IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF MISSOURI

In the Matter of Class of

American Farmers

No. _________

v.
Monsanto Technologies,
LLC.

PRELIMINARY
BRIEF

Katrianna Elizabeth Brisack

Legal Correspondent, PlanetGreen.org
katriannaelizabeth@gmail.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Statement of Facts................................................................3
Grounds for Relief.................................................................3
I. Relevant Patents Limited in Scope...................................6
II. Monsanto in Violation of PVPA.......................................9
III. MT/SA Not a Valid or Enforceable Contract...............10
IV. Monsanto's Monopolization..........................................14
Conclusion...........................................................................16
Appendix I: Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Adkins v. Children's Hospital,

261 U.S. 525.......................................................11
Booth v. Illinois,
184 U.S. 425.......................................................12
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire,
219 U.S. 549.......................................................11
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,
503 U.S. 249......................................................6,8
Crowley v. Christensen,
137 U.S. 89.........................................................12
Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568.......................................................13
Federal Crop Ins. Corp v. Merrill,
332 U.S. 380.......................................................14
Federal Trade Commission v. Algowa,
291 U.S. 67.........................................................16
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S. 561.........................................................6
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
32 N.J. 358.........................................................13
Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366.......................................................12
In re Richardson,
247 N.Y. 401.......................................................16
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11........................................................12
Knoxville Iron Co v. Harbison,
183 U.S. 13........................................................12
Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage,
218 F.5d 7 (2nd Cir.)............................................7
McLean v. Arkansas,

211 U.S. 539......................................................12

Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436......................................................13
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. R. Co,
223 U.S. 1..........................................................12
Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412......................................................11
Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502......................................................11
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
294 U.S. 290......................................................11
Patterson v. Bark Eudora,
190 U.S. 169......................................................12
Pennington v. Coxe,
2 Cranch 346.......................................................8
Schulte Co. v. Gangi,
328 U.S. 108........................................................7
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star,
221 F.2d 189 (2nd Cir.).....................................13
Trailmobile Co v. Whirls,
331 US 40............................................................7
United States v. Goldenberg,
168 U.S. 95..........................................................7
United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
345 U.S. 295........................................................8
United States v. Pulaski Co.,
243 U.S. 97..........................................................8
Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights,
543 F.Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex.)................................4
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379.......................................................12
West Virginia v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624.......................................................12
Wright v. Denn,
10 Wheat. 204......................................................8
Statutes:
7 U.S.C. 2402............................................................9, 17
15 U.S.C. 1, 15....................................................4, 5, 17
18 U.S.C. 241, 1001......................................................5
35 U.S.C. 161, 163..............................................passim
42 U.S.C. 1983................................................................4
UCC 2-303................................................................3, 13

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Monsanto Technology, LLC, is a corporation
organized under the laws of the state of Missouri.
Monsanto is engaged in the development, licensing, and
conditional sale of genetically modified agricultural seeds
in interstate commerce. The natural biological and
chemical makeup of these seeds has been tampered with
in several ways, primarily to increase resistance to insect
pests and Monsanto-made herbicides, and they have been
patented under 35 U.S.C. 161. Monsanto routinely
compels growers of the seeds to sign a uniform
Technology/Stewardship Agreement (MT/SA, the full
text of which is appended below). In the MT/SA, the
farmer agrees (among other things) to limit his use of the
seeds to a single planting, to use only Monsanto herbicides
on his crops, to allow Monsanto unbridled access to his
property and Internet records, to use only Monsantoapproved cotton gins, and not to conduct or allow any
independent studies of the safety or properties of the
genetically modified technology. The MT/SA does not
mention the applicable patent statutes, and there is no
indication that signers are made aware in any way of the
content of those laws. Monsanto holds hundreds of these
contracts, mostly in interstate commerce.
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
There is no dispute that Monsanto is the owner of
the patents controlling the seed technologies it has
developed. However, the MT/SA is an unconscionable
contract under 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and should be nullified as such for the following reasons:
1. In the document, Monsanto materially
misrepresents the scope of its patent under 35 U.S.C.
163.
2. Some contracts go beyond the terms of apposite
statutes, but still meet all the traditional requirements of
voluntary contracts. The MT/SA lacks the requisite
consensus ad idem, however, because of the inherent

inequality of the parties and the signers' lack of familiarity

with the terms of the patent laws, which Monsanto
exploits in the vague terms of the agreement.
Furthermore, Monsanto violated multiple federal
statutes protecting the civil and economic rights of
individuals through its delusory actions:
3. 15 U.S.C. 1 (the Sherman Act) proscribes
every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce. Monsanto's spurious claims as to the compass
of its patent protections resulted in its unlawful
dominance of the agricultural industry. 15 of the same
title entitles persons injured by this wrongdoing to treble
damages and the reasonable costs of the suit.
4. 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
The liberty to reasonably conduct private business without
interference is a right and a privilege under the meaning
of this statute. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights,
543 F.Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex 1982). Monsanto fraudulently
sought to abridge growers' rights to the full enjoyment of
their property and the ability to conduct their business
without undue interference, and is therefore liable under
this law.
Monsanto's conduct was not only duplicitous, it was
felonious under multiple provisions of federal law:
5. 18 U.S.C. 1001 criminalizes the behavior of

Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of

the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by
any trick, scheme or device a material fact; (2)
makes any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation; or (3)
makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.
The inaccurate terms of the MT/SA indicate Monsanto's
intent to mislead its customers as to the reach of its
federal patent rights, and that deliberate deception falls
under this provision.
6. The Sherman Act, supra, declares conspiracy in
restraint of trade to be an offense punishable by fines of up
to ten million dollars and imprisonment of up to ten years.
Monsanto's use of invalid legal reasoning to gain nearly
complete market dominance is incontrovertibly an
unreasonable attempt to restrain trade.
7. 18 U.S.C. 241 prohibits conspiracy by two or
more persons to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,
Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution
or laws of the United States. Monsanto's wholesale
deprivation of growers' civil rights, and their pattern and
practice of resorting to continual harassment and
malicious prosecution to prevent assertion of these rights,
violates this statute.
I. RELEVANT PATENTS LIMITED IN SCOPE
35 U.S.C. 163 simply and conclusively delineates
the significance of a United States plant patent such as
those held by Monsanto:

In the case of a plant patent, the grant shall

include the right to exclude others from asexually
reproducing the plant, and from using, offering
for sale, or selling the plant so reproduced, or any
of its parts, throughout the United States, or
from importing the plant so reproduced, or any
parts thereof, into the United States. (Emphasis
supplied).
This simple statute shows that Congress clearly did not
envision the near-absolute control over agricultural
development now held by Monsanto. As opposed to
granting patent holders free rein, 163 actually strikes a
delicate balance between agribusiness' incentives for new
development and citizens' interest in ensuring that
essential staple foods would not fall under the exclusive
control of a handful of companies or inventors.
Under the plain text of 163, farmers must
purchase new varieties of patented genetically modified
seed from the holder of the patent. However, the use of the
qualifier asexually conclusively indicates that the
legislature intended the natural breeding, saving, and
planting of seeds to remain legal. Any other reading of
these terms would render the word asexually mere
surplusage, and therefore should be rejected. As the
Supreme Court stated in Connecticut National Bank v.
Germain, Courts should disfavor interpretations of
statutes that render language superfluous. 503 U.S. 249
(1992) (see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561
(1995)).
In the context of the 163, asexually is a highly
specific word, and its removal would have no effect on the
clarity or grammatical structure of the sentence. If its
inclusion had been supererogatory, Congress would
doubtlessly have removed it during its 1998 revision of the
section (found at Pub. L. 105289). Instead, it merely
changed a single clause substituted the word include to

shall be of but left asexually in place. This change

could reasonably be interpreted to proscribe other
behavior, such as the artificial replication of a patent
holder's genetic codes by rival companies, but it does not in
any way interfere with an individual's ability to plant
seeds grown in his soil and tended by his hard work. As
was said in Trailmobile Co v. Whirls, 331 US 40 (1947),
The interpretation of statutes cannot safely be made to
rest upon mute intermediate legislative maneuvers.
Not only is Monsanto's crafty construction of this
clear, concise statute a transparently deliberate
misunderstanding designed to enlarge its profits while
unlawfully curtailing traditional farming practices, it is
blatantly inconsistent with accepted interpretation of
American law. As Justice Brewer once wrote for a
unanimous Court:

The primary and general rule of statutory

construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is
to be found in the language that he has used. He
is presumed to know the meaning of words and
the rules of grammar. The courts have no function
of legislation, and simply seek to ascertain the will
of the legislator... No mere omission, no mere
failure to provide for contingencies, which it may
seem wise to have specifically provided for, justify
any judicial addition to the language of the
statute. United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95
(1897)
This plain dictate has been reaffirmed countless times in
the century since. Learned Hand, speaking for the Second
Circuit, wrote in Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage that
laws should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but
with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind
them. 218 F.5d 7 (1914). In Schulte Co. v. Gangi, the
Supreme Court again recognized the importance of these
context clues: For the purposes of judicial enforcement,

the 'policy' of a statute should be drawn out of its terms, as

nourished by their proper environment, and not, like
nitrogen, out of the air. 328 U.S. 108 (1946). In Wright v.
Denn, Justice Story held that the law does not decide
upon conjectures, but upon plain, reasonable, and certain
expressions of intention. 10 Wheat. 204 (1825). In United
States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, Justice Frankfurter
noted that courts should not extrapolate meaning from
surmises and speculation and free-wheeling utterances,
especially... in disregard of the terms in which Congress
has chosen to express its purpose. 345 U.S. 295 (1953). In
CT National Bank v. Germain, supra, it was held that in
interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to
one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time
and again that courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there. And in Pennington v. Coxe, Chief
Justice Marshall set forth the governing rule simply but
conclusively:

That a law is the best expositor of itself... and

that the details of one part may contain
regulations restricting the extent of general
expressions used in another part of the same act,
are among those plain rules laid down by common
sense for the exposition of statutes which have
been uniformly acknowledged. Pennington v.
Coxe, 2 Cranch 346 (1804).
Finally, in United States v. Pulaski Co. , it was held that
there is a strong presumption that the literal meaning is
the true one, especially as against a construction that is
not interpretation, but perversion. 243 U.S. 97 (1917).
That statement seems equally applicable here.
II. MONSANTO IN VIOLATION OF PLANT VARIETY
PROTECTION ACT

7 U.S.C 2402, part of the Plant Variety Protection

Act of 1970 (PVPA), dictates that The breeder of any
sexually reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety
(other than fungi or bacteria) who has so reproduced the
variety, or the successor in interest of the breeder, shall be
entitled to plant variety protection for the variety.
However, this provision is entirely irrelevant to the case at
hand for two reasons.
Firstly, the Act only applies to sexually
reproduced plants. This clearly does not cover the
complex and unnatural process of genetic manipulation or
mutation. From the disparate treatment of sexually
reproduced cultivars entitled to variety protection
certificates and asexually created breeds protected by
plant patents it is evident that the legislature intended
this logical division. Any other reading would render
either the word sexually in the PVPA or the word
asexually in 35 U.S.C. 163 redundant.
Secondly, even if the PVPA does protect Monsanto's
creations to a limited extent, the provision of the MT/SA
proscribing farmers from saving and replanting seed still
vastly exceeds the PVPA's protections. The vast majority
of the soybeans, corn and cotton grown on American farms
is not produced for horticultural purposes, and therefore
2543 states:

It shall not infringe any right hereunder for a

person to save seed produced by the person from
seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained,
by authority of the owner of the variety for
seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the
production of a crop for use on the farm of the
person, or for sale as provided in this section. A
bona fide sale for other than reproductive
purposes, made in channels usual for such other
purposes, of seed produced on a farm either from
seed obtained by authority of the owner for
seeding purposes or from seed produced by

descent on such farm from seed obtained by

authority of the owner for seeding purposes shall
not constitute an infringement.
This unmistakeably protects the right of Monsanto's
customers to continue the traditional propagation of
ancient and basic cultivated crops.
III. MT/SA NOT A VALID OR ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT
In 4(f)-(i) of the MT/SA, all growers of Monsanto
seeds agree:

f. To use Seed containing Monsanto

Technologies solely for a single planting of a
commercial crop, except in the case of
Genuity Roundup Ready Alfalfa where a
single planting may be used for multiple
cuttings.
g. Not to save or clean any crop produced
from Seed for planting, not to supply Seed
produced from Seed to anyone for planting,
not to plant Seed for production other than
for Monsanto or a Monsanto licensed seed
company under a seed production contract.
h. Not to transfer any Seed containing
patented Monsanto Technologies to any other
person or entity for planting.
i. To plant and/or clean Seed for Seed
production, if and only if, Grower has entered
into a valid, written Seed production
agreement with a Seed company that is
licensed by Monsanto to produce Seed.
Grower must either physically deliver to that
licensed Seed Company or must sell for nonseed purposes or use for non-seed purposes
all of the Seed produced pursuant to a Seed

production agreement. MT/SA at 1.

These terms are grounded in the assertion found in section
5(b) of the MT/SA, infra, that Monsanto Technologies are
protected under U.S. patent law. However, Monsanto's
extraordinarily loose construction of these patent laws is
plainly repugnant to their actual meaning. This deceptive
statement appears highly likely to mislead growers as to
the rights they actually retain under the vaguely invoked
laws, and defraud them into waiving liberties they are
unaware they have.
The bare fact that the growers signed the MT/SA
fails to validate its usurious terms. Any threadbare
defense that Monsanto enjoyed an unrestrained freedom to
contract with its growers has been contradicted by the
Supreme Court in its decisions dating back to 1908
(Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412). In Norman v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co., it opined that Parties cannot remove their
transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional
power by making contracts about them. 294 U.S. 290
(1935). In Nebbia v. New York (291 U.S. 502 (1934)), it
wrote that government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows,
thereby sustaining Justice Holmes' 1923 view that

Contract is not specifically mentioned in the text

we have to construe. It is merely an example of
doing what you want to do, embodied in the word
'liberty.' But pretty much all law consists of
forbidding men to do some things that they want
to do, and contract is no more exempt from law
than other acts. Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525.
In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire, it
held: There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to
contract as one chooses... Liberty implies the absence of
arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable

regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of

the community. 219 U.S. 549 (1911). In 1943, it described
American law as a soil in which the laissez-faire concept
or principle of noninterference has withered, at least as to
economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly
sought through closer integration of society and through
expanded and strengthened governmental controls. West
Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. And in 1937, it
enunciated per Chief Justice Hughes:

The Constitution does not speak of freedom of

contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution
does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its
history and connotation. But the liberty
safeguarded is liberty in a social organization
which requires the protection of law against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the people. West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379.
See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, Crowley v.
Christensen, 137 U.S. 89, Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190
U.S. 169,
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. R. Co, 223 U.S. 1,
Knoxville Iron Co v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, Booth v.
Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, and McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S.
539.
Not only is freedom of contract a relative concept,
its invocation requires a valid contract at the very least
and the MT/SA fails to meet that standard. The
requirement that assent to a binding agreement be an
informed and rational choice is one of the oldest and basic
tenets of contract law. A waiver of any protections or
privileges by contract or otherwise, particularly those
economic and social liberties secured by the Due Process

Clause, must be made voluntarily, knowingly and

intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), see
also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961). A
promise or bargain made in the absence of this mutual
educated voluntariness frequently referred to as
consensus ad idem or meeting of the minds is no
contract at all.
This simple rule is not in any way negated by the
rise of mass commercial contracts, such as the MT/SA,
that corporations enter into with hundreds or even
thousands of their consumers. If this new social reality has
any affect on established common law at all, it only
renders the requirement more essential, lest large entities
like Monsanto abuse their inherent advantage in the
bargaining process. As was asked in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors: Where can the buyer go to negotiate
for better protection? Such control and limitation of his
remedies are inimical to the public welfare and, at the
very least, call for great care by the courts to avoid
injustice through application of common-law principles of
freedom of contract. 32 N.J. 358 (1960). See also
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189 (2nd Cir.
1955) (Standardized contracts have been described as
those in which one predominant party will dictate its law
to an undetermined multiple rather than to an individual.
They are said to resemble a law rather than a meeting of
the minds).
These contracts are also deemed unenforceable by
Missouri law, which says that If the court as a matter of
law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract. Uniform Commercial
Code, 2-302. The accompanying official commentary
provides a comprehensive definition of unconscionable:
This section is intended to allow the court to pass
directly on the unconscionability of the contract or
particular clause therein and make a conclusion of

law as to its unconscionability. The basic test is

whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are
so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making
of the contract.
The apposite statutes have remained unchanged since
1998, but Monsanto continues to peddle the MT/SA despite
their unambiguous prohibition of such behavior.
The MT/SA clearly does not meet these
requirements. In a society where criminal suspects must
be diligently educated as to their rights to remain silent
and to the advice of counsel information most Americans
already know any expectation that farmers should be
intimately acquainted with the terms of obscure
legislation seems inconsistent and unreasonable. As
Justice Jackson noted from the bench in Federal Crop Ins.
Corp v. Merrill, No farmer worth his salt would waste any
time reading a dreary publication like the Federal
Register. 332 U.S. 380 (1947). It is doubtful that the
patent laws would be more practical reading material.
IV. MONSANTO'S MONOPOLIZATION
Most cases brought under the antitrust laws require
arduous discovery and a flurry of subpoenas before a
prima facie case of monopolization begins to emerge.
However, the evidence of Monsanto's attempts to restrain
trade is much more publicly available simply enlarge the
fine print of MT/SA from its actual size (at which the
font of the contract is less than one-fifth of a centimeter
high), and the conspiracy becomes clear.
In 4, the farmer agrees to all of the following
conditions, without any ability to bargain or negotiate the
terms of the pact:

d. To acquire Seed containing these Monsanto

Technologies only from a seed company with
technology license(s) from Monsanto for the applicable
Monsanto Technology(ies) or from a licensed companys
dealer authorized to sell such licensed Seed.
e. To acquire Seed only from authorized seed
companies (or their authorized dealers) with the
applicable license(s)...
g. Not to save or clean any crop produced from Seed for
planting, not to supply Seed produced from Seed to
anyone for planting, not to plant Seed for production
other than for Monsanto or a Monsanto licensed seed
company under a seed production contract.
j. Grower may not plant and may not transfer to others
for planting any Seed that the Grower has produced
containing patented Monsanto Technologies for crop
breeding, research, or generation of herbicide
registration data. Grower may not conduct research on
Growers crop produced from Seed other than to make
agronomic comparisons and conduct yield testing for
Growers own use. Monsanto makes available separate
license agreements to academic institutions for
research...
m. Grower agrees... to deliver Genuity Roundup
Ready Flex Pima cotton to an Arizona, California,
New Mexico, or Texas gin that is on Monsantos
approved list...
n. To provide Monsanto copies of any records, receipts,
or other documents that could be relevant to Growers
performance of this Agreement... Such records shall be
produced following Monsantos actual (or attempted)
oral communication with Grower and not later than
seven (7) days after the date of a written request from
Monsanto.
o. To identify and to allow Monsanto and its
representatives access to land farmed by or at the
direction of Grower (including refuge areas) and bins,
wagons, or seed storage containers used or under the
control or direction of Grower, for purposes of
examining and taking samples of crops, crop residue or
seeds located therein. Such inspection, examination or

sampling shall be available to Monsanto and its

representatives only after Monsanto delivers or mails
to the Grower a written notice at least seven (7) days
in advance, and Monsanto also has reasonably
attempted to discuss the visits with the Grower in
advance of the visit.
p. To allow Monsanto to obtain Growers internet
service provider (ISP) records to validate Growers
electronic signature, if applicable. To use on crops
containing Roundup Ready, Roundup Ready 2
Technology, or Roundup Ready Flex only a labeled
Roundup agricultural herbicide or other authorized
non-selective herbicide which could not be used in the
absence of the Roundup Ready gene.

In light of the actual meaning of 35 U.S.C. 163 and

7 U.S.C. 2402, these terms are a flagrant violation of the
Sherman Act and infringement of growers' civil rights. As
was said in Federal Trade Commission v. Algowa, Fair
competition is not attained by balancing a gain in money
against a misrepresentation of the thing supplied. The
courts must set their faces against a conception of business
standards so corrupting in its tendency. 291 U.S. 67
(1934). Monsanto's pattern and practice of thinly disguised
chicanery must be similarly terminated.
CONCLUSION
The MT/SA, though masquerading as an attempt to
ensure the security of Monsanto's scientific innovations, is
actually an exorbitant contract that significantly exceeds
the protection afforded to GMO inventors under federal
law, and therefore should be nullified under the Uniform
Commercial Code. As then-Judge Cardozo said in 1928,
courts should decide cases not [on the basis of] what has
been done under the statute, but what may reasonably be
done under it. In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401. Grave
injustice would inevitably result from allowing Monsanto
to continue mongering their unconscionable agreements,

and therefore the courts must act promptly to prevent the

perpetuation of their patently false claims.
Respectfully submitted,
Katrianna Brisack
katriannaelizabeth@gmail.com

2015

Form Number

MONSANTO TECHNOLOGY/STEWARDSHIP AGREEMENT

(Limited Use License)

PLEASE MAIL THE SIGNED 2015 MONSANTO TECHNOLOGY/STEWARDSHIP AGREEMENT TO: DRC Data Services, Attn: AgCelerate Agreements, 2009 Fourth Street, SW, Mason City, IA 50401

GROWER INFORMATION (please print)

Please complete this section with your business information. To sign this Monsanto Technology/
Stewardship Agreement (Agreement) you must be the operator/grower for all fields that will
grow plants from Seed (as defined below). You represent that you have full authority to and do
hereby bind to this Agreement yourself, all entities for which you obtain Seed, all individuals and
entities having an ownership interest in any entities for which you obtain Seed, and that Monsanto

Company has not barred any of those individuals or entities from obtaining this limited-use
license. Your name must be filled in and must match the signature below. This Agreement
becomes effective if and when Monsanto issues the Grower a license number from Monsantos
headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri. Monsanto does not authorize seed dealers or seed retailers
to issue a license of any kind for Monsanto Technologies.

Growers Full Legal Name (First/Middle/Last)

Farm Business Name

Dr.

Mr.

Mrs.

Ms.

Suffix (Sr, Jr, II, III)

Farm Physical Address (as listed with the FSA)

Growers Mailing Address (no P.O. Boxes)

State

Growers City

Office Phone (include area code)

Zip

State

Farm City

Fax (include area code)

Last Four of Social Security #

XXX-XXCell Phone (include area code)

Role:

Operator

Owner/Operator

Zip

Farm Manager

Other

Email

If the above information changes, Grower agrees to promptly update this information via AgCelerate.com or by calling 1-800-768-6387, option 3.

SEED SUPPLIERS
Business Name
State

City

State

Phone

Area Code

Phone

Zip

Business Name
City

Area Code

Zip

This Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement is entered into between you (Grower) and Monsanto
Company (Monsanto) and consists of the terms on this page and on the reverse side of this page.
This Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement grants Grower a limited license to use Genuity Bollgard II, Genuity
Bollgard II with Roundup Ready Flex cotton, Genuity Roundup Ready Flex cotton, Genuity Roundup Ready 2 Yield
soybeans, Vistive Gold High Oleic soybeans with Genuity Roundup Ready 2 Yield technology, Genuity Roundup
Ready Canola, Genuity Roundup Ready Alfalfa, Roundup Ready Corn 2, Genuity DroughtGard Hybrids with Roundup
Ready Corn 2, Genuity Roundup Ready Sugarbeets, YieldGard Corn Borer corn, YieldGard Corn Borer with Roundup
Ready Corn 2, Genuity VT Double PRO corn, Genuity DroughtGard Hybrids with VT Double PRO corn, Genuity VT
Double PRO RIB Complete corn blend, Genuity DroughtGard Hybrids with VT Double PRO RIB Complete corn blend,
YieldGard VT Rootworm/RR2 corn, YieldGard VT Triple corn, Genuity VT Triple PRO corn, Genuity DroughtGard
Hybrids with VT Triple PRO corn, Genuity VT Triple PRO RIB Complete corn blend, Genuity DroughtGard Hybrids
with VT Triple PRO RIB Complete corn blend, Performance Series Sweet Corn, Genuity SmartStax corn, Genuity
SmartStax RIB Complete corn blend, Monsanto patented germplasm and Monsanto Plant Variety Protection rights
(Monsanto Technologies). Seed containing Monsanto Technologies are referred to herein as (Seed). This Agreement
also contains Growers stewardship responsibilities and requirements associated with the use of Seed and Monsanto
Technologies.

4. GROWER AGREES:
a To accept and continue the obligations of this Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement on any new land
purchased or leased by Grower that has Seed planted on it by a previous owner or possessor of the land; and to
notify in writing purchasers or lessees of land owned by Grower that has Seed planted on it that the Monsanto
Technology is subject to this Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement and they must have or obtain their own
Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement.

1. GOVERNING LAW: This Agreement and the parties relationship shall be governed by the laws of the State of Missouri
and the United States (without regard to the choice of law rules).
2. BINDING ARBITRATION FOR COTTON-RELATED CLAIMS MADE BY GROWER: Any claim, action or dispute made or asserted
by a Grower (or any other person or entity claiming an interest in Growers cotton crop, hereafter Grower) against
Monsanto, or any person or entity involved in the production, development, distribution, and/or sale of the Seed
containing Monsanto Technology (seller), regarding the quality of Monsanto cotton Seed or the agronomic performance
of Monsanto Technology in cotton Seed must be resolved by binding arbitration. The foregoing requirement to arbitrate
specifically excludes any claim, action or dispute involving the infringement, validity, or enforceability of a patent or that
otherwise arises under the U.S. patent laws. As a condition precedent to asserting any claim, action, or dispute regarding
the quality of Monsanto cotton Seed or the agronomic performance of Monsanto Technology in cotton Seed, the Grower
must provide notice to Monsanto pursuant to 10 of this Agreement. After Grower provides that notice, Grower may
request in writing that the parties engage in good faith negotiations, which the parties will undertake within 30 days after
Monsantos receipt of the request. In the event that a claim is not resolved within the 30 days, or after 30 days following
Growers service of a claim notice if Grower does not request negotiations, any party may initiate arbitration. The parties
pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec 1 et seq. and administered under the Commercial
Dispute Resolution Procedures established by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). GROWER MAY ONLY BRING A
CLAIM IN ARBITRATION IN GROWERS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND GROWER WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO DO SO AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OR PUTATIVE CLASS. The arbitration hearing shall be conducted in the capital
city of the state of Growers residence or in any other place as the parties decide by mutual agreement. Grower and
Monsanto/sellers shall each pay one half of the AAA filing fee. Grower and Monsanto/sellers shall each pay one half of
AAAs administrative and arbitrator fees as those fees are incurred. The arbitrator(s) shall have the power to apportion the
ultimate responsibility for all AAA fees in the final award. The arbitration proceedings and results are to remain
confidential and are not to be disclosed without the written agreement of all parties, except to the extent necessary to
effectuate the decision or award or as otherwise required by law.
3. FORUM SELECTION FOR NON-COTTON-RELATED CLAIMS MADE BY GROWER AND ALL OTHER CLAIMS: THE PARTIES
CONSENT TO THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, EASTERN DIVISION, AND THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, (ANY
LAWSUIT MUST BE FILED IN ST. LOUIS, MO) FOR ALL CLAIMS AND DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF OR CONNECTED IN ANY
WAY WITH THIS AGREEMENT AND/OR THE USE OF THE SEED OR THE MONSANTO TECHNOLOGIES, EXCEPT FOR COTTONRELATED CLAIMS MADE BY GROWER. THE PARTIES WAIVE ANY OBJECTION TO VENUE IN THE EASTERN DIVISION OF THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, INCLUDING THOSE BASED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, ON
THE DIVISIONAL VENUE LOCAL RULE(S) OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

b To read before planting and to follow the applicable Technology Use Guide (TUG) and the Insect Resistance
Management Grower Guide (IRM Grower Guide) as may be amended from time to time, which are incorporated into
and are a part of this Agreement. Grower must comply with the requirements set forth in the TUG and the IRM Grower
Guide and is advised to follow the best management practices, recommendations and guidelines provided in those
documents.
c To implement an Insect Resistance Management (IRM) program, if applicable, in accordance with the most recent
IRM Grower Guide and to cooperate and comply with these and any additional IRM programs Monsanto
communicates to Grower.
d To acquire Seed containing these Monsanto Technologies only from a seed company with technology license(s) from
Monsanto for the applicable Monsanto Technology(ies) or from a licensed companys dealer authorized to sell such
licensed Seed.
e To acquire Seed only from authorized seed companies (or their authorized dealers) with the applicable license(s).
f To use Seed containing Monsanto Technologies solely for a single planting of a commercial crop, except in the case
of Genuity Roundup Ready Alfalfa where a single planting may be used for multiple cuttings.
g Not to save or clean any crop produced from Seed for planting, not to supply Seed produced from Seed to anyone for
planting, not to plant Seed for production other than for Monsanto or a Monsanto licensed seed company under a
seed production contract.
h Not to transfer any Seed containing patented Monsanto Technologies to any other person or entity for planting.
i To plant and/or clean Seed for Seed production, if and only if, Grower has entered into a valid, written Seed
production agreement with a Seed company that is licensed by Monsanto to produce Seed. Grower must either
physically deliver to that licensed Seed Company or must sell for non-seed purposes or use for non-seed purposes all
of the Seed produced pursuant to a Seed production agreement.
j Grower may not plant and may not transfer to others for planting any Seed that the Grower has produced containing
patented Monsanto Technologies for crop breeding, research, or generation of herbicide registration data. Grower
may not conduct research on Growers crop produced from Seed other than to make agronomic comparisons and
conduct yield testing for Growers own use. Monsanto makes available separate license agreements to academic
institutions for research.
k To direct crops produced from Seed to appropriate markets. Any grain or material produced from Seed can only be
exported to, or used, processed or sold in countries where all necessary regulatory approvals have been granted.
It is a violation of national and international law to move material containing biotech traits across boundaries into
nations where import is not permitted.
l Pending import approvals in China, Grower agrees not to export Genuity Roundup Ready Alfalfa seed or crops
(including hay and hay products) to China. In addition, due to the unique cropping practices Grower agrees not to
plant Genuity Roundup Ready Alfalfa in Imperial County, California, pending import approvals in China and until
Monsanto grants express permission for such planting. Genuity Roundup Ready Alfalfa seed may not be planted for
the production of sprouts.
m Grower agrees: 1) not to export Genuity Roundup Ready Flex Pima cotton seed, meal, linters, or gin trash to Korea
pending import approval; 2) to deliver Genuity Roundup Ready Flex Pima cotton to an Arizona, California, New
Mexico, or Texas gin that is on Monsantos approved list (available at www.genuity.com under the Commodity
Marketing section of the Stewardship tab); and 3) not to market cotton seed, meal, linters or gin trash from Genuity
Roundup Ready Flex Pima to a third party who may send such products to countries where those products do not
have all necessary regulatory approvals.

THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION FOR COTTON-RELATED CLAIMS PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, 9 U.S.C. 1 ET SEQ., WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES.

[The Agreement continues on the reverse side of this page.]

GROWER SIGNATURE
AND DATE REQUIRED

Name

Date
Distribution: White to Monsanto, Yellow to Dealer, Pink to Grower

7.

n To provide Monsanto copies of any records, receipts, or other documents that could be relevant to Growers
performance of this Agreement, including but not limited to, Summary Acreage History Report, Form 578 (producer
print), Farm and Tract Detail Listing and corresponding aerial photographs, Risk Management Agency claim
documentation, and dealer/retailer invoices for seed and chemical transactions. Such records shall be produced
following Monsantos actual (or attempted) oral communication with Grower and not later than seven (7) days
after the date of a written request from Monsanto.

To obtain additional copies of the TUG or IRM information, contact Monsanto at 1-800-768-6387 or go to
www.monsanto.com. Once effective, this Agreement will remain in effect until either the Grower or Monsanto
choose to terminate the Agreement, as provided in Section 8 below. Information regarding new and existing
Monsanto Technologies, including any additions or deletions to the U.S. patents licensed under this agreement,
and any new terms will be sent to you. If Grower has provided Monsanto an e-mail address in conjunction
with this Agreement, Monsanto may send Agreement updates and new stewardship information to Grower by
e-mail or mail. Continuing use of Monsanto Technologies after receipt of any new terms constitutes Growers
agreement to be bound by the new term.

o To identify and to allow Monsanto and its representatives access to land farmed by or at the direction of Grower
(including refuge areas) and bins, wagons, or seed storage containers used or under the control or direction of Grower,
for purposes of examining and taking samples of crops, crop residue or seeds located therein. Such inspection,
examination or sampling shall be available to Monsanto and its representatives only after Monsanto delivers or mails
to the Grower a written notice at least seven (7) days in advance, and Monsanto also has reasonably attempted to
discuss the visits with the Grower in advance of the visit.
p To allow Monsanto to obtain Growers internet service provider (ISP) records to validate Growers electronic
signature, if applicable.

8.

q To pay all applicable fees due to Monsanto that are a part of, associated with or collected with the Seed purchase
price or that are invoiced for the seed. If Grower fails to pay Monsanto for cotton related Monsanto Technologies,
Grower agrees to pay Monsanto default charges at the rate of 14% per annum (or the maximum allowed by law
whichever is less) plus Monsantos reasonable attorneys fees, court costs and all other costs of collection.
r To use on crops containing Roundup Ready, Roundup Ready 2 Technology, or Roundup Ready Flex only a
labeled Roundup agricultural herbicide or other authorized non-selective herbicide which could not be used
in the absence of the Roundup Ready gene (see TUG for details on authorized non-selective products). Use
of any selective herbicide labeled for the same crop without the Roundup Ready gene is not restricted by
this Agreement. MONSANTO DOES NOT MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES OR RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING THE USE OF PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED OR MARKETED BY OTHER COMPANIES WHICH ARE LABELED
FOR USE IN ROUNDUP READY CROP(S). MONSANTO SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE USE
OF THESE PRODUCTS IN ROUNDUP READY OR GENUITY ROUNDUP READY 2 YIELD CROP(S). ALL QUESTIONS
AND COMPLAINTS ARISING FROM THE USE OF PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED OR MARKETED BY OTHER COMPANIES
SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THOSE COMPANIES.

t To direct any fresh produce from Performance Series Sweet Corn for sale or use in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.
It is a violation of national and international laws to move material containing biotech traits across boundaries into
nations where import is not permitted. Grower must talk to Growers buyers to confirm their uses of this product.
5. GROWER RECEIVES FROM MONSANTO COMPANY:
a A limited use license to purchase and to plant Seed pursuant to the terms of this Agreement in the United
States of America, comprised of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, except in any state or county where
the products do not have all the necessary approvals and to apply Roundup agricultural herbicides and other
authorized non-selective herbicides over the top of Roundup Ready, Genuity Roundup Ready or Performance
Series Sweet Corn crops. Check with your local Monsanto representative if you have questions about the
approval status in your state. Monsanto retains ownership of the Monsanto Technologies including the genes (for
example, the Roundup Ready gene) and the gene technologies. In purchasing seed containing the Monsanto
Technologies, Grower solely receives the right to use the Monsanto Technologies subject to the conditions
specified in this Agreement.

9.

11. LIMITED WARRANTY AND DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES:

Monsanto warrants that the Monsanto Technologies licensed hereunder will perform as set forth in the TUG
when used in accordance with directions. This warranty applies only to Monsanto Technologies contained in
planting Seed that has been purchased from Monsanto and seed companies licensed by Monsanto or the seed
companys authorized dealers or distributors. EXCEPT FOR THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES IN THE LIMITED WARRANTY
SET FORTH ABOVE, MONSANTO MAKES NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, AND DISCLAIMS ALL OTHER
WARRANTIES, WHETHER ORAL OR WRITTEN, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

c Enrollment for participation in Roundup Ready PLUS Weed Management Solutions.

d A limited use license to prepare and apply on glyphosate-tolerant soybean, cotton, alfalfa, sugar beet, or canola crops
(or have others prepare and apply) tank mixes of, or sequentially apply (or have others sequentially apply), Roundup
agricultural herbicides or other glyphosate herbicides labeled for use on those crops with quizalofop, clethodim,
sethoxydim, fluazifop, and/or fenoxaprop to control volunteer Roundup Ready Corn 2 corn in Growers crops for
the 2015 growing season. However, neither Grower nor a third party may utilize any type of co-pack or premix of
glyphosate plus one or more of the above-identified active ingredients in the preparation of a tank mix for use on
glyphosate-tolerant soybean, cotton, alfalfa, sugar beet, or canola crops.

12. GROWERS EXCLUSIVE LIMITED REMEDY:

THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY OF THE GROWER AND THE LIMIT OF THE LIABILITY OF MONSANTO OR ANY SELLER FOR
ANY AND ALL LOSSES, INJURY OR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR HANDLING OF SEED (INCLUDING
CLAIMS BASED IN CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY, STRICT LIABILITY, TORT, OR OTHERWISE)
SHALL BE THE PRICE PAID BY THE GROWER FOR THE QUANTITY OF THE SEED INVOLVED OR, AT THE ELECTION OF
MONSANTO OR THE SEED SELLER, THE REPLACEMENT OF THE SEED. IN NO EVENT SHALL MONSANTO OR ANY
SELLER BE LIABLE FOR ANY INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL, OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

6. GROWER UNDERSTANDS:
a Monsanto Company is a member of Excellence Through Stewardship (ETS). Monsanto products are
commercialized in accordance with ETS Product Launch Stewardship guidance and in compliance with Monsantos
Policy for Commercialization of Biotechnology-Derived Plant Products in Commodity Crops. Any crop or material
produced from these products can only be exported to, or used, processed or sold in countries where all
necessary regulatory approvals have been granted. It is a violation of national and international law to move
material containing biotech traits across boundaries into nations where import is not permitted. Growers should
talk to their grain handler or product purchaser to confirm their buying position for these products.

13. UNITED STATES PATENTS:

The licensed U.S. patents for Monsanto Technologies can be found at the following web page:
www.monsantotechnology.com.

b Performance Series Sweet Corn, Genuity Roundup Ready Alfalfa and Genuity Roundup Ready Flex Pima cotton
are subject to specific product export stewardship requirements.

ATTORNEYS FEES:
If Grower is found by any court to have infringed one or more of the U.S. patents covering Monsanto
Technologies or otherwise to have breached this Agreement, Grower agrees to pay Monsanto and the
licensed Monsanto Technology provider(s) and Dow AgroSciences, as appropriate, their attorneys fees and
costs related to the case plus any other expenses incurred in the investigation of the breach and/or
infringement.

10. NOTICE REQUIREMENT:

As a condition precedent to Grower or any other person with an interest in Growers crop asserting any claim,
action, or dispute against Monsanto and/or any seller of Seed regarding performance or non-performance of
Monsanto Technologies or Seed, Grower must provide Monsanto a written, prompt, and timely notice (regarding
performance or non-performance of the Monsanto Technologies) and to the seller of any Seed (regarding
performance or non-performance of the Seed) within sufficient time to allow an in-field inspection of the crop(s)
about which any controversy, claim, action, or dispute is being asserted. The notice will be timely only if it is
delivered 15 days or less after the Grower first observes the issue(s) regarding performance or non-performance
of the Monsanto Technology and/or the Seed. The notice shall include a statement setting forth the nature of
the claim, name of the Monsanto Technology, and Seed hybrid or variety. Grower must deliver the notice to DRC
Data Services, Attn: AgCelerate Agreements, 2009 Fourth Street, SW, Mason City, IA 50401.

b Monsanto Technologies are protected under U.S. patent law. Monsanto licenses the Grower under applicable U.S.
patents (other than the Dow AgroSciences Patent Rights), to use Monsanto Technologies subject to the conditions
listed in this Agreement. Dow AgroSciences LLC and Agrigenetics, Inc. (collectively Dow AgroSciences) licenses
the Grower under its applicable U.S. patents (the Dow AgroScience Patent Rights) to use Dow AgroSciences
Event TC 1507 and Event DAS 59122-7 to the extent either is present in any SmartStax Seed being obtained
by Grower pursuant to this Agreement, Monsanto being authorized to act on Dow AgroSciences behalf for this
Agreement, subject to the conditions listed in this Agreement. These licenses do not authorize Grower to plant
Seed in the United States that has been purchased in another country or plant Seed in another country that has
been purchased in the United States. Grower is not authorized to transfer Seed to anyone outside of the U.S.

TERMINATION:
Grower may choose to terminate this Agreement effective immediately by delivering written notice to Monsanto.
Monsanto may choose to terminate this Agreement in whole or in part by delivering written notice to Grower.
Grower must deliver the notice of termination to DRC Data Services, Attn: AgCelerate Agreements, 2009 Fourth
Street, SW, Mason City, IA 50401. If this Agreement is terminated pursuant to such a notice from either party,
Growers responsibilities and the other terms herein shall survive (such as but not limited to Growers obligation
to use Seed for a single commercial crop) as to Seed previously purchased by the Grower.
In the event Grower violates the terms of this Agreement, then the Growers rights under this Agreement shall
automatically terminate. However, Growers responsibilities and the other terms herein shall survive as to all
Seed purchased or used by the Grower (such as but not limited to Growers obligation to use Seed for a single
commercial crop, Growers obligation to pay Monsanto for its attorneys fees, costs and other expenses incurred
in enforcing its rights under this Agreement, and Growers agreement to the choice of law and forum selection
provisions contained herein). Further, Grower shall not be entitled to obtain a future limited-use license from
Monsanto unless Monsanto provides Grower with specific written notice expressly recognizing the prior breach
and prior termination of the limited-use license and expressly granting and/or reissuing the limited-use license
previously obtained (and terminated) pursuant to this Agreement. Grower expressly acknowledges that Growers
submission of a new Monsanto Technology Stewardship Agreement and Monsantos issuance of a new license
number shall not satisfy the specific written notice reference above and that any such action shall have no legal
effect. If Grower is found by any court to have breached any term of this Agreement and/or to have infringed
one or more of the U.S. patents, Grower agrees that, among other things, Monsanto and Dow AgroSciences, as
appropriate, shall be entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Grower and any individual
and/or entity acting on Growers behalf or in concert therewith from making, using, selling, or offering Seed for
sale. Additionally, Grower agrees that any such finding of infringement by Grower shall entitle Monsanto and
Dow AgroSciences, as appropriate, to patent infringement damages to the full extent authorized by 35 U.S.C.
271 et. seq. Grower will also be liable for all breach of contract damages.

Performance SeriesTM Sweet Corn

s To read and follow the TUG and to abide by and implement Insect Resistance Management requirements on the
product tag as may be amended from time to time, which are incorporated into and are a part of this Agreement.
Grower must comply with the requirements set forth in the TUG and the tag, and should follow the best
management practices, recommendations and guidelines provided in those documents.

GENERAL TERMS:
Growers rights may not be transferred to anyone else without the written consent of Monsanto. If Growers
rights are transferred with Monsantos consent or by operation of law, this Agreement is binding on the
person or entity receiving the transferred rights. If any provision of this Agreement is determined to be void or
unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect.

c Insect Resistance Management: When planting any YieldGard brand corn products, Genuity brand corn products
or Genuity Bollgard II cotton products, Grower must implement an IRM program according to the size and
distance guidelines specified in the IRM Grower Guide, including any supplemental amendments. Grower may
lose Growers limited use license to use these products if Grower fails to follow the IRM program required by this
Agreement. When planting Performance Series Sweet Corn growers must implement the IRM program outlined
on the product tag.
d Crop Stewardship & Specialty Crops: Refer to the section on Coexistence and Identity Preservation in the TUG for
applicable information on crop stewardship and considerations for production of identity preserved crops.

Thank you for choosing our advanced technologies. We look forward to working with you in the future. If you have any questions regarding the Monsanto Technologies or this license, please call 1-800-768-6387

ALWAYS READ AND FOLLOW PESTICIDE LABEL DIRECTIONS. Roundup Ready crops contain genes that confer tolerance to glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup brand agricultural herbicides. Roundup brand agricultural herbicides will kill crops that are not tolerant to glyphosate. Bollgard II, DroughtGard, Genuity,
Performance Series, RIB Complete, Roundup Ready 2 Technology, Roundup Ready 2 Yield, Roundup Ready, Roundup, SmartStax, Vistive, VT Double PRO, VT Triple PRO, YieldGard VT Rootworm/RR2, YieldGard VT Triple, and YieldGard are trademarks of Monsanto Technology LLC. Ignite and LibertyLink and the
Water Droplet Design are registered trademarks of Bayer. Herculex is a registered trademark of Dow AgroSciences LLC. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. 2014 Monsanto Company. [14-00201pgd] 5A5G140656

Distribution: White to Monsanto, Yellow to Dealer, Pink to Grower