p.

Administrative powers
1. Supervision of lower courts
In re Demetria, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001

Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice (DOJ)

prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen, filed their
respective Comments on the Compliance of Justice Demetria.4

IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON
BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G.
DEMETRIA, respondent.

On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and

designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino as Investigator and Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation then
commenced on 22 August 2000 and continued until 16 November 2000.

PER CURIAM:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity,
fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair
and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all
appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously
and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For,
theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and
integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
court or administrative agency."1 The slightest form of interference cannot be
countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the
regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of
the parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if
not totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which
appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The Manila Standard, The Manila
Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies
collectively reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu
Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila
casino.2
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued
a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to comment on the
derogatory allegations in the news items.3 On 24 July 2000, Justice Demetria
submitted his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP)
Jovencito R. Zuo, who disclosed to the media the name of Justice
Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of the

The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuo, SP

Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose H.
Afalla, an employee from the Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab,
Jr. The defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent
Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino Gaa, Jr.,
Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Daosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai,
MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go
Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and Luisito Artiaga,
official of the Philippine Amateur Track and Field Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are
quite clear. In an Information dated 9 December 1998, SP Formaran III
charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth
Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18, 5 with
violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent and
without authority of law . . . (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated
drug."6 Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth
Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a
Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of her guilt was not strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused,
especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing in the casinos of
Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the City Jail.7 On
the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the motion and
ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to the Manila City Jail. 8
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence
standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient to warrant conviction

of the two accused for the crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of
accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit.9 Consequently, both accused filed a
Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial court's actuation "do not
inspire the belief that its decision would be just and impartial." 10 On 28
January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion was utterly
without merit but considering the gravity of the offense and for the peace of
mind of the accused, inhibited himself.11
The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet.
Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the Confinement of the
Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the case
was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and
allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not
exceeding seven (7) days,12 contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose
Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu
Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital.13
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for
Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or until
such time that she is fit to be discharged from the said hospital." 14 On 7 July
2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to File
Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence.15 Soon,
rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that Judge Muro was partial towards
accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of the
RTC Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote
the Secretary of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the
Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro ordered
the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and there (was)
already a rumor circulating around the City Hall, that the notorious Judge had
given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to Quash,
which (would) be granted for a consideration of millions of pesos and the
contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who is an
employee in the said branch."16
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for
Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further handling this
case and/or from resolving the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused Yu
Yuk Lai as well as any other pending incidents therein." 17

On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was
supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai
was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn
Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat. She was unescorted at the time of
her arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for Inhibition of
Judge Muro was heard and submitted for resolution. Later, at around 11:30
o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was
informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals
Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that the Justice
wanted to speak with him. The caller requested for a return call. As
requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice Demetria
but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria,
PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng
Kok and a close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran
III in the DOJ which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier.
Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran III as he
greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor Formaran?"18
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP
Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this would
purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his
apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might convict his
friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III
informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition has been submitted for
resolution, one basis of which was the unsigned letter of the concerned court
employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the
inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The Justice then
advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep his cool" and
asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go Teng Kok.
Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been asking SP
Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai. 19 SP Formaran III
at first politely declined the request. But later, "just to put an end to (the)
conversation," 20 he told them that he would bring the matter to CSP Zuo.
"Iyon pala," Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then stood up, bade good
bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed closely behind. 21

Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuo and informed the latter of
what had transpired. CSP Zuo replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also told
ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same reply.22
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuo received a call from
Justice Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw
the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already issue
an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na i-withdraw na
iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si
Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was quoted as saying.23 Politely, CSP Zuo
said that he would see what he could do. "Tingnan ko po kung ano ang
magagawa ko."24
On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme
Court Justice . . . and an outspoken sports person and leader" 25 had been
exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria
and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear the name of the
Supreme Court justices who might have been affected by the erroneous
news report. The following day, 21 July 2000, several newspapers named
Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order dated 19 July
2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing the case of Yu Yuk
Lai and Kenneth Monceda.26
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having
interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ
on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng
Kok whom he did not know until that time was purely accidental. Expectedly,
Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do
something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever specifying the
kind of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of
erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran III that he
impliedly asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go
Teng Kok was appealing and requesting."27 Respondent claimed that the
"help" he was requesting could well be "within legal bounds or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the
discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not a form

of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the
discussion between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While
he asked about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of
knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that he could not have
possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by
CSP Zuo as the Justice exerting undue pressure on the DOJ were all
hearsay. Respondent submitted that CSP Zuo based his identification from
a newspaper account, from the statement of his secretary that it was he
(Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone and from SP
Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief State Prosecutor about the
visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw the
motion.
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he,
not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuo to inquire about the
latter's decision regarding the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP
Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken up
with his superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him
to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to do something for
Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither
did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be
unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not know.
Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July
2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino believes so. In her Report
dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent Justice Demetria "guilty of
violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended
that "appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him by this Honorable
Court."28
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning.
Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, after a
hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy to commit the following offenses
on the part of CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA

President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice

punishable under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act."29

simply pointed to one particular act. Thus, subsequently respondent Justice

called CSP Zuo to ask for just that the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit
Judge Muro.

While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal case,
his denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuo and SP
Formaran III,30 which are consistent with natural human experience. To
accept the testimony of the defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who
telephoned CSP Zuo, and not Justice Demetria, and that the "help" the
respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III was something "within
legal bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal of the motion is to
strain too far one's imagination.

Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to the
DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek assistance in the
appointment of Atty. Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old
friends,"32 and that the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But
respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier Compliance to the
Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his primary purpose in going to the
DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he
instead decided to see some officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited
for a long time.

The testimony of CSP Zuo is plainly unambiguous and indubitably

consistent with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the case
CSP Zuo: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi
mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong
kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge
Muro."31
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III
said that he would consult his superiors regarding the proposal to withdraw
the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuo was thus a logical followup. And no one could have made the call except respondent Justice since it
is not uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuo would recognize the
voice of respondent Justice who was CSP Zuo's former superior in the DOJ.
Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor
Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman
makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could not have come from anyone else
but from respondent Justice who had moral ascendancy over CSP Zuo, he
being a Justice of the Court of Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at
one time Acting Secretary of the DOJ.
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice claims
he did not know and met only that time, could not have meant any other
assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True,
Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his
Motion. But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at
that particular time "to do something . . . to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter
was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and nothing else. That was the
only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok wanted. The subtle pressure exerted

We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses
belied his alibi. ACSP Gaa, Jr. testified and confirmed that Justice Demetria
only said "hi."33 SSP Daosos, denied seeing him and claimed that it was
only Atty. Paas who peeped into his room.34 Suspiciously, it was really in the
office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria did not know,
where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok decided to "stay a
while."35
Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, the Investigating
Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not have been there to
exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were
not acquainted with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did not
personally know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact corroborated
by respondent himself.36
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's
earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that "[b]ecause
Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to drop by his office . . .
(and) I stayed a while."37
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there "to
join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of Formaran's
Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real purpose of their visit
to SP Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of
Justice Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok,
could not have been 'accidental' but pre-arranged." 38 And, "visiting old
friends" only came as an afterthought. The circumstances simply show that
Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas, together with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the

DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuo and SP
Formaran III.

place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of
judicial conduct and integrity.42

Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu Yuk
Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not personally know, and more
unthinkable that he would be asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had
just met for the first time.

WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold

Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture
of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any
government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government
owned or controlled corporation or institution.

The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a very

close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary
that respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk
Lai or SP Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused. It is
enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has been
helping the accused, and that he wields influence as a former DOJ
Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of
Appeals.
In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and
trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense which do not only defy
natural human experience but are also riddled with major inconsistencies
which create well-founded and overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility.
His at all times must be characterized with propriety and must be above
suspicion.39 His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside
the courtroom and as a private individual.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live up
to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only
make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to
the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national
newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering
with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness tha a seat
in the Judiciary.40 High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be
maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so
indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved.41 There is simply no

In re Letter of PJ Vasquez, A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, Sept. 9, 2008

A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA
September 9, 2008
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON
CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, et al.]
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic
institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the power to settle disputes
between parties and to determine their rights and obligations under the law.
For judicial decisions, which form part of the law of the land, to be credible
instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts
must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial, independent, competent
and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members of the
Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to
the strictest code of ethics and the highest standards of propriety and
decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one of the countrys second highest
courts, the Court of Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal and
controversy. It is this Courts bounden duty to determine the culpability or
innocence of the members of the Judiciary involved in the said controversy
and to discipline any one whose conduct has failed to conform to the canons
of judicial ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality,
competence and propriety in the performance of official functions.
The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated August 1, 2008
of Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding
Justice Vasquez), referring to this Court for appropriate action the much
publicized dispute and charges of impropriety among the justices of the Court
of Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled "Antonio
Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al."
To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court in its
Resolution dated August 4, 2008 constituted a three-person panel (the
"Panel of Investigators") composed of retired Justices of the Court; namely,
Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero and Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The

Panel of Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged improprieties

of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected
offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio
and Mr. Francis de Borja.
A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating Panel,
follows:
On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), then
Chairperson of the Ninth Division of the CA, filed an application for leave
from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.1
In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by Presiding
Justice Vasquez, Justice Jose C. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was
designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division
during the absence of Justice Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular senior
member of the Fifth Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized "to act on all
cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final resolution and/or appropriate
action, except ponencia, from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008 or until Justice
Reyes reports back for duty." The said office order likewise applied to the
other Division(s) where Justice Reyes had "participated or took part as
regular member or in an acting capacity."2
On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B. Alfonso,
Jesus P. Francisco, Christian S. Monsod, Elpidio L. Ibaez, and Francis Giles
B. Puno, as officers, directors and/or representatives of the Manila Electric
Company (hereinafter to be collectively referred to as "Meralco"), filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
(TRO) against the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez, Commissioner Hubert B.
Guevarra, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). 3 Aside
from the application for immediate issuance of a TRO, petitioners prayed for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction that should thereafter be declared
permanent, as well as a declaration of nullity of the cease and desist and
show cause orders issued by the SEC through Commissioner Martinez. The
petition was received by the CA at 10:49 a.m. on May 29, 2008 and docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent
motion for a special raffle. Presiding Justice Vasquez granted the motion in a
handwritten note on the face of the urgent motion, 4and CA-G.R. No. 103692
was raffled to Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas). 5 At 3:10 p.m., the
Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from Atty. Estrella C.
Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS, requesting the
re-raffling of the case "in the presence of the parties in the interest of
transparency and fairness."6 At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed an expartemotion to defer action on any incident in the petition pending the
resolution of their motion for the re-raffle of the case. 7

Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of the GSIS

Law Office, personally filed the urgent motion to defer action on the petition
pending the resolution of their motion to re-raffle the case. Since the
receiving clerk of the Court of Appeals could not assure them that the motion
would be transmitted to the Court of Appeals Division, Attys. Elamparo and
Polinar allegedly went to the office of Justice Roxas "for the sole purpose of
personally furnishing him a copy" of the motion. 8 They initially talked to a
male clerk who referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them
that it was not possible for them to personally hand a copy of the motion to
Justice Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar left a copy of the motion to
the staff but no one wanted to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.9
On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his
leave until June 6, 2008.10 In the meantime, Justice Mendoza, who had been
designated to replace Justice Reyes during the latters absence, informed
Justice Roxas through a letter that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from
the case on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the Meralco. 11 Hence,
in an "Emergency Request for Raffle," Justice Roxas informed the Raffle
Committee about the inhibition.12
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman
of the Ninth Division by raffle, "in lieu of Justice Mendoza." 13 At 11:30 a.m.,
the office of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice Dimaranan-Vidal)
received a notice of emergency deliberation with the new Acting Chairman of
the Special Ninth Division, apparently sent by Justice Roxas, stating that her
presence and that of Justice Sabio, Jr. were "indispensable" on account of
the "national interest" involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. 14
Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo "received a telephone call from somebody who
did not identify herself but (who) said that she had important information
regarding the Meralco case." The unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo that
"a TRO was already being prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in
fact been talking to Justice Roxas." The caller warned Atty. Elamparo against
Justice Roxas who had "administrative cases and was very notorious," but
when prodded, the caller would not disclose more details. 15
At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a telephone
call in his chambers from his older brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio
(Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG).16 Chairman Sabio informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had
been named the "third member" of the division to which the MERALCO-GSIS
case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was surprised as he had not yet been
"officially informed" about the matter. Chairman Sabio likewise informed him
that a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince
Justice Sabio "of the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC," and
asked his brother to help the GSIS, which "represents the interest of the poor
people." Justice Sabio told his brother that he would "vote according to [his]
conscience" and that the most that he could do was "to have the issuance of
the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled for oral arguments," at which the

respondents "must be able to convince" him that the TRO indeed had no
legal basis.
In his signed testimony,17 which he read before the Panel of Investigators,
Chairman Sabio narrated the circumstances of this call to his brother on May
30, 2008. It appears to have been prompted by a call from a member of the
Board of Trustees of GSIS. To quote from Chairman Sabios testimony:
Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my wife, Marlene,
waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL flight to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.
As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I. Santos, a
Member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. We had known each other
and had become friends since before Martial Law because as Chief
Counsel of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing
counsel in various cases in Bulacan.
Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the GSIS and
MERALCO was now in the Court of Appeals; and, that as a matter of
fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the Division to which the
case had been assigned. Being a Trustee, Attorney Santos
requested me to help. I readily welcomed the request for help and
thanked him. There was no mystery about his having known of the
results of the raffle because the lawyers are notified thereof and are
present thereat. As a Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned
and involved. As such it is his duty to seek assistance for the GSIS
where he could legitimately find it. He was right in seeking my
assistance.
I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and MERALCO. In
essence this was in fact a controversy between the long suffering
public and the mighty - financially and politically - controlling owners
of MERALCO. MERALCO is not only a public utility but also a
monopoly. Fortunately, GSIS had taken up the cudgels for the long
suffering public, who are at the mercy of MERALCO.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the noise I
could not hear him. So I waited until we would arrive in Manila.
As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with Justice
Sabio. After, he confirmed that he was in fact in the Division to which
the petition of MERALCO had been raffled. I impressed upon him the
character and essence of the controversy. I asked him to help GSIS
if the legal situation permitted. He said he would decide according to
his conscience. I said: of course.
xxx
xxx
x x x.
On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte
motion to inhibit Justice Roxas from CA-G.R. No. SP 103692. 18 The
Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received a copy of the
motion at 11:58 a.m.19

Claiming that the TRO was issued "to pre-empt the hearing" scheduled in the
afternoon of that day before the SEC, the GSIS Law Office, through Atty.
Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set forth its reason for the motion for inhibition as
follows:
3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that the
Honorable ponente has been in contact with certain lawyers of
MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft resolution
granting the TRO without affording respondents even a summary
hearing. The records of this case was (sic), per information,
immediately transmitted to the Honorable ponente upon his
instructions. The worries of the respondent were exacerbated when it
learned that there are supposedly two administrative cases pending
against the Honorable ponente, both of which involve allegations of
bias and prejudice.
It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not yet been
officially notified by the Raffle Committee that the case was raffled to
him.20 Moreover, contrary to the allegation of Atty. Elamparo that the raffle
was rigged, Justice Roxas had no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was
handled by the Division chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo with the use
of a "fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto machine." 21
Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latters signature,
the TRO which he had prepared, already signed by himself and Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio signed
it on condition that the case will be set for oral arguments.
Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,22 the Special Ninth Division composed
of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the Resolution
granting the TRO prayed for by the petitioners and directing the respondents
to file their respective comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition
within ten days from notice, with the petitioners given five days from receipt
of that comment within which to file their reply. The Special Ninth Division
also set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same
Resolution, parties were directed to file their respective memorandum of
authorities in connection with the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction together with their comments/reply. After the parties had filed their
memorandum of authorities relative to the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, the prayer for the said writ would be considered submitted for
resolution "forty five (45) days from promulgation of this Resolution." The
SEC received a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m. on that day.23
For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial of the
motion for inhibition filed against him. There was no need to put in writing the
action on the motion for inhibition.24
At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received the
Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order and To Hold Its

Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the GSIS.25 Justice Roxas did not act on
the Urgent Motion because he did not consider it meritorious. 26
On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr.
Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a person he had lost contact with for almost
a year already.27 Mr. De Borja greeted him with:"Mabuhay ka, Justice." When
Justice Sabio, Jr. asked Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him
that the Makati Business Club was happy with his having signed the TRO, to
which Justice Sabio retorted, "I voted according to my conscience."
On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated June 2, 2008
of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, Atty.
Elamparo, that the Court of Appeals could not grant her request for the reraffling of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 "in the presence of the parties in the
interest of transparency and fairness," as the case had been raffled in
accordance with the procedure under the IRCA.28
On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work. 29
On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,30 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appearing for the SEC, filed a manifestation and motion praying for the
admission of the comment (to the petition) attached thereto, as well as the
advance and additional copies of the memorandum of authorities.
On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its comment/opposition to the
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692,31 as well as its memorandum of
authorities.
On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita Custodio (Atty.
Custodio), delivered to Justice Reyes the cartilla of the Meralco case, and
informed him that a hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction had been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24,
2008.32However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of Court came back to
retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio. Justice Reyes
instructed his staff to return the cartilla and when he asked the Division Clerk
of Court why she was retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio "demanded"
that it be returned back to him. "Personally affronted" by the "domineering
and superior stance" of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes "read and re-read Secs.
1, 2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of Adjudication)" until he was satisfied that he
should sit as Division Chairman in the Meralco case.33
On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the rollo of CA-G.R.
SP No. 103692 from Justice Roxas so that he could study the case before
the hearing.34 Justice Roxas asked him whether Justice Reyes would preside
over the hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not Justice
Reyes, should preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the Division Clerk
of Court to send the rollo over to Justice Sabio. The next day, the Division
Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When
the rollo was eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of
Court asked him whether the rollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice
Sabio explained why the rollo should be with him.

On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of five days or
until June 23, 2008 within which to file their consolidated memoranda of
authorities and reply to the comment of the SEC.35
On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation together with
their reply to the comment of the GSIS.36 Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes
asked Atty. Custodio to report on "what transpired between her and Justice
Sabio" when she returned the cartilla. "Teary-eyed," Atty. Custodio begged off
from making a report.37
Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice "to avoid an ugly
confrontation" with the Justices on the "highly politicized case involving
giants of the Philippine society." He explained to the Presiding Justice his
understanding of the relevant IRCA rules and "the actual practice in similar
situations in the past." The Presiding Justice promised to talk with Justice
Sabio and, "for the sake of transparency and future reference," Justice
Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the matter.38
On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez a
letter39 calling the attention of Justice Edgardo P. Cruz ("Justice Cruz"),
Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, to the "dilemma" as to who between
him and Justice Sabio should "receive" CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice
Reyes posed these questions before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as Acting Chairman
of the Special 9th Division and who participated in the initial
Resolution of the case?
Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with the undersigned
as Chairman?
For Justice Reyes, the "dilemma" was engendered by this provision of
Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA:
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these
actions or proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course; (2) granting
writ of preliminary injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4) granting
execution pending appeal have been taken, the case shall remain
with the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report
and the Justices who participated therein, regardless of their transfer
to other Divisions in the same station.
The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been
scheduled for June 23 and 24, 2008, Justice Reyes considered it
"necessary" that the issues be resolved before that date. Moreover, the
referral of the controversy to the Presiding Justice would give him sufficient
time to seriously study the case before the hearing. 40
On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter of Justice
Reyes to Justice Cruz, Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, noting "some
urgency involved as the hearing of the case is on Monday, June 23, 2008." 41
On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a letter 42 quoting
Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the IRCA and stating that the "[i]ssuance of a TRO is
not among the instances where the Justices who participated in the case

shall remain therein." Hence, Justice Cruz opined that "[n]otwithstanding the
issuance of the TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction), the case reverted to
the regular Chairman (Justice Reyes) of the Ninth Division upon his return."
Justice Reyes received a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz in the afternoon of
that day.43
During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his opinion before
the Panel. He opined that the motion to lift the TRO is not a motion for
reconsideration because Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states that a motion
for reconsideration may be filed with respect to a decision or a final
resolution. A TRO is not a final resolution but an interlocutory order.
Moreover, since the subject of the hearing on June 23, 2008 was on the
application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no right to participate
in the hearing because as an Acting Chairman, his authority was only to act
on the motion to lift the TRO. Under the IRCA, the position of Justice Sabio
invoked the exception to the general rule in the IRCA. However, the settled
principle is to construe a rule strictly against the exception. The participation
of Justice Sabio in the hearing on June 23, 2008 was a "passport" to
participation in the decision-making process, in violation of the IRCA. 44
Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice referred the
matter to Justice Sabio who in turn, opined that "a temporary restraining
order is part of the injunctive relief or at least its initial action such that he
should be the one to chair the Division." 45 In his office after that consultation
with the Presiding Justice, Justice Reyes found that the Division Clerk of
Court had given him a copy of the cartilla just in case he would preside over
the hearing.In the evening, the Presiding Justice called up Justice Reyes to
inform him that Justice Sabio "insisted that he would preside over the hearing
of the case," and that the opinion of Justice Cruz, who was "junior" to Justice
Sabio "was no better than his own opinion."46
It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz, Justice
Sabio told the Presiding Justice by telephone that he disagreed with the
opinion of Justice Cruz "because he did not sign in an official capacity as
Chairman of the Rules Committee, but in his personal capacity" and hence,
the opinion of Justice Sabio "was as good as his, as in fact I (Justice Sabio,
Jr.) am even more senior than he."47 Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice
that he "smelled something fishy" about the move to transfer the case to the
Ninth Division especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it
despite the fact that they were seated together on three occasions.
Justice Sabio "smelled something fishy" because a couple or so weeks ago,
he attended a Chairpersons meeting regarding the leakage of
the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice Reyes as Chairperson and Justice
Jose Mendoza as senior member. The meeting was called because prior to
the promulgation of the decision of Justice Bato, the losing party already filed
a motion for the inhibition of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio
information on the decision could not have been leaked by Justice Bato but
by a member of the Division.48

The Presiding Justice "did not do anything anymore" to prevent an

"unpalatable" situation at the scheduled June 23, 2008 hearing,
notwithstanding the "conflicting opinions" of Justices Reyes and Sabio. The
"personal view" of the Presiding Justice was at the time "with Justice Cruz"
but Justice Sabio had a "different interpretation." Neither did the Presiding
Justice suggest that the Rules Committee be convened because the
Committee then had only two members. He felt that it would be "better" if
Justices Reyes and Sabio "could settle it between themselves." The
Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices "practically" everyday because he
did not want "these things to blow up." However, neither did it enter the mind
of the Presiding Justice that the hearing on June 23 could be reset. Had he
known that there was a motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, he would have
changed his position "that it should be the Sabio group." 49
Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to conduct a powerpoint presentation during the hearing.50 Likewise the SEC, through the OSG
prayed that it be allowed the use of Microsoft Powerpoint Application at the
June 23 and 24, 2008 hearings.51 Justice Roxas did not act on the motions.
On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the Division
chaired by Justice Reyes that would handle the case on account of the
opinion of Justice Cruz.52
In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with Justice Martin
Villarama, Jr. ("Justice Villarama") who advised him, "in no uncertain terms,"
that his stand was "correct" and that he should remain in the case. 53 Justice
Villarama said that the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division
"regardless of the transfer of the ponente to the Eighth Division because of
the pending motion to lift TRO," which the Special Ninth Division should
resolve "following the general rule that when a decision or resolution is
rendered by a division, a motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted
upon by all the Members of that division, whether regular or special, which
participated in the rendition of the decision or resolution, except in case of
death, retirement or resignation of such Member." 54
That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. The latter told
the former that since there was a motion to lift the TRO, Justice Roxas
should first rule on the motion. He also advised Justice Roxas to inhibit
himself from the case, as there might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka
magka-problema). Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama that he would follow
his "suggestion."55
Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell him of his
"strong conviction that the issuance of a TRO is not among the instances
provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when the case shall remain with those
Justices who participated in the case regardless of their transfer to other
division(s)." Justice Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his "understanding
and interpretation of said provision, x x x the case should remain with the
Special Ninth Division."56

At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called Justice Reyes to
inform him that the parties and their counsels were already in the hearing
room. Justice Reyes informed the caller that he could not preside as Justice
Sabio had "apparently hardened his position" and he wanted to avoid an
"ugly spectacle." His name plate was displayed in the hearing room but
Justice Sabio moved to another hearing room.57 Allegedly, the removal of the
nameplate of Justice Reyes was the talk of the Court of Appeals for weeks. 58
Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as counsel for
Meralco.59 At the hearing, Justice Sabio presided with Justices Roxas and
Dimaranan-Vidal in attendance. Justice Roxas, the ponente, did not ask a
single question.60 Not one of the Justices in attendance brought up the
motion for inhibition filed by the GSIS against Justice Roxas. 61 In open court,
the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 agreed to submit, within 15 days,
simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for by the
petitioners, after which the application for preliminary injunction would be
deemed submitted for resolution.62
On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate conversations of
Justice Villaram with Justices Sabio and Reyes, the Presiding Justice also
consulted Justice Villarama about the letter-queries of Justices Roxas and
Reyes on which Division should resolve "the matter of injunctive relief or
issue the decision" in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. 63
The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV reconstituting the
Committee on Rules and designating Justice Cruz as the Chairperson, with
Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim Abdulwahid, and Noel G.
Tijam, as members.64 The Committee on Rules was tasked to propose
amendments to the IRCA on or before August 15, 2008 "for submission and
adoption of the Court en banc." (The office order was later amended by
Office Order No. 196-08-CMV on August 4, 2008 to include as members
Justices Mario L. Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco
Flores.65) The Rules Committee used to be composed of only three
members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and Roberto Barrios, now
deceased, as members, with Justice Cruz as chairperson.66
It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office
Order No. 200-08-CMV stating that, in view of the retirement of Justices
Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon, and Rodrigo Cosico,
and the appointments of Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L. delos
Santos, the Divisions would have a new composition effective July 4,
2008.67 Under that office order, Justice Sabio became the Chairman of the
Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. Justice Reyes
became the Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. ("Justice Bruselas") as members.
On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of absence to use a
business class airplane ticket to Sydney, Australia that he had won in an APT
Golf Tournament in January 2008. He was still on official leave when the
reorganization of the Court of Appeals took place on July 4, 2008. 68

On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not attend
the Access to Courts (sic) summit on June 30 and July 1, 2008 at the Court
of Appeals Auditorium because he was busy with the Meralco case. Justice
Sabio was taken aback because at that time the parties had not yet
submitted their memoranda.69
That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to
meet with him for an "important" matter. Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m.
classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet after his classes but
not for long because his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is an
Attorney VI in the Office of the Chief Justice,70 would be waiting for
him.71 According to Justice Sabio, the conversation at that meeting with
Francis de Borja went as follows:
17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja was
already waiting for me at the Lobby Lounge of the 3rd Floor of the
Ateneo Law School. His first words to me were: Alam mo Justice
kung sino ang kasama ko sa kotse? Si Manolo Lopez. Then he
said: Noong tinatawagan kita at sinabi kong "Mabuhay ka Justice," si
Manolo Lopez ang katabi ko noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na
lang ang pumunta dito para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong kaso
na ito is a matter of life and death for the Lopezes. And alam mo
naman what the Marcoses did to them, which is being done now by
the Arroyos.
At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice
Bienvenido Reyes and myself. He said: Alam naming may
problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa chairmanship.
I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was
an internal matter of the Court of Appeals which only
happened fairly recently and many associate justices of the
CA were not even aware of this. Just the same, I explained
my stand and why I could not relinquish the chairmanship to
Justice Reyes.
He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni
Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge ang stand mo. Kaya lang,
mayroon namang nagsabi na it might become messy.
Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pagrecommend at pag-hire ng Villaraza Law Firm.
Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-win
situation.
He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready. Just
give way to Justice Reyes.
Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa
akin hindi?
He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.
At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard
for me. He was treating me like there was a price on my

person. I could not describe my feelings. I was stunned. But

at the same time, hindi ko rin magawang bastusin
siya because I had known him since 1993 and this was the
first time that he had ever treated me like this, or shown that
he believed I could be bought.
So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to
that.
His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka talaga
papayag. Kasi may anak iyang Opus Dei. Numerary pa.
At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not
stay long. I told him my wife and lawyer daughter were
waiting.
Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words
before I left were: Just think about it, Justice.72
At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a "sealed" brown paper bag, which he
was handling "as if something important" was inside. However, Justice Sabio
did not know if the bag contained P10million.73
In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the
offer of Mr. De Borja for Meralco.74
In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De Borja describes
himself as a businessman, a deal maker, and project packager. On July 1,
2008, he invited Justice Sabio for dinner "to touch base" and
for chismis about the MERALCO-GSIS case. As the latter would have
evening classes at the Ateneo Law School, and his wife and daughter would
be waiting in their car after his classes, they just agreed to meet at the lobbylounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew about the MERALCO case
allegedly came from news reports but he was interested in the news because
he is a "confirmed free-enterpriser." Moreover, De Borja thought that there
was "[n]othing like hearing things directly from the horses mouth." 75
When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred he was
indeed carrying a bag, not an expensive looking luggage. After parking his
car at the Rockwell basement, he took the escalator, intending to walk out of
the mall. On his way, he passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and, since it was
still early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he liked. He bought the T-shirt,
which he brought before the Panel of Investigators in the grey "Kenneth Cole
Reaction" bag. The photographs of the bag and the T-shirt costing P1,650.00
are marked Exhibits "A-De Borja" and "A-1-De Borja" and attached to
therollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, while the photograph of the receipt issued
by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as Exhibit "A-2-De Borja," shows that
the purchase was made on July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did
not contain P10 million.
Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Borja brought
during the hearing was not the bag that Mr. De Borja was carrying when
Justice Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008. What Mr. De Borja allegedly brought
with him to the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with

paper handle "about 2/3 (of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size." Justice Sabio
was told by the Panel that it could be the subject of rebuttal evidence but he
did not present such evidence.
According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the owner of
MERALCO whose wife was a member of Marthas Vineyard just like Mr. De
Borjas wife, was also an acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the Ateneo grade
school. Mr. Lopez did not ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio. At
a party where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja informed him that he
knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not say anything.
Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio. Instead, he
claimed that Justice Sabio informed him that the government has offered him
(Justice Sabio) money and a promotion to the Supreme Court to favor GSIS.
When Mr. De Borja asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist the
governments offer, Justice Sabio allegedly replied: "Fifty Million." 76 He
alleged that it was Justice Sabio who called up after that July 1, 2008
meeting to "feel" his reaction to the "P50 million solicitation." Justice Sabio
asked him: "O, ano, kumusta, ano ang nangyayari."
Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio, some 15
years ago, as a balatobecause he came to value the friendship of Justice
Sabio that developed while the latter was helping the Roa family in a
business transaction. Mr. De Borja earned "more than P25 million" although
he received only P3 million as down payment out of the sale of 100 hectares
of the Roa property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3 million to Justice
Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de Oro. Since the Roas
had a lot of "legal problems," Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation
at the time that he was an RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro. After the promotion
of Justice Sabio to the Court of Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for dinner.
They would see each other at get-togethers of the Roas with whom Mr. De
Borja is related, even at a gathering in the house of Mr. De Borjas mother.77
On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that
he (Justice Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he rejected) to have him
ousted from the Meralco case. The news allegedly shocked the Presiding
Justice. Justice Sabio also went to Justice Villarama who was both "shocked
and amused." Justice Sabio. did not tell them who the "offeror" was.
However, a day or two later, Justice Sabio found out that Mr. De Borja had
called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was also shocked that
Mr. De Borja had "the gall to ask her" to convince Justice Sabio to accept the
bribe.78
Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer of P10 million
to a Justice was, in the words of Justice Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he knew
that bribing a Justice is a criminal act, the Presiding Justice did nothing
because he could not "advise a fellow Justice on what to do" - the Justice
would know what he should do. Neither did he think of consulting Justices
Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the chairmanship impasse.79

On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with phone calls
and text messages, Justice Sabio called up Mr. De Borja who told
him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang deadline ng
submission ng memorandum. Pinag-isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer
namin? Kasi sayang din kung di mo tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso
sa Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10 million. Baka
sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice Sabio
said "No." Since Mr. De Borja did not seem to understand why he kept saying
"No," Justice Sabio explained to him: If I accept that, my conscience will
bother me forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One a lawyer
and the other a Numerary member of Opus Dei? And besides, how can I
reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs Ethics and Judicial Conduct
Department; being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of
the Ateneo Law School on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr. De Borja
retorted: Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal, eh. Then he
added: You know Justice, after two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito ng
mga tao. Meron naman diyang mga Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice Sabio
said: I dont know about them, but I am different. Mr. De Borja then
said: Well, if you will not accept, we will be forced to look for other ways. To
this, Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with me. In parting, Mr.
De Borja said:Justice, no matter what, saludo talaga ako sa iyo.
Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but denied the above
conversation with Justice Sabio.
On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals became effective
and brought Justices Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to the Eighth Division.
Justice Reyes went to see the Presiding Justice about the urgent motion for
him to assume the chairmanship of the Division, which shows on its face that
the Urgent Motion dated July 10, 2008 was received by the Court of Appeals
at 2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty. Teresita C. Custodio on July 9,
2008. Justice Reyes expressed to the Presiding Justice his apprehension
that should he fail to assume the chairmanship, he would face administrative
liability for nonfeasance or dereliction of duty. The Presiding Justice
suggested that the respondents in the case be required to comment on the
Urgent Motion "in a resolution to be issued by the former 9th Division of
Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to allow the new Division of Justice B.L. Reyes to
issue the resolution x x x would render moot and academic" the same
motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the Presiding Justice that he would be
sending over the records to him so that the Presiding Justice could place a
note thereon as to what had been agreed upon. However, the records of the
case did not reach the Presiding Justice.80
For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was mandatory and the
Meralco case followed him as its ponente to the Eighth Division. By the
reorganization, Justice Sabio was moved from the disbanded Special Ninth
Division to the Sixth Division, as the reorganization did not spare any
Justice.81 Moreover, the IRCA does not require that the Justices that issued a
TRO be the same Justices that will render the decision. 82 This is because the

TRO does not appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA. Accordingly, only
the issuance of a preliminary injunction could be an exception to the July 4,
2008 reorganization of the CA.83 He believes the IRCA does not require that
the Justices who heard the case should also decide it because the CA is a
court of record and Justices may rely on the transcript of stenographic
notes.84 And so, once the three Justices have signed the decision,
the ponente has the "pressing duty" to promulgate the decision. 85
Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted "on all
the ponencias" of Justices Reyes and Roxas, "just as they had acted" on
his ponencias.86
On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.
On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father, sought the
advice of Atty. Jose Midas Marquez ("Atty. Marquez") regarding the bribery
attempt. Atty. Marquez advised that Justice Sabio should write the Chief
Justice about the incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt but all that
has transpired relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia Sabio
immediately called her father and relayed Atty. Marquezs advice. Later that
date, Justice Sabio handed his daughter, Silvia, a handwritten letter for her to
deliver to the Chief Justice.87 The handwritten letter, in essence, requested
permission for Justice Sabio to "unburden" himself before the Chief Justice
on the Meralco case.88
At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio. The
conversation between them, as recalled by Justice Sabio, was as follows:
As soon as he came in, I said: "Why did you stab me behind my
back?" He said, "Why, what did I do? I asked him Why is it that you
have to resort to that strategy of seeking the opinion of Ed Cruz, in
his personal capacity, when we could have discussed the matter with
the PJ?
I reminded him that we were seated three times near each other on
different occasions only recently and he never mentioned to me
about the plan to oust me.
He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to you.
I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends. Why did you
have to do these things behind my back and not discuss the matter
with me face to face?
Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion; that he
was afraid Meralco would take action against him for nonfeasance
for not doing his job.
It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M for me
to give way to you?
I further asked him the following: In the first place, how was the
Meralco emissary able to know that there was an impasse between
you and me when that was supposed to be an internal matter?

 If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I

told you of the 10Million offer, what will I think of you?
Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you
are part of this whole scheme or shenanigan?
Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they
failed to convince me of their offer, now they will use you to
oust me? Is it because they are certain of your loyalty and
they are uncertain with mine?
And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to
assume? In my nine years in this court, I have never seen
such an animal as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever
advised this stupid motion is also stupid. Why do you have
to dignify such a foolish motion? They should file a motion
for me to inhibit or recuse myself.
Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing
on the 23rd and never raised any question on the alleged
irregularity of my having presided over the hearing?
Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not
aware that several days after the issuance of the TRO,
respondents filed a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente
Roxas and a motion to lift the TRO. Who then had the right
to resolve such motion?
Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano
ang tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?
His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not know of those
pending motions. (Incidentally, these motions were never resolved.)
He also said, wala talaga akong interest dito kundi ayaw ko lang ma
charge ng non-feasance for failing to do my duty.
I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito nonfeasance.
I taught the subject for many years and this is not one of them.
So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter.Bahala ka na.
Then I stood up to show him to the door. He was silent after that and
before he left, he put his arm around me.
For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: "Wala talaga ako dito, wala
akong interest kung di yun lang hindi ako ma non-feasance. Justice Sabio
thought otherwise.
Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
"the final decision on the MERALCO case" bearing his signature, which he
gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for "concurrence/dissent." According to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, Justice Roxas explained to her the "rationale for his
conclusion." Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned "with an
expensive looking travelling bag" from where he pulled out the "purported
final decision." Before the close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned to the
chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had

signed his decision. When she replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice
Roxas said he would pick it up the next day.89
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8,
2008 the Court of Appeals had been reorganized because she believed that
the Special Ninth Division was still existing on account of its having issued
the TRO.90 She also concurred with the portion of the decision
recommending administrative sanctions against the GSIS lawyers because
she believed the OSG or the OGCC should have appeared for the GSIS. 91
Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised
Justice Reyes to "lay off the case" and allow Justice Sabio "to continue" and
to resolve the urgent motion for Justice Reyes to assume the chairmanship.
Justice Villarama recalled that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: "Wala talaga
ako dito Jun, Wala akong personal interest dito."
After "a careful and judicious study" of the more than 56-page decision of
Justice Roxas, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed it. True to his word, Justice
Roxas personally picked up the decision that day "purportedly for the action
of the Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio," who was then on leave of absence
until July 11, 200.92 Notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not
submitted their respective memoranda, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the
"convincing" ponencia, including three copies of the signature page, because
Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due
to the impending lapse of the TRO on July 29, 2008. 93 Justice Sabio thought
otherwise.94
However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision. He denied that he gave it to her for
her signature. He said it was only for her to read because she asked to read
it. He said it was a mere draft as "everything was unofficial" - there was
no rollo or logbook with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not
have the "special seal" of Justice Roxas. It allegedly "was thrown in the
garbage can."
On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.
On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that Justice Reyes
assume the chairmanship of the Division,95 alleging the reasons for the
urgent motion as follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the instant
case, the parties were first directed to one of the Hearing Rooms of
the Court of Appeals. At the said room, the name plate of Justice
Reyes was already placed on the table for the justices. Thus,
petitioners were of the impression that the leave of absence of
Justice Reyes was over and that he would be presiding over the oral
arguments as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to another
Room of the Court of Appeals for the oral arguments in the instant
case, petitioners saw that the name plates on the table for the
justices included that of Justice Sabio, Jr., together with that (sic) of

Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal. Thereafter, Justice Sabio

presided over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Special Ninth
Division of the Honorable Court. Petitioners were, thus, of the
impression that the regular Chairman of the Ninth Division, Justice
Reyes, was still on temporary leave of absence.
7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners that
Justice Reyes has already returned from his temporary leave of
absence and has resumed his duties as Chairman of the Ninth
Division of the Honorable Court.
8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice Sabio, Jr.
should now refrain from acting as the chairman of the Division
hearing the instant case as he is already disqualified from acting as
such upon the return of Justice Reyes.
8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his
bounden judicial responsibility of performing his duties and
functions as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable
Court.
8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, a case can remain
with the justices who participated therein only when any of
the following actions have been taken: (a) giving due course;
(b) granting of a writ of preliminary injunction; (c) granting of
a new trial; or (d) granting of execution pending appeal:
xxx
xxx
x x x.
9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to Justice
Sabio, Jr.s continuing hold on the case. Although Justice Sabio, Jr.
was one of the Justices who issued the temporary restraining order
in favour of the petitioners in the instant case, this circumstance is
not among the grounds as above-quoted, when a justice of the Court
of Appeals may remain in the Division.
10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the grant of
a temporary restraining order but rather the grant of a writ of
preliminary injunction that sanctions a justices remaining with the
Division. Thus, the continued participation of Justice Sabio, Jr., in the
instant case, considering the clear Rules of the Honorable Court, is
not only irregular but may lead one to conclude that he is exhibiting
undue interest in the instant case.
On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip to Australia. 96
On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas called him
up for a meeting to discuss the case. Justice Sabio told him that he needed
ample time to read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas promised to
send to Justice Sabio the memoranda immediately.97
At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division Clerk of Court
a copy of Meralcos Urgent Motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the
Ninth Division.

On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio requested
Justice Roxas to meet with him as he had by then read the memoranda of
the parties. Justice Roxas initially agreed to the meeting but he later informed
Justice Sabio that he had another matter to attend to; neither was he
available in the afternoon. Justice Roxas had become scarce. Justice Sabio
learned that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking for Justice Roxas. 98
Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the reconsideration of
the TRO and informed Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted
to discuss it with them. The resolution he prepared "never saw light." 99
At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the rollo of CA G.R.
SP No. 103692 to Justice Reyes, and told the latter that he and Justice
Bruselas would be coming over to deliberate on the case. Ten minutes later,
the Eighth Division deliberated on the case.100 After a cursory examination of
the rollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision had been signed by Justices
Roxas and Bruselas but Justice Reyes asked for more time to study the
case.101
A transcript of the "Final Deliberation" on July 14, 2008 is attached to page
1926 of Volume III of therollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 and marked as Exh.
2- Roxas on page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA. According to
Justice Roxas, it was he who prepared the transcript from memory to "lend
credence" to the certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the decision
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution. 102 Justice Reyes
denied having seen it or having authorized its transcription. Justice Bruselas
did not sign any transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that a
transcript was being taken. There was no stenographer present, as only the
three of them, Justices Reyes, Roxas, and Bruselas were present at the
deliberation. Neither was there a recording machine. Justice Roxas
admittedly prepared the transcript "from memory." 103
The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that there were
"previous deliberations" were "really meetings," which they had twice, in the
office of Justice Reyes, according to Justice Roxas.104
On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty. Silvia Sabio
testified that she handed her fathers letter to the Chief Justice through his
private secretary, Ms. Jasmin Mateo.105 A few days later, however, Presiding
Justice Vasquez told Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer
meet with him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised the Chief Justice about
the matter.106
According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of the Presiding
Justice informed him that Justice Sabio was waiting for him in his office. As
soon as Justice Reyes was seated, Justice Sabio "berated" him and accused
him of "orchestrating matters." Justice Sabio told him that an emissary of
MERALCO had offered him P10 million to drop off the case, hence, he asked
that if he was offered that much, how much could have been offered "to the
principals?"107

On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the Presiding
Justice and informed him of the episode in the office of Justice Sabio. He
also went to ask Justice Villarama for his opinion as to who was "the rightful
claimant" to the chairmanship of the Division that should decide the Meralco
case. Justice Villarama allegedly replied that they "were both correct."
On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-CMIS, Justice
Villarama had a "brief chat" with Justice Bruselas. The former told the latter
that "both Justices Sabio and Reyes are correct in the sense that one (1) [of]
them can properly assume chairmanship either under the exception provided
in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI of the 2002 IRCA depending on the final disposition of
the prayer for injunctive relief, or pursuant to the general rule enshrined in
Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI."108
On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the Presiding
Justice109 an "Interpleader Petition"110 praying that Presiding Justice Vasquez
"decide which division Chairman (Justice Sabios Former Special 9th Division
or Justice B. L. Reyes 8th Division) should sign the Preliminary Injunction or
Decision."111 Justice Roxas averred that "[t]he impasse between two
Chairmen from two Divisions has to be resolved much earlier than July 30,
2008 because July 30, 2008 is the expiration date of the TRO issued by the
Special 9th Division (signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q.
Roxas [ponente] and Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal)." He opined that the
two Chairpersons differed in the interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 (d) in
relation to Section 5 of Rule VI on Process of Adjudication of the Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA).112 His stand was that the IRCA "should
be strictly applied" because "[w]hen the provisions are clear, there is no
room for interpretation."
Justice Roxas endorsed his "Interpleader Petition" to Justice Reyes for his
"signature or dissent" to the "finalized MERALCO Decision," which had been
in Justice Reyes possession since July 14, 2008.113 He also gave the rollo of
the case to Justice Reyes.114
Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as Presiding
Justice, he had no authority to rule on the Interpleader Petition, which is not
an administrative concern over which the Presiding Justice must intervene.
Nevertheless, to avoid further discussion, the Presiding Justice told Justice
Roxas that he would study the matter.115
On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a letter on "what
was discussed between us last 17 July 2008 at around 3:30
p.m."116 Apparently the Presiding Justice had suggested "to endorse the case
and have the Special Ninth Division direct the respondents to file their
simultaneous comments on the petitioners Urgent Motion (For Honorable
BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the
Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008."
Justice Reyes expressed "doubts" that the suggestion was "most prudent,"
as the dispute "revolves around the correct interpretation" of the IRCA. He
believed that since the question was "purely internal," the CA should not seek

"enlightenment" from the litigants for it would only be construed against its
"competence." He shared Justice Cruzs and Roxas interpretation of the
IRCA. Hence, he urged the Presiding Justice to decide the matter; otherwise,
he would interpret the rules according to his "best lights and act accordingly."
On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of CA G. R.
No. SP No. 103692 so he could "properly submit the requested opinion." It
was then that he came across the unresolved motion praying for the
inhibition of Justice Roxas and the pending urgent motion to lift the TRO or to
hold its enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice considered the latter
as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution issuing the TRO. 117
Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet received "any
reaction" from the Presiding Justice, he signed the decision as well as the
Certification. It was promulgated on the same day.
The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding Justices
opinion on whether it was the Eighth or Special Ninth Division that should
decide the case. Justice Roxas alleged that he did not expect the Presiding
Justice to "answer" or resolve the matter anyway.
On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to Justice
Reyes letter and Justice Roxas "Interpleader-Petition." The Presiding
Justice claimed having doubts on whether he possessed "the authority to
decide the subject conflict" simply because under the IRCA, the Presiding
Justice has control and supervision only over administrative affairs of the
Court. The controversy was certainly not an administrative matter but Section
11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding Justice "has the
authority to act on any matter not covered" by the Rules although such action
should be reported to the Court en banc.
The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that "the (Special
Ninth) Division that issued the temporary restraining order should continue
resolving the injunctive prayer in the petition" because it was the Division that
issued the Resolution granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, aside from the
fact that the parties did not contest the authority of Justice Sabio as Division
Chairman at the time, although Justice Reyes had reported back to work.
Moreover, the motion for inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO
"have a bearing" on the application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA,
especially because Section 7 (b) of Rule VI118 points to the retention of the
case by the Special Ninth Division. Furthermore, the new Division headed by
Justice Reyes may not be allowed to resolve the pending incidents because
two of its members, Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not participate in the
hearing on June 23, 2008. He did not believe that Justice Reyes would be
charged with dereliction of duty should he not assume the chairmanship. The
Presiding Justice ended his letter with the hope that the matter would be "laid
to rest" and that whoever would be dissatisfied "with its outcome may elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court."

At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding Justice that a
decision had been promulgated in the Meralco case the previous day. The
Presiding Justice was surprised because Justices Roxas and Reyes had
asked him to resolve the impasse on the Division chairmanship. Upon
inquiry, the Presiding Justice found that the decision had indeed been
promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23, 2008.119
It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal received a call
from Justice Sabio, informing her that Meralco had offered him a bribe of P10
million "in exchange for his voluntary stepping out from the Meralco case in
order to give way to Justice B. L. Reyes," and that the decision in the
Meralco case had been promulgated by the Eighth Division. 120 Shocked that
Justice Roxas did not inform her "as a matter of judicial courtesy" of the
scrapping of the decision which she signed on July 8, 2008, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24,
2008,121bringing to his attention "the apparent and obvious irregularities in the
handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692," and complaining about Justice Roxas
"lack of judicial courtesy" in discarding for reasons she would not know, his
"purported final Decision" that he had asked her to sign and which she
signed "after a judicious study of the records and rollo thereof." Justice
Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had "to incorporate therein some ten
pages which he forgot to include in his Decision."
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed "surprise and consternation" when she
learned "on even date that a Decision" in the case had been promulgated on
July 23, 2008 by the Eighth Division chaired by Justice Reyes, with Justices
Roxas and Bruselas as members. She said:
My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed the
supposed final draft of the Decision in the instant case which bears
the signature of the ponente, was not even informed by the latter as
a judicial courtesy at least, of the hurried easing out of the
undersigned from the case. This inevitably posed even to an
unprejudiced mind the following questions: under what basis was the
case suddenly transferred to the 8th Division and why is it that
neither the undersigned nor the Acting Chairman Justice SABIO, of
the Special 9th Division not consulted thereof? and, foremost, what
happened to the Decision which the undersigned signed after
devoting her precious time and effort in carefully and laboriously
examining the voluminous records and rollo of the case?
Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a flagrant
violation of the provision of Canon 5 particularly Sections 2 and 3
thereof of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).
On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a
letter,122 which was "prompted by a disturbing telephone call" he received
from Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24, 2008. Justice Sabio informed
Justice Bruselas that, "after the injunction hearing" on June 23, 2008,
Meralco offered him P10 Million "to either favor them or yield the chair" to

Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he had informed the
Presiding Justice of the "bribery incident" and that he "was disgusted over
the turn of events because he should have remained chair of the Special 9th
Division that issued the TRO on the case." Justice Bruselas informed Justice
Sabio that it was the first time that he heard of the matter and that he had
"participated in the deliberation on the case and concurred with
the ponencia" of Justice Roxas "without such information ever being taken
up." Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would not leave the matter
"as it is" because he would bring it up in the "open, to media, etc." Justice
Sabio asked Justice Bruselas that if P10M was offered to him, how much
would have been offered to the "others."
Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the Presiding Justice
where Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, who had received the same call from Justice
Sabio, joined them. After that meeting with the Presiding Justice, Justice
Bruselas called up Justice Reyes who confirmed that he had heard about the
"bribe offer" but that he did not reveal the same to Justice Bruselas as it
"escaped" his mind. The effort of Justice Bruselas "to get in touch" with
Justice Roxas proved futile.
Allegedly prompted by "the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived
at, and how the decision was promulgated," and that unless an "immediate
and thorough investigation thereon be undertaken" by the Court of Appeals,
"both the individual and institutional integrity of the justices" and of the Court
of Appeals would "undoubtedly be tarnished," Justice Sabio wrote on July 26,
2008 a letter123 to the Presiding Justice, which precipitated the present
investigation.
On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer "carried an account" of the
letter of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to the Presiding Justice, without her
knowing how her confidential letter to the Presiding Justice leaked out. 124
Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding Justice, he
received a copy of the letter of Justice Sabio and, through a telephone call,
reiterated his "full agreement with his desired investigation."
The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an "emergency en
banc session at 10:00 a.m. on July 31, 2008 at the Session Hall to elicit the
reaction of the Court and on the "possible effect" on the decision rendered.
The session was also called in order that the "predicament experienced in
CA-G.R. SP No. 103692" could be deliberated upon by the Committee on
Rules with a view to amending the IRCA on the reorganization of the Court of
Appeals. The Executive Justices of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, Justices
Antonio L. Villamor and Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to
attend the en banc session to report to the other Justices in their stations
what transpired at the session, and to "collect the personal reaction,
comment or view" of the Justices on the matter.125
In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, "after a torrid discussion
of all the issues," the Court of Appeals decided, as follows:

(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned

to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator;
(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision rendered in
the above-entitled case to the parties for them to take whatever legal
steps they may deem appropriate in the usual course of procedure;
and
(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules to the
Committee on Rules of the Court of Appeals in order to prevent the
recurrence of a similar situation.126
After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in a letter for
the Presiding Justice127her "strong reaction" to the paper of Justice Roxas
"falsely" imputing to her "grandstanding before the media or resorting to
media-recourse instead of just filing an administrative complaint before the
Supreme Court," and taking exception to "the equally outrageous, revolting
and baseless accusation that she is allegedly clinging" to the case. She
asserted that she never leaked a copy of her letter to the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, as her letter was only intended to bring to the attention of the
Presiding Justice "the impropriety done by Justice Roxas in the MERALCO
case" that resulted in her having been eased out of the case notwithstanding
that she "carefully and judiciously" examined theponencia with more than 50
pages, after devoting her "precious time" to such study, and affixing her
concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated her prayer for an
investigation of the matter.
Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit admitting that he
was the businessman referred to by Justice Sabio, Jr. in his letter to
Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De Borja publicly claimed having learned
"from the news" that Justice Sabio was "one of the justices" in the case
arising from the order of the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in favor of the
MERALCO management. He also alleged that Justice Sabio told him about
the "blandishments coming from the government side," that he was being
offered a promotion to the Supreme Court and money to favor the GSIS
position. Mr. De Borja asked Justice Sabio, Jr., "What would it take for you to
resist the governments offer?" and that the response of Justice Sabio, Jr.
was "Fifty Million."
Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to hold a press
conference the next day on account of the publicized affidavit of Mr. De
Borja. The Presiding Justice told Justice Sabio that "this is a matter of selfdefense on his part," hence, the Presiding Justice cannot stop him from
doing so.
Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an "initial response" to the
affidavit of Mr. De Borja, "vehemently" denying that Mr. De Borja asked him
what it would take for him to inhibit from the case, and that he "never asked
for money" from him.128

On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to read a

signed statement entitled "My Reaction to Mr. Francis De Borjas Affidavit
dated July 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC Case."
Expressing anger at the "filthy lie" of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio decided to
narrate "almost word for word" his "conversations" with Mr. De Borja.
In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn Clavano 129 executed in
Davao City, she stated that Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number of
Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. He related that because he was very close
to the Lopezes of Meralco, he wanted to call him regarding his
possible inhibition in a certain Meralco case, wherein he was
designated as a substitute member of the division vice a justice who
was temporarily on leave by reason of sickness. He further said that
the Lopezes desire that the same Justice, with whom the Lopezes
are more comfortable, to sit in the division.
So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice Jose. L.
Sabio, Jr. through business card.
xxx
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x x x.
On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel of Investigators
to investigate "(1) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v.
SEC, et al.) and (2) the alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed
respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja."
The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23, 2008. Affidavits
were submitted to the Panel to serve as the parties direct testimonies upon
which they were cross-examined by the Panel and the other parties.
On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted its Report of
even date to the Court en banc.
According to the Report, "the investigation has revealed irregularities and
improprieties committed by the Court of Appeals Justices in connection with
the MERALCO case, CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, which are detrimental to the
proper administration of justice and damaging to the institutional integrity,
independence and public respect for the Judiciary." 130
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas
Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the parties
prior to the promulgation of the Decision.
As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or
acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were enumerated in the Report as
follows:
(a) The "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of
the Petition Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle" filed by GSIS on May
29, 2008 soon after this case was filed on that date (Rollo, pp. 185186).

b) GSIS "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit" Justice Roxas, which

was filed on May 30, 2008.As the motion raised a prejudicial
question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before issuing
the TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did (Rollo, pp. 220223).
(c) GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008 (Rollo,
pp. 187-210)
(d) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to
use Power point at the hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20,
2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both motions were not acted
upon by Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)
(e) Meralcos "Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated
Memorandum of Authorities and Reply to Repondent SECs
Comment" filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 981- 987).
(f) Meralcos "Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case,"
which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 12621274).131 (emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Panel of Investigators that "by ignoring or refusing to act
on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third
paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve such motion in
writing with copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding
Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court." The pertinent
portion of the said provision states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. - x x x
xxx
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by
him alone in writing, copy furnished the other members of the
Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division
Clerk of Court.
This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that the issuance of
the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the motion to inhibit since under
IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is mandatory.
Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding that "Justice
Roxas failure to act on the other motions of the parties violated Canon 3,
Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies in a
suppletory manner to the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary) providing that:
"Rule 3.05. - A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods."
Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that
"[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness." Thus, it has
become well-settled in jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the

resolving pending motions or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed

by law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.132 With more
reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of Justice
Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No.
103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited
administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents in cases assigned to
him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court
imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving
two motions for reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him that
future commission any act of impropriety will be dealt with more severely.
Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.
Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the
Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found that he had been dishonest
and untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court adopts the following
findings of the Panel:
2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.
(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the "Transcript of Final Decision,"
which is supposed to be a transcript of the deliberation on July 14,
2008 of the Eighth Division on the final decision in the Meralco case
was not a true "transcript" of the minutes of the meeting, but purely a
"transcript from memory" because no notes were taken, no
stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in
fact a drama which he composed "from my recollection" to comply
with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that "minutes of the
meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept." The so-called "transcript" is
a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been compliance when actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA
that consultation and/or deliberation among the members of the
Division must precede the drafting of a decision.
(b) The statement in the "transcript" that it was a "recap from our
previous deliberations" was another falsehood because there had
been no previous deliberations.
(c) The reference in the "transcript" to a "Final Report of Justice
Roxas" was also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did not submit a
"report" as ponente, as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for
deliberation by the Eighth Division on July 14, 2008. The "Final
Report" which he submitted was admittedly the decision itself which
he and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The "Final Report"
was merely the title of the page that served as the cover of the
decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes supposed closing statement in
the "transcript" that -- "We have covered every angle of the Final
Report of Justice Roxas extensively" is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes
testified at the investigation that he had not seen the "transcript" until

the copy in therollo was shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during
his cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he brought the Meralco
decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a
draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not for
her to sign it, is completely false. This testimony was labelled by
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called Justice Roxas a
liar, because she did not ask to borrow the decision for her reading
pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought it to her office for her
to sign as a member of the Special Ninth Division. After poring over it
the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3) additional
signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies
of the decision.133
xxx
xxx
xxx
Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred
to the Panel in explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the
Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the qualification of integrity and
honesty expected of a magistrate and a member of the appellate court.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious
offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the
Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dishonesty is likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the
penalty of dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had
the occasion to rule that:
dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses
warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon the
commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court
did not hesitate to impose such extreme punishment on employees
found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the government
service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.134
Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in
the Court of Appeals.
The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague
and a lady at that, when he unceremoniously discarded, shredded,
and burned the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed,
because he allegedly forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and
Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been "reorganized out" of the Special
Ninth Division as of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case.

Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice DimarananVidal the reason why he was not promulgating the decision which
she had signed.
The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice
Villarama, Jr. on which Division should decide the Meralco case, may
have been convinced that it should be the Special Ninth Division.
That is why he brought his decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for
her signature. However, somehow, somewhere, during the night,
while Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision,
Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his decision to the Eighth
Division (to which he and Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4,
2008 reorganization of the Court), it may have dawned on him that if
the case remained in the Special Ninth Division, Justice Sabio, Jr.
might dissent, requiring the Presiding Justice to constitute a special
division of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a majority of
the Division on his side, he would lose his ponencia; someone else
would become the ponente (perhaps Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be
the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-Vidal
(even if the latter concurred with his decision) because he was
unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his
companions in the Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and
Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and Meralco were "comfortable".
(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez,
Jr. whose ruling on his "Interpleader Petition" he sought on July 21,
2008, but he promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days later, on
July 23, 2008, without waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.s
ruling which came out on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the
Interpleader Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice
B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing his request for Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the same chairmanship issue raised in the
Interpleader. Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed and
humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes and Roxas lack of courtesy and
respect for his position as head of the Court.
xxx
xxx
xxx
There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If
judges and justices are expected to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates
with respect and fairness, with more reason, that judges and justices should
give their fellow magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due to
them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are expected to "carry out judicial
duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the
parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance
of such duties."
This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in
his apparent haste to promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated

his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all
magistrates that their high office demands compliance with the most exacting
standards of propriety and decorum.
Justice Roxas questionable handling of the Meralco case demonstrates his
undue interest therein.
In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact
began drafting his decision even prior to the submission of the parties
memoranda. As discussed in the Report:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on
June 23, 2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their
memoranda and memoranda of authorities, and actually submitted:
On July 7, 2008 - GSISs 39 page- memorandum
On July 9, 2008 - SECs 62 page-memorandum
On July 10, 2008 - MERALCOs 555 page- memorandum (by
messenger) with memorandum of authorities
Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their
memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
for her signature on July 8, 2008. His "rush to judgment" was
indicative of "undue interest and unseemly haste," according to
J.Romero.
He cheated the parties counsel of the time, effort, and energy that
they invested in the preparation of their ponderous memoranda
which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other members of the
Eighth Division bothered to read before signing his decision. He
made a mockery of his own order for the parties to submit
memoranda, and rendered their compliance a futile exercise.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(underscoring supplied)
We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the "rush to
judgment" (even before the filing of the parties memoranda) was indicative of
Justice Roxas undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when taken
together with other circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the
case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas failure to resolve the
several pending incidents and instead jumping ahead to deciding the case on
the merits; his "rushing" of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his draft
Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties memoranda have not yet all been
filed with the CA; his precipitate transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for
promulgation of decision, without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the
Special Ninth Division who had already signed his draft Decision and despite
the unresolved Chairmanship dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice
Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding Justice for
appropriate action, just a few days before the promulgation.

We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice,
judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance
respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must
not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must
also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the
peoples faith in the judiciary. This standard applies not only to the decision
itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. 135 This Court will
not hesitate to sanction with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit
manifest undue interest in their assigned cases.136
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations of the canons
of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitute grave misconduct, compounded
by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, which warrant his DISMISSAL from the service.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed
improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.
The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother
Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to uphold the standard of
independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the appellate
court.
In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up
Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a resquest
for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding
the fact that Chairman Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the "rightness"
of the GSIS cause and asked him "to help GSIS" and that Justice Sabio
allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance with his
conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
"A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court."
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court
how the brothers can justify their improper conversation regarding the
Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilos
effort to influence his younger brothers action in the Meralco case,
because both believe that our Filipino culture allows brother-tobrother conversation, even if the purpose of one is to influence the
other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal. 137
For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide
that Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently
x x x free from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure,

threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for

any reason.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate
connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative
branches of government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.
In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of
Meralco contrary to his brothers advice, Justice Sabios "unusual interest in
holding on to the Meralco case," seemed to indicate that he may have been
actually influenced by his brother "to help GSIS." In arriving at this
conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio
adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division
although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to duty on June
10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution
(a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and
the SEC to comment on Meralcos "Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume
the Chairmanship of the 9th Division," which he probably intended to delay
the decision on the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the
prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.
Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice
Sabio had been influenced by his brother by speculating that he would have
favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the decision
in the Meralco case. However, we do find that it was improper for Justice
Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the
return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabios designation as acting chairman
was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes leave of absence. We
likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation
of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards equally well-reasoned
positions of his colleagues on the proper interpretation of their rules. Such
conduct on the part of Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and
amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned the
flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of behavior
unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.
Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and
indiscreet.
On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:
Knowing the nature of De Borjas profession, Justice Sabio, Jr.
should have been wary of the former. He should have foreseen that

De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind when he called Justice
Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja mentioned the Meralco case and
congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour
of Meralco.
But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De
Borja. A month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the
hearing of Meralcos prayer for preliminary injunction on June 23,
2008, and the case was ripening for decision or resolution, De Borja
again called up Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner
to "chit chat" about the Meralco case.
Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk
about the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja
in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his evening class
in Legal Ethics in said school.
Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the Meralco case with De
Borja was highlyinappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks with his
brother; the second time in conversation with De Borja, Justice
Sabio, Jr. broke the shield of confidentiality that covers the
disposition of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the
integrity and independence of the Court itself. He ignored the
injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: "Judges shall exhibit and
promote high standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in
order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is
fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence."
It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the
Ateneo Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him P10 million,
in behalf of Meralco, to step out of the case and allow Justice
Bienvenido Reyes to assume the chairmanship of the Special Ninth
Division because Meralco was "not comfortable" with him (Justice
Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the bribe offer because he "could not in
conscience accept it."
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja
would think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or
bought. The Panel is, however, honestly perplexed why in spite of his
outraged respectability, Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De Borja two (2)
days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop "pestering" him
with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person
who has been insulted would never want to see, much less speak
again, to the person who had disrespected him. He could have just
shut off his cell phone to De Borjas calls. De Borja denied that he
reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied
saying that even if the case should go up to the Supreme Court,
GSIS would still lose, hence, "saying lang yung P10 million; baka
sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo." He testified that his reply to Justice

Sabio, Jr.s call was "deadma" or indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr.

blamed that call of his to a "lapse in judgment" on his part.
Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice
Sabio, Jr.s story about De Borjas P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of
Meralco, than De Borjas denial that he made such an offer. Why
does the Panel believe him, and not De Borja?
First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe
offer to CA Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribeofferors name in both his verbal and written reports to Presiding
Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to the media as the
person alluded to.
Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50
million, not P10 million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr.
quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported the P10
million bribe offer to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would have
waited for Meralcos reply to his counter-offer.138
xxx
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xxx
Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on
the part of Justice Sabio is not credible. Nevertheless, the continued
communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the
latters rejected bribery attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor
judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in preservation
of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he belongs.
Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabios indiscreet
and imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother
and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice
Reyes constitute simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of
the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2) months suspension
without pay.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes.
As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice
Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice Reyes)
request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division of the
Court of Appeals - the Eighth Division with him as chairman, or the Special
Ninth Division chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case.
This was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the
same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that the Presiding
Justice informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter,
Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas,
promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. Justice
Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request for a ruling nor did
either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their intention to

proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding
Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he
was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008,
under the aegis of Justice Reyes Eighth Division. As found by the Panel,
"Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned
about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his opinion on the
chairmanship issue which by then had become functus oficio. He felt belittled
and humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him."
It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show the appropriate
consideration and respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.
Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes
guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly
asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the
conflicting interpretation of the IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be
reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case without
awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.
Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of
Investigators, to wit:
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed
herself to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision
on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties memoranda and without
the deliberation among members of the Division required by the
IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until July 30, 2008 some three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 - yet she allowed
herself to believe Justice Roxas misrepresentation that signing the
decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling
practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the IRCA,
showed weakness and lack of independence on her part. 139
The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are
instructive in this regard:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on
the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a
conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent
from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is
obliged to make independently.
Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure
constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her
judicial duties.

Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M.

Vasquez
It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez
failed to provide the leadership expected of him as head of the Court of
Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the perceived
lapses on the part of the Presiding Justice:
Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in
dealing with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case.
He vacillated and temporized on resolving the impasse between
Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of
the Division that should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed
to take action on the reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr.
He hesitated to assert his leadership of the Court even when the
parties repeatedly urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow.
Was he hampered by the fact that he has relatives - two daughters employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He
pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then, or did he discover
too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is in
fact authorized to act "on any matter"involving the Court and its
members? That Rule provides:
Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in
his place is authorized to act on any matter not covered
by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be reported
to the Court en banc.
He should have convened the Court en banc as soon asthe alleged
bribery attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was
an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court, calling for the
"protection and preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes"
of the Court, hence, an administrative matter cognizable by the
Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:
Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The
Court en banc
shall, inter alia:
(a) x x x
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures,
and policies for the protection and preservation of the
integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.
Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his "lapses in judgment." 140
In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the
view that much of the trouble now being faced by the Court of Appeals could
have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive action on the part of the
Presiding Justice. Certainly, this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to
act in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed
upon him what is required of him as leader of the second highest court in the
land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby severely

reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy
as required of him by the IRCA.
Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco case
Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred
to this Court "the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned" in the
Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light
during the investigation that relate to potential liabilities of other personalities
in the Meralco case.
With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline
members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a member of the Judiciary,
his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate
action.
With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court
reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be criminally liable for his attempt to
bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to
the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per
curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court en banc. At the
outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse themselves was
denied by the Court. Except for two members of the Court who were allowed
to inhibit themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve
Justices voted for the dismissal from service of Associate Justice Vicente Q.
Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service for six (6)
months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service
without pay of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month
suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited for being a
"whistle blower" and one (1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight (8)
Justices voted to reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five
(5) for his suspension from the service for one (1) month. As to the rest, the
voting was unanimous.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:
(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple
violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave
misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the service, with
FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits if any,
with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the
government including government-owned and controlled
corporations;
(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of
Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant
a more severe penalty;

(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY

REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and decisively in order
to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of
Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple
misconduct with mitigating circumstance and is REPRIMANDED,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
warrant a more severe penalty;
(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of
conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court of Appeals and is
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her
judicial duties.
(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence the judgment
of a member of the Judiciary in a pending case is hereby referred to
the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;
(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr. Francis R. De
Borja for attempted bribery of a member of the Judiciary is hereby
referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
2. Temporarily assign judges to other stations in public interest
3. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice
People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 (1975)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING
ABANO, defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION

AQUINO, J.:
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the
transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame,
Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the
municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is
charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were

to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are
many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of the
adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his
father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while hearing mass
at the Vigan cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a
gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate him. He could even
be lynched or shot to death on the specious pretext that he was trying to
escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified
his conformity to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New Bilibid
Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to
"order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice".
Here, what is involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal
safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to
undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a
justification for transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503, 103, W.
Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1wph1.t
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves
not merely the change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of
the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949 to another court. According to
Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence against him is in the custody of the
authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of Criminal Case No.
3949 to the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp
Crame appear to be the most convenient arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record
of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City where it should
be re-docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at
Camp Crame. The usual precautions and security measures should be
adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of
the hearing.
Mondiguing v. Abad, 68 SCRA 14 (1975)

ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES DUNUAN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Ifugao; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; MARIANO PACTIW, alias
Bugbug; DULMOG ABLUYEN and ANGELINA ABLUYEN,respondents..
R E S O L U T I O N.

AQUINO, J.:
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants
accused of double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in
Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao Province
(People vs. George Bayucca et al.). That case was filed in connection with
an ambuscade which was perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue,
Ifugao. As a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao
was wounded and his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Up to
this time the accused in that case have not been arraigned. .
On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this Court a petition
to transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed
that they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because
Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of that province is a
protege' of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman Romulo
Lumauig, and because their witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of
harassment and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed that, as may be
inferred from previous incidents recounted in the petition, their lives and the
lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao
because of the tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the
political rivalry between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The accused,
George Bayucca was killed on October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing
resigned as mayor of Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City). .
The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of venue
but he invited the Court's attention to the suggestion of Governor Lumauig
that the case may be transferred to the proper court in Isabela in view of its
proximity to Ifugao. .
Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment disputed the
correctness or truth of the grounds relied upon for the change of venue and

prayed that the petition be dismissed. He said that, if there would be bias on
his part, he would be biased in favor of the People of the Philippines. He said
that the crime charged was not "committed personally against" Governor
Lumauig. That statement is not correct since the governor is one of the
victims mentioned in the information. .
Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan sent to the court a letter dated
August 30, 1975 wherein he declined the services of Atty. Jose W. Diokno
(who filed the instant petition for transfer of venue). In view of that disclosure,
the petition herein should be regarded as having been filed only by Alipio
Mondiguing. .
The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974,
56 SCRA 522, 534, disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests
filed by Crescencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto Lumauig
and John Langbayan. In that case it was alleged that Judge Abad was a
political leader of Governor Lumauig and was recommended to his present
position by the Lumauig brothers. .
The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified. A
change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for
whimsical or flimsy reasons. "The interests of the public require that, to
secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary
to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be,
where he committed his crime" (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20
Phil. 523, 562). .
This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the
Constitution). It "possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the
trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be
transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district
whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious
and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had
jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead
to a miscarriage of justice" (People vs. Gutierrez, L-32282-83, November 26,
1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185). .
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown
that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the
trial was originally scheduled to be held (People vs. Pilotin Vincent Crisologo,
movant, L-3537778, July 31, 1975).

After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in Mondiguing's

petition to support his request for a change of the place of trial, we have
reached the conclusion that his petition is meritorious. .
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice
and considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in
Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of
Baguio. .
The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is that he be transferred from
the Philippine Constabulary headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao to Camp Crame
should be submitted for the consideration of the Circuit Criminal Court. .
WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the transfer of the venue
of Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao is granted.
The said case should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District so that it may be heard in Baguio City. .
People v. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO
(ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN
(ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER,
OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM,
ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed
DOES respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of
venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained
in the implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which,
even if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must
have been the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio
Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that
must have led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to
certain fundamentals. They ignored the principle that the responsibility for the
conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned.

Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need for a change
of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that further
action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one
day after the filing of the petition, the Court required the comment of the
Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents, 4 the accused in six
pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition
was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706,
People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on
behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only
by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors
that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of
the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it
did not press the legal point but instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of
the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal
Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail
to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for
a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the
evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a
search warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of seven
persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his
hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September
16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP
Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield
yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez,
Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie
Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980,
the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate
complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia,
Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14)
other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal
Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's
witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause
against the accused. It thus issued an order for their a. rest. However,

without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of
guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for
their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and
Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been
released from detention. In a parallel development. the witnesses in the
murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at
the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers
from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the
accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have
been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large.
Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made
on the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the
remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail
bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following
resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor
General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail
bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by
certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by
Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue
or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice;
(b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo
Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at
Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from
January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis
and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and
(c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without
prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to
assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a
change of venue has become moot and academic. The comments
respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981,
respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola
on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the
bail bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with the case
thereafter deemed submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of
respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the

prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital

offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner.
The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the
place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The Constitution
is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place
of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of
1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v.
Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and
categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the
prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at
liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process,
and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the
Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable
Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The
witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be
killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial.
Because of qqqts fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to
save their lives. 13 Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such
transfer, but his preference is for a court anywhere in Metro
Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the
question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made
clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added that there
may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals,
be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on
the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the
Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be
resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be
a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have
been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is
justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the
change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail
was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without
hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine
enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano,
speaking for the Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the
prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the
affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail

of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a

summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must
be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation
of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to
mind: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant
charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an
opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every
concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable
men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the
pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due
to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which
is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires
that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions
asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized
as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to
private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force
and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of
the resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the
petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly
heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
4. Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary
5. Promulgate rules concerning the enforcement and protection of
constitutional rights
6. Promulgate Rules Concerning Pleading, Practice and Procedure
7. Admission to the Practice of Law
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M.

GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman

under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by
petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special
Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this
Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public
statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of
the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the
criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 8600778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as
respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez.
Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987
Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal
informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP

Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177
denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those
cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that
respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the
1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority
independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft
and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that
the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M.
Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).Acting on
the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the
Court Resolved, without giving due course to the
petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT
thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161
and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique
Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving
the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated
September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari
and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming
only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24
September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 8701304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and
corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other

individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the

Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such
criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for
the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving
due course to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to
submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining
order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and
particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and
from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate
resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578
were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior
to issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No.
80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No.
12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an
Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued
the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the
Solicitor General for respondents for an extension of
thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period
within which to file comment on the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the
Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court Resolved
to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party
respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing
the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE
and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 8701304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique
Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and

continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering

respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan
to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in Criminal
Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs.
Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order
of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No.
80578, and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to
Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited
as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the
filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570
before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in
G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion
a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared
in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday
the Supreme Court order stopping him from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique
Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent
persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is
that it appears that while rich and influential persons get
favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult
for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due
course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive
interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the
people's apprehension over the justice system in this
country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes
go scot-free."

Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal

last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the
Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against
him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his
investigations because the latter wanted to help
promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique,
lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped
Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against the
governor, and from instituting any complaint with the
Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to
prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and
mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining
me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said
he had filed graft cases against two "very powerful"
officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner
Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of
the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar
petition before the Supreme Court, I am a little bit
disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of
some people that affluent persons can prevent the
progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive
over the weekend and that while she symphatizes with
local officials who are charged in court during election
time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people
and the voters who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local
officials during election time could be mere harassment
suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to

be informed of the character of tile candidate, who

should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16
February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on
aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988,
the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated
Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner
Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations
filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and
desist from conducting investigations and filing criminal
cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising
the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the
next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after
having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following
statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the
Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading
member of the court ... and he was asked to 'go slow on
Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from
investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in
the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;"
and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against (two Members of the Court)."

Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten

notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some members of this
Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e.,
the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration
with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the
above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next
several days carried long reports on those statements and variations
and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the
following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon.
Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A.
Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988, the
Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT
thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has
made public statements to the media which not only
deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to
and disrespectful of the Court and its individual
members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring
the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to
denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the
Court Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez to
explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice
hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of
court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for
making such public statements reported in the media,
among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the
"Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the
"Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila
Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an
offshoot of the position he had taken that the SC
Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors or motivated
by a desire to stop him 'from investigating cases against
some of their proteges or friends;"

(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court

"interceded for and on behalf of persons with pending
cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure
him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues
and friends;"

members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with
substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out
his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court
Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the
deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.

(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow

on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on him and to refrain
from investigating the Commission on Audit report on
illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it
will embarass the Court;

On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per
curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately
executory.

(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal

of cases against two Associate Justices; and

Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of

record:

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme

or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to

Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;

3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to

the purpose of and circumstances attendant upon the
notes written to said public respondent by three (3)
members of the Court have since been submitted to the
Court and now form part of its official records, the Court
further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH
to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and
the annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT
respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within
the same period of ten (10) days.

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines 21dated 20 May 1988

4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of

February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent Gonzalez
was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the
Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE
SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to
REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.

(b) For Inhibition and

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988

an Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among
other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court
"appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against
him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an
impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4

3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File

Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May
1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time

(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the

IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex
"A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the
alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court
and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988;
and

7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion

1988.

27

member

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted

earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer
with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges
presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex
"A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called
"Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on
22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to
discipline officers of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme
Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline
lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate
admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to
an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the
furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with
a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is
"necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with
the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the
complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play
in cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to
discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority
of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to
punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both by
lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where
the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority
of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the

Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into

play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is
charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for
contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority
of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an
officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task
and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action
against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at
one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez
first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in
the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A
little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from
passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this
Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially
and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the
proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in
such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re
Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had
occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the
exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as Atty.
Almacen would have it appear, the members of the
Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all
rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the

nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role

therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not
and does not involvea trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it
is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
property and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain
degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court
as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof But in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an
entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but only as a duly
constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in
the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense,
if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only
be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof
as well as the people themselveswhose rights, fortunes
and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave
hazard should the administration of justice be

threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to

discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in
the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice
of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it
cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that
even if it be conceded that the members collectively are
in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not
and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the
power because public policy demands that they, acting
as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the
end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of
the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge
is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to
disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would
prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements
of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the
members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate
the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them.
Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the
Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under
the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where
the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no
need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not
substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote
certain statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had
the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that
he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those
statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the
exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be
resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not
any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.

III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez
was saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied
making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the
newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially
correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme
Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it
rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez,
was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the
position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim
immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in
order to stop respondent from investigating against "some of (the)
proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court
cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of
27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying
respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated
Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter,
is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the
Court set out in its per curiamDecision and Resolution in the
consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the
seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the
Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of
the system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has
said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard
to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial
process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions
he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties.
It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater
outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this.
Respondent's statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's
statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his
continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this
Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated
Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court
rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day
later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective
immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from

hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by

respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24
November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for
Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from
further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally
reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue
pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could
scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of
the Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to
render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including
dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This
particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a
cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three
(3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent
attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court
of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and
respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject
matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order
to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to
the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately
rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with
great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court.
Once again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear
designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among
the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and,
more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing
him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was
in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand
and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and
powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing
or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation
can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely
bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the
Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of
revolutionary class war.

Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed

judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due
process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to
the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total
picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of
an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous"
decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts
arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of
law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court as
an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable.
Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2)
judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations,
he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative
cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence
in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both
strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures
there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen
the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate
to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept
does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type
proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one
may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to
explain why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected
to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to
above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to
inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the
following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit
[themselves] in the contempt and administrative
charges against the respondent, in the light of the
manifest prejudice and anger they hold against
respondent as shown in the language of the resolution
on the Motion for Reconsideration;"

(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already

lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be
able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt
citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as
angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no china
man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and
possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this
Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation running
riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with
such venom by the entire Court in its decision denying
the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have
confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and
that he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the
members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased
demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined
to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a
specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be
the ponente, or at least prepare the decision."
(Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier
made, respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the
Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and
statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this
Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due
process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this
Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one
obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It
is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how
respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal
of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath
of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by
respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily

demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any
other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may
reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious or as
warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over
members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the
kinds of statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as
constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the
Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for
Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a
decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a
veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President
of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and
implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty.
del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals.
He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable
for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was
terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar
apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and
agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time
later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied
the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme
Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted
in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for
Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for
lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of
Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last
two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the case
entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would
have filed against the Justices supporting the same,
civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the
Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent

falsification committed by Mr. Gica,reversed for him the

decisions of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a
favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of
exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our
Government, so that they may well know them and work
for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis
supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively
dealt with for making the above statements. In his additional
explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and
outside of the Government. It is this state of things that
convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or
reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in
my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire
from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to
God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the
practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as
state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant
in and outside of the government as justification for his
contemptuous statements. In other words, he already
assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that
because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the
government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are
among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly
committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow
respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to
remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
support the Constitution and obey the laws of the

Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and

maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court).
But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to
their younger brethren its paramount importance. A
lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the
court exercising a high privilege and serving in the
noble mission of administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals
in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of
the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn
denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on
certiorari of the decision because We found no reason
for disturbing the appellate court's finding and
conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals
and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case
under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and
imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to
veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their
respective stand in the decision and the resolution that
spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but
pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect
for the two highest Court of the land when on the flimsy
ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by
claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment.
In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and
malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who
in the future will choose to enter this profession, We
wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to
imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes
it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its

officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic

institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members
of the bar, acting as counsel for MacArthur International Minerals
Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements
made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the
applicable law due to the mis-representation and
obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10,
1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled
that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any
and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to
cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government
agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the
light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many
of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme
Court intends to create a decision that in effect does
precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second
sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated
Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to
Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering,
judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect
thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion
charges "It that the brother of the Honorable Associate
Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party
who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and
illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the exparte preliminary injunction rendered in the aboveentitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and
predetermining this case even before the joining of an
issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat
the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto

Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the

Philippine Government by the President a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this
case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of
the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion
presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and
makes a number of side comments projecting what is
claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31,
1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which,
according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been
caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in
favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a
favored party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur
and filed a fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court,
which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by
the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when
in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the
above-entitled casewhich condition is prohibited by
the New Rules of CourtSection 1, Rule 51, and we
quote: "Justices; who may take part... . Only those
members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ... ." This requirement is especially
significant in the present instance because the member
who penned the decision was the very member who was
absent for approximately four months or more. This
provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in the
Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably
either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine
Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965,

required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of

the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of
property and/or to the United States Government, either
its executive or judicial branches or both, on the
grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary
vested rights by the Philippine Government without
either compensation or due process of law and invoking
the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of
all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amounting to more
than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In
his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find
language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.'
He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic
tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes
our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous and
illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that
the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this
case prejudiced and predetermined the case even
before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless
manner two justices of this Court for being interested in
the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the
decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose
son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board
of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President, a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In
this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem
that the principles thus established [the moral and
ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority

by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to

itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further
removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reasonfor a
belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the
Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be less likely to
engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a
particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that
the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible
todelicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect.
He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice
and Justice Castro not only were not free from the
appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that
their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out
that courts must be above suspicion at all times like
Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to
happen in our country, 'although the process has
already begun.

the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this

Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross
disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts
much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly
not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended
to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited
are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in
the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines
and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture
in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice
is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of
contempt of court.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's

accusations have no basis in fact and in law.The slur
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole
court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any
other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any
members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this
posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices
of this Court are appointed by the President and in that
sense may be considered to have each received a favor
from the President. Should these justices inhibit
themselves every time a case involving the
Administration crops up? Such a thought may not
certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof
would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We
would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system
of government operating in this country. Counsel is
presumed to know this. But why the unfounded
charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take

the case to the World Court and/or the United States
government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the
decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were in ejected. More
specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will
inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the
Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12,
1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke 'the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all
aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including
the sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty
million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of
this Court to decide the case' in its favor. A notice of
appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in
Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between
the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An

appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has

already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the
World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a
change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no
aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never
be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief
that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to
the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer
to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a
lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31
SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest
against what he asserted was "a great injustice committed against his
client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by
this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not
only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people may
know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may]
never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of
his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published
statements attributed to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition,
said he did not expose the tribunal's'unconstitutional
and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions
or appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen

deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen
said in this petition, 'where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his
title by which he earns his living, the present members
of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination,
and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31
SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him. His explanation,
which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings
that can be found in all courts and government offices.
We have added only two more symbols, that it is also
deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of
this Court has ever heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or
given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the
above statement. We only described the impersonal
state of Things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and
confidence in the members of this Court and for which
reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate,
IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may
be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our
self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this Court, there is no
choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572;
emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected.
The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law
holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had
exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was
dismissed by this Court, made the following statements in his Motion
for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of
the resolution of this Honorable Court dated April
20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of
Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court
promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on
the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the
most important right in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation
which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be
upheld and protected by all means, because the rule of
law creates and preserves peace and order and gives
satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when
the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort,
sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the
cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated

again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme

Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated
people should keep their temper under control at all
times! But justice should be done to all concerned to
perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the
earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the
dignity of the Court and required counsel to show cause why
administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later
explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of
Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of
such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these
explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for
reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and
disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two
employees is but a covert threat upon the members of
the Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful
language contained in a pleading filed in courts are
constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly
decided(Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs.
Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil.
151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785,
September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April
29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the
present case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a
member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 580Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges
who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right to
expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily
that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the
cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the
fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not,
and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the

propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts

require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61
Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the
Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item
which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty.
Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication
of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No.
53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of
Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to
suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge
the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to
say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of
the majority of its members. In the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during
these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an
end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the
first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is
now constituted, the Supreme Court of today
constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It
need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf
may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from
the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor
and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598;
emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of
good faith and his invocation of the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show
cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court,
through Mr. Justice Feria, said-

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the
last years committing deliberately so many blunders and
injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on
the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower and degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark
to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief
for their grievances or protection of their rights when
these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the
courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion
before the Supreme Court which contained the following paragraph (in
translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of
record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our
power in order that this error may be corrected by the
very court which has committed it, because we should
not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of

the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press

publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, thejudicial
outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the
victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard
the prestige of this honorable court and of each and
every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at
the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the
public lose confidence in the administration of
justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be
declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it was
not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above,
the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court,
an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court
and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less than having
proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of
the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the
rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because
the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words
'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means
exactly the same as all these, according to the
Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the
Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language,
15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion
of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a
member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in
the least necessary, because in order to call the
attention of the court in a special way to the essential
points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the
force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said
motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it
is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort

to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done,

because both means are annoying and good practice
can ever sanction them by reason of their natural
tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a
serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial
matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less
veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated
therein, after the author shows the course which the
voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his
attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose
of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he
states in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the court,
thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in
order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions
of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote
distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of
public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days
ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the
dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority
thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the
sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation,
it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that
it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court,
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty
bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend
its integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him
the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158
and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In
re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also
because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes
distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents

anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent

which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that
bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed
exhaust our case law on this matter. In the following cases, among
others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively
disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from
those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441
(1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution
(unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt
Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939);
and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which

the Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting
application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold
that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially
the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and
unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that
the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak
vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of
disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and
degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system
of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless
charges have had some impact outside the internal world of subjective
intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for
impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent
members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a
repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court
deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the
respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely
exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the
related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair
criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court.
What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance
of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery
of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put it:

... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent

judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press.
Neither has primacy over the other; both are
indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press
in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through
which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And
one of the potent means for assuring judges their
independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the
following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech
and press. This constitutional right must be protected in
its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given
evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the
Libel Law which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The
liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the
press and of the citizens should not be confused with
liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free
exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance
of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the
Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to
scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by
subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the
parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the
capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control professional
misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost,
indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man.
Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's
right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a
layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer
and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes
duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the

embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government

of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing
lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to
criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court
may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism
is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re
Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that
it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between
fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to
the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has
criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism
or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the
Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as
characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will
not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his
words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out
that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and
exhibited no repentance. 56

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to

the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court
denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27
April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution
of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a
court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of
contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the
Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court
after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the
public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent
through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here
being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed
resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the
Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in
cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the
country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to
such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time
but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent
Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust
and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court
of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high
level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of
democratic government.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the

Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
In re : Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)
Aguirre v. Rana, Bar Matter No. 1036, June 10, 2003
DONNA
MARIE
S.
AGUIRRE, complainant,
RANA, respondent.

vs. EDWIN

L.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the
requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession
of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.
The Facts

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is

not the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of
this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of
libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available
against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive
remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the
individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution
that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate
remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer
of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez
from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed

the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center.However, the Court ruled that respondent
could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and

grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a
pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is
a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate.As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to
take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys
until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing.He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself
as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of
Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre,
the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that

the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign
the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment
and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC
was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on
19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as
counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.
Respondent
filed
a Reply
(Re:
Reply
to
Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001.
The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission
to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan
while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary
and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by
Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22
May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent
signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same
pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for,
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin
L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of
the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he
was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to

constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal

instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings,
without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing
fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court.A
bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even
from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran,
Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his
oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. [7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential

requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his

lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law
does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court
or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of
law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vicemayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. [10]Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a
client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
8. Integration of the Bar
In re : Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 (1978)
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following
June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or
causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation
to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the
action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member
and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted
a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing,
the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would
show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated
and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme

Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys
is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated
in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an
official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of
the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now
appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of
the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated
Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and
that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his
name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not

among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an

"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface
whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of
the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a
previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the
Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of
the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study
of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on
Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding

considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more
than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice
of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a
degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained,
the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to
the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the
Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining
the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9,
1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the
IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and
motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for,
as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare
is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom,
and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity
of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of
precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro.
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act,
the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act
(Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision
of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all
cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with
some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.

the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. 11

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely
deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to
be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty

provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice
of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder
of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right
but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state
that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably
recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the
Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and
disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky,
said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers
does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which
is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the
proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power
which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise

misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because
they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a
grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public
from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty
that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when
it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and
of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are
neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court
that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.
In re : IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491, October 6, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International
Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of
Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and
proclaimed as officers:
NAME

POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon

President

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys
Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws
which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its
power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oathtaking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting
and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the
"IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals,
was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above
board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent
tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted
by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila
Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive
columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an
article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and
the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were
unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly
employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C.
Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul,
money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit farflung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and
she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters
of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves
of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her.
Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some
members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as
well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and
Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government
positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition,
mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially
conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort
to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in
plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously,
womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x
x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the
election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial,
appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the
judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting
himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of
the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's
reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated
June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP
Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of

Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock

p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the
fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be nonpolitical in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in
the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would
be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that
in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of
the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was
extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well
as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including votebuying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus,
Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give
counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one
hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an
informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP
By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's
national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R.
Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. GrioAquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel
Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to
subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and
the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo)
allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their
supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and
the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that
an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB
planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of
delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge
that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention.
Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to

ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or
worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil
Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of
information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said,
on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to
have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom
Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing
and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have
direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after
deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political"
character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly
non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic
feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible
for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated
Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or
employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of
any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of
candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited
acts relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections.
The following acts and practices relative to election are
prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any
elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member,
directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or
through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign
material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign
material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate
on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or
causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons

other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the

elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding
an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of
candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1)
payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member;
(2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any
article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or
(3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made,
offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above
rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices
defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative
to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal
from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of
sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws
of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating
committee, the following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for
president, executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April
1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato
in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and
in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern
Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47)
where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP
chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written
endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested
the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize
their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started
campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the
chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of

Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989,
pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies
of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada,
Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S.
Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L.
Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito
M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V.
Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose
S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez,
Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon,
Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P.
Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the
commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes
in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that.
some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated,
intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695;
Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit
C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department
of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the
Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional
Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest
(Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant
Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty.
Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the
passengers were IBP candidates.

Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that
she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n.,
July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon
ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from
the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to
the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the
DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official
business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be
taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he
asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to
Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess
their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP
chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support
(t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty.
Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary
Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional
development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit
the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity
brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the
DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be
allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with
the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga,
Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente
Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed
their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for
Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern
Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater
Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.
(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco
(Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza,
Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for
Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern
Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).

Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano

Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez,
Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban,
Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the
convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles
was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan,
h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in
Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles
said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to
Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp.
77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and
another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine
Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr.
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won:
Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n.
July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to
delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at
the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be
occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites
were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association,
and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his
delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C.
Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio
Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio
Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado,
Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro
Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo,
Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela,
Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza,
Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores,
Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo

Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy,
Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon,
Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo
booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used
as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo,
the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of
P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40
rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza
banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed
with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty.
Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it
was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP
delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He
gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with
her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food,
and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of
P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with
Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65
at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the
Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet'
showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)

P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio

20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)

10,000

(d) Jay Castro

10,000

(e) Danny Deen

20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)

10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno

20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel

15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing
money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed
so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the
IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her
delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose
name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room
where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she
paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon
(t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty.
Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria
C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto
Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio
Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot,
Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma,
Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad
Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza,
Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior
partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that
some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n.
July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention.
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon
(meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being
sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate,
two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma
rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members
of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He
made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n.
July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by
soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher
(but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a
classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29,
39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract
with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room.
He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April
20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively
of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those
who committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B.
Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin,
Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano
Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno
Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo
Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate
while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he
took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He
stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some
moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member
of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma
Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon
being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the
Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her
immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong,
Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of
the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted
up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113
phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his
room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs.
Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy
Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as
the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed
before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the
supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the
Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.

(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or
support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate
who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in
the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989,
pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March,
April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by
P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of
legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be
distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as,
the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets
and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They
were printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP ByLaws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials
on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign
materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years.
The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter,
and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket,
testified that campaign materials were distributed during the convention by
girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning
for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him
to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run
as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989,
pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio
and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third
week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor &
Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin
and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her
to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty.

Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents'
meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region
(t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who
had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was
offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When
Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there
was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP
candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to
be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was
Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City,
Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my
wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters
informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June
29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly
campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the
Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections
because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an
assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the
Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty.
Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been
reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew
that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo,
at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He
knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty.
Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil
Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the
Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City.
These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations
at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the
offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two
companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own
tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES

Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks
of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was
the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces
(Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n.
June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not
include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before
the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some
delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's
camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty.
Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by
Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14
of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political"
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that
elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with,
or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written
commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the
delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the
expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and
some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among
the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of
tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo
admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed
girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign
materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of
assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the
use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the
Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel
accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in
exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them
to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored

consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings

and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated
the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which
imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold
the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal
processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful
practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for
their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the
association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle
of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did
not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials
and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses,
including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it
before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation
conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less
than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves
to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the
irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987
Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers.
The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office
might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the
participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct
which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this
Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not
entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the
organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned
unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an
association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court
hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled.

2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of
Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the ByLaws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive VicePresident elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of
the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47,
Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby
restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President
shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among
the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the
rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been
completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive VicePresident to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio VicePresident for their respective regions. There shall also be a
Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP
shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of
the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and
Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, ViceChairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of
Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar

of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to
be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from
that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at
least one (1) month before the national convention the
delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following
provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election
year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should
be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the
Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9)
IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's
resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these
special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held
on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution
entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified
in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon
that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for
any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by
the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the
dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of
such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
9 Legal Assistance to the Underprivileged
q. Report on the Judiciary
3 Lower courts
a. Qualifications and appointment
b. Tenure

De la Llana vs. Alba, 122 SCRA 291 (1983)

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City
Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS,
BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES
ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman,
Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of
Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of
any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the
crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An
act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and
delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of
judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle
of the independence of the judiciary 2as protected and safeguarded by this
constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age
of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their
dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges
of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except
the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the
security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled
Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this
Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent
Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit,

and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by
imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be
deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no
valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being
a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to
reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as
the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and
devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on
October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the
hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only
petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel but also the amici
curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the
debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted for
decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and
rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive
deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented
by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved.
As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the
principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The
other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be
considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the
matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino,
Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing of
petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not
protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the
public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials
staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The
protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and,
conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of
private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and

procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover,

petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their
standing to sue has been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat
from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works,foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the
doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we
are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to
the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their
claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in common
by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to
afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is
to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as
Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v.
Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest
violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in
informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open
to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This
Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated
September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which
shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide
the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary
which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the
Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special
Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a
Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It
began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has
the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its
appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for
what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of
the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for
remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from
Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest
opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the
administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a
greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially
those of modest means much more so, the poorest and the humblest
can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The
rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to

all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are
affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee
addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point
for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the
Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior
courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that
reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for
more efficient administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is
need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be
the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16,
1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades
of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater
complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in
the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically
underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances
previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its
task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to
the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need
for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is
well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove to
be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued
national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on
development. That has been repeatedly stressed and rightly so. All efforts
are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as
simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in
terms of sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National
Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes further than
economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the
democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of
the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and
change compels the government to extend its field of activity and its scope of
operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and
the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way
the social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could
be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures
deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court
on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be
filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas
for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would not,
even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of
the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not
conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report,
equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well

known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined

efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired
Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the
1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has
continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic
development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and
other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve
controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that
calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act,
before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it
did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its
coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms,"
characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth
noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such
scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations .
enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous
to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of
Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten
appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six
and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions may
sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of independence
of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It
continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of
Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City
Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit
Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has
been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there
would be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate
Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The
first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian
Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the
creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In
1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the
same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts
of First Instance. 34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later
became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting
forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues:
"Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been
drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular
attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of
more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a
revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice.
In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental and
parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in
the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the
jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate
adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish
its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court.
This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in the
proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill
was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter, Committee
Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang
Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the
sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the
Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17,
1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its
report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial
Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance
with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the
aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon
consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some
amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the
public hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted
of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and the bar who
had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill
upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such
Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the
disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice
dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the
easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the
bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules
of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the
present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it
may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings

of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its
discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well
as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August
14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in
factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of
arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that
characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the
Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within
the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias,
Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to
be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal
issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid
abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ...
And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to
have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to
the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an
office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle
that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The
above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial
Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded
it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with
the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that
element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The
concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be
any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming
that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial
Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of
original jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such
statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received
an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the
new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of
then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being
appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it
resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did not rule
squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel.
Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result

reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith

to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due
recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion
that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other
judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new
district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid
and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition
that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating
new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain
limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of
the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all
the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article
of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation
of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort.
(Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed;
937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the
National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the
constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges, But, is
this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the
one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to
realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily
factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead
and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may
arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of
tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may
be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that
kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not
until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the
purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by
the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not
enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any
particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of
the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was
greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of
the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were
approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of
these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation by
the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145
doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of
the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion

of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the
reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the
reorganization of all branches of the government, including the courts of first
instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by
new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there
was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to
Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first
instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that
the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and
constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that
the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating
new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an
intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts
of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial
courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and
municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the
fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa,
the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response
to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there
could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice,
however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only
with the question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eage56 this
Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno,
citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido
plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente
ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de
recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente.Mc Culley vs. State,
46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 aos de
edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o
reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such wellestablished principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining,
the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former justice
of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban
no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de
forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners
did not and could not prove that the challenged statute was not within the
bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive,
may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept

independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all

inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned,
with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on
such cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section on the transitory
provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in
accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The
Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations,
the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the
President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the
office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but
to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure
provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from extraneous influences, is
thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution
adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong
executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former
Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto
of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept,
categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the
fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to
govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed
by vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with
this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by
Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil.62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it
may be affirmed that once again the principle of separation of powers, to
quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but by actual
division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and
chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally
therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935
Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa
provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks
categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created the
position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was
a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the
executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet69 Clearly, a modified
parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments
though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of

Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary

system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister
with the Cabinet, a majority of the members of which shall come from the
regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an
Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not
more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of
the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of
government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the
strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise
undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact
whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually
formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why
in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a
greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary,
especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion
between the executive and the legislative branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing
inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent
Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was
a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as
conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior
courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under
the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is
in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to
its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would
be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that
as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear
need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of

law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its
say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it
could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been
put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the
vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of
the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore
from the tried and tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the
charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this
Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free
from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernidble except to
those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction
would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would
invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way
to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of
every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is
true that other Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to
avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for.
The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate
of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any
possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That
is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for
approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential
Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts,
specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of
this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-to-province
basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that
informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under
its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most
rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to
reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang
Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts
and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding
paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary
consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical
standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of
the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded

from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it
has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted
that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation.
As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while
in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions
and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to
recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in
its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights
for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government
powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle,
Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson,
is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay
down 'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight
compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do
not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon,
likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or
balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of
separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system,
and overlappings of governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable,
and inherent necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same way
that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right
versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this
attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of
power against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners
would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the
challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against
raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The
questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation
and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines
set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree

No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a

standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of nondelegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the
competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the
completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As
pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may
be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative
departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of
policies as well as their implementation can be accomplished with unity,
promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation
in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more
receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the
adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative
purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor
Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern
government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be
"a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point from
the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not
haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative
chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statue of what
petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of
merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme
Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of
the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant
to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by
the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section." 93 The
first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of
this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive
Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard
to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior

courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of the

reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such
declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The
incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold
office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service,
quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, 97 in
legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their
service. 98 It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers,
either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come
the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is
necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve
reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be
a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by
the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that
even acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply
omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the
principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981,
petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C.
Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named
was the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear
then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand
in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were
not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the
product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set
forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization.
That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There
could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal
has had administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the
opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and
how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the
recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or
members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines 101consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation
affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article
in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief
Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A
variety of conditions have been responsible for the development of this role,

and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit institutional
structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice
cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the
federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state
level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the
people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is
instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either
expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own
benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the
language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than
a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official
certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his
responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of
tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an
added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred
by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are
even more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the
dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or
unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed
with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus
viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus
subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due
care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded
in the national consciousness There is this farther thought to consider.
independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and
heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary
of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the
God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges
may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they
are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after
another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the
independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty
Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke,
regardless or in spite of the power of Congress we do not say unlimited
but as herein exercised to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall
one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made
clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what
becomes [him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case
stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v.
Mariano, 107 Theponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with
"men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties

in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and selfrespecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other
two departments of government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the
failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with
deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow
that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones
will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its
solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be
any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be of the appointing
power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and
efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and
truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers
assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their
determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the hopes
of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as
well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric
Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half
a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional
rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To
that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains
committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not
having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
5. The Judicial and Bar Council
Chavez v. JBC, G.R. 202242, July 17, 2012; MR-April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of
former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as his potential
successor, triggered the filing of this case. The issue has constantly been
nagging legal minds, yet remained dormant for lack of constitutional
challenge.

As the matter is of extreme urgency considering the constitutional deadline in

the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of the Chief
Justice, the Court cannot delay the resolution of the issue a day longer.
Relegating it in the meantime to the back burner is not an option.
Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
allow more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the
practice of having two (2) representatives from each house of Congress with
one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution? These are the pivotal
questions to be resolved in this original action for prohibition and injunction.
Long before the naissance of the present Constitution, the annals of history
bear witness to the fact that the exercise of appointing members of the
Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American
origins, both the Malolos Constitution1and the 1935 Constitution2 had vested
the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these
times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants
seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate
themselves with the members of the legislative body.3
Then, with the fusion of executive and legislative power under the 1973
Constitution,4 the appointment of judges and justices was no longer subject
to the scrutiny of another body. It was absolute, except that the appointees
must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary
from political pressure and partisan activities,5 the members of the
Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent
and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it
conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Its
composition, term and functions are provided under Section 8, Article VIII of
the Constitution, viz:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law,
a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President
for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice
for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as
may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide
in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties
as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the
JBC, designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex
officio members.6 Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses
to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the Senate
would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress
had only one (1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the
JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one
from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote.7Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full
vote each.8 At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition, 9 setting forth
the following
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION
I
Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs no
interpretation in that the JBC shall have only one representative from
Congress.
II
The framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated and
decided on a JBC composed of only seven (7) members.
III
Had the framers of the Constitution intended that the JBC composed
of the one member from the Senate and one member from the
House of Representatives, they could have easily said so as they did
in the other provisions of the Constitution.
IV
The composition of the JBC providing for three ex-officio members is
purposely designed for a balanced representation of each of the
three branches of the government.
V

One of the two (2) members of the JBC from Congress has no right
(not even right) to sit in the said constitutional body and perform
the duties and functions of a member thereof.
VI
The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is
illegal and unconstitutional.10
On July 9, 2012, the JBC filed its Comment.11 It, however, abstained from
recommending on how this constitutional issue should be disposed in
gracious deference to the wisdom of the Court. Nonetheless, the JBC was
more than generous enough to offer the insights of various personalities
previously connected with it.12
Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents defended
their position as members of the JBC in their Comment 13 filed on July 12,
2012. According to them, the crux of the controversy is the phrase "a
representative of Congress."14 Reverting to the basics, they cite Section 1,
Article VI of the Constitution15 to determine the meaning of the term
"Congress." It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House
of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
"Congress," such that the absence of either divests the term of its
substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. In simplistic
terms, the House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa, is
not Congress.16 Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers,
requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section
8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of "a representative from
Congress," it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.17
Tracing the subject provisions history, the respondents claim that when the
JBC was established, the Framers originally envisioned a unicameral
legislative body, thereby allocating "a representative of the National
Assembly" to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to
aptly jive with the change to bicameralism, the legislative system finally
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. According to
respondents, if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of
having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have
made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the
JBC.18
The ambiguity having resulted from a plain case of inadvertence, the
respondents urge the Court to look beyond the letter of the disputed
provision because the literal adherence to its language would produce
absurdity and incongruity to the bicameral nature of Congress. 19 In other
words, placing either of the respondents in the JBC will effectively deprive a
house of Congress of its representation. In the same vein, the electorate
represented by Members of Congress will lose their only opportunity to

participate in the nomination process for the members of the Judiciary,

effectively diminishing the republican nature of the government. 20
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives
of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render the latters purpose
nugatory. While they admit that the purpose in creating the JBC was to
insulate appointments to the Judiciary from political influence, they likewise
cautioned the Court that this constitutional vision did not intend to entirely
preclude political factor in said appointments. Therefore, no evil should be
perceived in the current set-up of the JBC because two (2) members coming
from Congress, whose membership to certain political parties is irrelevant,
does not necessarily amplify political partisanship in the JBC. In fact, the
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance
as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees.21
The Issues
In resolving the procedural and substantive issues arising from the petition,
as well as the myriad of counter-arguments proffered by the respondents, the
Court synthesized them into two:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the
power of judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its
functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of
Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its Comment, the JBC submits that petitioner is clothed with locus standi to
file the petition, as a citizen and taxpayer, who has been nominated to the
position of Chief Justice.22
For the respondents, however, petitioner has no "real interest" in questioning
the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition.23 As outlined in
jurisprudence, it is well-settled that for locus standi to lie, petitioner must
exhibit that he has been denied, or is about to be denied, of a personal right
or privilege to which he is entitled. Here, petitioner failed to manifest his
acceptance of his recommendation to the position of Chief Justice, thereby
divesting him of a substantial interest in the controversy. Without his name in
the official list of applicants for the post, the respondents claim that there is
no personal stake on the part of petitioner that would justify his outcry of
unconstitutionality. Moreover, the mere allegation that this case is of
transcendental importance does not excuse the waiver of the rule on locus
standi, because, in the first place, the case lacks the requisites therefor. The
respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition. 24 Being
aware that the current composition of the JBC has been in practice since
1994, petitioners silence for eighteen (18) years show that the constitutional
issue being raised before the Court does not comply with the "earliest
possible opportunity" requirement.

Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to
first ascertain the nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of
an action is determined by the allegations therein and the character of the
relief sought, the Court views the petition as essentially an action for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 25
The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be
considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the
execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very
declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being
so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional
Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are
raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those
within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution.26
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes
involved but also to the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more
prudent to take cognizance of it. After all, the petition is also for prohibition
under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2)
representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.
The Courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by
the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.27 Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of
an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party
possess a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
there is real, concrete and legal conflict of rights and duties from the issues
presented before the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 28 the Court
summarized the rules on locus standi as culled from jurisprudence. There, it
was held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a
claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in
the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there
must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that
the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.

In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public
right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a
person who is affected no differently from any other person, and can be suing
as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. 29
In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and
the rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for
lawful purposes. According to petitioner, "since the JBC derives financial
support for its functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid,
petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand
that the JBCs proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its
composition and actions do not violate the Constitution." 30
Notably, petitioner takes pains in enumerating past actions that he had
brought before the Court where his legal standing was sustained. Although
this inventory is unnecessary to establish locus standi because obviously, not
every case before the Court exhibits similar issues and facts, the Court
recognizes the petitioners right to sue in this case. Clearly, petitioner has the
legal standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake in
the outcome of this controversy.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief
Justice. While it is true that a "personal stake" on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of
Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for
being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs
duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the
land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be
affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be
passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts
and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right to bring this question to the
Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time, armed with issues of
transcendental importance to society. The claim that the composition of the
JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek
judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to

perceive from the opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants
established in jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised.31 The allegations of constitutional violations in this case are not empty
attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The
allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation
from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal and societal
ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a
constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our
judicial system.
The Composition of the JBC
Central to the resolution of the foregoing petition is an understanding of the
composition of the JBC as stated in the first paragraph of Section 8, Article
VIII of the Constitution. It reads:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law,
a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be
discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph
calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of
the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are
enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On
the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex
officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who
shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and "a representative of
Congress."
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a" preceding
"representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could
have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. 32 It is a wellsettled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in

the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they say.33 Verba legis non est
recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure. 34
The raison d tre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained;35 and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail. 36
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. 37 This
is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted
by the latter.38 The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and
in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as
to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 39 In
short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be
ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases
and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the
word "Congress" used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used
in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
The foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an
esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his
memorandum,40 "from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is
patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only." 41
Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the
clear purpose of the lawmakers.42 Not any of these instances, however, is
present in the case at bench. Considering that the language of the subject
constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort
extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the
members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records

thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. Thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.
On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about the appointments of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts. At present it
is the President who appoints them. If there is a Commission on
Appointments, then it is the President with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointment. In this proposal, we would like to establish a
new office, a sort of a board composed of seven members called the Judicial
and Bar Council. And while the President will still appoint the member of the
judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this Council.
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the
President appoints four of them who are regular members.
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. CONCEPCION. The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate
partisan politics.43
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. RODRIGO. If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be
exactly the same as the provision in the 1935 Constitution, Article VIII,
Section 5.
xxx
xxx
xxx
If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the Judicial
and Bar Council, this will be a diminution of the appointing power of the
highest magistrate of the land, of the
President of the Philippines elected by all the Filipino people. The appointing
power will be limited by a group of seven people who are not elected by the
people but only appointed.
Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in
our constitutional provisions on appointments. The members of the Judiciary
will be segregated from the rest of the government. Even a municipal judge
cannot be appointed by the President except upon recommendation or
nomination of the three names by this Committee of seven people,
commissioners of the Commission on Elections, the COA and the
Commission on Civil Serviceeven ambassadors, generals of the Army will
not come under this restriction. Why are we going to segregate the Judiciary
from the rest of our government in the appointment of high-ranking officials?
Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch the
honor of our President without being effective at all because this Council will
be under the influence of the President. Four out of seven are appointees of
the President and they can be reappointed when their term ends. Therefore,
they would be kowtow the President. A fifth member is the Minister of Justice,
an alter ego of the President. Another member represents the Legislature. In
all probability, the controlling part in the legislature belongs to the President

and, therefore, this representative form the National Assembly is also under
the influence of the President. And may I say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that event
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is an appointee of the President. So it
is futile he will be influence anyway by the President. 44 [Emphases supplied]
At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the
JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be
a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude
that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the
JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder
and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process, especially in the event a tie
is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating
the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it would
be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible
scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is
the best means to break a voting deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the
word "Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be
read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They
theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was
being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress.
Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral
form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article
VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.45 On this score, the Court cites the
insightful analysis of another member of the Court and JBC consultant,
retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.46 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the
composition of the JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in the
Council a representation for the major elements of the
community." xxx Theex-officio members of the Council consist of
representatives from the three main branches of government while the
regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The
unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each exofficio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting
members with the three ex-officiomembers having equal say in the choice of
judicial nominees.
xxx
xxx
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in
the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of
government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch of in the
matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of
legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and House of

Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of

Congress role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies
and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two houses of
Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made
when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental
branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary.
The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act
as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative
influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly
bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among
the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]
More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of
constitutional construction, the Court finds the above thesis as the paramount
justification of the Courts conclusion that "Congress," in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident that the
definition of "Congress" as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government - to legislate.47 In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds
true in Congress non-legislative powers such as, inter alia, the power of
appropriation,48 the declaration of an existence of a state of war,49canvassing
of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President, 50 and
impeachment.51 In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution employs
precise language in laying down the roles which a particular house plays,
regardless of whether the two houses consummate an official act by voting
jointly or separately. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in
the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. Verily, each house is constitutionally granted with
powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1)
its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the
principle of checks and balances, to the other branches of government.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence,
the term "Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic
scheme which the Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a
seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches
of government.
Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an
innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating
politics in the appointment of members of the Judiciary.52 To ensure judicial

independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a

JBC, the private sector and the three branches of government would have an
active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the
JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or onehalf (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former congressman and member of
the JBC put it, "negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution." 53
To quote one former Secretary of Justice:
The present imbalance in voting power between the Legislative and the other
sectors represented in the JBC must be corrected especially when
considered vis--vis the avowed purpose for its creation, i.e., to insulate the
appointments in the Judiciary against political influence. By allowing both
houses of Congress to have a representative in the JBC and by giving each
representative one (1) vote in the Council, Congress, as compared to the
other members of the JBC, is accorded greater and unwarranted influence in
the appointment of judges.54[Emphasis supplied]
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another
member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress
with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending
appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional
mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law
of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all
other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made
to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to
the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run
it.55 Hence, any act of the government or of a public official or employee
which is contrary to the Constitution is illegal, null and void.
As to the effect of the Courts finding that the current composition of the JBC
is unconstitutional, it bears mentioning that as a general rule, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.56 This rule, however, is not absolute. In the interest of fair play
under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,57 the Court explained:

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only

applies as a matter of equity and fair play.1wphi1 It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it
was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done
by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Considering the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in
this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in
the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are
nonetheless valid.
At this point, the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position
to determine as to who should remain as the sole representative of Congress
in the JBC. This is a matter beyond the province of the Court and is best left
to the determination of Congress.
Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the
Senate and the House of Representatives should be equally represented in
the JBC, the Court is not in a position to stamp its imprimatur on such a
construction at the risk of expanding the meaning of the Constitution as
currently worded. Needless to state, the remedy lies in the amendment of
this constitutional provision. The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver's
intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law
does not include the power to correct, by reading into the law what is not
written therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition
of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only
one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the acts of an
independent body, which is considered as a constitutional innovation the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). It is not the first time that the Court is called
upon to settle legal questions surrounding the JBC's exercise of its
constitutional mandate. In De Castro v. JBC,1the Court laid to rest issues
such as the duty of the JBC to recommend prospective nominees for the
position of Chief Justice vis--vis the appointing power of the President, the
period within which the same may be exercised, and the ban on midnight
appointments as set forth in the Constitution. In Chavez v. JBC, 2 the Court
provided an extensive discourse on constitutional intent as to the JBCs
composition and membership.
This time, however, the selection and nomination process actually
undertaken by the JBC is being challenged for being constitutionally infirm.
The heart of the debate lies not only on the very soundness and validity of
the application of JBC rules but also the extent of its discretionary power.
More significantly, this case of first impression impugns the end-result of its
acts - the shortlistfrom which the President appoints a deserving addition to
the Highest Tribunal of the land.
To add yet another feature of noveltyto this case, a member of the Court, no
less than the Chief Justice herself, was being impleaded as party
respondent.
The Facts
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of
Associate Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014.
Before his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules, 3 the
JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the said
vacated position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion
of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said
position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the
names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. On May
29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC.

It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014,
Jardeleza received telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals Associate
Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice
Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16,
2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that she would be invoking
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to
"make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he
would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition) 5 praying that the
Court, in the exercise of itsconstitutional power of supervision over the JBC,
issue an order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days
written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be summoned;
and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges against
him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any,
and copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn
statements shall be made part of the public record of the JBC; 2) allowing
him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and
the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under the same conditions
that attend the publicinterviews held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to
reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date; and 4)
directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the
voting on June 30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote
would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by Associate
Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza, incumbent
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a
resource person to shed light on a classified legal memorandum (legal
memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardelezas integrity as
posed by Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno
questioned Jardelezas ability to discharge the duties of his office as shown
in a confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international
arbitration case for the government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Courts ante-rooms where
Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima)
informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and
disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno,
characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was
summoned by the JBC at around 2:00oclock in the afternoon.

Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to

defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered
that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed.
Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn
statement specifying her objectionsand that he be afforded the right to crossexamine her in a public hearing. He requested that the same directive should
also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio. As claimed by the JBC,
Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he wanted to hear for
himself Jardelezas explanation on the matter. Jardeleza, however, refused
as he would not be lulled intowaiving his rights. Jardeleza then put into
record a written statement6 expressing his views on the situation and
requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc
would meet the next day to act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture,
Jardeleza was excused.
Later in the afternoon of the sameday, and apparently denying Jardelezas
request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations
and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist.
Thereafter, the JBC releasedthe subject shortlist of four (4) nominees which
included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with
six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B.
Daway with four (4) votes.7
As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later published in the
online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Courts
Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5)
nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardelezas letterpetition in
view of the transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Office of the
President, "without prejudice to any remedy available in law and the rules
that petitioner may still wish to pursue."8 The said resolution was
accompanied by an extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion,9 expressing his respectful disagreement as to the
position taken by the majority.
The Petition
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolutions declaration as to his
availment of a remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the

issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the

JBC to include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court Associate
Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief
Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient
number of votes to qualify for the position.
Notably, Jardelezas petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his
earlier letter-petition and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the same
was raffled only on July 1, 2014 or a day after the controversial JBC meeting.
By the time that his letter-petition was scheduled for deliberation by the Court
en bancon July 8, 2014, the disputedshortlist had already been transmitted to
the Office of the President. He attributedthis belated action on his letterpetition to Chief Justice Sereno, whose action on such matters, especially
those impressed withurgency, was discretionary.
An in-depth perusal of Jardelezas petition would reveal that his resort to
judicial intervention hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the
shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of his constitutional right to due process;
and 2) the JBCs erroneous application, if not direct violation, of its own rules.
Suffice it to say, Jardelezadirectly ascribes the supposed violation of his
constitutional rights tothe acts of Chief Justice Sereno in raising objections
against his integrity and the manner by which the JBC addressed this
challenge to his application, resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from the list of
nominees.
Jardelezas Position
For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered in the petition,
the Court hereunder succinctlysummarizes Jardelezas arguments, as
follows:
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardelezas right to due
process in the events leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist last
June 30, 2014. When accusations against his integrity were made twice, ex
parte, by Chief Justice Sereno, without informing him of the nature and cause
thereof and without affording him an opportunity to be heard, Jardeleza was
deprived of his right to due process. In turn, the JBC violated his right to due
process when he was simply ordered to make himself available on the June
30, 2014 meeting and was told that the objections to his integrity would be
made known to him on the same day. Apart from mere verbal notice (by way
of a telephone call) of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009

against his application and not on the accusations against him per se, he
was deprived of an opportunity to mount a proper defense against it. Not only
did the JBC fail to ventilate questions on his integrity during his public
interview, he was also divested of his rights as an applicant under Sections 3
and 4, Rule 4, JBC-009, to wit:
Section 3. Testimony of parties. The Council may receive written opposition
to an applicant on the ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the
Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted
for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to
cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. Anonymous complaints against an
applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true.
In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation or require
the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet again,
the verbalinformation conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified
against him) and as to the nature of the very accusations against him caused
him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno.
The latter gravely abused her discretion when she acted as prosecutor,
witness and judge,thereby violating the very essence of fair play and the
Constitution itself. In his words: "the sui generis nature of JBC proceedings
does not authorize the Chief Justice to assume these roles, nor does it
dispense with the need to honor petitioners right to due process." 10
B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from
the shortlist of nominees, in violation of its own rules. The "unanimity
requirement" provided under Section 2, Rule10 of JBC-009 does not find
application when a member of the JBC raises an objection to an applicants
integrity. Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the membership of the
body set to vote. The lone objector could be completely capable oftaking
hostage the entire voting process by the mere expediency of raising an
objection. Chief Justice Serenos interpretation of the rule would allow a
situation where all thata member has to do to veto other votes, including
majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of a candidate, without
need for factual basis.
C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the
part of the JBC to include Jardeleza in the subject shortlist.Section 1, Rule 10

of JBC-009 provides that a nomination for appointment to a judicial position

requires the affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members of the JBC.
The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that Jardeleza was able
to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion is that a majority of
the members of the JBC found him to be qualified for the position of
Associate Justice.
D. The unlawful exclusion ofthe petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs
the Presidents constitutional power to appoint.Jardelezas exclusion from the
shortlist has unlawfully narrowed the Presidents choices. Simply put, the
President would be constrained to choose from among four (4) nominees,
when five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the position. This limits the
President to appoint a member of the Court from a list generated through a
process tainted with patent constitutional violations and disregard for rules of
justice and fair play. Until these constitutional infirmities are remedied, the
petitioner has the right to prevent the appointment of an Associate Justice
viceAssociate Justice Abad.
Comment of the JBC
On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardelezas
petition lacked proceduraland substantive bases that would warrant favorable
action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorariis only available against a tribunal,
a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions. 11 The JBC,
in its exercise of its mandate to recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does
not exercise any of these functions. In a pending case, 12 Jardeleza himself,
as one of the lawyers for the government, argued in this wise:
Certioraricannot issue against the JBC in the implementation of its policies.
In the same vein, the remedy of mandamusis incorrect. Mandamus does not
lie to compel a discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for mandamus
must, among other things, show that the petitioner has a clear legal right to
the act demanded. In Jardelezas case, there is no legal right to be included
in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional
and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used
to legally demand that ones name be included in the list of candidates for a
judicial vacancy. Ones inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion
of the JBC.
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was
deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf
of the JBC en banc, called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice

Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question

on his integrity based on the way he handled a very important case for the
government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman spoke briefly about the case and
his general explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary De Lima
likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection against
his application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain himself.
Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to shed light
on the allegations against him,as he chose to deliver a statement, which, in
essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn statements
so that he would know of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses;and that the procedure be done on record and
in public.
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to
enlighten each member of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to
the voting process. His request for a sworn statement and opportunity to
cross-examine is not supported by a demandable right. The JBC is not a
fact-finding body. Neitheris it a court nor a quasi-judicial agency. The
members are notconcerned with the determination of his guilt or innocence of
the accusations against him. Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10,JBC-009
are merely directory as shown by the use of the word "may." Even the
conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is
discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of ascertaining
the truth or falsity of an allegation or opposition, the JBC would not call a
hearing in order to avoid undue delay of the selection process. Each member
of the JBC relies on his or her own appreciation of the circumstances and
qualifications of applicants.
The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a
general rule, an applicant is included in the shortlist when he or she obtains
an affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,however, is invoked because an applicants
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, when Chief
Justice Sereno invoked the saidprovision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative
vote of all the JBC members tobe included in the shortlist. In the process,
Chief Justice Serenos vote against Jardeleza was not counted. Even then,
he needed the votes of the five(5) remaining members. He only got four (4)
affirmative votes. As a result,he was not included in the shortlist. Applicant
Reynaldo B. Daway, who gotfour (4) affirmative votes, was included in the
shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, the "majority
rule" was considered applicable.

Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as
Solicitor General. Despiteclaiming a prefatory appearance in propria
persona, all pleadings filed with the Court were signed in his official capacity.
In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private interest while
retaining the office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very parties he was
tasked by law to defend, Jardeleza knowingly placed himself in a situation
where his personal interests collided against his public duties, in clear
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional
Ethics. Moreover, the respondents are all public officials being sued in their
official capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor General, and suing in the
said capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his own clients, being the legal
defender of the government and its officers. This runs contrary to the
fiduciary relationship sharedby a lawyer and his client.
In opposition to Jardelezas prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC called
to mind the constitutional period within which a vacancy in the Court must be
filled. As things now stand, the President has until August 20, 2014 to
exercise his appointment power which cannot be restrained by a TRO or an
injunctive suit.
Comment of the Executive Secretary

In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. (Executive

Secretary)raised the possible unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009, particularly the imposition ofa higher voting threshold in cases
where the integrity of an applicant is challenged. It is his position that the
subject JBC rule impairs the bodys collegial character, which essentially
operates on the basis of majority rule. The application of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 gives rise to a situation where all that a member needs to do, in
order to disqualify an applicant who may well have already obtained a
majority vote, is to object to his integrity. In effect, a member who invokes the
said provision is given a veto powerthat undermines the equal and full
participation of the other members in the nomination process. A lone objector
may then override the will ofthe majority, rendering illusory, the collegial
nature of the JBC and the very purpose for which it was created to shield
the appointment process from political maneuvering. Further, Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 may beviolative of due process for it does not allow an
applicant any meaningful opportunity to refute the challenges to his integrity.
While other provisions of the JBC rules provide mechanisms enabling an
applicant to comment on an opposition filed against him, the subject rule
does not afford the same opportunity. In this case, Jardelezas allegations as
to the events which transpired on June 30, 2014 obviously show that he was
neither informed ofthe accusations against him nor given the chance to
muster a defense thereto.
The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the subject
provision is held to be constitutional, the "unanimity rule" would only be
operative when the objector is not a member of the JBC. It is only in this
scenario where the voting ofthe body would not be rendered inconsequential.
In the event that a JBC member raised the objection, what should have been
applied is the general rule of a majority vote, where any JBC member retains
their respective reservations to an application with a negative vote. Corollary
thereto, the unconstitutionality of the said rule would necessitate the inclusion
of Jardeleza in the shortlist submitted to the President.
Other pleadings
On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute the
allegations of the JBC in its Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on
August 15, 2014. A few hours thereafter, orbarely ten minutes prior to the
closing of business, the Court received the Supplemental Comment-Reply of
the JBC, this time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led to
the filing of the petition,and a detailed "Statementof the Chief Justice on the
Integrity Objection."13 Obviously, Jardelezas Reply consisted only of his

arguments against the JBCs original Comment, as it was filed prior to the
filing of the Supplemental Comment-Reply.
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit commentsinintervention/oppositions-in-intervention were filed. One was by Atty.
Purificacion S. Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading echoed the
position of the JBC.14
The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a former
President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter and former Governor of the
IBP-Northern Luzon. It was coupled with a complaint for disbarment against
Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for representing conflicting interests.15
Both motions for intervention weredenied considering that time was of the
essence and their motions were merely reiterative of the positions of the JBC
and were perceived to be dilatory. The complaint for disbarment, however,
was re-docketed as a separate administrative case.

MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER).
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT
"QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY" AS CONTEMPLATED
UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN
THE COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES WHERE AN
OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN
THE SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.

The Issues
Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are
interrelated such that the resolution of one issue would necessarily affect the
conclusion as to the others, the Court opts to narrow down the questions to
the very source of the discord - the correct application of Section 2, Rule 10
JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights of applicants.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition
does not directly raise the unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule. Instead,
it bewails the unconstitutional effects of its application. It is only from the
comment of the Executive Secretary where the possible unconstitutionality of
the rulewas brought to the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical approach
dictatesthat the Court must confront the source of the bleeding from which
the gaping wound presented to the Court suffers.
The issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND
GIVE DUECOURSE TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND

The Courts Ruling

I Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to assume
jurisdiction over the case
A - The Courts Power of Supervision over the JBC
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the
JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads:
Section 8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Courtcomposed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
[Emphasis supplied]
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope
of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that

subordinate officers perform their duties.It ensures that the laws and the
rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and
complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they
themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion
on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. 16

In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of

votes in the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on
integrity in violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by the
Constitution but by the Councils own rules. For said reason, the Court is of
the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of review
vestedupon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:

Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the
overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardelezas principal
allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.

Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus

The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available.
"Mandamuslies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.
Mandamuswill not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a
public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and
duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court.17 There is no question that the JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary
and it may not becompelled to do something.
C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari
Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorarion the ground that it does
not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a
writ of certiorariis directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasijudicial function. "Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed
with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasijudicial function is
a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers
or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action using discretion of a judicial nature."18 It asserts that in the
performance of its function of recommending appointees for the judiciary, the
JBC does not exercise judicial or quasijudicial functions. Hence, the resort
tosuch remedy to question its actions is improper.

Article VIII.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch orinstrumentality of the government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. 19
In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the
Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impassemust be
overcome.
II Substantial Issues
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicants
integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBCs existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical
constitutional declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence." To ensure the
fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has
been tasked toscreen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making
certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and
suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is
shieldedfrom the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the

undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or

disqualified.
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the
"whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as "competence,
integrity, probity and independence are not easily determinable as they are
developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not possible or
advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who
aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman."
Given this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote stability and
uniformity in JBCs guiding precepts and principles." A set of uniform criteria
had to be established in the ascertainment of "whether one meets the
minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and
heart expected of him" and his office. Likewise for the sake oftransparency of
its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of
JBC-009. True enough, guidelines have been set inthe determination of
competence,"20 "probity and independence,"21 "soundness of physical and
mental condition,22 and "integrity."23
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of
qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicants good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards. That is why proof of an applicants reputation may be shown in
certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and nongovernmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau
of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even
conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public
on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which
shall be verifiedand checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a
virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of persons character." 24
The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of
JBC-009, in imposing the "unanimity rule," contemplate a doubt on the moral
character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise
disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all
the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration
of his nomination.

A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a
higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an
applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the
voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post
becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the
preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity"
as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a
person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all
the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that "integrity" as
used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants moral fitness is
challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation
when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application
where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicants moral
uprightness.
Examining the "questions of integrity" made against Jardeleza
The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 to Jardelezas case.
The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental CommentReply, reveal that during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on
his actuations in the handling of a case was called for explanation by the
Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to show his lack of
integrity: a supposed extra-marital affair in the past and alleged acts of
insider trading.26
Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardelezas
"inability to discharge the duties of his office" as shown in a legal
memorandum related to Jardelezas manner of representing the government
in a legal dispute. The records bear that the "unanimity rule" was initially
invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting held on June 5,
2014, where she expressed her position that Jardeleza did not possess the
integrity required tobe a member of the Court.27 In the same meeting, the
Chief Justice shared withthe other JBC members the details of Jardelezas
chosen manner of framing the governments position in a case and how this
could have been detrimental to the national interest.
In the JBCs original comment, the details of the Chief Justices claim against
Jardelezas integrity were couched in general terms. The particulars thereof

were only supplied to the Court in the JBCs Supplemental Comment-Reply.

Apparently, the JBC acceded to Jardelezas demand to make the
accusations against him public. At the outset, the JBC declined to raise the
fine points of the integrity question in its original Comment due to its
significant bearing on the countrys foreign relations and national security. At
any rate, the Court restrains itself from delving into the details thereof in this
disposition. The confidential nature of the document cited therein, which
requires the observance of utmost prudence, preclude a discussion that may
possibly affect the countrys position in a pending dispute.
Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the
original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on
Jardelezas integrity? Doeshis adoption of a specific legal strategy in the
handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his
moral character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases where the main
point of contention is the professional judgment sans charges or implications
of immoral or corrupt behavior?
The Court answers these questions in the negative.

As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their

reservations on whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could
be classified as a "question of integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC009.29 These reservations were evidently sourced from the factthat there was
no clear indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it might
have been a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a different
manner of presenting the countrys arguments, and there was no showing
either of a corrupt purpose on his part.30 Even Chief Justice Sereno was not
certain that Jardelezas acts were urged by politicking or lured by extraneous
promises.31 Besides, the President, who has the final say on the conduct of
the countrys advocacy in the case, has given no signs that Jardelezas
action constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of the countrys trust and interest.
While this point does notentail that only the President may challenge
Jardelezas doubtful integrity, itis commonsensical to assume that he is in the
best position to suspect a treacherous agenda. The records are bereft of any
information that indicatesthis suspicion. In fact, the Comment of the
Executive Secretary expressly prayed for Jardelezas inclusion in the
disputed shortlist.

While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 was not borne out ofa mere variance of legal opinion but by an "act
of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact
remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the "disagreement"
in legal strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers. The
approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that preferred by
the legal team. For said reason, criticism was hurled against his "integrity."
The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to the
exercise ofhis discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was
established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to
trounce upon the countrys interests or to betray the Constitution.

The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international
cases, given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging
case. Her efforts inthe determination of Jardelezas professional background,
while commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration of a
connection betweenthe act complained of and his integrity as a person.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act
complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and
not to his judgment as a professional. What this disposition perceives,
therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the
original ground of its invocation.

Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form

of, interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has
complete discretion on whatlegal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to
him28provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with competence
and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his
client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of
victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and
technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross
neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a
legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct
bearing on his moral choices.

As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of

Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the first
time onlyduring the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned
from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of these issues
had its origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might raise
issues of "immorality" against Jardeleza.32 The Chief Justice then deduced
that the "immorality" issue referred to by the media might have been the
incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza was still the General
Counsel of San Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC
had the duty to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the
applicants," it might as well be clarified.33

Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on integrity" under

Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid
issues.
This acquiescence is consistent with the Courts discussion supra. Unlike the
first ground which centered onJardelezas stance on the tactical approach in
pursuing the case for the government, the claims of an illicit relationship and
acts of insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral character.
Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyers deliberate
participation in extra-marital affairs was considered as a disgraceful stain on
ones ethical and moral principles. The bottom line is that a lawyer who
engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the
Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have never
gone physical or intimate could still be subject to charges of immorality, when
a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which was more
than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.35 As the
Court has held: Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but
includes conduct inconsistentwith rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the communityand an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.36 Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds
to objective reality.37 To have a good moral character, a person must have the
personal characteristic ofbeing good. It is not enough that he or she has a
good reputation, that is, the opinion generally entertained about a person or
the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is
known.38 Hence, lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye
and community approbation.39
The element of "willingness" to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a
weakness in ones values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor, not
only because it is a bold disregard of the sanctity of marriage and of the law,
but because it erodes the publics confidence in the Judiciary. This is no
longer a matter of an honest lapse in judgment but a dissolute exhibition of
disrespect toward sacredvows taken before God and the law.
On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of
our vital securities market.40Manipulative devices and deceptive practices,
including insider trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the
securities industry. Whensomeone trades inthe market with unfair advantage
in the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants
are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given enough of

stock marketscandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market,
such abuses could presage a severe drain of capital. And investors would
eventuallyfeel more secure with their money invested elsewhere. 41 In its
barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities based on
knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public at the time.
Clearly, an allegation of insider trading involves the propensity of a person
toengage in fraudulent activities that may speak of his moral character.
These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity"
under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of "questions
on integrity." Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come into operation as the
subject provision is worded.
The Availability of Due Process in the
Proceedings of the JBC
In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been
informed of the accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not furnished
the basis of the accusations, that is, "a very confidential legal memorandum
that clarifies the integrityobjection"; 3] instead of heeding his request for an
opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his refusal to explain,
during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of his right to answer the
unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was railroaded; and 5] the
alleged "discretionary" nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009 is negated by
the subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of which provides for a
10-day period from the publication of the list of candidates within which any
complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the JBC
Secretary; 6] Section 2 of JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be
in writing and under oath, copies of which shall be furnished the candidate in
order for him to file his comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof; and
7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010 prescribe a logical, reasonable and sequential
series of steps in securing a candidates right to due process.
The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza
the right to a hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as
a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the
nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does
not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative
offense but toascertain the fitness of an applicant vis--vis the requirements
for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer

the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of
rules of procedure which are, at the most, discretionary or optional. Finally,
Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections against him. During the
June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose
totread on his view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his
accuser, prosecutor and judge.
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC
proceedings. After a tedious review of the parties respective arguments, the
Court concludes that the right to due process is available and thereby
demandable asa matter of right.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal proceedings where the
finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua non. The JBCs
constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot
be compared to the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of
an offense and ascribe the same to an accused, consistent with established
rules on evidence. Even the quantum ofevidence required in criminal cases
is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument
that an applicants access tothe rights afforded under the due process clause
is discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal 42 and
administrative43 due process are not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings,
their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not
demandable.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for
the office when he presents proof of his scholastic records, work experience
and laudable citations. His goal is to establish that he is qualified for the
office applied for. The JBC then takes every possible step to verify an
applicant's trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining whether or not he is
qualified for nomination. It ascertains the factors which entitle an applicant to
become a part of the roster from which the President appoints.
The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed with discretion,
however, does not automatically denigrate an applicants entitlement to due
process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generisin that they are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.44 Hence, in the exercise of its

disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
accountfor his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.45 On the whole, disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to
verifyand finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualifiedto benefit from
the rights and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.
Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to explain
ones self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where
an objection to an applicants qualifications is raised, the observance of due
process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC
torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the
nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who
vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to
protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it
faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capriciousassessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an
objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person
challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also
compels the Court to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the parties
mentioned two: 1] JBC-009 and 2] JBC-010. The former provides the
following provisions pertinent to this case:
SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible
step to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council
certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and
non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts, National
Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council
may require.
SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council mayorder a discreet
background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant,

and receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to
validate the merits thereof.
SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written
opposition to an applicant on groundof his moral fitness and, at its discretion,
the Council mayreceive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing
conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be
allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an
applicant shall not begiven due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true.
In the latter case, the Council may either direct a discreet investigation or
require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
[Emphases Supplied]
While the "unanimity rule" invoked against him is found in JBC-009,
Jardeleza urges the Court to hold that the subsequent rule, JBC010,46 squarely applies to his case. Entitled asa "Rule to Further Promote
Public Awareness of and Accessibility to the Proceedings of the Judicial and
Bar Council," JBC-010 recognizes the needfor transparency and public
awareness of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof, JBC-010 was crafted
in this wise:
SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who
of the candidates meet prima facie the qualifications for the positionunder
consideration. For this purpose, it shall prepare a long list of candidates who
prima facieappear to have all the qualifications.
The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in
alphabetical order.
The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a
candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof.
SECTION 2.The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in
ten (10) legible copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall strictly
relate to the qualifications of the candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in
the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, as
well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by it.

The Secretary of the Council shallfurnish the candidate a copy of the

complaint or opposition against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days
from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or
opposition, if he so desires.
SECTION 3.The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet
in executive session to consider the qualification of the long list of candidates
and the complaint or opposition against them, if any. The Council may, on its
own, conduct a discreet investigation of the background of the candidates.
On the basis of its evaluationof the qualification of the candidates, the
Council shall prepare the shorter list of candidates whom it desires to
interview for its further consideration.
SECTION 4.The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published
the dates of the interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation. It shall likewise be posted in the websites
of the Supreme Court and the Judicial and Bar Council.
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the
dateand place of the interview.
SECTION 5.The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview,
only the members ofthe Council can ask questions to the candidate. Among
other things, the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or
opposition against him.
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again
meet in executive session for the final deliberation on the short list of
candidates which shall be sent to the Office of the President as a basis for
the exercise of the Presidential power of appointment. [Emphases supplied]
Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can
be gleaned from the use of the word "may." Thus, the conduct of a hearing
under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the part of the
JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an
opposition is discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain
the truth or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument suggests that the
JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an objection to
an applicants integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to
accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, "what is mandatory,

however, is that if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an

oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that
shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor."47 Again, the Court neither
intends to strip the JBC of its discretion to recommend nominees nor
proposes thatthe JBC conduct a full-blown trial when objections to an
application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the
observance of due process is a part of JBCs discretion when an opposition
to an application is made of record. While it may so rely on "other means"
such as character clearances, testimonials, and discreet investigation to aid it
in forming a judgment of an applicants qualifications, the Court cannot
accept a situation where JBC is given a full rein on the application of a
fundamental right whenever a persons integrity is put to question. In such
cases, an attack on the person of the applicant necessitates his right to
explain himself.
The JBCs own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The
subsequent issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBCs deference
to the grave import of the right of the applicant to be informed and corollary
thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-010, per se, provide
that: any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the
Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the complaint or opposition shall be in
writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies; the Secretary of the Council
shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against him;
the candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file
his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires; and the
candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under
the rules of statutory construction,bears great weight in that: 1] it covers
"any" complaint or opposition; 2] it employs the mandatory term, "shall"; and
3] most importantly, it speaks of the very essence of due process. While
JBC-010 does not articulate a procedure that entails a trialtype hearing, it
affords an applicant, who faces "any complaint or opposition," the right to
answer the accusations against him. This constitutes the minimum
requirements of due process.
Application to Jardelezas Case
Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on
whether Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the events
leading up to, and during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.

The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza
the opportunity to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the fact
that Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he
could shed light on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting, Chief
Justice Sereno informed him that in connection with his candidacy for the
position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Council would like to
propound questions on the following issues raised against him: 1] his
actuations in handling an international arbitration case not compatible with
public interest;48 2] reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC; and 3] alleged
insider trading which led to the "show cause" order from the Philippine Stock
Exchange.49
As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side,
as he would not want to be "lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he
manifested that his statement be put on record and informed the Council of
the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court en banc. When Chief
Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to hear from
him on the three (3) issues against him,Jardeleza reasoned out that this was
precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was not being given the
opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules.He asserted that a candidate must
be given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. He urged the
Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and translate the objections in
writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said that both
Jardelezas written and oral statements would be made part of the record.
After Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman
suggested that the voting be deferred, but the Chief Justice ruled that the
Council had already completed the process required for the voting to
proceed.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination
that the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardelezas
deprivation of his right to due process.
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does
not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process
is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself.50 Even as Jardeleza was verbally
informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and
was later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances
still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the
Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same
would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its wording
provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with

the Secretary withinten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list
of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC
members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period 51 is only applicable
to the public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount
the fact that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting
would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the
Council expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the
application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was only
during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite
Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day
when a resource person would shed light on the matter.
Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council
to resort to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition,
why did the JBC not take into account its authority to summon Jardeleza in
confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered to "take every
possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants?" It would not be
amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal memorandum used in
the invocation ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually addressed to Jardeleza, in
his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume is his knowledge of the
privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its indiscriminate release
to the public. Had he been privately informed of the allegations against him
based on the document and had he been ordered to respond thereto in the
same manner, Jardelezas right to be informed and to explain himself would
have been satisfied.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the
circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to
instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense.
Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of
his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable
chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in
a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It
would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital
affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014
meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on
June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to
affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea
of due process in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare
by surprise, but toprovide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient
time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes
anidle and futile exercise.

Needless to state, Jardelezas grievance is not an imagined slight but a real

rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges against him and his right to
answer the same with vigorouscontention and active participation in the
proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a
magistrate of this Court.
Consequences
To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical
fruition of the Courts findings, the Court now declares its position on whether
or not Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist, just in time when the period
to appoint a member of the Court is about to end.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:
1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section
2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardelezas legal strategy in handling a
case for the government.
2. While Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider
trading fall within the contemplation of a "question on integrity" and
would have warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was
notafforded due process in its application.
3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for
judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend
nomineesto the President. The sui generischaracter of JBC
proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due
process under JBC-010.
4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary
to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions
on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare
his defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have
been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated
position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the
violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due
process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the "unanimity
rule" as it reflects the JBCs policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of

nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable
defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza
received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to
observe the minimum requirements of due process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a partys right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process
is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.52 This rule may well be applied to the current situation for an
opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this,
the Court shall not concede. Asthe branch of government tasked to
guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an individual in
proper cases, the Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it
is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into operation in light of its
erroneous application on the original ground against Jardelezas integrity. At
the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBCs discretion in the
selection of nominees, but its application of the "unanimity rule" must be
applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by
Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only
conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC,
nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate
Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the
President. Need to Revisit JBCs
Internal Rules
In the Courts study of the petition,the comments and the applicable rules of
the JBC, the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired and
should be reviewed and revised. It appears that the provision on the
"unanimity rule" is vagueand unfair and, therefore, can be misused or abused
resulting in the deprivation of an applicants right to due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a
veto power over the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any
assertion by a member aftervoting seems to be unfair because it effectively
gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other members
in view of the unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can
recuse himself orherself, still the probability of annulling the majority vote
ofthe Council is quite high.

Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial
impression is that it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it
has been, used to mean other things. Infact, the minutes of the JBC
meetings n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to
its precise definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague,
nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a
candidate. Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the
respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be
formal or trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due
process. As always, an applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity
and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar
nature of its function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted
should be fair, reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the minimum
requirements of due process.
One final note.
The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist is an
endorsement of his appointment as a member of the Court.1wphi1 In
deference to the Constitution and his wisdom in the exercise of his
appointing power, the President remains the ultimate judge of a candidate's
worthiness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared
that Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the
shortlist submitted to the President for consideration as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and
ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings,
particularly JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of
the President of this Decision.
6. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary