Saberon v. Atty.

Larong
A.C. No. 6567, April 16, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Fernando Larong was charged of grave misconduct for

allegedly using abusive and offensive language in his pleadings filed before
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Atty. Larong was the in-house counsel and corporate secretary of the
Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation.
EVERYTHING BEGAN when complainant Jose Saberon filed before the BSP
a petition against the Bank and Alfredo Bonpin for the cancellation of
banks registration and franchise, alleging:
o the Bank refused to return various checks and land titles,
which were given as security for the loan obtained by
Saberons wife, despite full payment of the loan and interest.
o Bonpins family comprised the majority stockholders of the bank
o Bonpin was a foreign citizen
Atty. Larong, in behalf of the Bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses
that contained the controversial statement which read:
o That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by
plaintiff [herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to
coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain.
Saberon found the said statement to be totally malicious and baseless. He
added that by such statement, Atty. Larong aided in the infliction of damages
against Saberons family who were deprived of the use of the mortgage
property.
IBP Commisioner Dennis Funa recommended that Atty. Larong be held liable
for gross misconduct and be suspended for 30 days.
o the word blackmail connotes something sinister and
criminal.
o Atty. Larong violated Canon 15 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provided that a lawyer must
only present factual arguments and anchor his case on legal merits
o Atty. Larong went overboard when he used such WORDS
UNNECESSARY AND IRRELEVANT to the case.
However, the IBP Board of Governors disproved his recommendation
and dismissed the case for lack of merit. However, the IBP Board of
Governors Resolution did not state the facts and arguments on which their
dismissal was based.
Hence, Saberon filed the instant appeal and contended that the Resolution
was void ab initio for violating Sec. 12(a), Rule 139-B, requiring that the

decision must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which
it is based. Saberon also asked that the penalty be modified into
disbarment.
In his Comment, Atty. Larong claimed that the purportedly offensive
allegation was a statement of fact which he had backed up with a narration of
chronological events; hence, must be treated as ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED
like allegations made in any initiatory pleadings.
Nevertheless, Atty. Larong asked for Saberons and the courts CLEMENCY,
pleading that he was then only two years in the profession but without any
intention of causing dishonor to it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Larong is guilty of gross misconduct?

SUB-ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Larongs purportedly offensive allegation is
absolutely privileged?
OTHER ISSUES:
Whether or not the penalty of disbarment is proper?
Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors Resolution is void?

RULING:
NO, Atty. Larong is NOT guilty of gross misconduct BUT ONLY SIMPLE
MISCONDUCT for violating CANONS 8 and 11 and the rules thereof, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Lawyers, although they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark to further
the cause of their clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of RELEVANCY
AND PROPRIETY in making such remark or comment.

Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, HOWEVER FALSE or

MALICIOUS, are considered ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED provided that they are
PERTINENT AND RELEVANT to the subject of inquiry.
What is the TEST OF RELEVANCY? The utterance be LEGITIMATELY
RELATED thereto such that it MAY BECOME THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY in the
course of the trial.
Here, the Court found that the utterance of 'blackmail' in the Answer and
Rejoinder which Atty. Larong filed is NOT LEGITIMATELY RELATED OR
PERTINENT to the subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, namely: (a)
Bonpin's alleged alien citizenship; and (b) Bonpins majority stockholding in the
bank.
Thus, Atty. Larong is guilty of misconduct BUT SUCH is NOT of GRIEVOUS
character that warrants disbarment. DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION of an
attorney are the MOST SEVERE FORMS of disciplinary action, which should be
imposed only for duly proven SERIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES. The Court
also took into consideration Atty. Larongs apologies.
As regards the IBP Board of Governors Resolution, the Court found it to be
NON-COMPLIANT with the procedural requirement that every Boards decision
must state clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law on which the
same is based. Hence, IT IS VOID.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6567

April 16, 2008

JOSE C. SABERON, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court, complainant Jose C. Saberon
(complainant) charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for

allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before

the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition2 against Surigaonon Rural Banking
Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose family comprises the majority
stockholders of the bank, for cancellation

of the bank's registration and

franchise. The Petition, he said, arose from the bank's and/or Bonpin's refusal to
return various checks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained
by his (complainant's) wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests .

Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the

bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses to the Petition stating, inter alia,
3

5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff

[herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for

financial gain
x x x x.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder5 to complainant's Reply.

Finding the aforementioned statements to be "totally malicious,

viscous [sic] and bereft of any factual or legal basis," complainant
filed the present complaint.

Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his
constitutional right to seek redress of his grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and
acting corporate secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his (complainant's)
wife in behalf of "her children" had been paid in full, hence, there was no more reason to continue
holding the collaterals.

Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of damages
upon his wife and "her children" who were thus deprived of the use of the
mortgaged property.
In his Comment6 to the present complaint against him, respondent

argues that: (1)

there was "nothing abusive, offensive or otherwise improper" in the
way he used the word "blackmail" to characterize the suit against his
clients; and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is not in
any way aiding or abetting the infliction of damages upon the other
party.
By Resolution of March 16, 2005,7 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006, 8 IBP

Investigating
Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa held that the word "blackmail"
connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person accused thereof is
criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize
that person's act as blackmail.
Commissioner Funa

stressed that a counsel is expected only to present

factual arguments and to anchor his case on the legal merits of his client's
claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as follows:
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

respondent should not state his

personal belief as to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant to
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, he noted that in espousing a client's cause,
9

The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were "unnecessary

and irrelevant to the case," respondent went "overboard and crossed the line" of
professional conduct. In view thereof, he recommended that respondent be

found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice

of law for 30 days.

By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,10 the IBP

Board of Governors
disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed the case for
lack of merit.
The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007, transmitted the records of the case
to this Court.11

Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to this Court
via a petition filed on March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-B 12 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution as illegal and void ab initio for
violating the mandatory requirements of Section 12(a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court
that the same be "reduced to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which
it is based."
Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct to
be in accordance with the evidence, complainant nevertheless submits that the
recommended penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment. The
offense committed by respondent, he posits, manifests an evil motive and is therefore an infraction
involving moral turpitude.
In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the administrative

complaint against him is a harassment suit given that it was in his capacity as
counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he filed the Answer objected to by complainant.
Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation was a

statement of fact which he had backed up with a narration of the chronological

incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife against his clients. That being the case,
he contends that the allegation made in the Answer must be considered absolutely
privileged just like allegations made in any complaint or initiatory pleading .
Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had made serious

imputations of wrongdoing against his clients the bank for allegedly being
engaged in some illegal activities, and Bonpin for misrepresenting himself as a
Filipino.
Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and offensive

language was used, he was only two years into the profession, with nary an
intention of bringing dishonor to it. He admits that because of some infelicities of language,
he may have stirred up complainant's indignation for which he asked the latter's and this Court's
clemency.
In his Reply,13 complainant counters that respondent's Comment reveals the latter's propensity to
deliberately state a falsehood; and that respondent's claim that the administrative complaint was a
"harassing act," deducible from the "fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which has
prospered x x x against the same rural bank and its owner," is bereft of factual basis.

Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin, knew of the two criminal
cases he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and, as admitted by respondent, of the criminal
charges against him for libel arising from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against
him and his wife.
Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondent's entreaty for clemency.
This Court

finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using

intemperate language in his pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. 14

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language.15 Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
16

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. 17 In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified. 18
It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of respondent were made not before
a court but before the BSP. A similar submission that actuations of and statements

made by lawyers before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not
covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the NLRC not being a court,
was struck down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,19 thus:
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor Relations
Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar , an oath-bound
servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and
whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 20

The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.

Respecting respondent's argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP
were privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers,

though they are allowed a

latitude of pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of
the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients,
should not trench beyond the bounds of RELEVANCY AND
PROPRIETY in making such remark or comment.
21

True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently
been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious

they may be, but only for so long as they are pertinent and relevant to
the subject of inquiry. The test of relevancy has been stated, thus:
22

x x x. As

to the degree of relevancy or pertinency NECESSARY TO

MAKE ALLEGED DEFAMATORY MATTERS privileged the courts
favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so
palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man
can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be
privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings . It

must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to

the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of
inquiry in the course of the trial x x x.
23

Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of judicial proceedings, the

ascription of 'blackmail' in the Answer and Rejoinder filed by

respondent is NOT LEGITIMATELY RELATED OR PERTINENT to the
subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpin's
alleged alien citizenship and majority stockholding in the bank . Those
issues were amply discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses without need of the further
allegation that the Petition was "another

in a series of blackmail suits . . .

to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain." Hence,
such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled for. More so, considering that complainant and his
wife were well within their rights to file the cases against the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their
interests and seek redress of their grievances.
Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, indeed only a "Notice of
Resolution" was transmitted to this Court, together with the Records of the case, which Notice simply
stated that on January 18, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-036
in which it:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.

Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the procedural requirement that the

IBP Board of Governors' decision shall state clearly and distinctly the
findings of facts or law on which the same is based . Thus Section 12 of Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty
(30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's
report. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above requirement serves a very important function not just to inform the parties of the reason
for the decision as would enable them on appeal to point out and object to the findings with which
they are not in agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors has reached
the judgment through the process of legal reasoning. 24
With regard to complainant's plea that respondent be disbarred, this Court has consistently
considered disbarment and suspension of an attorney as the most severe

forms of disciplinary action, which should be imposed with great

caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative charges.
25

Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a
grievous character as to merit respondent's disbarment. In light of respondent's apologies,

the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the
circumstances, is considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct .
WHEREFORE, complainant's petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Fernando T. Larong, is
found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with a
stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in
the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,Chairperson Tinga, Velasco, Jr., Brion, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 1-5. Filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant on September 22, 2004.

Id. at 6-11.

Id. at 12-19.

Id. at 13; p. 2 of the Answer.

Id. at 26-35. Denominated as "Traverse to Reply," the rejoinder stated on paragraph 4, as

follows:
5

4. Most notably, after Respondents revealed that the instant Petition is a mere ruse
employed by Petitioner to blackmail the former for financial gain and after ample
showing that this action is baseless and fruitless, petitioner, finding his foot in his
mouth, now changes gear and goes amuck by raising new matters purely extraneous
to his original cause of action x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
6

Id. at 40-47. Filed before the OBC on February 1, 2005.

Id. at 192.

Id. at 187-190.

Canon 15- A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
9

10

Rollo, p. 186.

11

Id. at 185.

12

Section 2(c) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed
by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand or fine) it
shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case
shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other
interested party filed with the Supreme Court within (15) days from notice of the
Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.

13

Rollo, pp. 243-249.

14

Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106087, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 397, 420.

15

Rubio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84032, August 29, 1989, 177 SCRA 60, 63.

Torres v. Javier, A.C. No. 5910, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 408, 421; Nuez v.
Astorga, A.C. No. 6131, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 353, 364, citing Hueysuwan-Florido
v. Atty. Florido, 465 Phil. 1, 7 (2004); Cruz v. Cabrera, A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004, 441
SCRA 211, 219.
16

Section 20(f) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Vide Uy v. Atty. Depasucat, 455 Phil. 1, 21
(2003).
17

18

Ng v. Alar, A.C. No. 7252, November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 465, 473; Torres v. Javier, supra.

19

A.C. No. 2343, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 459, 462.

Supra, citing Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072, January 9,
1970, 31 SCRA 1, 17.
20

21

Uy v. Atty. Depasucat, supra note 17 at 19.

Torres v. Atty. Javier, supra note16 at 418; Villalon v. Buendia, 315 Phil. 663, 667 (1995);
Gutierrez v. Abila et al., 197 Phil. 616, 621 (1982).
22

Uy v. Atty. Depasucat, supra note 21. Vide Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 156183, February
28, 2007, 517 SCRA 74, 83; Tolentino v. Baylosis, 110 Phil. 1010, 1013 (1961).
23

Teodosio v. Nava, A.C. No. 4673, April 27, 2001, 357 SCRA 406, 412, cited in Cruz v.
Cabrera, supra note 16 at 216-217.
24

25

Nuez v. Astorga, supra note 16 at 354.