in the GaiJ.ga', will be false,
if it is taken to apply to the whole river, and it would apply to
the whole river, if there is a limiting relationship between not
having fish, and the Gailganess, which is the limitor of the property of being a iocus. The statement can be Perfectly true,
however, if taken to mean that, in a part of the river, there is no
fish. This .can be done by saying that Gailg,aness and the property of not having fish co-occur.
2.. I am translating the word svarga as 'heaven' only for expediency.
What is actually meant is a state of bliss devoid of misery.
[IV. G 13J q:<i:q. "n~i'I'i!<'!i=l'l f<l<:'1><:, <:11<'1,<1 :q 'l~l'I~ <:I<'lme:rut 'l('3'i~
. 'l~'lRr~ :ql'3'i'!f+r'~~~lIJ 3T<1 11:'1 'ib:l:~rr:!<qF:1f~l m'lP-ll'<f1C:-l
Jf'[l%: ~~~ I '31""11 ~:Ff'lf+rfu i!~ :q Qon'f<iiT<,,~~I'l<'iwr
'3Nrr,'!'illrr1'3l ,,'ll'Q'i{ ~'[r'<f;:f ~'l1G:. I ."I :q '31"rrf'll'ill<r1~'[I;;r;{
~'ll~fq 'l1"'ll{ I '3+1Fre~~~?':[Q'lT Clmm~fu l1 ~'11f':!'f.<lc'n: I
SECTION FO:uR
of the Neologicians.
1. This view is fo'
as follows: Cl~
Ql;'l :q "l<'li[s
~'!<:I1<i'I'i!'l1Rfci <["\I
2. p. 257).
2. If the property
of lIN, there wi
As has been spe
be the property
prior to somethi.
prior absence of
the expiatory Tit
prior absence .
absence? Thw
there will be no \
pt. 2, pp. 256-2,
3. I have amende
accepted by bo
otherwise it mal
4. 1 have accepted
rather than <11'
closer to the W(
See note 1.
[IV. G. 14J 31~B'l~
'Ilfu'C;; W
for<'1 olen I
-~------,~---~-,.
SECTION FOljR
. R~
<:I,l{iWreJut' l{'<:1"~
:!<ql<nf~crn m<[~,"l~
, . Q<m'f'llrel;mFl<9~q'~
'0[ <:Il'i!~<91't!l~l,);I'[lW'
~fu Q~l{lf<rif.<iCliT: I
-------~--
141
of the Neologicians.
1. This view is found in a commentary of the Tattvacintamal)i,
as follows: (ll;1l1<J:. <:I11l1;:l{(I: <:'1<:11<'12 );[,'I'Ii l;'1<:11~'1<;'l<rl~9i '11 i'i"<'1>l:
(IFf '0[ l;jl''1'lS;:1jl{: I <:~ <:Il1m&fT&;ci ;;''lllcrffi111R I ...31mffil1"1llT:
l;'1<:11"<'tl!!'11F!lcr <hl;j: I
(TattvaCinRa. (sabdaklu.lc;la) vol. 4, pt
---------
2. p. 257).
<:!l~'Il!!''1ll.
142
Q?[
l1Hl11T'I1G:. I
In addition, in this case, even later on, the concept of the property of being a distinct [heaven] need not be conceived of. There
is no basis for it [for the concept of vaijiitya] , since instigating knowledge is already first established.
1. The concept of vaijatya will not be needed. Vaijiitya is to be
thought of only in order to justify the inclination to act, by
removing the discrepancy created by the heaven being produced
by causes other than the Jyoti$toma. But in this view, the inc
clination to act is already explained, by the knowledge that
Jyo%toma produces the desired result heaven. Thus vaijatya is
not necessary in order to justify that.
[IV. G.1]
'q'
a,'!'
SECTION FOUR
a'<1c,g
1315;~
Objection:
Asvamedha not ,
This objection is :
. should even you r
~toma come into
that an individual
Objection: In t
the use of the lim
1. The view ta1
an individual
by another ir
Kau~l,iabhatt;
the limitor of
[IV.G .18]
a,!Hc'li
~![i'!'l
131!:j'
a>i
Therefore on"
a goal [kiiryat~]'
But ;that is hard .
Alternatively, let I
extended limitor c,
father in the Adv,
1. karyatva = kG
explained in r:
words, i.e., jan,
this limitor he
wide. It limit
medha etc. C
Ra.J'lgojibhatta,
a. limi tor can h
limitor. His j
[IV.G.19]
;r.gicr131
j'(c'l'C'lm
.~--------~--------
SECTION FOUR
14J
to be
clination to act, by
lven being produced
in this view, the inthe knowledge that
n. Thus vaijatya is
;onceived of in order
here is no difficulty
ice even without a
,t necessary to the
.sping it [kiiral.1atii] ,
,the time of grasping
ke the property of
is also delimlted, is
is always delimited.
lt to say, that like
also be grasped as
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------
144
Now this is what is said in theAdvaitasaroddhara in the section -where the property substanceness is rejected: After first proposing
[as a priliminary view] tha(t sUbstanceness can be established as the
limitor of the property of being a material cause in respect to all the
effects, [this view has been rejected in favour of the view that] Being
[satta] alone is the limitor. Nor can it be objected that, in that case,
-colour etc., could be [allowed to be] produced in a quality etc.,
[instead of in a substance]. For a particular colour a particular substance is necessary as the material cause. Thus it is due to the
absence of its special ingredients itself, ;that there is the absence of
the production of the result [i.e., the production of colour in a
quality]. 1. dravy,atva: 'substanceness'. The accepted rule is that '-H 'IT
'fiRlTfcrr UT 13r'l~;J>!r Thus the property of being a cause always has
to have a Iimitor. Thus to take the usually cited example threads
are the material cause- [or more correctly, the cause related _by
the inseperable relation of samavay;a] of "the cloth. The property
of being a cause would];>e here limited by the_property threadness.
But in the case of the result pot, the material cause is the earth
or clay, and the property of being cause would then be limited
by the property c1ayness. Now there is another maxim which
'f,~+!l~ ~Ic! s::c<i 13li<iTT'l"fiT,lTfB: 'substance is the
says that
inseperably related cause for all results.' When we think of the
karaIJata in this connection, there would be discrepancy if either
threadness or c1ayness were taken as the Iimitor. The conse,cutive proper-ty for both of them is substanceness, which is a
broader concept. Taking this as the limitar of the property of
being a cause, will avoid the discrepancy. This is the general
argument given in favour of the acceptance of substanceness as
a jati 'generic property'.
2. KaulJ't;Jabhatta's father Railgojibhatta does not accept substanceness as a generic property. How then can the discrepancy be
avoided? Threadness or clayness are narrow concepts, and we
SECTION FOUR
need something
crepancy. Ran
an additional jf
cited above, he 1
substances as th
to be taken as a
ina concept itt
stanceness. ACI
in all substance~
be the karaIJatt
the discrepancy.
3. The objection a
property of beir
resides not only
would lead to di
cause of the col,
the kiirm:zatavac
in quality (guIJ
which limits the
-cause. There WI
be considered p:
herence. It is
_accept substance
of the property ,
4. Rangojibhatta d
satta alone is su
-cause. For him
stanceness. The
for every partk
necessary as the
condition is not:
or colour in it is
a Iimitor that is
[IV.G.20]
~'1C!TB:
I;
131c! ~<1<'!T
<ltTlt'l<q'<ir
~
~Ic! ~ I
~-------'--.-----
SECTION FOUR
need something broader such as substanceness, to avoid the discrepancy. Rangojibhatta does not think it necessary to posit
an additional jati substanceness. In the case of the examples
cited aPove,. he ",ould take into consideration only the individual
substances as the material cause. When the broader concept has
to be taken as a limitor of the property of being a cause, he brings'
ina concept that is even more wide than the supposed substanceness. According' to him, satta, the 'Being' which resides
in all substances, qualities, and actions, should be considered to
be the kiiral}atvavacchedaka here, and that would take care of
the discrepancy.
3. The objection against this, argument is that the limitor of the
property of being a cause \V'ould then, be' too wide, since ,satta
resides not only in substances, but also in' qualities etc. This
would lead to difficulties. Thus cloth is -the inseperably related
cause of the colour residing in it.' According to Railgojibhatta,
the kar~atavacchedaka would be satta. But satta also resides
in quality (gul}a). Since, thus quality also has the limitor
which limits the property of being a cause, it would also be a
cause. There would 1h.en be the difficulty that colour could also ,
be considered' produced as in a' quality, by the relati~n of inherence. It is to avoid this difficulty that it is necessary to
accept sUbstanceness as a generic property and thus the limitor
of the property of being a cause.
4. Railgojibhatta does not accept this objection to his theory that
satta alone is sufficient as the limitor of the property of being a
cause. For him there is no need for the generic property substanceness. The difficulty noted' is removed by pointing out that
for every particUlar form or colour, a particular substance is
necessary as the inseperably connected cause .. Since this special
condition is not fulfilled by a quality, the non-occurance of form
or colour in it is perfectly justified. ,Thus the objection against
a limitor that is too wide, has been removed.
[IV.G.20J
145
~R1~1
146
[IV.G.2 'J
'f,rii<Cf'<flerQ{Oll~Her"ll"'lfq a~"g I
SECTION FOUR
being individ
of the other,
Nor [can it b
the property of bei
and by [thus] bei
thus [accepted, 1
mantras used to a
offering cakes [pl
in them, the acts
mantras are: 'I
worthy of your s.
[0 Puroqiisa) , Y01
firmly and happily
contain the phrase
the ritual act only,
is the final, accept
contradicted under
two faults: (a) [5
identical capacity,
the offering of barl
not now come abol
(b) [If, on the ot)
bringing about thi!
1. In this passage
and rice is diff,
and rice can b<
and have the s:
perty of being
the same singl
each other.
2. This objection
etc., (ApaSS. :
- - . - -..
see
~~IJj+nU\~~,;or f9~a>!T
:"';pf,'91~ OR ,m:f<:,~
The injunctions
,', and'
'1~~~iJ
;he rice arid barley
one or the other is
there is no discre~h other's absence.
causes of heaven.
!n raised about the
he pO%ibility that,
nihotra then would
1UJ.l9abhatta brings
'rihibhiryajeta and
rent grains for use
for the same fruit.
re contradictory to
ndividually able to
pancy in the result
e in the absence of
ollowed in the preand the Agnihotra
SECTION FOUR
,~~-
- - - - - - - - .-.---
141
Nor [can it be claimed that] there, both [rice and barley] have
the property of being a cause due to having the same single capacity,
and by [thus]' being alternates [of each other] . [If this claim is]
thus [accepted, the" following fault] also [results]. There are
mantras used to accompany the preparation of the vessel in which
offering cakes [PUroasa] are set, and the Setting of. the cakes
in them, the acts themselves being stated in the mantras. These
mantras are: 'I make a comfortable seat for you. I make it
1V0rthy of your si1ting in it by this pouring of ghee. Sit in it
[0 Puro<J,iia] , you, who are the essence of the rice, seat yourself
firmly and happily in this place free of death'. Since these mantras
contain the phrase 'you who are the es~ence of rice', they accompany
the ritual act only when the cake is made of rice, not of barley. This
is the final, accepted conclusion. .This established conclusion is now
contradiCted under the present claim. For, this results in either of
two faults: (a)' [Since both offerings now are supposed to have an
identical capacity, they should both produce the same aparva. But
the offering of barley, not accompanied by the mantras noted,] will
not now come about qua act which is to result in this one ajnirva;
(b) [If, on the other hand, this offering is considered to apply as
bringing about this apurva] , then there is discrepancy.
1. In this passage, first it has been suggested that the case of barley
and rice is different from the case of the two sacrifices. Barley
and rice can both be used alternatively in the DarnapUD)arnaSa
and have the same capacity. Thus they can each have. the property of being a caus,e. The sacrifices in question do not have
the same single capacity, and therefore, are not alternates of
each other.
2. This objection is then rejected. The ritual formulae syona1JZte
etc., (ApaSS. II.IO.6 and II.ILl) are to be used only when
"---.-
148
If, [to avoid the faults noted, thus] justifying the Mantras,
which provide an option, one assumes that there are distinct apurvas
[produced by the rice and barley offerings, then the following results] :
the properties which apply to the rice, do not apply to the barley,
just as the wip'ng etc., which apply to the graha [vessel], do not
apply to the camasa [vessel]. For, [once one has distinguished the
two cases by] taking into consideration the apurva of the soma
offering, the present [case, where the injunctions do not merely have
their primary significations, but have the] secondary signification
[of conveying that an offering is] a means [for bringing about] an
apurva is exactly parallel to [the case of] the camasa [ves~el].
Given, then that intermediate apurva [produced by the wiped graha
vessels] is understood immediately from [the mention of] the word
graha so that camasa is not included, it is difficult to avoid [concluding that] sprinkling etc. do not apply to barley. For, from [the
menti(')ll of] the word vrihi alone, one understands a particular ap17rva
produced through the rice [alone]. Therefore, with the [barley and
SECTION FOUR
'11'Olj"L. I
4T'!'1la ~
~'<{~li\ ij
fuf@la
Nor can it be (
[considered] the cc
pancy, then that [d
grass etc. also. Bec
its being a cause thl
barley etc. by Vedi.
an absence of the ri
of being a cause is
. and negative corico:
there is fire; if ther
and vJ"titiuka] are
of fact, there is St
which are neces~al
of there being the I
1. The argument
has here been
things too. TI
is not really n
Thus, the don
pot is not a c
which are abso
to indicate tha
tion to the abc
the generic pI
anyathiisiddha,
,,
I--~--------
ES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR
essence of rice'
not used with
rice are to have
~ used for both
uling explained
rice] , the property of being a cause reside~ [ir, them] with respect to
apurva with a single generic property. In common experience, it is
so that grass, ritual rubbing sticks, and the fire jewel have [the
property of being a cause] with respect to [a single type of] fire.
1. The problem as to whether the wiping etc., of graha vessel also
applies to the camasa vessel has been discussed in the camasiidhikara'(la. (M.S., IIL1.8.16-17).
ld this formulae
:esulting apurva
mt the formulae
'ne ,fault or the
rice and barley
laving the "arne
'ding the use of
~'<'imrrrt <r~t'lmfu~'[.c!T~'I.1T\o1'l''1-
Rn~~<'1 J:[~q<::1~
"1fu.m~'11~fq~!!IT
'l'!.~ Tl:'I ~l!<ll I 1l;9
Mantras,
distinct apurvas
llowing results) :
y to the barley,
[vessel]'; do not
:iistingU'i.'Shed the
v,a of the soma
not merely have
ary signification
nging about] an
:amasa [ves.<el].
the wiped graha
.on of] the word
t to avoid [conFor, from [the
)articular aparva
the [barley and
19 the
[IV.B.24]
149
Nor can it be objected th3lt in this case, even the donkey would be
[considered] the cause of a pot, and if it is put aside because of discrepancy, then that [discrepancy and thus not being a-cause) would befall
grass etc. also. Because there is no [authoritative] reason to suppose
its being a cause there. The property of being a cause is justified for the
barley etc. by Vedic injunction, and in the case of grass, when there is
an absence of the ritual rubbing wood and the fire jewel,' [the' property ,
, of being a cause is justified] by perception accompanied by positive
and negative concomitance of the following kind: when there is grass,
there is fire; if there is no grass, there is no fire. These two [anvaya
and vydtheka] are not seen in the case of the donkey. As a matter
of fact, there is superfluity [in the donkey) due to the stick etc.,
which are necessary [for making the pot]. There is no question
of there being the property of being a cause [in the donkey].
1. The arguments here are fairly clear. The word anyathiisiddhi
has here been translated as suPerfluity. But it can mean other
things too. The word has been used to indicate a cause which
is not really necessary, and thus should not be called a cause.
Thus, the donkey which 'is not neoessary to the making of the
pot is not a cause. The pot is made with causes like a stick
which are absolutely necessary. But the word has also been used
to indicate that which accompanies the necessary cause in addition to the abovementioned meaning of the unnecessary. Thus
. the generic property da'(lif.atva 'stickness' also is considered
anyathiisiddha, and slickness ~annot.be classified as unnecessary ,
SECTION FOUR,
150
Q'fci
I q:<i
Cll'G;T,+l\;or
[IV.G.26]
aTmiT"fl
~"'-li+l'
~ffl{;<[~
c[lq~qlr.
CIlq~'1lr.
CIlq~qlr.
In the case 0
heavenness by the
duced by Agnihotr;
the same generic pro
said [thus] in the
with Agnihbtra, at
Agn~~loma; he wh(
as much as he [Cal
the amaviasya [sac
Atir1itra.' The wi,
1. TaiSa. 1.6.9.1"
[IV. G.27] aTCi
Q;;
c[Sll3;fi'ra
That is why tl
The property of ha
the property of be:
the smoke [as inv
mountain]. There
of inference..
[IV. R.l] ~IT Ril'l<
p:rrq~r aT<
~q I<\"q~~'l
~Ri Cl~t
." ,u',
Of. ~
i
<{Ct +'l:
~l'llj."f;:'il~'1
(I ......
r.::
'fil'lF:h C!
>{1~
[Wn~B1 '1~-::!(q%:1
n-:: I lj~~~ 'Cf
SECTION FOUR
151
2. Will this then limit the performer of the sacrifice to the use of
rice or barley exclusively in all instances of the sacrifice, once
there has been the intention to use rice or barley in it during
one performance? No, says Kaurygabhatta. Since, the apurva
produced from that rite with the intention is destroyed once the
final apurva from the sacrifice is produced, there is no reason
why the alternate grain cannot be used in another instance of
that sacrificer.
[IV.0.26] armiT"fIil:: ""iT g arm~"f,"Hn~~folfugljlFW:[lj.'1;:~~,,'!lT,,!+!'1~G:9i+!C!: U1il'1"J"1Ql'1 t:!;'1 "~<rlsf>liT"f1ra:..i'l i'!l-: t:!;llfcr I ~<[a 'Cf
ri%(i'1~<ll1 "'1 t:!;<i fol"[Hm~ ~iTfcr '11'IG:~lqJ1:<fTI~
c!"I~(W;TIlcT 'l t:!;<i l~"[l'l:. QllJf+!1W '1'iTa '11q~;t,.TIqJl\fu
Cf1'l~qJr..m~ 'l t:!;<i f<i"[l'l:. 3T+!1'11BTT '1~a '1l'lGfQ\1~\qJ"<ilfcr
'(fl'l~qJr.;TIfcr I" 1i:Rr ~f"C!"i'r folm~rg ,
In the case of the heaven from Agnihotra etc. the limitor is
heavenness by the relation of inherence qualified by the. apurva produced by Agnihotra etc. Therefore', it is unavoidable that heaven \vith
the same generic property [is produced] by Agnihotra etc. It has been
said [thus] in the Taittirlya sruti, "He who knowing. this, sacrifices
w'ith Agnihotra, attains as much as he attains by performing the
Agni~toma; he who knowing this, sacrifices with Paurl).arnasi, gains
as much' as he [can] gain by Uktha; he who knowing this, performs
. the arna~asya [sacrifice], achieves as much as he [can] gain by
Atiratra.' The wise should take note of this.
1. TaiSa. 1.6.9.1-2.
[IV.0.27 J arC! t:!;'1 "l+!q-:l+!~ff~'fil:qc!lq~G:<t "l+!~,qlra:Of.i'rq <f g
C!"fl:!fi'rcll ~'ilT''1'1i.~cf.lC'1fi'r~'R!I;ffi fflr"a ,
That is why the following statement of the scholars is justified:
The property of having. smoke as a mark etC., alone is the limitor of
the property Of being the goal [in the case of] the consideration of
the smoke [as invariably related with fire, and as residing on the
mountain]. There is no [reason] to bring in vaijiitya in the process
of inference..
[IV. H.l) '1<;g. folP::{w~'1l'-Tf~~H'!il~ ~1"'I<:'11'f.T~ '"'1llc!ilm\:m"f'-fll w<:n.'1M~l ar~qfol,<!o'1'1T'fIB"ffT~Il<fTmil~1Jf 13lft~~1 ~+!+!Rn?l'lN'fi:r.r
~Q"'l"1!lr.('<l1 '"'11R1itm",i'r'ilrn:fo!\il1<!l+!'1:!m<i<"~IJf+!>!T+!lU'1mQiSR[
-,.-
....
"
..
Sl>Tl"lfa I
-"------_. __
-------'-~'.~-.-.-.-- -.--.-----.-.~-.
."
~--------
152
As to the following way [of thinking] cherished by the MImti.qlsakas etc. If,at the time one considers the meaning got from
lIN, vaijiitya is not accepted, then the fruit from Jyori~toma and
Agnihotra, will be the same. In that case, since the Agnihotra, which
. can be performed with less expenditure of money and less trouble, ..
can produce the desired end, there will be no inclination to perform
Jyot~$toma and Asvamedha due to the aver;;;ion created by their being
richer only in extra 'trouble. Thus there will be no performances of
these rites; on account of this, [the Vedic statements enjoining these
rites] will be unauthoritative. [To avoid this] that [vaijatya] has to
be accepted. Concerning this view, we say as follows:
[IV. H. 2]
SECTION FOUR
Actually, since
is able does not pe
[sacrifice] in order t
additional fruit of
in the GYtii, worldly
saying: 'People will
respectable person il
duty and reputation
of Yudhi$thira etc. 11
[men] born of [the
the kingdom [altho
instiga.tor to activati
wish to be qualified. b
Thus the fault !:j1;ate.
1. The verses quol
[IV. H.4]
31a 1l;c!T~f;
'T1<'ItiT>:>.t >r
rr ~I;{: I
Hence it is that
rites] accomplished v
of worldly eminence,
selves' authorised to r
the extreme passion :
[such] great expense
thus even when there
. 1.
31Cf t<:'lf)3Q'fiTrrt
<b~'T 'Cfl~+nUT<'l1G:.
~1!a:
ilJ'!Cl<:'lH:!~l~S'lilij~qWdlWl'i'Tif <51fii;'li>mnfl<"'lTl<l'li-
'li<?lil '11 +ri[Cf1 Q~Rlrr'i:!'lq;;rl I . 31a 1l;C! <furl'll+!. " 310filrn 'Cflfq
:l[!TT'l,'T f;'j"
"F'i~rr Q?:l;f
------,-,-----
SECTION FOUR
",Of)?! :Q'l''l~qt!Rr: I
n:rEf: I or"'!"T C!OfTN
'~c!;;<l'~~<l'~;nfl:[\;rT~'fil<'l'
(lr~n%>r"'!m~T!ffu~: I
<Dq'l,,;r(~ "II <'l'1'[T<rTFJ:. I
Benares edition in
: corru pt and as the
~lf<f;'li;mnn~CfTf"l'fi
'<fJ911Rfm:UJ1C\W.0'l~ I
t !fEf<l91~;i't'lc!B:. 1 orC!
'li'{l"<l'l~ ,j\,,"fm\!lUJT-
lfcrq"81;;;ll'F1Fi't<'f. ~ "WI
[IV. H.4 1 orC! ll;EfT!glrr'liT<rf 'fiHf<m\'<~ "f['lC!THN oS'If-:r.'li>rRr'llif '1::foi'Qii'l''lT<l'RHn~~ ;['[RI&>:'l'aSN I >rfci'l1<D ,mt<91(;'l:[lFJ:. 'lSfil'QO'J"lT<l'l"l<D-<[ itq: 1 orc!~c!'F:R SN <[ R'[R!: I
."
[ IV. H . 5 1 ~c!~g;
("
~ ~
[LaghuMafi. p. 334.]
.::-."
(I~
(I
",p:!!: 'liT+i"'ll ~ql'lT~R:ll - ~<:q-C!: "~'f''''~ ~-ti'I!JfIlTW'lT: mr.~~C!'1TN ~:;'ql!!"nG:1<[lHFF~'f'-T ~~lW 1 -a:oiqibTHlt!;[<:rT'1('l lrr<'l'C!'lT orl'l"<'l"H<l' ~'fl~'iiTH.p.jEfT~"61~ ~<ITil~<'lfuf;l;:-
"-'1'[4<[ ~~f9:c!<"T"l~.Tl<r. ~~2'll1~1 ;r'[~'1{!~l1Ofl<r.1
all
J 54
hence must be performed [under penalty of incurring sin] '. One can,
[now] , perform these in the desire of attaining a son. Once this has
been done, . [the Damapaul'l).amasa] inCidentally meet [the requirement of being performed] obligatorily. Therefore, by virtue of one's
wishing to perform as few rites as possible one is not possibly inclined to perform [also] the Putre~ti etc.
1. For the performance of Darsapaurl).amasa to fulfil all wishes,
ct. ApasS. III.l4.9_ Also See JaiNy,aVi. IV.3.U (p. 246-47).
{IV. K 6] ;:r;:~C!<l:'.fii'l ~Srf!~Tfu:'Ii~ ~~
;a-,'f,~:
'Or [one might claim that] the Vedic sentence about [these sacd-
SECTION FOUR
~'m:m'
Then let it be so
own .counterobjectio
answered. [If you sc
have started perforn
the inclination towar,
1. The Mimfup.saka
lessness of the Sl
the third explam
have nothing aga
harm to their pt
provide an answ
[IV.H.5] that tl
accepting vaijiit>
SECTION FOUR
fiees yielding] all desires lays down the use of Darsapaun:J.amasa for
the fruit of only all the op,tional 4tis [without soma], and of Jyoti~trna for the fruit of all the optional soma sacrifices; hence it will
not be even possible to gain the fruit of Putre~ti etc. by means of
Jyoti~toma. Nor will the concept of three kinds of fruit be necessary.
This [vi,ew] is not acceptable. In the case of a person who has set
up a [ritual] fire, and is desirous of a son etc., the performance of
Putre$ti etc. is possible even before Darsapaul1).amasa. Sinoe the
uselessness [of Putre$ti] is thus avoided, the concept of v.aijatya in
the fruit itself is not IJOssible, because [it would result in] prolixity.
Nor [can one claim that] , as soma sacrifices are [to be performed]
after Darsapaurl}amasa, because of the statement 'one should perform a sacrifice with soma after performing the Darsapaul1).amasa',
other sacrifices [without soma] are also like that [to be performed
after Darsapau,rl}amasa]. There is no authority for this [view].
' 1a I
;j 'qlc'f.l!~lfq
f'l"l<r. C!B11N :g '3{liU if
'f"r ~'!n::mRr '!1~+I. I
Tfq~;
I
or this very reason
[attained by persuits from others] .
\1 though [such] a
)ncluding that the
'ebhyah' kiimebhyo
tlso is enjoined for
can [be obtained]
.ned [to perform a
One assumes .that
la] is for the fruit
Irds the Putmiti]
l'Il'3{%> ,",j)-R!2t11~
fl!.,>{Tre;'fmB1 'ii>{lfu2'rw.cn"Cf1;j~'1 ~r
FlU++i~;n<l ,q'f'l"qfto:i~
i
'''<r~'iq'i1l]111UP'<!1:l!l<l
q
RH a~T~ 111"fl1Tm I
~h: ~ <1<::111: I
{I
155 .
\
\
156
Actually, however, one who has not set up a fire, having perceived the momentariness of possessions and thoughts, wishes to bring
about [a] soma [sacrifice] and its fruit, without delay, need not wait
for a [certain] time to set up the optional [sacrifice] fire; nor need
he wait to perform the soma offering until after he has performed
the Darnapaul1l).amasa first. For, with respect to the Agni$toma,
the established view is that one need not do this. This view is held
on the authority of the following Vedic utterance: "Let one who is
to offer a SO:l1va offering, set up a fire; he should inquire neither about
the season, nor about the constellation [which is in conjunction with.
the moon] . " .
1. For the text quoted,. cf. AsvasS. 11.1.14. (p. 140).
j
.-
SECTION FOUR
1. KaUll,lQabhatta is a
is no difference bet
sacrifice such as
performing a spec
opinion, the conce
sakas cannot be St
time it takes to Pt
fruit.
[IV.
H. 10] "<.1~~T"'<ll;o
'1a;'!mllT<9"T1
aG:111'l'liTll.,r;
<.1'If~<'1R~
<:'1 ii'liT111
~>;hloT"I
Ci<'M5
SECTION FOUR
1.
[IV.
'<{
i'l., <{!\<{+nUJ1Sm+llG,",,1C1
m?!
fu~lRlQB:, I
;p.
140).
tI9a<:([I'1i'lil~"'+"1+Il3....
t'......
(I
'Q,H'~'f'Ffl'il:Rl<t G,"'.lJ~
'lil<Ol~fl,,~ "9~-
<IT
,<91<1:, I
;'!~fl'QC<f'll<{l,,,.
-~
157
One should also obEerve that the statement "Anyone who sets up
a sacrificial fire will be offering a soma sacrifice" allows one to conclude that such a person will make such an offering without the
intervention of a fire rite, so that _such a person's soma offering also
n-eed not be p~eceded -by the Agnihotra. Further, [one cannot claim
that .the Agnihotra, Darsapaurl).arnasa etc., must be performed obligatorily; hence must precede the soma offering, for,] the statement
'Let him who is desirous of heaven [perform etc.] , serves to provide the
fruit of the obligatory rites enjoined by the statements 'One [is to]
perform the Agnihotra as long as one lives, let one perform the
DarsapauO}.amasa sacrifice as long as one lives.' This by contextual
contiguity. The desire for heaven is correctly assumed [as that which
prompts one to perform such rites] on two counts: [first], it is a
simpler concept than [the avoidance of demerit, which involves] :
the positing of the absence of demerit as the fruit because it is an
obligatory rite, the occurrence of demerit, [in the mind of the sacri- .
ficer] , the aversion to this, and the desire for its absence, brought by
this [aversion]. [Secondly, this is correctly assumed] on account
of the principle 'Let the [fruit of a sacrifice whose fruit is not directly
stated] be heaven, since this is the fruit common to all [persons, i.e.,
which all desire] .'
1.
Hii"!i1m G,".hi~lHm ApasS. IIIA.14.8 m+!{T <{l"\;~~ <{~-
158
SECTION FOUR
1% g; Cl'<l
. ~'li'l"C!TR'"
f9f-cr<rT c
~fu ~ f.lif
mentioned aDove.
d to be the fruit for
mentioned directly,
;;>f1fuR1ini1rr~?f9i<?'1)
he difference in the
.ed by the greatne~s
ination [to perform
injunctions enjoinllld there be no use[sa for all fruits on
;hould be performed
i] has been brought
. m<nliT'llc; ifh:'!1"l I.
<i 'o'1'[~~Ri(jT I 8lci
I
~ce in the fruit is
ifference] , and prole other hand, it is
. fruit according to
is justified: 'A man
a hundred, and he
ten. [These] and
; just water, are all
f sentences such as
l51}
SECTION FOUR
w'ill .
[IV.H. 13]
-the performer of Asvamedha, still [one sees that this person] is Hot
[thereby necessarily] inclined [to perform this rite]. Therefore, [une
concludes that] the production of such a knowledge by means of the
[verb affix denoting] vidhi is fruitless. For, the meaning of vidhi
[should be] only an object of that cognition which is an instigator
[to action]. Therefore, this [view given by the Naiyayikas] amounts
-to nothing.
1. I have accepted the reading q'q<'fiOHll"'!<rffi:i.!TrrI1Ef of the Bombay
edition instead of the q''fiOlm"'!<rQl~I<r'l:. of the Benares edition
in this passage..
2. The Naiyayika views mentioned here have already been explained in my notes on [IV,G,6] and [IV.G.12].
[IY.H.14J
'{fu .
R;:clT+!fi1r~I<~'fClftrfCr
SECTION FOUR
sentence mean
indeed the mea
that prompts (
2. According to 1
. properly be oni
is rejected'
[lV.H.l) 1 aT;:>:(~J
,~
'fig)'
f<imrf;
,PH
'q
. Otherwise, it v
a speaker is the de:
in the way stated 1
.by lIN etc., is the
[on the part of ane
to what the agent
[this assumption w
obtains as timitor (
general property \
being a means to ;
denoted].
1.
f<if\;{~'fl1<:f1:r:ql'i:
of Udayanacal
the property 0
directly expres
noted by lIN.
[IV. H.16 J
~l~"!l
IJ;E[
.Clle;'iI\;{
SECTION FOUR
161
of the Bombay
b.e Benares edition
'IEf
Til:qqTG:'f.fol4'1iEff<r:l~'I
CI
.'. If, on the other hand, one insists that only that which is the
object of the knowledge whiCh is directly the insigaior, can be the
denoted meaning rof lIN], then the only proper meaning is the
property ofachievinga.distinct svarga. In the way ad.opted by me,
the inclination to activity is [causedJ by- the cognition produced by
liN. .There is there'fore, no'support -for conceiving that kind of process [which the Naiyayikas accept]. For,[this view] has no autho
162
.Now; even if this is so, the prohibition' [One should] not [eat]
kalafij.a' cannot be justified. For, the eating of kalafija does produce
something desired such as satisfaction [of hunger], the absence of it
. [of something desired] is refuted. By the same token, the following
statement of the author of the Kalpataru is rejected: In order tc
justify the absence of the property of being the means to a desired
end stated in the Vedic sentence, the property of being the mt;ans
of something extremely undesired is assumed. .
1. kalafija: The whole sentence is fAa kalafijam bhak~ayet. na
lattna1?l na grfijana.1!l, of which, however, only the first part is
usually the subject of discussion. About the meaning of the
word kalafija, there is controversy. The following oftquoted
floating verse describes it to mean the meat from those animals
or birds that have .been killed with a poisoned arrow:
ferq~+'l'fCl'!Tut;:r ~
<f\
SECTION FOUR
It is true that,
this as follows: (
the property of be
[all is in order] .
such results, one's
Once desire turns:
Hence, there isiJ.o I
[such prohibitive i:
the absence of [an
1. This has been 1
[IV. I. 3 1
cr~ a:tli
d,
crT<'fill<i'
FH'f'-i~<!
tllB1U'-i1
;:r
<D"f
However, that I
parimalal himself,
\vho :does believe i1
there is certainty ,
fruit at the time de
tion [supposed to1
means to a desired
proper that the Ve
both authoritative
sons in question.
tional meaning: t
which is] greatly 1
negative [particle]
[as not entailing a
the qualifier. Th
described before.
1 . ~~ISfIJfT1'fT'!lq<;]':
rally taken inl
(a)
~~ISfIJfT1'f
by itself,
as qualifil
'n bhakayet. na
, the first part is
meaning of the
lowing qftquoted
Jm those --animals
JOisoned arrow:
''IT 'Gl'1tT"1ui 'Cf~<J:: I
h in view of the
nentioned in the
:J been translated
ted here""can be
. Kaul:lI;labhatta
der to justify the
)mething desired,
a causes greater
zlaiija does cause
~ of the desired
lfRr<:!""11it <:!i<rrn-'f.ff ~<:!l"l"'c'lTo:rT~
~
qmB:.1
163
SECTION FOUR
[IV. I. 3 1
However, that has been rejected by [the author of the Kalpataruparimala] himself, as follows: In the case of a desirous person,
who does believe in the' Veda, but is blinded by lust, even, though
there is certainty about future suffering in, hell, the desire for the
fruit at the time does not goaway. Thus for him,a negative injun
Hon [supposed to] signify the absence of the property of being the
means to a desired end, would not be authoritative. And it is not
proper that the Veda, which is accepted as authoritative for ali, be
both authoritative and not authoritative, according' to different per
sons in question. Hence, [says Appayya], lIN has an additional meaning: the property of not being followed by a [result
which is] greatly undesired. Thus [in a negative injunction], the
negative [particle] nafi conveys the absence [of an action] qualified
[as not entailing a greatly undesired result], due to the absence of
the qualifier. This [view of Appayya] is refuted in the way
.
described before.
1 .. f;i~qUjT111'llq'>[: fiT~mt+rT'f: Three ki~lCis 'of visilitiibhli1,)as are gene
rally taken into consideration.
(a) fiT~qQj'lo:rl~'Rl: fiTfu21o:rT'I:
the qualificand is present
by itself, but the qualifier is absent. Thus the qualificand
as qualified by the qualifier can be said to be absent. For
0"
.~, . . . . . . . . . . . . _
_ . . . . . . _ _ --.~,.,..."....... _ _ _
"~~.
__
:.....
'
164
(c)
:;r11'l"T111'l!:!~'fCl: fciroHll1l'1:
[IV. I 4)
SECTION FOUR
a contrary, so that
[that the act in qu
Ithe words] asura,
namely, a demon, ;
dom]. Nor [in th
a compound [must
asu'l"a, avidyii. Fo
statement [vibhii$ii
a compound] optio
the paryudiisa niin,
1. niinuyiije$u:
. 'Ii~f<r <Tl~'l"l~9:
command yaja
Cf'<!,m"1<Ti
<:<ft'-!i1U<:"f.
Others [hold th
that lIN denotes the
vidual ends, then on
svarga [do not then
denoted by lIN, but]
. [Similarly, in negat
SECTION FOUR
up John there?
ressed, there is a
;>tesent by itself,
f the same quescily dressed per; foii\l'i'fTl:rT'i'-m'fo:
the property oj
in a prohibited
of not entailing
g of the negative
I'n'f: I
: property of Hot
IN, has already ,
ior~mCl"l<'i6+'fFCI
~~o~ ''iI"F<':r! 'II
01"'-If.l~~g<'iH'f 'II
rfu: I foil'!Nlffi"l
q~il:I~ ';:f'-," ll:m
ve injunction is
:those who have
sacrifices ,[and
; [the acts], by
19 the means to
, undesirable reo
~sirable results],
~nly understood,
[According to]
'cative function,
)
165
<<mf~q<i:' (l"l<'fio;(lT<.~'mm
IT'fiI,wf.mm'il"l<i[ ~:g:~t ;{3{, ol<~>ll\'!'Ii ll:<'F'l I
Others [hold the following opinion]. If the view [is accepted]
[IV. I. 5)
(l"lttlTCI"l<;i fei"<1~ ~ q~
that lIN denotes the property of being a means to particular individual ends, then one accepts also that [co,occurdng] itemssuchas
svarga [do not themselves convey the result in question, thus, bdng
denoted by lIN, but] serve to convey the intention [of the utterance] .
, [Similarly, in nega:tive injunctions], lIN [itself] has .as a, meaning
166
r. 6]
f<t~'1'~: I
~'1.f~'Ta<'1fl~o<r'#!:
'1T'O'1iJ:,1
'li~mr~":rifsl1w
8'1+rl'fiT<:'lil1';:'1"!+'TiG:T<ilm: I
'{2<:1Ni'{,'!r;:'f'1' '{Ri
;:r]~*,
.....
f1':r?lo'1,qRr-..!;
'li<;qi'{T[! I
SECTION FOUR
1. 8tRTU'S[
Ag:
sa,/!!sthtis of J y
VII.4.10. In'
ms
AND MOODS
>rim::
re<,{Rr I
'CI~1;;r
....:;
gative injunction
e absence of ;he
eans to avoiding
d to the meaning
)sence of eating,
N]. Nor should
\67
SECTION FOUR
one object [to this] as follows. There is a principle that affix meanings are construed [first] with the meanings of the bases [to which
the affixes are attached]. [Therefore, in the present case, the meaning
of lIN should be related first to the meaning of the root bhizk].
How, then, can the [meaning of UN, namely] the property of being
a means to a desired end be related to absence, which is not a meaning of the base [to which lIN is attached]? [This objection is met
as follows]. [The interpretation given] is justified by accepting that
[the meaning of lIN is] indeed connected [with the meaning of its
base] through the intermediary of absence. [i.e. the meaning~ of
lIN and nafi are not themselves related merely as such; it is the
absence of eating which is related to the meaning of lIN]. Alternatively, [this interpretation is justified by abandoning the principle
noted] : a different principle is set up in cases where nan isused.
1. The semantic rule involved in this argument is normally stated
as follows: rr,'l',{l<lT );['!i<'!'lff.'1C1~l~I;f"li''1ll:. I
2. The meaning of lIN, i.e., the property of being the means to a
desired end -. absence (the meaning of the negative particle)
~ eating (the meaning of the verbal root). Thus the condition
'that the meaning of a suffix must be connected with' that of the,
root is satisfied by acceping the meaning of ,the negative particle
as a lirik in the relation.
[IV. I. 8J 11;ci 'Cf "srf<rust "I):s~<i 'li!..llflRl", "<!TRrU~ rn'SfoJrj 'lir....lJfTfu" ~<'!'frfit ,
>r~ut >!l;:llfl'l'fT't 'iill!ffi"l<l<ci <!\"~ I ~~u,{l'" <I <D"I: I' 8i'CI
11;'1 'W-&l'f!':TIlfTl'fl'lf<i"l<fi; <fiTi{mfu ~~" ~,1:[i?r "tiRm. I
".
168
t!,."'
Now, this being oso [it follows that] the sacrificing of an animal
to Agni and Soma results in sin .. For, [the injunction] na hi1!lsyat
'one should not kill' prohibits [such sacrificing]. Nor is there any
[authority for] restricting [the prohibition, so that it be inapplicable]
in the present case. [The situation is] thus: [From the injunction]
agni$omiYiaill. .. one understands that the sacrificing [of an animal]
is a means to a desired end. And [the injunction] na hi'1zsyiit states
[that such killing] is the means to an undesired end. Nor is there
any confliflct between the two [in which case, the particular Vedic
. injunction to sacrifice would cancel tbe general negative injunction] .
. [For a single act can be a means to both] , since it is observed that
both the properties [of being a means to desired and undesirable
ends] occur together in )the eating of food mixed with honey and
PoiSon, ,and in approaching someone else's beautiful wife.
:1.: -The- sacrifice of an animaf for the deities Agni and Soma, is
SECTION FOUR
prescribed b)
the three kine
two are refe:
All the prirr.
TaiSa. 1.3.7.
2. The prohibiti
269.5. This i
literature itse
should be bro
and treated a
later bias aga
of taking res(
smrti sentenc3. For the ut:>ar
[IV. J. 2]
Cf<gi.'!<s
l\e~,!(
Actually, ho,~
$omiYalll] pasumi
cause this particui
the object here oj
the animal offered
1. The argumer
enjoins a saer
with theproh
tion, it will b
The whole thi
[IV. J. 3J.
81<9;'
S:<'1M'f.
~'<llrrlq
----~------------~---~--""-~-"-~""
lestion as to how
in Sabarabhii~ya
!en decided that,
the action, there
in the senterice
nust be accepted
le taki ng of the
)ited by another,
ption. Both lhe
leh an action 8re
:d by the taking
fficulty.
nowhere stated. "
I a way out by
~fidencyJ even if
'e is greater fruit
lattaDL p. 797) .
al I "I '<fl,=rlltl'iffN:
R~F:::~"ll<1: I
ing of an animal
tion] na hilJlsyat
~or is :here any
be inappli'Cable]
!1 the injunction]
~ [of an animal]
1a hinzsyiit states
ld. Nor is there
particular Vedic
3.tive injunction] .
is observed that
and undesirable
with honey and
I wife.
;ni and Soma, is
16~
SECTION FOUR
"eif~allJ"F<11~12~'l~ iit'l''ll<J:.1
Actually, however, the verbiilabh used in the [injunction, agniThis because this particular act, which has not been enjoined otherwise, is
the object here of an injunction, and connectep with a thing [i.e.,
the animal offered], and a d~ity [Agni, Soma]. ."
$omiya.J?lJ paurnfilabheta, has the meaning of sacrificing.
gj~g;
en S1f0+11"l~'f ~q~~l'f+( I
" '
"fq~'-l
5[l~~"lm, "
~<'1M"1i,<it
" 'fffl~T<?i'tQ " ~F'1~~UTqloaefFf'1Tl,,"f~l~'i!l"l\q~f{f\1 ~q~ ~q~~l"S( a<l:~~ ~fu re;awaa<'lTF( I
Or, let the word iilaJlzbhana here [mean] touching only. In the
section visaye priiy,adarsaniit [M.S., 11.3.6.16]; the opponent ,"ays
that on the strength <if. the sentence vatsamiilabheta in the section 011
Agnihotra, it wiII follow that the"k:iIIing of a calf is prescribed. [Cancelling this] , the final decision is that the word [ala1J1bhanaj means
touching. only; ,
170
3lC! 1l.'1 ." '1,\ i'[!Il[l'JaTI ~~C!: 13,f'1!~C!tlr '1liJI\1<'1'Fi <f ~lJr" ~Rr
'llrreffi lJ'W~~~ I
That is why the following verse in the Bhagavata is justified:
"since [it is] the smelling of the wine that is prescribed. and similarly,
the iilabhana of an animal, not its killing."
1. . This sentence is omitted in the Benares edition. 1. am here
accepting th'e reacting' of the Bombay edition of the text.
'2. The half verse quoted here is taken from the Bhagavata Purii.lf3,
X1.5.l3.
3. The only way in which iilaMana cannot be killing is if it is
accepted to mean only touching, and not actually sacrificing.
[ IV. J. 5] C!~r 'q ~'l'<!~~ifi,Il[;:'lT~<f lJ~~ ~'l1iJN'!if ffl-7.fRr I C!~ ~
"~,[G;'-f~t'1'fm.,B:" ~,~'f''fr ttiM1'lr.,'T'!i~'1 ~ S:j;Slil;:<!''11''l~'fr>f: J
<'IIi!; "~'[";;~:"~fuwil'rn:. 'i{~tP.f, 'q~~~'1 05111; 1;'lT05T, ~il: ll:
" 3lrR,'1~: "l[~'f''fr "3lRfu+!Itf,'t;:r ') l[~'f<!C'fRtt;;:;:frs>t l[Rr
RoT~ sfit '1~ 'fl~I .,Tffii ~ ".~'Rmg:::fmh+!: ", " Tit 'q~
Rolq<J:" l[;!lT~' . <l~rfm:<l;l=f<i" mmli, I 'fl;f'l~"f'l<'lfq- (q'!i;;:q<f
'1"r ~'i(r"''!i<'liB05r'f.~G:'1r,MR''lT~ (q~i':r'f.'1T<p:fa'lT 'i(05'1,'1T'
,[FP:ro~ C!:<l;'fc! 1l.'1T>.if '!frm: I 3l"l"f1fq ~f<:::'f.<'IT~Gj6~ 1l.'fr~i
m;:;:'l:f l[fcr "liJi'l 'fft7.f<l l[~'f<l+r. I .1<:'f+!"f1fq' ~T'lc::oi<fT<J: 1;Qm>.f''fR!)hri<;:'l~Tfit lJ 1<:'1 >!Tll:'l:f l[fu fu'qfcr I
ha~
SECTION FOUR
1. trivrccarvadhi!
stated in the
'11m"f~ 'i(~<R
lata is justifted:
:d, and similarly.
..on, I am here
f the text.
,agavata Purar.la,
idlling is if it is
Illy sacrificing.
fu~'1fcr I qi;, ~
S3}!i1rcr<'n~1t~r'~: I
~'I; ~~roft, "lit IT
'RI''1T<O-~S'~ ~Fci
""
[gIl'[: ",
".nil' 'q~
~~q'l<'1fq
Jq'!il;q;:r
fi'jT'f'1C1<n <;;'f'i'qT'
'li<'1TtG:fu:&: ~Ttif
'1G:rJ;:rTil:, ~qOJN' -
19 'touch' every-
SECTION FOUR
171
172
Tii1!~lyaBra.
lire
SECTION FOUR
consider inter:
(a), in which
for carrying 0
accepted view
Vedic meariing
Agni$tut is. ch;
t'rivrt way .. S,
6. TaiSa. 2.3.2.3.
'let (the adhv(
him [the sacri
splendour of BI
.affix [lal~ ~
cated to.,:' (
should be a tn '
means 'rice', aj
X.l.l0.34-44 aJ
sidered here.
7. dasame: The
tenth section oc
M.S., 'X.l.l0.3'
"l\Rq;;fla9il+!: Hen
in favour of th
8. All this discussi<
rather than the
Since in one pi
'to kill', but has
ale frequent, ijlt
Vedic instance.
. contradiction wi
[IV. J 5] 1l:'i '"1~fe
Thus, since tlie
the same thing, ho"
[the. injunction] ? .
l. "It has been sho
'one should not
1omiya111 pasu1n'
to this prohibiti<
ms
AND MOODS
is stronger than
~aviizadhika1'a1J.a,
caru mentioned
the commentary
antraVi'i. p. 221.
.e term bahilipaled in three trip
together forming
bahipavamiina,
he sadas near the
)f the mahiivedi]
See Ti'it;lc;lyaBrii.
'I~lffl~T: ;qfo: 6 q-'I-
iNyaVi. 1.4.3.
bahipavamiina
; is to be chanted
ma called trivrt.
; follows: 11l ea,ch
:hanted after the
19 on .the precise
lifications. These
luotes :
,dicated to Aditi,
I worship) 'Aditi
exact statements
>are . R;fq-u['liT~S-
.e in Ti'it;lc;lyaBra.
'ifice,which is a .
ises here whether
d or (b) a stoma
s not here, as in
ent to show that
. ~nce, . cine' might
SECTION FOUR
173
.. -~--~~----~---.~-~-----------"~.-" .. ----~. . . .
174
~BTt'l'W'1FTf'"ll~q",.'IT 'I . ~
. 'Cf
qf.fifi'1J~<[r ~>.f.rt'l~;:<{cT:
SECTION FOUR
considered to
actual harm t(
of the prescrir:
3. This objection
killihg does n
accompanying'
animal, and in
perty of belo~~
being offered, t
longing' to the
that it occurs :
[IV. J. 7J
f~mHI[9'
'-fTlT~~'<[
. 1;:r,['\1it 'Cf'
Objection: [}
sentences that lay d<
formed]. Otherwis(
, killing wi th a weapc
is that the [prescri])(
complete limbs and
sound, and thus car
[also].
1. Previously it ha
scribing iila1!'lbh(
killing is to be <>
ing rites. Here 1
have been prescI
in which the aniI
considered as in
killing with a w;
way the animal
acceptable for a :
way to kiII a sacr:
injuhctions to kil
2. Kaundabhatta re
thes~ 'sente~~es' i
animill is killed, j
ms AND MUODS
touched ritually.
)t have anything
:h, other. . . ;
Ht ;;]T"l<lt"<l<\:;:'la;
<ll,",!l{ , m~'t<iq~
'l~a\~""Fli:r~+l'na:.
eother hand, is
;hat is, from the
its parts]. Nor
is case, one does
ffering is effected
~s in'the offering
he patnisalf/yaja
preparation pero be) performed
rice to make the
takes place before
iary 'of the lparts,ne killed earlier]
I'ise, [the animal
~dicated to Agni
)asusajJZskariit,a!!t
;anii, to the~parfs
.
~d.
There
.,'41,
IS
room
SECTION FOUR
175
killing is to be obtained only by inference from the accompanying rites, Here the opponent says that the killing can be said to
have been prescribed by the sentences that lay down the way
in which the animal should be killed, If these sentences are not
considered as injunctions for killing, says -the opponent, even
killing with a weapon [which is in direct contradiction of the
way the animal is said to be killed for sacrifice], will also be
acceptable for a. sacrifice. Thus these sentences prescribing the
way to kill a sacrificial animal must be~ccepted as authoritative
injunctions to kill an animal. .
2. Kaul):gabhatta rejects this by pointing out that the purpose of
these sentences that lay down the way in which a sacrificial
animal is killed, is to obtain whole limbs without any cuts on
176
SECTION FOUR
them, and also to avoid the fault which will occur if the animal
. makes a sound while being killed. Thus an additional purpose
of prescribing killing cannot be imposed on these sentences. An
additional purpose not actually stated in a prescriptive sentence,
can be thus assigned only to th?se seritences that have 119 apparent purpose.
f;'FG:I>TCjra:!:!I'lf.a:{~lqit;Jlmrijf1'lo<:[lWll~Tliif~~<I'Cj""'Tf<{21"!:!
~~<lW[Ril'iq'l '<ll<,!>i
[TV. J. 8J
.,.'i'[
~r<lCT~<;>:fI!:!T+!lU'1<=1t'<l1 <f\f.R-Ffi~q"l I
'i'[ ., ~~Tl11+!lU<lfuT% 1j~\'<i'f,P:rlql<l:. 1
Nor is it right to' go about it in the following way: Since anything which is laid down in an injunction not accompanied by derogatory statements or the teaching of an expiatory rite, is invariably
associated with the property of not entailing evil [anything undesired] ; and since there is contradiction with the resulting meaning
of the injunction, the prohibition [against killing] should not operate.
[This is not accepted for the following reason]: When there is
[direct] contradiction between a Vedic statement and the meaning of
[another Vedic statement], the question of restricting [the scope]
arises out of fear tha;t, otherwise, one of them would be unauthoritalive. But when the contradiCtion' is .with the resultrng meaning
[inferred from an injunction], there is no [fear of the calamity of
nonauthoritativeness] for the Veda [itself]. Thus there is no reason
to restrict the scope [of the prohibition] .
1. As has already been explained, according to Kau~J.(;labhatta,
there is no direct injunction in the Veda which prescribes the
killing of the sacrificial animal. This is obtained only by inference, since there are Vedic statements that provide for the rites
to be performed on that animal. But this conclusion is only
inferred from the Veda, and not stated directly there. Thus,
since there is no contradiction between an actual injunction anq
the prohibition to kill, the..contradictionbeing only between the
prohibition and what is merelyipferred, from other injunctions,
there is no fear of nonauthoritativeness descending on the Veda.
Thus there is no reason \vhy the scope of the prohibition should
. be restricted in order io accommodate the killing in sacrifice.
[IV. J. 9]
"!ftt,, s:r~;jlJ
ql'R!+l1ql<l:. ~
<II 1); Q<:[Ff~
9i~liR"~fq l:!
+!qf<'~ ilJ~~
!:!'11;;j'f,B:, I 'f<!i......
,. -'::"'r-!',-...;
~~Il~qrl['
~~fW'o'r '<il~
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
:NSESAND l\1l)ODS
SECTION FOUR
----
....
_-
.... _-.--...
_- ..... -_.
_ .._.. _ . _ - , - - -
177
t<iisterW[I'<!RRr J;lm;
;'4t<<lT Blf.[~'li.r.r;qT I
m% ~\''liTl'lT'Il<J:, 1
to Ka~QaJJhatta,
hich prescribes the
ined only by infer
trovide for the rites
conclusion is only
ectly there. Thus,
lual injunction and
g only between the
1 other injunctions,
nding on the Veda.
prohibition should
!ling in sacrifice.
,
[IV. J. 9]
178
limiting condition, also goes against the smrti, [by quoting the versel
'killing' etc.
.
'
1. Here Kaw;rc;labhatta brings in the Madhva commentary on
SECTION FOUR
[Madhva's argum
standing the basis of
not [claim that hhrzsii
but because it is prohi
thatthe property of bofl, injunction. And
merely assumed [as
authoritative] stateme
teachers such as Kam;
1. The smrti quote!
authoritative. F(
as authoritative, ,
[IV;]. 11] ~ '<C' '-loft!
;;r;:l{'Il'il'lRi
w:<rr 'IT ~~
[Given this. ther
snqtisl such as conu
have to be discarded
demerit ca,used by dri
also'- Thus it has hi
pural)ai, 'Just as [it
mud, or the result 0:
possible to wipe away
sacrifices.'
1. The verse quotec
[IV. J. 12J aloft'"'18 '
~~'1 110:1'
<:CIT SH i
~~~CTT f
" GfGtITIIf>!!
,I
[IV. J. 10] ~~r~l{F1'1.iit'i!T'?ri!;:I'!"'<orm:: I ",fu ~ITfuuTI ~m~ lT1ITm'ila:<!f.cr 'I l'iii g Rf~ 1 ' ~q~ll'!"'i ~NR!~~'1Tfit
~ ~l{Te/m: 1 ~fc!<:r.:!f<i;:crifi+l6r~~fct<!;<;tf9i+!~'1ifi~<fcfetfc! <r
!!m1lfCl~'IlRR:cftfc!
"ilW I
<[mil'
IT;
d~+lro~liI q
aT~9
,,'IW{l~iri
On this [wel c
.1ft
1&'mfo!;r tflq+f[tfT-
SECTION FOUR
179
[Madhva's argument is not acceptable] , due to [his] misunderstanding the basis of the opponents' objection. The opponents do
not [claim that hilrtsii produces] demerit [just] because it is hil!ISii,
but because it is prohibited. It is the same even for you who accept
that the property of being the means to a desired end is [the meaning
of] injunction. And one should consider that the smrti quoted is
merely' assumed [as authoritative] by Madhva, who assumes [as
authoritative] statements in endless array on the authority of endless
teachers such as Kamatha etc., so that this smrti is not authoritative.
1. The smrti quoted by Madhva has been rejected here as nonauthoritative. For a list of those cited by Madlwa and assumed
as authoritative, see MaTaMuMa. p. 3, note 4.
[IV. J. III Il;'i "". Etul1q~~iFf+l;rIfu:~~fii<ilr:fl'rr~: I q:oi '1HIQi'\sfr.i W1!f~
;;f;:l{q'[q'[qfutClf~q I Cf'iT ;'1:1'fa IT'i+l~'f.;:i':r I "'-l'iT qi;;r ![\bTUl:
~'IT CIT !!U'[.CfB: I '!.Cfl['1:'-IT Cf~~'1ii ;r '-l~<Ifg+l~fCf" ~fu ~<J:. I
[Given this. then, one might say that] all rites [prescribed in
smrtis] such as commiting ritual suicide. at Prayaga and sati will
have to be discarded [as not being authoritative] ; and, in this way,
demerit caused by' drinking wine will be unavoidable in the Viijapeya
also. Thus it has been said in the first book [of the BhlgavatapuraI.J.a], 'Just as [it is not possible to cleanse] muddy water with
mud, or the result of [drinking] wine with [more] wine; it is not
possible to wipe away [even] the killing one animal with [several]
sacrifices.'
1. The verse quoted here is BhagP. 1.8. 52.
of
~fcr ~'<l~+E~Cf'fT~ I
. "<qmllf'ie.tr f<r~Cf: W:T'-I1l;Cf~ WK!<.'!l1-l ;r 1&'61" i\.fu ml1<lCfT<J:. I
"'-Imif tf~'!: ~121: ~w:r'! ~'-l+wrT I 1RI1 S~'-I ~~ lJ'i~
~~ CI~$CI'<l:" ~fu" '-IT ~f<r~cn ~m f.T'-lcnR+r.J:, 'C(tffi I
<il<4a"
~fu t:p.q.m.'-Im?:{+1'1-
180
SECT~ON
FOUR
and "Slaughter is n,
furthermost words, i.
demerit:
.
. 1. .Just saying that
must mean tJ.lat
elsewhere, which
killing prescribed
was born, does n
[IV.; J. 14) ~ ~'<l)lm<
.
mi<il ~l~Rf
~"'-il
---------.-~-----
SECTION FOU:R .
o tha t there is no
n the subSt;OlY of
carry_ away other
no harm to ..these
anCe with dharma
_ of the advice of
-hile following the
from the [follow.ing prescribed by
[following] stateuming [by only]
ing of the animal
m the fifth section
mals for the- sake
1. Therefore the
ing prescribed by
jlling. .For from
1&1
[IV.' J. 14]
ing of sacrificial
counted as hafm
and the resultil-i!:
na
sm'fli statement
lon-authoritative,
is the same thing
.to support the
.,
Witt
---.----
182
I u'-iT (:l@I2!IR2r1'('l';;rf;'r't;~
q<f<reT~ ~v:rf~; I fliMR'tI'l'lT'FfI'l'l\T uID''iJli'( I siu~
<[ 'if
~:&::'fTq;;fR'IlT ~ 'R'>~:
;;f<['li1<Ef[1'(<li
;;iI-'lu '{<~Hi:l+J:. I
Nor [can it be saJd that] all it means is that [hitl/sii] does not
cause unmitigated d~merit. If it is taken that way, [these statements]
will be futile as the resulting meaning will be that [hinlSii] produces
hath desired and undesired results .. This is [already]. understood
from the injunctive and prohibitive sentences. For the same reason,
the view that it is the absence of the. property of being the cattse of
something desired that is to be:signified is also toberej'ected.
1. Sirice sac'rificialhinzsii is prescribed by an injUnction"it follows
SECTION FOUR
that it must be c
since the prohib
obvious that hi1
fore, if the stater
sa~rificial ki!lin~
Nor can it be Ci
repeating [the same
bition]. It is not I
purpose [of {heir 0'
[in the M.S.] woul,
1., An anuviida c
~vailable from .
claiming that it j
,quoted .above ir
that the sacrifici
claimed in the i:
mat sacrificial
create demerit; 1
been said that 1
the injunction I
all killing. It i,
that this difficU:
as repititions of
prohibition. TJ
2. Kal1J}.Qabhatta:
calling somethir
not possible to
If another purp<
meaning to be ;
possible. Thus,
showing that s
cannot be callI,
gathered 'from j
3. The tatprakhyi
is
must be delimited
denoted by' /ziJ!Zsii,
wi/, and hi'lJ'lsii are
,rty which delimits
~acchedaka, Now,
.es in interpreting
sence has its 'praa-
'wayitiivaccitedaka.
is not a blue pot',
olue'pot'ness; and
'. Otherwise, false
I!o'tra 'there is not
lence the property
~ is potness. Now,
;ent when one said
one could say na
present,
I hi1?zsii ishi1!zsii.
'hedaka is potness)
:opcrty, not a pm
it is this property
(See Introduction
ie absence of halm- .
It such
as himsii
na
.
'
i denotes harming
~lrIf.rID~9.n.f~~
~"ll<t. I oi~ ~i!-
SECTION FOUR
183
184
'(M.s., 1.4.4.4.).
_,
,"
,'
. . _,"
,_
I,
'to-
'. '
"....
'.
',"! .. '
.~,
.~.
\ \
-,.
..,
," ., _f
~.
..,
~.
-.
"
SECTION FOUR
2. The aphorism' h~
[IV.J.9].
3.
Kaul,l~abhatta
hen
father Railgojibha1
able to me.
[IV. J, 18 J
u:<i "~(::T;g:+i1
,,,
c!T<'l'i1'-l" '"f
l!\]l:{~I<l:lqi<r
Thus in statement:
etc., it is the property ,
as the criterion for deci(
with ,adharma. Thus
statements, there is ll(
sacrifice when it is pn
1. The part of the '
The verse only me
about taking win.
of the 'general im
understand the m
by the Veda is per
,Veda including th
wise be a cause 01
2. I have accepted th
q;;;q;:II<;[![ffi'RJ:
ar~g
q,W(
fq'C!l~;i c!~'1,
,;'
('
. 'l'Sf"W1N <rI
a:Tfufu~n1fC!
Or let it [causing
taking wine. The ISh:
taking through [smelli
cOrisideratibn'the fact t
tiohof a verysmalleXp
ENSES
AND MOODS
in this section is
, as to whether the
ve the name of the
considered a gu~a
deity to whom the
iew is' that this sen'deCision however
qeity, because ,there
lame of the deity to
d. This sentence
is
.' .
this other sentence
~ity; the ~Ol'dagni
ifice concerned, and
SECTION FOUR
,'
al
185
[IV. J. 18]
~,....
,....,
2. I have accepted the readings "lir~s"!+fI~'1<o;'t and u:a<::>-f'Ii'l'C(<{'f,'ii'1;:rwr. _.~CI: of the Bombay edition as they make better
sense than .m'ill;jl-TI~~ an d U:'CT<::ii'fi'l'C(<{'fi"q'll"l' of the Benares
edition.
', ,
,
[IV. J.l9]
., .
~;:i'11 . ~'qcfiRtcll~
'~m1fG:<lrfct~"qQ'l>:rfu~l;jl~<{
,.-.:J
"_.
.
.,_.
"""
~fu~~ l!<ftl~h:flo<!~ I
"
-"."
, - - - - -,
-~
186
q,'~ ;r'iH~9
'fRlf~
ol[ll:i'1
q~~~l>:f9'9'1!1~''f
RlJfl~B: I 9'9<i
'<1
'1IQ'fjQl<:fI<5B: I
81~>~:
' .
".
Cj~ S~'l'T2T'fj<91u:. I
~ffi~
--
------- -_._- - - - - - - -
SECTION FOUR
S[~
r.: lif[<'li<'l
~iim
I '1',
'<
,It is for this vel
[by which he means
expiatory rite. [Anc
is not performed, nev
vamarsa!h
.. 'worthy of
that persons desirous
whicq ne~essaJj,ly: cc;
kp.al.qsya eki[l)~J J:
[Pcmcaikh;;t} . ans,~et
11' <t Sal,'aKau. I?'
,
[rv.J :23]"
"
'1'<1 ~~
f.j;
,
+11~mil
.
'~
l;~rCfClO'l
<rT<r~,
'C[
ES AND MOODS
]erits caused by
le, experiencing
n untouchable".
t . 6.146.
([~T
"'1 'l1'1'I([T
Jj]~B: I O(;:r;:i
;:r
d some demerit
z Vyasa has den the Rataftjala
be very slight
)t rid of, and is
te merit [of the
erit," etc.
the Y.S. ILl3
lis statement is
; no elaboration
on is obviously
i ;<[1re:,;q;:O(;q: I '13
1 <IS([~~~T3-
i'[
:rr~ 1 ~ej~ ~ 1
-,'
fTo(T'~'n"r;ql<:Hjlto( ~.
!fB: 1
[It
' .
~1iw<m:
'
is to be]
:merit resulting .
'e is no inc! inaso there would
t which results
1] that [act] is
e exertion etc.
SECTION FOUR
187
[involved in any sacrifice] , it. does not cause [one to turn away from
the act]. It is with tjlis in mind thllt [thetea,cherPaiicaikhasaysj
svalpa1.i'very little.' And the slightness [of the sin I:esultipg from
such acts is known] from the teaching, "Hence, killing at a sacrifice
is not killing". For [l&.ere] the [particle] nan has the meaning 'slight',
as in anudma kanya 'a girl with no (i.e. a small) belly'. Nor should
one, by way of doubting [this view1loint, say the following] : Let it
be stated, on the basis of the same reason [- the same teaching] , that
no sin [is involved] in that [sacrificial killing]; [this] by taking nan
[to have] the meaning 'absence' as in agha~(/IZz 'no pot' .. For it is
impossible to restrict a general prohibition [against killing] if it is
possible [in such way to maintain its effectiveness].
1. For a discussion of the, ellting of food mixed with poison and
honey, see [IV.B.27].
2. For a discussion on how exertion is not a deterent to performing
a sacrifice, see [IV.B.27], Introduction [1-2].
3. The part of the verse quoted is from Manu. '5.39.
[IV J. 22]
,(t, . . . . ....
<lgfcRrc'1'1T'lT<'fm'<"Rl'1T,
([~~l;o(<fu:r <IS<Of9i;;Q"lT<J:. I
This is
.,.
._-----
----~~--~-~------
188
acceptable if indeed the heaven is greater than the sin which results
from killing [in a sacrifice]. .But. what is the authority for this?
[This objection IS not to be made], since the answer has already been
given [namely, that the statement ~asmiid yajiie vadho'vadhaf;, provides this]. Moreover, from the fact that the expiatory rite for the
sin resulting from the killing of an animal [at a sacrifice] is accomplished with an extremely small expenditure of money and effort,
one infers that the sin to be eliminated by it is also very slight. And,
since the ~acrifice itself is accomplished with great expenditure of
money and effort, one assumes that the heaven which results from
it is [also] great.
flV.J.24 1 3FT \l:'iT:a-i:t"f~Cf,"'fi<'ll'l'-m",,1't s<ft;:itTit~~'Il?J1 n'fIJf1iffl:qT~~lfu:':"!1
:t;:~\'fIU
CI",,!
~fcrT-:lIJf1R~q'll'ii\cn I
....
r-. ,......
"!~'fi<'lT;:a~W<f<;qql'Qre~''fHl::
<rol;:Cf<TCff~"lfu:'Jfi'l:(Glq'f;B~
I a:rCf \l:'f
,.....
(I
:--. ...
'HfI~~l:ql'1'RT'lo:;q
SECTION FOUR
[IV J. 2513i<:PTT ~
f;r~f,
Alternately, let
pectively from the Sl
Nevertheless, the inc
[that person's] desi
just as [a person] h
.cause he sees a desi
desirable results] .
]. Previously it w:
sacrifice must bi
the demerit prot
. Now it is said 1
ment that, the
still no difficult
particular result
. is desired, there
by the killing a
actions are brol
though he know
because of his d .
deed (d.' f;rfil
there will be su
instigated to pe:
can be obtained
[IV J. 26]
3i<f \l:'f
1'lllf'f~
\l:'1 c"!q
3TIB+1'l'l
fq~: I
;r~:
.~
It is for this re
[act involving actm
in the eleventh [bot
on their desires] do
the drinking of liqw
SECTION FOUR
[IV J. 25]
f'
'""
r-
[Cf1 \[tl1l'<;;;"'1ql'r'f,"'~
. q~fu@:q1~:q;:r~q
I killing of animals
tied the stream of
as befalling Indra
n wheri they were
ices. The coming
:c. in the sacrifice,
of the sacrifice is
is said in the re~ even in heaven,
'uit to be wori*by
There are; in the
b.u~a etc. who.got
otminga hundred'
lii fruit of'; these.
free thes~ p~bpl;
when. they were
IS such as RiivaQ.a
itya, this trouble
, sacrifices i5 to be
curred by killing
189
f<\~fu9CI:.l
Alternately, let the happiness and suffering [which result respectively from the sacrifices and the killing involved in it] be equal.
Nevertheless, the inclination [to perform] is justified on account of .
[that person's] desire for such [fruit which results from'the act] ,
just as [a person] is inclined [to perform] a prohibited [action, be:
.cause he sees a desirable result arising from it in addition to undesirable results] .
]. Previously it was stated that the happiness resulting from' the
sacrifice must be so great that the small suffering resulting from
the demerit produced by sacrificial killing cannot be a deterent.
Now it IS said that, even if it is supposed for the sake of argument that, the happiness and the suffering are equal, there is
still no difficulty in justifying the inclination to act. If that
particular result which could be got from that particular sacrifice
. is desired, there will be inclination in spite of the suffering caused
by the killing of animals involved in that sacrifice. Prohibited
actions are brought in as an example. lust as a person, even
. though he knows that adultery leads to hell, is still .inclined to it
because of his desire for the kind of happiness derived from thiil
deed (cf. f<\f';r~ ~'l~: ~RI~<!T
[IV.B.16] ) knowing that
there will be suffering caused by sacrificial killing, will still be
instigated to perform a saqifice by his desire for heaven which
can be obtained with the aid of a sacrifice.
[IV J. 26]
It is for this reason that the discerning do not accept that thi~
[act involving actual harm] is of the highest kind. Hence it is said
in the eleventh [book] of the Bhiigavata: '[The foolish men bent
on their desires] do not know that their own duty is pure, since [not
the drinking of liquor, but] the smelling of liquor is enjoined; [that]
190
SECTION FOUR
f;'j121~
'
[IV. J. 29]
l:Ri %,,:
1'1
>..:;J
lol~: 'U
Ql;<iT"'f' "
WRl"<'!f
As to [the follo
viidas convey the p
require these [in ore
worthiness] consist~
great.iy undesired re,
worthiness]. There
ot.her way, it is not j
also this" [praisew(
simultaneous applic~
in effect, a person is
able]. It has alreal
of not entailing sO!
by lIN] because [it
act which produces g
for through [the he:
will produce bad r
quite well denote t
without any accoml
act]. Thus the folle
[IV. J. 30]
q~;:''1li
~~q,'19i
..... _ . -
---------------------
.j
SECTION FOUR
belongs to him] , there is no lack in the sacrifice. It has been perfonned as instigated."
1. If hilJZsa is thus. said to cause demerit even in the sacrifice, this
will cause a fault in the sacrifice. To this objection, the answer
is given that the fault lies with the man, Le., the performer of
the sacrifice, and not with the sacrifice. The sacrifice thus should
be considered complete and fulfilLed.
2. The section calledkantmdhikara1}G is on M.S. III.4.4.12-13.
[IV. J. 29]
fcli':r: lITf'i:aol
i't<lll~:i f'f~: I
5.1S.
q1q;:r ~<;q: >!<<;~g I
IN'f,~ot 'l1Z,;!~C!+J:. I
Sf,<l\>;Cl'f ~!1u;q 'l?TT-
CfT ferfClf<rl1Cl'l"I:
SIC!
1l;'!T;:<:j~.'l"'fT?Il'f
WRI<'Ir"~ lJi~'l"qm"~T:1>:!TPl;:r: I
amediately fcHows
3F'l"~RH'l1'11<J:: I
cr;'l"T;:<:j?TT~m(F~Hr: I
r~~'!'Rl'~!l:~lT:" ~Ci
q~ ~~f.<I f<I~o"lT:
;a I
191
As to [the following claim]. It is established for all that arthamidas convey the praiseworthiness of sacrificial injunctions, which
require these [in order to instigate one to action]. And. that [praiseworthiness] consists in [the sacrificial act] not being followed by
greatiy undesired results, since nothing else can. [constitute this praiseworthiness]. Therefore; since [that praiseworthines] is got in some.
other way, it is not [assumed] that [iIN which denotes] vidhi denotes
also this' [praiseworthiness). Nor, [consequently], is there any
simultaneous application of an injunction and a prohibition [so that,
in effect, a person is not subject to sin]. That [view is] riot [acceptable) '. It has already been noted [see IV.B.27] that [the property
of not entailing something greatly undesired need not be denoted
by liN] because [its effect namely, the instigation of a person to an
act which produces good results, not bad ones] , is' otherwise accounted
for through [the hearer's] great aversion [to perfonn an act which
wil! produce bad results for him]. Moreover [the affix lIN] can
quite well denote that [an action) quickly produces results, this
without any accompanying praiseworthiness [as a qualifier of the
act}. Thus the followers of Sailkhya and Yoga.
[IV. J. 30]
I "~'if~t~
192
<{~'F!lj<!t'fq"('H
~1!!1<'fffi<Wau'Fj;~:\.9lT~'li:;:'-.91~<'l+Ifq-
SECTION FOUR
denotation of an injun
along with the propert
absolutely unavoidable.
denoted [by IIIV] : the r
feasibility, and the actl
along with the propert
unavoidable]. Thus, il
of generating an undesi
properties n1entioned al
junction, the property
undesired goal [is signi
does not operate in the
the sacrifice of an anim
In the case of the sye
being means to a desir
rehited to [the act, not
without causing stifferi
meaning of the injunct
1. syena is a sacrifi(
is to achieve the
. sacrifice does ach
former is hell. ~
causing undue sui
2. I have accepted t:
rather than grrr'!'1
3. I have accepted t
of the Bombay (
of the Benares ec
[IV. J. 32]
gr~,fqr;
;;Jrl;fl
a&:
<'!lq~: I
'>\111 ij:{r.'l'i
~!i!~'Iia~
1l;<TBf ~'I~
CTG:l<Ua<l<P
befalls a person
been
noted that,
.
liS that] the prohi;pect to sacrifices].
[statePlents] that
in is small. [Once
,ch as na hit}'lsyiit] ,
1 killing is like any
in respect to that
s by the principle
useless for her to
)n the prohibition
Dm killing, not to
Irtly [subject to]
1
IS
~<r,qf+rn\,q'<ir,l:f]f<t;r<i
~frr1?!'5Irf'-li<'!~a t
iWa f.ii!l'<i: Wlacr ~Rr
principie~ dra~n
.nM'I;~JP31;;r.:r'-li<'!+!fct
J93
SECTION FOUR
i
II
I;
Il;tl~ ~lR!ll;jrf<'!t,Rt-
[IV. J. 32]
'5I"'l<'1 (!"[l;;<r~fQ ~;;rl .n;:r~~'11~f!9i";;(;:<r~l.O,-! <IF<lD<r9i. ,qiq~: I ~Q'Ilr.<r<r (!~Rt ~;;r I ~ 9ilfW-ti<i~f;:<l'lf<;le;'i
..
<-.
..~.
..-.----~-,
..
194
(f[UJo:rr~'li~'Cf,~ql'.r~qflq:q~:<arjr.:f.f,''1B{
"f.<'i'r~ sfrt
tf'i'l1'( fEi,:q~fi';qlil<n~inq~: I B'IiOl~qflq'1'f;~:~n"l~<i "'f ;:r
'<'1Tmmi:l sqlrq for<,,'<l<nlil: ,,'11'( I ~"I1~1'1~?~n"lit'lli ~I~i'i'li'i'i_
SECTION FOUR
"
has an eye dlsease-.
unjustified. In a pn
sure, possible [to say
of not producing hel
immediately discernil
tions, as are stated in
purpose, so that it is I
{of- the property of
view] ; the meaning {
1. for (f), d. sabc
fIV. J. 33[
Cf~g;<;ag;
s:fcr Wi.!",
;;{r"qrr.rrq
9ii;r.'.{(f
"Z'
<m:l'1Tt+l1
l!v~qq~
Actually, even i
11
'ii<O~l1a:r1t SJq
<i;F-rnlW'l',2t;:r
fe1~1P~-
considered. It is
dable. How, then,
fN] ? [The IvllowIt constitutes' being
unavoidable ",hich
is desired. [if one
result. It follows,
ihmmJa is, [though
e] this is unacceptoccurs only where
.lded by the desired
llxlship is unavoided results ar~' "O'ot] ,
,sary to perform a
rence the meaning
! rm such sacrificial
f., mavoidable which
,; Iits are achieved] ,;~k
tle desired result is
'hichprecedes the
knowledge which
that the act is a
which lead to unpurpose in one's
of an injunction.
to action, it will
act which can be
ley and effort but
;his is not accept!
SECTION FOUR
195
nV. J. 33(
Cf~g;>;(Tg; ~i.t;r (T"T >:i'r\f.lS'Jq "IFf ;r cr~l ~tSf: <! Q;'I ll'laa;rp:r
~fct f<!~wn~f'i:<f'll~q<i f.p;1:f,i7.+( I ;:r ~<i ;;;'-llfctffillF:ft <mi~{1I
;;j;:'lQl'n'l''lT fu!!l;:rltlll~'l'lq'~mT1D<:Ilfl'l' ~it,q'<il<1fT~T o:rf'i:<I:
'Il~r."I(T ~fct 'IT'Oll+( I mIlfT~~(p1i[Tr.mmlif~sfcr m[<T+l<fetoftlliro-
~l'll<+lrs,~
<l'1<'IR'l'~
";l:Ii"li;o~;;~mm~
tll::<lTmtJ
ll~~qq~~~lifTqq(rii(T''1m: I
196
who does not have such an aversion is inclined to act, .not any other.
Thus it is fruitless to imagine that kind of denotative function for
injunction. [Objection]: Since there is the difficulty that there will
be the demerit caused by killing animals in Jy~toma etc., the leaders
of wciety would not be inclined to perform it. It is in order to
avoid this difficulty that we assuine a denotative function for the
generation of the desired goal etc. [without causing any suffering
that is not absolutely unavoidable]. [Answer]: This should not
be said. It has been described many times that even the inclination
of the great is justified in actions such as satz, committing ritual suicide
in the confluence of the three rivers, and in the Sarvasvara sacrifice,
of which giving the oblation of oneself is one of the parts~ Although
[these] cause such a tremendously undesired thing as death, [there
is inclination] because of- the intense desire for the fruit.
1. tatha bodhane'pi. If ;:r..a~:>.:f.!;~:~:;nN'f,~?~IHi;:r'f,'9~
[IV.J,3]
is denoted by a Vedic injunction.
2. This is the same argument as was PUt forward in [IV.B.29j.
3. .On Sarvasvarayajiia, see M.S., X.2.23.
[IV. J. 34]
[V. I]
05Ts~hlli'[ I ITT
"05T~ 'q" ~i
~?11~ ~11:r~
What is more, even in this way, one cannot obtain the relaxation
of the prohibition. As in the case of the syena sacrifice, it is possible
to justify the operating of the injunction by means of [the assump
tion that here the optative ending] denotes merely the property of
being the means to a desired end, and feasibility; This in accord with
the prohibition .. The contradiction of a part of the [negative] in
junction in the case of the prescribed killing is not much compared
to the contradiction by which the prohibition would not take effect
at all. These things should be taken into consideration by the
learned.
1. This is the final refutation of the view put forward in [IV.J,31].
~-- .. ~
SECTIQNFIVE
(V. 1 1
lrd in [IV.B.29].
ffi~ "efl3f'r~;pz1iIT~;rCcf- '"
~~~<!t ~~<!~if.
lR!if. ~rlfG: ~~-
_.
,',"
"
..".--
. .
'~;.:"
"','
"
.::"
------
....
_-_.
SECTION SIX
[VI. 3]
",'1i
('I)
[VI. 2]
Today
Exclusive of today
I
I
I
,---.---'----!
past
~
future
x
I
past
v
~'-T!jlil: I ~
"31~" ~~T
R'ilf'iffm'ff fq"
[Now the author]
'in the sense of past in ,
occurs under the head
'became, happened'. R
being the counterpositi'
And this is in no way
so that, even when a I
pot came into being'.
1. The property of 1
absence existing nc
which is the locus '
.:.
~.
"lCll1VI~<R=rqfcr<!T!l'r~
by anac.ti6n whit
ab~end~ existiI1gin
, .I
.'
(I
~~:$tt< t:.'-~
SECTION SIX
]VI. 1]
r-, .
. l",;S;oq;:nil: I
I
future
x
~ts~o:.' c(jJilbe
which is the (ocus (
It is the action of!
[VI. 51
~>:f!jlil:
~~: L <!'
w;f%i'! '1l"l:
19!}
SECTION SIX
[V 1. 3]
~~ II (~)
members] marked
following senses :
yesterday; [when].
tion is referred' to]
/{here [two actions
oes not [actually]
past and [to the]
Thus IAN denotes
1S instigation, and
.lit ~"~ ~'I1<J:. I
not inclusive' of
he user of the form'
ldytAtane Zan.
;t
_:.cl
live of today
I
I
-I
future
x
lpplication.
. [Now the auth~i'] states the meaning of lIN, [with the words]'
'in the sense of instigation etC:, on the strength of the [Pa1,linian]
rule vidhinimantra:::za . .. etc. By the word 'etc.', the meaning 'wish'
taught by [the rule]' aS4z [inlotau is also included.
1. vidhinimantra~ziimantraniidhi~aSa1!lpras.napriithamu liM
P. III.3.161 and P. III.3.173.
2. Since a whole long section has already been spent, under the
heading lET, to discuss the meaning of lIIV, it is not necessary
to elaborate here.
[VI. 4]
[Now the author] states the meaning of IUd'\[, [with the words]
'in the sense of past in general', on the strength of the rule lwi, which
occurs under the heading bhute. For example, [the form] abhut
. 'became, happened'. Here. [by] pastneBs' [is meant] the property of
being the counterpositive of consequent absence at the present time.
And. this is in no way incOJ;npatible. with the action .lin question],
so that, even when a pot actually exists, one says [correctly] 'the
pot came into being'.
1. The property of being the counterpositive of the consequent
absence existing now, has to belong. to action, and not to that
which is the locus of that action. Thus what is really meant is'
qr111~~.re1Tfci';i'rm~<mfflImir ~''f+!.1 Pastness is characterised'
by an action which is the countetpOsitive of the' conseq)rent .'
. ab2ence existing in the present. '){i$' due <to.t~is thaI Uie usage ....
~TS'li,<I:.
can he calIedcorrect,eyen.whenthepot in; Cjllest ion,
which is the locus of'the action of becoining'kstill
existence. .
It is the action of becoming which is past.... '
.
in
[VI. 5 1
200
. [Now the author] states the meaning of llJ!=l, [with the words]
'when there is' etc. [The words] 'in the past and also in the future'
are to be understood qS 'in the instances where there is the relationship of cause and effect etc: Thus, the import is that in the instances
where there is the relationship of cause and effect and it is understood that the action does not take place, llJN is to be [introduced].
1. The Pal).inian rules in question are as follow: ~~f;rrn'if ~
f,j;'1T1~1
P. IlL3.I3S, and ~Q;~Q;+!(llffl~,
P. IlL3.I56.
[VII. I]
<!;:~oi ~>.Ti'i~
CItfu ~'${ I '
in
'.
"<'-.
[VII. 2 I
~~ oo~f
<l Q; OJ"fu;qR
;',-
."
SECTION SEVEN
[VII. 1]
use
[VII. 2]
202
SECTION SEVEN
t;~v;rt
Sfi<lR!<JHi
111+rh:r'liT~fl:l~;
The determinant 0
discussed) is the order
sakas refer to lET alon
1. If the I-members I
Fan.ini gives them
follows: UT . (F
(P. III.3.l3), IU'!
justified on the ba~
the I-members witl:
order has been dete
I (lIT), U (IUT),
accepted order. Tl
'the fifth l-membeI
there is no confus
II ~>.
,_..............................
,j
~ENSES
:'li>rf~~<IT qr~<I:. I
1 q"{ q;r 05fSuTT OJ
i'!~ '"l1N'li ~<[~RuTi't
203
SECTION SEVEN
AND MOODS
~~OJ .
.e meanings' is not
Advaitadipik,a - by Nrsimhasrama, with a commentQry by Naraya\1asrama, ed; Madanmohan Pathak andG. S. Nene, Reprint
from Pandit, Varanasi, 1919.
A.loka - by ]ayadevamisra, see TattcaCin.
Anuvyakhyana - by A.nandatirtha on B.S., ed. not indicated,
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A.pastamba Dharmasiitra - ed. Umesa Candra Pandeya, Kashi
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A.pastamba Srautasiltra - ed. Chinnasvami Shastri, Gaekwad's
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Arthasarp.graha -' by Laug;ak~ibhaskara, ed. Shivaram Mahadeo
Paranjape, with translation and commentary in Marathi,
Nirnayasagar Press; Bombay, 1927. [ArthaSaJl1.j',
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Nirnayasagar Press, 'Bombay, 1954.' [P.]
AvaLayana Srautasiitra - ed. Mangaladeva Sastri, 'The Princess of
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[AsvasS.]
Balamanorama -'by Vasudeva DIk9ita on S.K., edd. Giridharasarma
Caturveda and Paramesvarananda Sarma, Motilal Benarsidas,
4 vols., Delhi, 1958. [BalMa.]
BmgavatapureI;ta - ed. not indicated, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay,
1950. [BMgP.]
BhagavadgIta - [BhagGL]
BMmati - ' by Vacaspatimlsra on S.B., ed. Artantakrsna Sastri
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'
"
Nlrnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1938. [BMm.]
Bhskarodaya -.' by Laiq;nii:ilrsirnha Siistri onT.S,ed. MukUndJha
- Nirnayasagar Pniss, Bombiry, 1933. tBha~k.Y "'.',
'
.
_'.
'.
,.)
. ' .,','
. . -,
"
Bhattacintlim1m).i - by
khamba Sanskri'
{BhattaCin.]
,Bmttad[pika - byKJ
and Vasudeo
Ll-lII.3], Nirm
Bhlittadipika - by I
Sastri, 4 vols:; l\t
1952-57. [Bhatt:
Brahmasiitra - by I
Bhiimati. lB.S.]
Brahmasutrabhlisya
-'.
.
.
. -'
, Tattvadipikaby
Bharata Madhv:
Brhatparasarasmr. ti
[Br.ParaS!!1.]
Darpai~a
- by Hariva
, and the commen
, Adarsa GranthaJ
Didhiti - by Raghiih;
skrit Seri es 197(
Gadiidhari - by Gad(
Sanskrit Series",
Hiranyak~~i Satya~\lh
aiJd Shankarsast:
190732. [HiraJ;l:
J agadisi - ori Didhiti,
. [Jag.]
JaiininiyanyayamaIa '~
Sanskrit Series 1
Jaiminiyanyayamiiliivi~
Kalpatamparimala -'
see ,Bhamati. II
Kiirikavali with MukU
205
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ra Pandeya, Kashi
DhS.]
Shastri, Gaekwad's
;.]
;hivaram Mahadeo
in Marathi,
haSal11:]
'ana Rama, Acarya,
~n~ary
BhiihacintamaJI.li - by Giagabhatta, ed.' Suryanarayan Sukla, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, reprint 25 ,and 27, Varanasi, 1933.
{BMttaCin.j
, Bhl:it~ad'ipika - by Kh~9.adeva on M.S., edd. Anantakrsna Sai;tri
and' Vasudeo Laksmanshastri Panshikar, [from M.S.,
I.l-lII.31, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1921. [BhattaDi.]
Bhiittadipikii - by Kh~9adeva on MS., ed. S" Subrahmanya
Sastri, 4 vols., Madras University Sanskrit Series 19, Madras,
1952-57. [BhiittaD'i.j
Brahmasutra - by 'BadarayaI).a, with four commentaries, see
Bhiimat'i. [B.S.]
Brahmasiitrabhii9ya - by Aanandatirtha, ,with the commentary
, Tattvaliipikaby Trivikrama Pmy;lifa, ed. not indicated, Akhiia
Bharata Madhva Hahamandala, Udupi, 1958.
Brhatpar.asarasmr,ti
Bombay Sanskrit' Series 1893-1919
[l3;rParaSrp..l
DarpaI)a - by Harivallabha Siistri on V.B.S., with text of V.B.S.,
, and the cominentary Prabhii by Balkrsna Pancoli on V.B.S.,
, Adarsa Granthamala 2, Varanasi, 1947. [Darp.]
,
Dldhiti - by Raghtinatha siroma1).i on TattvaCin, Chowkha Sanskrit Series 1970.
Gadadhari - by Gaddhara Bha\taciirya on DIdhiti, Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Series, Benares 1970 [Gada.].
'
Hiranyak~i Satyii~9.ha srautasutra -
,dd. Giridharasarma
MotHal Benarsidas,
sar Press, Bombay,
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iskj' , , , ,_
206
Mima'q1sakoSa -. ed. I
[M.K.]
Mimatp.sanyayapralm:Sl
sastri Abhyanb
Government Or
Oriental Resear'
Mimfup.sanyayapral,ii,S,
Sastri, Kashi Sl
Mima.'P-sasiitra - by .
varttika and Tu
Sastri, Anandai
[M.S.]
Nllakal)c1;hi - by Nilal
daya. [NiKa.]
Nirukta - by Yaska
and Prakrit Seri
Nyllyakosa - by Bhi
sastri Abhyank;
Bhandarkar Ori,
Nyayamaiijarl - by .
.
106, second edil
Nyayaratnamala - b:
Ramanujaoarya,
Nyayasudha - by JaJ
Khuperkar Sast
Paramalaghumaiijii~
.
Kalikaprasad S
Series 7, Barod:
Paribha~endusekhara
.
Vasudevasastri .
darkar Oriental
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5. Jetly, Gaekwad's
not indicatea, Jain
1908. [KriyaRaSa.]
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;h six commentaries,
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t~ tical
I
'.
:aiSa.J
'. Ganapati Sastri,
m, 1913. [Mart;liDa.]
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Iwkhamba Sanskrit,
[M.K.]
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Gaekwad's Oriell
T'antraratna - by Pal
Tantra\~rttika .
[TantraVa.']
Tarkasamgraha - by
Y. V. Athalye, ;
tion and transl~
Prakrit Series 5!
Tattvacintamani _. b:
Mathuranlitha,
nath Tarkavagi:
908, 91-, 918,!
sabdakh81).Qa, v
Tattvacintamal).irahas~
[TattvaCinRa.]
Tup\ika - by KumaI
Uddyota -
by Nages
209
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:, Rohatak, 196263.
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[IILl7] jed. KA.
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l.14) , ed. L. A. Ravi
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[sastraD~.]
- ----.---_ ..
'~'~---'---.--.------'---
.. -'
.... -
.-- ..
_-..--
210
MOOD~
Vaiyakaral)abhil~a,i).a
Yogasutra - by Pataiijal
harananda Ayany~
[YogBha.]
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Nirnayasagar Pres
Yuktisnehaprapiira:l).l -'
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sphota-nirl).aya ,
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Matilal Bimal Krishr
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211
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---------------~------
212
SELECTIVE
I~
.Indian Philosophical
Ig, The Adyar Library
,ntence and its Parts,
69.
,rbs d'apres les GramC.C.X.V.III, fasc. 3,
leSa of Bhartrhari's
:ary, translated from
11 Benarsidas, Delhi,
)emantics,' Journal of
icutta, vol. 13; 1926.
III
'.
-----~-----~-----~
~~-~-~~---------------------------
214
cik!ir~25,
93, 96
dharmin 22
dhatu 29
dhlitvartha 52, 75, 117, 141
dhva;qlsa 77, 199
dravyatva 143, 144
dvara 29, 104
dvesa 18, 38, 39, 101, 103, 191,
193, 195
dyotakatva 8, 52, 54, 56, 63, 64
dyotya 6, 7, 52, 53, 56, 63
gurudharma 46, 48, 133
him.sa 43, 169, 170, 174, 177-189
hitasadhanatva 32. 95
icchia 21, 25, 93, 98,99, 111, 112,
119-21, 131, 189
icchatva 161
i~ta 33, 34, 100
istadevata 33, 82
istasadhana 20, 33, 77
istasadhanatva 20, 21, 23, 29,
.. 32, 33, 35-8, 41, ~-5, 79,
81, 86, 88-92, 97,' 98, 102,
104,111,120,121,127,128,
132,161,162,166,167,192,
196
i~otpatti 192, 193, 195
itikartaryata 26, 28
janaka 103
janakiivighataka 102, 103
janyatiivacchedaka 138
janyatva 138, 143
jati 6, 132, 136, 142-4
jmna 20, 68, 93, 98, 111, 121,
160
jffiipaka 71
kala 10, 15, 52, 60, 64,65, 67 .
kaiaiija 24, 37, 162,' 165, 167,
190, 194, 195
kalavibhaga 13
karaka 6, 43, 70
kararia
131 .
. 27, 43, 44,.130,
.
nn
:00'
28,92
215
.~---~--.----
216
. savi~ayatva: 68
siddhadhartna 23
sthanin 3
sthitalaksana 1
sUP 202' '.
taddhita 173
takrakClUJ;lc;iinyanyaya 10, 55, 64 .
tatparya 8, 54, 107, 108, 131
tatparyagrahaka 8, 54, 165
tatparyagrahakatva 8, 54
tatprakhyadhikaraJ).a 183
tiD. 4, 128, 129
tiiltva 92,93
tiP 3
Triv[ccarvadhikarat,lanyaya 179, 171
tumUN 77
upadana pramal,la 32, 40, 107,
109 .
upalak~al).a: 76
upaya 20, 21
upayeccha 25
utpadyatva 8
. va<;akatva 53, 62, 63
v;acya 6, 7, 52~4, 56, 63, 64, 129 .
v;acyatva55,56, 58,64,79,113,
114, 116
.
vaijatya 45, 47, 48, 132, 133,
138, 142, 143,148,151, 152,
154, i55, 157-9
.
vaktrabhipraya 161
vaktrbuddhivi~ayatva '34, 100,'
119
vakyase~a 170, 171
.. '
vyakti 6
.
!
. vyapaka 34, 100, 140
. ~.
vyapa:ra4, 7, 1.0' 17, 20, 25, 26,
28-30,57-61,.69,71,79, 104 I
vyaparasantana 10, 11, 56!8
vY1apti 136, 137, 142
vya~ya 34, 84, 100
\
vyatrreka 1:, 62, 97, 102, 137,
138, 140, 146, 149, 166
,
vyatirekavyabhicara 132
yacitama'l;lc;iananyaya 68
yogyata 40, ~36
.
yogyatavacchedaka 40, 108~ 114
I
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I
I
..
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