1

2015 GOLDEN BEACON

POLITICAL LAW
By:
Dean MANUEL R. BUSTAMANTE

1.

WRIT OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO OF NORIEL H.
RODRIQUEZ vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO et. al.
G.R. 191805,

November

15,

2011, 660 SCRA 84

FACTS: Rodriguez, a member of KMP, was

abducted by military men and
was tortured when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA.
When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data against President Arroyo et. al.
ISSUES: 1) Whether
President
GMA
may
command responsibility
doctrine within the
proceedings.
2) Whether the rights
to life, liberty
violated or threatened by respondents.

and

be held
liable under the
context of
the
amparo
property

of

Rodriguez

are

HELD: YES. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command

responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a
superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as his superior and
the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the superior knew or
had reason to know that the crime was about or had been committed;
and (c)
the
superior
failed
to
take the necessary and
reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The President, being
the
commander-in-chief
of
all
armed
forces,
necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a
superior within the purview of the command responsibility.
2) YES. The totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably
prove the responsibility and accountability of some respondents in violating
his life, liberty and security. The right to security of a person includes
the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the
duty to investigate. In this case, there was an abject failure to conduct a
fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the
military wherein respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of
the military.
While on military custody, he
was
forced
to
sign documents
declaring that he had surrendered in an encounter and the soldiers did
not shoot him because he became a military asset.

SPOUSES NERIO & SOLEDAD PADOR vs. BARANGAY

CAPTAIN BERNABE ARCAYAN et. al.
G.R. No. 183460, March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 192

FACTS: Respondents conducted a raid on the property of Padors based on

information that the latter were cultivators of marijuana. The barangay captain
sent
them invitation letters without stating the purpose of the invitation.
Barangay Captain Arcayan refused to receive Padors letter-reply. Anticipating
the possibility more harassment cases,
false accusations and potential
violence from respondents, the Padors filed a writ of amparo.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Padors are entitled to a writ of Amparo.

2
HELD:
NO. To be entitled to
the privilege of
the writ of Amparo,
petitioners must be proven by substantial evidence that their rights to
life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission. It was undisputed that the intrusion occurred, whether
the
entry
was
done
with
or
without permission, it
was merely a
violation of Padors property rights. The writ of Amparo does not envisage
the
protection of concerns
that
are purely property or
commercial
in
nature.

2. FREEDOM

OF EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ

vs.

AND

OF

THE

PRESS

RAUL M. GONZALES

G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441

FACTS: Press Secretary Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning
to destabilize the administration by releasing
an
audiotape of a mobile
phone conversation
allegedly between
the President GMA and
Comelec
Commissioner Garcillano. The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through
wire-tapping. Atty. Allan Paguia subsequently released an alleged authentic
tape recording of the wiretap.
Included
in
the tapes were purportedly
conversations
of
the
President,
First
Gentlemen,
Comelec Commissioner
Garcillano and the late Senator Barbers.
DOJ Secretary
Gonzales
warned
reporters
that
those
who
had
copies
of
the CD
and
those
broadcasting
or
publishing
its contents could
be
held
liable
under
the
Anti-Wiretapping
Act. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales
ordered the NBI
to go
after
media
organizations
found to have
caused
the
spread,
the
playing
and
the
printing
of
the contents
of
a
tape
of
an
alleged
wiretapped
conversations
involving
the
President
about
fixing votes
in
the
2004
national
elections .
The
NTC
issued
this
press
release :
NTC
GIVES
FAIR
WARNING
TO
RADIO
AND
TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS
TO
OBSERVE
ANTIWIRETAPPING
LAW
AND
PERTINENT
CIRCULARS
ON
PROGRAM
STANDARDS.
ISSUE: Whether
infringed at the

free
speech
and
case at bar.

freedom

of

the

press

have

been

HELD: YES. Government action

that
restricts
freedom
of
speech
or
of
the
press
based
on
content
is
given the strictest scrutiny,
with
the
government
having
the
burden
of
overcoming
the
presumed
unconstitutionality
by
the
clear
and
present
danger
rule.
This
rule
applies
equally
to
all
kinds
of
media ,
including
broadcast media.
The
acts
of
respondents focused solely on but one
object -- a specific content -- fixed as these
were
on
the
alleged
taped
conversations
between
the
President
and
a COMELEC official .
Undoubtedly
these
did
not
merely
provide
regulations
as
to
the
time,
place
or
manner
of
the
dissemination
of
speech
or
expression.
Free speech and free press may be identified to discuss publicly
and
truthfully
any
matter
of
public
interest
without
censorship
and
punishment.
There
is
to
be
no
previous
restraint
on
the
communication
of
view
or
subsequent
liability
whether
in
libel
suits,
prosecution
for
sedition,
or
action for
damages
or
contempt
proceedings
unless
there
be
a
clear
and
present
danger
of
substantive evil that Congress has right to prevent.

BAYAN
G.R. No. 169838,
*** Calibrated
unconstitutional.
1.
2.
3.

Pre-emptive

April

Response

vs.
29,

ERMITA
2006,

(CPR)

488
used

SCRA
to

226
disperse

rallies

Authorities must strictly observe the policy of maximum tolerance in

dealing with rallies.
The no permit, no rally policy under BP 880 is upheld.
Local
governments
are
ordered
to
designate
freedom
parks
where
rallies can be held without a permit within 30 days after the court
ruling becomes final.

is

4.
5.
6.

All parks in cities and municipalities that fail to designate Freedom

Park will become freedom parks.
Mayors
have
two
days
to
act
on rally permit applications.
Applications are deemed approved if no action is taken.
Specific reasons must be stated in writing if a rally permit application
is denied,
namely
clear
and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175241, February

24, 2010,

vs.
613

MAYOR LITO ATIENZA

SCRA

518

FACTS: On June 15, 2006, the IBP filed with the Office of the Mayor of
Manila an application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge
on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.
Mayor Atienza issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP
to stage a rally
on a given date
but indicated therein Plaza Miranda
as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received
on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, IBP filed on June 21, 2006 a petition for certiorari at the
Court of Appeals. The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from
filing brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The high courts resolution
of November 20, 2006 denied the petition for being moot and academic.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the
justiciable controversy.
rally

2. Whether the
permit constitutes

instant

petition

modification of
grave
abuse

no
the
of

longer

present

venue
in
discretion.

IBPs

HELD:
1. NO. An exception to
the
decide
a
question
otherwise
moot
yet
evading review.

rule
on
if
it
is

mootness,
courts
will
capable
of
repetition ,

In
the
present
case,
the
question
of
the
legality
of
a
modification
of
a
permit
to
rally
will
arise
each
time
the
terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official , yet
it
evades
review,
owing
to
the
limited
time
in
processing
the
application
where
the
shortest
allowable
period
is
five
days
to
the assembly.
2. YES. It
is
an
indispensable
condition
to
such
refusal
or
modification
that
the
clear
and
present
danger
test
be
the
standard
for
the
decision
reached.
If
he
is
of
the
view
that
there
is
such
an
imminent
and grave danger of
a
substantive
evil,
the
applicant
must
be
heard
on
the
matter. Thereafter, his
decision whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted
to them
at
the
earliest
opportunity.
Thus,
if
so
minded,
they
can
have
recourse
to
the
proper
judicial
authority.
In
modifying
the
permit
outright,
Mayor
Atienza
gravely
abused
his
discretion
when
he
did
not
immediately
inform
the
IBP
who
should
have
been
heard
first
on
the
matter
of
his
perceived
imminent
and
grave
danger
of
a
substantive
evil
that
may
warrant
the
changing
of
the
venue .
The
opportunity
to
be
heard
precedes
the
action
on
the
permit ,
since
the
applicant
may
directly
go
to
court
after
an unfavorable
action
on
the permit.

PHILIPPINE

JOURNALISTS, INC. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN

G.R. No. 143372, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 482

FACTS: A news item was published by the petitioner that a certain Swiss
national was shooting cats and dogs that come up his walls and driving
barbarously with children playing around. It was proven at the trial that the
news article contained several inaccuracies.

4
ISSUE: Whether or
freedom of speech
this case.

not
and

the constitutional privilege granted under the

of the press
extends to the petitioner in

HELD: NO. The freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute.
Libel is not
protected
speech .
Although
it
has
been
stressed
that
a
newspaper
should
not
be
held
to
account
to
a
point
of
suppression
for
honest
mistakes ,
or
imperfection
in
the
choice
of
words,
even
the
most
liberal
view
of
free
speech
has
never
countenanced
the
publication
of
falsehoods ,
especially
the
persistent
and
unmitigated
dissemination
of
patent
lies.
There
is
no
constitutional value in false statement
of
facts.

POSTING

OF

TARPAULIN

THE DIOCESE OF

BACOLOD

G.R. No. 205728,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1

FACTS: On February 21, 2013, the Diocese of Bacolod posted two (2) tarpaulins
within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
The
second
tarpaulin contains
the heading Conscience
Vote
and list
candidates
as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (PRO-RH)
Team Patay with an X mark.
The electoral candidates
were
classified
according to their vote on
the
adoption of the
RH law. Those who voted for the passage of the
law
were
classified
as comprising
Team Patay, while those who voted
against it form
Team Buhay.
The tarpaulins were neither sponsored nor paid for
contains names of candidates for
the 2013 elections.

by

any

candidate .

In

The Comelec issued a Notice to Remove Campaign ordering the tarpaulins

removal within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise, it will be constrained to
file an election offense against the Diocese of
Bacolod.
ISSUE:
Whether the removal of
expression and right to property.

the

tarpaulins

violate

the

right

to

freedom

of

HELD: YES. The removal of tarpaulins violates petitioners right to freedom of

expression. Comelec had no legal basis
to issue an order
as the tarpaulins
were
not
paid
for
by
any
candidate or political party and the
candidates
were not consulted regarding the posting.
Comelec
preferred
right
case.

does
not have
to freedom of

the
authority to
regulate the enjoyment
expression
exercised by a non-candidate

First, the petitioner is a private individual

commentary
on
the
candidates
when
the
removed.
Second, the
Third,

the

who has
Comelec

lost his
ordered

of the
in this

right
the

to give
tarpaulin

tarpaulin is protected speech.

tarpaulins

and

their

message

are

not

religious

speech.

More
importantly, every citizens
expression with
political consequences
enjoys a high
degree of protection . While the tarpaulin may influence the
success
or failure of the named candidates
and political parties,
this does
not mean it is election propaganda.

3.

RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

of

- Right of government employees to organize: limited

unions or associations only, no right to strike.

to

the

formation

GSIS vs. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA NG GSIS (KMG)

G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006,

510 SCRA 622

FACTS: For four (4) straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS
employees staged a walkout and waged or participated in a mass protest or
demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main building against Winston
Garcias mismanagement of the financial resources of the GSIS. Administrative
sanctions were imposed against those who participated in said mass action.

5
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not
(GOCC) is covered by Civil
to conduct concerted mass

GSIS, a government owned

Service Law and thus its
actions.

(2) Whether or not the

air
grievances
be
considered
crowd.

and controlled corporation

employees are prohibited

four-day mass actions of

GSIS
an
assembly of citizens
or

employees to
a
striking

HELD: (1) YES, under the 1987 Constitutions, government owned

and controlled
corporations with original charters like GSIS are covered by the Civil Service
Law. As such,
employees
of
GSIS
are
part
of
the
civil
service
system
and
are
subject
to
the
guidelines
for
the
exercise
of
the
right
to
organize of government employees , however, they are prohibited on concerted
mass
action
in
the
public
sector.
(2) It is an STRIKING CROWD, the stubborn fact remains that the erring
employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time , had
taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically
after. As events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main office
building during office hours and staged rallies and protests , and even tried to
convince
others
to
join
their
cause ,
thus
provoking
work
stoppage
by
government personnel and service-delivery disruptions , the very evil sought to be
forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.
Any collective activity undertaken by government employees with the intent
of
effective
work
stoppage
or
service
disruption
in
order
to
realize
their
demands
or
force
concession,
economic
or
otherwise,
is
a
prohibited
concerted
mass
actions.

4.

POLICE POWER OF THE STATE

MMDA vs. DANTE GARIN
G.R. No. 130230,

April 5, 2005, 456 SCRA 176

FACTS: Respondent Garin assails the validity of Section 5 (f) of RA 7924 creating
the MMDA which authorized it to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license
in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations. He further contended that the
provision violates
the constitutional prohibition against delegation of legislative
authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and
therefore unlimited fines and other penalties.
ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

MMDA

is

vested

with

police

and

legislative

power?

HELD:
NO. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let
legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.

alone

MMDA is not a local government unit

or
a
public corporation endowed
with
legislative power.
It
has
no
power
to
enact
ordinances
for
the
welfare of the community. With the passage of RA 7924, Metropolitan Manila
was declared as a
special development and administrative region and the
administration of metro-wide basic services affecting the region placed under
a development authority referred
to
as
the
MMDA.
The powers of
coordination, regulation,
of policies, installation

the MMDA are limited to the following acts : formulation,

implementation, preparation,
management monitoring, setting
of a system and administration.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty,

is
the
power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain and
establish
all
manner
of
wholesome
and
reasonable
laws ,
statues
and
ordinances,
either
with
penalties
or
without,
not
repugnant
to
the
Constitution ,
as
they
judge to be for the good
and
welfare of the commonwealth and
for the subjects
of
the
same.

MMDA vs. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING PROMOTIONS

G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009, 608 SCRA 335
FACTS: Pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, MMDA prohibited the posting,
installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers,
in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space.
Trackworks entered into contract with MRT3 for advertising services, however, when
Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the formers
billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

6
ISSUE:
Whether
signages

MMDA

has

authority

to

dismantle

the

subject

billboards

and

HELD: NO, it
is
futile
for
MMDA to
simply
invoke
its
legal
mandate
to
justify the dismantling of Trackworks billboards, signages and other advertising
media. MMDA
simply
had
no
power
of
its
own
to
dismantle , remove the
billboards, signages and other advertising
media on the MRT3 structures by
Trackworks.
The MMDAs
power
were
limited
to
the
formulation , coordination,
regulation,
implementation,
preparation,
management
monitoring,
setting
of
policies, installing a system and administration . Nothing in RA 7924 granted
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The
prohibitions
against
posting,
installation
and
display
of
billboards,
signages and
other
advertising
media
applied
only
to
public
areas
but
MRT3,
being
private property,
was
not
one
of
the
areas
to
which
the
prohibition
applied.

RODOLFO BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH

G.R. No. 133640, November

25,

2005, 476 SCRA 168.

RA 7719 required the phase-out of commercial

who operated commercial blood bank, argued that the
of property without due process.

blood banks.
law constituted

Petitioners,
deprivation

HELD: The avowed policy of the law

is
the
protection of public health by
ensuring
an
adequate
supply
of
safe
blood
in
the
country
through
voluntary blood donation. To give meaning to the purpose of the law , the
legislature deemed
it
necessary
to
phase
out
commercial
blood
banks . RA
7719 is a valid exercise of police power. The legislature adopted a course
of
action
that is both necessary
and
reasonable
for
the
common good.
with

Police power in the state

personal liberty or property

authority to enact legislation that

in order to promote the general

may interfere
welfare . (Pita

vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 362).

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons
may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government ,
the rights of the individual may be subordinated . (Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 104786, January 27,

1994, 229 SCRA 554).

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier

purpose targeted
by
the government . (Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs.
Drilon,

G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988,

163

SCRA

386).

AMELIA CABRERA vs. MANUEL LAPID

G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006,

510 SCRA 55

FACTS: Petitioners fishpond was ordered demolished by the respondent Governor

in the presence of media representatives and other government officials
because
it
was
purportedly
illegal
and
blocked
the
flow
of
the
Pasak
River.
Respondent claimed
that
the
demolition of the fishpond is
an
exercise of
police power.
ISSUE: Whether

the

demolition

of

the

fishpond

is

valid.

HELD: YES. The demolition of the illegal fishpond following the declaration thereof
as a nuisance per
se
constitutes
exercise
of
the
police
power
of
the
state.
The
acts
of
blasting
of
the
subject
fishpond
were
only
impelled
to
serve
the
best
interest
of
the
general
public for
the
good
and
the
highest
good.

ROBERT

TAYABAN

G.R. No. 150194,

et. al.

vs.

PEOPLE

March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 488

FACTS: A
formal
contract
was
executed
by
contractor
Pugong and
the
Cordillera Executive Board, the
project
owner,
for
the
construction of
the
Tinoc public market. While the construction was on progress, the Sangguniang
Bayan of
Tinoc adopted Resolution No. 20 to demolish the erected
structures
for
the purpose of
erecting
the Public Market Building. On
that
same
day,
Mayor Tayaban and
his co-petitioners, together with some
men,
proceeded
to
the construction site and demolished the structures and improvements introduced
thereon

7
As
a
result, Mayor
Tayaban and
his
co-petitioners
were
charged
for
violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
alleging
that
in
the
performance
of
their
official
functions
and
acting
in
evident
bad
faith,
willfully
and
unlawfully
pass
and
unanimously
approve
Resolution
No. 20, vesting
upon
themselves
powers
and
authority
to
demolish
the
half-finished Tinoc Public Market construction to the damage and prejudice of the
government particularly the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB), being the owner of
the project.
ISSUE: Whether
demolition.

or

not

there

was

valid

exercise

of

police

HELD: NO. petitioners

were guilty of
bad faith
in
causing
Evidence of this is the fact that
Resolution No. 20
was
the same day that it
was adopted
without
due
notice
demolition
given
to
the CEB and
the private
contractor.

power

in

the

the
demolition .
implemented
on
of the planned

Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners contention

that the
subject demolition
is
a
valid
exercise
of
police
power .
The
exercise of
police power
by
the
local
government
is
valid
unless
it
contravenes
the
fundamental law
of
the land , or
an act
of
the
legislatures , or
unless
it
is
against
public
policy ,
or
is
unreasonable,
oppressive,
partial,
discriminating, or in derogation
of
a
common right .
In the
present
case,
the
acts
of
petitioner have been
established
as
a
violation
of
law ,
particularly
of
the
provisions
of
Section 3 (e)
of
R.A.
No.
3019.

WHITE

LIGHT

CORPORATION

vs.

CITY

OF

MANILA

G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416

FACTS: Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 prohibits short time rates and admissions,
wash-up rates in hotels, motels, inns and other similar establishments
in the
City of Manila. The said ordinance was questioned for being unconstitutional
and void since it
violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement.
It
is
also
criticized
as
an
invalid
exercise
of
police
power
and
it
is
an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
ISSUE: Is
a
city
ordinance
admissions
in
hotels,
motels
exercise of
police
power?

absolutely
prohibiting
and
other
similar

HELD: NO. The

prohibition
not
only
affects
the
owners
but
also
of
third
persons
who
would
short time rates.
The
rights
involved
not
only
the
petitioners
but
the
liberty
and
privacy
of
be
their
customers.
It
bears
stressing
that
the
test
power
requires
that (1)
it
must
be
in
general
as
distinguished
from
that
the
means
employed
must
be
accomplishment
of
the
purpose
and
private
rights.

short
time
establishments

rates
and
a
valid

property
rights
of
the
wish
to
avail
of
the
the
property
rights
of
third
persons
who
may

for
the
valid
exercise
of
police
for
the
interests
of
the
public
of
a
particular
class
and
(2)
reasonably
necessary
for
the
must
not
unduly
oppressive
of

MMDA vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO. INC.

G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 341
FACTS: E.O. 179 was issued providing for the establishment of greater Manila
transport system and designated MMDA to implement the removal of bus terminals
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares
and providing a more convenient
access to the mass transport system and to the commuting public through the
provision of mass transport terminal facilities.
ISSUE: Is

E.O.

179

constitutional

as

valid

exercise

of

police

power?

HELD: NO. The

said
E.O .
failed
to
satisfy
one
of
the
valid
tests
of
the
proper
exercise
of
police
power ,
namely,
the
means
employed
are
reasonably
necessary
for
the
accomplishment
of
the
purpose
and
not
unduly
oppressive
upon
individuals.
Closure
of
the
bus
terminals
would
not
solve
the
traffic congestions
in
the street.
Furthermore,
legislative
power
closure of
bus

MMDA
has
no
authority
to
implement
the
said
terminals.

be
it
police
E.O.
for
the

power
order

or
of

8
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. vs. DSWD & DOF SECRETARY
G.R. No. 175356,

December 3, 2013, 711 SCRA 302

FACTS: Upon the enactment of RA 9257 amending Sec. 4 of RA 7432 otherwise

known as
Expanded Senior Citizen Act, the DSWD and DOF issued IRRs allowing
business establishment to claim 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax
deduction. Petitioner questions said tax treatment as it contravenes to the former
Sec. 4 (a) of RA 7432 which allows 20% discount given to senior citizens as a
tax credit. It further claims that allowing the 20% tax deduction scheme would
violate Sec. 9 (1) Art. III of the Constitution which provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 20% discount to senior citizens that may be claimed
a tax deduction by private establishments, valid and constitutional.

as

HELD: YES. The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of public power where
just compensation is not warranted contrary to the claim that it is an exercise of
eminent domain which would render it unconstitutional because it is not a peso to
peso reimbursement of the 20% discount given to senior citizens.
The 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments
to price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals,
senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential concern.

5.

AMENDMENTS

AND REVISIONS
LAMBINO

vs.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160

FACTS: On 15 February 2006, petitioners, namely Lambino and Aumentado (Lambino
Group), commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5
(b) and (c) and Section 7 of R.A. No. 6735
or the Initiative and Referendum
Act (RA 6735).
However, in a Resolution dated 31 August 2006, the COMELEC denied due
course
to the initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. The COMELEC
invoked the Courts ruling in Santiago vs. Comelec declaring RA 6735 inadequate
to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Thereafter, the Lambino Group prayed for the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution and to compel
the
COMELEC
to give due course to their initiative petition.
The Lambino
Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in
denying
their
petition since Santiago is not a
binding
precedent.
Alternatively,
the
Lambino Group
claims
that
Santiago binds only
the
parties
to
that
case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the will of
the sovereign people.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or
with Section 2 , Article
Constitution through
a

not
the
XVII
of
peoples

Lambino
Groups
the
Constitution
initiative.

initiative
petition
on
amendment

2. Whether
or
not
the
Court
should
revisit
declaring RA 6 735 incomplete,
inadequate
or
wanting
conditions
to
implement
the
initiative
clause
on
the Constitution.

complies
to
the

its
ruling
in
Santiago
in essential
terms
and
proposals
to
amend

HELD: 1. NO. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly
state that
the petition
must
set
forth
the
full
text
of
the
proposed
amendments.
However,
the deliberations of
the framers of our
Constitution
clearly
show
that
the
framers
intended
to
adopt
the
relevant
American
jurisprudence
on
peoples
initiative.
In
particular,
the
deliberations
of
the
Constitutional
Commission
explicitly
reveal
that the framers intended that
the
people must
first
see
the full context
of the proposed
amendments
before
they sign, and
that the people
must
sign
on
a
petition
containing
such
full text. Indeed, Section 5 (b) of RA 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act
that
the
Lambino
Group invokes
as
valid,
requires
that
the people must
sign the petition x x x as signatories.

9
In the instant case, there is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of
text
of the Lambino Groups
proposed
changes
in
the
signature
sheet .
Neither
does
the
signature
sheet
state
that
the
text
of
the
proposed
changes
is
attached to it.
The
signature sheet
merely
asks
a
question
whether
the
people
approve a shift
from
the
Bicameral-Presidential
to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary
system of government. The signature
sheet
does
not
show
to
the
people
the
draft
of
the
proposed
changes
before
they
are
asked
to
sign
the
signature
sheet .
Clearly,
the
signature
sheet
is not
the petition that the framers
of
the Constitution
envisioned
when they formulated
the initiative clause in Section 2, Article
XVII
of the
Constitution.
Furthermore,
the initiative petition violates Sec. 12, Article XVI of the
Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives. A peoples initiative to change
the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to
its revision. Certainly, the Lambino groups initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the
basic
plan
of
government,
from
presidential
to
parliamentary;
and
from
bicameral to unicameral legislature.
2. NO. The present petition warrants dismissal
for failure to comply
with
the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on the
conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is
no
need
to
revisit
this
Courts
ruling
in
Santiago
declaring
RA
6735
incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions
to cover
the
system
of
initiative
to amend
the Constitution . The Court
must
avoid
revisiting
a
ruling
involving
the
constitutionality
of
a
statute
if the case
before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is
a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass
upon the constitutionality of a statute
if
the
case
can
be
resolved
on
some other grounds.
The Court added that, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement
the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not
change the result because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution.
To be a
valid
initiative,
the present
initiative
must
first
comply
with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
even before complying
with RA 6735.

6. CITIZENSHIP
TABASA

vs.

G.R. No. 125793,

COURT
August

29,

OF
2006,

APPEALS
500

SCRA 9

FACTS: The petitioner, Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. His father, Rodolfo Tabasa, having acquired US citizenship through
naturalization,
the
petitioner
also
acquired
American
citizenship
by
derivative
naturalization.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as
a balikbayan for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by
agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996. The reason for the arrest
and detention was a letter of the Consul General of the US Embassy, Kevin
Herbert, to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) saying that the
petitioners passport has been revoked by the US Department of State making
the
petitioner
an
undocumented
and
undesirable
alien
in
the
Philippines.
Thereafter, the BID ordered deportation to his country of origin.
Petitioner then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.
Afterwards,
he
also
filed
a
Supplemental
Petition
alleging
Filipino
citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171 and that because he is
now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent
Bureau. The Court of Appeals ruled against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether
RA 8171 and
origin.

or not petitioner
therefore
cannot

has validly reacquired Philippine

be
summarily
deported
to

citizenship under
his country of

HELD: NO. The Court said that the only persons entitled to repatriation under
RA 8171 are the following:
(1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens; and
(2) Natural-born Filipinos including minor children who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

10
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171
is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said naturalborn citizen. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine
citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under
RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the
law. To claim the benefit of RA 8171 , however, the children must be of minor
age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent . This is so
because a child life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like
the election of citizenship.
In the case at bar, petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his
repatriation
on June 13, 1996.
The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to
children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for
repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country
due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship
by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was
his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in
deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his.

SPOUSES DAVID & MARISA WILLIAM vs. ATTY. RUDY ENRIQUEZ

A.C. No. 6353,

February

26,

2006,

483

SCRA

204

FACTS: Respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil Case

pending
before
the
RTC
of
Dumaguete
City
where
complainants
are
the
defendants. According to the complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot
subject of the controversy. A TCT was then issued in her favor, stating that
she is a Filipino married to David W. Williams, an American Citizen.
On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with falsification of public
documents
before
the
Office
of
the
City
Prosecutor
of
Dumaguete
City.
Respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no longer a citizen
of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her marriage to David
Williams.
ISSUE:
married

Whether or not
David Williams.

Mrs.

Williams

lose

her

Filipino

citizenship

when

she

HELD: NO. Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution provides: Sec. 4. Citizens of

the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed under the law, to have renounced it.
There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa BacatanWilliams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her Certificate of Marriage,
which
does
not
show
that
she
has
automatically
acquired
her
husbands
citizenship upon her marriage to him.

MA. JEANETTE TECSON

G.R. No. 161634,

March

vs.
3,

COMELEC

2004,

424

SCRA

&

FPJ

277

FACTS: Atty. Fornier filed a Petition for Disqualification of Presidential Candidate

FPJ. He asserted that Poe is not a citizen, much more a natural-born citizen.
Fornier would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child. According to Fornier, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F.
Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making
his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and FPJ an illegitimate child.
The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than FPJ himself, consisting of a birth certificate of FPJ
and marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20
August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to
each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents
would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Atty. Fornier further contended that as an
illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley,
an American citizen.
ISSUE: Whether
Fernando Poe Jr.,
the main contenders for the May

the
2004

hero
of
silver
screen
and
one of
presidency,
a natural - born Filipino.

11
HELD: YES. The question whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed
by the Comelec, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether
or not the father of respondent , Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
FPJ prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn
from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old , Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence , could have well been
his place residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether
such children are legitimate
or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation
to
Section
74,
of
the
Omnibus Election Code.

2ND LT. SALVADOR

G.R. No.

PARREO
162224,

vs.

COMMISSION

June 7,

2007,

523

ON

SCRA

AUDIT

(COA)

390

FACTS: Salvador Parreo served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
for
32
years.
On
5
January
1982,
petitioner
retired
from the
Philippine
Constabulary
with
the
rank
of
2 nd Lieutenant.
Parreo
availed
and
received
payment of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985,
Parreo started receiving his monthly pension amounting to Php13,680.00.
Parreo migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In
January 2001, the AFP stopped Parreos monthly pension in accordance with
Section 27 of PD 1638 as amended by PD 1650, provides that a retiree who
losses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Parreo filed a
claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension but COA
denied the same.
ISSUES: (1)
Whether
or
not
the
COA
has
jurisdiction
to
rule
on
the
constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638 as amended.
(2) Whether or not COA commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners
money
claim.
(3) Whether PD 1638 as amended has retroactive or prospective effect.

(4)
(5)

Whether
or
not
petitioner
benefits.
Whether
petitioner
was
denied
clause of the Constitution.

has
of

vested
equal

right
protection

to
and

his
due

retirement
process

HELD: (1) NO. The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the
government does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality
or
validity of laws.
The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare
unconstitutional
a
law,
treaty,
international
or
executive
agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the Supreme
Court and in all Regional Trial Courts.
(2) NO.
Assuming
that COA assumed jurisdiction over the instance case,
claimants entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must
necessarily be severed or stopped upon loss of his Filipino citizenship as
prescribed in Section 27, PD 1638 as amended.
The
COA effectively denied petitioners claim because of the loss of his
Filipino citizenship.
(3) Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement
and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who
were in the service at the time of its approval.
In fact, Section 2 of PD 1638 as amended provides that the decree shall
apply to all military personnel in the service of the AFP. PD 1638, as
amended, was signed on 10 September 1979. Parreo retired in 1982, long after
the approval of PD 1638 as amended. Hence, the provisions of PD 1638, as
amended, apply to Parreo.

12

(4) NO. As a rule, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by
the due process clause. At the time of the approval of PD 1638 and at the
time
of
its
amendments,
Parreo
was
still
in
active
service.
Hence,
his
retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not constitute a vested
right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee,
he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature
of employment, age and length of service.
It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquires a vested right
to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest wherever they
acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.
Further, the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in
nature. They are not similar to pension plans where employer participation is
mandatory,
hence,
the
employers
have
contractual
or
vested
rights
in
the
pension which forms part of the compensation.
(5) NO. The constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws is not
absolute
but
is
subject
to
reasonable
classification.
To
be
reasonable,
the
classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member
of the class.
There is compliance with all these conditions . There is a substantial
difference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who
lost
their
Filipino
citizenship
by
naturalization
in
another
country
such
as
Parreo in this case.
The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render
personal and military service necessarily includes not only private citizen but
also citizen who have retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his
Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state , thus, he may
no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service
when
the
need
arises.
Parreos
loss
of
Filipino
citizenship
constitutes
a
substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their
Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another.
There was no denial of due process in this case. When Parreo lost his
Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension in
accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. He had opportunity to
contest the termination of his pension when he requested for reconsideration of
the removal of his name from the list of retirees and the termination of his
pension. The JAGS
denied the request pursuant to Section
27
of
PD
1638,
as amended.

REPUBLIC
G.R.

No. 153883,

January

vs.
13,

By being an illegitimate child of a

since birth without having to elect Filipino
age of majority.

ERNESTO MERCADO vs.

LIM

2004,

419

SCRA

123

Filipino mother , she is a Filipino

citizenship when she reached the

EDUARDO MANZANO

G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 630

FACTS: Edu Manzano was born in
San Francisco, California, USA and he
acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution and laws under
the
principle
of
jus
soli.
He
was a
natural
born
Filipino
citizen
by
operation
of
the
1935
Philippine
Constitution,
as
his
father
and
mother
were Filipinos at
the time of his birth.
During
the
1998
local
elections,
Manzano
obtained
the
highest
number
of
votes
among
the
candidates
for
vice
mayor
of
Makati
City
but
his
proclamation
was
suspended
in
view
of
a
petition for
disqualification
as
Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manzano is
candidate for vice mayor of
Makati

a natural
City.

born

citizen

and

qualified

as

13

HELD: YES. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis ,
while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, at birth, he was
a
national
of
both
of
the
Philippines
and
of
the
United
States .
By
participating in
1998
Philippine
elections,
Manzano
effectively
renounced
his
U.S. citizenship under American law so that now he is
solely a Philippine
national.
The
filing
of
certificate
of
candidacy
sufficed
to
renounce
his
American
citizenship
and
effectively
removing
any
disqualification
he might
have as a dual citizen.

CIRILO VALLES vs. COMELEC & ROSALIND Y. LOPEZ

G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 543
FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Western Australia
to Filipino father and
Australian mother. In 1952, she married
to
a
Filipino
citizen, Leopoldo Lopez, in Manila. Since then, she has
continuously participated
in
the
Philippine
electoral
process
not
only
as
a
voter
but
as
a
candidate. When she ran for governor of Davao Oriental, her election was
contested by her opponent as she was an Australian citizen.
ISSUE: Whether

or

not

Rosalind

Ybasco

Lopez

is

natural

born

citizen.

HELD: YES. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen, having born to a

Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount
to her losing her Philippine citizenship . If Australia follows the principle of
jus soli,
then at most,
she can also claim Australian
citizenship
resulting
to
her
possession
of
dual
citizenship.
When
she
filed
her
certificate
of
candidacy, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

EUSEBIO

EUGENIO K.

G.R. No. 182701,

LOPEZ

July 23, 2008,

vs.

COMELEC

559 SCRA 696

FACTS: Eusebio Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American
citizenship and renounced
his
Filipino citizenship.
By
virtue of RA 9225, he
became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship. He returned to the
Philippines and established his residence in Barangay Bagacay where he ran
as barangay chairman. He won the elections, took
his
oath
and
began to
discharge the functions of Barangay chairman but this
victory
was
challenged
as
he
failed to personally swear to a renunciation of foreign citizenship
at
the time of filing his certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing
an effective renunciation of
foreign

of a certificate
citizenship.

of

candidacy

operate

as

HELD: NO.
It
is
undisputed
that
Lopez
reacquired
his
Filipino
citizenship
under
RA
9225.
This
new
law
explicitly
provides
that
should
one
seek
elective
public
office,
he
should
first
make
a
personal
and
sworn
renunciation
of
any
and
all
foreign
citizenship
before
any
public
officer
authorized
to
administer
an
oath.
Lopez
failed
to
renounce
his
American
citizenship
as proven by the absence of an affidavit
that will prove the
contrary.
For
failure
of
Lopez
to
prove
that
he
abandoned
his
allegiance
to
the
United
States,
he
is
disqualified
from
running
for
an
elective
position
in
the
Philippines
and
the
votes
cast
in
his
favor
should
be
considered stray votes.

NESTOR

JACOT

G.R. No. 179848,

vs.

ROGEN

November

27,

T.

DAL

2008,

572

&

COMELEC

SCRA

295

FACTS: Nestor Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines who became
a
naturalized citizen of the U.S. on December 13, 1989.
He
reacquired
his
Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225.
During the 2007 elections, he
ran for
vice mayor in Catarman, Camiguin and garnered the highest number of votes
for
the
said
position.
Just
before
the
election,
Rogen
Dal
sought
his
disqualification for his failure to renounce his U.S.
citizenship
as
required
under
Section 5 (2)
of
RA
9225.
Jacot
countered
that
his
oath
of
allegiance
in
Los
Angeles
operated
as
an
effective
renunciation
of
his
foreign citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether
or
not
candidate
for his
failure
his U.S. citizenship.

Nestor
Jacot
to
make
a

is
disqualified
from
personal
and
sworn

running
as a
renunciation
of

HELD: YES. Under Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it categorically requires person

seeking
elective
public
office ,
who
either
retained
their
Philippine
citizenship
or
those
who
reacquired
it,
to
make
a
personal
and
sworn
renunciation
of
any
and
all
foreign
citizenship ,
before
a
public
officer
authorized
to
administer an oath
simultaneous with
or before the filing of the certificate
of candidacy. For his failure to comply with election requirements applicable
to
dual
citizen,
he
is
declared
disqualified
to
run
for
the
position
of
vice mayor of Catarman, Camiguin.

14

LOSS AND REACQUISITION

RENATO M.

DAVID

OF PHILIPPINE

vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY & PEOPLE

G.R. No. 199113,

FACTS:
In 1974, David
by
naturalization. Upon
Philippines.
beach
built

Sometime in 2000,
in Gloria, Oriental
However, in
his house

CITIZENSHIP

March 18,

2015

migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen

their
retirement, David and
his wife
returned
to
the
David purchased a 600 - square meter lot along the
Mindoro where he constructed a residential house.

the year 2004,

is public land

he came
and part

On April 12, 2007, David filed a

the
subject
land with
the
DENR
citizen.

to know that the

of salvage zone.

portion

Miscellaneous Lease Application

and
indicated
that
he
is

where

he

(MLA) over
a
Filipino

Agbay opposed his application on the ground that David is a

Canadian
citizen
and
disqualified
to
own
land
and also
filed
a
criminal
complaint
for falsification of public document for indicating in his MLA application that
he is a Filipino citizen.
RA

Meanwhile, David re-acquired his

9225 on October 11, 2007.

David
argued
that
he
is
acquiring the same
status under
not to have lost it at the time
the time when he was said to
his Miscellaneous Lease Application.

Filipino

citizenship

under

the

provisions

of

a
natural - born Filipino citizen and by reRA 9225 , he was by legal
fiction deemed
of his naturalization is Canada and through
have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in

ISSUE:
Whether the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of
another
country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under RA 9225 on dual citizenship.
HELD:
YES.
Section 3
of
RA 9225
categories
of
natural - born Filipinos.

lays

down

such

conditions

for

two

Under the first paragraph

are those natural born Filipinos who have lost
their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their
Filipino citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic
of
the
Philippines.
The second paragraph covers those natural born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after RA 9225 took effect , who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the same oath.
The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural born citizens who became citizens of a foreign country but the terminology used is
different, re-acquired for the first group, and retain for the second group.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country , they shall be
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant
to CA 63, under
which
naturalization in
a
foreign country is one of the
ways which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
RA 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the
old
law
which
takes
away
Philippine citizenship from
natural born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship , and
also
provides
for
the
procedure
for
re-acquiring
and
retaining
Philippine
citizenship.
In
the case of those who became foreign citizens after RA 9225 took
effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired citizenship
provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of RA 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural born Filipinos
under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost
Philippine
citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship , he
was able to re-acquire his
Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of
allegiance.

15
David made the untruthful statement in the MLA , a public document, that
he is a Filipino citizen at
the time of the filing of said
application , when in
fact
he
was still
a Canadian citizen . Under CA 63, the governing law at
the
time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country
was among those
ways by which a natural born citizen loses his Philippine
citizenship.
While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 six months later ,
the falsification was
already a
consummated act , the
said law
having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual
citizenship status is
concerned.

7.

S U F F R A G E
LOIDA NICOLAS - LEWIS vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649

A perusal
of
the
Constitution
suggests
that
Section 1
of
Article
V
prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to
vote. On the other hand, Section 2 of the same article authorizes Congress to
devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident
may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be
allowed to vote. In response to this mandate, the Congress enacted RA 9189
of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
The Court also noted that there is no provision in the dual citizenship
law - RA 9225 - requiring duals to
actually
establish
and
physically
stay
in
the
Philippine
first
before they
can
exercise
their
right
to
vote . On the
contrary, RA 9225, in implicit acknowledgment
that
duals
are
most
likely
non-residents,
grants
under
its
Section 5 (1) the
same right of suffrage as
that granted an absentee voter under RA 9189 . It cannot be overemphasized
that
RA 9189
aims,
in
essence,
to
enfranchise
as
much
as
possible
all
overseas
Filipinos
who,
save
for
the
residency
requirements
exacted
of
an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
** Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens
of
Philippines abroad exercise
their
right to vote.
** Overseas Absentee Voter
refers
to a
citizen
of
the Philippines who
is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified
by
law, who is abroad on the day of election.
the

ATTY. ROMULO

MACALINTAL

vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 614

Section 5 (d) of RA 9189 is not a violation of Sec. 1, Art. V of the
Constitution
and
is
therefore
not
unconstitutional.
The
interpretation
here
of
residence
is
synonymous with domicile. Under our
election
laws
and
the
countless pronouncements of the Court
pertaining
to
elections,
an
absentee
remains
attached
to
his residence in
the
Philippines ,
as
residence
is
considered
synonymous
with domicile.
Comelec should not be
belongs
to
the
Congress.
harmonized with the Overseas
canvassing
of
the votes
and
president
and vice president
hands
of Congress.

allowed to usurp a power that constitutionally

The
provisions
of
the
Constitution
should
be
Absentee Voting Act of
2003
and hence,
the
the
proclamation of the winning candidates for
for the entire nation
must
remain
in
the

8. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
ARTURO TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 148334, January

21,

2004,

420

SCRA

438

In case of vacancy in the Senate

or in the House of Representatives, a
special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed
by law, but the Senator or
Member of
the
House
of
Representatives
thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

16
In
case
a
vacancy
arises
in
Congress
at
least
one
year
before
the
expiration of the term, Sec. 2 of RA 6645, as amended, requires Comelec: (1)
to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which
shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) days after
the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the
office or offices to be voted for.
An
election
held
at
the
fact
that
the
body
election failed to do so.

the
time
thus
prescribed
is
not
invalidated
charged
by
law
with
the
duty
of
calling

by
the

The
test in determining the validity of a special
election in relation
to the failure to give notice of the special election
is whether the want
of
notice
has
resulted in
misleading
a
sufficient
number
of
votes
as
would
change
the
results
of
the
special
election.
If
the
lack
of
official
notice
misled
a
substantial
number of
voters
who
wrongly
believed
that
there was no special election to fill a vacancy,
a
choice by a small
percentage of voters would be void.
In a
election is
elections.

general election, where the law fixes the date of the election,
valid without
any
call
by
the
body charged
to
administer

the
the

In a
special
election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that
expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next
general election fixes the date at
which the special election is to be held
and operates
as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at
the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged
by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because
the right and duty to hold the election by some authority and the law thus
charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.

SENATE

OF

THE

G.R. No. 169777,

of
in
of

PHILIPPINES

April 20, 2006,

vs.

488

ERMITA

SCRA

While attendance to Congressional hearings is discretionary on the part

department
heads
during
the
question
hour,
such is not the case
inquiries in aid of legislation , except upon a valid and express claim
executive privilege.

The
principle
of
separation
of
powers
is
the
reason
why
executive
officials may not be compelled to attend hearings when the Congress exercises
its oversight functions. Though,
this
is
not
the
case
when
the
Congress
exercises
its
power of inquiry
in
aid of legislation.
Sections
21
and
22,
Article
VI therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other,
should
not
be
considered
as
pertaining
to
the
same
power of
Congress.
One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation,
the
aim
of
which
is
to
elicit
information
that
may
be
used
for
legislation, while
the
other
pertains
to
the
power
to
conduct
a
question
hour,
the
objectives
of
which
is
to
obtain
information
in
pursuit
of
Congress
oversight
function.

ROMULO

L. NERI
G.R.

No.

vs. SENATE
180643,

March

COMMITTEE
25,

2008,

549

ON

ACCOUNTABILITY

SCRA

77

FACTS: Neri was

invited
by
the
Senate
Committee
to
attend
the
joint
investigation
on
NBN
project.
He
testified
that
Abalos
brokered
for
ZTE
and
was
offered
P200 million
for
his
approval
of
the
project.
He
informed
the president
about
the
bribery
attempt
and
was
told
not
to
accept
the bribe. When
asked what had Neri and the President discussed
about the NBN project, he refused to answer invoking executive privilege.
ISSUE: Whether
or
not
the
questions
covered by executive privilege.

HELD:
YES.
privilege and
department.

The
that

that

Neri

questions
are
covered
by
this privilege has been validly

refused

to

presidential
claimed by

answer

are

communications
the executive

17
Ultimately,
the
power
of
Congress
to
compel
the
appearance
of
executive
officials under Section 21
and the lack of
it under Section 22
find
their
basis
in
the
principle
of
separation
of
powers .
While
the
executive
branch
is
a
co-equal
branch
of
the
legislature,
it
cannot
frustrate the power of Congress
to legislate by refusing
to
comply
with
its
demand
for
information.

STANDARD

CHARTERED
G.R.

No.

BANK vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS

167173,

December

27,

2007,

541

SCRA

456

FACTS: The Senate Committee conducted an inquiry in

aid
of
legislation
on
account
of
Senator
Enriles
privilege
speech
denouncing
Standard
Chartered
Bank (SCB)
for
selling
unregistered
foreign
securities
in
violation
of
RA
8799.
During
that
investigation,
SCB
representative
submitted
a
letter
presenting its position that these were cases pending in court involving the
same issues subject of the legislative inquiry.
ISSUE: Whether
the
power of

or
not
the pending cases
inquiry from the
legislature?

before

the

courts

could

divest

HELD: NO. The

unmistakable
objective
of
the
investigation
was
simply
to
denounce
the
illegal
practice
committed
by
a
foreign
bank
in
selling
unregistered
foreign securities by conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation
so
as
to
prevent
the
occurrence
of
a
similar
fraudulent
activity in the
future.
Indeed, the
mere
filing
of
a
before
a
court
or
a
quasi-judicial
conduct of legislative investigation.

ANTONIO

F.

TRILLANES IV

G.R. No. 179817,

June

criminal
or
body
should

vs.

an
administrative
not
automatically

HON.

27, 2008,

OSCAR

556

SCRA

complaint
bar the

PIMENTEL
471

FACTS: Trillanes is currently under detention due to charge of coup detat filed
against him for his participation in the Oakwood accident. As a result of
his
election
as
Senator,
he
asked
the
RTC
to
allow
him
to
leave
detention
in
order
to
attend
to
his
functions
as
a
Senator
and
to be
allowed to set up an office at his place of detention.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
to attend to his duties

Trillanes
be
as
Senator?

allowed

to

leave

detention

in

order

HELD: NO. Election

to
public
office
does
not
itself
merit
the
temporary
release
of
a
detention
prisoner
in
order
for
him
to
attend
to
his
official
duties. The
necessary
consequence
of
arrest
and
detention
is
to
curtail
the
detainees
physical
movement
and
practice
of
profession
or
occupation
including
that
of
holding offices.

ANTERO J. POBRE vs. SEN.

A.C. No. 7399,

MIRIAM

DEFENSOR

SANTIAGO

August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 1

FACTS: Out of personal

anger
and
frustration
at
not
being
considered
for
the post of Chief Justice, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago delivered a privilege
speech
on
the
Senate
floor
where
she
was
quoted
as
saying
that
she
wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court
and calling the Court a Supreme Court of
idiots.
ISSUE: Whether or
not
a disciplinary proceeding

the privilege speech

under the Rules of

is actionable
Court.

criminally

or

in

HELD: NO, because her statements, being part of her privilege speech as
a
member
of
Congress
was
covered
by
the
constitutional provision on
parliamentary
immunity.
Indeed,
her
privilege
speech
is
not
actionable
criminally
or
in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

9.

EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENT
GEN.

G.R.

No.

GUDANI

170165,

August

vs.
15,

GEN.
2006,

SENGA
498

SCRA

671

18
The
President has constitutional authority to
prevent
a member of the
armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry , by
virtue
of
her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any
chamber of
Congress which seeks the appearance before it
of
a
military
officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under the
law
to
compel
such
attendance.
Any
military
official
whom Congress
summons
to
testify
before
it
may
be
compelled
to do so by
the
President.
If
the
President
is
not
so
inclined ,
the
President
may
be
commanded by
judicial
order
to compel
the attendance
of
the
military
officer.
Final
judicial
orders
have
the
force of the law
of
the
land
which
the
President
has
the
duty
to
faithfully
execute.

PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 164978,
The
Congress

President
has
the
is
in
session.

vs.

October

13,

authority

ERMITA
2005,

to

472

issue

SCRA 587

acting

appointments

while

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is

in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the president, the
acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence.
Thus,
by
the
very
nature
of
the
office
of
a
department
secretary,
the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while
Congress
is
in
session .
That
person
may
or
may
not
be
the
permanent
appointee,
but
practical
reason may make it expedient that the
acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Distinguishing
capacity:

ad-interim

Both

are

of

them

appointments

effective

from

upon

appointments

in

an

acting

acceptance.

But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of

Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time
there is a vacancy.
Moreover, ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission
on Appointments
for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments
are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.

PIMENTEL

vs.

G.R. No. 158088,

EXECUTIVE
July

6,

2005,

SECRETARY
462

SCRA

622

Under
our
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President ,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate . The role of the Senate , however, is
limited only to giving
or withholding its consent
or
concurrence, to
the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit
a
treaty
to
the
Senate , or having
secured
its
consent
for
its
ratification, refuse to ratify it.
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a
treaty
which
has
been
signed
in
its
behalf
is
a
serious
step
that
should
not
be
taken
lightly,
such
decision
is
within
the
competence
of
the
President alone,
which
cannot
be
encroached
by
the
Court
via
a
writ
of
mandamus.

CONSTANTINO
472 SCRA 505, G.R. No.

106064,

vs.

October

*** Whether the President can delegate to

constitutional
authority to incur foreign debts.
- - - It fell upon the Secretary of
President to formulate
a
scheme
for
expressed by the President and respect

CUISIA
13,

2005,

the

472

Secretary

SCRA

505

of

Finance

Finance as
the alter ego of the
the
implementation
of
the
policy
sovereign debt.

- - - the lack
of showing that the President countermanded the
the
Secretary
of
Finance
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
they
presidential approval.

RUFINO vs. ENDRIGA

G.R. Nos.

139554

&

139565,

July

the

21,

2006,

496

SCRA

112

acts of
carried

19
The
source
of
the
Presidents
power
to
appoint ,
as
well
as
the
Legislatures authority to delegate the power to appoint , is found in Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Under the same
section, the Congress
may,
by law,
vest in the heads
of
departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards the appointment of officers lower in rank . However, the express language
of the Constitution and its framers intend that the heads of
departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards, upon whom the legislature may delegate the
power of appointment,
must appoint officers of lower rank and not
of coequal rank. Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 is, thus, irreconcilably inconsistent
with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6 (b) and (c) of
PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in
the CPP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees . And since
the
pertinent section
is
unconstitutional , the President
has the power to appoint
the trustees by virtue of Sec. 16 , Art. VII of the Constitution which gives the
President the power to appoint officers whose appointments are not provided
for by the law.

10.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

ALEJANO

468

vs.

AND CORRESPONDENCE

CABUAY

SCRA 188, G.R. No. 160792,

August

25,

2005

*** Whether the right to privacy of the petitioners who were detained
charged with staging a coup detat was violated
because the officials of
detention
center
opened
and
read
the
letters
they
were
sending
mailing.

and
the
for

- - Inmates
anyone.

with

are

- - Inmate
mail
government interest

deemed
may
such

to

have

no

be
censored
as security or

right

for
the
discipline.

- - The inspection of the letters is a

purpose as the opening of sealed letters
-and

Since the letters

their lawyer, the

correspond
furtherance

valid measure as
for the inspection

confidentially
of

it
of

substantial

serves the same

the contraband.

were not confidential communication between the detainees

officials of the detention center could read the letter.

- - If the letters are marked

and their lawyer,
the
officials
the envelop for inspection in

11.

to

confidential communications between the detainees

should
not
read
the
letter
but
only
open
the
presence
of
detainees.

JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT
KILOSBAYAN vs. EDUARDO ERMITA
G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 353

FACTS: Justice Gregory Ong was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court by the president through the Executive Secretary.
The appointment was
questioned because Ong is a Chinese citizen as indicated in his own birth
certificate
which
also
reveals
both
his
parents
were
Chinese
at
the
time
of
his
birth.
Justice
Ong
claimed
he
is
a
natural
born
citizen
as
indicated in the
certification
of
the
Bureau
of
Immigration and
the
opinion
of the DOJ Secretary Guingona.
ISSUE: Whether

or

not

Gregory

Ong

is

natural

born

citizen.

HELD: NO. He
is
a
naturalized
Filipino
citizen
because
his
Chinese father
was naturalized in 1964 when he was only eleven years old . The alleged
subsequent
recognition
of
his
natural
born
status
by
the
Bureau
of
Immigration
and
the
DOJ
cannot
prevail
since
citizenship
status
cannot
be
changed without a judicial order . Until he obtains a judicial order changing
his
citizenship
status,
he
cannot
accept
an
appointment
to
the
Supreme
Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution.
the
can

Naturalized
Filipino
citizens
are
disqualified
from
being
a
member
of
Supreme Court. Under the Constitution, only natural born Filipino citizen
be appointed as member of the Supreme Court.

FRANCISCO

CHAVEZ

vs. JUDICIAL &

BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 496

20
FACTS:
Under Section 8 (1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that: A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and
a representative
of
the
Congress,
as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the
Supreme Court and a representative of the private sector.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
An eight member was added to
the
JBC as the two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2)
of a vote.
In
Senate

2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives

and the House of Representatives one full vote each.

ISSUE: Whether or not

House of Congress with

from the

the practice of having two (2) representatives from each

one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.

HELD: NO, the provision is clear and unambiguous and does not
further interpretations. Construction and interpretation come only after it
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

need any
has been

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives

in the Council ,
with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
The unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8 (1), was to treat each ex
officio member as representing one co-equal branch of the government. Thus,
the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio
members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.

12. TERM LIMITS

FRANCIS
G.R.

No.

ONG

163295,

vs.

January

JOSEPH
23,

2006,

ALEGRE
479

SCRA

473

FACTS: In May 1995 elections, Francis Ong was elected mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte.
He was re-elected in May 1998 elections, however, respondent
Alegre filed an election protest. The RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected
mayor in 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on July 4,
2001, when Francis Ong had fully served
the 1998-2001 mayoralty
term and
was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect
of
the municipality of San Vicente.
ISSUE: Whether or not
Francis
Ongs
assumption
of
office
the mayoralty term
1998
to
2001
should
be
considered
for the purpose
of
the
three-term
limit
rule.

as
as

Mayor
for
full
service

HELD: YES. The Court held that

such assumption of office constitutes, for
Francis Ong, service for the full term ,
and should be counted as a full
term in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the Constitutional
and statutory provisions barring local executive officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC ruled in Election Protest that it was respondent
Alegre who won in the 1998 mayoralty race and therefore , was the legally
elected mayor of San Vicente.
However, that disposition, it must be stressed,
was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after
the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis Ongs contention
that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty
derby as
his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected
Mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente
as
the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term
in contemplation of the three-term rule.
For the three-term limit for elective government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: 1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) terms in the same local government post, and
2)
that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

ROMEO
G.R.

LONZANIDA

No. 135150,

July

vs.

28, 1999,

COMELEC
311

SCRA

602

21
Petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive terms as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then
ran
again
for
the
same
position
in
the
May
1995
elections,
won
and
discharged his duties as Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation
and filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision
dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of election and declared
the
position
vacant. The Comelec affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida
acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and
performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998
elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to
disqualify, under the three-term rule, and was eventually granted. There,
the
Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having
been
duly
elected
to the post in the May 1995 ,
and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office . As the Court
pointed
observed,
Lonzanida
cannot
be
deemed
to
have
served
the
May
1995
to
1998
term
because
he
was
ordered
to
vacate
and
in
fact
vacated his post before the expiration of the term.

DIFFERENCE

between ONG & LONZANIDA rulings

In Lonzanida,
the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity
for the stated reason of failure of election, and as a consequence thereof,
the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order
for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from
office
as
a
result
of
legal
processes .
In
fine,
there
was
an
effective
interruption of
the continuity of service.
On the other hand,
the
case. There was actually no
Ongs service respecting the
unseated during the term in
and responsibilities as Mayor
period covering the 1998-2001

failure-of-election factor does not obtain

interruption or break in the continuity
1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Ong
question, he never ceased discharging
of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte
for
term.

in Ongs
of Francis
was never
his duties
the entire

ATTY. VENANCIO RIVERA vs. COMELEC & MARINO MORALES

G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007,
FACTS: It is undisputed
position of
mayor
of
a)
b)
c)
d)

July
July
July
July

1,
1,
1,
1,

1995
1998
2001
2004

to
to
to
to

523 SCRA 41

that respondent
Marino Morales was elected to
Mabalacat
for
the
following
consecutive
terms:
June
June
June
June

30,
30,
30,
30,

the

1998
2001
2004
2007

Respondent Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July 1,
June 30, 2007 term is not his fourth because his second term, July
to June 30, 2001 to which he was elected and which he served,
be
counted
since his proclamation
was
declared
void
by
the
Angeles City, which decision became final and executory on August
and besides he was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in
graft
case
from
January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999. He claimed
only a caretaker of the office or
as
a
de
facto officer.

2004 to
1, 1998
may not
RTC
of
6, 2001
an antihe
was

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Morales had served as

consecutive terms
and
therefore
is
ineligible
to
run
for
fourth term.

for three
term
or

mayor
another

HELD:
YES. Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as Mayor until June 30,
2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the decision of the
RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting respondent as
mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full
term. Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor
of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. By June 30,
2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of
Mabalacat.
In the light of the foregoing, respondent Morales cannot be considered a
candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for
him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.

22
As a consequence of Morales ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the
contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice mayor in
accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

RAYMUNDO ADORMEO vs. COMELEC &

G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002,
Assumption
of
the
remaining
term is not
of the Constitution and

RAMON TALAGA

376

SCRA

90

office
of mayor
in
a
recall
election
the
term contemplated under Section 8,
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.

for
the
Article X

As the Court observed, there was a break in the service of

respondent Ramon T. Talaga as mayor .
He was a private citizen
time
before
running
for
mayor
in
the
recall
elections.

JOEL

G. MIRANDA

vs.

private
for
a

ANTONIO M. ABAYA

G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999,

There can be
no
valid
substitution
not only by disqualification
but
also
by
certificate of candidacy.

311 SCRA 617

where
denial

a
candidate
is
and
cancellation

excluded
of
his

ROBERTO LACEDA vs. RANDY LIMENA

G.R. No. 181867,

November

25,

2008,

571

SCRA 603

Where
a
person
has
been
elected
for
three
consecutive
terms
as
Punong
Barangay
and
prior
to
the
end
or
termination
of
such
three-year
term, the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted
into
Sorsogon
City
as
a
new
political
unit ,
without
the city
charter
interrupting
his
term
until
the
end
of
the
three-year
term ,
the
prohibition
applies
to
prevent
him
from
running
for
the
fourth
time
as
Punong
Barangay thereof, there being no break in the continuity of his term.

FEDERICO MONTEBON vs. COMELEC & SESINANDO POTENCIOSO

G.R. No. 180444,

April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 50

FACTS: Potencioso was elected

for
three
consecutive
terms
as
municipal
councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004 and 2004-2007. However, the service of his
second
term
in
2001-2004
was
interrupted
on
January
12, 2004
when he
succeeded as vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L.
Mendoza.
During
the
2007
elections,
his
candidacy
for
municipal councilor
was assailed because he is alleged disqualified from running for the same
position as it would be his fourth consecutive terms.
ISSUE: Whether or not Potencioso
term thereby disqualifying him to

deemed
run for

to have
municipal

fully served
councilor.

his

second

HELD: NO. His assumption of

office as vice mayor in January 2004 was
an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor , resulting in
an interruption in
the
service
of
his
2001-2004 term .
Consequently,
he
is
qualified to run for municipal councilor.

13.

LAW

ON

PUBLIC

CONSTANTINO

OFFICER
GUMARU

G.R. No. 161496, June

vs.
22,

QUIRINO
2007,

525

STATE
SCRA

COLLEGE
412

FACTS:
On June
25,
1985,
C.T.
Gumaru
Construction
and
Quirino
State
College through
its
president
Julian
Alvarez, entered into
an
agreement
for
the
construction
of the
state
colleges
building.
On
October
17,
1997,
Gumaru filed a complaint for damages
against
the respondent
college
and
its
president.
Respondent
state
college
was
instead
represented
by
a
private
lawyer who made no move to protect its interest except to file a motion
to
dismiss
the
complaint
filed
against
the
state
college,
which
was
eventually denied by the trial court. No answer to the complaint was filed
notwithstanding
due
receipt
of
the
order
directing
its
filing, as
a
consequence of
which the state college was declared in default. The order
of
default
itself
was
not
reconsidered,
no
move
whatsoever
having
been
made
in
that direction. Gumaru was allowed
to present
its evidence
exparte. When the decision was rendered adjudging the state college and its
president Alvarez liable to the plaintiff,
no effort was made to appeal the
decision
notwithstanding
due
receipt
of
a
copy
thereof
by
the
private
lawyer.
Thus,
a
writ
of
execution
was
issued
against
the
properties
of
the
state
college
which by
this
time
remained
as
the
sole
defendant,
Julian
Alvarez
having
died
during
the
pendency
of
the
case.

23
ISSUE: Whether or not the
mistakes or negligent
acts
as a result thereof.

state college
be
bound by
or
of
its
officials or agents,
much

HELD: NO.
The State has to protect
or
estopped
by
the
mistakes
or
agents,
much
more
non-suited
as
legal
representation
can
be
raised
the
proceedings.

estopped by the
more non-suited

its interests and cannot be bound

negligent
acts
of
its
officials
a
result
thereof.
The
legality
and
questioned
at
any
stage

by ,
or
of
of

The Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
(OSG) is
mandated
to
act
as
the
law
office
of
the
government,
its
agencies,
instrumentalities,
officials
and
agents
in
any
litigation
or
proceeding requiring the services
of a
lawyer. With respect to governmentowned
or
controlled
corporations
(GOCCs),
the
OSG
shall
act
as
counsel
only
when
authorized
by
the
President
or
by
the
head
of
the
office
concerned.
The principal law
office
Corporate Counsel (OGCC).

of

GOCCs

Respondent state college

chartered
institution, viz:

is

classified

is

the

under

Office
the

of

the

Administrative

Government
Code

as

(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating

under
a
special
charter,
and
vested
by
law
with
functions
relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges
and
the
monetary
authority of the State.
as

opposed

to

GOCC

defined

in

the

following

segment,

viz:

(13) a
government-owned
or
controlled
corporation
refers
to
any
agency as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions
relating the public needs whether government or propriety in nature,
and
owned
by
the
Government
directly
or
through
its
instrumentalities either wholly or where applicable as in the
case
of stock corporations.
The
Solicitor
General
cannot
refuse to
represent
the
government ,
its
agencies,
instrumentalities,
officials
and
agents
without a
just
and
valid
reason.
He
should
not
desist
from
appearing
before
the
Court
even
in
those cases where his opinions may be inconsistent with the government or
any of its agents he is expected to represent. (Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
92561, September 12, 1990, 189 SCRA 459).

As in the case of fiscals or prosecutors, bias or prejudice and animosity or

hostility do not constitute legal and valid excuses for inhibition . (Enriquez vs. Hon.
Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932 (1960)]

Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment , a

fiscal or prosecutor,
or
the
Solicitor
General
in
the
case
at
bar,
cannot
refuse to perform his functions without violating his oath of office . (Enriquez
vs. Gimenez, supra).

Government agencies were admonished not to reject the services of the

Solicitor General, or otherwise
fail
or
refuse
to
forward the papers of a
case to the OSG for appropriate action. (Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, supra).
The fee of the lawyer who rendered legal service to the government in lieu of
the
OSG
or
the
OGCC
is
the
personal
liability of
the
government
official
who
hired
his
services
without
the
prior
written
conformity
of
the OSG
or the OGCC, as the case may be. (Polloso vs. Gangan, 390 Phil.
1101 (2000).
The Solicitor General is thus expected to be the official who would best
uphold and protect the legal interests of the government . His non-representation
of the government is dangerous and should not be allowed.

GERARDO R. VILLASEOR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R.

No.

180700,

March

4,

2008,

547

SCRA

658

FACTS:
Villaseor
is
facing
both
criminal
and
administrative
charges
in
connection with the Manor Hotel disaster. He was preventively suspended for
a period of six months in the administrative case. During the pendency of
the criminal case, the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension for a period of
90 days upon the motion of the Special Prosecutor. He questions the said
suspension
as the same was absorbed
in the administrative case
as both
the
criminal
and
administrative
cases were
anchored
on the
same
set
of
facts.

24
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
preventive
suspension
proceeding
a
bar
for
a
preventive
suspension in
a
same facts
and circumstances.

in
an
administrative
criminal
case
on the

HELD: NO. It
is
well-settled
preventive
suspension under
Section 13
of
RA
3019 is mandatory.
There
are
three
kinds
of
remedies that
are
available
against
a public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers
and
discharge
of
his
duties :
(1)
civil,
(2)
criminal,
and
(3)
administrative.
These
remedies
may
be
invoked
separately,
alternately,
simultaneously
or
successively.
Sometimes,
the
same
offense
may
be
the
subject
of
all
three
kinds
of
remedies.
It
is
clear
that
criminal
and
administrative
cases
each other.
The
settled
rule
is
that
criminal
and
altogether
different
from
administrative
matters.
Verily,
may
proceed
independently
of
criminal
proceedings.

PRUDENCIO QUIMBO
G.R.

vs.

are
distinct
civil
cases
administrative

from
are
case

DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN GERVACIO

No. 155620, August

9,

2005,

466

SCRA

277

FACTS: Quimbo
was
placed
under
preventive
suspension without
pay
for
a
period of two (2) months and seventeen (17) days. The Deputy Ombudsman
found
him
guilty
of
oppression
and
recommended
that
he
be
suspended
from
office
for
a
period
of
eight
(8)
months.
On
appeal,
the
appellate
court modified the decision and reduced the penalty for a period of two
(2) months suspension without pay.
ISSUE: Whether or
not
the
service
and
17
days
be
credited
as
suspension
without
pay.

of
preventive
service
of

suspension of
2
penalty
of
2

months
months

HELD: NO. Preventive suspension is

not
a
penalty
but
merely
a
preventive
measure, a
preliminary
step
in
an
administrative
investigation . The
purpose
of
the
suspension
order
is
to
prevent
the
accused
from
using
his
position
and
the
powers
and
prerogatives
of
his
service
to
influence
potential
witnesses
or
tamper
with
records
which
may
be
vital
in
the
prosecution
of
the
case
against
him .
If
after
such
investigation ,
the
charge
is
established
and
the
person
investigated
is
found
guilty
of
acts
warranting
his
suspension
or
removal,
then
he
is
suspended,
removed or
dismissed.
This
is
the
penalty.
Clearly,
service
of
service
of
penalty.

the

preventive

suspension

cannot

be

credited

as

DR. DEMETRIO BEROA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 142456, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 303
FACTS: Dr. Beroa was the Provincial Health Officer when he was charged
for violation of RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. During the pendency of
the proceeding, he resigned from the Health Office and he ran and won
as
Municipal
Mayor
of
Pilar,
Abra.
After
the
arraignment,
Sandiganbayan
suspended him from office
for 90 days. Dr. Beroa claims that preventive
suspension would no longer applicable to him as he no longer occupying
the position when he was charged under RA 3019.
ISSUE:
officer

Whether or not
suspension
might be currently holding.

pendente

lite

applies

to

any

office

the

HELD:
YES.
The
provision
of
suspension
pendente
lite
applies
to
all
persons indicted upon a valid information. The term office in Section 13
of
the
law
applies
to
any
office
which
the
officer
might
currently
be
holding
and
not
necessarily
the
particular
office
in
relation
to
which
he
is charged.
about

Preventive
it.

suspension

is

mandatory

and

there

are

no

ifs

and

buts

GUALBERTO CASTRO vs. HON. RICARDO GLORIA

G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001, 363 SCRA 417
FACTS: Castro was found guilty of immorality by the DECS Regional Office
and was meted the penalty of dismissal
from
the
service.
He
impugns
the
correctness
of
the
penalty
of
dismissal
from
the
service
and
seeks
the
payment of back salaries.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Castro
is
dismissal, reinstatement
and payment

entitled
for
reduction
of back salaries.

of

his

penalty

of

25
HELD: YES
so
far
as
the
reduction
of
penalty
of
dismissal
from
the
service and reinstatement
are concerned. Inasmuch as the present charge of
immorality
constitutes
the
first
charge
of
this
nature,
the
Supreme
Court
reduced the penalty of dismissal imposed to one (1) year suspension from
office without pay. In view of the length of time
he has
been out of
the service, the penalty of suspension to have been
fully served. He was
ordered to be reinstated to office immediately.
The
issue regarding
payment
of back salaries during the period that
a member
of the civil service
is out of work,
but subsequently ordered
reinstated
is
settled
in
our
jurisdiction.
Such
payment
of
salaries
corresponding
to
the
period
when
an
employee
is
not
allowed
to
work
may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges . However, if the
employee
is
not
completely
exonerated of
the
charges
such
as
when
the
penalty
of
dismissal
is
reduced
to
mere
suspension ,
he
would
not
be
entitled to the payment of
his back salaries.

14.

NATIONAL EMERGENCY
RANDY DAVID vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006, 489

SCRA 160

*** DECLARATION OF A STATE OF REBELLION vs. DECLARATION OF

A STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY.
- - - President Arroyos
declaration of a state of
rebellion
was
merely
an
act
declaring
a
status
or
condition
of
public
moment
or interest.
- - - it
is
harmless,
without
legal
significance
and
deemed
not
written. (Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656, G.R. No.
159085, February 3, 2004).
- - - In declaring a state of national
emergency , President Arroyo
did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution - - a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. (CALLING-OUT POWER).
- - - She also relied on Section 17, Article XII -- a provision on
the states extra ordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest.
- - - Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power - - Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without
legal significance or not written, as in the case of declaration of
a state of rebellion.
*** The DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW is a warning to citizens
that the military power has been called upon by the executive to
assist
in
the
maintenance
of
law
and
order, and
that,
while
emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment,
not commit any acts which will any way render more difficult the
restoration of order and the enforcement of law. (Aquino vs. Ponce
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).
*** Powers that can be exercised by the President as commanderin-chief where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law
or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus:
1. arrests and seizures without judicial warrants
2. ban on public assemblies
3. take-over
of
news
media
and
agencies
and
press
censorship
4. issuance of Presidential Decrees
*** TAKE CARE POWER
- - - the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws
as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws.
- - - he sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials
and employees of his department.
- - - we all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President
Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
- - - Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued
by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to
all
decrees,
orders
and
regulations
promulgated
by
me
personally or upon my direction.

26
**** Is it within the domain
decrees?
- - - - She cannot issue decrees
Pres. Marcos under PP 1081.

of

President

similar

to

Arroyo

those

to

issued

promulgate
by

former

- - - - Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category

and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period
of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
- - - the President is granted an Ordinance Power
issue any of the following:
1. Executive Order (EO)
2. Administrative Order (AO)
3. Proclamations (PP)
4. Memorandum Order (MO)
5. Memorandum Circular (MC)
6. General or Special Orders (GO or SO)
- - - President
issuances.

Arroyos

ordinance

- - - The Court rules that

insofar
as
it
grants
promulgate decrees.

power

is

limited

where

to

the assailed PP 1017 is

President
Arroyo
the

**** Can President Arroyo

laws through the military?

enforce

obedience

to

she

the

may

foregoing

unconstitutional
authority
to

all

decrees

and

- - - With respect to laws,

she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as custom laws, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and
contracts and the like.
--She can
laws pertinent

only order the military , under PP

to its duty to suppress lawless

1017, to
violence.

enforce

*** POWER TO TAKE OVER

- - - Presidents authority to
vs. authority to exercise

declare a
emergency

state of
powers.

national

emergency

- - - President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state

of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional
enactment.
- - - But the exercise of
emergency powers, such as the taking
over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest,
is
a
different
matter -this
requires
delegation
from
Congress.
- - - Generally, Congress
Certainly, a body cannot

is the
delegate

repository of emergency powers.

a power not reposed upon it.

- - - During grave emergencies, for possible or practical purposes, it

is deemed wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
1. there must be a war or other emergency
2. the delegation must be for a limited period only.
3. the delegation
must
be
subject
to
such
restrictions
as
the Congress
may
prescribe.
4. the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.
- - - Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of
the emergency
powers clause and that power refers to Congress,
not the president.
--the
taking
over
of
private
business
affected
with
public
interest is just another facet of the emergency powers
generally
reposed upon Congress.
- - - tsunami, typhoon, hurricane
limited
view
of emergency.

and

similar

occurrences

are

- - - Emergency
as contemplated in our Constitution may include
rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood or
other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportion or effect.

27
- - - Legislative
power,
through
which
extraordinary
exercised, remains in Congress
even
in
times
of
vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).

measures
are
crisis . (Araneta

- while the President

alone
can
declare
a
state
of
national
emergency, however, without legislation,
he has no power to take
over privately-owned public utility
or business affected with public
interest.
- - - Likewise, without legislation,
the President
has no power to
point
out
the
types
of
businesses
affected
with public
interest that should be taken over.
- - - in short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise
all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article XII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
**** AS

APPLIED

CHALLENGE

- - - the rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the right

against
warrantless
arrest,
and
the
freedom
of
speech,
of
expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of
Rights suffered the greater blow
**** Can the Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017
No. 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general,
illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?

and G.O.
does the

- - - Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare

statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused and
may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.
- - - the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined
from
its
general
purpose
and
its
efficiency
to
accomplish
the
end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.
- - - PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the
power
but
there
is
nothing
in
PP
1017
expressly
or
impliedly,
to
conduct
illegal
violate the citizens constitutional rights.
- - - the
on the

Court cannot
ground that

Presidents calling-out
allowing
the
police,
arrest,
search
or

adjudge a law
or ordinance unconstitutional
its implementation committed illegal acts.

- - - the criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance

is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of
power and not a mere incidental result arising from its execution.
- - - the absence of a law defining acts of terrorism may result
in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military
and
therefore
the
Court
declares
that
the
acts
of
terrorism
portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
- - - there

is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizes the military

or
police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate
to suppress and prevent lawless violence
the limitation of their
authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise such acts are considered
illegal.
- - - Assembly means a right on the part of the citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs . It is
a
necessary
consequence
of
our
republican
institution
and
complements the right of speech.
- - - As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not
to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent.
- - - Like other rights embraced in the
right
to
assemble
is
not
subject
censorship.

freedom of expression,
to
previous
restraint

the
or

- - - it may not be conditional upon the prior issuance of a

permit or authorization from the governmental authorities except, of
course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place
and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

28
- - - the ringing truth is that petitioner David et. al. were arrested
while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They
were not committing any crime,
neither was there a showing of
a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that
right.
- - - Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a
crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot
be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meeting
cannot be branded as criminals on that score.
- - - the dispersal and arrest of the members of the KMU was
done merely on the basis of Malacaang directives canceling all
permits previously issued by local government unit is arbitrary - - the wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right
to prevent.
- - - Under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies
is lodged with the local government units . They have the power
to issue permits and to revoke such permit after due notice and
hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present
danger.
- - - while admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and
sealed like the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers,
yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their
enforcement duties.
--the
search
and
seizure
of
materials
for
publication,
the
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices ,
and the arrogant warning of government officials to media ,
are
plain censorship.

15.

ELECTION

COMELEC
REGINA

LAW

JURISDICTION

vs.

ONGSIAKO REYES

HRET
vs.

JURISDICTION

COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 522

G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, 709 SCRA 197
FACTS: On 31 October 2012, Joseph Tan filed before the Comelec a petition to
deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Regina Reyes on
the ground of material representations specifically among others that she is not
a Filipino citizen but rather an American citizen.
During the course of the proceedings, Joseph
record of
the
Bureau of
Immigration indicating that
American citizen
and a
holder of a U.S. passport
various travels abroad.

Tan presented a database

Regina O.
Reyes
is
an
which she used in
the

On 27 March 2013, the Comelec First Division found that , contrary to the
declarations she made in her COC , Regina O. Reyes is not a citizen of the
Philippines because of her failure to comply with requirements of RA 9225
or the
Citizenship Re-acquisition and Retention Act of 2003 namely: (1) to take an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
and
(2) to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any
public officer to
administer an oath.
In addition, the Comelec ruled that she did not have the
one
year
residency requirement
under
Section 6, Article VI
of the
1987
Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of representative for
the lone district
of Marinduque.
On 8 April 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration
is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost
simply obtaining and
using
an
American passport.
Reyes

On 14 May
Motion for

2013, the Comelec en banc promulgated

Reconsideration for lack of merit.

winner

Four days thereafter or on 18 May

of the 13 May 2013 elections.

2013,

Regina

a
Reyes

claiming that she

such status by
resolution
was

denying

proclaimed

29
On 5
declaring its

June 2013, the Comelec en banc issued a

14 May 2013 Resolution final and executory.

On same
Belmonte of the

day,
Regina Reyes
took
House of Representatives.

Reyes has yet

of 30 June 2013.
ISSUES:

HELD:

to

(1)

Who

(2)

When is a
candidate
Representatives?

(1)

The

has

assume office , the

jurisdiction

Comelec retains

over

the

her

oath

of

term of which

Certificate
office

officially

of

Finality

before

Speaker

starts at

noon

case?

considered

jurisdiction for the

Member
following

of

the

House

of

reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of
Reyes qualifications,
as
well
as
over
the
assailed
Comelec
Resolutions, unless a
petition is
duly
filed
with said
tribunal .
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the
jurisdiction of
the
HRET
begins
only after
the
candidate is considered a member of the House of Representatives
as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives , there
must be a concurrence of the following requisites : (a) a valid proclamation; (b)
a proper oath; and (c) assumption of office.
The Court has invariably
hold that once a
winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives,
the
Comelec jurisdiction over
election
contests relating
to
his
election, returns, and qualification ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Here, the petitioner
cannot
be
considered
a
Member of the House
of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office as the term
of office begins only at
noon on the 30 th day of June next following their
election. Thus, until such time, the Comelec retains jurisdiction.

Disqualified

Candidate

cannot

be

voted

upon

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 163776,

April

24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23

FACTS: Cayat and Palileng were

the
only
candidates
for
the
mayoralty
post
in Buguias, Benguet, in
the 10 May 2004 local elections . Palileng filed a
petition
for
disqualification
against
Cayat .
Palilengs
petition
alleged
that:
Cayat
is
not
eligible
to
run
as
Mayor
having
been
convicted
by
final
judgment
for
a
criminal
offense
for
the
Crime
of
Acts
of
Lasciviousness.
In
fact,
Cayat
is
still
under
probation
at
the
time
he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy.
COMELEC cancelled
Cayats
COC. In
the
local
elections
held
on
10
May
2004, Cayats
name
remained
on
the
COMELECs
list
of
candidates .
Cayat
received
the
highest
number
of
votes . Cayat
was
thus
proclaimed
the
duly
elected
Mayor
of
Buguias,
Benguet.
Cayat
took
his
oath
of
office on 17 May 2004.
Palileng
moved
for
the execution
of COMELECs order
canceling
the
certificate
of
candidacy
of
Cayat .
The
latter
thereby,
annulled
the
proclamation
of
petitioner
Rev.
Fr.
Nardo
B.
Cayat .
The
new
MBOC
proclaimed
Palileng
as
Mayor
of
Buguias , Benguet. Palileng
took
his
oath
of office on the same day.

ISSUE: Whether
proclamation
of Buguias,

HELD:

or
not
the orders canceling
Cayats
COC ,
nullifying
as Mayor of Buguias , Benguet, and declaring Palileng as
Benguet
are
valid.

Cayats
Mayor

YES.
There
is
no
doubt
as
to
the
propriety
of
Palilengs
proclamation.
The
COMELECs
Resolution
of
12
April
2004
canceling
Cayats
certificate of candidacy due to disqualification
became final and executory on
17
April
2004
when
Cayat
failed
to pay
the
prescribed
filing
fee .
Thus,
Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10
May 2004 elections. Twenty-three days before Election Day, Cayat was already
disqualified
by
final
judgment
to
run
for
Mayor
in the 10
May
2004
elections.
Palileng
was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng

30
was the sole and only placer. Consequently,
of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

Palilengs

proclamation

as

Mayor

The
law
expressly
declares
that
a
candidate
disqualified
by
final
judgment before an
election cannot be voted for , and votes cast
for him
shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law under Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
Cayats
proclamation
is
void because the decision disqualifying
him had
already become final on 17 April 2004 . There is no longer any need to
ascertain whether there
was
actual
knowledge
by
the voters
of
Cayats
disqualification when they cast their votes on Election Day
because the law
mandates
that
Cayats
votes
shall
not
be
counted.
There
is
no
disenfranchisement
of the 8,164
voters.
Rather, the 8,164
voters are deemed
by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate , and thus their votes
are stray and shall not
be counted.

Valid

Substitution

to

JOY CHRISMA

non-age
B.

Candidate

LUNA

vs.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 107

FACTS: On 15 January
2004,
Luna filed her COC
for the position of vicemayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger , who withdrew his
certificate of candidacy on
the same
date .
The name
of
Hans
Roger
was
removed
from
the
list
of
candidates
and
was
replaced
by
the
name of
Luna.
Private respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate
of
candidacy
or
disqualification
of
Luna
alleging
that
Lunas
COC was not
validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid
due to the fact that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on election day
and
therefore,
was
disqualified
to
run
for
vice-mayor
and
cannot
be
substituted by Luna.
The COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being under age,
considered
to
have
filed
a
valid
COC
and
therefore ,
is
candidate who could be substituted by Luna.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave
ruled that there was no valid substitution by

abuse of
Luna for

could not be
not
a
valid

discretion
when
Hans Roger.

it

HELD: YES.
The
substitution
of
Luna
for
Hans Roger
was
valid.
When a
candidate files his
COC,
the
COMELEC has
a
ministerial
duty
to
receive
and
acknowledge
its
receipt
pursuant
to
Sec. 76
of
the
Election
Code .
Since
Hans
Roger
withdrew
his
COC
and the
COMELEC
found
that
Luna
complied with all
the
procedural
requirements for a
valid substitution, Luna
may validly substitute for Hans Roger.
The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny
due
course to
or
cancel
a certificate
of
candidacy
filed in due form .
In
Sanchez vs. Del Rosario,
the
Court
ruled
that
the
question
of
eligibility
or
ineligibility
of
a
candidate for non-age
is
beyond
the
usual
and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC.
If
Hans
Roger
made
a
material
misrepresentation as to his date of
birth or age in his COC, his eligibility may only be impugned
through a
verified petition to deny due course
to
or
cancel such COC under Section
78 of the Election Code.

UNDER

AGE

OLIVIA DA

CANDIDATE
SILVA

VALIDLY

CERAFICA

vs.

SUBSTITUTED
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014, 743 SCRA 426

FACTS: On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for councilor of Taguig City
for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1992 , or
that she
will be twenty (20) years
of
age
on
the
day of
elections ,
in
contravention of
the requirement that one must be at
least
twenty three
(23)
years of age on the day of election.
As such, Kimberly
qualification.

was

summoned

to

clarificatory hearing due to the

age

31
Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of
Withdrawal of COC on 17 December 2012. Olivia, who belongs to and is certified
by the same political party filed her own COC
as a
substitute of Kimberly .
Owing to these events, the clarificatory hearing no longer pushed through.
However, the
Comelec Law
Department recommended
the
Kimberlys COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution
Olivia. This recommendation was affirmed by Comelec.
ISSUES:

(1)

Whether the

(2)

Whether Olivia complied

valid substitution.

HELD: (1) NO. The

receipts of COCs.
Comelec has
and its duty to
character.

Comelec

cancellation of

has

the

Kimberlys COC

with

ministerial

no discretion to give
give due course to

usual

the requirements for

duty

such, the cancellation of

to

receive

defects in the

The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a

and proper cognizance of the Comelec.
As

was proper.

and

acknowledge

or not to give due course to COCs

COCs in due form is ministerial in

While the Comelec may look into patent

matters not appearing on their
face.

into

all of

cancellation of
of Kimberly by

COCs, it

candidate

Kimberlys COC was

not

is thus

may not

go

beyond

the

proper.

(2) YES. Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of BP Bldg. 881 , not just
any person, but only an official candidate
of a registered or
accreditated
political party may be substituted.
thus,

In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the

she can be validly substituted.

Liberal

Party,

All the foregoing requisites were complied with in the case at bar . First,
there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly COC after the last day for the filing of
COCs. Second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to
which Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of
election day.
Therefore,

No

Olivia can substitute

Kimberly.

valid Substitution - Material

Representation

SILVERIO TAGOLINO vs. COMELEC &

G.R. No. 202202,

March 19, 2013,

LUCY TORRES GOMEZ

693 SCRA 574

FACTS: Richard
Gomez filed
his
COC
with
Comelec
for
congressman
of
Leyte
for
May
2010
elections . A petition was
filed before the
Comelec
to
cancel
COC of Richard Gomez for
his
failure
to meet
the
one
(1)
year
residency
requirement.
The
Comelec
granted
the
petition
without
qualification
stating
that
Richard
Gomez
is
disqualified. Thereafter, Richards
wife, Lucy Torres filed her
COC as
official substitute candidate of
Richard
Gomez
with
the
partys endorsement. Comelec allowed the substitution.
When the elections were conducted , Richard Gomez,
whose name remained
on the ballots,
garnered the highest number of votes . In view of
substitution,
Lucy Torres was proclaimed the winner.
ISSUE:
Whether
Lucy
congressional
candidate in

Torres
validly
substituted
the
said
election.

Richard

Gomez

as

HELD: NO. The substitution is invalid. Considering that section 77 of the OEC
requires that
there
be
a
candidate
in
order
for
substitution
to
take
place, as well as the precept that
a person
without a
valid COC is
not
considered
as
a
candidate
at
all ,
it
necessarily
follows
that
if
a
persons COC
had
been
denied
due
course
to
and/or
cancelled,
he
or
she
cannot
be
validly
substituted
in
the
electoral
process .
The
existence
of a valid COC is therefore a
condition sine qua non for a disqualified
candidate to be
validly substituted.

an

Moreover, Section 77 expressly enumerates that substitution is permissible when

official
candidate
of
a
registered
or
accredited political party
dies,

32
withdraws or
is
disqualified for any cause. Noticeably, material representation
cases are not included
and
therefore cannot be a valid basis to proceed
with candidate substitution.
Richard Gomez
failure
to
comply
with
the
residency
requirement
constitutes
a
material
representation
of
ones
qualification
which
is
a
ground
for
the
denial
to
and/or
cancellation
of
his
COC
and
not
for
disqualification.
This
makes
COC
void
ab
initio.
Consequently,
his
wife
cannot validly substitute him as a candidate in the said
election.

NUISANCE

CANDIDATE

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL
G.R. No. 206004,

vs. COMMISSION
February

ON

ELECTIONS

24, 2015, 751 SCRA 456

FACTS: On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed

the Second District of Caloocan City.

a certificate of candidacy for councilor of

On January 15, 2013, Timbol was ordered to appear before the

clarificatory hearing in connection with his certificate of candidacy.

Comelec for

Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia.
During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate
and contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eight among all the candidates
who ran for councilors in the second district . He allegedly had sufficient resources
to sustain his campaign.
The clarificatory panel assured him that his name would be deleted from the list
of nuisance candidates and that his certificate of candidacy would be given due
course.
not

Despite Election Officer Valencias favorable recommendation, Timbols name was

removed from the list of nuisance candidates posted in the Comelec website.

With the printing of ballots for the

2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013,
included in the certified list of candidates.

automated elections set on February 4,

a
petition praying that his name be

In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013 , the Comelec denied the
petition for being moot considering that the printing of ballots had already begun.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Timbol was
nuisance candidate.
(2)

Who

are

nuisance

denied due process for

being considered a

candidates?

(3)
When is
a
case
recognized exceptions.

moot

and

academics

and

what

are

the

HELD: (1) YES. The opportunity to be heard is a chance to explain ones side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In
election cases, due process requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
To
minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance
candidates , their
certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by Comelec. This
denial or cancellation may be moto propio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party subject to an opportunity to be heard.
(2) Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificate of candidacy to
put the election process in mockery or disrespect or to cause confusion among
the voters
by the
similarity of the name of the registered candidates or other
circumstances
or acts clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed
and, thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
(3)
A case is moot and academic, if it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical use or value.
it.

When a case is moot and academic, court generally declines jurisdiction over
There are recognized exceptions to this rule:

(1) there

was a grave

violation of

the

Constitution.

33
(2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of
paramount public interest.
(3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles
to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public, and
(4)

the

case

was

capable

of

repetition

yet

evading

review.

16. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW - Prospective Extraditee is entitled to

the grant of bail
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG vs.
G.R.

No.

153675,

April

HON. FELIXBERTO OLALIA, JR.

19,

2007,

521

SCRA

470

While the Court in Purganan limited the exercise of

the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights , particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of the Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, the Court noted that the exercise of the States
power to deprive
an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings .
Respondent, in administrative proceedings,
such as deportation and quarantine,
have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes
to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise
of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. The Court had admitted to
bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings.
In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention
during the pendency of administrative proceedings (e.g. deportation proceedings)
taking
into
cognizance
the
obligation
of
the
Philippines
under
international
conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation
cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where
the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Finally, while our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to
an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him
or her from filing
a
motion
for
bail,
a
right
to
due
process
under
the
Constitution.
The
applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that
in
criminal
proceedings.
A
new
standard
which
is
termed
clear
and
convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases . This
standard
should
be
lower
than
proof
beyond
doubt
but
higher
than
preponderance
of
evidence.

EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ vs. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 17 of MANILA

G.R. No. 157977,

February

27,

2006,

483

SCRA

290

In Purganan case,
the Court said that a prospective extraditee is not
entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest ,
because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest .
But this is for cases pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a
cancellation
of
a
bail
that
had
been
issued
after
determination
that
the
extraditee is a no-flight risk.
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is
arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice . On the extraditee lies
the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted . If after his
arrest and if the trial court find that he is no-flight risk , it grants him bail.
The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented
evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no-flight risk, and the
trial
court
had
already
exercised
its
sound
discretion
and
had
already
determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled
to provisional release.
Considering, therefore, that she has not been shown to
be a flight risk nor
a danger to the community,
she is entitled to
notice
and
hearing
before
her
bail
could
be
cancelled .
Absent
prior
notice
and
hearing, the bails cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.

NON - SIGNATORY

TO

UNCLOS

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, et. al. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT et. al.
G.R. No. 206510,

September

16, 2014, 735 SCRA 102

FACTS: On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian while transiting the Sulu Sea ran
aground on the shoal of Tubbataha Reefs which caused environmental damage.

34
On
April
17, 2013,
the
above-named
petitioners,
including
minors or
generations
yet
unborn
filed
a
petition
against
the
U.S.
military
officers
involved, President Pinoy and officials of the Philippine government involved in
military
exercise
and
environmental
protection
for
the
institution
of
civil ,
administrative
and
criminal
suits
for
acts
committed
in
violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
being

The U.S.
government
invoked the
doctrine of
a non-signatory to
the
treaty
of
UNCLOS.

ISSUES:

immunity

(1)

Whether
the
on behalf of

minors
petitioners
have
generations yet unborn.

(2)

Whether
the
the doctrine

acts
of
U.S.
respondents
of sovereign immunity.

(3)

Whether the non-membership in the

disregard the rights of the Philippines
its internal waters and territorial sea.

from

personality

are

suit

and

to sue

governed by

UNCLOS of U.S. would

as a Coastal State over

HELD:
(1) YES. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such
include the
resources.

right is
judicious

based on rhythm and harmony of

disposition, utilization and conservation

nature indispensably
of countrys natural

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that

harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

rhythm and

The minors
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes ,
the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
that right for the generations to come.
(2)
YES.
The U.S. respondents
were
sued in
commanding officers of the U.S. Navy who had control
USS Guardian and its crew.

at
of

their official capacity as

and supervision over the

The alleged act

or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the
USS Guardian on the Tubbataha Reefs was committed while they were performing
military duty.
Considering that the satisfaction of the judgment against said officials will
require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the U.S. government , the
suit is deemed to be one against the U.S. itself.
The
principle of
State Sovereign
jurisdiction of our Supreme Court over
and Robling.

Immunity therefore bars the

the persons of respondents

exercise of
Swift , Rice

(3) NO. The non-membership in the UNCLOS

will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
waters and territorial sea.

does not mean that the U.S .

Coastal State over its internal

The U.S. government has to bear international

connection
with
the
USS
Guardian
grounding
Tabbataha reefs.

responsibility under Art. 31 in

which
adverse
affected the

The rationale of U.S. refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining
which considers the
ocean and deep seabed
commonly owned by mankind and has nothing to do
with the U.S. acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.

CONDUCT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

-

PACTA

SUNT

BY

THE

EXECUTIVE

SERVANDA

ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al.

vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROMULO

G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014, 732 SCRA

596

FACTS: Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider the April 28, 2010 decision and
declare
(1)
that the rapes, sexual
slavery, torture and other
forms of
sexual
violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity
and war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not

35
bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver
the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that
Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse
refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women and
legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan.

of the claims of
the Secretary of
of discretion in
for an apology ,

ISSUE: Whether the public respondents can be compelled to espouse

for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

their

claims

HELD:
NO.
The
Constitution has
entrusted to
the
Executive
Department
the
conduct of
foreign relations for the
Philippines
whether or not
to
espouse
petitioners claim
against
the
Government
of
Japan is
left
to the
exclusive
determination and judgment of the Executive Department.
The Court cannot
foreign relations by the

interfere with or question the

Executive Department.

wisdom of the

conduct

of

The Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan bound the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda .
The validity of the Treaty of Peace
was the result of the ratification by two
consenting parties.
Consequently, the obligations embodied in the
carried out in accordance with the common and real
the time the treaty was concluded.

Treaty of Peace must

intention of the parties

be
at

17. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR
A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 1
Benevolent
neutrality
recognizes
that
government
must
pursue
its
secular
goals
and
interests
but
at
the
same
time
strive
to
uphold
religious
liberty
to
the
greatest
extent
possible
within
flexible
constitutional
limits.
Thus,
although
the
morality
contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation
of
morality
based
on
religion, provided
it
does
not
offend
compelling
state
interests.
Court
must

The
compelling
state
interest
test
explained
this
process
in
detail,
be
answered
in
each
step, viz:

involves
a
three-step
process .
The
by
showing
the
questions
which

First, Has
the
statute
or
government
action
created
a
burden
on
the
free
exercise of
religion ? The court often
looks
into
the
sincerity
of
the
religious
belief,
but
without
inquiring
into
the
truth
of
the
belief
because
the
Free
Exercise
Clause
prohibits
inquiring
about
its
truth.
Second,
the
court
asks:
Is
there
a
sufficiently
compelling
state
interest
to
justify
this
infringement
of
religious
society ?
In
this
step,
the
government
has
to
establish
that
its
purposes
are
legitimate
for
the
state
and
that
they
are compelling.
Third,
the
court
asks:
Has
the
state
in
achieving
its
legitimate
purposes
used
the
least
intrusive
means
possible
so
that
the
free
exercise
is
not
infringed
any
more
than
necessary
to
achieve
the
legitimate
goal
of
the
state ?
The
analysis
requires
the
state
to
show
that
the
means
in
which
it
is
achieving
its
legitimate
state
objective
is
the
least
intrusive
means , i.e.,
it
has chosen
a
way
to
achieve
its
legitimate
state
end
that
imposes
as
little
as
possible
on
religious
liberties.

18.

QUALIFICATION

OF

SENATORIAL

CANDIDATES

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD

ISSUE:
May
for Senator?

HELD:
NO.
to run and
matters:
(1)
(2)

G.R.

No. 157870,

November

RA

9165

drug

add

3,

testing

2008,
as

570
a

SCRA

410

requirement

for

candidacy

The
Constitution
expressly
limits
the
qualifications
of
a
person
become a Senator as those that are limited to the following

citizenship
voter registration

36
(3)
(4)

age
residency.

Congress
power
to
legislate
while
given
broad
recognition
must
overflow
the
bounds
set
by
the
Constitution .
Where
the
Constitution
expressly
set
out
the
qualification ,
these
are
exclusive
and
may
not
broadened nor circumscribed by legislative fiat.

19. REMOVAL OF AN

ELECTIVE

SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY

May

the

Sangguniang

OFFICIAL

OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS

vs. MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 170626,

ISSUE:

LOCAL

not
has
be

March

Bayan

3,

2008,

remove

547

an

SCRA

elective

416

official

HELD: NO. An
elective
local official may be removed
from
grounds
provided
by
law
only
by
order
of
the
proper

from

office?

office
court.

on

the

20. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

FORFORM
G.R.

DEVELOPMENT

No. 124795,

December

CORPORATION
10,

2008,

573

vs.

PNR

SCRA

350

FACTS: The San Pedro - Carmona Commuter Line Project

was
implemented
with
the installation of railroad facilities and appurtenances to serve
the squatters
resettlement areas.
The
properties
of
Forform
were
traversed
as
right-ofway
and
the
PNR
occupied
the
Forform
properties
without
previous
condemnation proceedings
and
payment
of
just compensation.
ISSUES:
1.
PNR
is

Whether Forform
can
recover
possession
of
failed
to
file
any
expropriation
case
and

2. Whether
beyond
the

leasing
scope

out
of

of
portion
public
use.

of

the

its
just

property
because
compensation.

property

to

third

person

HELD:
1. NO. The
owner
of
the
land,
who
stands
by,
without
and sees as
public
railroad
constructed
over
it ,
cannot, after
is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon
of his apparent
acquiescence ,
reclaim the land,
or
enjoin
its
the
railroad
company.

objection,
the road
the faith
use
by

In
such
compensation.

right

case,

2. NO. The public

of
eminent
domain
is
changing conditions.

there
use
a

can

only

remain

requisite for
flexible
and

to

the

owner

the valid exercise

evolving
concept

of

of the power
influenced
by

At
present,
it
may
be
amiss
to
state
that
whatever
beneficially
employed
for
the
general
welfare
satisfies
the
requirement
public
use.
The
term
public
use
has
now
been
held
to
synonymous
with
public
interest,
public
benefit,
public
welfare,
public
convenience.
Whatever
may
be
beneficially
employed
for
general
welfare
satisfies
the
requirement
of
public
use.

is
of
be
and
the

REPUBLIC vs. SPOUSES AGUSTIN & IMELDA CANCIO

G.R. No. 170147, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 346
- The
payment
of
the
provisional
value
as
a
issuance
of
a
writ
of
possession
is
different
from
just
compensation
for
the
expropriated
property.

- While
valuation,
just
value
of
the

the
provisional
value
is
based
compensation
is
based
on
the
property.

condition
for
the
payment

on
the
prevailing

current
fair

HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO vs. JOVITO M. LUIS

G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009, 603

SCRA 576

the
of

zonal
market

37

FACTS: The City of Pasig had taken the parcel of land of Luis and used the
same as municipal road now known as Sandoval Avenue. After 16 years, Mayor
Eusebio informed Luis
that Pasig
City
cannot
pay
him
more
than
the
amount
set
by
the
Appraisal
Committee . Thereafter, Luis filed an action for
reconveyance. Mayor Eusebio contended that Luis action for
just
compensation
for the property taken for public use is already barred by prescription.
ISSUE:
taken

Whether Luis
action
for
public
use
is

to
claim
just
already
barred

compensation
for
by
prescription.

the

property

HELD: NO.
Where
private
property
is
taken
by
the
government
public
use
without
first
acquiring
title
either
through
expropriation
negotiated
sale,
the
owners
action
to
recover
the
land
or
value
thereof
does
not
prescribe.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SANTA LORO VDA. DE

for
or
the

CAPIN

G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 648

- Expropriation
is
not
limited
to
the
acquisition
of
with
a
corresponding
transfer
of
title
or
possession.
way
easement
resulting
in
a
restriction
or
limitation
rights
over
the
land
traversed
by
transmission
lines
within
the
ambit
of
the
term
expropriation.

21.

RIGHT

TO

real
property
The
right
of
on
property
also
falls

TRAVEL

REV. FR. ROBERT REYES vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ

G.R. No. 182161, December
ISSUE:
Whether
petitioners
the
Writ
of
Amparo.

right

to

3,

2009,

travel

is

606

SCRA 58

covered

by

the

Rule

on

HELD: NO.
The
right
to
travel
refers
to
the
right
to
move
one
place
to
another. Here,
the
restriction
on
petitioners
right
to
travel
as
a
consequence
of
the
pendency
of
the
criminal
case
filed
against
him was not unlawful. Fr.
Reyes
failed
to
establish
that
his
right
to
travel
was
impaired
in
the
manner
and
to
the
extent
that
it
amounted
to
a
serious
violation
of
his
right ,
liberty and
security,
for
which h there
exists
no
readily
available
legal resource or remedy.
The direct recourse to the Supreme Court is inappropriate considering the
provision
of
Section 22
of
the
Rule
of
the
Writ
of
Amparo
which
states
that
when
a
criminal
action
has
been
commenced ,
no
separate
petition for the writ shall be filed.
The reliefs under the writ shall be
available
by
motion in the criminal case.

22.

CREATION OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT

SEN. BENIGNO C. AQUINO III vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010,
FACTS: RA 9716 created
Sur by reconfiguring the
province.

an additional
existing first

617 SCRA 623

district for the Province of Camarines

and second legislative districts of the

Sen. Aquino contends that the reapportionment run afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of 250,000 for the
creation of a legislative district and RA 9716 is unconstitutional
because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or
only 176,383.
ISSUE:
Whether a
population
requirement for the creation of

HELD: NO. Section 5 (3)

population
only
for
a
so for
a
province.

BAI

of
city

of
a

250,000
is
new legislative

the
Constitution
to be
entitled

SANDRA SEMA vs.

an
indispensable constitutional
district in a province.

requires
a
250,000
to
a
representative ,

COMMISSION

ON

minimum
but
not

ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 700

38
FACTS: ARMM
Regional
Assembly
under
Section
19,
Article
VI
creating
the
Province
of
Shariff
ISSUES:
1. Whether
the
ARMM
of
Shariff
Kabunsuan.
2. Whether
Congress
Assembly
the
power
to
Representatives.
3,
Whether
Congress
under

Sharif
Section

exercised
its
power
to
of
RA
9054,
enacted
Kabunsuan.

Regional

Assembly

can

create

can
validly
delegate
to
create
legislative
districts

Kabunsuan
is
5 (3),
Article

entitled
VI
of

to
the

create
MMA

the
for

provinces
Act
201

the

Province

ARMM
Regional
the
House
of

one
representative
Constitution.

in

HELD:
1. NO.
A
province
because
it
will
violate
as
well
as
Section
3

cannot
Section
of
the

be
created
without
5
(3),
Article
VI
Ordinance
appended

a
of
to

legislative
district
the
Constitution
the
Constitution.

2. NO,
the
power
to
create
a
province
or
a
population
of
250,000
or
more
requires
also
the
power
legislative
district
exclusively
vested
in
Congress.

city
to

with
create

3. NO. The
Constitution
legislative
districts,
not
the

or

reapportion

23.

MIDNIGHT

empowered Congress to
regional
assemblies.

create

a
a

APPOINTMENT

IN RE: APPOINTMENT DATED MARCH 30, 1998 OF JUDGES

MATEO VALENZUELA AND PLACIDO VALLARTA
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408
FACTS: President
Ramos
appointed
Judges
Mateo
Valenzuela
and
Placido
Vallarta
as
RTC
Judges
on
March
30,
1998
during
the
election
ban
and
the
said
appointment was transmitted
to
the
Office
of
the
Chief
Justice
on May 14, 1998. Both
Judges
took
their
oath
of
office
and
entered
upon
the
performance
of
their
duties
on
the
basis
of
the
appointment
documents
coming
from
Malacaang.
ISSUE: Whether
the
during
the
period
service.

president
of
an

can
make
election
ban

HELD: NO.
While
the
filling
of
in
the
public
interest,
there
is
to
justify
the
making
of
the
ban.

appointments
to
the
in
the
interest
of

vacancies
in
no
showing
appointments

judiciary
public

the
judiciary
is
undoubtedly
of
any
compelling
reason
during
the
period
of
the

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL & BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 191002,

March 17, 2010

- the
appointment
of
Justice
Renato
Corona
as
the
new
Chief
Justice
of
the
Supreme
Court
during
the
election
ban
as
successor
to
retiring
Chief
Justice
Reynato
Puno
is
valid
under
the
principle
of
pro
hac
vice.

24.

JURISDICTION

Contests

involving

IN

SK

ELECTION

CASES

Officials

INDIRA R. FERNANDEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R.

No.

176296,

- The
1987
Constitution
over
all
contests
involving
courts
of
limited
jurisdiction.

June

30,

2008,

556

SCRA

vests
in
the
COMELEC
elective
barangay
officials

765

appellate
decided

jurisdiction
by
trial

- Construed
in
relation
to
the
provision
in
RA
7160
that
includes
in
the
enumeration
of
barangay
officials
the
SK
Chairman ,
the
constitutional
provision
indeed
sanctions
the
appellate
review
by
the
COMELEC
of
election
protests
involving
the
position
of
SK
Chairman.

39
Intra Party Disputes

JOSE L. ATIENZA,
G.R.

JR.

No. 188920,

vs.

COMMISSION

February

16,

- The
COMELEC
may
resolve
a
proper
case
brought
about
it
register
political
parties.

2010,

an
as

612

ON

ELECTIONS

SCRA

761

intra-party
leadership
an
incident
of
its

dispute
power

in
to

Validity of Voters Registration

JAMELA SALIC MARUHOM vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 108

- It must
be
underscored
that
in
addition
to
the
express
jurisdiction
of
COMELEC
over
petition
for
cancellation
of
COCs
on
the
ground
of
false
material
representations ,
under
Section
78
of
the
OEC ,
the
Constitution
also
extends
to
COMELEC
all
the
necessary
and
incidental
powers
for
it
to
achieve
the
holding
of
free ,
orderly,
honest,
peaceful
and
credible
elections.

Interlocutory Order

EDDIE T. PANLILIO vs. COMMISSION

G.R.
before

181478,

Only
final
orders
the
COMELEC
en

only
the

No.

Section 3,
motion
for
COMELEC
en

Jurisdiction

of

July

of
the
banc.

Article
IX-C
reconsideration
banc.

the

PET

15, 2009,

COMELEC
of
of

and

the
final

the

ON

ELECTIONS

593

SCRA

in

Division

139
may

be

raised

1987
Constitution
mandates
decision
shall
be
decided

that
by

SET

BANAT PARTY LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R.
once
have

No.

177508,

The
jurisdiction
of
the
the
winning
presidential,
been proclaimed.

August
PET
vice

7,

2009,

595

SCRA

477

and
the
SET
can
only
be
invoked
presidential
or
senatorial
candidates

- Under
Section
37,
Congress
and
the
COMELEC
en
banc
shall
determine
only
the
authenticity
and
due
execution
of
the
certificates
of
canvass.
Congress
and
COMELEC
en
banc
shall
exercise
this
power
before
the
proclamation
of
the
winning
presidential ,
vice
presidential
and
senatorial
candidates.

HRET

Jurisdiction

over

Party-List

Representatives

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S.

PALPARAN

vs. H R E T

G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 375

- Since party-list nominees
are
elected
members
of
the
House
Representatives
no
less
than
the
district
representatives
are ,
HRET
has
jurisdiction
to
hear
and
pass
upon
their
qualification.

25.

of
the

AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS

SEVERINO B. VERGARA vs. OMBUDSMAN
G.R.

- When
the
speaks
of
prior
Panlunsod
and
not

No.

174567,

March

12,

2009,

580

local
chief
executive
enters
authorization
or
authority
ratification.

SCRA

into
from

693

contracts,
the
law
the
Sangguniang

- It
cannot
be
denied
that
the
City
Council
issued
Resolution
No.
280
authorizing
Mayor
Lajara
to
purchase
the
subject
lots .
As
aptly
pointed
out
by
the
Ombudsman ,
ratification
by
the
City
Council
is
not
a
condition
sine
qua
non
for
Mayor
Lajara
to
enter
into
contracts.

40

26.

CONCURRENCE
MELANIE
G.R.

OF

MONTUERTO
No.

177736,

SANGGUNIAN
vs.

October

MAYOR

6,

2008,

- The verbal concurrence allegedly given

concurrence
required
and
envisioned
under
a
body,
acts
through
a
resolution
or

27.

by
RA
an

ROLANDO

567

SCRA

TY

670

the Sanggunian is not

7160 .
The
Sanggunian,
ordinance.

the
as

PROHIBITION TO HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE

DENNIS FUNA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308

FACTS:
President
Gloria
M.
Arroyo
appointed
Maria
Elena
H.
Bautista
as
undersecretary of DOTC. Upon
the resignation of MARINA Administrator, Bautista
was designated as OIC Administrator
of
MARINA in concurrent capacity as
DOTC undersecretary.
ISSUE: Whether
the
designation
of
Bautista
as
OIC
of
MARINA
and
concurrently
DOTC
undersecretary
violated
the
constitutional
proscription
against
dual
or
multiple
offices
for
cabinet
members
and
their
deputies
and
assistants.
HELD:
YES.
The
1987
Constitution
in
prohibiting
dual
or
multiple
offices,
as
well
as
incompatible
offices ,
refers
to
the
holding
of
the
office
and
not
the
nature
of
the
appointment
or
designation.
To
hold
an
office
means
to
possess
or
occupy
the
same
or
to
be
in
possession
and
administration
which
implies
nothing
less
than
the
actual
discharge
of
the
function
and
duties
of
the
office.

DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. ACTING DOJ SECRETARY ALBERTO C.

G.R. No. 191644,

February 19, 2013,

AGRA

691 SCRA 196

FACTS: Agra
was
the
Government
Corporate
Counsel
when
he
was
designated as Acting Solicitor
General and Acting Secretary
of
Jesus when
Agnes Devanadera
resigned
in
order
to
run
for
Congress
in
the
May
2010
elections.
He
relinquished
the
position
as
Government
Corporate
Counsel
and
assumed
the
positions
of
Acting
Secretary
of
Justice
and
Acting Solicitor General in
concurrent capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
designation of
Agra as
Acting Secretary
of
Justice,
concurrently
with
his
position
of
Acting
Solicitor
General,
violates
the
constitutional
prohibition
against
dual
or
multiple
offices
for
the
members
of
the Cabinet and their deputies
and assistants.
HELD:
YES.
The
designation
of
Agra
as
Acting
Secretary
of
Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General was
unconstitutional
and
void
for
being
in
violation of
the
constitutional
prohibition
under
Section 13, Article VII of
the l987 Constitution.
It
was of
no
temporary capacity.

moment

To
hold an office
to
be
in
possession
nothing
less
than
the
the office.

that

Agras

designation

was

in

means to possess
or
to occupy
and
administration of
the
office,
actual
discharge
of
the
functions

an

acting

or

the office, or
which
implies
and
duties
of

The language of Section 13 makes no reference to the nature of the

appointment or designation.
The
prohibition
against
dual
or
multiple
offices
being held by
one
official
must
be
construed
as
to
apply
to
all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary.

28.

DOCTRINE OF

OPERATIVE

FACTS

The doctrine of operative facts means that before a

declared unconstitutional, its actual existence must

law was
be taken

41
into account and whatever was done while
operation should be recognized as valid.

the

law

was in

CLAUDIO S. YAP vs. THENAMARIS SHIPS MANAGEMENT

AND INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.
G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369
FACTS: Claudio was employed by Vulture Shipping as electrician for a vessel. The
contract was for a duration of 12 months. On the 3 rd month, he was illegally
dismissed. The Court of Appeal awarded him salaries for
three months, however,
on appeal, the clause for three
months
for
every
year of the unexpired
term under
Section 10 of RA 8042
was
declared unconstitutional for being
violative of the rights of
OFWs to equal protection of the law.
ISSUE: Whether the
declaration
of
unconstitutionality
8042 applies retroactive to the present case.

of

Section

10

of

RA

HELD: NO. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law ; it confers

no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it
is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. An exception to this is
the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration
of
unconstitutionality
will
impose
an
undue
burden
on
those
who
have
relied
on
the
invalid law . Thus, if it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in
double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.

MIRALLOSA

vs. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC.

G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013, 711 SCRA 30

FACTS: Carmel was the registered owner of Pangarap Village with a total land area
of 156 hectares. On October 14, 1973, President Marcos issued PD 293
which
invalidated the
titles of Carmel
and
declared them open for disposition to the
members of MHAI.
On the basis of PD 293,
subsequently built houses there.

Juan,

member

of

MHAI,

occupied

On January 29, 1988, the Supreme Court declared PD 293 as

and void ab initio in all its part in Tuason case.
Lot

Sometime in 1995, Juan executed an affidavit

32 and built his structures on the premises.

authorizing

Lot

32

and

unconstitutional

Mirallosa to occupy

In April 2002, Carmel made several oral & written demands on Mirallosa to
vacate the premises but to no avail until Carmel filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer.
Mirallosa claimed that Carmel has no cause of action against him under the
doctrine of operative fact and he should not be prejudiced by Tuason case because
he was not a party to the case.
ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

Mirallosa

can

avail

of

the

Operative

Fact

Doctrine.

HELD: NO. The Operative Fact Doctrine is a rule in equity. As such, it must be
applied as
an
exception to
the
general
rule
that
an
unconstitutional laws
produces
no
effects.
The
doctrine
is
applicable
when
a
declaration
of
unconstitutionality
will
impose an
undue
burden
on those who relied on the
invalid
law
but it
can never be invoked ,
to
validate as constitutional
an
unconstitutional act.
Mirallosa merely anchored his
by Juan in 1995 or seven years
time he built the structures on the
binding effects of the Tuason case
These
circumstances
necessarily
operation fact
doctrine.

right over the property to an Affidavit issued

after the Tuason case was promulgated. At the
premises, he aught to have been aware of the
and the subsequent unconstitutionality of PD 293.
remove
him
from
the
ambit
of
the

29. CALLING-OUT POWER

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO
G.R. No. 190259,

June 7, 2011, 651 SCRA 228

FACTS: After the Maguindanao Massacre, PGMA issued Proclamation 1946 placing
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She
directed the AFP and PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the

42
Constitution and by
law
to
prevent
violence in the named places.

and

suppress

all

incidents

of

lawless

ISSUE: Whether
then
President
Arroyo
invalidly
exercised
emergency
when
she ordered
the
deployment
of
the
AFP
and
PNP.

powers

HELD: NO. Such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers

under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not proclaim a
national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And
she did not act pursuant to
any
law enacted by Congress that
authorized
her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The
calling out of the armed forces
to prevent
or
suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President under Section 18 , Article VII, and to
suppress
or
prevent
violence
springs from the power vested in
her
as
the
Commander-in-Chief of
the AFP.

30.

CITIZENSHIP - NATURALIZATION
BORN CITIZEN

AND NATURAL-

RENALD F. VILANDO vs. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 192147 & 192149,

August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17

FACTS: Limkalchong won as the Representative of Negros Oriental in the 2007

elections. Vilando, a losing candidate, filed a petition for quo warranto before the
HRET. The petition challenged the eligibility of Limkalchong asserting that she
was a Chinese citizenship, having been
born to a father whose naturalization
had
not
attained
finality
and
to
a
mother
also
acquired
the
Chinese
citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her
marriage to the latter.
ISSUES: 1.
2.

Whether
Whether

the HRET has jurisdiction to rule on

Limkalchong is a natural-born citizen.

ones

citizenship.

HELD: (1) NO. The HRET has no authority to delve into the legality of the
judgment of naturalization. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on
the citizenship of Limkalchongs father which is not permissible. In our jurisdiction,
an attack
on
a
persons
citizenship
may
only
be
done through a
direct
action for
its
nullity.
(2) YES. It was ruled that with Limkalchongs father having been conferred the
status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a naturalized Filipino born
to a Filipino father. Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceeding and
the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkalchong
can still be considered a natural-born citizen, having been born to a Filipino
mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority
age.

31.

RULES ON SUCCESSION OF ELECTIVE OFFICERS

BARBARA TALAGA

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 197

FACTS: Mayor Ramon Talaga and Vice Mayor Castillo filed their respective Certificates
of Candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in the scheduled May
10, 2010 elections.
Four (4)
days
later, Castillo filed with the Comelec a petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Talaga for
having
already
served
three (3)
terms as a City Mayor of Lucena.
The Comelec declared Ramon Disqualified
Three (3) days before the election, Barbara
Lucena City in substitution of Ramon.

On

election

day,

Barbara

garnered

44,099

to run for mayor of Lucena City.

filed her own CoC for Mayor of

votes

as

against

Castillos

39,615

votes.
Castillo promptly filed a petition for annulment of proclamation of Barbara
with the Comelec
where
he alleged that Barbara could
not
substitute
Ramon
because
his
CoC
had been
cancelled
and
denied due course, and
Barbara
could
not
be
considered
a
candidate
because the Comelec en banc had
approved her substitution three (3) days after the elections, hence, the votes
cast
for
Ramon should be considered stray.
ISSUES: (1) Was

the

substitution

of

Barbara

as

candidate

valid

in

place

of

43
her

husband

(2) In
case
of
the position of

Ramon?
permanent
Mayor?

vacancy,

(3) When may a

second placer
disqualified winning candidate?

be

who

must

allowed

to

succeed

take

the

and

assume

place

of

HELD: (1) NO. The filing of a CoC within 60 days prior to the regular election
is
mandatory
requirement
to
be
a
candidate
in
a
national
or
local
election. Since Barbara filed her own CoC three (3) days before the election,
there
can
be no valid
substitution of the candidate under
Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code
as
she has
no valid CoC to be considered a
candidate.
of

(2) The duly

elected
Vice-Mayor
must
Mayor due to a
permanent vacancy

succeed
and
in the office.

assume

the

position

(3) The only time that a

second placer
is
allowed to take the place
of a disqualified
winning
candidate is when two requisites
concur , namely:
(a)
the
candidate
who
obtained
the
highest
number
of
votes
is
disqualified, and (b)
the electorate was
fully
aware in
fact
and
in
law
of
that
candidates disqualification as
to bring such
awareness
within
the
realms of notoriety but the electorate still
cast
the plurality of votes in
favor
of
the
ineligible
candidate . Under this sole exception, the electorate may
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes. In which case the
eligible
candidate
with
the
second
highest number of votes may be deemed
elected.

RENATO M. FEDERICO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 199612,

January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 134

FACTS:
Edna Sanchez (Edna) and Maligaya
were
of
Mayor
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas in the May

candidates
for
2010 elections.

the

position

On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and gubernatorial candidate
for the province of Batangas, died. Two days later, Edna withdrew her Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for the position of mayor and filed a new CoC for the position
of Governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband.
On May 5, 2010, Renato filed his CoC as
view of the withdrawal of Edna.

substitute

candidate for Mayor,

in

On May 10, 2010, the day of elections, the name SANCHEZ, Edna P. was
retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas and garnered the highest
number of votes - 28,389 against Maligayas 22, 577 votes. A second print-out of
the COCVP was issued by the MBOC crediting the votes garnered by Edna to
Renato. Subsequently, Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Renato.
ISSUES:

(1) Did Renato validly substitute Edna who withdrew her candidacy
for the mayoralty position?
(2)

Should

Maligaya be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor?

HELD:
(1) NO. When Edna withdrew her candidacy for Mayor on
April 29,
2010, the
deadline for
substitution
in
case
of
withdrawal
had
already
lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. Her substitution as
the widow of her late husband in the gubernatorial race could not justify a
belated substitution in the mayoralty race.
(2) Therefore, there being no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest
number of
votes
should
be
proclaimed
as
the
duly
elected
mayor . Being
the only candidate, Maligaya received the highest number of votes. Accordingly,
he should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.

CASAN MAQUILING vs. COMELEC & ROMMEL ARNADO

G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420
FACTS: Arnado is
a
natural born
Filipino
citizen. As
a
consequence of his
subsequent
naturalization as
US
citizen,
he
lost his
Filipino
citizenship.
He
applied for repartriation
under
RA 9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 in San Francisco, California, USA.
On April 3, 2009,
Arnado again
Republic and
executed
an
Affidavit of

took his
Oath of
Renunciation of
his

Allegiance to the
foreign citizenship.

44
He ran and won the mayoralty of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, in connection
with
the
May
10,
2010
elections.
Casan
Maquiling,
placed
second having
garnered highest
number
of votes,
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado or
cancel his COC
on
the ground that
Arnados nationality
is USA - American
as
per certification of
the
Bureau of Immigration
and
Deportation (BID).
The
Comelec En Banc granted the petition for disqualification of Arnado.
ISSUE: Whether or
as
the winner.

not

the

second

placer

eligible

candidate

be

declared

HELD: YES. The

votes
cast
in
favor
of
an
ineligible
candidate
do
not
constitute
the
sole
and
total
expression
of
sovereign
voice . The votes
cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidate form part of that voice ,
then
the eligible candidate
obtaining
the
next
higher
number
of
votes
may
be
deemed elected.
Knowledge
by
the
electorate
of a
candidates
disqualification
is
not
necessary before a qualified candidate who
placed
second
to
a
disqualified
one
can
be
proclaimed
as
the
winner . The second-placer in the vote count
is
actually
the
first
placer
among
the
qualified
candidates . That
the
disqualified
candidate
has
already
been
proclaimed
and
has
assumed
office
is of no moment.
The
subsequent
disqualification
based on a substantial
ground
that
existed
prior
to
the
filing
of
the
Certificate
of
Candidacy
void not only the COC
but also the proclamation.

32.

THE POWER OF REMOVAL OF

THE PRESIDENT

EMILIO A. GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614
FACTS:
For finding Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of
Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, the Office of the
President (OP) dismissed him from service.
Gonzales claims that the Office of the President (OP) has no jurisdiction over
him considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which he belongs is clothed
with constitutional independence thus necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of
said office.
ISSUE:
Does the Office of the President have a constitutional or valid statutory
authority to subject Deputy Ombudsman to an administrative investigation and to
thereafter order his
removal from office?
HELD: YES. Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with
it the power to remove. As a general rule,
therefore, all officers appointed by
the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law
expressly provides
otherwise - that is,
when the power to remove
is
expressly
vested in an office or
authority other than the appointing power.
In giving the President
down in
express
terms
constitutional
authority
to
Ombudsman.

the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman simply laid

an
authority
that
is
implied from the Presidents
appoint the aforesaid official in the Office of the

It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct

administrative investigations proceeds from its constitutional mandate to be an effective
protector of
the
people
against
inept and corrupt government
officers and
employees. While the Ombudsmans authority to discipline administratively is extensive
and covers all
government
officials, whether
appointive or
elective with
the
exception only of those officials removable only by impeachment , the members of
Congress and the Judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive. Gonzales
cannot
insist that he
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman.

While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in
the Constitution which is by impeachment, there is,
however,
no constitutional
provision similarly dealing with the removal from the office of a Deputy Ombudsman
for that matter.

33. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATION - INACTION

OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
EVALYN I. FETALINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

45
G.R. No. 191890, December 4, 2012, 686 SCRA 813
FACTS: On February 10, 1998, President Ramos extended an interim appointment
to Fetalino and Calderon as Comelec Commissioners. Congress, however, adjourned
in May 1998 before the CA could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban
on
midnight
appointments
later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no
longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners. Thus, the two merely
served
as
Comelec Commissioners for more than four months.
Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits and
monthly pension with
the
Comelec pursuant to RA 1568. However, the Comelec
disapproved their claim for a lump sum benefit stating that they whose ad interim
appointments were not acted upon by the Commission on Appointments (CA) and
who were subsequently,
not
reappointed,
are
not
entitled
to
the
five-year
lump
sum
gratuity because
they
did
not
complete
in
full
the
seven-year
term of office.
ISSUE:
Can ad interim appointments
lapsed by the inaction of
considered as a having served a term of office to entitle
such
benefits?

the CA be
appointees to

HELD: NO. While an ad interim appointment is characterized as a permanent

appointment that takes effect immediately
and
can no
longer be withdrawn
by
the
President
once
the
appointee has
qualified
into
office .
To hold
otherwise
would
mean
that
the
President
by
his
unilateral
action
could
start
and
complete
the
running
of
a
term
of
office
in
the
Comelec
without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
Therefore, based
on
these
considerations,
Fetalino
and
Calderon
can
never
be
considered
to
have
retired
from
the
service
not
only
because
they
did
not
complete
the
full
term ,
but
more
importantly
because
they did not serve
a
term of office as
required by
Section
1 of
RA 1568, as amended.

34.

WARRANTLESS

ARREST

PEOPLE

vs.

NAZARENO VILLAREAL

G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013, 693 SCRA 549

FACTS: PO3 Renato de Leon was driving his motorcycle on his way home
along 5th Avenue
when he saw Nazareno from a
distance of
about 8 to 10
meters,
holding
and
scrutinizing
in
his
hand a plastic sachet of shabu.
Thus, PO3 de
Leon
alighted
from
his
motorcycle
and
approached
Nazareno
whom
he
recognized
as
someone
he
had
previously
arrested
from
illegal
drug possession. Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, Nazareno tried to escape but was
quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver. PO3 de Leon was able
board Nazareno on to his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu
in his possession.
ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

the

warrantless

arrest

was

valid.

HELD. NO.
Nazarenos
acts
of
walking
along
the
street
and
holding
something in
his hands
even
if
they
appeared
to
be
dubious , coupled
with
his
previous
criminal
charge
for
the
same
offense,
are
not
by
themselves
sufficient
to
incite
suspicion
of
criminal
activity
or
to
create
probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 of
Rule 113.
Probable
Cause
has
been
understood
to
mean
a
reasonable
ground
of
suspicion
supported
by
circumstances
sufficiently
strong
in
themselves
to
warrant
a
cautious
mans
belief
that
the
person
accused
is
guilty
of
the
offense
with
which
he
is
charged.

UNCONSUMMATED BUY-BUST OPERATION PRECLUDES

WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE
PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 188133,

FACTS:
together
conduct

July

7,

vs. OLIVER RENATO EDAO

2014,

729

SCRA

255

On the evening of August 6, 2002, member of Drug Enforcement Group

with a
female
informant
went to the
parking area of McDonalds
to
an entrapment operation.

46
Edao arrived
approached Edao
Edao.

at around 7:00 p.m. on board a space wagon .

and talked to him inside the vehicle.

Afterwards, the
informant
The latter
went
out

waived
of
the

The

at
PO3
Corbe who
then
vehicle
and
ran
away.

informant

approached

PO3 Corbe was able to grab Edao , causing the latter to fell
on the
ground.
PO3
Corbe
recovered
a
knot-tied
transparent
plastic
bag
from
Edaos right hand.
ISSUES:
valid.
HELD:
search
valid.

Whether
NO,
and

the

search

and

seizure

the warrantless
arrest
seizure
that
followed

that

followed

warrantless

arrest

is

of Edao was not valid . Consequently, the

the
warrantless
arrest
was
likewise
not

In
this
case, there
was
no
overt
act
indicative
of
a
felonious
enterprise
that
could be properly
attributed
to
Edao to
rouse suspicion
in
the
mind
of
the
police
that
he
had
just
committed , was
actually
committing or
was
attempting
to commit
a crime in their presence.
Informant
exchange of

and Edao
money and

were
drugs

Edao
is
entitled
to
from
him
is
inadmissible
the
poisonous
tree.

35.

SEARCHES

in

acquittal
since
evidence
for

AND

PEOPLE OF

just
talking to
each other, there was
as the
police approached
the car.

the
shabu
purportedly
seized
being
the
proverbial
fruit
of

SEIZURES

- STOP AND FRISK

THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200334,

July

no

vs. VICTOR COGAED

30, 2014,

731

SCRA

427

FACTS:
An informant thru a text message told
the police
Marvin would be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy.
The police organized checkpoints
in order
passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived
driver
disembarked
and
signaled
to
SPO1
passenger was
carrying
marijuana.

that

certain

to intercept the suspect.

A
at the checkpoint . The jeepney
Taracatas
indicating
a
male

SPO1 Taracatas approached the male passenger who was identified as Victor
who was carrying a blue bag. SPO1 Taracatas asked Victor about the contents
of his bag and he said he did not know since he was transporting the
bag as a
favor to his
barrio
mate named Marvin.
After
marijuana.

this exchange, Victor opened the blue bag revealing three bricks
SPO1 arrested Victor and was brought to the police station.

of

The RTC and the CA found Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation
of
RA
9165
when
Victor
waived
his
right
against
warrantless
searches
without
prompting
from
SPO1 Taracatac,
he
voluntarily
opened his
bag.
ISSUE:

Whether

the

search

HELD: YES. Stop and

protect the privacy of
Constitution.

and

seizure

was

illegal.

frisk searches should be balanced with the need to

citizens in accordance with Article III , Section 2 of the

The
balance lies
in
the
concept
of
suspiciousness
present in
the
situation
where
the
police
officer
finds
himself
in .
Experienced police
officers
have
personal
experience
dealing with criminal
and criminal
behavior.
Thus, a
basic criterion would be
that the police officer, with his personal
knowledge, must
observe the
facts
leading to the
suspicion of
an
illicit
act.
In the case at bar, Victor was simply a passenger carrying a bag and
traveling aboard a jeepney. There was
nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal,
about
riding
jeepney
or carrying
a
bag.
Hence,
the
search
and
seizure
against
the
accused
Victor
is
illegal
because
of
the
absence
of
the
requisite
of suspiciousness.

47
The assessment
of suspicion
by
the
jeepney
driver
who
suspicious.
The known
seizures
are:

jurisprudential

was
not
made by the
police
signaled
to
the
police
that

instances

of

reasonable

1.

warrantless search incident to a lawful

2.

seizure of evidence in plain view

3.

search of

4.

consented warrantless search

5.

customs

6.

stop and

7.

exigent and emergency circumstances.

warrantless

officer
Victor

but
was

searches

and

arrest.

moving vehicle

search
frisk,

and

Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed

in flagrante
delicto, and the
search
conducted within the
vicinity and within
reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons ,
as
well as to
preserve the evidence.
Stop and frisk
are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a
crime .
Its object is
either
to
determine
the
identity of a
suspicious individual
or
to
maintain the status quo
momentarily
while
the
police
officer
to
obtain more
information.
There can be
we
assume
that
open
his
bag.

no
he

valid waiver of
did
not
object

Victors constitutional rights

when
the
police
asked

even if
him
to

His
silence
should not
be
lightly taken
as consent to such search
as it
is a mere
passive
conformity given under intimidating
or
coercive
circumstances created by the
presence of the
police officer and thus
no
consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

37.

RIGHT

AGAINST

SELF -

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ

vs.

G.R. No. 200748,

INCRIMINATION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

July 23,

2014,

730

SCRA

655

FACTS:
On January 31, 2006, the NBI Regional office received a complaint from
Corazon and
Charito that
Ariel , the live-in partner of Corazon and son of
Charito, was
detained at
the
police
station
for
selling drugs . In the said
police station,
they met PO1
James
who
demanded P40,000
in
exchange
for the release of Ariel.
A team was immediately formed to
implement an
entrapment operation
which took place inside Jolibee where the nbi operatives were able to nab
PO1 James
by
using a pre-marked
500 peso bill
dusted with fluorescent
powder.
PO1
to submit
result for

James was brought to the NBI

his
urine
for
drug
testing
presence of dangerous drugs.

Petitioner
claimed
that
he
requested to be
allowed to call
urine sample but
to
no avail.
Sec.

The
15,

RTC found
Art. II of

The

CA

ISSUE:

Whether

the
accused
RA 9165.

affirmed
the

the

drug

ruling

test

forensic laboratory and was

and
it
later
yielded
a

required
positive

refused
the
urine
sample
collection
his
lawyer
prior to
the
taking of
guilty
of

conducted

beyond

the

reasonable

doubt

of

and
his

violating

RTC.

upon

the

accused

is

legal.

HELD: NO. The drug test is illegal. It violates the constitutional right of an
accused
against
self-incrimination which
proscribes the use of
physical
or
moral
compulsion
to
extort
communication from
the
accused
and
not
the
inclusion of
his body
in evidence when
it may
be
material.

48

First, the drug

person
apprehended
unlawful acts
listed

test in
Sec. 15, Art. II
of
RA
or
arrested
for
any
unlawful
under
Art. II
of
RA 9165.

Second, the
drug
test
is
not
compulsion. The
RTC and CA failed to
material to the
charge
of
extortion.

covered
by
see how a

9165
act,

does
but

not cover
only
for

allowable non-testimonial
urine
sample could be

Third
and most
importantly, the
drug
test was a
violation of PO1
James
right
to privacy and right
against
self-incrimination . He
refused
and
also
asked for
a
lawyer
prior
to the urine
test . However, all of his
efforts
proved
futile because he
was still
compelled to
submit
his urine
for
drug testing.

******

GODS

SPEED ****