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ABSTRACT. The so-called New Theory of Reference (Marcus, Kripke etc.) is inspired
by the insight that in modal and intensional contexts quantifiers presuppose nondescriptive
unanalyzable identity criteria which do not reduce to any descriptive conditions. From
this valid insight the New Theorists fallaciously move to the idea that free singular terms
can exhibit a built-in direct reference and that there is even a special class of singular
terms (proper names) necessarily exhibiting direct reference. This fallacious move has
been encouraged by a mistaken belief in the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers,
by the myth of the de re reference, and a mistaken assimilation of "direct reference" to
ostensive (perspectival) identification. The de dicto vs. de re contrast does not involve
direct reference, being merely a matter of rule-ordering ("scope").
The New Theorists' thesis of the necessity of identities of directly refened-to individuals
is a consequence of an unmotivated and arbitrary restriction they tacitly impose on the
identification of individuals.
1.
INTRODUCIION
In this paper it wilt be shown what is right and what is wrong in this
so-called New Theory of Reference. Very briefly, the New Theory was
developed as an account of a phenomenon which its founders thought they
had found and identified. This phenomenon was supposed to be direct
(a.k.a. rigid or de re) reference by singular terms, unmediated by any
descriptive criteria. The fallacy that the New Theory involves lies in the
fact that there is no such phenomenon to be explained as a primitive idea
that cannot be handled in the object language simply by getting clear
about its semantics and its rules of inference. After that has been done,
the allegedly primitive direct reference that supposedly needs a special
theory for its explanation becomes possible to handle by means of explicit
object-language conditions and definitions. In particular, there is no need of
Synthese 104: 245-283, 1995.
(~) 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Prinwd in the Netherlands,
246
247
(1)
However, a may instead (or also) know something about the individual
who in fact is b, without knowing that he, she or it is b. For instance, Stefan
may know some fact or other about Count von Fersen, who in fact was the
unhappy queen's paramour, even if Stefan is blissfully oblivious of their
liaisons dangereuses. In such a case, an outsider might truly say "Stefan
knows of the individual who in fact was Marie Antoinette's lover that he
" ,
or even "Stefan knows that Marie Antoinette's lover
". In
this case, the phrase "Marie Antoinette's lover" will have to pick out the
same gentleman (viz. Count yon Fersen) in all the scenarios admitted by
Stefan's knowledge, even though he could not use this phrase to specify
the object of his knowledge. In general, knowledge "of the individual who
in fact is b" cannot be expressed by a statement of the form (1) unless "b"
picks out the same individual in all the scenarios compatible with what
248
a knows. And this seems scarcely possible unless "b" refers to the same
individual in all possible scenarios. Such terms designate whatever they
designate necessarily, in Kripke's (sexist?) language "rigidly".
This latter kind of knowledge is sometimes said to be de re whereas the
former sort is called de dicto knowledge.
Hence it might seem that, in order to express de re knowledge, we
must have at our disposal "rigid designators" referring to whatever they
refer to necessarily. Furthermore, this rigid reference cannot be mediated
by any contingent definite description. For such a description can always
in principle refer to different individuals in different possible scenarios.
Instead, the protagonists of the New Theory of Reference typically identify
their directly referential singular terms with proper names. For instance,
Ruth Marcus writes that "... [An] identifying tag is a proper name of the
thing . . . . This tag, a proper name, has no meaning. It simply tags." (1961,
pp. 30%10.)
2.
249
(2)
(?x)xxfd
(3)
(?x)tcos[d
or
where N is the necessity operator and K~ the epistemic operator "a knows
that". On the normal (referential) interpretation of quantifiers, the truth of
(3) in a possible world w is formulated with respect to valuation (value
assignment function) 9 by the following pair of clauses:
(4)a.
(4)b.
Here g U {(z, :3)} is the valuation which extends 9 with the value 3 for z.
Also, dora(w) can be taken to be either the class of all individuals existing
in w or else the class of individuals well defined in w, i.e. of which it makes
sense to ask whether they exist in w.
Similar truth conditions can be formulated for (2).
Thus in each of(2) and (3), one is saying that something is true (viz., that
Six]) of one and the same individual a in a range of different possibilities
(scenarios, possible worlds, possible situations, or whatever you want to
call them.) In (2), the relevant possibilia are all the states of affairs or
courses of events that are being considered possible. In (3) they are all the
possibilities left open by what a knows. As a slogan, as we may perhaps
put it, quantifying in presupposes that criteria of cross-identification have
been given.
These criteria cannot themselves be expressed by quantifiers. For in
order to do so, we must be able to compare the denizens of any two scenarios ("possible worlds") for identity. And this inevitably involves quantifying in, or its equivalent. For instance, such criteria of identity clearly cannot
be expressed by means of definite descriptions, for such descriptions would
themselves involve quantifiers. In the jargon of the New Theorists of Reference, we might perhaps say that variables of quantification are "directly
referential and are not equivalent to definite descriptions".
This impossibility of giving an account of cross-identification of individuals by means of the usual apparatus of quantifiers, connectives etc. is
not due to some curious feature of quantified modal logic. It is due to the
nature of the question as a foundational or perhaps rather transcendental
250
problem. The task is to spell out the preconditions of the use of quantitiers in modal and intensional contexts. An account of this kind can use
quantifiers only on pain of blatant circularity.
It seems to us that both Marcus and Kripke deserve a great deal of credit
for perceiving this basic problem situation. Their work in quantificational
modal logic undoubtedly brought home to them the basic fact that the use
of variables of quantification depends on irreducible cross-identification
relations unmediated by definite descriptions.
We are convinced, even though direct evidence is hard to come by,
that it was Marcus' and Kripke's insight into the reliance of quantitiers on independently understood criteria of cross-identification that led
them to emphasize the need of "direct referentiality". For those criteria of
cross-identification themselves cannot be defined in terms of quantifiers
(including quantifiers hidden in definite descriptions), just because they
are conceptually prior to quantifiers. This motivation of the New Theory
is nevertheless insufficient.
3.
( 3 z ) ( x = b A I(~S[z]).
N S[b]
and by
(7)
( B x ) ( x = b A NS[~])
respectively.
In an analogous way, we can distinguish what is necessary for whoever
is or may be b, from what is necessary for the individual who in fact is b.
In other words, we can distinguish de dicto and de re necessities.
More generally, it is important to realize that if the criteria of crossidentification are specified, quantification into modal and intensional contexts makes perfect sense completely independently of what one may think
251
of names and other singular terms, including their relation to the individuals they stand for. There is no need to assume any particular class of "rigid
designators". If a singular term "b" is a "rigid designator" as far as the
given class of possible worlds is concerned, this can be expressed in the
language by means of quantifiers as
(8)
(3x)N(b = x)
Likewise, the fact that "b" picks up one and the same individual in all the
scenarios compatible with what a knows can be expressed by
(9)
(~x)I(~(b = z)
In more colloquial terms, (9) says that a knows who, what, where . . . . b is,
where the choice of the question word depends on the range of the variable
z in (9).
What (8)-(9) do is to express cross-identity between certain classes of
possible worlds. They show how this can be done independently of there
being any syntactic class of "logically proper names" or "rigid designators". They show that rigid designators can be expressed, and afortiori
accounted for, in terms of quantifiers. And quantifiers make sense as soon
as the criteria of cross-identification have been understood completely
independently of questions of any possible rigid designation by free singular terms including names. This is actually a line of reasoning which has
been countenanced by Kripke himself. In Kripke (1976, p. 374), he has
acknowledged the same way of imposing rigid reference on an a priori
nonrigid singular term as we have relied on in (8) and (9). And in Kripke
(1963), he treats quantifiers in modal contexts in a referential way as we
did in (4) without any appeal to rigid designators.
A corollary to this basic feature of the semantics of quantifiers is a
restriction to the validity of some of the familiar inference rules of the
usual non-modal logic. For instance, instances of existential generalization
like
xs[q
(10)
(3a:)NS'[xj
(11)
ices[b]
or
are valid only on the assumption that the term "b" picks out the same
individual in all the relevant possible worlds. This does not cause any
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xs[b]
(13)
In (10)-(13) we have assumed that S[b] is first-order. These rules can
nevertheless be generalized to formulas of a more complex structure. The
underlying conceptual point can likewise be generalized.
What happens here is essentially that the idea of (more or less) rigid
reference is explained by reference to quantifiers. Moreover, this treatment
is not foreign to natural language and ordinary discourse. In fact, the
natural-language counterparts to the de re constructions (5) and (7) would
be something like the following:
(14)
(15)
six].
six].
These exhibit a striking parallelism with (5) and (7). It is especially interesting to note that in the main assertive part of (14) and (15), the singular
term "b" is replaced by an anaphoric pronoun, not unlike the way bound
variables replace "b" in the transition from (2) to (7) and from (3) to (5).
4.
The striking thing about these important insights into the way quantifiers
and quantified variables behave in modal contexts is that they have as such
nothing to do with the references of singular terms. On the contrary, they
amount to an elegant argument for the dispensability of rigid designators
and other directly referential free singular terms. For such developments
as we have just reported amount to showing how the job for which rigid
designators were allegedly needed can be done so to speak free of charge
by quantifiers. As we have seen, quantifiers presuppose a kind of direct
referentiality of the values of their variables. But as soon as we have them
at our disposal, we do not need any other kind of direct representability.
253
254
follow that we must have in our own language a special class of free singular terms that refer rigidly (or any such terms, for that matter). As was seen
above, normally interpreted ("referential") quantifiers, constitute a fully
adequate linguistic medium of rigid reference. The only possible rationale
for the requirement that there must be a class of individual constants that
refer rigidly is that quantifiers are interpreted substitutionally.
Thus we may think of the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers as
the bridge that led the New Theorists of Reference from a valid insight into
the semantics of quantifiers to a fallacious theory of reference and which
prompted the proponents of this theory to reverse the fight direction of
explanation here. Above, we showed how the notion of rigid designation
can, in a sense, be expressed by means of quantifiers and hence automatically explained by reference to how quantifiers operate. The New Theorists
of Reference want, on the contrary, to explain quantifiers in terms of rigid
designation. Their line of thought goes somewhat as follows:
The admissible substitution-values of quantifiers in the usual rules of
inference are rigid designators or such contextually "rigid designators" as
satisfy conditions like (3) or (4). Since the meaning of quantifiers is to be
explained by reference to the given fixed class of substitution-values of
quantified variables, quantification makes sense only on the assumption
that there is in the language in question a class of rigid designators to serve
as such substitution-values. Marcus and Kripke identify them with proper
names.
5.
This line of thought leading to the New Theory of Reference is nevertheless fallacious. The fallacy lies in the use of the idea of the substitutional
interpretation of quantifiers. For this interpretation just does not do justice
to the way quantifiers work. It is not only the case that the so-called substitutional interpretation of quantifiers is not needed as an account of direct
reference (or as a part of such an account). A substitutional interpretation
is not even possible as a self-sufficient account of the meanings of quantitiers. Drawing upon some work that we have published or are publishing
elsewhere (see Hintikka, forthcoming; Hintikka and Sandu 1989; Hintikka
and Sandu, forthcoming), the failure of the substitutional interpretation can
easily be explained.
Basically, what the substitutional account overlooks is the character
of quantifiers as codifying certain possible choices which may depend on
other choices. This does not make a difference as long as we are dealing
with isolated sentence-initial quantifiers. But when quantifiers occur inside
255
(16)
(V.rc)(Vz)(39/Vz)(3~/Vz)S[z,
9, z, ,2]
(17)
(Vz)(3q/Vz)5"[z, y]
Ai Vj 5'[ai, at]
, where a i and aj are all the individuals in our domain. In reality, in the
correct translation the disjunction would be independent of the conjunction:
(19)
Ai(Vj/Ai)S[ai, aS]
(20)
At v~ S[a~,at]
256
but not with (18), as it ought to be on the substitutional view. In general, if we try to express the meanings of quantified sentences in terms of
their substitution-instances, we find that independent quantifiers must be
explicated by means of independent connectives. Hence the substitutional
theory of quantifiers is not applicable in general without further explanations, except perhaps in the artificially simple case of received first-order
logic.
In a deeper sense, the substitutional account does not work in ordinary
first-order logic, either, as an interpretation of quantifiers. In a charitable
mood, we could say that the translation or paraphrase which the so-called
substitutional interpretation relies on may be correct, but it does not amount
to an explanation of how quantifiers operate. The most important aspect
of their modus operandi is the network of their mutual dependencies and
independencies. These relations of dependence and independence are left
unexplained by the so-called substitutional interpretation. They are simply
replaced by the same relationships, this time holding between propositional connectives instead of quantifiers. In this deeper sense, there simply is
no such thing as the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers. The substitutional idea is not, and cannot be, a full account of the meaning of
quantifiers, for it does not explain the most important aspect of the semantics of quantifiers, viz. their relations of dependence and independence.
One thing that this fact implies is that the damage to the substitutional
account cannot be localized. The failure of the substitutional account of
quantifiers does not concern only informationally independent quantifiers.
For what is seen there is the general truth that a substitutional account
cannot do justice to the relations of dependence and independence holding between different quantifiers. And these relations are the lifeblood of
quantifiers in ordinary first-order logic quite as much as in independencefriendly logic. In ordinary first-order logic the failure of the substitutional
account is merely hidden by the artificial notational simplification which
Frege and Russell foisted on logicians.
Admittedly, the New Theorists of Reference have not usually relied on
the substitutional interpretation in so many words. Kripke appears to be
aware to some extent of the dependence of his ideas on the substitutional
interpretation as evinced by the fact that a denial of the substitutionaljnterpretation provoked him to put forward a defense of the interpretation that
one is tempted to describe as nasty, brutish and long. (Cf. Kripke, 1976.)
The dependence of Kripke's theory on the substitutional interpretation
might help to explain his ardor.
It is nevertheless fair to say that the substitutional interpretation of
quantifiers is merely a symptom of a deeper mistake that has also prompted
257
the parallel fallacy of the New Theory. But even though this is the case,
to see the basis of the New Theory of Reference in the substitutional
interpretation of quantifiers helps crucially to understand the nature (and
the shortcomings) of the New Theory of Reference. Among other things,
it helps to understand why it has been claimed to be a theory of reference
and not just a theory of identification in modal and intensional contexts.
One can perhaps even identify the deeper flaw in the thinking of the
New Theorists. It is a failure to appreciate the importance of the semantic
interplay between quantifiers as distinguished from what can be said of the
meanings of quantifiers considered in isolation from each other. Once this
is realized, our criticism is seen to be applicable even if the substitutional
interpretation is an emblem rather than a premise of the New Theory of
Reference.
To a considerable extent, the failure of the substitutional interpretation
of quantifiers is parallel with the failure of Tarski-type truth-definitions in
independence-friendly first-order languages. In the case of truth-definitions,
too, this failure reveals a fundamental weakness which is present but as
it were only latent already in their application to ordinary first-order languages. (See here Sandu, forthcoming, and Hintikka, forthcoming, chapter
6.)
Our results nevertheless show that in a right perspective the substitutional interpretation has a large grain of truth, and can perhaps be defended
as a thesis about quantifiers. A comparison between sentences like (17) and
(18) shows that the behavior of quantifiers is reflected in the behavior of
propositional connectives. What the substitutional interpretation cannot be
is a full account of the meaning ofquantifiers. For that purpose, an account
of the dependence and independence of quantifiers and propositional connectives of each other is needed. And the substitutional "interpretation"
just does not provide it. tt merely relies on the analogous dependencies
between connectives instead of accounting for them. The substitutional "theory" may be a correct theorem about quantifiers, but it is not an
interpretation of quantifiers.
We have also to be quite clear about what precisely is meant by the
substitutional interpretation of quantifiers. In one sense, a substitutional
interpretation of quantifiers cannot be objected to. Anyone is free to choose
one's interpretation freely: cuius l~gio, eius quant~ficatio, so to speak.
What is at issue in Kripke and Marcus seems to be a much more striking
thesis than the possibility of some sort of substitutional interpretation of
quantifiers. For Marcus, it is the idea that a substitutional account is the
only reasonable way of implementing the ordinary realistic understanding
of quantifiers. For Kripke, it is the consilience of the substitutional and of
258
the objectual quantification (Cf. Kripke, 1977, p. 377.) It is for this reason
that Kripke can claim that the objectual and the substitutional accounts of
quantifiers are equivalent or in any case differ only with respect to the class
of entities that quantifiers range over.
This assumption of the convergence of the substitutional and the objectual accounts is not a monopoly of the New Theorists. At least in his
younger years, Quine seems to have countenanced some kind of substitutional account when he describes names as "those constant expressions
which replace variables and are replaced by variables according to the usual logical laws of quantification", while proclaiming from the ontological
side of his mouth that "to be is to be a value of a bound variable". (See
Quine, 1939.) And if he subsequently gave up the assumption of the two
accounts, it was because the substitutional account relies on the prosaic
but false assumption of there being a designator in the language for each
member of one's universe of discourse. (See Quine 1961, p. 328.) Such a
reason for forsaking the stronger forms of the substitutional interpretation
are a far cry from the much sharper thesis argued for in our paper here that
the substitutional account is incapable of explaining single-handedly the
logical modus operandi of quantifiers.
6.
259
260
Second, when modal or intensional concepts occur in S[x], the "ranging over" metaphor becomes inadequate for a different reason. In such
a case, the individuals who are the values of the variable x are in effect
considered as members of more than one model ("scenario", "possible
world"). This presupposes cross-identification which is not explained at
all by the "ranging over" metaphor. Hence to assume that the "ranging
over" idea is a sufficient explanation of the quantifiers presupposes that
the cross-identification problem is trivial. And this assumption is nothing
but the postulation of a prefabricated individual making its appearances in
all the different worlds. Such a postulation is blatantly circular.
7.
It is useful in understanding the motivation of the New Theorists of Reference to think of them as relying on the substitutional interpretation of
quantifiers. However, to do so is not fully accurate historically, and it leaves
certain important collateral assumptions of the New Theorists unaccounted
for.
In fact, the New Theorists are not unaware of the expressibility of
direct reference by means of quantifiers. For instance, Kripke, in his classical paper on modal logic from 1963, presents his semantics ofquantifiers
in modal contexts entirely in objectual terms, and in his defense of substitutional quantification (see Kripke, 1976), he shows how singular terms
(standing for definite descriptions) in intensional contexts can be given a
de re interpretation by using quantifiers. Yet in the very same paper, Kripke
argued for the thesis that proper names refer rigidly. (See Kripke, 1972.)
Thus the New Theorists obviously think that we have to assume rigid
designation by singular terms even though we have ordinary (objectual)
quantifiers at our disposal, and even though they can be used to spell out the
conditions on which a singular term refers rigidly, as in (8) and (9). They
are in effect claiming tbr reasons other than the alleged and now refuted
need of a substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, that some singular
terms, viz. proper names, exhibit intrinsically rigid reference and that our
reconstruction (or is it deconstruction?) of direct reference by means of
quantifiers does not do the whole job. It might first appear that what we
have shown is merely the possibility of drafting quantifiers into service to
facilitate direct reference. But the real problem is elsewhere according to
them. Even if rigid designators could in principle be eliminated in favor
of quantifiers, free singular terms cma (and do) operate in natural language
by direct (de re) reference.
261
Tom knows of the individuals who in fact are Dick and Harry
that the former kicked the latter.
captures the force of (22), but it does not explain how the names "Dick"
and "Harry" can exhibit direct reference in (21), it may be alleged.
This objection is in order, but it relies too much on the surface forms
of formal as well as of natural languages. Why cannot we simply say that
(22) and hence (23) spells out the logical form of (21) which its surface
form hides? We do not see any valid objection to so doing.
However, it turns out that we do not have to do so. W~ do not have to
resort to quantifier paraphrases like (23). We already have at our disposal
an eminently natural way of bringing the syntactical forms of formal and
natural languages closer together, without introducing any new primitive
ideas. This way is to bring in the idea of informational independence. We
will indicate the independence of (3x) of K~ by writing it ( 3 x / K ~ ) , and
similarly for other notions. It is to be noted that the slash is not really a
new logical notion, but only a punctuation mark serving the same kind of
purpose as brackets. By means of the slash notation we can represent the
logical form of all the different kinds of knowledge statements, as has been
explained elsewhere. (See e.g. Hintikka 1992.)
Now it was argued as early as in I985 by Hintikka and Kulas that in
the semantics of natural languages we have to associate a game rule also
with individual constants, including proper names. As with any rule, its
applications can be independent of applications of other rules. Thus we
can write
(24)
A~Tom((Dick/KTom)
kicked (Harry/t(Tom))
t~'~S(b/K~).
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263
264
8.
265
(27)
(28)
I am Quentin Smith
the identity is asserted to hold between entities whose criteria of crossidentification are importantly different (perspectival vs. public.) Yet no
special sense of identity is involved, and it is even dubious whether any
distinction between two different kinds of reference is involved. On the
other hand, if your theory of reference deals with the way the references
of names and other singular terms are determined in any old (or new)
possible world (or several possible scenarios), then much more is involved
than questions of cross-identity. The question as to how the reference of
a term depends on the possible world in which this reference is located
is according to Montague (1974) the same as the question of its meaning.
And even if you do not follow Montague completely in this regard, his
view illustrates how much more is involved in the question as to how
precisely the "world lines" of different individuals are drawn than in the
much narrower question as to according to what principles they are drawn.
The main division between such principles is that between perspectival
and public world lines, to be explained below in Section 13. There you can
see clearly how little these principles predetermine the specifics of world
lines, Hence a theory of cross-identification does not amount to a theory
of reference, even for singular terms. And yet it is all that is needed to
understand the phenomenon of direct reference.
Furthermore, the tacit reliance of the New Theorists on the substitutional theory of quantifiers also explains the shallowness of the theoretical
accounts provided by the New Theory. This theory in effect strives to
explain the operation of quantifiers by reference to the rigidity of designation by proper names. But how is the rigidity of proper names to be
explained or even expressed in an appropriate logical notation? What does
it take to say that the individuals a given designator picks out in all the
different possible worlds are identical? Whatever difficulties there may be
here, there is no hope in the world of expressing this without quantifiers.
And of course resorting to quantifiers would be circular.
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267
N((t,z)B[,] = b)
= .z.).
However, if the world lines were drawn even partially by means of other
considerations, these sentences would not be true, even if there were a
descriptive element in the conditions of cross-identification.
Moreover, even if (29)-(30) were true for some particular individual b
or even for each individual, in the sense that there should exist a definable
set of attributes B[a:], definite descriptions would not necessarily do the
job here. For what we need is identity conditions between different worlds
which would explain the meaning of quantifiers in modal and epistemic
contexts in general. And if the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers
is rejected, there is no hope of inferring such an account of cross-world
268
10.
269
(31) (3x):(b= x)
(32)
( 3 z ) N ( d = z)
They say that "b" and "d" are "rigid designators". But (31) and (32) together
do not logically imply
(33) N(b=d)
as you can easily see. The conclusion (33) follows only if the world lines
are assumed not to branch when we move from a world to its alternatives.
But it was seen that the non-branching assumption rests on an unacceptable
metaphysics of individuals which is in turn inspired by the demonstrably
fallacious "substantial interpretation of quantifiers". Hence the thesis of
necessary identity which we might dub "The New Theory of Identity"
and which is generally considered as an ingredient of the New Theory of
Reference is mistaken. A f o r t i o r i , there is no reason to think that there
are any necessary truths a posteriori. In general, the entire question of the
substitutivity of identity and its possible failure in modal and epistemic
contexts is totally irrelevant to any discussion of rigid reference, unless
unwarranted further assumptions are made.
1 1.
270
p. 89.) This is none the less a non sequitur. What is needed for the thesis that identities between names (rigid designators) are necessary is an
assumption concerning the principles of cross-identification, viz. the nonbranching assumption. The assumption that names are rigid designators is
not enough.
The point is worth spelling out. The a posteriori character of genuine identities (identities between well-defined individuals) is of course
a familiar phenomenon. Even if you know perfectly well that "Anthony
Eden" and "Lord Avon" are both proper (very proper) names, you may
still fail to know, that they refer to the same proper British gentleman. But
this nonmysterious character of unknown identities between individuals
in ordinary discourse is captured in an equally nonmysterious way by our
epistemic logic. There we simply have a situation that parallels the one
dealt with in (31)-(33). The truth of the following sentences
(34)
( 3 x ) K ( e = x)
(35)
( 3 z ) K ( a = x)
K ( a = e).
271
(V::')(Vy)(:~. = y --- N ( z
= :y)).
This Marcus did years before she formed the rigid designation idea in
1961.
272
273
12. THEPRIMACYOFCROSS-IDENTIFICATION
One important consequence of the failure of the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers in modal and intensional contexts is the primacy of
the criteria of cross-identification over any explanation of the operation of
quantifiers by means of substitutional instances.
The substitutional interpretation of quantifiers is in a way at odds with
the entire style of logical analysis which was launched by Russell in his
essay "On Denoting" (1905) and subsequently practised by many logicianphilosophers. Its culmination is Quine's slogan "to be is to be the value of
a bound variable". The leading idea is to explain the facts of denotation
and reference by means of quantifiers.
What the substitutional interpretation attempts to do is in a sense the
opposite. The nature of quantification is explained in terms of certain kinds
of reference. We consider this strategy as retrogression. In order to make
sense of quantification in modal and intensional contexts, criteria of crossidentification have to be given (and understood). But nothing else is needed
to understand quantifiers, and nothing else is needed to be in a position to
specify' how other kinds of singular terms behave logically.
The same remarks can be made about the New Theory in general. Even
when quantifiers are not used to explain such things as the de ditto vs. de re
distinction (cf. section 7 above), the explanation turns on good old-fashion
logical tools, such as operator-ordering (scope relations), not armchair theories as to how names are taught and learned. That the strategy underlying
the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers is based is a mistaken one
is also shown by the fact that it has directed philosophical analysts' attention to wrong directions, largely just via its offspring, the New Theory of
Reference. One can see why. If all the different possible worlds are built
out of the same individuals, then the crucial question is to specify these
274
13.
Among other ingredients of this practice, far too little attention has been
paid to the role of continuity in cross-identification, even though several
quite specific things can be said about that role in the case of the identification of physical objects. (See Hintikka and Hintikka 1982.) Even
more surprisingly, the extremely important distinction between perspectival (subject-centered) and public (object-centered) modes of identification
have largely been neglected in recent philosophical discussion.
This last point needs and deserves an explanation. As Hintikka has
shown in a number of articles, the criteria of identification can in fact
be chosen in two different ways, and are in fact so chosen in our actual
semantical practice. (See, for instance, Hintikka 1975a and 1975b.) On the
one hand, there is the ordinary public mode of identification which goes
together with the truth-conditions of identificatory sentences like (4)-(5)
above. Hintikka has called it public system of identification. On the other
hand, there is a mode of identification which relies on the subject's direct
cognitive relations to persons, objects, places, times, events etc. These
relations constitute a frame of reference and cross-identification. In the
simplest case of visual knowledge, i.e., seeing, this frame of reference
is the subject's visual space. An object's place in it can serve to crossidentify it even if the subject does not see (or otherwise know) who or
what the individual in question is. Hintikka has called such an identification
perspectival. Such an identification creates a pair of quantifiers analogous
with but different from ( ~.r ), (Vy), etc. Let us use (E:r), (A:~/), etc. as such
quantifiers. Knowledge expressed in terms of these quantifiers is in effect
275
(38)
z).
276
277
14.
One consequence of what has been shown is an explanation why philosophers like Marcus and Kripke have not developed a viable epistemic logic
and at the same time a demonstration of how naturally such a logic can
be developed if one drops the fallacious assumptions underlying the New
Theory. For one thing, we have seen that the most basic rules for quantitiers have to be changed when we move from ordinary first-order logic to
quantified epistemic logic. The requisite change is ii!ustrated by the need
of replacing (11) by (13).
Undoubtedly because they believe that they have available to them rigid
designators which automatically make the extra premises true, the New
Theorists have not acknowledged the need of such changes. In reality,
these changes are needed in any adequate approach to epistemic logic.
And a further examination of the situation reveals further changes which
are needed in the logical laws of quantified epistemic logic and which are
naturally formulated in our framework.
278
Londres = London
(40)
(41)
BPierre(Londres is beautiful)
(42)
BPierre-,(London is beautiful)
Londres London.
279
m(~X)Keierre
(Londres = x).
(45)
(3:~)B~,,(b = z)
and
(46)
( 3 z ) K ~ ( b = z).
Indeed, from the vantage point of rightly understood epistemic and doxastic logic, we can even locate a kernel of truth in Kripke's misformulated
doctrine of allegedly a posteriori necessities. A look at rules of inference
like (13) shows the important role of extra premisses like (46). What such
a premise expresses is a posteriori knowledge. Yet, if b is a proper name,
there is a kind of flavor of necessity to it. For the proper name b can scarcely fail to refer to the individual it in fact refers to. (This is precisely what
Kripke has insisted on in arguing that proper names cannot be construed
as hidden definite descriptions.) But however necessary the relation of a
280
proper name to its object is, there is nothing impossible in a person's failing to know it. Hence (46) may in a sense be a posteriori, but it does not
express any substantial necessity. Kripke is able to find candidates for the
role of a posteriori necessities only by making the restrictive assumptions
about world lines that were criticized above.
Furthermore, it would be in fact more accurate to say that in (46) we
are dealing with a priori knowledge rather than a posteriori. For even
though the knowledge expressed by (46) has to be acquired, it is conceptual knowledge, knowledge of what our names mean. In this respect too,
Kripke's use of identities as the focal point of his analyses has led him
astray, instead of the conditions of identification like (46).
Kripke acknowledges that epistemic and doxastic contexts present a
problem for the New Theory of Reference. For one thing, as we have seen,
substitutivity of identity fails in such contexts, even for proper names.
Accordingly, Kripke speculates that something more than direct reference
might be involved in such contexts, something like the mode in which
the reference is picked out in different worlds. This is the closest he
comes to acknowledging the primacy or even the role of cross-world
identification.
Generally speaking, the attitude of the New Theorists of Reference to
epistemic logic has in fact been most puzzling. Even though the existence
of epistemic logic constitutes a clear cut counter-example to their central
ideas, the New Theorists have refused to discuss the logic of epistemic
notions. This is a telling instance of the alienation of the New Theorists
from the real problems in intensional logic. In a wider perspective, their
neglect of epistemic logic is potentially damaging to the entire profession,
for it is epistemic logic that is most important for real life applications
among all modal and intensional logics. It has turned out to be, not unexpectedly, an important tool not only in AI but in distributed database theory
too. It has accordingly been cultivated in recent years largely by computer
scientists rather than philosophers. (See e.g. Fagin et al., 1995.) This has
led to a wealth of unused opportunities and also to a great deal conceptual
confusion. The New Theorists' myopia has in this direction had serious
detrimental effect on the course of research.
The neglect of epistemic logic can be taken to have the same root as
the fallacy of the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers. This fallacy
was seen to lie in disregarding the interplay of different quantifiers, prominently including their relation of dependence and independence. Likewise,
relations of dependence and independence are at the bottom of the logic
of knowledge. As Jaakko Hintikka has emphasized, the entire epistemic
logic is nothing more and nothing less than the logic of existential quanti-
281
These adverse effects of the New Theory of Reference have been aggravated by the fact that in its usual form, the so-called Kripke semantics is
not the correct semantics for logical modalities either. As has been pointed out repeatedly (see Hintikka, 1980, 1982, Cocchiarella, 1975a, 1975b,
1986, cf. Kanger, 1957), Kripke semantics, unlike e.g. the variant possibleworlds treatment by Kanger, is analogous to the nonstandard interpretations
of higher-order logics, which is not equivalent with the intended standard
interpretation of these logics. In other words, the so-called Kripke's semantics does not provide us with the right model theory of logical (conceptual)
necessities in any case.
Hence the New Theorists either have to change the logic they are
basing their discussion on or else admit that they are not dealing with
purely logical (alethic) modalities, but with some kind of metaphysical
necessity and possibility. But such metaphysical modalities, unless they are
assimilated to natural (nomic) necessity and possibility, have a deservedly
murky reputation in serious philosophy. It is instructive that Kripke has
repeatedly resorted to "intuitions" about what can or cannot be the case
which cannot be tested in any way and which are delivered without any
respectable argumentation. It may, ~br instance, be the case that the origin
of an entity plays a special role in determining its identity, as Kripke has
claimed, following John Locke. But such claims have to be based on a
general semantical theory, not marshalled as the pronouncements of an
intuitional oracle.
The New Theory of Reference has a more than one fatal flaw. It is in the
last analysis an attempt to explain a nonexistent phenomenon. The more
quickly it is put out of its misery~ the better for everybody.
NOTES
The fact that Wittgenstein is also dealing with higher-order (higher-type) entities does not
matter here. For Wittgenstein assumes in the Tractatusa nonstandard interpretation of his
higher-order language, which means that it can be dealt with as if it were a many-sorted
first-order language.
282
2 If you do not find this example convincing, try the same idea with belief instead of
knowledge. Cf. Sec. 14 below.
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