Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRAGMACIO
VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by
the spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the
Civil Code apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of
title in the name of the widow? This is the issue posed in this
petition to review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 60903 which is an action for
reconveyance and damages. *
On November 28, 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son,
Salvador M. Vitug, mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) several parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 2289 Pampanga to guarantee the loan
granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in
the amount of P40,900.00 which was duly registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. 1
On December 1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also mortgaged in
favor of PNB certain properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and
2888-Pampanga to guarantee the payment of the loan account
of her son Salvador Vitug in the amount of P35,200.00, which
mortgage was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga. 2
2
The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor
with whom he had 8 children, namely, Pragmacio, Maximo,
Jesus, Salvador, Prudencio and Anunciacion, all surnamed
Vitug, the late Enrique Vitug represented by his wife Natalia
Laquian, and the late Francisco Vitug who is survived by 11
children, namely, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio,
Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus and Luz.
Clodualdo Vitug died intestate on May 20, 1929 so his estate
was settled and distributed in Special Proceeding No. 422 in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga wherein Donata
Montemayor was the Administratrix. 7
and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They
invoked the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, L-5297 decided by
this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for partition and
liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties
were found to be conjugal in nature.
In a decision of Sept. 15, 1975, the lower court dismissed the
complaint with costs against the plaintiffs and ordered them to
pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 to the defendant's counsel.
Plaintiffs then interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
wherein in due course a decision was rendered on May 20,
1981, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Hence the herein petition for certiorari filed by the PNB raising
the following assignments of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING TO THE CASE AT BAR THE RULING OF
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN
FLORENCIA VITUG VS. DONATA MONTEMAYOR, ET
AL., 91 PHIL. 286 (1953) BECAUSE:
A. BETWEEN A PROVISION OF A SPECIAL
LAW AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
3
AND/OR APPLICATION OF A PROVISION OF
A GENERAL LAW, THE FORMER PREVAILS.
B. THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS IS
NOT A MECHANICAL FORMULA OF
ADHERENCE.
C. PNB WAS NOT A PARTY, AND HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABOVECITED CASE.
D. SIMILARLY, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND
MAXIMO VITUG WERE NOT PARTIES IN
SAID CASE.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT RECOGNIZING THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF
THE CERTIFICATE, OF TITLE, AS PROVIDED IN ACT
496, AS AMENDED (THE LAND REGISTRATION).
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
IGNORING THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF
OWNERSHIP OF DONATA MONTEMAYOR OVER
THE PROPERTIES WHICH WERE REGISTERED
EXCLUSIVELY IN HER NAME WHEN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS (PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO
VITUG), AS LESSEES, ENTERED INTO A
CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH DONATA
MONTEMAYOR AS THE OWNER-LESSOR.
IV
4
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The presumption applies to property acquired during the
lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the
face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata
Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the
property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there
is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. 12 And this presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in
the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third
parties are involved. 13
The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the
certificates of title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal
purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time
the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the
PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor. 14
True it is that in the earlier cases decided by this Court,
namely Vitug VS. Montemayor decided on May 15, 1952,
which is an action for recovery of possession of a share in said
parcels of land, 15 and in the subsequent action for partition
between the same parties decided on Oct. 20, 1953, 16 this
court found the 30 parcels of land in question to be conjugal in
nature and awarded the corresponding share to the property of
Florencia Vitug, an heir of the late Clodualdo Vitug from the
first marriage. In said cases this Court affirmed the decision of
the lower court. In the dispositive part of the decision of the
trial court it made the observation that "but from the conduct of
Clodualdo Vitug and Donata Montemayor during the existence
of their marital life, the inference is clear that Clodualdo had
the unequivocal intention of transmitting the full ownership of
5
their mother to the PNB and thereafter were sold at public
auction, but they did not do anything. 22 It is only after 17 years
that they remembered to assert their rights. Certainly, they are
guilty of laches. 23
Moreover, as correctly held by the lower court. Pragmacio and
Maximo Vitug as occupants and lessees of the property in
question cannot now dispute the ownership of their mother
over the same who was their lessor. 24
WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another
decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint and
ordering private respondents to pay attomey's fees and
expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount of
P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
* Penned by Mr. Justice Porfirio V. Sison, and
concurred in by Messrs. Justices Juan Sison
and Elias B. Asuncion.
1 Annex 2, Answer of PNB, Record on Appeal;
par. 11, Partial Stipulation of Facts, p. 139;
Record on Appeal.
6
13 Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713;
Seva vs. Nolan, 340.
14 Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil 606, 612;
Roxas vs. Dinglasan, L-27234, May 30, 1969,
28 SCRA 430.
15 91 Phil. 286.
16 93 Phil. 99.
17 91 Phil. 289.
18 Exhibit 17 PNB & 18 PNB, Pp. 210-212,
Record on Appeal.
19 Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa, L-3595, May 22,
1950; Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, L2979, Jan. 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 84-85.
20 Fule vs. Legare, supra; Arches vs. Billanes,
L-20452, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 715.
21 Vitug vs. Montemayor, 91 Phil. 286, 288; see
also Exhibits 3 Mendiola, 3-A Mendiola, 3-B
Mendiola, pp. 238-240, Record on Appeal.
22 Exhibits 1, 1-A, and 1-B Mendiola, 2 and 2-A
Mendiola, pp. 236-238, Record on Appeal.
23 Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15,
1968, 32 SCRA 29.
24 Section 3 (b), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
7
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72321 December 8, 1988
DIOSDIDIT, BALDOMERO, FILOMENO, ELPIDIO, AIDA, all
surnamed CUENCA, petitioners,
vs.
RESTITUTO CUENCA, MELADORA CUENCA and COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices for petitioners.
Cipriano C. Alvizo, Sr. for respondents.
8
Article 892 of the New Civil Code. The other claim of
the plaintiffs for damages and accounting of the value
of the produce corresponding to their shares is not
granted for lack of evidence. The counterclaim of
defendants is likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
(Rollo, pp. 37-38)
On December 3, 1984, the petitioners received a copy of the
appellate court's decision.
On December 14, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.
On February 22, 1985, the petitioners filed a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion for New Trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence.
9
facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly
discovered evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The rules are clear and leave no room for interpretation, Rule
37 speaks of a trial court while Rule 53 speaks of the Court of
Appeals. Undoubtedly, the appellate court erred in denying the
petitioners' motion for new trial on the ground that it was filed
out of time pursuant to Rule 37. The applicable law is Rule 53
and since the motion for new trial was filed before the
appellate court's judgment could become final and executory,
the motion was filed within the reglementary period.
With these findings, the usual procedure would be to remand
the case to the appellate court. Nevertheless, since all the
relevant facts needed to resolve the issue as to whether or not
the petitioners' motion for new trial is meritorious are before
us, we find no need to refer the case back to the appellate
court. (See Tejones v. Gironella, et al., G.R. No. L-35506
March 21, 1988; Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (135
SCRA 37 [1985]), and Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988).
Civil Case No. 1240 had for its subject matter parcels of land
which were claimed by- two sets of families. Private
respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca claimed
ownership over the subject parcels of land on the ground that
they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria
Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of
land. They alleged that some of the parcels are paraphernal
property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of
Maria and Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca
and Engracia Basadre were not legally married because at the
time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain
Jesusa Pagar.
10
3058, B. Adormio, 3059, A. Cuenca and east
portion of Lot No. 3063, containing an area of
six (6) hectares, more or less (This is a portion
of Lot No. 3063, Pls-22 of Cad. of Municipality
of Butuan which parcel of land belongs
exclusively to Maria Bangahon during her
lifetime and which property is separate from the
conjugal property of the marriage of said Maria
Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan,
planted to rice with irrigation under the present possession of
the heirs, bounded on the North by Mariano Agagdang on the
East by Clerencia Tagonsod on the South by Suatan River and
on the West by Mariano Agagdang containing an area of
1.2500 hectares, more or less, under Tax Dec. 3055, assessed
at P250.00 by the property records of Agusan.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan,
planted to coconut, under the present possession of the heirs,
bounded on the North by Maximo Bangahon, on the East, by
Sergio Pagar, on the South, by Macaria Agagdang on the
West, by Folgencio Buyan, containing an area of 1.1722
hectares, more or less, assessed at P670.00 by Tax Dec. No.
4026 of Agusan."
belong to Maria Bangahon as her inheritance from her
parents. This declaration against interest is further reiterated
by Agripino Cuenca in that judicial settlement and sale
executed by him on October 19, 1950. These two documents,
as rightly contended by the plaintiffs, are ample proofs that the
properties in question described in par. 2 of the complaint,
belong exclusively to Maria Bangahon as her paraphernal
property, a fact declared by no less than the husband himself
in a declaration against his interest. It was error for the trial
court to unceremoniously brush aside the importance of the
11
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Agripino Cuenca
executed by the defendants of Engracia Basadre-Cuenca and
her children. It is self-serving and proves nothing.
In passing, We note that the defendants presented tax
declaration (Exhibits 3-17-A), pieces of evidence which have
been ruled in a long line of decisions by our Supreme Court to
be not real evidence at all sufficient to prove ownership or
possession.
After considering the evidence of both parties, in sum, We find
convincing evidence to show that Agripino Cuenca and Maria
Bangahon were legally married with Restituto Cuenca and
Meladora Cuenca as their issues; that Maria Bangahon
brought properties into her marriage; that the couple acquired
properties during the marriage; that by virtue of the
extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and his
children, Restituto is the absolute owner of the parcels of land
described in paragraph 2(a) (b) and (c) of the complaint; that
one half of the land described in par. 6 of the complaint
belongs to Agripino Cuenca and the other half to Maria
Bangahon the same having been acquired by Agripino Cuenca
and Maria Bangahon during their marriage-conjugal
partnership property. Therefore, upon the dissolution of the
conjugal relationship by the death of spouses Agripino Cuenca
and Maria Bangahon, one half goes to Agripino Cuenca which
portion after the death of Agripino Cuenca goes to his alleged
third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca together with the
plaintiffs as forced heirs of Agripino Cuenca (Arts. 185 & 189,
New Civil Code).
From the evidence of the plaintiffs, We find the present appeal
impressed with merit." (Rollo, pp. 33-37)
In their motion for new trial the petitioners alleged:
12
The issue as to whether or not petitioner Engracia Basadre
was legally married to Agripino Cuenca was settled by the
appellate court in this wise:
After considering the evidence of both parties, in sum,
We find convincing evidence to show that Agripino
Cuenca and Maria Bangahon were legally married with
Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca as their
issues; that Maria Bangahon brought properties into
her marriage; that the couple acquired properties
during the marriage; that by virtue of the extrajudicial
settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and his
children, Restituto is the absolute owner of the parcels
of land described in paragraph 2(a) (b) and (c) of the
complaint; that one half of the land described in par. 6
of the complaint belongs to Agripino Cuenca and the
other half to Maria Bangahon the same having been
acquired by Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon
during their marriage-conjugal partnership property.
Therefore, upon the dissolution of the conjugal
relationship by the death of spouses Agripino Cuenca
and Maria Bangahon, one half goes to Agripino Cuenca
which portion after the death of Agripino Cuenca goes
to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca
together with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of agripino
Cuenca (Arts. 185 & 189, New Civil Code). (Rollo, pp.
36-37) (Emphasis supplied)
The dispositive portion of the decision states that petitioner
Engracia Basadre was entitled to inherit from Agripino Cuenca
together with the latter's legitimate children by Maria
Bangahon, the private respondents herein in accordance with
Article 892 of the New Civil Code.
Accordingly, the appellate court declared Engracia Basadre as
surviving spouse. There was, therefore no need to prove the
13
Magallon v. Montejo, supra) The fact that these parcels were
surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the
marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre
is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the
parcels were the conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.
Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered
by the documents are titled in the name of either respondent
Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca. The
presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved. (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra
citing Nable Jose v. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713) Under the
circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the
presumption should also be upheld.
In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an
unnecessary exercise and ineffective. The documents sought
to be presented during a new trial would not in any way
change the result. The motion for new trial was correctly
denied although not for the reason given by the respondent
court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
questioned resolutions of the appellate court are AFFIRMED.
For non-compliance with this Court's Resolution dated March
2, 1988, ordering him to show cause for his failure to file a
memorandum within the period given to him, Atty. Cipriano C.
Alvizo, Sr. is fined Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos. If he fails to
pay the fine within ten (10) days from notice of this decision,
he shall be imprisoned for five (5) days.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
14
EN BANC
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Both parties in this case have moved for the reconsideration of
the decision of this Court promulgated on February 29, 1972.
Plaintiffs maintain that the decision appealed from should be
affirmed in toto. The defendant, in turn, prays that the decision
of this Court be "set aside ... with or without a new trial, ... and
that the complaint be dismissed, with costs; or, in the
alternative, that the amount of the award embodied therein be
considerably reduced." .
15
instance, which includes "all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." 2
Thirdly, in its answer to plaintiffs' original and amended
complainants, defendant had set up a counterclaim in the
aggregate sum of P12,000, which is, also, within the original
jurisdiction of said courts, thereby curing the alleged defect if
any, in plaintiffs' complaint. 3
We need not consider the jurisdictional controversy as
to the amount the appellant sues to recover because
the counterclaim interposed establishes the jurisdiction
of the District Court. Merchants' Heat & Light Co. v.
James B. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 27 S. Ct. 285,
51 L. Ed. 488; O. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klepner,
176 F. 343 (C.C.A. 2), certiorari denied 216 U.S. 620,
30 S Ct. 575, 54 L. Ed. 641. ... . 4
... courts have said that "when the jurisdictional amount
is in question, the tendering of a counterclaim in an
amount which in itself, or added to the amount claimed
in the petition, makes up a sum equal to the amount
necessary to the jurisdiction of this court, jurisdiction is
established, whatever may be the state of the plaintiff's
complaint." American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler
(D.C.) 227 F. 321, 324. 5
Thus, in Ago v. Buslon, 6 We held:
... . Then, too, petitioner's counterclaim for P37,000.00
was, also, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the latter courts, and there are ample precedents to the
effect that "although the original claim involves less
than the jurisdictional amount, ... jurisdiction can be
sustained if the counterclaim (of the compulsory type)"
such as the one set up by petitioner herein, based
16
It may not be amiss however, to stress the fact that, in his
written report, made in transit from Wake to Manila or
immediately after the occurrence and before the legal
implications or consequences thereof could have been the
object of mature deliberation, so that it could, in a way, be
considered as part of the res gestae Capt. Zentner stated
that Zulueta had been off-loaded "due to drinking" and
"belligerent attitude," thereby belying the story of the defense
about said alleged bomb-scare, and confirming the view that
said agent of the defendant had acted out of resentment
because his ego had been hurt by Mr. Zulueta's adamant
refusal to be bullied by him. Indeed, had there been an iota of
truth in said story of the defense, Capt. Zentner would have
caused every one of the passengers to be frisked or searched
and the luggage of all of them examined as it is done now
before resuming the flight from Wake Island. His failure to
do so merely makes the artificious nature of defendant's
version more manifest. Indeed, the fact that Mrs. Zulueta and
Miss Zulueta were on board the plane shows beyond doubt
that Mr. Zulueta could not possibly have intended to blow it up.
The defense tries to explain its failure to introduce any
evidence to contradict the testimony of Mr. Zulueta as to why
he had gone to the beach and what he did there, alleging that,
in the very nature of things, nobody else could have witnessed
it. Moreover, the defense insists, inter alia, that the testimony
of Mr. Zulueta is inherently incredible because he had no idea
as to how many toilets the plane had; it could not have taken
him an hour to relieve himself in the beach; there were eight
(8) commodes at the terminal toilet for men ; if he felt the need
of relieving himself, he would have seen to it that the soldiers
did not beat him to the terminal toilets; he did not tell anybody
about the reason for going to the beach, until after the plane
had taken off from Wake.
17
But, why asks the defendant did he not reveal the same
before the plane took off? The record shows that, even before
Mr. Zulueta had reached the ramp leading to the plane, Capt.
Zentner was already demonstrating at him in an intemperate
and arrogant tone and attitude ("What do you think you are?),
thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer back in the same vein.
As a consequence, there immediately ensued an altercation in
the course of which each apparently tried to show that he
could not be cowed by the other. Then came the order of Capt.
Zentner to off-load all of the Zuluetas, including Mrs. Zulueta
and the minor Miss Zulueta, as well as their luggage, their
overcoats and other effects handcarried by them; but, Mr.
Zulueta requested that the ladies be allowed to continue the
trip. Meanwhile, it had taken time to locate his four (4) pieces
of luggage. As a matter of fact, only three (3) of them were
found, and the fourth eventually remained in the plane. In
short, the issue between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta had
been limited to determining whether the latter would allow
himself to be browbeaten by the former. In the heat of the
altercation, nobody had inquired about the cause of Mr.
Zulueta's delay in returning to the plane, apart from the fact
that it was rather embarrassing for him to explain, in the
presence and within the hearing of the passengers and the
crew, then assembled around them, why he had gone to the
beach and why it had taken him some time to answer there a
call of nature, instead of doing so in the terminal building.
Defendant's motion for reconsideration assails: (1) the amount
of damages awarded as excessive; (2) the propriety of
accepting as credible plaintiffs' theory; (3) plaintiffs' right to
recover either moral or exemplary damages; (4) plaintiffs' right
to recover attorney's fees; and (5) the non-enforcement of the
compromise agreement between the defendant and plaintiff's
wife, Mrs. Zulueta. Upon the other hand, plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration contests the decision of this Court reducing
the amount of damages awarded by the trial court to
18
In other words, Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, not to protect
the safety of the aircraft and its passengers, but to retaliate
and punish him for the embarrassment and loss of face thus
suffered by defendant's agent. This vindictive motive is made
more manifest by the note delivered to Mr. Zulueta by
defendant's airport manager at Wake Island, Mr. Sitton, stating
that the former's stay therein would be "for a minimum of one
week," during which he would be charged $13.30 per day. This
reference to a "minimum of one week" revealed the intention to
keep him there stranded that long, for no other plane, headed
for Manila, was expected within said period of time, although
Mr. Zulueta managed to board, days later, a plane that brought
him to Hawaii, whence he flew back to the Philippines, via
Japan.
Neither may criminal cases, nor the cases for libel and slander
cited in the defendant's motion for reconsideration, be equated
with the present case. Indeed, in ordinary criminal cases, the
award for damages is, in actual practice, of purely academic
value, for the convicts generally belong to the poorest class of
society. There is, moreover, a fundamental difference between
said cases and the one at bar. The Zuluetas had a contract of
carriage with the defendant, as a common carrier, pursuant to
which the latter was bound, for a substantial monetary
considerationpaid by the former, not merely to transport them
to Manila, but, also, to do so with "extraordinary diligence" or
"utmost diligence." 9 The responsibility of the common carrier,
under said contract, as regards the passenger's safety, is of
such a nature, affecting as it does public interest, that it
"cannot be dispensed with" or even "lessened by stipulation,
by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or
otherwise." 10 In the present case, the defendant did not
only fail to comply with its obligation to transport Mr. Zulueta to
Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to humiliate
him, to chastise him, to make him suffer, to cause to him the
greatest possible inconvenience, by leaving him in a desolate
19
acts of his agent unless the former has participated in said
acts or ratified the same. Said case involved, however, the
subsidiary civil liability of an employer arising from criminal
acts of his employee, and "exemplary damages ... may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances." 14 Accordingly, the Rotea case is
not in point, for the case at bar involves a breach of contract,
as well as a quasi-delict.
Neither may the case of Palisoc v. Brillantes, 15 invoked by the
defendant, be equated with the case at bar. The Palisoc case
dealt with the liability of school officials for damages arising
from the death of a student (Palisoc) due to fist blows given by
another student (Daffon), in the course of a quarrel between
them, while in a laboratory room of the Manila Technical
Institute. In an action for damages, the head thereof and the
teacher in charge of said laboratory were held jointly and
severally liable with the student who caused said death, for
failure of the school to provide "adequate supervision over the
activities of the students in the school premises," to protect
them "from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or
other parties." Such liability was predicated upon Article 2180
of our Civil Code, the pertinent part of which reads:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
20
PANAM impugns the award of attorney's fees upon the ground
that no penalty should be imposed upon the right to litigate;
that, by law, it may be awarded only in exceptional cases; that
the claim for attorney's fees has not been proven; and that
said defendant was justified in resisting plaintiff's claim
"because it was patently exorbitant."
Nothing, however, can be farther from the truth. Indeed apart
from plaintiff's claim for actual damages, the amount of which
is not contested, plaintiffs did not ask any specific sum by way
of exemplary and moral damages, as well as attorney's fees,
and left the amount thereof to the "sound discretion" of the
lower court. This, precisely, is the reason why PANAM, now,
alleges without justification that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case.
Moreover, Article 2208 of our Civil Code expressly authorizes
the award of attorney's fees "when exemplary damages are
awarded," as they are in this case as well as "in any other
case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees ... be recovered," and We so deem it just and
equitable in the present case, considering the "exceptional"
circumstances obtaining therein, particularly the bad faith with
which defendant's agent had acted, the place where and the
conditions under which Rafael Zulueta was left at Wake Island,
the absolute refusal of defendant's manager in Manila to take
any step whatsoever to alleviate Mr. Zulueta's predicament at
Wake and have him brought to Manila which, under their
contract of carriage, was defendant's obligation to discharge
with "extra-ordinary" or "utmost" diligence and, the "racial"
factor that had, likewise, tainted the decision of defendant's
agent, Capt. Zentner, to off-load him at Wake Island.
As regards the evidence necessary to justify the sum of
P75,000 awarded as attorney's fees in this case, suffice it to
say that the quantity and quality of the services rendered by
21
separated for at least one year." This provision, We held,
however, refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real
party in interest, not to the case at bar, "in which the husband
is the main party in interest, both as the person principally
aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal partnership ...
he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of
carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter,
under the contract, with funds of the conjugal partnership," to
which the amounts recoverable for breach of said contract,
accordingly, belong. The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta
were mainly an in accident of the humiliation to which her
husband had been subjected. The Court ordered that said sum
of P50,00 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be deducted from
the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the
simple reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
as provided by law, said amount would have to be reckoned
with, either as part of her share in the partnership, or as part of
the support which might have been or may be due to her as
wife of Rafael Zulueta. It would surely be inane to sentence
the defendant to pay the P700,000 due to the plaintiffs and to
direct Mrs. Zulueta to return said P50,000 to the defendant.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of
public policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her share in
the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution thereof. 17 She
cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous title, without
the husband's consent, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree. 18
It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of
litigations by compromise agreement between the contending
parties, but, it certainly does not favor a settlement with one of
the spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a
common cause, such as the defense of the rights of the
conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the
22
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether
the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or
as salary of the spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during
the marriage, coming from the common property or
from the exclusive property of each spouse.
Considering that the damages in question have arisen
from, inter alia, a breach of plaintiffs' contract of carriage with
the defendant, for which plaintiffs paid their fare with funds
presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, We hold
that said damages fall under paragraph (1) of said Article 153,
the right thereto having been "acquired byonerous title during
the marriage ... ." This conclusion is bolstered up by Article
148 of our Civil Code, according to which:
ART. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property
of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her
own;
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by
lucrative title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by
exchange with other property belonging to only one of
the spouses;
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of
the wife or of the husband.
23
It is true that in Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 27 it was held that
the "patrimonial and moral damages" awarded to a young and
beautiful woman by reason of a scar in consequence of an
injury resulting from an automobile accident which
disfigured her face and fractured her left leg, as well as caused
a permanent deformity, are her paraphernal property.
Defendant cites, also, in support of its contention the following
passage from Colin y Capitant:
No esta resuelta expresamente en la legislacion
espaola la cuestion de si las indemnizaciones debidas
por accidentes del trabaho tienen la consideracion de
gananciales, o son bienes particulares de los
conyuges.
Inclinan a la solucion de que estas
indemnizaciones deben ser consideradas como
gananciales, el hecho de que la sociedad pierde la
capacidad de trabajocon el accidente, que a ella le
pertenece, puesto que de la sociedad son losfrutos de
ese trabajo; en cambio, la consideracion de que igual
manera que losbienes que sustituyen a los que cada
conyuge lleva al matrimonio como propiostienen el
caracter de propios, hace pensar que las
indemnizaciones que vengana suplir la capacidad de
trabajo aportada por cada conyuge a la sociedad,
debenser juridicamente reputadas como bienes
propios del conyuge que haya sufrido elaccidente. Asi
se llega a la misma solucion aportada por la
jurisprudencia francesca. 28
This opinion is, however, undecisive, to say the least. It should
be noted that Colin y Capitant were commenting on
the French Civil Code; that their comment referred to
indemnities due in consequence of "accidentes del trabajo
"resulting in physical injuries sustained by one of the spouses
24
Accordingly, the other Philippine cases 33 and those from
Louisiana whose civil law is based upon the French Civil
Code cited by the defendant, which similarly refer to moral
damages due to physical injuries suffered by the wife, are,
likewise, inapplicable to the case at bar.
We find, therefore, no plausible reason to disturb the views
expressed in Our decision promulgated on February 29, 1972.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration above-referred
to should be, as they are hereby denied.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Castro and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.
Barredo, J., voted to modify the judgment by reducing the
amount of the awarded damages and individualizing the same,
and now reserves the filing of a separate concurring and
dissenting opinion in support of his vote.
Footnotes
1 Layda v. Court of Appeals, L-4487, Jan. 29,
1952; Yutuk v. Manila Electric Co., L-13016,
May 31, 1961.
2 See. 44 (a), Rep. Act No. 296.
3 See 38 Harvard Law Review, 744-751; 45
Yale Law Journal, 416.
4 Ginsburg v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 69 F.
(2d) 97, 98.
25
13 109 Phil. 495.
28 Emphasis ours.
16 Supra.
26
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31618 August 17, 1983
EFREN R. MENDOZA and INOCENCIA R. DE
MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
PONCIANO S. REYES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-31625 August 17, 1983
JULIA R. DE REYES, petitioner,
vs.
PONCIANO S. REYES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Conrado B. Enriquez and Elpidio G. Navarro for petitioners.
Pacifico M. Castro for respondents.
27
separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De Reyes, supported the
spouses Mendozas' contentions.
III
28
On the first issue regarding the alleged paraphernal character
of the disputed properties, we find that the records sustain the
findings of the Court of Appeals
The fact are:
xxx xxx xxx
... Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes-to be herein
referred to as Ponciano and Julia alone for brevity-were
married in 1915. The properties in question consisting
of Lots 5 and 6, Block No. 132, situated at Retiro
Street, Quezon City-plus the buildings erected thereon,
were bought from J. M. Tuason & Co., represented by
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. to be herein mentioned as
"Araneta"-February, 1947 on installment basis.
(Testimony of Julia, t.s.n., p. 74, February 15, 1963).
The first installment on Lot No. 5 was P69.96 and on
Lot No. 6 was P102.00 (Exh. 'H' and uncontradicted
testimony of Ponciano, t.s.n., p. 4, July 20, 1964).
The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of
the installments to Araneta due to lack of money (t.s.n.,
pp. 5-7, July 20, 1964) so they had to borrow money
from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation-herein
after referred to as RFC for short. Thus, on November
26, 1948, they jointly obtained a loan of P12,000.00
from the RFC for the following exclusive purposes only:
'to complete the construction of one-storey residential
building on 9th Street, La Loma Quezon City; and to
pay the balance of the price of the lot offered as
security' which is Lot 5, (Deed of Mortgage, Exh. 'A') l').
Out of this loan, the amount of P5,292.00 was paid to
Araneta as price of Lot 5. The corresponding deed of
absolute sale thereof was executed by Araneta on
November 27, 1948 (Exh. 'A'). On October 2, 1952, the
29
In spite of the good rentals they had been receiving for
the building, the spouses failed to pay seasonably their
obligations to the RFC so, as late as November 28,
1958, they had to ask for an extension of 5 years from
the Development Bank of the Philippines or DBP, as
successor of the RFC, for the payment of an
outstanding balance of P7,876.13 (Exh. 'D').
On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent
attending his farm in Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold
absolutely the lots in question, together with their
improvements to appellees Mendozas for the sum of
P80,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of
Ponciano (Exh. 'I'-Mendoza). At the same time the
spouses were living separately and were not in
speaking terms. By virtue of such sale, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 561 10 and 56111 were
subsequently issued in the name of the Mendozas.
The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code
which provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership
property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether
the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses;
xxx xxx xxx
The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must
also be overcome by one who contends that the disputed
property is paraphernal Article 160 provides:
30
Citing Palanca v. Smith Bell & Co. (9 Phil. 13 1) interpreting
Par. 3, Article 1401 of the old Civil Code, the Court in Castillo
v. Pasco stated:
If money borrowed by the husband alone on the
security of his wife's property is conjugal in character, a
fortiori should it be conjugal when borrowed by both
spouses. The reason obviously is that the loan
becomes an obligation of the conjugal partnership
which is the one primarily bound for its repayment.
To rebut the presumption and the evidence of the conjugal
character of the property, the petitioners have only the
testimony of Julia de Reyes to offer.
Mrs. Reyes testified that she bought the two parcels of land on
installment basis and that the first payment of a little less than
P2,000.00 came from her personal funds: The receipt issued
by Araneta, however, shows that the first installment on one lot
was only P69.96 and on the other lot, P102.00. Mrs. Reyes
also testified that she paid the entire purchase price and the
construction of the buildings from her personal funds and
money borrowed from the Philippine National Bank. The
mortgage contracts, however, show that the properties were
paid out of the loan from RFC.
As a matter of fact, Mrs. Reyes' testimony about a loan from
Mrs. Rosa Borja, the sale of a lot in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija given
by her mother, and the loan from PNB only emphasize the
conjugal nature of the disputed properties because she stated
that these sums were also used to put up their gravel and
sand business, a poultry farm, and a banana plantation plus a
jeepney transportation line although according to her, every
business venture handled by her husband failed. The two were
establishing businesses and buying properties together as
husband and wife, in happier times.
31
question and disclaimed the existence of any conjugal
partnership funds or properties of himself and his wife.
(Petitioner's Brief, L-31616, p. 7).
It turns out that in 1948, Ponciano Reyes was sued in the then
Municipal Court of Manila for ejectment from a leased hotel
that he was then operating. Judgment was rendered against
Reyes in favor of the lessors, the brothers named Gocheco
Having failed in a bid to garnish the rentals of the disputed
buildings because the municipal court stated that it had no
jurisdiction to decide the paraphernal or conjugal nature of the
properties, the Gocheco brothers filed Civil Case No. 24772
for revival of judgment with the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
It was in this latter case where Mr. Reyes stated in his special
defenses that he and his wife never had any kind of fund
which could be called conjugal partnership funds, that they
acted independently from one another whenever either one
engaged in any business, andThat the herein plaintiff has not limited his action in the
present case against defendant Ponciano S. Reyes as
he did in the original case above-mentioned, that is,
Civil Case No. 7524 of the Manila Municipal Court
which the instant case derived from, but has included
the defendant's wife Julia Reyes, with the only intended
purpose and design of going over and against the
paraphernal properties of said Julia Reyes. (par. 4,
Special Defenses, Answer, Exh. II; Petitioner's Brief, L31618, pp. 9-10).
Article 1437 of the Civil Code on estoppel involving immovable
property provides:
32
party in the case where the said pleadin was filed. Neither is
there any assertion by the Mendozas that the said pleading
was shown to them or that they happened to see it or to have
any knowledge about it before they purchased the properties
in question. The alleged representation was never addressed
to the petitioners, much less made with the intention that they
would act upon it. Moreover, there is no specific and clear
reference to the disputed lots as paraphernal in the cited
answer. The petitioners cannot invoke estoppel in these
petitions.
May the Mendoza spouses be considered buyers in good
faith?
The proof that the petitioners in L-31618 are purchasers in
good faith comes from the testimony of Mrs. Inocencia
Mendoza herself. Mrs. Mendoza testified that Mrs. Julia R. De
Reyes assured her that the properties were paraphernal that
her lawyer verified the titles being in the name of Mrs. Julia R.
De Reyes, and that she never dealt with Mr. Ponciano Reyes
when she and her husband were still renting the properties
they later purchased. On cross-examination, Mrs. Mendoza
admitted that she learned of the RFC mortgage when the lots
were about to be purchased.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be
conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the
name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal
nature. (Bucoy v. Paulino, 23 SCRA 249). Section 46 of P.D.
1529, the Property Registration Decree, reiterates the proviso
in Section 70 of the former Land Registration Act that
registration cannot be construed to relieve registered land or
the owners thereof from any rights incident to the relation of
husband and wife. (See also: Marigsa v. Macabuntoc 17 Phil.
107, 109; Romero de Pratts v. Menzi & Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 51,
54; Padilla v. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377, 382-384; Vitug v.
33
of sale which entailed a greater transfer of rights such consent
was not required.
The final argument refers to the alleged unjust enrichment by
Ponciano Reyes if the deed of sale is nullified This petitioners
admit that the benefit including that represented by one-half of
the purchase price, accrued not to the respondent but to his
wife. Since Mr. Reyes did not receive any part of the proceeds
of the sale and his wife has been aligning herself with the
Mendoza couple, there could be no unjust enrichment as
alleged. The assignments of errors have no merit.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and
Relova, JJ., concur.
34
THIRD DIVISION
VITUG, J.:
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of
land acquired by a husband while living with a paramour
and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The
property had been bought by the husband on installment basis
prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950 but the final
deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his
common law spouse, has ensued during the latter Code's
regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take note of the
new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988.
35
action for reconveyance of the property. On the basis of he
above facts, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and it
ordered that
. . . Josephine Bosing executed a deed of
reconveyance of the property in question to the legal
heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and that both
defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual damages
by way of attorney's fees and expenses in litigation,
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS as moral
damages, pus TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS
exemplary damages to prevent future frauds.
The defendants went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial court's order for reconveyance but reversed the
decision on the award for damages, thus
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED insofar as defendant Josephine Bosing is
ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance of the
property granting the same to the legal heirs of the
deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and REVERSED insofar as
it awards actual, moral and exemplary damages. 1
Hence, the instant petition for review 2 submitting that
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE
HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT, THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE IS
BASED UPON AN IMPLIED OR CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST.
36
when, three years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine
executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in which
she asserted a one-half (1/2) interest in the property in what
may be described as her share in the "conjugal partnership"
with Alayo, plus another one-fourth (1/4) interest as "surviving
widow," the last one-fourth (1/4) going to Josephine as the
issue of the deceased. Observe that the above adjudication
would have exactly conformed with a partition in intestacy had
they been the sole and legitimate heirs of the decedent.
The appellate court below, given the above circumstances,
certainly cannot be said to have been without valid basis in
concluding that the property really belonged to the lawful
conjugal partnership between Alayo and his true spouse
Juliana.
As regards the property relation between common-law
spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law
established through judicial precedents under the old code
(Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11
May 1984). In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more
than once been repudiated when either or both spouses
suffered from an impediment to marry (Jeroniza vs. Jose, 89
SCRA 306). The present provisions under Article 147 and
Article 148 of the Family Code did not much deviate from the
old rules; in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case
without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256, Family
Code).
It was at the time that 'the adjudication of ownership was made
following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo merely allowed the
property to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was not
intended to be adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a
constructive trust was deemed to have been created by
operation of law under the provisions of Article 1456 of the
Civil Code.
37
Appellants' prayer for a new trial based upon what they
claim is newly discovered evidence deserves scant
consideration.
Appellant proposes to prove (1) that Josefa Bosing sold
certain property for P8,000.00 in 1948 and was
therefore in a financial position to make the payments
to Magdalena Estate Inc. and (2) that appellee Juliana
Bosing got married in 1961 to one Burayos Ballit, and
thus, "forfeited" her right to the conjugal partnership.
The first ground is not meritorious. It is not newly
discovered evidence. As described in appellants'
Motion the documents were "not discovered or
considered as necessary evidence during the trial of
the case below" by the former counsel; it is therefore
more properly considered as forgotten evidence, which
the appellant knew or should have known during the
trial (Tesoro vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 296;
Republic vs. Vda. de Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336).
Moreover, assuming the sale is proven, it does not
follow that the proceeds were used to pay the lot in
question; the payments were made in installments, not
in one lump sum.
Neither is the second ground deserving of merit.
Assuming that the marriage to Ballit in 1961 is duly
proven, and that this provided a cause for legal
separation and consequent disqualification of the guilty
spouse to succeed to the husband's intestate estate
under Article 1002 of the Civil Code, the fact remains
that no action for legal separation was brought by the
husband during his lifetime and within the period
provided by law. It is too late to raise the issue at this
time.
# Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes,
concurred in by Justices Santiago Kapunan and
Ricardo Francisco.
2 Ably presented by Atty. Jaime Infante.
3 See Articles 708-709, 711, Civil Code; Amerol
vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396.
4 Article 1390, Civil Code.
5 Article 1391, Ibid.
38
FIRST DIVISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, spouses, filed
this petition for review on certiorari from the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals 1 upholding the validity of the
Deed of Sale over Lot No. 564 executed by petitioner Lucia
Embrado in favor of private respondent Eda Jimenez.
Lot No. 564 is a 366-square meter lot situated in Dipolog City
originally owned by Juan, Pastor and Matias Carpitanos. On 2
July 1946, a Venta Definitiva, a notarized document written
entirely in Spanish, was executed by the Carpitanos whereby
they sold Lot No. 564 to "Srta. LUCIA C. EMBRADO . . .
soltera, con residencia y direccion postal Municipio de
39
Cimafranca alleging that the sale of Lot 564 by Lucia Embrado
to Eda Jimenez was void not only for lack of consideration but
also because Oreste Torregiani did not consent to the sale,
which consent was necessary because Lot 564 was conjugal
property. In addition, the petitioners claim that Lucia was
misled into signing the deed of sale marked as Exh. "D" on the
belief that Lot 564 was merely intended as security for a loan
that the Jimenez spouses were then negotiating with the First
Insular Bank of Cebu. Since the Jimenez spouses did not
acquire valid title to the land, the subsequent sales in favor of
Salimbagat and Cimafranca were without legal effect.
The Torregianis were sustained by the CFI of Zamboanga del
Norte 10 which held that the sale of Lot 564 to Eda Jimenez
and its subsequent transfers to Marcos Salimbagat and
Pacifico Cimafranca, who were declared buyers in bad faith,
were void and of no effect. More specifically, the judgment (a)
declared Exhs. "D," "G" and "H" as well as TCT No. 17103 null
and void and of no force and effect; (b) ordered defendants
jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the sum of P2,000.00 as
actual damages and P1,500.00 for attorneys fees; (c) ordered
the Register of Deeds of Dipolog City to cancel TCT No. 17103
in the name of Eda Jimenez and issue another one in favor of
plaintiff Lucia Embrado, married to Oreste Torregiani, and to
cancel all the annotations thereon emanating from the void
transfers in favor of Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico
Cimafranca; (d) ordered defendants Eda and Santiago
Jimenez to return to defendant Pacifico Cimafranca the sum of
P30,000.00 paid by him for the 301 square meters and the
house in question, and to defendant Marcos Salimbagat the
P6,500.00 paid by him for the 65 square meters occupied by
Comendador Clinic with legal interest of six percent (6%) until
fully paid; and, (e) ordered defendant Cimafranca to pay
plaintiffs all the rents he has been collecting from the lessees
of the first floor of the house with legal interest thereon from
the time he started collecting them until fully paid, with costs
against defendants. 11
The foregoing judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals
which held that since Lucia Embrado actually agreed with
Juan, Pastor and Matias Carpitanos, the original owners, to
the purchase of Lot 564 on 15 April 1941 12 when she was not
yet married, then the lot was her paraphernal property since a
sale is considered perfected the moment the parties agree on
the object and cause of the contract. In addition, the
respondent court declared Salimbagat and Cimafranca buyers
in good faith since the contrary was not proved. Consequently,
the complaint in the trial court was ordered dismissed by
respondent Court of Appeals.
Three (3) issues are herein involved: (a) whether Lot 564 was
paraphernal property of Lucia Embrado or conjugal with her
husband Oreste Torregiani; (b) whether the sale in favor of
Eda Jimenez was valid; and, (c) whether vendees Marcos
Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca were buyers in good faith
so that the sale to them was valid, hence, would bar
reconveyance.
We sustain petitioners. While we agree with respondent court
that Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia,
we cannot adopt its conclusion that because Lucia and the
original owners agreed in 1941 for its purchase and sale,
ownership was already acquired by Lucia at that moment.
Under Art. 1496 of the Civil Code, "ownership of the thing sold
is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to
him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in
any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession
is transferred from the vendor to the vendee," and under Art.
1498, "(w)hen the sale is made through a public instrument,
the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
40
thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred."
In the case at bar, the Venta Definitiva over Lot 564 in favor of
Lucia Embrado was executed by the Carpitanoses on 2 July
1946 when her marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was
already subsisting. Although ownership was acquired during
the marriage and hence presumed conjugal, the presumption
of conjugality 13 was successfully overcome by the terms of
the Venta Definitiva which contains a positive assertion of
exclusive ownership, which was duly supported by the
testimony of Matias Carpitanos, one of the original sellers of
the lot. 14
However, a decisive fact appears which prevents us from
ultimately affirming the validity of her sale of Lot 564 to private
respondent Eda Jimenez. The trial court found as a fact the
construction in 1958 of a residential/commercial building 15 on
said lot a part of which was leased to third persons and
another part serving as the Torregianis conjugal dwelling.
Although no evidence was presented on the source of funds
used in the construction to determine whether the same was
conjugal or paraphernal, other than the testimony of
Torregiani, 16 petitioners nevertheless enjoy in their favor the
presumption that the funds used were conjugal. 17
The second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code provides
that "[b]uildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership,
during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses,
also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall
be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." Under this
article, the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the
building without awaiting reimbursement before or at the
liquidation of the partnership upon the concurrence of two
conditions, to wit: (a) the construction of the building at the
41
husbands conformity should be considered void ab initio being
contrary to law. 21 Since "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases
provided by law," 22 it follows that Lucia Embrado Torregiani
could not, by herself, validly dispose of Lot 564 without her
husbands consent. Consequently, Eda Jimenez likewise could
not have acquired ownership over the land. The issuance of a
certificate of title in favor of Eda Jimenez did not vest upon her
ownership over the property. Neither did it validate the alleged
purchase thereof which is null and void. Registration does not
vest title. It is merely evidence of such title. Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than
what he actually has. 23 Being null and void, the sale to Eda
Jimenez and the transfer of the property she made to
Salimbagat and Cimafranca produced no legal effects
whatsoever.Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum. There
being no valid title to the land that Eda Jimenez acquired from
Lucia, it follows that no title to the same land could be
conveyed by the former to Salimbagat and
Cimafranca. 24
We agree with the trial court when it found that Salimbagat and
Cimafranca purchased the disputed lot from Eda and Santiago
Jimenez with knowledge of facts and circumstances which
should have put them upon such inquiry and investigation as
42
1972. 30 This means that the lease of the building by
Salimbagats daughter already commenced while Lucia
Torregiani was still the registered owner and this was prior to
the alleged sale by Lucia Torregiani of the property to Eda
Jimenez on 1 May 1971. There can be no doubt that
Salimbagats daughter was aware of the factual background of
the property and the personal circumstances of the owners
thereof especially that they are all occupying the same
building. During the time that Salimbagat was already
interested in buying the property, it would have been usual and
part of ordinary human nature for him to inquire about the
property from his daughter who was living very near the
supposed owners. Considering that the Torregiani and
Jimenez families are not total strangers to Salimbagat, it is
safe to conclude that Salimbagat had some knowledge of the
financial status of the supposed vendors which should have
put him on guard before buying the property. Moreover, the
records show that this would not have escaped the notice of
Salimbagat and Cimafranca that at the time of the sale to them
petitioners were in actual possession of the property with
Salimbagats daughter renting a portion thereof. For that
matter, at the time of the sale to Salimbagat and Cimafranca,
petitioners had already been in continuous possession of the
property for fourteen (14) years, or since 1958. Santiago
Jimenez admitted that after his marriage he and his wife Eda
lived and stayed with her parents, herein petitioners, and
dependent on them for support. 31
Before buying the property, Salimbagat and Cimafranca
allegedly inquired from the office of the Register of Deeds
concerning the genuineness of the certificate of title of Eda
Jimenez, and from the Clerk of Court of the Court of First
Instance of Dipolog City as to whether the property was
involved in any litigation. 32 However, they failed to inquire from
petitioners as to why they were the ones in actual possession
of the property.
43
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
dated 26 April 1979 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Zamboanga del Norte dated 14 June 1976 is
REINSTATED and ADOPTED herein as the decision in this
case.
SO ORDERED.
3 Id., p. 3.
44
20 Baranda v. Baranda, G.R. No. 73275, 20
May 1987, 150 SCRA 59.
45
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57499 June 22, 1984
MERCEDES CALIMLIM- CANULLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. WILLELMO FORTUN, Judge, Court of First instance
of Pangasinan, Branch I, and CORAZON
DAGUINES, respondents.
Fernandez Law Offices for petitioner.
Francisco Pulido for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the Decision, dated
October 6, 1980, and the Resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration, dated November 27, 1980, of the then Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch I, in Civil Case No.
15620 entitled "Corazon DAGUINES vs. MERCEDES
Calimlim-Canullas," upholding the sale of a parcel of land in
favor of DAGUINES but not of the conjugal house thereon'
The background facts may be summarized as follows:
Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO
Canullas were married on December 19, 1962. They begot five
children. They lived in a small house on the residential land in
question with an area of approximately 891 square meters,
located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After
FERNANDO's father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the
land.
46
(2) Declaring as null and void the sale of the conjugal
house to plaintiff on April 15, 1980 (Exhibit A) including
the 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the
conjugal relation between Fernando Canullas (vendor)
and his legitimate wife, herein defendant Mercedes
Calimlim- Canullas;
47
The foregoing premises considered, it follows that
FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to
DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to
said sale. 4
Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was
null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy.
The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after
he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where
his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their
support. That sale was subversive of the stability of the family,
a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. 5
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts
whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy are void and
inexistent from the very beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or
with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause
is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy."
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from
selling property to each other subject to certain
exceptions. 6 Similarly, donations between spouses during
marriage are prohibited. 7 And this is so because if transfers or
con conveyances between spouses were allowed during
marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal
partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to
prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over
the other, 8 as well as to protect the institution of marriage,
which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply
to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt
48
fr. 1), "It would not be just that such donations
should subsist, lest the conditions of those
who incurred guilt should turn out to be better."
So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of
our family law, reason and morality alike
demand that the disabilities attached to
marriage should likewise attach
toconcubinage (Emphasis supplied),
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Judge, dated
October 6, 1980, and his Resolution of November 27, 1980 on
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby set aside
and the sale of the lot, house and improvements in question, is
hereby declared null and void. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De
la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Tabotabo vs. Molero, 22 Phil. 418 (1912).
2 Vda. de Padilla vs. Paterno, 3 SCRA 678, 691
(1961).
3 20 SCRA 474 (1967).
4 Article 166, Civil Code.
5 Article 216, Civil Code.
49
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-63025 November 29, 1991
RAMON C. ONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO BOIX and ARSENIO
CAMINO AS DEPUTY SHERIFF OF CAMARINES
NORTE, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioner.
Jose M. Abola for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:p
The instant petitioner for certiorari seeks are reversal of the
decision ** of herein public respondent Court of Appeals dated
October 24, 1977 in CA-G.R. No. 47063-R and its resolution
dated January 14, 1983 denying herein petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
The record shows that on November 16, 1961, Ramon
C. Ong filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio
Camino as Deputy Sheriff of Camarines Norte and
Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale of a parcel of
land, allegedly owners conjugally by plaintiff and his
former wife Teodora B. Ong, awarded in favor of Boix,
as highest bidder, in an auction sale conducted on
October 10, 1958 by the Deputy Sheriff of Camarines
Norte, herein defendant Camino, pursuant to a writ of
execution dated August 8, 1958 (Exhibits "C", "2-A")
50
After the aforementioned decision became final and
executory, Boix moved to execute the judgment. The
motion was granted and a corresponding writ of
execution, dated August 8, 1958 (Exhibits "C", "2-A"),
was issued. Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines
Norte levied and attached a parcel of land situated at
Diego Linan St., Daet, Camarines Norte, declared
under Tax No. 05378 in the sole name of Teodora B.
Ong, subject-parcel of herein suit. In a notice of levy on
Execution dated August 22, 1958 (Exhibit "2-B"), and
notice of Public Auction sale dated September 10, 1958
(Exhibit "2-C"), auction sales was held on October 10,
1958 and as already mentioned, defendant Boix was
adjudged highest bidder. A writ of possession was
issued to place the execution-creditor in possession of
the property levied upon and sold on execution. A
corresponding Certificate of Sale (Exhibit "H") was also
issued in favor of Boix.
Subsequently, thereafter, Ramon C. Ong filed an
Omnibus motion dated October 2, 1961 (Exhibit "D")
with the same Court of First Instance of Manila asking
to quash the writ of possession, which was denied in
an order dated December 6, 1961. A motion for
reconsideration dated December 29, 1961 (Exhibit "F")
was likewise denied in an order dated February 10,
1962 (Exhibit "G"). (Pp. 1-4, Decision; pp. 11-14 Rollo)
Consequently, petitioner brought the case to the Court of
Appeals to annul the auction sale allegedly irregularly
executed on the following grounds, namely, that the property
was conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal
debts contracted by the wife, and that the there was no valid
publication thus making the auction sale void.
51
the date of public auction from September 25, 1958 to October
10, 1958.
Petitioner's other argument is also based on factual
considerations. Against the Court of Appeals' finding that the
subject property is paraphernal property, in view of the fact that
it was "declared, under Tax No. 05378, in the name of Teodora
B. Ong while the house erected thereon was declared under
Tax No. 06022 in the name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B.
Ong (Exhibits "B", "2-B", "2-C, "4") (Decision, p. 4) is
petitioner's claim that the subject property is conjugal.
Petitioner stresses heavily on the fact that since the surname
"Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong)
was carried by Teodora in the aforesaid declaration, that
indicates that the subject property was acquired during the
marriage. By reason thereof, the property in dispute is
presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses.
We disagree. The mere use of the surname of the husband in
the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof
that said property was acquired during the marriage and is
therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was
declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built thereon
was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such
circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records
of the present case, We hold that the lot in question is
paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of
the wife.
Thus, it was held in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, 20
SCRA 474, that
The presumption that property is conjugal (Art. 160,
New Civil Code) refers to property acquired during the
marriage. When there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that the
52
that the wife's paraphernal properties, as well as those of their
conjugal partnership, shall be liable for the obligations incurred
by the wife in the course of her business (Arts. 117, 140, 172,
203, and 236, Civil Code; Art. 10, Code of Commerce, cited in
Commentaries on Phil. Commercial Laws, Martin, T.C. Vol. 1,
1970 Revised Edition, pp. 14-15). After all, whatever profits are
earned by the wife from her business go to the conjugal
partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the
obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her
business may also be chargeable not only against her
paraphernal property but also against the conjugal property of
the spouses.
Let it be noted that due to the length of time that this case has
remained pending, private respondents Francisco Boix and
Arsenio Camino have allegedly already died in the process.
No proper substitution of parties have apparently been made.
Nevertheless, despite such supervening events, for failure on
the part of petitioner to show any grave abuse of discretion or
reversible error committed by respondent appellate court, We
deem it wise to affirm the said court's decision. Besides, the
decision of the trial court is in accordance with law and the
evidence presented.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.
# Footnotes
53
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
54
authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to prove
the legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is
simply proof of the only act to which the priest may certify by
reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in
his presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a
day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record with
respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and
distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.
(Adriano v. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TYPEWRITTEN LETTER OF THE
DECEDENT FATHER DISCLAIMING THE EXISTENCE OF
HIS OTHER FAMILY, NOT AN AUTHENTIC WRITING. We
also agree with the finding of the Committee that" (t)he letters
written by Judge Berciles to her daughters with Flor
Fuentebella especially the one sent to daughter Mercy
Berciles (Exh. "22") wherein he vigorously affirmed that its
only her mother, Flor Fuentebella, and no other woman who
was recognized as his wife and loved by her parents deserve
scant consideration. Pascual Berciles could not be expected to
admit the existence of his other family. This would be
disastrous to his efforts at preventing one family from knowing
the other." Not only do they deserve scant consideration but
also, there is jurisprudence that a typewritten letter signed by
the father is not an authentic writing. (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of Feb. 27, 1923 and Dec. 7, 1927 cited in 3
Castan, 6th ed., 25; see Caguioa, Comments and Cases on
Civil Law, Vol. I, p. 379).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD; RIGHT TO SUPPORT
REQUIRES RECOGNITION. Under the law, Article 287,
New Civil Code, illegitimate children other than natural in
accordance with Art. 269 are entitled to support and such
successional rights as are granted in the Code, but for this
Article to be applicable, there must be admission or
recognition of the paternity of the illegitimate child (Paterno, Et.
Al. v. Paterno, 20 SCRA 585, citing Noble v. Noble, G.R. No. L17742, Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1104; Paulino v. Paulino, G.R.
No. L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961, 113 Phil. 697). Article 887,
N.C.C., defining who are compulsory heirs, is clear and
specific that" (i)n all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation
must be duly proved." library
5. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION;
SHARE OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE IS EQUAL TO THE
SHARE OF EACH OF THE CHILDREN. According to Article
996 of the New Civil Code which provides that "If a widow or
widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that
of each of the children," and Article 980 which provides that
"The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares," the
retirement benefits shall be distributed equally to the five (5)
heirs: Iluminada Ponce Berciles, Ilona Berciles Alvarez, Ellery
P. Berciles, England P. Berciles and Ione P. Berciles.
6. ID.; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; PROPERTY
RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS; RETIREMENT PREMIUMS
PRESUMED CONJUGAL. As to the retirement premiums
totaling P9,700.00, the same is presumed conjugal property,
there being no proof that the premiums were paid from the
exclusive funds of the deceased Judge (Article 160, New Civil
Code). Such being the case, one-half of the amount belongs to
the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the
other half shall go to the estate of the deceased Judge which
shall in turn be distributed to his legal heirs.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; APPEAL FROM A
DECISION OF THE GSIS; P.D. 1146 (REVISED
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE ACT OF 1977)
APPLICABLE TO DISPUTES ARISING UNDER THE
55
JUDICIARY RETIREMENT ACT; CASE AT BAR Section 25
of P.D. 1146 specifically laying down the procedure whereby
the party aggrieved by the decision of the GSIS may appeal
the same to the Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate
Appellate Court, on questions of law and facts following the
procedures for appeals from the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) to the I.A.C. and if the appeal is only on
questions of law, the same shall be brought directly to the
Supreme Court on certiorari, which abbreviated procedure was
designed to facilitate, and not to prolong, the payment of
benefits, may be invoked by the petitioners. That P.D. 1146,
Sec. 35 is applicable to disputes arising under the Judiciary
Retirement Act and all other acts administered by the GSIS
may also be construed from Sec. 23 of the Decree which
provides that the "System shall prescribe such rules and
regulations to facilitate payment of benefits, proceeds and
claims under the Act and any other laws administered by the
System."
DECISION
each for the illegitimate children, namely, Maria Luisa
Berciles,
GUERRERO, J.:
The disposition made by respondent GSIS of the retirement
benefits under Republic Act 910, as amended, due the heirs of
the late Judge of Court of First Instance Pascual G. Berciles
whereby the GSIS considered said retirement benefits in the
total amount of P311,460.00 as partly conjugal and partly
exclusive in nature and thus divided the same in the following
proportion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
77
56
57
the following days thereafter for the reception of evidence in
support of their respective claims. None of the parties,
however, appeared. Records from the Retirement Section,
Administrative Services Office of this Court show that the claim
of Iluminada Ponce and her children was already approved by
the GSIS as of October 9, 1980 and that in fact, the five years
lump sum equivalent to P301,760.00 (gratuity less the
retirement premiums paid under R.A. 910, as amended, which
was to be returned to the retiree by the GSIS) under Check
No. 04824308 as retirement gratuity of the deceased had been
remitted by the Budget and Finance Office of this Court to the
GSIS for payment to the heir-beneficiaries on October 15,
1980.
On February 4, 1981, Atty. Cecilia T. Berciles, daughter-in-law
of the deceased Judge, and Mrs. Iluminada Ponce Berciles
submitted to the Court Investigator additional documents in
support of the claim of Mrs. Iluminada P. Berciles and her
children, consisting of (A) Evaluation Report, as approved by
the GSIS, under P.D No. 626 with the following
recommendations, to wit:
"1. It is recommended that the death benefits under PD 626
due to the death of the deceased of a compensable
contingency, be awarded to Iluminada Ponce having
established her marriage to the deceased and had been living
with the deceased up to the time of the latters death.
"2. In the same light, the claim of Flor Fuentebella be denied
for two reasons: (a) She has not clearly established her
legitimate relationship with the deceased and, (b) She was not
living with the deceased at the time of his death as required by
the rules and regulation of P.D. 626, as amended. (Rule XIV,
Section 1(b), No. 1 the legitimate spouse living with the
employee at the time of employees death . . .)." virtua1aw
library
58
it follows that the innocent children that came into being out of
the alleged marital union of the deceased Judge and Ms. Flor
Fuentebella Berciles are spurious and have no established
family filiation with the said Judge. We can, therefore, rule that
the attached papers/documents in the letter of Miss Rhoda F.
Berciles, dated October 29, 1979 relative to their claim as the
surviving heirs of the late CFI Judge Pascual Berciles are
mere scrap of papers unworthy of credence, there being no
substantiating evidence to corroborate the same, especially so
in the face of the adverse claim of Mrs. Iluminada Ponce
Berciles as the rightful surviving spouse and with whom the
deceased Judge was living with at the time of his untimely
demise." library
The same memorandum, therefore, recommended that since"
(a)ll the documents presented amply corroborate and fully
substantiate what were previously submitted to the office by
Mrs. Iluminada Ponce Berciles and her children. We find,
therefore, the evidence presented and submitted in favor of
Mrs. Iluminada Ponce Berciles as sufficient to establish the
fact that she is the lawfully wedded wife of the deceased
Judge Berciles. This finding is fully supported by the
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Bocaue,
Bulacan, dated August 24, 1977, attesting to the marriage
between the deceased Judge and Iluminada Ponce which took
place on January 20, 1941 before the then Justice of the
Peace of the place. This being the case, the four (4) children
(ILONA, ELLERY, ENGLAND and IONE) begotten by the said
spouses during their marital union are all legitimate, . . . that
the unpaid salary, money value of terminal leave and
representation and transportation allowances of the late
District Judge Pascual G. Berciles be awarded and
correspondingly distributed to his lawful heirs, namely, MRS.
ILUMINADA PONCE BERCILES (surviving spouse); MRS.
ILONA BERCILES ALVAREZ (daughter); ELLERY BERCILES
(son); ENGLAND P. BERCILES (son); and IONE P. BERCILES
59
Philippines to reside in the United States of America and that
the aunts and cousins residing at the old address moved to a
new address at GSIS Village, Project 8, Quezon City; that
before they moved to the new address, these relatives left a
forwarding address at the Makati Post Office; and, that they
did not receive the aforementioned mail. The fact of nonreceipt was confirmed by one Domingo P. Raiz, letter carrier of
the Post Office of Makati, who executed an affidavit to that
effect, which affidavit We admitted in Our resolution of July 9,
1981. The matter of the Fuentebella Motion for
Reconsideration is docketed before Us as Administrative
Matter No. 10468-CFI.
Acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, We
adopted the following resolution dated July 2, 1981, to wit:
"Administrative Matter No. 10468-CFI Re Terminal Leave
Pay, Unpaid Salary and Allowance of the late CFI Judge
Pascual G. Berciles: Flor Fuentebella and her four children, all
surnamed Berciles v. Iluminada Ponce and her four children,
all surnamed Berciles. - Judge Pascual G. Berciles of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu died in office on August 21,
1979 at the age of sixty-six years. He was a native of Lapuz
Norte, La Paz, Iloilo City.
Iluminada Ponce of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, who claimed to be the
decedents widow, and her four children, Ilona, Ellery, England
and Ione, filed a claim dated May 2, 1980 for survivors
benefits. Iluminada executed an affidavit of heir ship dated
September 19, 1979.
On the other hand, Rhoda F. Berciles, 6069-B Palma Street,
Makati, Rizal in a verified statement dated November 19,
1979, claimed that the deceased judge was survived by Flor
Fuentebella, as widow, and their four children named Voltaire,
Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda. Judge Berciles allegedly married
60
resolution of March 17, 1981. Payment was made to them on
the assumption that they are the only legal heirs of Judge
Berciles.
Atty. Luzel D. Demasu-ay, counsel for Flor Fuentebella and her
four children, in his motion for reconsideration dated April 21,
1981, alleged that his clients were not heard before that
payment was made. He said that the payment was being
capitalized upon by Iluminada Ponce and her children in the
GSIS as the basis for the payment to them of the retirement
gratuity of Judge Berciles.
Considering that the issue as to who are the legal heirs of
Judge Berciles is still being litigated in the Social Security
Services of the GSIS (according to Atty. Felicisimo Fernandez
of that unit), and the survivors benefits have not yet been paid
to Iluminada Ponce and her children, and considering that the
children of Flor Fuentebella, even as illegitimate children of
Judge Berciles, would be entitled to a share in his terminal
leave pay, allowance and unpaid salary (In re Chanliongco,
Adm. Matter No. 190-Ret., October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 364),
the Court Resolved (1) to require Iluminada Ponce and her
children, c/o Ione P. Berciles, 9 Jersey Street, Toro Hills,
Project 8, Quezon City, to COMMENT on the said motion for
reconsideration within ten (10) days from notice and (2) to
direct Atty. Juan P. Enriquez, Jr., Deputy Clerk of Court and
Chief of the Administrative Division, to advise the GSIS that,
should Flor Fuentebella and her children be ultimately
adjudged as legal heirs of Judge Berciles, their share in the
sum of P60,817.50 (terminal leave pay, etc.) would be taken
from the survivors benefits amounting to P301,760, already
remitted to the GSIS and, consequently, the shares of
Iluminada Ponce and her children in the said gratuity would
answer for the portions due to Flor Fuentebella, Et. Al. in the
terminal leave pay, etc., if adjudged entitled thereto.
61
on October 9, 1980, the GSIS approved the claim of Iluminada
Ponce and so, the five (5) years lump sum retirement gratuity
of the deceased Judge, in the net amount of P301,760.00, was
remitted by our Budget and Finance Office to the GSIS on
October 15, 1980 under Check No. 04824308 for payment to
Iluminada and her four children. The GSIS, however, in its
Memorandum dated June 25, 1982 in G.R. No. 57257 denied
having approved the claim of Iluminada Ponce Berciles and
her children saying that no such approval was made. The
records in G.R. No. 57257 disclose Annex "A" attached to the
petition on pp. 14-15 of the Rollo the following evaluation
report evaluated by Carmelo C. Garcia, Legal Evaluator;
reviewed by Lorenzo Sanchez, Legal Evaluator; approved by
Felicisimo A. Fernandez, Manager, Survivorship Benefits
Dept.; and confirmed by Juanito S. Santamaria, Vice
President, SSS-II, to wit:
I Medical Evaluation
II Legal Evaluation
A. Documents Submitted: virtual 1aw library
(b) Birth certificate of Ilona May 15, 1945; Ellery - Sept. 21,
1946; England Nov. 14, 1948; Ione Ainee Aug. 25, 1955.
62
(b) She was not living with the deceased at the time of his
death as required by the rules and regulation of PD 626, as
amended. (Rule XIV, Section 1(b), No. 1 the legitimate spouse
living with the employee at the time of employees death . . .).
EVALUATED BY: REVIEWED BY: virtual 1aw library
B. Findings
63
In denying the above approval, the GSIS in its Memorandum
claims that the matter was elevated sometime in October 1980
to the Committee on Claims Settlement for the proper
determination of the legal heirs of the late Judge Berciles. The
two sets of claimants having failed to reach an amicable
settlement, the GSIS advised the parties to submit the
necessary documents to prove their relationship or filiation to
the deceased.
5
for the acknowledged natural child Pascual Voltaire
134 Berciles;
4
77
for the surviving spouse, Iluminada Ponce Berciles;
134
x"
10
each for the legitimate children, Ilona Berciles Alvarez,
134 Ellery P. Berciles, England P. Berciles and Ione P.
Berciles;
64
acting on the merits of the pleadings filed, We resolved to give
due course to the petition in Our Resolution of April 14, 1981.
Considering Our Resolution of July 21, 1981, the disposition of
Administrative Matter No. 1337-Ret. and Administrative Matter
No. 10468-CFI rests on Our decision in the present petition.
The primary issue raised in the herein petition for certiorari is
the validity of the GSIS decision contained in its Resolution
No. 431 finding private respondent Pascual Voltaire Berciles
as an acknowledged natural child of the late Judge Pascual G.
Berciles and the other private respondents namely Maria Luisa
Berciles Villareal, Mercy Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles
as illegitimate children of the deceased, and thus, upon this
finding, disposed the retirement benefits in the manner and
proportion set forth in said resolution after considering said
benefits as partly conjugal and partly exclusive. Petitioners
contend that on the basis of the documents and testimony
submitted by private respondents, the conclusion of
respondent GSIS is erroneous and unfounded and that
respondent GSIS erred grossly in its resolution. The
correctness of the legal conclusion drawn by the respondent
GSIS or its appreciation of the undisputed state of facts
obtaining in the present controversy is thus squarely raised by
petitioners.
We note that private respondents in their Comment dated July
27, 1981 to the petition herein, while pointing out that the
Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the original
determination of the legal heirs of a deceased judge who is
covered by R.A. 910 as amended and that the determination
of the question of heirship can be appropriately considered
only in our regular courts of justice where private respondents
actually did file a Special Civil Action No. 13966 for
"Mandamus with Prayer for a Restraining Order" in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, a copy of which is
attached to the Comment as Annex "A", raised the same issue
65
and Exh. "G"), Income Tax Returns for the years 1975 (Exh.
"U") and 1976 (Exh. "V"), individual sworn statements of
persons who knew or were related to the deceased
corroborate the filial affinity of Iluminada Ponce and her
children to the late Judge Berciles.
"Based on these documents, there is no question that
Iluminada Ponce was married to Pascual Berciles, alias
Paquito, on January 20, 1941 at Bocaue, Bulacan. From this
union, they begot the following children, namely: Ilona, Ellery,
England and Ione.
"The evidence for claimant Flor Fuentebella Berciles and her
children may also be briefly described as follows: She claims
to have been married to the late Judge Pascual Berciles on
March 28, 1937 in Iloilo City before Justice of the Peace Jose
Vicente Mapa. In other words, she professes to be the first
wife of the deceased Judge. Flor Fuentebella was, however,
not able to present her marriage contract or certificate of
marriage. Instead she submitted a certification of the Local
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (Exh. "1") attesting to the loss or
destruction of the records of marriage for the year 1944 and
previous years and another certification issued by the Office of
Civil Registrar General of the National Census and Statistics
Office (Exh. "2") stating the non-availability of the record of
marriage between Pascual Berciles and Flor Fuentebella.
"In concrete support of her claim of marriage to the late Judge
Berciles, Flor Fuentebella presented to the Committee sworn
statements of several persons. Of the several sworn
statements, at least two or three deserve serious
consideration. The first is the one executed by Concepcion M.
Gonzales (Exh. "31") of 46 South Mapa, Philam Homes,
Quezon City, who stated that she knew for a fact that Flor
Fuentebella was married to Pascual Berciles in 1937 at Iloilo
City. It was represented to the Committee that she was present
66
as a guest in the marriage ceremony. Due to importance of her
testimony, the Committee requested her actual presence in the
hearing. However, due to her advanced age of 89 years and
her other physical infirmity, her attendance at the hearing was
dispensed with instead, the Committee directed the Manager,
Survivorship Department to secure her deposition on
questions prepared in advance by the Committee. In his report
to the Committee, the Manager stated that the old lady is
already blind, quite hard of hearing and her memory already
weak. In the Answers (Exh. "31-A") to the questions written by
the Manager, Survivorship Department, Concepcion Gonzales
declared that she was present during the marriage ceremony
of Pascual Berciles and Flor Fuentebella which was held in the
Municipal Hall of Iloilo City. She described the wedding as
attended by only the members of the family and that after the
ceremony they went to the house of Pascuals parents where a
small party was held.
"The Committee finds the testimony of Concepcion Gonzales
quite deficient in important detail. Flor Fuentebella had not
been presented in person for the proper identification of the
witness. Was the Flor Fuentebella who allegedly married
Pascual Berciles on March 28, 1937 the same Flor
Fuentebella who is cited by Concepcion Gonzales? At any
rate, assuming that a confrontation did occur, Concepcion
Gonzales would not be able to properly identify Flor
Fuentebella, by reason of her blindness.
"The other sworn statements which merit particular discussion
are those executed by Coronacion Berciles (Exhs. "10 and
31") a sister-in-law of the late Judge Berciles. Coronacion was
presented before the Committee as a witness for Flor
Fuentebella. In her testimony, she stated facts and
circumstances about the marital relations between Pascual
Berciles and Flor Fuentebella. She declared that her husband
was the younger brother of the late Judge Berciles; that even
67
him in Iloilo City on March 28, 1937. The affidavit is nothing
more than a self-serving statement. Flor Fuentebella was not
presented to the Committee as a material witness. On the
other hand, the sworn statement of Pascual Berciles (Exh. "4")
commands no evidentiary value at all. Mr. Santiago Medina,
former Provincial Fiscal of Cebu, who appears to have
administered the oath, in a subsequent sworn statement (Exh.
"M") denied his signature on the document (Exh. "4").
"The letters written by Judge Berciles to her daughters with
Flor Fuentebella especially the one sent to daughter Mercy
Berciles (Exh. "22") wherein he vigorously affirmed that its
only her mother, Flor Fuentebella, and no other woman who
was recognized as his wife and loved by her parents deserve
scant consideration. Pascual Berciles could not be expected to
admit the existence of his other family. This would be
disastrous to his efforts at preventing one family from knowing
the other.
"Flor Fuentebella likewise submitted to the Committee the birth
or baptismal certificates of her children begotten with the late
Judge Berciles; the birth certificates of Pascual Voltaire
Berciles (Exh. "6"); baptismal certificate of Maria Luisa Berciles
(Exh. "7-A"); birth certificate of Mercy Berciles (Exh. "8"); birth
certificates of Rhoda Berciles (Exh. "9"). The other evidence
consist of family pictures (Exhs. "30 to 30-M") which have
been identified by witness Coronacion Berciles both in her oral
testimony before the Committee and in her affidavit. (Exh.
"32", par. 15). The pictures, however, do not indicate that the
marriage took place. If at all, the said pictures show the
presence of a family with or without the sanction of marriage.
"After a careful evaluation of these documents, the Committee
believes that there is no sufficient evidence that Pascual
Berciles and Flor Fuentebella were married to each other on
March 28, 1937 in Iloilo City; however, certain relationship did
68
Consequently, the legal heirs of the late Judge Berciles entitled
to share in the distribution of his retirement benefits are the
following: Iluminada Ponce, surviving spouse; Ilona Berciles
Alvarez, Ellery Berciles, England P. Berciles and Ione P.
Berciles, legitimate children; Pascual Voltaire Berciles, natural
child; Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy Berciles, and Rhoda
Berciles, illegitimate children." From the above recital, We can
readily summarize the following three (3) conclusions therein
made and arrived at by the Committee which were approved
and adopted in toto by respondent GSIS through Board of
Trustees Resolution No. 431, to wit: virtual 1aw library
1." (T)hat Iluminada Ponce was married to Pascual Berciles,
alias Paquito, on January 20, 1941 at Bocaue, Bulacan. From
this union, they begot the following children namely: Ilona,
Ellery, England and Ione." virtua1aw library
2." (T)hat there is no sufficient evidence that Pascual Berciles
and Flor Fuentebella were married to each other on March 28,
1937 in Iloilo City." virtua1aw library
3." (H)owever, certain relationship did exist and from such
relationship were begotten the following children, namely:
Pascual Voltaire Berciles, Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy Berciles
and Rhoda Berciles.." . ." The children begotten with her are
either natural or illegitimate children depending on whether
they have been born before or after the marriage of Iluminada
Ponce." library
As pointed out earlier, petitioners assail the validity of the third
conclusion or finding that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an
acknowledged natural child and that Maria Luisa Berciles,
Mercy Berciles and Rhoda Berciles are illegitimate children of
the late Judge Pascual Berciles, petitioners being in complete
accord and conformity with the first two conclusions
summarized above.
69
registration of births, including those of illegitimate parentage;
and the record of birth under such law, if sufficient in contents
for the purpose, would meet the requisites for voluntary
recognition even under Article 131. Since Rodolfo was born in
1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here
really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is
merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied
upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed
upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is
no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its
contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753
(Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 493; In re Adoption
of Lydia Duran, 92 Phil. 729). For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners
say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a
public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural
child may also be made, according to the same Article 131.
True enough, but in such a case there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child
as his or her own (Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1); and in
Exhibit 1 no such statement appears. The claim of voluntary
recognition is without basis." virtua1aw library
With respect to the Committees finding that the other private
respondents are illegitimate children of the deceased Judge
Berciles, We find that the evidentiary basis of such finding are
the baptismal certificate of Maria Luisa Berciles, Exh. "7-A" ;
birth certificate of Mercy Berciles, Exh. "8" ; and birth certificate
of Rhoda Berciles, Exh. "9." We have also examined the
above exhibits and We find that Exh. "7" is a mere certification
that all the Civil Registry records of birth filed in the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar for the year 1944 and previous years
were either burned, destroyed or lost during the last war and
hence, the office could not furnish the birth certificate of Maria
70
compulsory recognition of the relationship. For this purpose,
the provisions concerning natural children are held applicable,
thus, recognition is voluntary when made in the record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing (Article 278); and compulsory when made by means of
a court action in the cases enumerated in Articles 283 and 284
(Paulino v. Paulino, L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961).
Discrediting the above certificate (birth and baptismal) of the
illegitimate spurious children which do not constitute proof of
filiation with the deceased Judge Berciles, what remains are
the sworn statements of Coronacion Berciles, Exh. 10 and 31,
sister-in-law of the late Judge Berciles wherein she stated that
after she was married to her husband, they lived together with
the family of Pascual Berciles and his wife, Flor Fuentebella;
that their two families had lived closely enough during the
Japanese Occupation and even after. These statements,
however, does not prove the filiation of the children to the late
Judge Pascual Berciles.
Neither are the family pictures, Exhs. 30 to 30-M, which,
according to the Committee, do not indicate that the marriage
(between Judge Berciles and Flor Fuentebella) took place and
that if at all, the said pictures show the presence of a family
with or without the sanction of marriage. We agree and We
add that said pictures do not constitute proof of filiation.
We also agree with the finding of the Committee that" (t)he
letters written by Judge Berciles to her daughters with Flor
Fuentebella especially the one sent to daughter Mercy
Berciles (Exh. "22") wherein he vigorously affirmed that its
only her mother, Flor Fuentebella, and no other woman who
was recognized as his wife and loved by her parents deserve
scant consideration. Pascual Berciles could not be expected to
admit the existence of his other family. This would be
disastrous to his efforts at preventing one family from knowing
71
their filiation must be duly proved." And in the Noble case,
supra, the Supreme Court laid down this ruling:
72
Supreme Court on certiorari. No appeal bond shall be
required. The appeal shall take precedence over all other
cases except criminal cases wherein the penalty of life
imprisonment or death has been imposed by the trial court.
Appeal shall not stay the decision of the Board unless so
ordered by the Board, by the Court of Appeals, or by the
Supreme Court." virtua1aw library
Respondents position is untenable. We hold that Sec. 25 of
P.D. 1146 quoted above may be availed of by petitioners.
Republic Act 910, as amended, is a special statute governing
and granting retirement benefits to members of the judiciary.
While Section 5 of the Act provides that the GSIS shall take
charge of the enforcement and operation of the Act, there is no
provision therein setting forth the procedure or remedy for the
final determination of the legal heirs of the deceased Judge in
case a dispute arises between the opposing claimants. Even
under the old GSIS Act, Commonwealth Act No. 186 as
amended, there is no express provision on appeal from the
award or decisions of the GSIS. In both cases, the decision or
the award made by the GSIS which affects property rights as
well as the legitimate or illegitimate status of the claimants is
brought to and assailed in the regular courts of justice under
the general power and jurisdiction of the courts to review
decisions of administrative bodies and this is where the
litigation becomes not only delayed or protracted but also
expensive and cumbersome, to the great prejudice and
detriment of the parties.
As may be gleaned from the "whereas clauses" of P.D. 1146
which, among others, recognize that "provisions of existing
laws . . . have prejudiced, rather than benefitted, the
government employee; restricted rather than broadened, his
benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the payment of
benefits, must now yield to his paramount welfare," P.D. 1146
73
Judge. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE its finding that Pascual
Voltaire Berciles is an acknowledged natural child and that
Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy Berciles, and Rhoda Berciles are
illegitimate children of the deceased CFI Judge Pascual G.
Berciles. The claims of the petitioners as legal heirs are hereby
APPROVED and the GSIS is hereby ordered to pay
immediately to each and every petitioner the various sums
hereunder indicated opposite their names, as follows: 1aw
library
gratuity P60,352.00
retirement premiums
=========
4. ENGLAND P. BERCILES.
=========
gratuity P60,352.00
gratuity P60,352.00
74
Total Amount Due Him P61,322.00
========
5. IONE P. BERCILES.
A. Her 1/5 share of retirement
gratuity P60,352.00
B. Her share from return of
retirement premiums 970.00
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 8715. October 24, 1914. ]
MARIANO VELOSO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUCIA MARTINEZ,
personally and as administratrix of the estate of Domingo
Franco, deceased, Defendant-Appellee.
Martin M. Levering, for Appellant.
75
The lower court further found that the defendant was entitled
to the possession of said jewelry, and ordered the plaintiff to
return the same to her and in case of the plaintiffs failure to
return said jewelry to the defendant, then and in that case, he
shall pay to the defendant, for such failure, the sum of P6,000.
From the judgment of the lower court, each of the parties, plaintiff
and defendant, appealed to this court. Later the defendant
withdrew her appeal, thereby allowing that part of the judgment
relating to the plaintiffs right to the possession of the land in
question, together with damages, to become final. The only
question remaining, therefore, for this court to decide is as to the
ownership and right of possession of said jewels. It is admitted
76
that the jewels in question, before the possession of the same
was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally
and that she had inherited the same from her mother. The
defendant, Lucia Martinez, is the widow of Domingo Franco, and
after the death of her husband she was appointed administratrix
of his estate. The record further shows (Exhibit C) that a short
time before the death of Domingo Franco he borrowed from the
plaintiff the sum of P4,500 and gave as security for the payment
of said sum the jewelry described in the complaint. The money
was borrowed on the 7th day of April, 1911, under promise to
repay the same, with 12 per cent interest, on the 7th day of May,
1911. It is not clear whether or not the jewelry, at the time of the
execution of said document (Exhibit C), was in fact delivered to
the plaintiff. Said exhibit states that the jewelry was contained
"dentro de una caja que queda cerrada despues de demostradas
las alhajas a D. Mariano Veloso" (in a box which remains closed
after the jewels were shown to Mariano Veloso). The document
further admits that "la llave quedara en poder de D. Domingo
Franco" (the key shall remain in possession of Domingo Franco).
After the death of Domingo Franco it appears that said jewelry
was found in the same "caja" and that the key was in the
possession of the defendant. It is very doubtful, indeed, under the
facts, whether the plaintiff ever obtained the actual possession of
the jewelry. His possession, however, seems to be admitted by
the defendant in the present action. So far as the record shows
the jewelry was in the same box where it was found at the time of
the execution and delivery of said Exhibit C and that the
defendant still has the key to said box.
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff attempted to show that
the jewels in question were pawned to him by Domingo
Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of the defendant.
And not only that, the plaintiff further attempts to show that
after the death of Domingo Franco, the defendant promised to
pay the amount for which the said jewels were pawned. The
defendant positively denies that she knew that her husband
had pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem the
same by paying the amount due. No explanation is contained
EN BANC
77
City and The Spouses CESAREA E. VILLANUEVA and
GREGORIO LEAO respondents.
Rosales & Montesa for petitioner.
Venida & Demonteverda Law Offices for respondents.
REYES J.B.L., J.:
Amalia Plata resorts to this Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari against the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
V, Quezon City, to annul and set aside its order of 4 January
1963, issued in its Civil Case No. Q-6250 (Cesarea Villanueva,
et al. vs. Gaudencio Begosa) finding petitioner Plata in
contempt of court for refusing to vacate certain property, and
sentencing her to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, with a warning of more
drastic action should she persist in disobeying the writ issued
by said court.
At petitioner's instance, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
to stay enforcement of the order complained of, and respondents
required to answer.
78
of petitioner Amalia Plata to Gaudencio Begosa is weak,
considering the admissions of married status in public documents
(Answer, Exhs. 3 and 4); the well known presumption that
persons openly living together as husband and wife are legally
married to each other, and that the prior marriage of Begosa to
someone else does not necessarily exclude the possibility of a
valid subsequent marriage to herein petitioner; still the
respondents Villanueva could not ignore the paraphernal
character of the property in question, which had been
unquestionably acquired by Plata while still single, as shown by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25855 of Rizal (Art. 148 of the
New Civil Code). The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso
Saldaa, and the reconveyance of her several months afterward
of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to
conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to
Saldaa came from common or conjugal funds (Civ. Code, Art
153). The deed of mortgage in favor of respondents Villanueva
actually recites that the petitioner was the owner of the tenement
in question and so does the conveyance of it by Saldaa to her
(Ans., Exhs. 3 and 4).
It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage (Exh. 4) as
a co-mortgagor; but by itself alone that circumstance would not
suffice to convert the land into conjugal property, considering that
it was paraphernal in origin. This is particularly the case where
the addition of Begosa as co-mortgagor was clearly an after
thought, the text of the deed showing that Plata was the sole
mortgagor.
Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and
purchasers were aware of it, the fact being clearly spread on the
land records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was not
derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment
against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's
possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and
administers independently, and which she may even encumber or
alienate without his knowledge or consent (Civ. Code, Arts. 136.
137, 140). Hence, as she was not made party defendant in the
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004]
MILAGROS
JOAQUINO
REYES, petitioner,
a.k.a.
MILAGROS
J.
79
vs. LOURDES REYES, MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and
RODOLFO
JR.
-all
surnamed
REYES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though registered in the paramours name, property
acquired with the salaries and earnings of a husband belongs
to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse. The filiation
of the paramours children must be settled in a probate or
special proceeding instituted for the purpose, not in an action
for recovery of property.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the February 4, 2002
Decision[2] and the August 14, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 45883. The CA disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theappealisherebypartially
DENIEDandtheDecisiondatedMay30,1994,oftheRegional
TrialCourtofPasayCity,Branch111inCivilCaseNo.9722P
isMODIFIEDtoread,asfollows:
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorofplaintiffs
andagainstthedefendantasfollows:
a.DeclaringthehouseandlotregisteredunderTransferCertificate
ofTitleNo.90293(26627A)oftheRegistryofDeedsofMetro
Manila,DistrictIVasconjugalpartnershippropertyofthelate
SpousesRodolfoandLourdesReyes;
b.Orderingthe[petitioner]tosurrenderpossessionofsaidsubject
property,pursuanttotheapplicablelawonsuccession,tothe
respectiveestatesofthelateRodolfoReyesandLourdesReyesand
topayareasonablerentalofP10,000.00amonth,tothesame
juridicalentities,upontheirfailuretodosountilpossessionofthe
propertyisdelivered;and
c.Topay[respondents]attorneysfeesinthesumofP20,000.00and
topaythecosts.[4]
The questioned Resolution, on the other hand, denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
[Respondents]filedaComplaintforreconveyanceanddamages,
datedJanuary23,1982,beforetheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,
containingthefollowingallegations:
xxxThecomplaintallegesthat[respondent]LourdesP.Reyesisthe
widowofRodolfoA.ReyeswhodiedonSeptember12,1981;that
[respondents]Mercedes,Manuel,MiriamandRodolfo,Jr.arethe
legitimatechildrenof[respondent]LourdesP.Reyesandthe
deceasedRodolfoA.Reyes;thatforyearsbeforehisdeath,Rodolfo
A.Reyeshadillicitrelationswith[petitioner]MilagrosB.Joaquino;
thatbeforehisdeath,xxxRodolfoA.ReyeswasVicePresidentand
ComptrollerofWarnerBarnesandCompanywithanincome
ofP15,000.00amonthand,afterretirementonSeptember30,1980,
receivedfromsaidcompanybenefitsandemolumentsintheamount
ofP315,0[1]1.79;that[respondent]wifewasnottherecipientofany
portionofthesaidamount.
80
ThecomplaintfurtherallegesthatonJuly12,1979,a[D]eedof
[S]aleofapropertyconsistingofahouseandlotatBFHomes,
Paraaque,MetroManilawasexecutedbythespousesRamiroGolez
andCorazonGolezinfavorof[petitioner]MilagrosB.Joaquinofor
whichTransferCertificateofTitleNo.90293oftheRegisterof
DeedsofMetroManila,DistrictIVwasissuedinthenameof
[petitioner]MilagrosB.Joaquino;thatthefundsusedtopurchase
thispropertywereconjugalfundsandearningsofthedeceased
RodolfoA.ReyesasexecutiveofWarnerBarnesandCompanyas
[petitioner]Joaquinowaswithoutthemeanstopayforthesame;that
[petitioner]executedaSpecialPowerofAttorneyinfavorof
RodolfoA.ReyestomortgagethepropertytoCommonwealth
InsuranceCorporationinordertopaythebalanceofthepurchase
price;thatsaidRodolfoA.Reyesexecutedamortgageinfavorof
CommonwealthInsuranceCorporationforP140,000.00andto
guarantypaymentthereof,hesecuredalifeinsurance[policy]with
PhilamLifeInsuranceCorporationforthesaidamount,assigningthe
proceedsthereoftoCommonwealthInsuranceCorporation;thatthe
monthlyamortizationsofthemortgagewerepaidbysaidRodolfoA.
Reyesbeforehisdeathandatthetimeofhisdeath,theoutstanding
balanceofP110,000.00wastobepaidoutofhisPhilamLife
Insurance[p]olicy.
Thecomplaintfinallyallegesthatthedeceasedhadtwocarsin
[petitioners]possessionandthattherealandpersonalpropertiesin
[petitioners]possessionareconjugalpartnershippropert[ies]ofthe
spousesLourdesP.ReyesandRodolfoA.Reyesandonehalf
belongsexclusivelyto[respondent]LourdesP.Reyesandtheother
halftotheestateofRodolfoA.Reyestobeapportionedamongthe
[otherrespondents]ashisforcedheirs.[Respondents]therefore,pray
thatthepropertycoveredbyT.C.T.No.90293bedeclaredconjugal
propertyofthespousesLourdesP.ReyesandRodolfoA.Reyesand
that[petitioner]beorderedtoreconveythepropertyin[respondents]
favor;thatthetwocarsin[petitioners]possessionbedeliveredto
[respondents]andthat[petitioner]bemadetopayactual,
compensatoryandmoraldamagesto[respondents]aswellas
attorneysfees.
xxxxxxxxx
[Petitioner]eventuallyfiledherAnswer,datedAugust1,1982,the
allegationsofwhichhavebeensummarizedbythetrialcourtinthe
followingmanner:
InherAnswer,[petitioner]MilagrosB.Joaquinoallegesthatshe
purchasedtherealpropertyinquestionwithherownexclusivefunds
anditwasonlyforconveniencethatthelateRodolfoReyes
facilitatedthemortgageoverthesame;thatalthoughthelateRodolfo
Reyespaidthemonthlyamortizationofthemortgageasattorneyin
factof[petitioner],themoneycameexclusivelyfrom[her].
[Petitioner]furtherallegesinheranswer,bywayofspecialand
affirmativedefenses,thatduringallthenineteen(19)yearsthat[she]
livedwithRodolfoReyesfrom1962continuouslyuptoSeptember
12,1981whenthelatterdied,[petitioner]neverhadknowledge
whatsoeverthathewasmarriedtosomeoneelse,muchlessto
[respondent]LourdesP.Reyes;that[petitioner]wasneverthe
beneficiaryoftheemolumentsorotherpecuniarybenefitsofthelate
RodolfoReyesduringhislifetimeorafterhisdeathbecause[she]
hadthefinancialcapacitytosupportherselfandherchildren
begottenwiththelateRodolfoReyes.[Petitioner]praysfora
judgmentdismissing[respondents]complaintandforthelatterto
payunto[petitioner]moralandexemplarydamagesinsuchamounts
asmaybedeterminedduringthetrial,includingatto[r]neysfeesand
thecostsofthesuit.xxx.
xxxxxxxxx
OnFebruary2,1993,[respondent]LourdesReyesdied.
81
Subsequently,thetrialcourtgrantedthecomplaintbasedonthe
followingfactualfindings:
LourdesReyeswaslegallymarriedtoRodolfoReyesonJanuary3,
1947inManila.Theyhavefourchildren,namely:Mercedes,
Manuel,MiriamandRodolfoJr.,allsurnamedReyesandco
[respondents]inthiscase.RodolfoReyesdiedonSeptember12,
1981.Atthetimeofhisdeath,RodolfoReyeswaslivingwithhis
commonlawwife,MilagrosJoaquino,xxxwithwhomshebegot
three(3)childrennamely:JoseRomillo,ImeldaMayandCharina,
allsurnamedReyes.
Duringhislifetime,RodolfoReyesworkedwithMarsmanand
CompanyandlatertransferredtoWarnerBarnes&Co.,wherehe
assumedthepositionofVicePresident[Comptroller]untilheretired
onSeptember30,1980.HismonthlysalaryatWarnerBarnes&Co.
wasP15,000.00xxxanduponhisseparationorretirementfromsaid
company,RodolfoReyesreceivedalumpsumofP315,011.79infull
paymentandsettlementofhisseparationandretirementbenefits.
DuringthecommonlawrelationshipofRodolfoReyesand
[petitioner]MilagrosJoaquinoandwhilelivingtogether,they
decidedtobuythehouseandlotsituatedatNo.12BaghdadStreet,
Phase3,BFHomes,Paraaque,MetroManila.ADeedofAbsolute
SaledatedJuly12,1979wasexecutedinfavorof[petitioner]
MilagrosJoaquinoandTransferCertificateofTitleNo.S90293
coveringthesaidpropertywasissuedinthenameof[petitioneronly]
onJuly20,1979.
Tosecurethefinanceswithwhichtopaythepurchasepriceofthe
propertyintheamountofP140,000.00,[petitioner]executedonJuly
20,1979,aSpecialPowerofAttorneyinfavorofRodolfoA.Reyes
forthelatter,asattorneyinfact,tosecurealoanfromthe
CommonwealthInsuranceCompany.Anapplicationformortgage
loanwasfiledbyRodolfoReyeswiththeCommonwealthInsurance
CompanyandaRealEstateMortgageContractwasexecutedas
collateraltothemortgageloan.Theloanwaspayableinten(10)
yearswithamonthlyamortizationofP1,166.67.Themonthly
amortizationswerepaidbyRodolfoReyesandafterhisdeath,the
balanceofP109,797.64waspaidinfulltotheCommonwealth
InsurancebythePhilamLifeInsuranceCo.asinsurerofthe
deceasedRodolfoA.Reyes.[5]
On appeal to the CA, petitioner questioned the following
findings of the trial court: 1) that the house and lot had been
paid in full from the proceeds of the loan that Rodolfo Reyes
obtained from the Commonwealth Insurance Company; 2) that
his salaries and earnings, which were his and Lourdes
conjugal funds, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed
property was conjugal; and 3) that petitioners illegitimate
children, not having been recognized or acknowledged by him
in any of the ways provided by law, acquired no successional
rights to his estate.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the RTC, the CA held that the property had been
paid out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes because
the monthly amortizations for the loan, as well as the
premiums for the life insurance policy that paid for the balance
thereof, came from his salaries and earnings. Like the trial
court, it found no sufficient proof that petitioner was financially
capable of buying the disputed property, or that she had
actually contributed her own exclusive funds to pay for
it. Hence, it ordered her to surrender possession of the
property to the respective estates of the spouses.
The appellate court, however, held that the trial court
should not have resolved the issue of the filiation and the
successional rights of petitioners children. Such issues, it said,
were not properly cognizable in an ordinary civil action for
82
reconveyance and damages and were better ventilated in a
probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for the Courts
consideration:
I.
Whetherornotithasbeenindubitablyestablishedinacourtoflaw
andtrieroffacts,theRegionalTrialCourt,thatpetitionersthree[3]
illegitimatechildrenarexxxindeedthechildrenofthelateRodolfo
Reyes.
IV.
WhetherornottheSupremeCourtshouldenforcetherulethatthe
partiestoalawsuitshouldonlytellthetruthatthetrialandin[their]
pleadingsxxx.
V.
WhetherornotthelegitimatechildrenofthelateRodolfoReyes
shouldrespecttheirfathersdesirethathisillegitimatechildren
shouldhaveahomeoraroofovertheirheadsinconsonancewithhis
dutytolove,careandprovideforhischildrenevenafterhisdeath. [7]
The issues boil down to the following: 1) the nature of the
house and lot on Baghdad Street (BF Homes Paraaque, Metro
Manila); and 2) the propriety of ruling on the filiation and the
successional rights of petitioners children.
II.
The Courts Ruling
Whetherornotitislegallypermissiblefor[respondents]tomakea
mockeryofthelawbydenying[the]filiationsoftheir[two]2
illegitimatesistersandone[1]illegitimatebrotherwheninfactthe
verycomplaintfiledbytheirmother,thelawfulwife,Lourdes[,]
showsthatherhusbandRodolfohadillicitrelationswiththe
petitionerMilagrosandhadlivedwithherinahouseandlotat
BaghdadStreet.
III.
WhetherornotthefactthattheCourtofAppealsmadeafindingthat
thehouseandlotatBaghdadStreetareconjugalpropertyoflawfully
weddedRodolfoandLourdesincludingtheinsuranceproceeds
whichwasusedtopaythefinalbillforthehouseandlot,thiswill
prevailoverArticles19and21oftheCivilCode.
83
As to the facts, it is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo
Reyes was legally married to Respondent Lourdes Reyes
on January 3, 1947.[8] It is also admitted that for 19 years or so,
and while their marriage was subsisting, he was actually living
with petitioner. It was during this time, in 1979, that the
disputed house and lot was purchased and registered in
petitioners name.
Plainly, therefore, the applicable law is the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal
partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage [9] and
lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment,
legal separation or judicial separation of property.[10] Conjugal
properties are by law owned in common by the husband and
wife.[11] As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in
Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:
(1)Thatwhichisacquiredbyoneroustitleduringthemarriageatthe
expenseofthecommonfund,whethertheacquisitionbeforthe
partnership,orforonlyoneofthespouses;
(2)Thatwhichisobtainedbytheindustry,orwork,orassalaryof
thespouses,orofeitherofthem;
(3)Thefruits,rentsorinterestsreceivedordueduringthemarriage,
comingfromthecommonpropertyorfromtheexclusivepropertyof
eachspouse.
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of
the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the
wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG.For the
rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must
first be proven to have been acquired during the existence of
the marriage.[12]
84
Theforegoingrulesonforfeitureshalllikewiseapplyevenifboth
partiesareinbadfaith.
Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal
impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them -through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry -- shall be owned by them in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions.
With these facts and principles firmly settled, we now
proceed to the merits of the first issue.
The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds
paid for the house and lot in question. Upon the resolution of
this issue depends the determination of whether the property
is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive
(owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.
The above issue, which is clearly factual, has been
passed upon by both the trial and the appellate courts, with
similar results in favor of respondents. Such finding is
generally conclusive; it is not the function of this Court to
review questions of fact. [20]
Moreover, it is well-settled that only errors of law and not
of facts are reviewable by this Court in cases brought to it from
the Court of Appeals or under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[21]
This principle applies with greater force herein, because the
CA came up with the same factual findings as those of the
RTC.
Even then, heeding petitioners plea, we have gone
through the pleadings and the evidence presented by the
parties to find out if there is any circumstance that might
warrant a reversal of the factual findings. Unfortunately for
petitioner, we have found none.
85
business. Respondents had not been given any opportunity to
cross-examine the affiants, who had not testified on these
matters. Based on the rules of evidence, the Affidavits and the
Certification have to be rejected. In fact, they have no
probative value.[33] The CA was also correct in disregarding
petitioners allegation that part of the purchase money had
come from the sale of a drugstore[34] four years earlier.
The
prohibition
against
donations
between
spouses[35] must likewise apply to donations between persons
living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the latter would be
better situated than the former.[36] Article 87 of the Family Code
now expressly provides thus:
Art.87.Everydonationorgrantofgratuitousadvantage,director
indirect,betweenthespousesduringthemarriageshallbevoid,
exceptmoderategiftswhichthespousesmaygiveeachotheronthe
occasionofanyfamilyrejoicing.Theprohibitionshallalsoapplyto
personslivingtogetherashusbandandwifewithoutavalid
marriage.(Italicssupplied)
Regarding the registration of the property in petitioners
name, it is enough to stress that a certificate of title under
the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used
as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership. [37] It has
been held that property is conjugal if acquired in a commonlaw relationship during the subsistence of a preexisting legal
marriage, even if it is titled in the name of the common-law
Art.1456.Ifpropertyisacquiredthroughmistakeorfraud,the
personobtainingitis,byforceoflaw,consideredatrusteeofan
impliedtrustforthebenefitofthepersonfromwhomtheproperty
comes.
Second Issue:
Ruling on Illegitimate Filiation
Not Proper
It is petitioners alternative submission that her children are
entitled to a share in the disputed property, because they were
voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children. Claiming
that the issue of her childrens illegitimate filiation was duly
established in the trial court, she faults the CA for ruling that
the issue was improper in the instant case.
Her position is untenable.
Indeed, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights
of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper
probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for
the purpose of determining such rights.[40] Sustaining the
86
appellate court in Agapay v. Palang,[41] this Court held that the
status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a
decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
Considerations of due process should have likewise
deterred the RTC from ruling on the status of petitioners
children. It is evident from the pleadings of the parties that this
issue was not presented in either the original[42] or the
Supplemental Complaint[43] for reconveyance of property and
damages; that it was not pleaded and specifically prayed for
by petitioner in her Answers[44] thereto; and that it was not
traversed by respondents Reply to the Supplemental
Complaint.[45] Neither did petitioners Memorandum,[46] which
was submitted to the trial court, raise and discuss this issue. In
view thereof, the illegitimate filiation of her children could not
have been duly established by the proceedings as required by
Article 887 of the Civil Code.[47]
In view of the foregoing reasons, the CA cannot be faulted
for tackling the propriety of the RTCs ruling on the status of the
children of petitioner, though she did not assign this matter as
an error. The general rule -- that only errors assigned may be
passed upon by an appellate court admits of exceptions. Even
unassigned errors may be taken up by such court if the
consideration of those errors would be necessary for arriving
at a just decision or for serving the interest of justice.[48]
The invocation by petitioner of Articles 19[49] and 21[50] of
the Civil Code is also unmeritorious. Clearly, the illegitimate
filiation of her children was not the subject of inquiry and was
in fact not duly established in this case. Thus, she could not
have shown that respondents had acted in bad faith or with
intent to prejudice her children. These are conditions
necessary to show that an act constitutes an abuse of rights
under Article 19.[51] She also failed to show that respondents --
in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code -had acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.
Moreover, we note that the issue concerning the
applicability of Articles 19 and 21 was not raised by petitioner
in the trial court or even in the CA. Hence, she should not be
permitted to raise it now. Basic is the rule that parties may not
bring up on appeal issues that have not been raised on trial.[52]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.,
C.J.,
(Chairman),
Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago,
[1]
[2]
[3]
Id., p. 161.
[4]
[5]
87
[6]
[7]
[17]
[8]
Exhibit
A,
Marriage
and Lourdes Reyes.
[9]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
Exhibit I-1.
[10]
Contract
between
Rodolfo
[11]
[12]
[13]
[15]
[16]
88
[26]
[27]
Ibid.
[29]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[37]
Adriano v. CA, 385 Phil. 474, 485-486, March 27, 2000 (citing
Padilla v. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377, 383, October 4, 1943).
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
Supra.
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
De Vera Jr. v. CA, 419 Phil. 820, 834, October 18, 2001;
Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, 384
Phil. 19, 23, March 7, 2000.
[49]
[28]
[30]
[36]
[34]
[35]
89
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
[50]
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
[51]
[52]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9984
90
Carriedo, and the other on Calle San Sebastian. For the
purpose of consolidating her full ownership in and to both
properties, Petrona Javier acquired from her father's second
wife, Pascuala Santos, the latter's usufructuary right in her
deceased husband's estate for the sum of P3,000, which
amount, it appears, Javier was obliged to borrow, giving as
security for the loan a mortgage on the property she had
inherited.
These properties that were inherited by Petrona Javier from
her parents were those levied upon by the sheriff in the
execution of the judgment against Florentino Collantes, and
notwithstanding her protests the sale was carried out. The
successful bidder therein was the Osmea estate itself which
paid P500 for each parcel of property, that is, P1,000 for
Collantes' right in both parcels and in the usufructuary interest
acquired by his wife from Pascuala Santos.
Inasmuch as Petrona Javier claimed that her husband
Collantes had no rights whatever in said two pieces of property
or in the usufructuary interest acquired by her, she filed claim
of intervention in order to recover her ownership of the
properties and her right to usufruct after the sheriff's sale
should be annulled.
The defendant Osmea estate, in answer to the complaint,
admitted plaintiff's exclusive right of ownership in the said two
aforementioned parcels of real estate, subject to the
usufructuary right of the second wife of plaintiff's father, and
also admitted the purchase of this right by plaintiff. Defendant
claimed, however, that the money with which said usufructuary
interest was purchased belonged to the conjugal partnership
and therefore that the right of usufruct so acquired belonged to
the said conjugal partnership. Defendant concluded by praying
that the court rendered judgment holding that the revenues
from both properties are conjugal partnership property of the
91
Collantes, had represented as his agents in Manila for
the sale of tobacco consigned to them by Osmea from
Cebu and for the investment of the profits, in Osmea
's name and as his agent in Manila, in merchandise
which these agents consigned to him at Cebu (record,
p. 2). When Javier retired from the commission
business in 1902, it appears that he was indebted to
Tomas Osmea in the sum of four or five thousand
pesos, and that this debt was assumed by this
successor Collantes. How this debt originated, the
record does not show. In 1908, Collantes rendered a
statement (they probably were accounts) to Osmea
which showed that his debt to the latter amounted to
fourteen or fifteen thousand pesos. No steps were
taken by Osmea during his lifetime to collect this debt,
but after his death a judgment for the same was
obtained by the administrator of his estate in June,
1913. This judgment was founded on the statement
made by Collantes in 1908 in which he admitted is
debt, together with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per
centum per annum.
xxx
xxx
92
And inasmuch as "the fruits, revenue, or interest collected or
accrued during the marriage coming from the partnership
property, or from that which belongs to either one of the
spouses," is community property, according to article 1401;
and, further, as the law expressly provides that "the fruits of
the paraphernal property form a part of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, and are liable for the payment of the
marriage expenses" (art. 1385), hence it follows that the
creditor of the husband may bring his action, not against the
paraphernal property, but against the fruits and revenues of
this private property of the wife.
This conclusion is not barred by the provision of article 1386,
to wit, that "the personal obligation of the husband cannot be
paid out of the fruits of the paraphernal property unless it be
proven that they were incurred for the benefit of the family." It
is chiefly upon this article that appellee's whole brief is based.
The antecedents of this article of the Civil Code are not only
the laws embraced in some of the codes enacted prior thereto,
but principally the numerous cases decided by the supreme
court of Spain which interpret the old law which the appellee
says is identical with article 1386 of the present Civil Code.
Among the various decisions which might be cited, the most
important is that of June 9, 1883, because it covers the entire
question at issue in this case: Quirico Casanovas was a
creditor of Jose Gimiso for the value of certain drafts protested
for nonpayment; he brought suit to recover and attached
various properties belonging to the marriage partnership, for
Gimiso was married, and also several parcels of real estate
that belonged to the debtor's wife, Antonia Carruana. The latter
filed a third party claim and alleged that this real estate was
her paraphernal property and that the fruits thereof were
subject to the payment of the marriage expenses; that the
husband could dispose of such fruits only after the payment of
such expenses, among which his personal debts were not
93
The decision of the supreme court did not sustain the appeal
in cassation:
Considering that the debts contracted by the husband
during the marriage, for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes toward
the support of his family, cannot be deemed his
personal and private debts, nor consequently, can they
be excepted from payment out of the products or
revenue of the wife's own property which are liable, like
those of her husband's, for the discharge of the
liabilities of the marriage couple; and considering that
the debt claimed by Don Quirico Casanovas, for the
payment of which attachment has been levied on
certain property belonging to the petitioner, is
of this nature,inasmuch as it was contracted in the
exercise of the industry or business carried on by her
husband; therefore, the doctrine cited in
the second assignment of error of the appeal,
is inapplicable, and has not been violated by the
judgment appealed from, in holding, as it does, that
intervention prayed for by the wife, cannot be allowed.
The appellee herself established the presumption that
whatever the husband contributed toward the support of his
family, he gave out of what he earned from his commissions
and profession. In conformity, then, with the aforecited
decision on cassation, the debts contracted for and in the
exercise of such industry or profession cannot be considered
as his personal and private debts, nor can they be excepted
from payment out of the products or revenue of the wife's own
property, which, like that of her husband's, is liable for the
discharge of the marriage liabilities. So far were they from
being personal debts of the husband, that the wife herself
avers that the payment to Osmea of four or five thousand
pesos of the twenty-six and odd thousand pesos of the total
94
According to article 1384, the wife shall have the management
of her paraphernal property. Pursuant to article 1412, the
husband is the administrator of the community property of the
conjugal partnership and of the conjugal capital in general, and
we have already said that the fruits of the paraphernal property
form a part of the assets of the conjugal partnership (art.
1385). To confide the management of the property and of its
revenue to a receiver would be to deprive the husband and the
wife of their respective rights. In the case at bar, the wife has
given no cause for being deprived, nor has any reason
whatever been advanced for depriving her, of her right to
manage her own property. The same may be said of the
husband with respect to the community property of the
marriage. There is no reason to change the present status of
affairs. Neither has any sufficient reason been offered for the
appointment of a receiver, nor has any of the cases
enumerated in section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
been invoked.
Therefore, the appellant's petition for the appointment of a
receiver must be denied.
The lower court having failed to make any ruling on the
declaration and the appointment prayed for by appellant, the
judgment appealed from is reversed in so far as regards this
omission, and we hold that the fruits and revenue from the two
properties belonging to the wife, described in the judgment
appealed from, are liable for the payment of the debt owing by
the husband, the judgment debtor, and that there is no need
for the appointment of a receiver. Without special finding as to
costs, it is so ordered.
Torres, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56479 November 15, 1982
SOCORRO L. VDA. DE STA. ROMANA, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK and
HON. SANCHO Y. INSERTO, as Judge of Branch I, COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, respondents.
German M. Lopez for petitioner.
Tirol & Tirol Law Offices for private respondent.
VASQUEZ, J.:
In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioner seeks to annul
and set aside an Order of the respondent Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch I, which dismissed Civil Case
95
No. 13533, entitled Socorro L. Vda. de Sta. Romana, Plaintiff,
versus The Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, et al.,
Defendants. The petition was given due course in the
Resolution dated July 29, 1981 and the parties have submitted
their respective memoranda.
Civil Case No. 13533 is an offshoot of Civil Case No. 7678,
entitled "PCIB, et al. versus Ramon. Sta. Romana" which was
filed way back on August 6, 1968. Civil Case No. 7678 was an
action for rescission with damages filed by herein private
respondent PCIB as Administrator of the estate of the
deceased C.N. Hodges, and for the recovery of a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 1258-G which Ramon Sta. Romana
purchased from the late C. N. Hodges under a Contract to
Sell. On motion of private respondent PCIB, a writ of
preliminary attachment was issued in said case by virtue of
which the Sheriff levied on August 23, 1968 on the rights and
interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over Lot No. 1258-F and the
improvements existing thereon, which lot Ramon Sta. Romana
also purchased from C. N, Hodges under another Contract to
Sell. A third party claim was filed by a certain Emilio Sta.
Romana who claimed that Lot No. 1258-F and its
improvements had been sold to him by Ramon Sta. Romana
on August 16,1963.
The trial court rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 7678 on
June 16, 1975 rescinding the Contract to Sell and ordering
Ramon Sta. Romana to return the possession of Lot No. 1258G to the herein private respondent, as well as to pay rentals or
damages for use and occupation thereof. The decision was
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the same and
further ordered Ramon Sta. Romana to pay the land taxes and
the interest thereon.
On October 5, 1979, the trial judge issued a writ of execution
by virtue of which the Sheriff issued a notice of sale at public
96
she could not be bound by the judgment rendered in said case
and, consequently, the writ of attachment and the consequent
writ of execution which levied on Lot No. 1258-F, together with
its existing improvements, are null and void insofar as her
ONE-HALF (1/2) interest in said properties is concerned.
We find no merit in this contention of the petitioner.
The action filed by private respondent against the petitioner
Ramon Sta. Romana was clearly a suit to enforce an
obligation of the conjugal partnership. Civil Case No. 7678
arose out of the failure of Ramon Sta. Romana to pay the
purchase price of a lot he bought from C. N. Hodges
presumably in behalf of the conjugal partnership. Petitioner
does not deny the conjugal nature of both Lots Nos. 1258-G
and 1258-F. Indeed, she bases her contention on the claim
that at least Lot No. 1258-F, together with its improvements
existing thereon, constitutes property of the conjugal
partnership. It may not be denied, therefore, that the liability
incurred by Ramon Sta. Romana is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership assets, it being undisputed that the said
obligation was contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. (Art. 161 [1], Civil Code.)
The non-inclusion of the herein petitioner as a party-defendant
in Civil Case No. 7678 is immaterial. There is no rule or law
requiring that in a suit against the husband to enforce an
obligation, either pertaining to him alone or one chargeable
against the conjugal partnership, the defendant husband must
be joined by his wife. The contrary rule is prescribed in Section
4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113 of the Civil
Code, but not the other way around, obviously in recognition of
the legal status of the husband as the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. (Art. 112, Civil Code.) There was,
therefore, no need of including the petitioner as a party in Civil
Case No. 7678 for the purpose of binding the conjugal
97
6. That the herein movant having been not impleaded
in the case at bar; no jurisdiction over his person had
been vested in the proceedings; therefore whatever
acts of levy on the property of which she is or
presumed to be a co-owner and which has never been
liquidated yet is an ultra vires following a well-known
principle that a person who is not a party in a given
case cannot be reached by any process or order of the
given court;
7. Thus, the rule is well-settled in this jurisdiction
that"on the contention that at least one-half of the
conjugal partnership belongs to the husband, and
therefore could be validly levied upon to satisfy the
money judgment against said husband, it must be said
that as long as the conjugal partnership subsists, there
can be no one-half share of the husband or the wife.
Only when the conjugal partnership is dissolved and
liquidated between husband and wife. In the meantime,
the interest of each in the conjugal partnership property
is inchoate and is a mere expectancy. Therefore, any
levy on the conjugal partnership property to satisfy the
money judgment against the husband is null and void.
(Quintos Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila, 64 Phil. 116).
Conformably to the foregoing doctrine, it is therefore
respectfully submitted that the writ of execution, notice
of levy if one has been made and the notice of sale in
public auction are null and void. (Rollo, pp. 38-39.)
The respondent court ruled on this motion by issuing the Order
dated March 5, 1980 denying the same for lack of merit.
(Annex B, Petition, Rollo, p. 41.) The petitioner did not seek a
further review of the said order of denial either in the
respondent court or in any other tribunal; instead, she resorted
to the remedy of filing on June 10, 1980 Civil Case No. 13533.
98
requisites of res judicata being all present in the incident
concerning the issuance of the writ of execution, We feel no
hesitancy in declaring that the filing of Civil Case No. 13533 is
barred by the principle of res judicata, The underlying
philosophy of this doctrine is:
... that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the
same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial
has been given the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or
estat........ (2 Moran Rules of Court, p. 362, citing Sta.
Ana v. Narvades, L-24390, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA
454, 463.)
To sanction the filing of Civil Case No. 13533 is to nullify
altogether the proceedings had in connection with the
petitioner's motion to quash the writ of execution and the ruling
made by the respondent court thereon which had already
attained the status of finality.
In the least, the institution of Civil Case No. 13533 may be
deemed barred by the principle of conclusiveness of judgment
which is expressed in the Rules in the following terms:
Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order,
may be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or
their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
99
court issued its Order dated May 5, 1980 denying the
aforesaid Motion to Quash Execution for lack of merit (Ibid, p.
32), the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Ibid, pp.
33-34) which was opposedly the private respondent in writing
(Ibid, pp. 35-35-B) and which in turn a Reply to Opposition,
was filed by the petitioner (Ibid., pp. 36-38). In said motions,
oppositions and replies repeatedly filed by the parties, the
same issues sought to be reopened by the petitioner in Civil
Case No, 13533 had been fully and exhaustively ventilated. It
was in the basis of such exposure of those issues that the
respondent court issued its Order denying the motion to quash
the writ of execution, and also the Order denying a motion for
a reconsideration of the same.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the Orders of the
respondent Judge issued in Civil Case No. 13533 dated March
5, 1980 and May 15, 1980 are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs
against the petitioner.
SECOND DIVISION
SO ORDERED.
CUEVAS, J.:
100
Assailed and challenged in this Petition for Review is the
Decision dated April 29, 1977 of the then Court of Appeals in
its CA-G.R. No. SP-05920, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted.
The levy on execution dated February 11, 1976,
the sheriff's certificate of sale dated March 25,
1975 and final deed of sale, and the orders of
the respondent judge dated April 26, 1976, July
12, 1976 and August 26, 1976, are set aside
and declared null and void. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore in force is
made permanent. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent Luis R. Narciso is a businessman. He is
engaged in business as a producer and exporter of Philippine
mahogany logs and operates a logging concession at del
Gallego, Camarines Sur. He is legally married to the other
private respondent Josefina Salak Narciso.
Petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. upon the other hand, is a domestic
corporation engaged primarily in the business of leasing heavy
equipments such as tractors, bulldozers, and the like.
Sometime in February 26, 1973, private respondent Luis R.
Narciso entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment
with petitioner G-Tractors under the terms of which the latter
leased to the former tractors for the purpose of constructing
switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of Narciso's
logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur. The
contract provided for payment of rental for the use of said
tractors.
101
On March 5, 1975, Luis R. Narciso offered to redeem and/or
buy back all the personal properties sold to G-Tractors for the
same amount of P4,090.00 which the latter agreed and for
which a Deed of Reconveyance was executed by G-Tractors.
Likewise, on February 12, 1975, the Sheriff of Quezon City
made a levy on "all rights, interest, title, participation which the
defendant Luis R. Narciso" may have over a parcel of
residential land covered by TCT No. 120923 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City 2 which parcel of land is allegedly the
conjugal property of the spouses Luis R. Narciso and Josefina
Salak Narciso.
On February 22, 1975, the Sheriff notified the general public,
in his Notice of Sheriff's sale, that on March 25, 1975 he would
sell at public auction to the highest bidder for cash "the rights,
interest and participation of the aforementioned defendant Luis
R. Narciso in the aforesaid real estate property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 120923, together with all the
improvements existing thereon" to satisfy the aforementioned
writ of execution. 3
On March 25, 1975, a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to the
effect that "on said date (March 25, 1975) by virtue of the writ
of execution issued by the Honorable Ulpiano Sarmiento in
Civil Case No. Q-19173, the ex-oficio Sheriff of Quezon City
sold at public auction to the highest bidder (plaintiff G-Tractors,
Inc.) for P180,000.00 the real estate property covered by TCT
No. 120923, Quezon City, and levied upon on February 12,
1975, together with all the improvements thereon. 4 At that
time, however, TCT No. 120923 was mortgaged to Mercantile
Financing Corporation to guarantee an outstanding unpaid
account of Luis R. Narciso and his wife in the amount of
P74,327.52.
102
the entry and issuance of a new torrens title in the name of GTractors, Inc.
103
C To direct the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel TCT No. 218552 in the name of G-Tractors, Inc.
and to issue a new one in the name of petitionersspouses.
On April 29, 1977, the then Court of Appeals rendered its now
assailed Decision, annulling the levy on execution dated
February 11, 1975, the sheriff's certificate of sale dated March
25, 1975, as well as the sheriff's final deed of sale; and the
Orders dated April 26, July 12 and August 26,1976.
G-Tractors, Inc.'s motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the instant petition for Review on certiorari was filed
before this Court, petitioner contending that respondent Court
of Appeals erred
1. In holding that a levy on a residential land does not
include the residential house or any improvement
erected and existing thereon;
2. In holding that the judgment debt of private
respondent Luis R. Narciso, subject of Civil Case No.
Q-19173, entitled G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Luis R. Narciso,
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX
was not the conjugal debt of private respondentsspouses Luis R. Narciso and Josefina Salak Narciso;
3. In not holding that there was laches and delay in the
firing by private respondents-spouses of CA-G.R. No.
05920-SP with the respondent Court of Appeals.
4. In granting the writs applied for by private
respondents spouses in CA-G.R. No. 05920, the
petition itself not being the proper remedy.
The crucial issue that poses itself for our resolution in the
instant petition is-whether or not the judgment debt of private
respondent Luis R. Narciso is a conjugal debt for which the
conjugal partnership property can be held answerable.
Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal
partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.
There is no question that private respondent Luis R. Narciso is
engage in business as a producer and exporter of Philippine
mahogany logs. He operates a logging concession at del
Gallego, Camarines Sur and holds office right in the conjugal
dwelling at 208 Retiro Street, Talayan Village, Quezon City,
Metro Manila, where he and his family reside. His account with
petitioner G-Tractors, Inc. represents rentals for the use of
petitioner's tractors which he leased for the purpose of
constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite
of the logging concession at del Gallego, Camarines Sur which
is not his exclusive property but that of his family. There is no
doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought
about in order to enhance the productivity of said logging
business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the
right to embark the conjugal partnership.
This is the finding of the trial court and we find no cogent
reason to deviate therefrom. It held:
Lastly, the contention that the conjugal partnership is
not liable because the obligation contracted by the
husband is personal in nature is not applicable in this
104
case. The record shows that Luis R. Narciso is a
producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs and
that the bulldozers leased to him was used for the
construction of switchroads for logging. It is very clear,
therefore, that the obligations were contracted in
connection with his legitimate business as a producer
and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited
the conjugal partnership. Justice J.B.L. Reyes is very
liberal in interpreting Art. 161 of the Civil Code when he
declared in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. versus de Garcia
(30 SCRA 118) that the words in said article "all debts
and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership "do not require that
actual profit or benefit must accrue to the conjugal
partnership from the husband's transaction", but it
suffices that the transaction should be one that
normally would produce such benefit for the
partnership. 9
10
105
from C.N. Hodges presumably in behalf of the conjugal
partnership. Petitioner does not deny the conjugal
nature of both Lots Nos. 1258-G and 1258-F. Indeed,
she bases her contention on the claim that at least Lot
No. 1258-F, together with its improvements existing
thereon, constitutes property of the conjugal
partnership. It may not be denied, therefore, that the
liability incurred by Ramon Sta. Romana is chargeable
against the conjugal partnership assets, it being
undisputed that the said obligation was contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(Art. 161(l), Civil Code)
The non-inclusion of the herein petitioner as a partydefendant in Civil Case No. 7678 is immaterial. There
is no rule or law requiring that in a suit against the
husband to enforce an obligation, either pertaining to
him alone or one chargeable against the conjugal
partnership, the defendant husband must be joined by
his wife. The contrary rule is prescribed in Sec. 4, Rule
3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113 of the Civil
Code, but not the other way around, obviously in
recognition of the legal status of the husband as the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 112,
Civil Code) There was therefore, no need of including
the petitioner as a party in Civil Case No. 7678 for the
purpose of binding the conjugal partnership properties
for the satisfaction of the judgment that could be
rendered thereon. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the then Court of Appeals
sought to be reviewed is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-48889. May 11, 1989.]
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
(DBP), Petitioner,
v. THE HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Judge of the
Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and
SPOUSES PATRICIO CONFESOR and JOVITA
VILLAFUERTE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
SO ORDERED.
106
1. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; MAY BE
EXPRESSLY RENOUNCED OR WAIVED; CASE AT BAR.
The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. There is
no doubt that prescription has set in as to the first promissory
note of February 10, 1940. However, when respondent
Confesor executed the second promissory note on April 11,
1961 whereby he promised to pay the amount covered by the
previous promissory note on or before June 15, 1961, and
upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the
mortgage, said respondent thereby effectively and expressly
renounced and waived his right to the prescription of the action
covering the first promissory note. This is not a mere case of
acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new
promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new
promissory note is the pre-existing obligation under the first
promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but
does not discharge the debt.
2. ID.; FAMILY RELATIONS; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
GAINS; HUSBAND AS ADMINISTRATOR BINDS THE
PARTNERSHIP FOR ALL DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
CONTRACTED BY HIM. Under Article 165 of the Civil
Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No
doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second
promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
107
judgment, ordering the defendants Patricio Confesor and
Jovita Villafuerte Confesor to pay the plaintiff Development
Bank of the Philippines, jointly and severally, (a) the sum of
P5,760.96 plus additional daily interest of P1.04 from
September 17, 1970, the date Complaint was filed, until said
amount is paid; (b) the sum of P576.00 equivalent to ten (10%)
of the total claim by way of attorneys fees and incidental
expenses plus interest at the legal rate as of September 17,
1970, until fully paid; and (c) the costs of the suit."
Defendants-spouses appealed therefrom to the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on April 28, 1978 reversing the appealed decision
and dismissing the complaint and counter-claim with costs
against the plaintiff.
108
proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely
bars the remedy and does not discharge the debt, there is
something more than a mere moral obligation to support a
promise, to wit a pre-existing debt which is a sufficient
consideration for the new promise; the new promise upon this
sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of
action." 3
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
109
The Baristers Law Office for petitioners.
Simeon T. Agustin for private respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Before Us is a petition foe review of the decision, dated May
13, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 13122,
entitled Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. v. Leonardo Mariano
v. Amparo Gosiengfiao 1 raising as issue the distinction
between Article 1088 2 and Article 1620 3 of the Civil Code.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
It appears on record that the decedent Francisco
Gosiengfiao is the registered owner of a residential lot
located at Ugac Sur, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, particularly
described as follows, to wit:
"The eastern portion of Lot 1351, Tuguegarao
Cadastre, and after its segregation now
designated as Lot 1351-A, Plan PSD-67391,
with an area of 1,1346 square meters."
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2416
recorded in the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.
The lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to
the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao (designated as
Mortgagee bank, for brevity) on several occasions
before the last, being on March 9, 1956 and 29, 1958.
110
third-party defendants. She went to the Barangay
Captain and asked for a confrontation with defendants
Leonardo and Avelina Mariano to present her claim to
said property.
111
state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it is undisputed and supported by
records, that third-party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra
redeemed the propety in dispute within the one year
redemption period. Her redemption of the property,
even granting that the money used was from her own
personal funds did not make her the exclusive owner of
the mortgaged property owned in common but inured
to the benefit of all co-owners. It would have been
otherwise if third-party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra
purchased the said property from the mortgagee bank
(highest, bidder in the foreclosure sale) after the
redemption period had already expired and after the
mortgagee bank had consolidated it title in which case
there would no longer be any co-ownership to speak
of. 6
The decision of the Court of Appeals is supported by a long
line of case law which states that a redemption by a co-owner
within the period prescribed by law inures to the benefit of all
the other co-owners. 7
The main argument of petitioners in the case at bar is that the
Court of Appeals incorrectly applied Article 1620 of the Civil
Code, instead of Article 1088 of the same code which governs
legal redemption by co-heirs since the lot in question, which
forms part of the intestate estate of the late Francisco
Gosiengfiao, was never the subject of partition or distribution
among the heirs, thus, private respondents and third-party
defendants had not ceased to be co-heirs.
112
given a copy of the questioned deed of sale and shown a copy
of the document at the Office of the Barangay Captain
sometime November 18, 1982, this was not supported by the
evidence presented. On the contrary, respondent, Grace
Gosiengfiao, in her testimony, declared as follows:
A. Yes, I did.
11
113
kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the
intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or
any other means of information as sufficient to give the
effect of this notice, then there would have been no
necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the
New Civil Code that the said notice be made in writing
for, under the old law, a verbal notice or information
was sufficient. 14
Moreover, petitioners themselves adopted in their argument
respondents' allegation In their complaint that sometime on
October, 1982 they sought the redemption of the property from
spouses Leonardo Mariano and Avelina Tigue, by tendering
the repurchase money of P12,000.00, which the spouses
rejected. 15 Consequently, private respondents exercised their
right of redemption at the first opportunity they have by
tendering the repurchase price to petitioners. The complaint
they filed, before the Barangay Captain and then to the
Regional Trial Court was necessary to assert their rights. As
we learned in the case of Castillo, supra:
It would seem clear from the above that the
reimbursement to the purchaser within the period of
one month from the notice in writing is a requisite or
condition precedent to the exercise of the right of legal
redemption; the bringing of an action in court is the
remedy to enforce that right in case the purchaser
refuses the redemption. The first must be done within
the month-period; the second within the prescriptive
period provided in the Statute of Limitation. 16
The ruling in Castillo v. Samonte; supra, was reiterated in the
case of Garcia v. Calaliman, where We also discussed the
reason for the requirement of the written notice. We said:
114
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., ponente, Justices Ricardo J.
Francisco and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago concurring.
2 Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights
to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may
be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing
him for the price of the sale, provided they so within the period
of the month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale by the vendor.
3 Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of
any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only
a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of
redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share
they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
4 Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 71-73.
5 Rollo pp. 67-68.
6 Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 74-75.
7 Annie Tan v. C.A., G.R. No. 79899, 172 SCRA 660 (1989);
Adille v. C.A., G.R. No. 44546, 157 SCRA 445 (1988); De
Guzman v. C.A., G.R. No. 47378, 148 SCRA 75 (1987).
8 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, pp. 607608, citing Manresa at p. 777.
9 16 SCRA 775 (1966).
10 Id., at pp. 779-780.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25659
FERNANDO, J.:
115
The crucial question in this petition for the review of a decision
of the Court of Appeals, to be passed upon for the first time, is
whether or not a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any
showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company. The
Court of Appeals held that it could not. Petitioner Luzon Surety
Co., Inc., dissatisfied with such a judgment, which was an
affirmance of a lower court decision, would have us reverse.
We do not see it that way. The Court of Appeals adjudicated
the matter in accordance with law. We affirm what it did.
As noted in the brief of petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc., on
October 18, 1960, a suit for injunction was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental against its Provincial
Sheriff by respondents-spouses, Josefa Aguirre de Garcia and
Vicente Garcia "to enjoin [such Sheriff] from selling the sugar
allegedly owned by their conjugal partnership, pursuant to a
writ of garnishment issued by virtue of a writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. 3893 of the same Court of First
Instance ... against the respondent Vicente Garcia ... ."1
There was a stipulation of facts submitted. There is no
question as to one Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and
petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc., executing a surety bond in
favor of the Philippine National Bank, Victorias Branch, to
guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Ladislao Chavez
in the sum of P9,000.00. On or about the same date, Vicente
Garcia, together with the said Ladislao Chavez and one
Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity
agreement wherein they bound themselves, jointly and
severally, to indemnify now petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes,
penalties, charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and
nature which the petitioner may at any time sustain or incur in
consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond, to
116
them.2 The suit for injunction filed by the Garcia spouses was
the result.
As noted, the lower court found in their favor. In its decision of
April 30, 1962, it declared that the garnishment in question
was contrary to Article 161 of the Civil Code and granted their
petition, making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
Luzon Surety, Inc. elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals,
which, as mentioned at the outset, likewise reached the same
result. Hence this petition for review.
We reiterate what was set forth at the opening of this opinion.
There is no reason for a reversal of the judgment. The decision
sought to be reviewed is in accordance with law.
117
to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. So
it is in this case. That is how the Court of Appeals acted, and
what it did cannot be impugned for being contrary to law.5
Moreover, it would negate the plain object of the additional
requirement in the present Civil Code that a debt contracted by
the husband to bind a conjugal partnership must redound to its
benefit. That is still another provision indicative of the
solicitude and tender regard that the law manifests for the
family as a unit. Its interest is paramount; its welfare
uppermost in the minds of the codifiers and legislators.
This particular codal provision in question rightfully
emphasizes the responsibility of the husband as
administrator.6He is supposed to conserve and, if possible,
augment the funds of the conjugal partnership, not dissipate
them. If out of friendship or misplaced generosity on his part
the conjugal partnership would be saddled with financial
burden, then the family stands to suffer. No objection need
arise if the obligation thus contracted by him could be shown
to be for the benefit of the wife and the progeny if any there
be. That is but fair and just. Certainly, however, to make a
conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the
avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost
concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a
unit.7 The husband, therefore, as is wisely thus made certain,
is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted
risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.
No useful purpose would be served by petitioner assigning as
one of the errors the observation made by the Court of
Appeals as to the husband's interest in the conjugal property
being merely inchoate or a mere expectancy in view of the
conclusion thus reached as to the absence of any liability on
the part of the conjugal partnership. Nor was it error for the
Separate Opinions
REYES, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, but would like to make of record that, in
my opinion, the words "all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" used in
Article 161 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in describing the
charges and obligations for which the conjugal partnership is
liable, do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to
the conjugal partnership from the husband's transactions; but
that it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally
118
would produce such benefit for the partnership. This is the
ratio behind our ruling in Javier vs. Osmea, 34 Phil. 336, that
obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his
profession are collectible from the conjugal partnership.
Footnotes
1
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61464 May 28, 1988
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO
YULO, LILY YULO (doing business under the name and
style of A & L INDUSTRIES), respondents.
119
instituted by the petitioner and ordering it to pay damages on
the basis of the private respondent's counterclaim.
proceeds for their own use and benefit, without the knowledge
or consent of the petitioner.
The trial court issued the writ of attachment prayed for thereby
enabling the petitioner to attach the properties of A & L
Industries. Apparently not contented with the order, the
petitioner filed another motion for the examination of
attachment debtor, alleging that the properties attached by the
sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered by it in the case. This was
likewise granted by the court.
120
The petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision except for the exemplary damages which
it reduced from P300,000.00 to P150,000.00 and the
attorney's fees which were reduced from P30,000.00 to
P20,000.00.
121
the appellate courts who merely have to rely on the
recorded proceedings which transpired in the court
below, and the records are bare of any circumstance of
weight, which the trial court had overlooked and which
if duly considered, may radically affect the outcome of
the case.
On the other hand, the appellee Lily Yulo, to back up
her claim of forgery of her signature in Exhibit B-1,
presented in court a handwriting expert witness in the
person of Police Captain Yakal Giron of the Integrated
National Police Training Command, and who is also a
Document Examiner of the same Command's Crime
Laboratory at Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila. His
experience as an examiner of questioned and disputed
documents, in our mind, is quite impressive. To qualify
him as a handwriting expert, he declared that he
underwent extensive and actual studies and
examination of disputed or questioned document, both
at the National Bureau of Investigation Academy and
National Bureau of Investigation Questioned Document
Laboratory, respectively, from July 1964, up to his
appointment as Document Examiner in June, 1975,
and, to further his experience along this line, he
attended the 297th Annual Conference of the American
Society of Questioned Docurnent Examiners held at
Seattle, Washington, in August 1971, as a
representative of the Philippines, and likewise
conducted an observation of the present and modern
trends of crime laboratories in the West Coast, U.S.A.,
in 1971; that he likewise had conducted actual tests
and examination of about 100,000 documents, as
requested by the different courts, administrative, and
governmental agencies of the Government, substantial
portions of which relate to actual court cases.
122
belongs exclusively to respondent Lily Yulo, namely: a) The
Certificate of Registration of A & L Industries, issued by the
Bureau of Commerce, showing that said business is a single
proprietorship, and that the registered owner thereof is only
Lily Yulo; b) The Mayor's Permit issued in favor of A & L
Industries, by the Caloocan City Mayor's Office showing
compliance by said single proprietorship company with the
City Ordinance governing business establishments; and c) The
Special Power of Attorney itself, assuming but without
admitting its due execution, is tangible proof that Augusto Yulo
has no interest whatsoever in the A & L Industries, otherwise,
there would have been no necessity for the Special Power of
Attorney if he is a part owner of said single proprietorship.
With regard to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the findings of the trial court that there was bad faith
on the part of the petitioner as to entitle the private respondent
to damages as shown not only by the fact that the petitioner
did not present the Deed of Assignment or the construction
agreement or any evidence whatsoever to support its claim of
fraud on the part of the private respondent and to justify the
issuance of a preliminary attachment, but also by the following
findings:
Continuing and elaborating further on the
appellant's mala fide actuations in securing the writ of
attachment, the lower court stated as follows:
Plaintiff not satisfied with the instant case where
an order for attachment has already been
issued and enforced, on the strength of the
same Promissory Note (Exhibit"A"), utilizing the
Deed of Chattel Mortgage (Exhibit "4"), filed a
foreclosure proceedings before the Office of the
Sheriff of Caloocan (Exhibit"6") foreclosing the
remaining properties found inside the premises
123
bad faith and malice on the part of plaintiff
which may warrant the award of damages in
favor of defendant Lily Yulo. (Ibid., pp. 102103).<re||an1w>
124
When a writing is offered as a standard of comparison
it is for the presiding judge to decide whether it is the
handwriting of the party to be charged. Unless his
finding is founded upon error of law, or upon evidence
which is, as matter of law, insufficient to justify the
finding, this court will not revise it upon exceptions."
(Costelo v. Crowell, 139 Mass. 588, 590, 2 N.E. 648;
Nuez v. Perry, 113 Mass, 274, 276.)
We cannot find any error on the part of the trial judge in using
the above documents as standards and also in giving
credence to the expert witness presented by the private
respondent whose testimony the petitioner failed to rebut and
whose credibility it likewise failed to impeach. But more
important is the fact that the unrebutted handwriting expert's
testimony noted twelve (12) glaring and material differences in
the alleged signature of the private respondent in the Special
Power of Attorney as compared with the specimen signatures,
something which the appellate court also took into account.
In Cesar v. Sandiganbayan (134 SCRA 105, 132), we ruled:
Mr. Maniwang pointed to other significant divergences
and distinctive characteristics between the sample
signatures and the signatures on the questioned
checks in his report which the court's Presiding Justice
kept mentioning during Maniwang's testimony.
In the course of his cross-examination, NBI expert
Tabayoyong admitted that he saw the differences
between the exemplars used and the questioned
signatures but he dismissed the differences because
he did not consider them fundamental. We rule that
significant differences are more fundamental than a few
similarities. A forger always strives to master some
similarities.
125
chargeable against the conjugal property are those
incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career,
profession or business with the honest belief that he is
doing right for the benefit of the family. This is not true
in the case at bar for we believe that the husband in
acting as guarantor or surety for another in an
indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did
not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Such
inference is more emphatic in this case, when no proof
is presented that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or
guarantor received consideration therefore, which may
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.(Ibid,
pp. 46-47).
xxx xxx xxx
126
SE 362; Pittsburg etc. 5 Wakefield, etc., 135 NC 73, 47
SE 234). ...
The question before us, therefore, is whether the attachment
of the properties of A & L Industries was wrongful so as to
entitle the petitioner to actual damages only or whether the
said attachment was made in bad faith and with malice to
warrant the award of other kinds of damages. Moreover, if the
private respondent is entitled only to actual damages, was the
court justified in ordering the petitioner to pay for the value of
the attached properties instead of ordering the return of the
said properties to the private respondent Yulo ?
Both the trial and appellate courts found that there was bad
faith on the part of the petitioner in securing the writ of
attachment. We do not think so. "An attachment may be said
to be wrongful when, for instance, the plaintiff has no cause of
action, or that there is no true ground therefore, or that the
plaintiff has a sufficient security other than the property
attached, which is tantamout to saying that the plaintiff is not
entitled to attachment because the requirements of entitling
him to the writ are wanting. (7 C.J.S., 664)" (p. 48, Section 4,
Rule 57, Francisco, Revised Rules of Court).
Although the petitioner failed to prove the ground relied upon
for the issuance of the writ of attachment, this failure cannot be
equated with bad faith or malicious intent. The steps which
were taken by the petitioner to ensure the security of its claim
were premised, on the firm belief that the properties involved
could be made answerable for the unpaid obligation due it.
There is no question that a loan in the amount of P591,003.59
was borrowed from the bank.
We, thus, find that the petitioner is liable only for actual
damages and not for exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Respondent Lily Yulo has manifested before this Court that
127
THOUSAND PESOS (P660,000.00) as actual damages. The
remaining properties subject of the attachment are ordered
released in favor of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25355
128
indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife "after the
responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered,"
in the absence of any separate property of the offending
spouse or its insufficiency. 1 How such an obligation "may be
enforced against the partnership assets" is the question, one
of first impression, raised in this appeal from a lower court
order, based on the assumption of the total exemption of the
conjugal partnership from the liability thus incurred, prior to the
stage of liquidation. The result was to set aside the preliminary
attachment and thereafter the writ of execution in favor of the
heirs of the murdered victim, appellants before us, the
judgment against the accused imposing not only the penalty of
reclusion perpetua but also the indemnification to such heirs
having attained the status of finality. In view of the failure,
apparent on the face of the appealed order, to respect what
the Civil Code ordains, we reverse and remand the case for
further proceedings.
The brief of appellants, the heirs of Pelagio Cagro, the
murdered victim, discloses that on February 19, 1960 an
information was filed against the accused, Froilan Lagrimas,
for the above murder committed on February 15, 1960 in
Pambujan, Samar. Thereafter, appellants as such heirs, filed
on February 27, 1960 a motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment on the property of the accused, such
motion being granted in an order of March 5, 1960. After trial,
the lower court found the accused guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the appellants as such heirs in the
sum of P6,000.00 plus the additional sum of P10,000.00 in the
concept of damages, attorney's fees and burial expenses. An
appeal from the judgment was elevated to this Court by the
accused but thereafter withdrawn, the judgment, therefore,
becoming final on October 11, 1962.
129
take place only after the dissolution of the partnership thru the
occurrence of any of the causes mentioned in article 175 of
the same Code, one of which is death of one of the spouses.
Since both are still living there cannot be any dissolution,
imprisonment for life of the husband notwithstanding, in the
absence of a judicial separation of properly decreed in
accordance with the provisions of article 191 thereof.
Moreover, the fines and indemnities sought to be charged
against the ganancial properties of the accused and his wife
are not such debts and obligations contracted by said
accused for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." 2
The conclusion arrived at by Judge Mangosing follows: "We
sympathize with the predicament of the widow and other heirs
of the deceased Pelagio Cagro, but the law is clear on the
matter. The indemnities adjudged by the Court in their favor
may only be charged against the exclusive properties of the
accused if he has any, or against his share in the partnership
assets after liquidation thereof if any still remains after the
payment of all the items enumerated in article 161 of the said
Civil Code." 3
Hence, this appeal, the heirs of Pelagio Cagro assigning as
sole error the quashing and annulling of the writs of
attachment and execution aforesaid. As stated at the outset,
we find the appeal meritorious.
The applicable Civil Code provision 4 is not lacking in
explicitness. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either
husband or wife "may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have
been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; ... ." It is quite
plain, therefore, that the period during which such a liability
may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is
still existing. The law speaks of "partnership assets." It
130
The next question is how practical effect would be given this
particular liability of the conjugal partnership for the payment of
fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife? In
the brief for appellants, the heirs of Pelagio Cagro, they seek
the opportunity to present evidence as to how the partnership
assets could be made to respond, this on the assumption that
the property levied upon does not belong exclusively to the
convicted spouse.
In Lacson v. Diaz, 6 which deals with the satisfaction of the
debt contracted by husband or wife before marriage by the
conjugal partnership, likewise included in this particular article,
it was held: "Considering that the enforceability of the personal
obligations of the husband or wife, against the conjugal assets,
forms the exception to the general rule, it is incumbent upon
the one who invokes this provision or the creditor to show that
the requisites for its applicability are obtaining."
Without departing from the principle thus announced, we make
this further observation. Considering that the obligations
mentioned in Article 161 are peculiarly within the knowledge of
the husband or of the wife whose conjugal partnership is made
liable, the proof required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity
should not be of the most exacting kind, ordinary credibility
sufficing. Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case may
be, representing the conjugal partnership, may find the
temptation to magnify its obligation irresistible so as to defeat
the right of recovery of the family of the offended party. That
result is to be avoided. The lower court should be on the alert,
therefore, in the appraisal of whatever evidence may be
offered to assure compliance with this codal provision.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of August 7, 1965 is set
aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for the
reception of evidence in accordance with this opinion. With
costs against appellee Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas.
131
the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to
complete a professional, vocational or other course."
2
SECOND DIVISION
SECURITY BANK and TRUST G.R. No. 143382
COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Present:
-versusMAR TIERRA
CORPORATION,
WILFRIDO C.
MARTINEZ,
MIGUEL J. LACSON
and
RICARDO A. LOPA,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
132
November 29, 2006
x----------- ---------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity
agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third
party?
This issue confronts us in this petition for review on
certiorari assailing the November 9, 1999 decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48107.
On May 7, 1980, respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its
president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit
accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company.
Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line
agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an
indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C.
Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound
themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the
payment of the loan.
On July 2, 1980, the credit line agreement was amended and
increased to P14,000,000. Individual respondents correspondingly
executed a new indemnity agreement in favor of the bank to secure
the increased credit line.
On September 25, 1981, respondent corporation availed of
its credit line and received the sum of P9,952,000 which it undertook
to pay on or before November 30, 1981. It was able to
pay P4,648,000 for the principal loan and P2,729,195.56 for the
interest and other charges. However, respondent corporation was not
133
were wrong in ruling that the conjugal partnership of the Martinez
spouses could not be held liable for the obligation incurred by
individual respondent Martinez.
We uphold the CA.
Factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court,
will not be disturbed on appeal but must be accorded great weight.
[4]
These findings are conclusive not only on the parties but on this
Court as well.[5]
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the amount
availed of by respondent corporation from its credit line with
petitioner was only P9,952,000. Both courts correctly pointed out
that petitioner itself admitted this amount when it alleged in
paragraph seven of its complaint that respondent corporation
borrowed and received the principal sum of P9,952,000.[6] Petitioner
was therefore bound by the factual finding of the appellate and trial
courts, as well as by its own judicial admission, on this particular
point.
At any rate, the issue of the amount actually availed of by
respondent corporation is factual. It is not within the ambit of this
Courts discretionary power of judicial review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which is concerned solely with questions of law.[7]
We now move on to the principal issue in this case.
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code,[8] the conjugal
partnership is liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. But when are
debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone considered for
the benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal
partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract
entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the
contemplation of the said provision?
134
conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the
transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation
pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil
Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit.
[15]
The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the
conjugal partnership.[16] Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal
partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
[10]
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983
EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND
VICENTE V. FELIPE, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON, NAMELY: GIMENA
ALMOSARA, SOFIA ALDON, SALVADOR ALDON, AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Romulo D. San Juan for petitioner.
Gerundino Castillejo for private respondent.
135
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The
spouses bought several pieces of land sometime between
1948 and 1950. In 1960-62, the lands were divided into three
lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415 of the San Jacinto Public Land
Subdivision, San Jacinto, Masbate.
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses
Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe. The sale was made
without the consent of her husband, Maximo.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his
widow Gimena and their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Masbate
against the Felipes. The complaint which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 2372 alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners
of Lots 1370, 1371 and 1415; that they had orally mortgaged
the same to the defendants; and an offer to redeem the
mortgage had been refused so they filed the complaint in order
to recover the three parcels of land.
The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from
the plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent delivery to them.
The trial court sustained the claim of the defendants and
rendered the following judgment:
a. declaring the defendants to be the lawful owners of
the property subject of the present litigation;
b. declaring the complaint in the present action to be
without merit and is therefore hereby ordered
dismissed;
136
property because of a loan or mortgage or antichresis
and that what really transpired was the execution of a
contract of sale thru a private document designated as
a 'Deed of Purchase and Sale' (Exhibit 1), the
execution having been made by Gimena Almosara in
favor of appellee Hermogena V. Felipe.
After a study of this case, we have come to the
conclusion that the appellants are entitled to recover
the ownership of the lots in question. We so hold
because although Exh. 1 concerning the sale made in
1951 of the disputed lots is, in Our opinion, not a
forgery the fact is that the sale made by Gimena
Almosara is invalid, having been executed without the
needed consent of her husband, the lots being
conjugal. Appellees' argument that this was an issue
not raised in the pleadings is baseless, considering the
fact that the complaint alleges that the parcels 'were
purchased by plaintiff Gimena Almosara and her late
husband Maximo Aldon' (the lots having been
purchased during the existence of the marriage, the
same are presumed conjugal) and inferentially, by force
of law, could not, be disposed of by a wife without her
husband's consent.
The defendants are now the appellants in this petition for
review. They invoke several grounds in seeking the reversal of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. One of the grounds is
factual in nature; petitioners claim that "respondent Court of
Appeals has found as a fact that the 'Deed of Purchase and
Sale' executed by respondent Gimena Almosara is not a
forgery and therefore its authenticity and due execution is
already beyond question." We cannot consider this ground
because as a rule only questions of law are reviewed in
proceedings under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court subject to
well-defined exceptions not present in the instant case.
137
entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when
such consent is required, are annullable at her instance during
the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code.)
Gimena's contract is not rescissible for in such contract all the
essential elements are untainted but Gimena's consent was
tainted. Neither can the contract be classified as
unenforceable because it does not fit any of those described in
Art. 1403 of the Civil Code. And finally, the contract cannot be
void or inexistent because it is not one of those mentioned in
Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. By process of elimination, it must
perforce be a voidable contract.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by
her husband only during the marriage because he was the
victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was
the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its
annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the
annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted
because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not
improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do during
the marriage, she could not do thereafter.
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the
death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the
defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their
hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The
father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is
two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
138
consider appellees' possession in bad faith as a
possession in the concept of owners, this possession
at the earliest started in 1951, hence the period for
extraordinary prescription (30 years) had not yet lapsed
when the present action was instituted on April 26,
1976.
As to the second question, the children's cause of action
accrued from the death of their father in 1959 and they had
thirty (30) years to institute it (Art. 1141, Civil Code.) They filed
action in 1976 which is well within the period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
modified. Judgment is entered awarding to Sofia and Salvador
Aldon their shares of the lands as stated in the body of this
decision; and the petitioners as possessors in bad faith shall
make an accounting of the fruits corresponding to the share
aforementioned from 1959 and solidarity pay their value to
Sofia and Salvador Aldon; costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 92245
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The issue is whether the wife's sale in
1651 of an unregistered sixteen-hectare conjugal land, without
the consent of her husband (he died in 1959), can be annulled
in 1976 by the wife and her two children.
139
PARAS, J.:
The only issue before Us is whether or not a husband, as the
administrator of the conjugal partnership, may legally enter
into a contract of lease involving conjugal real property without
the knowledge and consent of the wife.
According to the Decision * rendered by the respondent Court
of Appeals, the pertinent facts of the case as alleged in
plaintiff-petitioner's complaint indicate:
1. That plaintiff is of legal age, married but living
separately from husband, one of the defendants herein
and presently residing at No. 4 Ambrocia St., Quezon
City; while defendant Antonio S. Roxas is likewise of
legal age and living separately from his wife, plaintiff
herein, with residence at No. 950 Quirino Highway,
Novaliches, Quezon City where he may be served with
summons; and defendant Antonio M. Cayetano is of
legal age and residing at No. 28 Mariano Olondriz
Street, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila where he
may be served with summons;
2. That only recently, plaintiff discovered that her
estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas, had
entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio
M. Cayetano sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a
portion of their conjugal lot situated at 854 Quirino
Highway, Novaliches, Quezon City, described in T.C.T.
No. 378197 (formerly T.C.T. No. 23881) of the Land
Registry for Quezon City without her previous
knowledge, much less her marital consent-xerox; copy
of which lease contract is hereto attached as Annex
"A", and made an integral part hereof.
140
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband is
the administrator of the conjugal partnership," in view of the
fact that the husband is principally responsible for the support
of the wife and the rest of the family. If the conjugal partnership
does not have enough assets, it is the husband's capital that is
responsible for such support, not the paraphernal property.
Responsibility should carry authority with it.
The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a mere
administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or otherwise
alienate the property being administered, the husband can do
so in certain cases allowed by law. He is not required by law to
render an accounting. Acts done under administration do not
need the prior consent of the wife.
However, administration does not include acts of ownership.
For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets
unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal
realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the wife has been
declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to
give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the
141
same." This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband,
and guarantees the rights of the wife, who is partly responsible
for the acquisition of the property, particularly the real property.
Contracts entered into by the husband in violation of this
prohibition are voidable and subject to annulment at the
instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code)
As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, the word "alienation"
means 'the transfer of the property and possession of lands,
tenements, or other things from one person to another . . . The
act by which the title to real estate is voluntarily assigned by
one person to another and accepted by the latter, in the form
prescribed by law. Cf. In re Enrhardt U.S.D.C. 19 F. 2d 406,
407 . . . ." While encumbrance "has been defined to be every
right to, or interest in, the land which may subsist in third
persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but
consistent with the passing of the fee by the conveyance; any
(act) that impairs the use or transfer of property or real estate .
. ." (42 C.J.S., p. 549).
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease is an
encumbrance and/or alienation within the scope of Art. 166 of
the New Civil Code.
Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things,
one of the parties binds himself to give to another the
enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period
which may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease for
more than ninety-nine years shall be valid." Under the law,
lease is a grant of use and possession: it is not only a grant of
possession as opined by the Court of Appeals. The right to
possess does not always include the right to use. For while the
bailee in the contract of deposit holds the property in trust, he
is not granted by law the right to make use of the property in
deposit.
142
In the case at bar, the allegation in paragraph 2 of the
complaint indicates that petitioner's estranged husband,
defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered into a contract of
lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her marital
consent being secured as required by law under Art. 166 of the
Civil Code. Petitioner, therefore, has a cause of action under
Art. 173 to file a case for annulment of the contract of lease
entered into without her consent. Petitioner has a cause of
action not only against her husband but also against the
lessee, Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of
lease.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and this case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005]
Footnotes
* Penned by Justice Jorge S. Imperial, and concurred
in by Justices Reynato S. Puno and Artemon D. Luna.
143
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June
3, 2002, which affirmed with modification the October 18,
1997 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San
Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San
Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The
subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes
under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-2802. The
Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion
of his wife.[3]
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth
Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured
by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City.
Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the
amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor,
Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the
SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge
and consent of respondent.[4]
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on
the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the
highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property
being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president,
consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6,
1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of
Absolute Sale.[5]
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December
20, 1995. In one of her visits to the subject property,
respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a
certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a
Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play
with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in
nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, San Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97)
for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale,
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered
a Decision on October 18, 1997. The dispositive portion
thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,theplaintiffhavingprovedbythepreponderanceof
evidencetheallegationsoftheComplaint,theCourtfindsforthe
plaintiffandherebyorders:
ONTHEFIRSTCAUSEOFACTION:
1.Thedeclarationofthefollowingdocumentsasnullandvoid:
144
(a)TheDeedofRealEstateMortgagedatedDecember1,
1993executedbeforeNotaryPublicRomuloUrreaand
hisnotarialregisterenteredasDoc.No.212;PageNo.
44,BookNo.XXI,Seriesof1993.
(b)TheCertificateofSaleexecutedbyNotaryPublic
ReynaldoAlcantaraonApril20,1995.
(c)TheAffidavitofConsolidationofOwnershipexecuted
bythedefendant
(c)TheAffidavitofConsolidationofOwnershipexecuted
bythedefendantovertheresidentiallotlocatedatBrgy.
SanFrancisco,SanPabloCity,coveredbyARPNo.95
0911236enteredasDoc.No.406;PageNo.83,Book
No.III,Seriesof1996ofNotaryPublicOctavioM.
Zayas.
(d)TheassessmentofrealpropertyNo.950511236.
2.Thedefendantisorderedtoreconveythepropertysubjectofthis
complainttotheplaintiff.
ONTHESECONDCAUSEOFACTION
1.ThedefendanttopaytheplaintiffthesumofP40,000.00
representingthevalueofthecarwhichwasburned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
1.ThedefendanttopaytheplaintiffthesumofP25,000.00as
attorneysfees;
2.ThedefendanttopayplaintiffP25,000.00asmoraldamages;
3.ThedefendanttopaytheplaintiffthesumofP10,000.00as
exemplarydamages;
4.Topaythecostofthesuit.
Thecounterclaimisdismissed.
SOORDERED.[6]
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts finding that the subject
property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject
property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo
belongs to their conjugal partnership.[7] The appellate court
declared as void the mortgage on the subject property
because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent
of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family
Code. Thus, it upheld the trial courts order to reconvey the
subject property to respondent.[8] With respect to the damage
to respondents car, the appellate court found petitioner to be
liable therefor because it is responsible for the consequences
of the acts or omissions of the person it hired to accomplish
the assigned task.[9] All told, the appellate court affirmed the
trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and
attorneys fees for lack of basis.[10]
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this
Courts consideration:
1.WHETHERORNOTTHEMORTGAGECONSTITUTEDBY
THELATEMARCELINODAILO,JR.ONTHESUBJECT
PROPERTYASCOOWNERTHEREOFISVALIDASTOHIS
UNDIVIDEDSHARE.
145
2.WHETHERORNOTTHECONJUGALPARTNERSHIPIS
LIABLEFORTHEPAYMENTOFTHELOANOBTAINEDBY
THELATEMARCELINODAILO,JR.THESAMEHAVING
REDOUNDEDTOTHEBENEFITOFTHEFAMILY.[11]
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision
applicable to the factual milieu of this case. It contends that
Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation
to Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART.493.Eachcoownershallhavethefullownershipofhispart
andofthefruitsandbenefitspertainingthereto,andhemaytherefore
alienate,assignormortgageit,andevensubstituteanotherpersonin
itsenjoyment,exceptwhenpersonalrightsareinvolved.Butthe
effectofthealienationorthemortgage,withrespecttotheco
owners,shallbelimitedtotheportionwhichmaybeallottedtohim
inthedivisionupontheterminationofthecoownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART.124.Theadministrationandenjoymentoftheconjugal
partnershippropertyshallbelongtobothspousesjointly....
Intheeventthatonespouseisincapacitatedorotherwiseunableto
participateintheadministrationoftheconjugalproperties,theother
spousemayassumesolepowersofadministration.Thesepowersdo
notincludethepowersofdispositionorencumbrancewhichmust
havetheauthorityofthecourtorthewrittenconsentoftheother
spouse.Intheabsenceofsuchauthorityorconsent,thedispositionor
encumbranceshallbevoid....
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family
Code requires the consent of the other spouse to the
mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could
not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from
146
wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner,[18] the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with
what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal
partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements.[19] Thus, the property relations of respondent and
her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code.
In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code
provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is
silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime,
without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject
property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By
express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to
the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on coownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the
law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.[20] Thus,
both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in
declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject
property for lack of respondents consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of
the principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to
the benefit of the family.[21]
147
loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below,
he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to
permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party
but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process.[25] A party may change his legal
theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would
not require presentation of any further evidence by the
adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno,
(Chairman),
Austria-Martinez,
Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1]
Callejo,
[2]
[3]
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
As quoted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 12; Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[7]
[8]
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
[11]
Rollo, p. 24.
[12]
Rollo, p. 26.
[13]
[14]
Id. at 374.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
Rollo, p. 27.
148
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19565
CASTRO, J.:
149
The net gain of the Philippine Texboard Factory, the principal
business of the spouses, was P90,454.48 for the year 1957.
As of December 31, 1959, the total assets of the various
enterprises of the conjugal partnership were valued at
P1,021,407.68, not including those of the Top Service Inc., of
which firm the defendant has been the president since its
organization in 1959 in Manila with a paid-up capital of
P50,000, P10,000 of which was contributed by him. This
corporation was the Beverly Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal,
the Golden Acres Subdivision and the Green Valley
Subdivision in Las Pias, Rizal, and a lot and building located
at M. H. del Pilar, Manila purchased for P285,000, an amount
borrowed from the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company.
The spouses are indebted to the Philippine National Bank and
the Development Bank of the Philippines for loans obtained, to
secure which they mortgaged the Philippine Texboard Factory,
the Silay hacienda, their conjugal house, and all their parcels
of land located in Bacolod City.
The essential issues of fact may be gleaned from the nine
errors the defendant imputes to the court a quo, namely,
1. In finding that the only visit, from May 15, 1955 to the
rendition of the decision, made by the defendant to the
conjugal abode to see his wife was on June 15, 1955;
2. In finding that the letter exh. 3 was written by one
Nenita Hernandez and that she and the defendant are
living as husband and wife;
3. In finding that since 1951 the relations between the
plaintiff and the defendant were far from cordial, and
that it was from 1948 that the former has been
receiving an allowance from the latter;
150
the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in
the conjugal home at 2nd Street, Bacolod City. Since 1955 the
defendant had not slept in the conjugal dwelling, although in
the said year he paid short visits during which they engaged in
brief conversations. After 1955 up to the time of the trial, the
defendant had never visited the conjugal abode, and when he
was in Bacolod, she was denied communication with him. He
has abandoned her and their children, to live in Manila with his
concubine, Nenita Hernandez. In 1949 she began to suspect
the existence of illicit relations between her husband and
Nenita. This suspicion was confirmed in 1951 when she found
an unsigned note in a pocket of one of her husband's polo shirt
which was written by Nenita and in which she asked "Bering"
to meet her near the church. She confronted her husband who
forthwith tore the note even as he admitted his amorous liaison
with Nenita. He then allayed her fears by vowing to forsake his
mistress. Subsequently, in November 1951, she found in the
iron safe of her husband a letter, exh. C, also written by
Nenita. In this letter the sender (who signed as "D") apologized
for her conduct, and expressed the hope that the addressee
("Darling") could join her in Baguio as she was alone in the
Patria Inn and lonely in "a place for honeymooners".
Immediately after her husband departed for Manila the
following morning, the plaintiff enplaned for Baguio, where she
learned that Nenita had actually stayed at the Patria Inn, but
had already left for Manila before her arrival. Later she met her
husband in the house of a relative in Manila from whence they
proceeded to the Avenue Hotel where she again confronted
him about Nenita. He denied having further relations with this
woman.
Celia Baez, testifying for the plaintiff, declared that she was
employed as a cook in the home of the spouses from May 15,
1955 to August 15, 1958, and that during the entire period of
her employment she saw the defendant in the place only once.
This declaration is contradicted, however, by the plaintiff
151
from P1,200 to P1,500 a month. He financed the education of
their children, two of whom were studying in Manila at the time
of the trial and were not living with the plaintiff. While in
Bacolod City, he never failed to visit his family, particularly the
children. His wife was always in bad need of money because
she playedmahjong, an accusation which she did not traverse,
explaining that she played mahjong to entertain herself and
forget the infidelities of her husband.
Marcos V. Ganaban, the manager of the Philippine Texboard
Factory, corroborated the testimony of the defendant on the
matter of the support the latter gave to his family, by declaring
in court that since the start of his employment in 1950 as
assistant general manager, the plaintiff has been drawing an
allowance of P1,000 to P1,500 monthly, which amount was
given personally by the defendant or, in his absence, by the
witness himself.
The defendant denied that he ever maintained a mistress in
Manila. He came to know Nenita Hernandez when she was
barely 12 years old, but had lost track of her thereafter. His
constant presence in Manila was required by the pressing
demands of an expanding business. He denied having
destroyed the alleged note which the plaintiff claimed to have
come from Nenita, nor having seen, previous to the trial, the
letter exh. C. The allegation of his wife that he had a
concubine is based on mere suspicion. He had always been
faithful to his wife, and not for a single instance had he been
caught or surprised by her with another woman.
On the matter of the alleged abuse by the defendant of his
powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, the
plaintiff declared that the defendant refused and failed to
inform her of the progress of their various business concerns.
Although she did not allege, much less prove, that her
husband had dissipated the conjugal properties, she averred
152
without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal
partnership, except that . . . if the husband has abandoned the
wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition
the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the
conjugal partnership property, or separation of property". In
addition to abandonment as a ground, the plaintiff also invokes
article 167 of the new Civil Code in support of her prayer for
division of the matrimonial assets. This article provides that "In
case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership property by the husband, the courts, on the
petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or
administration by the wife, or separation of property". It
behooves us, therefore, to inquire, in the case at bar, whether
there has been abandonment, in the legal sense, by the
defendant of the plaintiff, and/or whether the defendant has
abused his powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership property, so as to justify the plaintiff's plea for
separation of property.
We have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is our
considered view that the defendant is not guilty of
abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant
division of the conjugal assets.
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178
when she has been abandoned by the husband for at least
one year are the same as those granted to her by article 167
in case of abuse of the powers of administration by the
husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies, under article
178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere
separation. 1 The abandonment must not only be physical
estrangement but also amount to financial and moral
desertion.
153
reproduced, it seems rather clear that to constitute
abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be
absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights,
with the intention of perpetual separation.
Coming back to the case at bar, we believe that the defendant
did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently. The
record conclusively shows that he continued to give support to
his family despite his absence from the conjugal home. This
fact is admitted by the complainant, although she minimized
the amount of support given, saying that it was only P500
monthly. There is good reason to believe, however, that she
and the children received more than this amount, as the
defendant's claim that his wife and children continued to draw
from his office more than P500 monthly was substantially
corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, whose declarations were
not rebutted by the plaintiff. And then there is at all no showing
that the plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the
contrary, the plaintiff admitted, albeit reluctantly, that she
frequently played mahjong, from which we can infer that she
had money; to spare.
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his
wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return
to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and
rights. In People v. Schelske, 6 it was held that where a
husband, after leaving his wife, continued to make small
contributions at intervals to her support and that of their minor
child, he was not guilty of their "abandonment", which is an act
of separation with intent that it shall be perpetual, since
contributing to their support negatived such intent. In re Hoss'
Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father did not abandon his
family where the evidence disclosed that he almost always did
give his wife part of his earnings during the period of their
separation and that he gradually paid some old rental and
grocery bills.
154
Q. I am not asking you whether she writes very well or
not but, my question is this: In view of the fact that you
have never received a letter from Nenita, you have ot
sent any letter to her, you are not familiar with her
handwriting?
A. Yes.
Q. You have not seen her writing anybody?
A. Yes.
Anent the allegation that the defendant had mismanaged the
conjugal partnership property, the record presents a different
picture. There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has
squandered the conjugal assets. Upon the contrary, he proved
that through his industry and zeal, the conjugal assets at the
time of the trial had increased to a value of over a million
pesos.
The lower court likewise erred in holding that mere refusal or
failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal
partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family
businesses constitutes abuse of administration. For "abuse" to
exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts
prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts
injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of
mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes
willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership,
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions
prejudicial to the latter. 7
If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and
nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the
conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the
conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency
155
family solidarity may be irretrievably shattered; and any
flickering hope for a new life together may be completely and
finally extinguished.
The monthly alimony in the sum of P2,000 which was allowed
to the wife in 1958, long before the devaluation of the
Philippine peso in 1962, should be increased to P3,000.
On the matter of attorney's fees, it is our view that because the
defendant, by leaving the conjugal abode, has given cause for
the plaintiff to seek redress in the courts, and ask
for adequate support, an award of attorney's fees to the
plaintiff must be made. Ample authority for such award is found
in paragraphs 6 and 11 of article 2208 of the new Civil Code
which empower courts to grant counsel's fees "in actions for
legal support" and in cases "where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be recovered."
However, an award of P10,000, in our opinion, is, under the
environmental circumstances, sufficient.
This Court would be remiss if it did not, firstly, remind the
plaintiff and the defendant that the law enjoins husband and
wife to live together, and, secondly, exhort them to avail of
mutually, earnestly and steadfastly all opportunities for
reconciliation to the end that their marital differences may be
happily resolved, and conjugal harmony may return and, on
the basis of mutual respect and understanding, endure.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees
separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set
aside. Conformably to our observations, however, the
defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of
support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until he shall have
rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the
meantime, be reduced or increased in the discretion of the
court a quo as circumstances warrant. The award of attorney's
Note 4, supra.
156
women and their respective offspring are not parties of these
case.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial
separation of conjugal property, docketed as Civil Case No.
51, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against him
and docketed as Civil Case No. 36, in the Regional Trial Court
of Negros Oriental, Branch 35.
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On
November 29, 1983, Judge German G. Lee, Jr. rendered an
extensive decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG
(with aliases JOSE JO and CONSING), respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having
cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The
first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be his
legal wife whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other
157
support. 1 The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property was dismissed for lack of a cause of action and on
the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by
Article 178 of the Civil Code.
When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both
parties came to this Court for relief. The private respondent's
petition for review on certiorari was dismissed for tardiness in
our resolution dated February 17, 1988, where we also
affirmed the legality of the marriage between Jose and Prima
and the obligation of the former to support her and her
daughter.
This petition deals only with the complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property.
It is here submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that: a) the judicial separation of conjugal property sought was
not allowed under Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code;
and b) no such separation was decreed by the trial court in the
dispositive portion of its decision.
The private respondent contends that the decision of the trial
court can longer be reviewed at this time because it has a long
since become final and executory. As the decretal portion
clearly made no disposition of Civil Case No. 51, that case
should be considered impliedly dismissed. The petitioner
should have called the attention of the trial court to the
omission so that the proper rectification could be made on
time. Not having done so, she is now concluded by the said
decision, which can no longer be corrected at this late hour.
We deal first with the second ground.
While admitting that no mention was made of Civil Case No.
51 in the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court,
158
caused by an omission or a mistake in the dispositive portion
of the decision, this Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an
amendment even after the judgment have become final. 2 In
doing so, the Court may resort to the pleading filed by the
parties and the findings of fact and the conclusions of law
expressed in the text or body of the decision. 3
The trial court made definite findings on the complaint for
judicial separation of conjugal property, holding that the
petitioner and the private respondent were legally married and
that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were acquired
by Jo during their marriage although they were registered in
the name of the apparent dummy.
There is no question therefore that the penultimate paragraph
of the decision of the trial court was a ruling based upon such
findings and so should have been embodied in the dispositive
portion. The respondent court should have made the
necessary modification instead of dismissing Civil Case No. 51
and thus upholding mere form over substance.
In the interest of substantive justice, and to expedite these
proceedings, we hereby make such modification.
And now to the merits of Civil Case No. 51.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement
and not because of abondonment. The respondent court relied
mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under
oath that she left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were
living together "because that was our agreement." It held that a
agreement to live separately without just cause was void under
Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of
abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was
that the only remedy availabe to the petitioner was legal
159
partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the
preceding paragraph refer to martial, parental or
property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abondoned the other
when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without
any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the
conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
failed within the same period to give any information as
to his or her whereabouts shall be prima
facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling.
Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for
judicial separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abondonment by a spouse of the other without just
cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her
obligations to the family without just cause, even if she
said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the
avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence
without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in
the least for one's family although able to do so. 5 There must
be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights,
with the intention of perpetual separation. 6This idea is clearly
expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a
spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or
she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of
returning."
160
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have
been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The amendments introduced in the Family Code are
applicable to the case before us although they became
effective only on August 3, 1988. As we held in Ramirez v.
Court of Appeals: 7
The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view
that an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on
appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law
prevailing at the term of such disposition, and not
according to the law prevailing at the time of rendition
of the appealed judgement. The court will therefore
reverse a judgement which was correct at the time it
was originally rendered where, by statute, there has
been an intermediate change in the law which renders
such judgement erroneous at the time the case was
finally disposed of on appeal.
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is
based on the finding of both the trial and respondent courts
that the private respondent is indeed their real owner. It is
these properties that should now be divided between him and
the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired
during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half.
As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division
must include such properties properly belonging to the
conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name
of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his
extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he
must now make an accounting to his lawful wife of the
properties he denied her despite his promise to their of his
eternal love and care.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
decision of the respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No.
51 is hereby decided in favor the plaintiff, the petitioner herein,
and the conjugal property of the petitioner and the private
respondent is hereby ordered divided between them, share
and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial
court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the
said conjugal partnership, including those that may have been
illegally registered in the name of the persons.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Chua, Segundino G., J., ponente, Coquia,
Jorge R. and De Pano, Nathanael, Jr., P. JJ.,
concurring, promulgated on January 28, 1987.
2 Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellant Court, 152 SCRA 316;
Alvendia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 181
SCRA 252.
3 Sentinel Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals. 182 SCRA 516.
4 Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains
terminates:
161
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
7 72 SCRA 231.