Union of India v.

Association for Democratic Reforms

and Another (2002)
Facts
In the earlier case of Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and
Another (2002), the Supreme Court had held that citizens have a right to know
about public functionaries and candidates for office, including their assets and
criminal and educational backgrounds, and found that right to be derived from
the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression. The Parliament
then essentially nullified part of that ruling by amending the Representation of
the People Act so as to require political candidates to disclose certain criminal
records; namely, any charges or convictions for any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more. Moreover, the Act expressly stated that no
candidate could be compelled to disclose any additional information, including
educational qualifications and assets and liabilities, notwithstanding anything
contained in the judgment of any court or directions issued by the Election
Commission (Section 33B).
The petitioner in the instant case, the Union for Civil Liberties (UCL), filed a
petition with the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of Section 33B.
In particular, UCL contended that the provision was arbitrary on its face and
violated fundamental rights of the voters as previously recognized by the
Supreme Court; and that without exercise of the right to know the relevant
antecedents of the candidate, it will not be possible to have free and fair
elections (p. 6). The interveners submitted that the Amended Act was
consistent with the 2002 judgment (p. 6) and that it cannot be held that a voter
has any fundamental right of knowing the antecedents/assets of a candidate
contesting the election (p. 32).
Decision
The Court reiterated the main findings in Union of India v. Association for
Democratic Reforms and Another.
It observed that the judgment in that case was a final decision that had
precedential effect and that, accordingly, Article 19(1) of the Constitution
(freedom of speech and expression) should be interpreted to include a
fundamental right [of the voters] to know relevant antecedents of the
candidate contesting the elections (p. 9). In other words, information to a voter
[] is one facet of the fundamental right [of freedom of speech and expression]
[] (p. 20).The Court ruled that Parliament cannot exercise its powers in
violation of fundamental rights and has no power to declare a courts decision as
void or of no effect (p. 24). Therefore, once the Supreme Court held that a voter
has a fundamental right to know candidates qualifications, this right may be
limited only in cases provided by Article 19(2) of the Constitution (p. 24).The
fundamental right of the voters to know relevant qualifications of the candidate
is independent of any statutory rights under the election law (p. 41); when a
statutory provision violates a fundamental right, such provision must be struck
down (p. 35).
With respect to the relationship between the right to access asset declarations
of the candidates and the right to privacy, the Court emphasized that the right

to privacy is not absolute and a person having assets or income is normally

required to disclose the same under the Income Tax Act or such similar fiscal
legislation (pp. 29-30). This is especially true for candidates for public
offices. Disclosure of asset declarations is the necessity of the day because
of statutory provisions of controlling wide spread corrupt practices (p. 30).
For all of the above reasons, the Court declared Section 33-B of the Amended Act
to be illegal, null and void (p. 41).