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Case No.

1 Legine Ramayla
PNOC Energy Devt. Corp. vs. NLRC

Facts:
In June 1985, Danilo Mercado was dismissed by PNOC-Energy Development Corporation
(PNOC-EDC) due to the alleged serious acts of dishonesty. Mercado then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against PNOC-EDC. PNOC-EDC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Labor arbiter and/or the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) has no jurisdiction over the
case because PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), that
being a government-owned and controlled corporation, it is governed by the Civil Service Law as
provided for by the 1973 constitution:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Issue: Whether or not matters of employment affecting the PNOC-EDC, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, are within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

Ruling:
This issue has already been laid to rest in the case of PNOC-EDC vs. Leogardo, where this
Court ruled that the doctrine that employees of GOCC, whether created by special law or formed
as subsidiaries under the General Corporation law are governed by the Civil Service Law and not
by the Labor Code, has been supplanted by the present Constitution.
Thus, under the present state of the law, the test in determining whether a government-owned
or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law are the manner of its creation, such
that government corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those
incorporated under the General Corporation Law are not within its coverage.
Specifically, the PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the General Corporation Law was
held to be a GOCC whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.
Further, the fact that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect,
does not deprive the NLRC of jurisdiction on the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that
governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision.

Case N0 2 Teonilo Bagalanon Jr


DE LOS SANTOS V YATCO

FACTS:

Petitioner files for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his
previous order for execution on the parcel of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land
is being occupied by Fernando Mendoez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land
to the petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously
made shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was filed by the petitioner against
Mendoez for failure to pay as per agreement of both parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for
execution to take the land back. Defendant Mendoez moved for postponement to give both
parties sufficient time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the respondent judge. It
was settled by both parties that Mendoez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was ready to
make the payment the petitioner refused to abide with their agreement and now asking for a
higher amount of money for payment. Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of
execution, Judge Yatco quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted in lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion

RULING:

The court held that any judge has the jurisdiction to quash any writ of execution issued by him
especially when it was improvidently issued. There is no abuse of discretion by the judge since
the defendant made an opposition and proved that there is subsequent verbal agreement that
amended the compromise hence the execution cannot be validly decreed without a hearing. The
consequent ability of the defendant to meet his obligations by securing a GSIS loan also justifies
the courts refusal to eject him from the premises by an execution.

Case No 4 Beverly Jean Demafelis


Delos Santos v. Mallare

Facts:
Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed as City Engineer of Baguio on July
16, 1946, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and
functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim
appointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of
the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of
Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City
Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the
salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position violates Section
4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."

Held:
Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all
branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil
Service, except as those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examination."

Three specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarily confidential and


highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and
employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. None of these exceptions are
obtained in the present case.

Also, section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code provided that "Persons in the
Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified service, and went to say that The classified
service embraces all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service. Then section 671
described persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and
assistant directors of bureaus or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of
the government whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone."

Therefore petitioner is entitled to remain as City Engineer of Baguio until he resigns or


removed for cause, and that Mallares appointment was ineffective.

Additional Notes:

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly
technical. A confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for
the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters
of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not
formulate a method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute
policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and
duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and
are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not
highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or
training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is
employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service
whose technical competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the
duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very well be
discharged by non-technical men possessing executive ability.

Case No 5 Doreena Pauline Aranal


Salazar vs. Mathay
FACTS:
On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General
"confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System.
Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service under Section 5, paragraph (j)
of Republic Act No. 2260, subject to the usual physical and medical examination. She was
extended another appointment by way of promotion. Petitioner has qualified in the general
examination held and her appointment, which have been previously approved as provisional
under section 24(c), Republic Act 2260, was approved anew subject to the usual physical and
medical examination.
On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as
"confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor, Government Service Insurance System have
been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966.
On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo,
Auditor of the Government Service Insurance System issued an appointment to petitioner
Melania C. Salazar as Junior Examiner in his office. Said appointment was approved by the
Commission of Civil Service under Section 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 with a notice that
general clerical eligibility is not appropriate for the position involved. On the same day, petitioner
assumed the position.
On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she
be reinstated to her former position as "confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS.
However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the
Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position as
"confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, but the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition for mandamus without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First
Instance.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the services of petitioner as "confidential agent" was validly terminated on the
alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to
said position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.

RULINGS:
There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the
President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service
Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such
declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists "close intimacy
between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters
of state."
Since the position of the petitioner falls under the first category of primarily confidential
positions, it is no longer necessary to inquire into the nature of the functions attached to the
office in order to determine whether her position is primarily confidential or not. Her position

being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services as
confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS is in violation of her security of tenure.
It should be noted, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not
"removed" or dismissed" from office his "term" merely "expires,. The term of a confidential
officer is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes
fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the
services of the incumbent. When this even takes place, then he is not "removed" or "dismissed"
from office his term has merely "expired." Accordingly, petitioner was not removed from her
office as confidential agent in the office of the Auditor, GSIS, but that her term in said position
has already expired when the appointing power terminated her services.
But even granting, that petitioner's position was not primarily confidential and that her removal
from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her security of tenure, yet by her
acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976,
she was deemed to have abandoned former position of "confidential agent" in the same office. To
constitute abandonment, there must be a total abandonment to clearly indicate an absolute
relinquishment of the office. The officer should manifest a clear intention to abandon the office
and its duties which may be inferred from his conduct. The abandonment of an office by reason
of the acceptance of another, in order to be effective and binding should spring from and be
accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice, either to keep the old office or renounce it
for another.
Petitioner took her oath of office, performed the duties thereof and received her salary. All these
clearly indicate that she has completely abandoned her former position. That petitioner had the
clear intention to abandon her old position is firmed up by the fact that after her services as
"confidential agent" in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, she did not even bother to find out the
reason for the termination of her services. Right the next day, she accepted the position of Junior
Examiner in the same office. It took almost a year when she changed her mind and wanted to
return to her old position. Certainly, by her conduct she has shown her clear intention to abandon
it.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against petitioner.

Case No 6 Meriam Rika Wong


CORPUS VS CUADERNO (3-31-65)
Facts:
Petitioner R. Marino Corpus, is a "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the
Export Department" of the Central Bank, a position declared by the President of the Philippines
as highly technical in nature, was administratively charged by several employees in the export
department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority,
oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public official, and of violation of the internal regulations of
the Central Bank. The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office and created a threeman investigating committee. After a thorough investigation the committee found no basis to
recommend disciplinary action and recommended the immediate reinstatement of the
respondent. However, the Board issued a resolution considering the respondents resignation as
of the day he was suspended due to the statement of the Central Bank Governor that he had loss
confidence of the respondent.
Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it,
after which he filed an action for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with
preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The court rendered judgment
declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordered for the payment of damages. The
appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary Board is planted on the proposition that officers
holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the
appointing power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the
Constitution.

Issue:
W/N the lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and
legitimate cause of removal
Rulings:
The loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be predicated, is a clear
and evident afterthought resorted to when the charges, subject matter of the investigation, were
not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the record which
the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere
pointed to any substantiation of the charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the
loss of confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of facts herein that
the alleged loss of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the
charges upon which the investigation had proceeded. And inasmuch as the charges against
petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to follow the mandate that:
No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law.
Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants
in positions that are by their nature important, such as those that are "highly technical," the
Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at
least demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended
with prudence and deliberation adequate to show that said ground exists. The tenure of officials
holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries) ends
upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them
endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is different for those

holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly
distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of
confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made
by our fundamental charter.
CASE NO. 7 - JAY MARK P. BALBOSA
Republic vs CA
FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner's
complaint in Civil Case No. 88- 44048 praying for a declaration of illegality of the strike of the
private respondents and to restrain the same. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's
petition for certiorari, hence, this petition for review.
NPDC (National Parks Development Committee) was originally created in 1963 under Executive
Order No. 30, renamed as The National Parks Development Committee, Inc. as a non-stock and
non-profit corporation as registered in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under EO No.
68 on September 2, 1967.
It was attached to Ministry (later Department) of Tourism by virtue of EO No. 120 provided with a
separate budget subject to audit by the Commission on Audit.
On September 10, 1987, the Civil Service Commission notified NPDC that pursuant to Executive
Order No. 120, all appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted through the
Commission.
Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of employees
holding supervisory positions in the different areas of the parks, was organized and it affiliated
with the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and entered into two
collective bargaining agreements and later staged a stake on the alleged unfair labor practices
by NPDC.
A petition was filed by NPDC before RTC of Manila contending that the strike was illegal and that
the strikers have no right to strike for being government employees, dismissed by the Lower
Court for lack of jurisdiction and that the case falls under Department of Labor as stated
paragraph 5 of Article 217 of the Labor Code and was affirmed by Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a government agency,
or a private corporation.

RULINGS:
In Jesus P. Perlas, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 84637-39, August 2, 1989, we ruled
that the NPDC is an agency of the government, not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rules
and regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees
(Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180).
While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of
their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of a labor dispute between
the employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987
provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the Department of Labor and
Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in

holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable
by the Department of Labor and Employment.

Case no. 8- Paul Jason Acasio


Quimson vs Ozaeta

Facts:
Faustino Aguilar, then manager of the Administration, prepared the appointment for the post of
agent- collector on a part-time basis in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant Braulio Quimson, with
compensation of P720 per annum, the appointment to take effect upon assumption of duty. At
the time, Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal.
Defendant-Appellee Roman Ozaeta who by reason of his office of Secretary of Justice was acting
as Chairman of the Board of Directors, signed the appointment and forwarded the papers to the
President through the Secretary of Finance for approval. Without waiting for the said approval
Quimson assumed his position on May 6, 1948 and rendered service as agent-collector of the
Administration until October 21, 1949, inclusive, when he was informed that because of the
disapproval of his appointment, his services were considered terminated. There were several
objections to his appointment, among them that of the Auditor General on the ground that since
Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, his additional
compensation as agent-collector would contravene the Constitutional prohibition against double
compensation. The Commissioner of Civil Service said that he would offer no objection to the
additional compensation of Quimson as agent-collector provided it was authorized in a special
provision exempting the case from the inhibition against the payment of extra compensation in
accordance with section 259 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Issue: WON Quimzon may hold another position concurrently with the principal position.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the prohibition of the Constitution was against the double
compensation, not double appointments. Hence, a second position may be held concurrently
with the principal position as long as the two are not incompatible, but the incumbent cannot
collect additional salaries for services rendered unless specifically allowed by law. It would be a
violation of Article IX-B, Section 8: No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor
accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind
from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
double, or indirect compensation.

Case 10 Mary Grace Pausal


HERRERA vs. NPC
Facts:
RA No. 9136 was enacted on June 8, 2001 to provide a framework for the restructuring of the
electric power industry, including the privatization of NPCs assets and liabilities. One necessary
consequence of the reorganization was the displacement of employees from the Department of
Energy, the Energy Regulatory Board, the National Electrification Administration and the NPC. To
soften the blow from the severance of employment, Congress provided in Section 63 of the
EPIRA, for a separation package superior than those provided under existing laws.
Petitioners argue the following:
1) The EPIRA does not bar the application of CA No. 186, as amended. Petitioners are therefore
entitled to their retirement pay in addition to separation pay.
2) Petitioners have vested rights over their retirement benefits.
3) The payment of both retirement pay and separation pay does not constitute double
compensation, as the Constitution provides that "pensions or gratuities shall not be considered
as additional, double or indirect compensation".
Issue:
W/N the petitioners, former employees of the National Power Corporation (NPC) who were
separated from service due to the governments initiative of restructuring the electric power
industry, are entitled to their retirement benefits in addition to the separation pay granted by
law.
Ruling:
Absent clear and unequivocal statutory authority, the grant of both separation pay and
retirement benefits violates the constitutional proscription on additional compensation.
Section 8 of Article IX(B) of the Constitution provides that "no elective or appointive public officer
or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law". In prior decisions, we have ruled that there must be a clear and unequivocal
statutory provision to justify the grant of both separation pay and retirement benefits to an
employee. Here, absent an express provision of law, the grant of both separation and retirement
benefits would amount to double compensation from one single act of separation from
employment.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, their interpretation has little legal precedent. The CSC has
previously ruled that employees similarly situated to petitioners herein were not entitled to both
separation pay and retirement benefits; instead, the concerned employee must either avail of
the separation benefit or opt to retire if qualified under existing laws. In CSC Resolution No.
021112, the CSC interpreted the phrase "separation pay and retirement" in RA No. 6656 as
follows:
While the afore quoted provision of law used the conjunctive "and" between the words
"separation pay" and "retirement", this does not mean that both benefits shall be given to an
affected employee. This interpretation is supported by the phrase "if entitled thereto" found
before the phrase "be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits
under existing laws". Thus, payment of both separation and retirement benefits is not absolute.
Nothing in the EPIRA justifies the grant of both the separation package and retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101 in SCA No. Q-03-50681 holding that petitioners are not entitled
to receive retirement benefits under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that petitioners are entitled to a refund of their contributions to the retirement
fund, and the monetary value of any accumulated vacation and sick leaves.

Notes:
SEC. 63. Separation Benefits of Officials and Employees of Affected Agencies. National
government employees displaced or separated from the service as a result of the restructuring of
the [electric power] industry and privatization of NPC assets pursuant to this Act, shall be entitled
to either a separation pay and other benefits in accordance with existing laws, rules or
regulations or be entitled to avail of the privileges provided under a separation plan which shall
be one and one-half month salary for every year of service in the government: Provided,
however, That those who avail of such privilege shall start their government service anew if
absorbed by any government-owned successor company. In no case shall there be any
diminution of benefits under the separation plan until the full implementation of the restructuring
and privatization.

EPIRA - a legislative enactment dealing specifically with the privatization of the electric power
industry

Case No. 11 - Mary Tweetie Antonette G. Semprun


Civil Service Commission vs Pobre

Facts:
Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former government official who retired from the
government service three times. On his third retirement, respondent Pobre claimed payment of
his terminal leave based on his highest monthly salary as PRC chairman but to be reckoned from
the date he first entered the government service as budget examiner in the defunct Budget
Commission in 1958. He invoked Sec. 13 of Commonwealth Act 186:
Sec. 13. Computation of service. The aggregate period of service which forms the basis
for retirement and calculating the amount of annuity described in section eleven hereof shall be
computed from the date of original employment, whether as a classified or unclassified
employee in the service of an employer, including periods of service at different times and under
one or more employees; xxx.
Doubtful of the legality of the claim, the succeeding PRC chairperson sought the opinion of
both COA and CSC. CSC said however that all respondent was entitled were his terminal leave
benefits based only on his accrued leave credits from the date of his assumption to office as PRC
chairman and not his total terminal leave credits, including those earned in other government
agencies from the beginning of his government service. On appeal, the CA ruled that it is the
COA who has jurisdiction and not CSC, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CSC has the exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
respondents claim for terminal leave?
Ruling:
While the determination of leave benefits is within the functions of the CSC as the central
personnel agency of the government, the duty to examine accounts and expenditures relating to
such benefits properly pertains to the COA. Where government expenditures or use of funds is
involved, the CSC cannot claim exclusive jurisdiction simply because leave matters are involved.
Thus, even as the CSCs jurisdiction is recognized in this case, its power is not exclusive as it is
shared with the COA.
COA is yet to render its opinion on PRCs query regarding respondents claim for terminal
leave benefits. It is therefore found prudent to abstain from any pronouncement on this issue and
to wait for COA to rule on respondents claim.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is hereby modified. Its ruling on the jurisdiction is SET
ASIDE but the order to await the outcome of COAs decision respecting respondents claim is
AFFIRMED.

Case No. 12 Bryne Angelo Brillantes


CHR Employees Association vs. CHR

Facts:
The General Appropriations Act of 1998 which provided a Special Provision that is which
provided all Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy the power among others, the
Organizational Structure and the Use of Savings for their respective office. The Commission of
Human Rights, who claims to be a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG)
passed and approved a Joint Resolution adopting internal rules implementing the Special
Provisions. Annexed to the said resolution is the proposed creation of ten (10) additional plantilla
positions with particular upgrade of salary grade.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of
Budget (DBM) with request for its approval, but was denied.

Issue: Whether or not CHR enjoys Fiscal Autonomy and that Fiscal Autonomy includes the actions
taken by collapsing, upgrading and reclassification of positions therein.

Ruling:
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the
CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied. Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention
that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside
control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize
funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs
may require from time to time. It is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
The Court notes with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while
cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to
which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but
merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy.

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