Tolentino v Sec of Finance

9 cases
FACTS: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our
decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
HELD:
I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue
bills.
PC that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed
in the House of Representatives where it passed three
readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where
after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and
Means Committee
-that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings.
Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S.
No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994.
--no merit.
--The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in
which the Senate proposed an amendment to a House
revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill.
--during the 8th Congress, the Senate passed its own version
of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with House bills earlier
passed, became the enrolled bills.
--9th Congress passed revenue laws which were also the
result of the consolidation of House and Senate bills.
--the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance
in which the Senate, in the exercise of its power to
propose amendments to bills required to originate in
the House, passed its own version of a House revenue
measure.
--Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard
to revenue bills, the Philippine Senate possesses less power
than the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between
constitutional provisions giving them the power to propose or
concur with amendments.
--Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments as on other Bills.
--Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
--The power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments is apparently without restriction. It would seem
that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically rewrite a bill required to come from the House and leave only a
trace of the original bill.
-It is also accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is
known as an amendment by substitution, which may entirely
replace the bill initiated in the House of Representatives.
--Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630
is an independent and distinct bill.
that there is something substantially different between the
reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197.
-they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House
and in the Senate and that it is the product of two "half-baked
bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed
by both houses of Congress."
--In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No.
1630, clearly appear to be mere amendments of the
corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197.
-Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S.
No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere amendment of
the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to
pass the Senate on second and three readings.
-When the House bill and Senate bill, which became R.A. No.
1405 (Act prohibiting the disclosure of bank deposits), were
referred to a conference committee, the question was raised
whether the two bills could be the subject of such conference,
considering that the bill from one house had not been passed
by the other and vice versa.

--- If a House bill is passed by the House but not passed by the
Senate, and a Senate bill of a similar nature is passed in the
Senate but never passed in the House, can the two bills be
the subject of a conference, and can a law be enacted from
these two bills?
=If the House bill had been approved by the Senate, there
would have been no need of a conference; but precisely
because the Senate passed another bill on the same subject
matter, the conference committee had to be created, and we
are now considering the report of that committee.
-WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with
finality and the temporary restraining order previously issued
is hereby lifted.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14,
1997
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240,
which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are constitutionallymandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation
of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The
Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of
the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the
House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But
after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There
being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The
Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority
Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in
character. They are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but
only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but
only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier

motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been

defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.
ESCUDERO & REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior
decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBCs action of allowing more
than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member
was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the
entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase a
representative of congress refers that both houses of congress should
have one representative each, and that these two houses are
permanent and mandatory components of congress as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution
provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only
one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and
the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to
be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the
phrase a representative of congress should be construed as to
having only one representative that would come from either house, not
both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of
the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers
to its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of
laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each
house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of
JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists
in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken
to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates
that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member
was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the
controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is
their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components
of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the
term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the

Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the

Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to
legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it
should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the
power of judicial review have been met in this case?
2. Is the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate
and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7
sitting members unconstitutional?
3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current
composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?
Held:
1. Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to
several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when
the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of
government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that
petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official
nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus
standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the
post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the
JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise
screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit
heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all
limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the
land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the
country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to
the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy.
The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee
to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to
seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can
readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a
JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court.
Then it goes to its composition where the regular members
are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a
representative from the private sector. On the second part lies
the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex
officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and
a representative of Congress.
The use of the singular letter a preceding representative of
Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been
the intention that more than one (1) representative from the

legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no

uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is
that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII, Section
8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate
or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that,
in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed
to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the
JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution
should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason
leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be
divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for
that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process,
especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose
would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise
mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would
be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every
possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew
that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting
deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of
Congress, the word Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate
and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so
worded because at the time the said provision was being
drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of
Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission
eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the
Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII,
Section 8 of the Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral
body refers to its primary function in government to
legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in
the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The
same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An interplay between the two houses is necessary in the realization of
these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of
JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses
exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress
must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under
the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They
are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general
rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies
the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of

unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have

consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception
applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DOJ; COMELEC; HON. LEILA DE
LIMA, HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., and the JOINT DOJCOMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and
FACT-FINDING TEAM
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a
joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall
conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and
anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating
and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004
and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases
composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial
report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of
North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated.
The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a
resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral
sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against
Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of
COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is
valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal
protection clause?
HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.
FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.
POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC
Sec 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers
and functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power
to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to
enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly,
and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of
prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter,
however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail
itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with
the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary
investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by
the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an

abdication of the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to

fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of
election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Dissenting Opinion. Justice Arturo Brion, with whom Justice Martin

Villarama fully concurred, wrote a Separate Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion. Justice Jose Mendoza wrote a Separate Opinion. Finally,
Justice Sereno wrote her own Dissenting Opinion.

SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the
equal protection clause.

The dissents in the July 5, 2011 decision

The dissents of the minority justices were on the other fine points of the
decision.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection

Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and FactFinding Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and
prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint
Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as
public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to
preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to
GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in
connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint
Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or
privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression
based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires
that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be
treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
DISMISSED.
The Hacienda Luisita v Luisita industrial park - July 15, 2011
In its Decision in Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) vs. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC), G.R. No. 171101, promulgated last July 5,
2011, the Supreme Court en banc DENIED the petition filed by HLI and
AFFIRMED the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands under
compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) of the government.
The Court however MODIFIED the PARCs resolutions and did not
order outright land distribution. Noting that there are operative facts
that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore,
the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application
of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they
want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution].
The Court said it cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in 1989, 93%
of the FWBs agreed to the Stock Distribution Option Agreement
(SDOA), which became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC. It
thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to
immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain
to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of
their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret
voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing
their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
The Court refused to pass upon the question on the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, the legal basis for the stock distribution option
exercised by Tadeco/HLI, because it was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and because the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the
case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic
since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA
9700. The Court also held that those portions of Hacienda Luisita that
have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired
by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and
Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO) should be excluded from
the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution since the said
intervenors are innocent purchasers for value. Finally, the Court held
that in determining the just compensation to be paid to HLI, the date of
the taking was November 21, 1989, the time when PARC approved
HLIs SDP.
Justice Presbitero Velasco wrote the majority opinion. Fully
concurring with him were Justices Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas
Bersamin, Mariano Del Castillo, Roberto Abad, and Jose Portugal
Perez. Chief Justice Renato Corona wrote what he styled as

Chief Justice Corona dissented insofar as the majority refused to

declare Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional. The provision grants to
corporate landowners the option to give qualified FWBs the right to
own capital stock of the corporation in lieu of actual land distribution.
The Chief Justice was of the view that by allowing the distribution of
capital stock, and not land, as compliance with agrarian reform, Sec.
31 of RA 6657 contravenes Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution,
which, he argued, requires that the law implementing the agrarian
reform program should employ [actual] land redistribution mechanism.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, he noted, the corporate landowner remains
to be the owner of the agricultural land. Qualified beneficiaries are
given ownership only of shares of stock, not [of] the lands they till. He
concluded that since an unconstitutional provision cannot be the basis
of a constitutional act, the SDP of petitioner HLI based on Section 31 of
RA 6657 is also unconstitutional.
Justice Mendoza fully concurred with Chief Justice Coronas position
that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional. He however agreed with
the majority that the FWBs be given the option to remain as
shareholders of HLI. He also joined Justice Brions proposal that that
the reckoning date for purposes of just compensation should be May
11, 1989, when the SDOA was executed by Tadeco, HLI and the
FWBs. Finally, he averred that considering that more than 10 years
have elapsed from May 11, 1989, the qualified FWBs, who can validly
dispose of their due shares, may do so, in favor of LBP or other
qualified beneficiaries. The 10-year period need not be counted from
the issuance of the Emancipation Title (EP) or Certificate of Land
Ownership Award CLOA) because, under the SDOA, shares, not land,
were to be awarded and distributed.
Justice Brions dissent centered on the consequences of the revocation
of HLIs SDP/SDOA. He argued that that the operative fact doctrine
only applies in considering the effects of a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a statute or a rule issued by the Executive
Department that is accorded the status of a statute. The SDOA/SDP is
neither a statute nor an executive issuance but a contract between the
FWBs and the landowners; hence, the operative fact doctrine is not
applicable. A contract stands on a different plane than a statute or an
executive issuance. When a contract is contrary to law, it is deemed
void ab initio. It produces no legal effects whatsoever. Thus, Justice
Brion questioned the option given by the majority to the FWBs to
remain as stockholders in an almost-bankrupt corporation like HLI. He
argued that the nullity of HLIs SDP/SDOA goes into its very existence,
and the parties to it must generally revert to their respective situations
prior to its execution. Restitution, he said, is therefore in order. With the
SDP being void, the FWBs should return everything they are proven to
have received pursuant to the terms of the SDOA/SDP. Justice Brion
then proposed that all aspects of the implementation of the mandatory
CARP coverage be determined by the DAR by starting with a clean
slate from [May 11,] 1989, the point in time when the compulsory
CARP coverage should start, and proceeding to adjust the relations of
the parties with due regard to the events that intervened [thereafter].
He also held that the time of the taking (when the computation of just
compensation shall be reckoned) shall be May 11, 1989, when the
SDOA was executed by Tadeco, HLI and the FWBs.
Justice Sereno dissented with respect to how the majority modified the
questioned PARC Resolutions (i.e., no immediate land distribution,
give first the original qualified FWBs the option to either remain as
stockholders of HLI or choose actual land distribution) and the
applicability of the operative fact doctrine. She would instead order the
DAR to forthwith determine the area of Hacienda Luisita that must be
covered by the compulsory coverage and monitor the land distribution
to the qualified FWBs.
Erroneous interpretation of the Courts decision
The High Tribunal actually voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition of HLI and to AFFIRM the PARC

resolutions. This is contrary to media reports that the Court voted 6-4
to dismiss the HLI petition. The five (not four) minority justices (Chief
Justice Corona, and Justices Brion, Villarama, Mendoza, and Sereno)
only partially dissented from the decision of the majority of six (Justice
Velasco Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, and
Perez). Justice Antonio Carpio took no part in the deliberations and in
the voting, while Justice Diosdado Peralta was on official leave. The
14th and 15th seats in the Court were earlier vacated by the
retirements of Justices Eduardo Antonio Nachura (June 13, 2011) and
Conchita Carpio-Morales (June 19, 2011).
Another misinterpretation came from no less than the Supreme Court
administrator and spokesperson, Atty. Midas Marquez. In a press
conference called after the promulgation of the Courts decision,
Marquez initially used the term referendum in explaining the High
Courts ruling. This created confusion among the parties and the
interested public since a referendum implies that the FWBs will have
to vote on a common mode by which to pursue their claims over
Hacienda Luisita. The decision was thus met with cries of
condemnation by the misinformed farmers and the various peoples
organizations and militant groups supportive of their cause.
Marquez would later correct himself in a subsequent press
briefing. But since by then the parties had already filed their respective
motions for reconsideration, he called upon everyone to just wait for
the final resolution of the motion[s], which is forthcoming anyway. The
resolution of the consolidated motions for reconsideration came
relatively early on November 22, 2011, or less than five months from
the promulgation of the decision.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME
SERVICES, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under
a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as
Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus
$700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per
month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano
Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and 7
days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and
twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA),
the dismissal was declared illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the
provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this
time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in
the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the
subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his
contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary
package he will receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on
the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the
law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the
State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly
the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end
in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of
OFWs wherever they may be employed.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing

constitutional provisions translate to economic security and

parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially
neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer
examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on,
OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year
vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or
more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more
than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period
employment;
The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other
OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp-March 14, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private
corporations incorporated under Philippine laws, both
engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,
pesticides and agricultural chemicals. Marcos issued Letter of
Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital recovery component
of Php10.00 per bag of fertilizer. The levy was to continue until
adequate capital was raised to make PPI financially viable.
Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
(FPA), which was then remitted the depository bank of PPI.
Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.After the
1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition
of the P10 levy. Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the
amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a
complaint for collection and damages, questioning the
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust,
unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition
that amounted to a denial of due process. PPI argues that
Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality
of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a "personal and
substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a
result of its enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not
suffer any damage from the imposition because" incidence of
the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers
themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question
the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.What is the power of
taxation?
RULING: Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct
injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality
which may be waived. The imposition of the levy was an
exercise of the taxation power of the state. While it is true
that the power to tax can be used as an implement of police
power, the primary purpose of the levy was revenue
generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue
is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the
exaction is properly called a tax. Police power and the power
of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are
distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the
power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes
to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police
power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while
taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful subjects" and
"lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a
law enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on
the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and
constitutional limitations.
CLAUDIA S. YAP v. THENAMARIS SHIPS MGT & INTERMARE
MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,
FACTS:

Petitioner was employed as an electrician of the vessel, M/T

SEASCOUT by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its
principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. The contract was for 12 months. On
23 August 2001,Yapboarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job
as electrician. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel
was sold.

Also, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker

allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the computation of
the lump-sum salary. First, fair play, justice, and due process dictate
that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this
question. Second, the allowance was encapsulated in the basic salary
clause.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along
with the scrapping bonus. However, he insisted that he was entitled to
the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was
illegally dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for
immediate transfer but none was made.

Luz Farms vs. Sec of DAR G.R. No. 86889. December 4,

1990
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining
order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions
of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the
Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit
Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to
herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.
On June 10,1988, the President of the Philippines approved
R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine in its coverage.
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section
11 of R.A. No. 6657.
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in
the livestock and poultry business and together with others in
the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected
by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13,
Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and
of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production
and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on
January 2,1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January
9,1989.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No.
6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) is
constitutional.
Held:
If legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to
declare what the other branches of the government had
assumed to do, as void? This is the essence of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII,
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the
1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the
Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in
many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]). (
reason why it was held as the court did)
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE
permanent. SO ORDERED.

Respondents contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed. They

further alleged that Yaps contract was validly terminated due to the
sale of the vessel and no arrangement was made for Yaps transfer to
Thenamaris other vessels.
Thus, Yap brought the issue before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled
that petitioner was illegally dismissed; that respondents acted in bad
faith when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation but he was not
able to board; and that petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine months
(US$12,870.00), P100,000 for moral damages, and P50,000 for
exemplary damages with 10% of the same for Attys fees.
Respondents sought recourse from the NLRC which modified the
award of salaries from that corresponding to nine months to only three
months (US$4,290.00) pursuant to Section 10 R.A. No. 8042.
Respondents and petitioner both filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
NLRC affirmed the finding of Illegal Dismissal and Bad Faith on the
part of respondent. However, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision,
holding that "there can be no choice to grant only 3 months salary for
every year of the unexpired term because there is no full year of
unexpired term which this can be applied."
Respondents filed an MR, which the NLRC denied. Undaunted,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC.
However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LAs
interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The CA relied on the
clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042.
Both parties filed their respective MRs which the CA denied. Thus, this
petition.
ISSUE:
[1] Whether Section 10 of R.A. 8042, to the extent that it affords an
illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of "salaries for
[the] unexpired portion of his employment contract for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is
constitutional;
[2] Assuming that it is, whether the CA gravely erred in granting
petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term of
9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired term"
threshold.
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.
We have previously declared that the clause "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional
for being violative of the rights of (OFWs) to equal protection.
Moreover, the subject clause does not state any definitive
governmental purpose, hence, it also violates petitioner's right to
substantive due process.
Generally, an unconstitutional act is not a law. An exception to this is
the doctrine of operative fact applied when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. This case should not be included in the
exception. It was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an
act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents.

JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS vs. THE MUN OF

URDANETA, ET AL (18 OCT 1979)
FACTS:A criminal complaint was filed against plaintiff
Primiscias for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of
1964 after being apprehended by a member of the Municipal
Police for overtaking a truck. Primiscias thereafter filed for the
annulment of the subject ordinance with prayer for issuance
of preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from enforcing
the said ordinance. The Court of First Instance rendered
Ordinance No. 3,S-1964 as null and void, and repealed by RA

4136 also known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.

Appellant appealed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964
enacted by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pang is null and
void.
HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that subject ordinance
has been repealed by the enactment of RA 4316 and has

therefor, become null and void stating that a later law prevails
over an earlier law. The Supreme Court further averred that
local ordinances, in this case, a municipal ordinance, are
inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state and
whenever there is conflict between an ordinance and a
statute, the ordinance must give way.