Surrender of Owners Duplicate (Sec. 107, P.D.

1529)
Toledo Banaga vs. CA (G.R. No. 127941, Jan. 28, 1999)
Facts:
Petitioner Banaga filed an action for redemption of her property which
was earlier foreclosed and later sold in a public auction to the
respondent. The trial court declared petitioner to have lost her right for
redemption and ordered that certificate of title be issued to the
respondent which the petitioner caused an annotation of notice of lis
pendens to the title. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and
allowed the petitioner to redeem her property within a certain period.
Banaga tried to redeem the property by depositing to the trial court
the amount of redemption that was financed by her co-petitioner Tan.
Respondent opposed in that she made the redemption beyond the
period ordered by the court. The lower court however upheld the
redemption and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the
respondents title and issue a new title in favor of the petitioner. In a
petition for certiorari before the CA by the respondent, another notice
of lis pendens was annotated to the title. CA issued a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the execution of the court order. Meanwhile,
Banaga sold the property to Tan in the absolute deed of sale that
mentions the title of the property still in the name of the respondent
which was not yet cancelled. Despite the lis pendens on the title, Tan
subdivided the lot into a subdivision plan which she made not in her
own name but that of the respondent. Tan then asked the Register of
Deeds to issue a new title in her name. New titles were issued in Tans
name but carried the annotation of the two notices of lis pendens.
Upon learning the new title of Tan the respondent impleaded her in his
petition. The CA later sets aside the trial courts decision and declared
the respondent as the absolute owner of the property for failure of the
petitioner to redeem the property within the period ordered by the
court. The decision was final and executory and ordered the Register of
Deeds to reinstate the title in the name of the respondent. The Register
of Deeds refused alleging that Tans certificate must be surrendered
first. The respondent cited the register of deeds in contempt but the
court denied contending that the remedy should be consultation with
the Land Registration Commissioner and in its other order denied the
motion of respondent for writ of possession holding that the remedy
would be to a separate action to declare Tans title as void. In its
motion for certiorari and mandamus to the CA, the court set aside the
two assailed orders of the trial court and declared the title of Tan as
null and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate the title in
the name of the respondent. Petitioners now argued that Tan is a buyer

in good faith and raised the issue on ownership of the lot.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Tan is a buyer in good faith?
Ruling:
The court held that Tan is not a buyer in good faith because when the
property was sold to her she was aware of the interest of the
respondent over the property. She even furnished the amount used by
Banaga to redeem the property. When she bought the property from
Banaga she knows that at that time the property was not registered to
the sellers name. The deed of sale mentioned the title which was
named to the respondent. Moreover the title still carries 2 notices of lis
pendens. Tan therefore cannot feign ignorance on the status of the
property when she bought it. Because Tan was also impleaded as a
party to the litigation, she is bound by the decision promulgated to the
subject of such litigation. It is a settled rule that the party dealing with
a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to
determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect her
interest. She has only to look and rely on the entries in the Certificate
of Title. By looking at the title Tan would know that the certificate is in
the name of respondent. Being a buyer in bad faith, Tan does not
acquire any better right over the property. The adjudication of the
ownership in favor to the respondent includes the delivery of the
possession by the defeated party to the respondent includes the
delivery of the possession by the defeated party to the respondent.

Abad, et. al., vs. Filhomes Realty (G.R. No. 189239, Nov. 24,
2010)
Facts:
Fil-Homes filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners.
Respondent alleged that since 1980, they have made demands for
petitioners to vacate, but they went unheeded. Petitioners countered
that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30
years; and that respondentspredecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas
Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. During the pendency
of the case, the city of Paranaque filed a case of expropriation. A writ of
possession was granted to the city.
The respondent won in the unlawful detainer case, but the RTC
reversed the ruling upon appeal reasoning that there was no
"tolerance" on the part of Respondents. On appeal of the Respondents
to the CA, it upheld the decision of the MeTC. Thus, the current
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioners should be ejected from the premises.
Ruling:
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature,
are not suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite the
pendency of a civil action regarding ownership. In the present case, the
mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings
did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City.Such issuance
was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence
that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the
City's possession of the lots

Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries

of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation
proceedings does not state so.Petitioners cannot thus claim any right
over the lots on the basis of the ordinance. Even if the lots are
eventually transferred to the City, it is nonsequitur for petitioners to
claim that they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries
thereof.For certain requirements must be met and complied with
before they can be considered to be beneficiaries.
Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA is affirmed