Magno vs.

CA (Crim1)
Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of
Appeals and People of the Philippines,
respondents.

in question. All the while, said amount was in the

safekeeping of the financing company which is
managed by the officials and employees of LS
Finance.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND

ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ,

Facts:

PETITIONERS,
VS.
COMMISSION
ELECTIONS AND DENNIS GARAY,

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring

complete set of equipment to make his car
repair shop operational, approached Corazon
Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance
and Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing
to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS
Finance could accommodate Magno and and
provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring
Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the
equipment as warranty deposit but Magno
couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP
Gomez to look for third party who could lend him
that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon

was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno

issued six checks, two of them were cleared and
the rest had no sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture,

Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then
pulled out the equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP

Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found
guilty.

ON

RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Dennis Garay filed a case alleging that
petitioners made false and untruthful
representations in violation of Section 10[11] of
Republic Act Nos. 8189.

The petitioners contended, inter alia that Section

45(j) of the Voters Registration Act
was void for being vague as it did not refer to a
definite provision of the law, the violation
of which would constitute an election offense.
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner Spouses Carlos
Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez on 26 May
2008 from the Decision of this Court
dated 30 April 2008.

ISSUE:
Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be

punished for the issuance of the checks in
question.

vagueness doctrine.

Held:
No
Ratio:

WoN criminal statute may be challenged

considering and following the void for

To charge Magno for the refund of a

warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it
was not his own account, it having remained
with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an
unjust debt since he did not receive the amount

HELD:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law
is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.

However, this Court has imposed certain

limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the
challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This
Court has declared that facial

impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines

(AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon
and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
Oscar
Calderon.

invalidation or an on-its-face invalidation of

criminal statutes is not appropriate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should

prosper

Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal

statutes would result in a mass acquittal
of parties whose cases may not have even
reached the courts. Such invalidation would
constitute a departure from the usual
requirement of actual case and controversy
and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract
context having no factual
concreteness.The rule established in
jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,

our

religious freedom, and other fundamental rights

may be facially challenged. Under
no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge.

Case Digest: Southern Hemisphere

Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council,
et al.

FACTS:
Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were
filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act.
Impleaded as respondents in the various
petitions
are
the
Anti-Terrorism
Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of
the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting
Defense Secretary and National Security
Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members.
All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also

HELD: No. Petitions Dismissed

REMEDIAL LAW- certiorari does not lie
against respondents who do not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial functions
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege
with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: On 4 April 2001, an Information for
plunder was filed against former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to
be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659, assailed the said law for

being unconstitutional. He contends that (a) it

own conduct could not be regulated by a statute

suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it

drawn with narrow specificity. The possible

dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard

harm to society in permitting some unprotected

in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the

speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the

element ofmens rea in crimes already

possibility that the protected speech of others

punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all

may be deterred and perceived grievances left

of which are violations of fundamental right of

to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of

due process.

overly broad statutes.

Issue: Whether or not the crime of plunder is

People vs. Dacuycuy [GR L-45127, 5 May

1989] En Banc, Regalado (J): 14 concur

unconstitutional for being vague?

Facts:

Decision: The test in determining whether a

criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and
practice. The vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude. A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protected speech. The
theory is that [w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression
is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his

In a complaint filed by the Chief of

Police of Hindang, Leyte on 4 April 1975,
Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and
Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte,
were charged before the Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case 555 thereof for
violation of Republic Act 4670. The case was set
for arraignment and trial on 29 May 1975. At the
arraignment, Matondo, et. al. pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally
moved to quash the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the
correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The
motion to quash was subsequently reduced to
writing on 13 June 1975. On 21 August 1975,
the municipal court denied the motion to quash
for lack of merit. On 2 September 1975,
Matondo, et. al. filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the denial order on the same
ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further
allegation that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense considering that Section 32
of RA 4670 is null and void for being
unconstitutional. In an undated order received
by the counsel for Matondo, et. al. on 20
October 1975, the motion for reconsideration
was denied. On 26 October 1975, Matondo, et.
al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the former
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII
(Civil Case B-622), to restrain the Municipal
Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of

Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of

said Criminal Case 555 upon the ground that the
former Municipal Court of Hindang had no
jurisdiction
over
the
offense
charged.
Subsequently, an amended petition alleged the
additional ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense since the penal provision,
which is Section 32 of said law, is
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It
imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the
term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run
to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being
solely left to the discretion of the court as if the
latter were the legislative department of the
Government. On 30 March 1976, having been
advised that the petition of Matondo, et. al. was
related to Criminal Case 1978 for violation of PD
442 previously transferred from Branch VIII to
Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Judge Fortunato B. Cuna of the former
branch transferred the said petition to the latter
branch for further proceedings (Civil Case
5428). On 15 March 1976, the Provincial Fiscal
of Leyte filed an opposition to the admission of
the said amended petition but Judge Auxencio
C. Dacuycuy denied the same in his resolution
of 20 April 1976. On 2 August 1976, the
Provincial Fiscal filed a supplementary
memorandum in answer to the amended
petition. On 8 September 1976, Judge Dacuycuy
rendered the decision holding in substance that
RA 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for
its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts, and remanding the
case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang,
Leyte only for preliminary investigation. On 25
September 1976, the Provincial Fiscal filed a
motion for reconsideration. Likewise, Matondo,
et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the
lower court's decision but the same was limited
only to the portion thereof which sustains the
validity of Section 32 of RA 4670. Judge
Dacuycuy
denied
both
motions
for
reconsideration in a resolution dated 19 October
1976. The Provincial Fiscal filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Section 32 of RA 4670, by not

providing a determinable term of imprisonment,
renders the penalty excessive, cruel and
unusual.
Held:
The rule is established beyond question
that a punishment authorized by statute is not
cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the
nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous
one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community.
Based on this principle, our Supreme Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the
defense that the punishment of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved
is cruel and unusual. "The Constitution directs
that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." The
prohibition of cruel Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or
character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and
apply to punishments which never existed in
America, or which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance there
(sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the
wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition. That the penalty is grossly
disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient
basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the
ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that
the punishment authorized by the statute is
severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In
addition, what degree of disproportion the Court
will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution
has still to await appropriate determination in
due time since, to the credit of our legislative
bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a
penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or
"excessive." However, Section 32 of RA 4670
provides for an indeterminable period of
imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a
maximum duration having been set by the
legislative authority. The courts are thus given a
wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of
imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration

thereof may range, from one minute to the life

span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a
duty essentially legislative in nature and which
does violence to the rules on separation of
powers as well as the non-delegability of
legislative powers. This time, the presumption of
constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing
considerations, and by virtue of the separability
clause in Section 34 of RA 4670, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof
should be declared unconstitutional.

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No. 142396
February 11, 2003)

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled

to diplomatic immunity.
RULLING
YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can
be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine
government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be
gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

The
official
exchanges
of
communication between agencies of the
government of the two countries

Certifications from officials of both the

Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs
and the United States Embassy

Participation of members of the

Philippine Narcotics Command in the buybust operation conducted at the residence
of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo

Facts
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
was filed against Minucher following a buy-bust
operation conducted by Philippine police
narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the
house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where
heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher
was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in
the discharge of his official duties as being
merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the United States Department
of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic
Note of the United States Embassy addressed
to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of
Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that
the note is a true and faithful copy of its original.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE

These may be inadequate to support the

diplomatic status of the latter but they give
enough
indication
that
the
Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine
territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the
target, to inform local law enforcers who would
then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal
case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond

the scope of his official function or duties.

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR

no. 125865 January 28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words
against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner
was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security
Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an office of protocol from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process under section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the
ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from
suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The
latter filed a motion for reconsideration which
was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig
City which set aside the MeTC rulings and
ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner
elevated the case to the SC via a petition for
review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered
with immunity from legal process with regard to
Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary
investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the

communication from the DFA that the petitioner

is covered by any immunity. It has no binding
effect in courts. The court needs to protect the
right to due process not only of the accused but
also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity
under Section 45 of the Agreement is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the
acts must be done in official capacity. Hence,
slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime,
such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as
this case. Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law. The rule on
criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive

application of penal laws should also cover
procedures, and that these should be applied
only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in
time to provide relief to the accused in line with
the constitutional guarantee to the right to
speedy trial.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit
themselves from deciding in the Motion for
Reconsideration given they were only appointed
in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral
arguments.
HELD:
The rule should be applied prospectively. The
court upheld the petitioners contention that
while Sec.8 secures the rights of the accused, it
does not and should not preclude the equally
important right of the State to public justice. If a
procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would
work injustice, the said rule may not be given a
retroactive application.

2. WON the application of the time-bar under

Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive
application without reservations, only and solely
on the basis of its being favorable to the
accused.
The Court is not mandated to apply rules
retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule is
intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by
the court, it intended that the rule be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so
would be tantamount to the denial of the States
right to due process. A retroactive application
would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and to the victims of
crimes and their heirs.

GO VS. DIMAGIBA
Facts :
Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Susan Go 13
checks.
Go presented the checks to the drawee bank for
encashment but were dishonored due to the
reason account closed. Dimagiba was
prosecuted for the violation of BP 22.
MTCC convicted him of the case. Dimagiba
appealed to the RTC. RTC denied the appeal
and sustained the conviction. No further appeal
was brought to the CA. RTC issued a Certificate of Finality. MTCC issued an
order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the
service of his sentence. A Writ of Execution was
issued to enforce his civil liability.
Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
MTCC denied the motion.
He filed with the RTC a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. RTC issued an Order directing
the immediate release of Dimagiba from
confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of
P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. RTC invoked
Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,
which allegedly required the imposition of a fine
only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22
violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or

a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this

rule should be retroactively applied in favor
of Dimagiba.
Issue
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas
corpus was validly granted
Held
NO, it was not validly granted.
Ratio
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention in which
individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint; or, more
specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those
who may have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus
deliver them from unlawful custody. It is
therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is
detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person
in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue
of a valid judgment. However, as a postconviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the
following exceptional circumstances is
attendant:
(1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person;
(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or
(3) the imposed penalty has been excessive,
thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, Dimagiba
raised the same arguments that he had invoked
in the motion for reconsideration. His resort to
this extraordinary remedy was a procedural
infirmity. The remedy should have been an
appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions,
in which he should have prayed that the
execution of the judgment be stayed. But he
effectively misused the action he had chosen,
obviously with the intent of finding a favorable
court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had
already become final and executory. Such an
action deplorably amounted to forum shopping.
Respondent should have resorted to the proper,

available remedy instead of instituting a different

action in another forum. His arguments
for his release insubstantial to support the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code
Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel

engaged in the transport of animals named
Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the
port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said
vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674
heads of cattle without providing appropriate
shelter and proper suitable means for securing
the animals which resulted for most of the
animals to get hurt and others to have died while
in transit.

within the jurisdiction of the courts of the

Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during
the time the ship was within the territorial waters
- regardless of the fact that the same conditions
existed when the ship settled from the foreign
port and while it was on the high seas,
In light of the above restriction, the defendant
was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of
two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code
Facts:

Issue:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney

General, filed an appeal that urges the
revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court
of First Instance of Manila presented by the
defendant. The defendant, accused of having
illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while the
said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two
and a half miles from the shores of the city. In
the said demurrer, the defendant contended the
lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said
crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the
case.
Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an

offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Whether or not the Philippine courts have

jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional
waters.

Held:

Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from

the headlines which embrace the entrance of
Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters
and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply.
A crime committed on board a Norwegian
merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed

in our internal waters thus the Philippine courts
have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense.
The Court said that having the opium smoked
within our territorial waters even though aboard
a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public
order because it causes such drugs to produce

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to

Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Constitution. It is however contended that cases
cannot be filed because neither was it said that
the court sitting where the animals were
disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it
say about ships not licensed under Philippine
laws, like the ships involved.

pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore,

the demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered
further proceedings.
People vs Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573
G.R. No.L-5887. December 16, 1910.
ARELLANO, C. J.
Lesson: Crimes NOT involving a breach of
public order committed on board a public vessel
is NOT triable by our courts
Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC, Opium Law
FACTS:
Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English
nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that
it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of
Manila and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found
during the inspection and search of the cargo.
o Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the
saloon
o larger sack in the hold
o Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found
on the part of the ship where the firemen
habitually sleep
the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant
to the instructions he had from the Manila
custom-house, were permitted to retain certain
amounts of opium, always provided it should not
be taken shore so it was returned
2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the
Court of First Instance of Cebu:
o unlawful possession of opium
o unlawful sale of opium
Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these
sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention
of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera
Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been
searched several times for opium, he ordered
two other Chinamen to keep the sack.
The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction,
inasmuch as the crime had been committed
within its district, on the wharf of Cebu. The court
sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvencyxxx It further
ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular
Government.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.

HELD: YES. Modified by reducing the

imprisonment and the fine imposed to six
months and P1,000

GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited

use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit, in any of their ports, does NOT constitute
a crime triable by the courts of this country, on
account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality

EX: when the article, whose use is

prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an
open violation of the laws of the land with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal
law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, only the court established in that said
place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the
absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.
Lol-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922.
MALCOLM, J.
FACTS:
2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1
of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject,
and in the other boat 11 men, women, and
children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat
arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid
in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once
on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on
the Dutch boat, except the 2 young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in
it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros
finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2
of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also
raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro
the 2 women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home
in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
with the crime of piracy
All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation
on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.

 Piracy is a crime not against any particular

state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any
country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of
piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
limits.
As it is against all so may it be punished by
all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of
a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral
to war, are not neutral to crimes."
ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code
dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No.
2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is
found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.
YES.
Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy,
notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force
in the Philippines.
The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1)
an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent
means of saving themselves. It is, therefore,
only necessary for us to determine as to whether
the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should
be imposed.
At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that
the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary for its commission, that
advantage was taken of superior strength, and
that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must
also be taken into consideration in fixing the
penalty.

Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488

US v. AH CHONG / G.R. No. L-5272 / March 19,
1910
FACTS:
Because of recent bouts of burglaries, Ah Chong
kept a knife under his pillow for protection. On
the day of the incident, he also placed a chair in
front of the door for further protection. He was
awakened when someone was trying to open
to door. Ah Chong asked who the person was,

twice, but did not reply until the chair was struck
above his knees. In a fit of panic and confusion
and believed that he was being attacked, he
grabbed his knife and stabbed the intruder who
turned out was his roommate, Pascual. He
died after and Ah Chon was charged of murder
ISSUE: Whether was guilty?
RULING:The Supreme Court decided that it was
mistake of fact. Ah Chong thought that
the person behind the door was an intruder. The
SC was convinced that he acted in good faith
and was defending himself. There was no
malice and he only protected his life and
property.
PEOPLE VS OANIS
G.R. No. L-47722 / July 27, 1943
FACTS:
Policemen, Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
received information regarding whereabouts of
the criminal Anselmo Balagtas who is with Irene
Requinea. Once, on the location, Oanis and
Galanta found a man with his back towards and
started shooting him. The man found to
be Serapio Tecson, Requineas paramour. Oanis
and Galanta gave the trial court contradictory
testimonies which they didnot believe and held
them guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence.
ISSUE: Whether Oanis and Galanta was guilty.
RULING:
The Supreme Court said that the most important
fact was that Tecson was shot with his back
towards the respondents. Even though they
acted in mistake of fact and honest performance
of their duty, they found respondents guilty of
murder. The SC said that both men had time not
to use violent means. Tecson was not resisting
or showing signs of defense. Also, both men
committed treachery making ita qualifying
circumstance to murder. Their arguments of
mistake of fact and honest performance was
held as mitigating circumstances.

Criminal Law- People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) &
8(2) OF THE R.P.C.

committed by him.
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay
No. L-74324 17November1988
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of
Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and
sentencing them to a prison term ranging from
12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20
years (prison temporal) as maximum and for
samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they
used to sleep together. On the evening of May
19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public
plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after
midnight accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived (they were drunk),
and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda.
Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can
of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter,
Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do
the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him. They were
arrested the same night and barely a few hours
after the incident gave their written statements.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that
murder can be the crime? If not what are the
criminal responsibilities of the accused?
There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the
same quantum of evidence as the felony itself,
more specifically by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to
the existence of a previous agreement to commit
a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the
same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda
and the accused, and add to the that that the
meeting at the scene of the incident was purely
coincidental, and the main intent of the accused
is to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven,
the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay
and Samson arising from different acts directed
against miranda is individual NOT collective and
each of them is liable only for the act that was

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted

action of the assailants in confronting the victim.
Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act committed by
his companions who at the same time were
making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE
SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient
evidence that appears in the record establishing
qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy).
And granted the mitigating circumstance that he
never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

PEOPLE VS GARCIA
GR No. 153591
FACTS:
The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their
apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down
to which Garcia commented that Chy was being
arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand
on him. Two days later, the group decided to
drink at a store owned by Chys sister, Esquibel.
Chy was about to come out of his house and
upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly
punched him. Chy continued to parry the blows
and when he found an opportunity to escape, he
ran home and phoned his wife to call the police
regarding the mauling. He also complained of
difficulty in breathing. He was found later
unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating.
Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia
appeals that the injuries he caused were not as
violent in nature as to have caused the death of
Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of
homicide. The autopsy doctor confirms that the
boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the
victim could not have caused any direct physical
effect to cause the heart attack if the victims
heart is healthy. What could have caused said
heart attack is the victims emotions concerning
the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE:
Whether the circumstance of having no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should be appreciated
RULING:
The circumstance that the petitioner did not
intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim
does not exempt him from criminal liability.
Since he deliberately committed an act
prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates
his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the
Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, said
circumstance must be appreciated in favour of
the petitioner. The fact that the physical injuries
he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally
and logically caused the actual death of the
victim, if the latters heart is in good condition.
Considering this mitigating circumstance,
imposable penalty should be in the minimum
period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the trial court properly imposed upon
petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

payment of the sale of a house and lot situated

at No. 46 P. Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila by Albert Quijada, Jr. to accused, said
accused then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with intent to defraud and
damage Alberto Quijada Jr made alterations and
wrote words, figures and phrases to the original
receipt which completely changed its meaning
by making appear thereon that it was issued on
January 24, 1991 in the amount of Fifty Five
Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when in truth and
in fact, the said accused fully well knew that the
receipt was only for the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos.

Sometime in early October 1990, a verbal

agreement was entered into between Alberto
Quijada, Jr. (Alberto) and Avella for the sale of
the formers house and lot located at 46 P.
Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for the
purchase price of P1.2 million pesos. On
October 23, 1990, an earnest money in the
amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) was
given to Alberto by Avella. On October 31, 1990,
the amount of one hundred and fifty-five
thousand pesos (P155,000) was delivered by
Avella representing this time the downpayment
for the house and lot. A subsequent payment of
five thousand pesos (P5,000) was made on
January 21, 1991.

GARCIA v. CA Case Digest

AVELLA GARCIA v. CA
G.R. No. 128213 December 13, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Avella Garcia (Avella) was

charged with Falsification of a Private
Document, defined and penalized under Article
172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), of the
Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion
reads:

That on or about the month of January, 1991 in

Pasay City, Philippines , Abella Garcia, being
then in possession of a receipt for Five
Thousand Pesos dated January 21, 1991 issued
by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down

The relationship between buyer and seller

turned sour. Avella filed a complaint for estafa
against Alberto for his failure to execute a deed
of sale and deliver the subject property. Among
the evidence she submitted was the copy of the
receipt she prepared on January 21, 1991.
However, the receipt appeared to have been
altered in the following manner: 1) the word
fifty was inserted before the word five on the
second line of the receipt to read fifty five
thousand instead of five thousand; 2) the
number 5 was inserted before 5,000.00 on
the third line of the receipt so that it would read
55,000.00; 3) additional words were inserted in
the last sentence of the receipt which reads,
Now covered by T.C.T. # 3998 R.D.
Mandaluyong MM. the parties agree to execute
of [sic] valid deed of conveyance covering the

same sale; 4) on the date January 21 the

number 4 was superimposed so that it would
read as January 24 instead; and 5) there now
appears the amount of 55,000.00 and below it
the word value on the upper left hand corner of
the receipt.

Having noticed the alterations, Alberto instituted

a criminal action before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City charging that Avella
had made it appear that he received P55,000
when he received only P5,000. Needless to
state, the City Prosecutor found that a prima
facie case of violation of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code had been committed by
Avella and accordingly filed the corresponding
Information.

Avella, in her defense, admitted that she did in

fact alter the receipt but claims that it was done
in the presence and at the request of Alberto.

On January 21, 1991, Alberto, along with his

sister, came to Avellas residence in
Mandaluyong City to ask for additional
downpayment for the house and lot. At that time
she only had P5,000 in cash which she handed
over to Alberto and then promised him a bigger
sum in the future. Avella then hand wrote two
receipts which was signed by Alberto and his
sister, as evidence of the payment of P5,000.
One receipt was her copy while the other was
for Alberto. Three days later, on January 24,
1991, Avella called up Mr. Celso Cunanan
(Celso), an architect, from whom she asked to
borrow P50,000. Celso had earlier committed to
Avella that he would lend her P50,000. Celso
arrived at her house that evening to give her the
money. Already present in the house were
Avella, her sister and Alberto. Celso delivered to
Avella P50,000 which the latter, in the formers
presence, handed over to Alberto. With respect
to the alteration, Avella explained that Alberto did
not have with him his copy of the January 21,
1991 receipt and so he told her to just add in
her copy the amount of P50,000 to make it
P55,000. Avella acceded to the request and
made the changes in front of Alberto while he

was counting the money. Avella said she

showed the altered receipt to Alberto but that he
was not able to affix his signature thereon
because he was in a hurry to leave. Avellas
account was corroborated by the testimony of
Celso who declared that all these happened in
his presence.

Avella further claimed that this case was filed

against her in retaliation for the estafa case she
filed against Alberto. As claimed by Avella, she
found out that the deed of sale which
purportedly transferred ownership of the house
and lot to Alberto was a fake. Upon her request,
the National Bureau of Investigation (N.B.I.),
Questioned Documents Division, examined the
signatures of Mr. Floro Caceres and Mrs.
Paciencia Castor Caceres, the transferees of the
subject property, contained in the deed of sale.
In its report the N.B.I. determined that the
questioned signatures and sample signatures of
Floro Caceres and Paciencia Caceres were not
written by one and the same person

ISSUE: W/N Avella is guilty under Art 171 and

172 of the RPC

HELD: The plea lacks merit and is denied.

The elements of the crime of falsification under

Article 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that there be an alteration (change) or
intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) that it
was made on a genuine document; (3) that the
alteration or intercalation has changed the
meaning of the document; and (4) that the
changes made the document speak something
false. When these are committed by a private
individual on a private document the violation
would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the
same code, but there must be, in addition to the
aforesaid elements, independent evidence of
damage or intention to cause the same to a third
person.

Given the admissions of Avella that she altered

the receipt, and without convincing evidence that
the alteration was with the consent of private
complainant, the Court holds that all four (4)
elements have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is
readily apparent as it was made to appear that
Alberto had received P50,000 when in fact he
did not. Hence, Avellas conviction.

Lesson: Felony, Bigamy, Judicial Declaration of

Presumptive Death, malice, good faith as a valid
defense
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea

penalty of from 6 years and 10 months, as

minimum, to 10 years, as maximum and
P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus
costs of suit
Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been
dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year
absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from
liability for bigamy
Eduardo appealed to the CA contending that
he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent whereas under Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be
criminally liable for a felony
CA: affirming the decision of the RTC stating
that Article 41 of the Family Code should apply
that there should have been a judicial
declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the
absent spouse and modified minimum to 2 years
and four months

Laws Applicable: Art. 3 par 2 RPC, Art.

349 RPC, Art. 41 FC

ISSUE: W/N Eduardo is guilty of Bigamy, a

felony by dolo (deceit).

FACTS:
July 28, 1975: Eduardo married Rubylus Gaa
before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati
Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and
thereafter imprisoned
Eduardo only visited 3 times and never saw her
again
January 1996: Eduardo met Tina B.
Gandalera, 21 year old computer secretarial
student, in Dagupan City while she looked for a
friend during her 2 days stay
Later, Eduardo visited Tina, they went to a
motel together and he proposed marriage and
introduced her to his parents who assures that
he is single
April 22, 1996: Eduardo married Tina before
Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of
the RTC of Baguio City and they were able to
build a home after
1999: Eduardo only visited their home twice or
thrice a year and whenever jobless Tina would
ask for money, he would slap her
January 2001: Eduardo packed his things and
left and stopped giving financial support
August 2001: Tina through inquiries from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila and
was embarrassed and humiliated to learn that
Eduardo was previously married
Eduardo claimed that he did NOT know that
he had to go to court to seek for the nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina
RTC: Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy and sentenced to an indeterminate

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED. CA affirmed

Manuel v. People
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

o
o

o
o

o
o

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision

mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is
to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of
marriage established by law.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made
the dissolution of marriage dependent not only
upon the personal belief of parties, but upon
certain objective facts easily capable of accurate
judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy,
the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and
(b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage
without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is deceit when the act
is performed with deliberate intent
Malice -a mental state or condition prompting the
doing of an overt act WITHOUT legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury

When the act or omission defined by law as a

felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it
to have been intentional
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by
dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil
act and an evil intent.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
GR: mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent.
EX: ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the
law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
burden of the petitioner to prove his defense
that when he married he was of the wellgrounded belief that his first wife was already
dead, as he had not heard from her for more
than 20 years since 1975
failed to discharge his burden since no judicial
declaration as proof
Article 41 of the Family Code amended the
rules on presumptive death on Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code which states that before
the spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse,
without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absentee spouse.
moral damages may be awarded under Article
2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code for being against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society

Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted.

The court held that the killing was done in
performance of a duty. Napoleon was under the
obligation to surrender and his disobedience
with a weapon compelled Delima to kill him. The
action was justified by the circumstances.
Case digest on PEOPLE V. HERMOGENES
FLORA
G.R.
NO.
125909
The 2 accused (Hermogenes and Edwin) were
convicted for the murder of Emerita and Ireneo
and the attempted murder of Flor. The 2 were
found to have conspired to kill Ireneo. However,
during the commission of the crime, Emerita was
also killed and Flor hit by a bullet.
HELD:
Co-conspirators are liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done
outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators
or which are not the necessary and logical
consequence of the intended crime, only the
actual perpetrators are liable. Evidence only
shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo and no one else.
Hence, both can be convicted for the murder of
Ireneo. However, only Hermogenes who fired at
Emerita and Flor can be convicted for the
murder of Emerita and Flor respectively.
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Ivler vs. San Pedro G.R. No. 172716 November

17, 2010
Bill of Rights
Ivler vs. San Pedro

PEOPLE

v.

DELIMA

[46

Phil.

738

(1922)]

Facts: Lorenzo Napoleon escaped from jail.

Poiiceman Felipe Delima found him in the house
of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of
bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima ordered
his surrender but Napoleon answered with a
stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it,
fired his revolver but didnt hit Napoleon. The
criminal tried to ran away, not throwing his
weapon; the policeman shot him dead. Delima
was tried and convicted for homicide; he
appealed.

G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August

2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide and Damage to Property for the

death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C.

Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces
vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary

release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner
pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict
and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information for the second
delict for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no

identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the
MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal
case, including the arraignment his arraignment
as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioners motion,

the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioners absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a

resolution denying petitioners motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his
standing to seek relief from his petition for
certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment
in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight

Physical Injuries for injuries sustained

respondent; and

by

2. Whether petitioners constitutional

right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
for the death of respondent Ponces husband.

RULING:
The accused negative constitutional
right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution
for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,

submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner,

arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article

shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal
laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence

under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the

second
prosecutions
as
constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the

accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger
and simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they
are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48,
but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of nonprosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as
"light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct concept of
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule
of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.

PEOPLE vs ILIGAN
191 SCRA 643
FACTS:
At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo
Quinones and his companions Zaldy
Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home from
barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio
fiesta. On the way they met the
accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew

Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo

Asis pushed them aside prompting Zaldy Asis to
box him. Felix quickly said that they had
no desire to fight. Upon seeing his
nephew fall, Fernando Iligan drew from his
back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed.
Terrified the trio ran, pursued by the three
accused. They ran for a good while andeven
passed the house of Quinones, when they
noticed that they were no longer being
chased the three decided to head
back to Quinones house. On the way
b a c k t h e t h r e e accused suddenly emerged
from the road side, Fernando Iligan then hacked
Quinones Jr.o n t h e f o r e h e a d w i t h h i s
bolo causing him to fall down. Felix
a n d Z a l d y r a n . U p o n returning they saw
that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his
head busted.The postmortem examination
report and the death certificate indicates
that thevictim died of shock and massive
cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular
accident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable for the
victims death given that it was dueto a vehicular
accident and not the hacking.
HELD: YES.
We are convinced beyond peradventure that
indeed after Quinones, Jr. had fallen from the
bolo hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he
was run over by a vehicle. This finding,
however, does not in any way exonerate
Iligan from liability for the death
of Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the
RPC which states that criminal liability shall b e
incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act
d o n e b e different from that which he intended.
The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that
an intentional felony has been committed
and that the wrong done to the aggrieved party
be the direct natural and logical consequence of
the felony committed by the offender
.
It is held that the essential elements
are present in this case. The
intentional felony committed was the
hacking of the head of Quinones the
f a c t t h a t i t w a s c o n s i d e r e d superficial
by the physician is immaterial. The location of
the wound intended to do away with
him.T h e h a c k i n g i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e
d on the national highway where

v e h i c l e s p a s s a n y moment, the
hacking blow received by Quinones
weakened him and was run over by a
vehicle. The hacking by Iligan is thus
deemed as the proximate cause of the
victims death. Iligan is held liable for homicide
absent any qualifying circumstances

same to clean her shoes, which she needed for

church the next day
o Then she remembered that her husband
needed gasoline for his lighter so she dropped
by his place of work
o She saw her husband inside a building of the
NAWASA standing by the window

People v. Mananquil
GR No L-35574, Sep 28, 1994, Cuevas, J.
Dean Lozarie Law 109 Crim 1 Group B5
FACTS:
Prosecutions version
o 1965 Mar 6: At about 11pm, Valentina
Manananquil went to the NAWASA Building at
Pasay City, where her husband was working as
a security guard
o She had just purchased 10 centavos worth of
gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft
Avenue. She placed the gasoline in a coffee
bottle
o She was angry at her husband, Elias Day,
because the latter had burned her clothing, was
maintaining a mistress, and had been taking all
the food from their house
o Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she
knocked at the door
o Immediately after the door was opened, Elias
Day shouted at his wife and castigated her,
saying PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON
o The appellant, tired of hearing the victim, then
got the bottle of gasoline and poured the
contents thereof on the face of the victim
o Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo
shirt of the victim aflame
Defenses version
o Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she
left for a nearby gasoline station and bought ten
centavos worth of gasoline, intending to use the

o She entered and knocked at the wooden door.

Elias opened the door, but when he saw his wife
he shouted at her.
o She told him that she had brought him fluid for
his lighter, but Elias, who was drunk, cursed her
PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON. This
shouting continued despite her telling him that
she had come just to bring the gasoline that he
wanted
o She trembled and became dizzy. She was
beside herself and did not know that she was
sprinkling the gasoline on her husbands face.
o She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down
for a while. Then she remembered her grandson
who was alone in the house so she went home,
leaving her husband who was walking to and fro
and not paying attention to her
o She went to bed but could not sleep. She
returned to NAWASA to apologize to her
husband, but, upon arriving, saw that police
officers were present
o An officer pulled her aside, asked her if she
was Eliass wife
o When she said yes, officer accused her of
setting her husband on firean accusation she
denied
o The police took her to the headquarters,
prepared a written statement which she was
made to sign upon a promise that she would be
released if she signed it
ISSUES:
WON appellants extrajudicial confession was
voluntarily given YES
WON burns sustained by victim contributed to
cause pneumonia which was the cause of the

victims death
RULING: YES
RATIONALE
Court found appellants aforesaid assertions
a mere pretense to flimsy to be accepted as
true, no error in the trial courts pronouncement
that the appellants sworn statement was
voluntarily given by her
Contrary to her claim, she knew and
understood Tagalog even though she was not a
Tagala as she had stayed in Manila
continuously for 14 years
her total indifference and seemingly
unperturbed concern over the fate that had
befallen the victim supports the theory that she
has murder in her heart and meant to do harm
to her husband
Mananquil claimed that victims pneumonia,
from which he died, was caused by the alcohol
which he was drunk on that night. But as
testified by a doctor, taking alcohol cannot cause
pneumonia
Pneumonia was complication of the burns
sustained
While accepting pneumonia as the immediate
cause of death, the court held on to state that
this could not have resulted had not the victim
suffered from second-degree burns
MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and
RANDYVER PACHECOG.R. No. 155791.
March 16, 2005
Facts:
An Information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court that the accused Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating,
and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert
where the three were fishing, causing Wilson
Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a
demurer to evidence which the trial courtgranted
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also
held that it could not hold the respondents liable
for damages because of the absence of
preponderant evidence to prove their liability for

Wilsons death. The petitioner appealed the

order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil
aspect of the case was concerned. The CA ruled
that the acquittal in this case is not merely based
on reasonable doubt butrather on a finding that
the accused-appellees did not commit the
criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to
the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any
civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in
a criminal action bars the civil action arising
therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds
that the accused did not commit the criminal
acts imputed to them.
Issue: Whether or not the extinction of
respondents criminal liability carries with it the
extinction of their civil liability.
Held:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action. The prime
purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order. The sole purpose of the civil action is the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury
he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused. The extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from where the civil liability may arise
does not exist.
PEOPLE v. QUIANZON / G.R. No. 42607 /
September 28, 1935
FACTS:
Juan Quianzon, after being fed up with Andres
Aribuabo applied a firebrand on his abdomen.
He died after 10 days. Three witnesses
corroborated to facts and Quianzon also owned
up to his act.The trial court charged Quianzon of
homicide. His counsel argued that it should only

be convicted serious physical injuries as

Aribuabo died because of his carelessness and
his disobedience to his doctors
ISSUE: Whether Quianzon committed homicide.
RULING:
The Supreme Court said that Quianzons
contention was without merit. The doctor even
said that it was difficult if the victim would survive
or not. His act was the direct cause of the
victims death. The SC held that Quianzon was
guilty of murder with additional mitigating
circumstance because of his admission to the
crime.
URBANO v. IAC (INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT / G.R. No. 72964 / January 7, 1988
FACTS:
In 1980, Filomeno Urbano went to his rice field
where he found his sacks of palay soaked from
an overflowing canal. He saw Marcelo
Javier and Emilio Erfe at the scene and asked
who did it. Javier admitted and Urbano got angry
and struck him with his bolo on his right palm.
No charges were filed as Javier and Urbano
had an amicable settlement wherein he paid
some of the medical dues. A few days later,
Javier died from tetanus. The family of Urbano
filed a homicide charge against him and was
found guilty afterwards. Then the IAC, through a
petition, affirmed the RTCs decision. A motionfor
a new trial was based on their barangay captain
where he saw Javier catching fish in the dirty
irrigation water days before his death.
ISSUE: Whether Urbanos act was the direct
cause of Javiers death.
RULING:
Urbano argues that it was Javiers fault that he
got infected with tetanus because his hands
were healing days before his death. Javier was
not infected days after the hacking incident.
The SC found that the wound was infected but it
was not because of the hacking as Javier would
only have mild tetanus if that were true. The SC
found that the act of Urbano was not
the proximate cause of Javiers death. The SC
acquitted him of the homicide charge but direct
him to pay civil liabilities.

INTOD VS CA
215 SCRA 52
FACTS:
February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge
Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked
him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that
he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of
a land dispute between them and that Mandaya
should accompany them. Otherwise, he would
also be killed.
February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them
armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and
fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was
no one in the room.
RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder
based on the testimony of the witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder
since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)
HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with
the accessory penalties provided by the law, and
to pay the costs
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would
be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's
absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the
crime inherently impossible.
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the
Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art.
4(2)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime

 Legal impossibility would apply to those

circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended
physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person
already dead
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat
pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
United States: where the offense sought to
be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime;
legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot
be held liable for any crime

People v. Domasian
G.R. No. 95322

March 1, 1993

Lessons Applicable:
Laws Applicable: Art. 4
FACTS:
March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was
walking with Tirso Ferreras, his classmate, along
Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon,
he was approached by Pablito Domasian who
requested his assistance in getting his father's
signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed
to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to
Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the
man went into a building to get the certificate.
Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry
when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the
man flagged a minibus and forced him inside,
holding him firmly all the while. The man told him
to stop crying or he would not be returned to his
father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took
another tricycle, this time bound for the
municipal building from where they walked to the
market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver
and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr.
Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then
boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente. As

Enrico was crying and being firmly held,

Alexander Grate, the tricycle driver became
suspicious and asked Domasian about his
relationship with the boy who told him they were
brothers. Their physical differences and the
wide gap between their ages made Grate doubt
so he immediately reported the matter to two
barangay tanods when his passengers alighted
from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went
after the two and saw the man dragging the boy.
Noticing that they were being pursued,
Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico
behind. Enrico was on his way home in a
passenger jeep when he met his parents, who
were riding in the hospital ambulance and
already looking for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same
day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an
envelope containing a ransom note. The note
demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico
and warned that otherwise the boy would be
killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note
was familiar. After comparing it with some
records in the hospital, he gave the note to the
police, which referred it to the NBI for
examination
March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an
envelope containing a ransom note demanding
P1 million otherwise Enrico will be killed. . Agra
thought the handwriting in the note was familiar
so he referred it to the NBI for examination and it
turned out to be Dr. Samson Tans signature.
Domasian and Tan were subsequently
charged with the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon
o Domasians alibi: at the time of the incident
he was watching a mahjong game in a friend's
house and later went to an optical clinic with his
wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses
o Dr. Tans alibi: he was in Manila
Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed
Domasian.
RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties
Appealed
ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of
kidnapping kidnapping with serious illegal
detention
HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention may consist not only in placing a

person in an enclosure but also in detaining him

or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not
finding that the sending of the ransom note was
an impossible crime which he says is not
punishable.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs
of the same article, which clearly applies to him,
thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability
shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received,
the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention had already been committed. The act
cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent improbability of
its accomplishment or the employment of
inadequate or ineffective means. The sending of
the ransom note would have had the effect only
of increasing the penalty to death under the last
paragraph of Article 267 although this too would
not have been possible under the new
Constitution.
On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that
it exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it, whether they act
through physical volition of one or all,
proceeding severally or collectively. These acts
were complementary to each other and geared
toward the attainment of the common ultimate
objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million
in exchange for Enrico's life.

US vs. Eduave
36 Phil 209
Facts: The accused rushed upon the girl
suddenly and struck her from behind with a
sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the
lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and
one-half inches long and two inches deep,
severing all of the muscles and tissues there.
The accused was incensed at the girl for the
reason that she had theretofore charged him
criminally before the local officials with having
raped her and with being the cause of her
pregnancy. He was her mothers querido and

was living with her as such at the time the crime

here charged was committed
Issues: WON the crime murder or homicide if
the girl had been killed, WON the stage of
commission is attempted or frustrated
Held: The crime committed was MURDER; The
attack was made treacherously. Qualified by the
circumstance of alevosia (Sp. treachery, a-le-voSI-a), the accused making a sudden attack upon
his victim partly from the rear and dealing her a
terrible blow in the back and side with his bolo.
The stage of commission is FRUSTRATED;
Not attempted murder because defendant
PERFORMED ALL OF THE ACTS which should
have resulted in the consummated crime and
voluntarily desisted from further acts.
People vs. Orita
184 SCRA 105
Facts:
Victim: Cristina Abaya, 19 years old, freshman at
St. Josephs College in Borongan, Eastern
Samar
At around 1:30 am, after attending a party,
Abayan came home to her boarding house. As
she knocked at the door, Orita suddenly held her
and poked a knife at her neck. She pleaded for
him to let her go but instead of doing so, Orita
dragged her upstairs with him while he had his
left arm wrapped around her neck and his right
hand holding and poking the balisong at the
victim. At the second floor, he commanded
Christina to look for a room. Upon finding a
room, Orita held her against the wall while he
undressed himself. He then ordered her to
undress. As she took off her shirt, he pulled off
her bra, pants and panty, and ordered her to lie
on the floor. He then mounted her and, pointing
the balisong at her neck, ordered he to hold his
penis and insert it in her vagina. In this position,
only a portion of his penis entered her, so he
ordered Abayan to go on top of him. With him
lying on his back and Abayan mounting him, still,
he did not achieve full penetration and only part
of his penis was inserted in the vagina. At this
instance, Abayan got the opportunity to escape
Orita because he had both his hands and the
knife on the floor. Abayan, still naked, was
chased from room to room with Orita climbing
over the partitions. Abayan, frantic and scared,
jumped out of a window and darted for the
municipal building and was finally found by Pat.

Donceras and other policemen. Due to darkness

though, the failed to apprehend Orita.In the
medico legal, Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude had the
following findings: circumscribed hematoma at
Ant. neck, linear abrasions below left breas,
multiple pinpoint marks at the back, abrasions
on both kness, erythemetous areas noted
surrounding vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact;
no laceration fresh and old noted; examining
finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal
cavity tight, no discharges noted
Issue: Whether or not rape is consummated
Held: Rape was consummated. Perfect
penetration is not essential. For the
consummation of rape, any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient to
qualify as having carnal knowledge. In the crime
of rape, from the moment the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim, he actually
attains his purpose and from that moment, the
essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished
People vs. Campuhan
329 SCRA 270
Facts:
Primo Campuhan was accused of raping four
year old Crysthel Pamintuan. Campuhan was
caught by childs mother on April 25, 1996 at
around 4pm in their house. Campuhan, helper of
Corazons brother was allegedly

kneeling
in front of
the child
with both

their
pants
downa dn
child was
crying
ayoko,
ayoko w
hile Primo
forced his
penis

into
childs
vagina

Issue:
WON
crime is
rape?
Held:
No.
Modified

to
attempted
rape1. Co
nsummat
ed rape:
perfect pe
netration
not essen
tial. Slight
penetratio
n is equiv

alent to ra
pe. Meret
ouching
of
external
genitalia
considere
d when
its an
essential
part of

penetratio
n not just
touching
in
ordinary
sense(Pe
ople v.
Orita).
Labia
majora
must be

entered
for rape
to be
consumm
ated
(People
v. Escobe
r)2.
Attempte
d

no
penetratio
n or didnt
reach
labia/mer
e grazing
of surface
3. Failed
to prove t
hat penet

ration occ
ur
red.
Mothers
testimony
questiona
ble with
regards to
her
position

relative to
Primo
and child.
They
failed to
establish
how she
could
have
seen
actual

contact
in her
position4.
Mans
instinct is
to run
when
caught.
Primo
could not
have

stayed
or to
satisfy h
is lust
even if ..
seeingCo
razon5. C
hild denie
d penetra
tion occur
red

People v.
Villamor
consumm
ation
even
when
penetratio
n
doubted:
pains felt,
discolorati

on of
inner lips
of vagina
or
red labia
minora or
hymenal
tags not
visible.
Now seen
in case,

Medico
legal
officer,
though
penetratio
n not
neededto
prove
contact,
no

medical
basis
to hold
that there
was
sexual
contact.
Hymen
intact