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and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. his
bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement
pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule above cited, which are
now pending appeal before this Court where the accused is still on
provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused, within
ten (10) days from notice, to the court of origin. The bondsman,
thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which
the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court.
2) RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau
of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain
under confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period
of ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be
issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be
dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he
shall be to have jumped bail.
In the cases at bar, appellant was charged in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 37, in three cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 2 and two cases of estafa. 3 These cases were jointly tried and a
decision thereon was rendered by Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez on March
12, 1991. 4chanrobles virtual law library
On the three cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, appellant
was convicted and sentenced to a total penalty of two years of
imprisonment and to pay a total fine of P96,290.00.
On the two indictments for estafa, in Criminal Case No. 86-51209 she
was found guilty and sentenced to twenty-two years of reclusion perpetua
with its accessory penalties, to indemnify the complaining witness in the
sum of P80,540.00 and to pay the costs; and in Criminal Case No. 8651210, she was likewise convicted and imposed an indeterminate
sentence of six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, together with the accessory penalties, as well as to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P15,750.00 and to pay the costs.
Elevated to the Court of Appeals for appellate review, said cases were
It will be observed that Article 27 of the Code 7 provides for the minimum
and maximum ranges of all the penalties in the Code (except bond to keep
the peace which shall be for such period of time as the court may
determine) from arresto menor to reclusion temporal, the latter being
specifically from twelve years and one day to twenty years. For reclusion
perpetua, however, there is no specification as to its minimum and
maximum range, as the aforesaid article merely provides that "(a)ny
person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after
undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of
his conduct or some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief
Executive as unworthy of pardon."chanrobles virtual law library
The other applicable reference to reclusion perpetua is found in Article 70
of the Code which, in laying down the rule on successive service of
sentences where the culprit has to serve more than three penalties,
provides, that "the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not
be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most
severe of the penalties imposed upon him," and "(i)n applying the
provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetual)
shall be computed at thirty years."
The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua,
therefore, is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict's
eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the
service of multiple penalties. Since, however, in all the graduated scales
of penalties in the Code, as set out in Articles 25, 70 and 71, reclusion
perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher to reclusion temporal, it
follows by necessary implication that the minimum of reclusion perpetua
is twenty (20) years and one (1) day with a maximum duration thereafter
to last for the rest of the convict's natural life although, pursuant to
Article 70, it appears that the maximum period for the service of
penalties shall not exceed forty (40) years. it would be legally absurd and
violative of the scales of penalties in the Code to reckon the minimum of
reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years since there would thereby be a
resultant lacuna whenever the penalty exceeds the maximum twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal but is less than thirty (30) years.
On the main issue now, it will be recalled that before the ratification of
the present Constitution on February 2, 1987, the rule on non-bailability
of a criminal offense was singularly in the case of a capital offense where
the evidence of guilt is strong. 8 Thus, as late as the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure effective on January 1, 1985, bail was a matter of
right, except in a capital offense when the evidence of guilt thereof is
strong 9 and, following the traditional concept, a capital offense, as the
term is used in said Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, may be punished with death. 10 Offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua, were accordingly bailable.
With the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution against the imposition of
the death penalty, 11 a correlative provision therein categorically declared
the unavailability of bail to persons charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. 12
Correspondingly, the aforecited Section 3 of Rule 114 was amended to
provide that no bail shall be granted to those charged with "an offense
which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong." 13 There can be no pretense that such unequivocal and
explicit provisions in the Constitution and the Rules of Court would
admit of any exception, qualification or distinction.
With such developmental antecedents, it may not be said that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, a number of whom were lawyers and
who can plausibly be credited even by the censorious with at least a
working knowledge of criminal law and procedure, were unaware of the
felonies under the Revised Penal Code which were already punishable
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and which, with the amendments
introduced by the present Constitution, would become non-bailable
offenses as a consequence. Specifically with respect to the offense of
estafa involved in the present case, the members of the Constitutional
Commission could not have been oblivious of Presidential Decree No, 818,
which took effect as early as 1975 and was given extensive media
coverage at the instance or with the cooperation of the banking
community, providing for the penalty of reclusion perpetua where
bouncing checks of the requisite amount are involved.
For that matter, as will hereafter be demonstrated, there are other
crimes involving government and private funds or property which
theretofore were also already punished with reclusion perpetua. Hence,
under the rule of contemporanea expositio and since the felony of estafa
was not expressly or impliedly excluded from the aforestated provisions
on non-bailability, we see no reason why an accused charged with estafa
punishable by reclusion perpetua should now be given the exceptional and
favored treatment of being admitted to bail. The same may be said of any
accused charged with any offense so punished, whether the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is by direct statutory prescription or is imposed as a
consequence of the interplay of related provisions of the Code.
It is suggested that since estafa is a crime against property and