TALA vs CA

No right is created where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) filed before 17 Regional Trial Courts (RTC) 17
complaints for reconveyance of different properties against Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala Realty) et al.

Banco Filipinos complaints commonly alleged that in 1979, expansion of its operations required the purchase of
real properties for the purpose of acquiring sites for more branches; that as Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General
Banking Act limit a banks allowable investments in real estate to 50% of its capital assets, its board of directors
decided to warehouse some of its existing properties and branch sites. Thus, Nancy L. Ty, a major stockholder and
director, persuaded Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas Aguirre, both major stockholders of Banco Filipino, to
organize and incorporate Tala Realty to hold and purchase real properties in trust for Banco Filipino; that after the
transfer of Banco Filipino properties to Tala Realty, the Aguirres sister Remedios prodded her brother Tomas to, as
he did, endorse to her his shares in Tala Realty and registered them in the name of her controlled corporation, Add
International.
Thus, Nancy, Remedios, and Pedro Aguirre controlled Tala Realty, with Nancy exercising control through her
nominees Pilar, Cynthia, and Dolly, while Remedios exercised control through Add International and her nominee
Elizabeth. Pedro Aguirre exercised control through his own nominees, the latest being Tala Realtys president,
Rubencito del Mundo.

In the course of the implementation of their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some of its
properties. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to Banco Filipino the properties for 20 years, renewable for another
20 years at the option of Banco Filipino with a right of first refusal in the event Tala Realty decided to sell them.
Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded payment of rentals, deposits, and
goodwill, with a threat to eject Banco Filipino. Thus arose Banco Filipinos 17 complaints for reconveyance against
Tala Realty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trust agreement is void

HELD:
In Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, the Court, by Decision dated
November 22, 2002, ruling on one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against Banco Filipino arising
from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance cases subject of the present petitions, held that the trust
agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced.

An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as the Court has held that where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in
favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.

The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since its purpose
was contrary to law. As admitted by the Bank, it warehoused its branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue
its expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in Makati, and at the same time
avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act which it had already
reached.

Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act and
that its warehousing agreement with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to
put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject
property at any time as a first preference to buy at the same transfer price. This agreement which the Bank
claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus, while the Court finds the sale and lease of the subject
property genuine and binding upon the parties, the Court cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the
parties intended to create it. In the words of the Court in the Ramos case, the courts will not assist the payor in
achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the clean hands
doctrine. The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust
relationship with Tala.

J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
Doctrine:
The absence of the word zero rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided
one way, courts have no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner.

Facts:
Petitioner, a PEZA Corporation, filed applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated sales
for the taxable quarters of 2000. The claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence,
petitioner was constrained to file a petition before the CTA.

The CTA eventually denied the petition for lack of the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts.

Issue:
Whether or not the failure to print the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund
of input VAT on zero-rated sales

Held:
Yes. The absence of the word zero rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT.

This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly
Matsushita Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No.
178090, 612 SCRA 28, February 8, 2010). In that case, the claim for tax credit/refund was denied for noncompliance with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which requires the word zero rated to be
printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-rated sales.

From the abovementioned decision, the Court ruled that the appearance of the word zero-rated on the face of
invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no
VAT was actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be
refunding money it did not collect.

Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided one
way, courts have no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner
[Agencia Exquisite of Bohol, Incorporated v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 150141, 157359 and
158644, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 539, 550].

Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC

FACTS:
[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian
Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private
respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a
supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine
British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for
execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the
petition of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court. A temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the counterbond of the
petitioner.

HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words

and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule requires that
a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify
its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a
statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction.
They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to
consequences.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal.

Pilar vs. Comelec

FACTS:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of
candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion
for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the
COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition
for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures
because he was a non-candidate, having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing.
Petitioner posits that it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should
have either won or lost under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their candidacy for election.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
RATIO:
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who
pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73
of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that [t]he filing or withdrawal of
certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may
have incurred. Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondents: Hon. Judge Antonio C. Evangelista
Facts:
Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide in the RTC. The RTC appreciated in his favor the
priveleged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified his sentence. Private respondent filed a petition

for probation, alleging that (1) he possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for probation
under P.D. No. 968, as amended; (2) the Court of Appeals has in fact reduced the penalty imposed on him by the
trial court; (3) in its resolution, the Court of Appeals took no action on a petition for probation which he had earlier
filed with it so that the petition could be filed with the trial court; (4) in the trial courts decision, two mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntarily surrender were appreciated in his favor; and (5) in Santos
To v. Pao, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the accused to probation notwithstanding the fact that he had
appealed from his conviction by the trial court. RTC ordered private respondent to report for interview to the
Provincial Probation Officer. Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of private
respondents application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he
could have then applied for probation, private respondent waived the right to make his application. The Probation
Officer thought the original sentence imposed on private respondent by the trial court (1 year of imprisonment) was
probationable and there was no reason for private respondent not to have filed his application for probation. The
RTC set aside the Probation Officers recommendation and granted private respondents application for probation.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents is qualified for probation under PD 968 despite the fact that he had
appealed from judgement of the trial court

RULING: No. Having appealed from the judgement of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the
Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of
probation.

Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgement of conviction. Probation may be granted whether the
sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial
court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. An order granting or denying
probation shall not be appealable.

When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. If an appeal is truly meritorious the accused
would be set free and not only given probation. This is precisely the evil that the amendment in P.D. No. 1990
sought to correct, since in the words of the preamble to the amendatory law, probation was not intended as an
escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at
the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated.

The petitioner who had appealed his sentence could not subsequently apply for probation. Llamado v. CA, 174
SCRA 566 (1989).The perfection of the appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment of
conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an application for probation is
filed with the trial court which can only grant the same after it shall have convicted and sentenced [the] defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal.

Cecilio de Villa vs. CA

FACTS:
[P]etitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
(Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on
the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense
was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs against the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration
of the said decision was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus elevated to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
(1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case; and,
(2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
HELD:
YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
RATIO:
For the first issue: The trial courts jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned, as
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide. The information under consideration
specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling
and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a
criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
For the second issue: Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law
does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance
Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention
of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of
the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.

COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, Inc. vs.

HON. BLAS F. OPLE, COLGATE PALMOLIVE SALES UNION
Facts:
Respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor
practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of union officers/members; and coercing employees to
retract their membership with the union and restraining non-union members from joining the union. The Office of
the MOLE, upon petition of petitioner, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor
Code.
Petitioner pointed out that the allegations regarding dismissal from employment due to union membership were
false. It also averred that the suspension and eventual dismissal of the three employees were due to infractions
committed by them and that the management reserves the right to discipline erring employees. Petitioner also
assailed the legality of the Union, among others.
The minister rendered its decision, ruling that there was no merit in the Unions complaint. It also ruled that the
three dismissed employees were not without fault but nonetheless ordered the reinstatement of the same. At the
same time, respondent Minister directly certified the respondent Union as the collective bargaining agent for the
sales force in petitioner company and ordered the reinstatement of the three salesmen to the company on the
ground that the employees were first offenders.
Issue:

Whether or not the minister erred in directly certifying the Union based on the latters self-serving assertion that it
enjoys the support of the majority of the sales force in petitioners company and in ordering the reinstatement of the
three dismissed employees.
Held:
The Court held that the minister failed to determine with legal certainty whether the Union indeed enjoyed majority
representation. The Court held that by relying only on the Notice of Strike, the minister had encouraged disrespect
of the law. He had also erroneously vested upon himself the right to choose the collective bargaining representative
which ought to have been upon the employees.
The Court held that the reinstatement of the three employees despite a clear finding of guilt on their part is not in
conformity with law. Ruling otherwise would only encourage unequal protection of the laws with respect to the rights
of the management and the employees.
The court rendered the decision of the minister reversed and set aside, ordering petitioners to give the three
employees their separation pay.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and

Troadio Tecson
.
FACTS:
The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of
Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. The
Board opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial
Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent because he is a subordinate of former President Marcos. Respondent alleged
that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal
acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the
Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc.
or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent acted as a subordinate under E.O. No.1 and related executive orders.
HELD:
NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent.
RATIO:
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is [w]here general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class
as those specifically mentioned. The term subordinate as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who
enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family
member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
nominee in E.O. No. 2.
The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent, without
prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecution agency.

People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting
as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge
Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds

(1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through stealth and strategy, whereas under the decree
the entry should be effected with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the
cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No.
5440.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.
HELD:
NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial courts dismissal was affirmed.
RATIO:
[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it
was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter
areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case.
Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to
illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to
when the legislative intent is uncertain.

MISAEL P. VERA v. HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS

FACTS:
Private respondents (the companies) are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products
throughout the Philippines. Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines,
is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of
local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.
Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition for preliminary injunction wherein
plaintiffs pray for an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation to the enforcement of Section
169 of the Tax Code against their filled milk products.
The controversy arose when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue required the companies to withdraw from the
market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with a warning of action if they failed.
Section of the Tax Code is as follows:
Section 169.
Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever
form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be
clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are
marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with
other equivalent words.
The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction which restrained the CIR from requiring private respondents to
print on the labels of their rifled milk products the words.
Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and injunction with a petition for
preliminary injunction. Respondent-companied therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade Board desist from
further proceeding from the action filed by the Philippine Association of Nutrition for misleading advertisement,
mislabeling and/or misbranding. That petitioners' milk was not labeled as an imitation of cow's milk.
Both cases was heard jointly.
Respondent court held to perpetually restrain the CIR and the Fair Trade Board from requiring respondentcompanies to print on the labels on the filled milk products.
ISSUE: Whether respondent court was correct.
RULING:
Yes.

Section 169 of the Tax code has been repealed by implication. It was enacted together with Sections 141 and 177,
which were already repealed. Through it, Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision, without a tax
purpose, or a penal sanction.
It was also apparent that Section 169 does not apply to filled milk. Following ejusdem generis, the provision
specifically stated skimmed milk which implies a restriction in scope of the classes of milk.

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs. CIR

FACTS:
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling,
manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue millers tax and manufacturers sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for
taxable year 1987 particularly on SPMCs sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while
the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed
the assessments.
The Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by
way of a petition for review. docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the liberal application of the rules
because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% millers tax. It maintains that the crude oil
which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence,
not subject to millers tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMCs
milled products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be exempted from the millers tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SPMCs sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% millers task.
HELD:
NO. Petition was denied.
RATIO:
The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied
only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their
original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the
factory or by the miller himself.
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its
effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very
language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not
have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms
to those expressly mentioned.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its application in this case is
consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMCs claim
for tax exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.

Parayno vs Jovellanos
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Police power

Facts:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao
petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another
location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the

Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor
the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing
gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law.

According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art.
6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are
less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB
Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential
buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire;
3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during
gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic.

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before
the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but is under
Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid
exercise of the latters police powers

HELD:
The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The
Counsel in fact admitted that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined
in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the
said official zoning code;

The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them. hence,
because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could
not insist that gasoline service station under Section 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under
Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a
gas filling station.
As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the
closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact
measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the
law and the rights of petitioner.

A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause
and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.

Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it
maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and
church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance
was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that

respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either.

Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily
abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety
of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.

On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we
again note: Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is more
perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended to build such buildings
after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed
location is in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff
negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from
enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to
another location.

Parayno vs Jovellanos
(under Expresso unius in Agpalo)
The court held that since the ordinance made a distinction between gasoline service station and gasoline filling
station, the maxim ejusdem generis does not apply and what is applicable is the maxim expression unius
exclusion exclusion alterius. we hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear
distinction between gasoline service station and gasoline filling station
Pertinent provisions: Sec 21. Filling station. A retailstation servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles with
gasoline and oil only. Sec 42. Service station. A building and itspremises where gasoline oil, greases, batteries,
tires and car accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and where, inaddition, the following services may
be rendered and sales and no other. Hence, because of the distinct and definite meaningsalluded to the two terms
by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Sec 44necessarily
included gasoline filling station under Sec21. Indeed, activities undertaken in a gas service station did not
automatically embrace tose in a gas filling station.

Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier

FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was issued
in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private
respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court
required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his
comment, stated that (a) The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct
power to suspend; and (b) Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or
employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not
been met in the instant case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices
other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against
said officials and employees.

HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
RATIO:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend the suspension of a public official or
employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to suspension, as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word
suspension in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure.
Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word suspension should be given the same sense as the other words with
which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and
employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive
suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the
administrative charges.

Fule v. CA
Facts:
Gregorio Fule, a banker and a jeweller, offered to sell his parcel of land to Dr. Cruz in exchange for P40,000 and a
diamond earring owned by the latter. A deed of absolute sale was prepared by Atty. Belarmino, and on the same
day Fule went to the bank with Dichoso and Mendoza, and Dr. Cruz arrived shortly thereafter. Dr. Cruz got the
earrings from her safety deposit box and handed it to Fule who, when asked if those were alright, nodded and took
the earrings. Two hours after, Fule complained that the earrings were fake. He files a complaint to declare the sale
null and void on the ground of fraud and deceit.
Issue:
Whether the sale should be nullified on the ground of fraud
Held:
A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of
the contract and upon the price. Being consensual, a contract of sale has the force of law between the contracting
parties and they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective contractual commitments. It is evident from
the facts of the case that there was a meeting of the minds between petitioner and Dr. Cruz. As such, they are
bound by the contract unless there are reasons or circumstances that warrant its nullification.

Contracts that are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties
are: (1) those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract; and (2) those where the consent
is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. The records, however, are bare of any
evidence manifesting that private respondents employed such insidious words or machinations to entice petitioner
into entering the contract of barter. It was in fact petitioner who resorted to machinations to convince Dr. Cruz to
exchange her jewelry for the Tanay property.

Furthermore, petitioner was afforded the reasonable opportunity required in Article 1584 of the Civil Code within
which to examine the jewelry as he in fact accepted them when asked by Dr. Cruz if he was satisfied with the
same. By taking the jewelry outside the bank, petitioner executed an act which was more consistent with his
exercise of ownership over it. This gains credence when it is borne in mind that he himself had earlier delivered the
Tanay property to Dr. Cruz by affixing his signature to the contract of sale. That after two hours he later claimed that
the jewelry was not the one he intended in exchange for his Tanay property, could not sever the juridical tie that
now bound him and Dr. Cruz. The nature and value of the thing he had taken preclude its return after that
supervening period within which anything could have happened, not excluding the alteration of the jewelry or its
being switched with an inferior kind.

Ownership over the parcel of land and the pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings had been transferred to Dr. Cruz
and petitioner, respectively, upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. Said contract of sale being absolute
in nature, title passed to the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold since there was no stipulation in the contract
that title to the property sold has been reserved in the seller until full payment of the price or that the vendor has the
right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period.

While it is true that the amount of P40,000.00 forming part of the consideration was still payable to petitioner, its
nonpayment by Dr. Cruz is not a sufficient cause to invalidate the contract or bar the transfer of ownership and
possession of the things exchanged considering the fact that their contract is silent as to when it becomes due and
demandable.

Bersabal vs. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador

FACTS:
[P]etitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge and to compel said respondent Judge to
decide petitioners perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City
Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents. The second
paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted
from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral
argument if so requested . (Emphasis supplied).
A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court. The
respondent Judge dismissed petition on August 4, 1971 upon failure of defendantappellant to prosecute her
appeal, with costs against her. Petitioner filed her memorandum. The respondent Court denied the motion for
reconsideration on October 30, 1971. Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration
which was likewise denied by the respondent court on March 15, 1972.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the
same paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to
prosecute.
HELD:
NO. The challenged orders of Respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15, 1972 are
set aside as null and void.
RATIO:
The above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the
submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter
may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the
Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said memorandum the
appellant so chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to
decide the case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other
words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his
memorandum, but rather it is the Courts mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence
and records transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word may when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while
the word shall is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615,
Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the
appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus
memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association v. CA

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. (LGVHAI) was organized on 8 February 1983 as the
homeoenwers' association for Loyola Grand Villas. It was also registered as the sole homeowners' association in
the said village with the Home Financing Corporation (which eventually became Home Insurance Guarantee
Corporation ["HIGC"]). However, the association was not able file its corporate by-laws.
The LGVHAI officers then tried to registered its By-Laws in 1988, but they failed to do so. They then discovered
that there were two other homeowners' organizations within the subdivision - the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners
(North) Association, Inc. [North Association] and herein Petitioner Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South)
Association, Inc.["South Association].
Upon inquiry by the LGVHAI to HIGC, it was discovered that LGVHAI was dissolved for its failure to submit its bylaws within the period required by the Corporation Code and for its non-user of corporate charter because HIGC
had not received any report on the association's activities. These paved the way for the formation of the North and
South Associations.
LGVHAI then lodged a complaint with HIGC Hearing Officer Danilo Javier, and questioned the revocation of its
registration. Hearing Officer Javier ruled in favor of LGVHAI, revoking the registration of the North and South
Associations.
Petitioner South Association appealed the ruling, contending that LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the
period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code effectively automatically dissolved the corporation. The
Appeals Board of the HIGC and the Court of Appeals both rejected the contention of the Petitioner affirmed the
decision of Hearing Officer Javier.
Issue: W/N LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code
had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.
Ruling: No.
The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this case states:
Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. - Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1) month after receipt
of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
adopt a code of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code.
Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imposition of duty which must be enforced. However, the word "must" in a
statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be consistent with an ecercise of discretion. If the language of a
statute, considered as a whole with due regard to its nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended to use
the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning.
The legislative deliberations of the Corporation Code reveals that it was not the intention of Congress to
automatically dissolve a corporation for failure to file the By-Laws on time.
Moreover, By-Laws may be necessary to govern the corporation, but By-Laws are still subordinate to the Articles of
Incorporation and the Corporation Code. In fact, there are cases where By-Laws are unnecessary to the corporate
existence and to the valid exercise of corporate powers.
The Corporation Code does not expressly provide for the effects of non-filing of By-Laws. However, these have
been rectified by Section 6 of PD 902-A which provides that SEC shall possess the power to suspend or revoke,
after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations upon failure to file ByLaws within the required period.
This shows that there must be notice and hearing before a corporation is dissolved for failure to file its By-Laws.
Even assuming that the existence of a ground, the penalty is not necessarily revocation, but may only be
suspension.
By-Laws are indispensable to corporations, since they are required by law for an orderly management of
corporations. However, failure to file them within the period prescribed does not equate to the automatic dissolution
of a corporation.

Crisologo vs Globe Telecom

Facts:
Petitioner was an employee of respondent company.When she was promoted, she became entitled to anexecutive car. In April 2002,
she was separated fromthe company. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegaldismissal and reinstatement with NLRC which laterdismissed
the complaint. The Petitioner filed forcertiorari with the CA assailing the dismissal.Pending said petition, Respondent filed a civil case
withthe RTC an action for recovery of possession of the carwith application for a writ of replevin with damagesdocketed as case MC042480. Petitioner filed a motionto dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia and forumshopping but was denied by the trial
court. Thus,petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.Petitioner also filed with the CA a motion for theissuance of a writ of prohibition
to enjoin proceedings inthe replevin case before the trial court. Thereafter, Respondent filed a motion to declaredefendant in
default in Civil Case No. MC04-2480, whichwas granted by the trial court. Respondent was thusallowed to present its evidence ex-parte.
Petitionerfiled a motion for reconsideration of the order of defaultbut it was denied by the trial court. The trial courtrendered a judgment by
default, declaring respondenthaving the right of possession over the subject motorvehicle and ordered the petitioner to pay for
damages,attorneys fee, and cost of suit.Petitioner then filed with the Supreme Court a petitionfor review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, which was denied for being the wrong remedyunder the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Thus, Petitioner
filed the present motion forreconsideration, alleging that the filing of said petitionis the proper recourse, citing Matute vs. Court
of Appeals, wherein it was ruled that a defendant declaredin default has the remedy set forth in Sec. 2, par (3) of Rule 41.
Issue:
WON the Petitioners filing of review on certiorari withthe SC citing Matute case is the proper recourse for a judgment by default
rendered by the trial court.
Ruling:
No. The filing of the present petition is clearly not theproper remedy to assail the default judgment renderedby the trial court. The Matute
case is of 1969, vintageand pertained to the old Rules of Court and has alreadybeen superseded by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.Her only recourse then is to file an ordinary appeal withthe Court of Appeals under Sec. 2 (a), Rule 41 of the1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

PNB vs. CA et al

FACTS: The spouses Chua were the owners of a parcel of land covered by a TCT and registered in their names.
Upon the husbands death, the probate court appointed his son, private respondent Allan as special administrator
of the deceaseds intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation from PNB to be
secured by a real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel of land, which Allan did for P450,000.00 with
interest.
For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. During the auction,
PNB was the highest bidder. However, the loan having a payable balance, to claim this deficiency, PNB instituted
an action with the RTC, Balayan, Batangas, against both Mrs. Chua and Allan.

The RTC rendered its decision, ordering the dismissal of PNBs complaint. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision by dismissing PNBs appeal for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: The WON it was error for the CA to rule that petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action the recovery of
the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the same.

HELD: petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

No

Petitioner relies on Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189 SCRA 612, 615 (1990),holding that in extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage, when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover
the deficiency from the mortgagor.

However, it must be pointed out that petitioners cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a mortgage. The
case at bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement of estate, wherein the
administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the
probate court. As the CA correctly stated, the Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into play decisively.
The applicable rule is Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court ( which PNB contends is not.)

In the present case it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been complied with [see
notes]. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand,
which in summary [and case law as well] grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in
case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without
right to file a claim for any deficiency.

Clearly petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditors option ofextrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged
property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate,
after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further
liability remains on the part of respondents and the deceaseds estate.

NOTES:
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, which states that:
Sec. 7. Rule 86. Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by
mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in
this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or
realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a
judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or
other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the
preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone and foreclose the same at any time
within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall
receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the

executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged by paying the debt for which it is hold
as security, under the direction of the court if the court shall adjudge it to be for the interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made.

To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded
in the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order authorizing the administrator to
mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been executed by the deceased himself. Section 7
provides in part:
Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate The court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate,
or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules when it appears
necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:

xxx
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or
otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor
or administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his
lifetime.

ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC

FACTS:
[P]etitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed separate complaints for
unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII,
Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners regular
project employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such [project] activity exists, but
entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also
ordered payment of salary differentials.
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiters decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiters holding
that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking the Five
Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been determined at the time of their engagement and
which operation was not directly related to the business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the
award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are regular
employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are necessary, desirable and work-related to private respondents main
business, steel-making; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are considered permanent employees as opposed to being only project employees of
NSC.
HELD:
NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.
RATIO:

Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered permanent employees. However, contrary to petitioners
apprehensions, the designation of named employees as project employees and their assignment to a specific
project are effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable
requirements of labor laws.
On the claim that petitioners service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as regular employees,
the Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as
project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project
employees. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee
who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not
to project employees.
Munoz vs comelec
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor of Camalig, Albay in the May 10,2004 election.
Private resp objected to the inclusion of 26 from various precincts because of physicalirregularities and reasons of
force and intimidation. Despite the pendency of the appeal, petitioner was later proclaimed by the MBC as the
winning candidate. Private respondent then filed with the COMELEC a petitionto annul the proclamation of the
petitioner for being premature and illegal-> GRANTED. MFR of petitioner tothe En Banc>DENIED.
ISSUES:1) WON the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided only the
Petition to Annul Proclamation despite the agreement of the parties to consolidate private respondents appeal
from the ruling of the MBC since both cases were raffled to the same Division and the issue in the latter case
wasconnected to, if not determinative of, the merits of the former case.2) WON the COMELEC En Banc correctly
ordered the new MBC to re-canvass all the ERs and to proclaim thewinner on the basis thereof despite the
pendency of the appeal with the First Division.
HELD:1.
No. COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides thatwhen an action or proceeding involves a question oflaw and fact
which is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the same may beconsolidated with the
action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number ,
-> this rule is only permissive, not mandatory. Moreover, the two cases involve different matters of fact and law. 1st
case:a pre-proclamation controversy; 2nd case: conduct of the MBC in proclaiming the petitioner withoutauthority of
the COMELEC > Hence, the rule isnt applicable. Mere pendency of the two cases is nota ground for their outright consolidation.
2.On Re-canvassing: No. It exceeded its authority by ordering the re-canvass of all the ERs. TheCOMELEC
En Banc in effect rendered a decision on the merits of SPC No. 04-087, which up to
the present is still pending before its First Division, in violation of the rule that it does not have the authority to hear
and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, at the firstinstance
3.On Proclamation: Yes. Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle thatCOMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made