Secretary of the DENR vs.

Yap
G.R. No. 167707.October 8, 2008. (568 SCRA 164)
FACTS:
These two consolidated cases involved the right of the present occupants of
Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. The first was
a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court in Aklan granting the petition for declaratory relief
filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordering the survey of
Boracay for titling purposes. The second was a petition for prohibition, mandamus,
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
ISSUE:
W/N an act declaring the land as alienable and disposable is required.
HELD:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.

Pasio vs. Monterroyo

G.R. No. 159494. July 31, 2008. [560 SCRA 739 (2008)]
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession and damages
against respondents. They alleged that the subject land was occupied, cultivated
and
cleared by Laureano Pasio in 1933; that after Laureano died, the Dir. of Lands
issued an Order for the issuance of a homestead patent in his favor. However, the
heirs of Laureano failed to receive the order. Consequently, the land was not
registered. In their answer, respondents claimed that they had been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lot for over 30 years.
ISSUE:
W/N the contention of the petitioners are correct.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of the respondents. In Director of Lands vs.
IAC [146 SCRA 509 (1986)], the Court held that alienable public land held by a
possessor, continuously or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously
and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land
Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
of the period, ipso jure.
Furthermore, the Court stated that once a homestead patent in accordance
with law is registered the certificate of title issued by virtue of the patent has the
force and effect of a Torrens title issued under the land registration law. In this case,
the issuance of a homestead patent in 1952 in favor of Laureano was not registered.
Sec. 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents since
it is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee. Non-registration of patent
with Register of Deeds, the deed as a contract between the Government and the
patentee rendered it functus officious.

Land Bank vs. Republic

G.R. No. 150824. February 4, 2008. [543 SCRA 453(2008)]
FACTS:
OCT No. P-2823 was issued on September 26, 1969 in favor of one
Angelito

C.

Bugayong.

It

covered

parcel

of

land

located

in

Bocana,

Kabacan, Davao City, with an area of 41,276 square meters. Marshy and under
water during high tide, it used to be a portion of a dry river bed near the mouth
of Davao River. Bugayong sold all of the four lots to different persons.
Afterwards, the spouses Du further caused the subdivision of the land
covered by their TCT No. T-42166 into two (2) lots. They sold one of said lots to
spouses Felix and Guadalupe Dayola, who were issued TCT No. T-45586. The other
remaining lot, registered under TCT No. T-45587, was retained by and registered in
the names of spouses Du.
Subsequently, Du spouses TCT No. T-45587 was cancelled and was replaced
by TCT No. T-57348 registered in the name of Lourdes Farms, Inc. subject of this
case. Lourdes Farms, Inc. mortgaged this property to petitioner LBP on April 14,
1980. The validity of OCT No. P-2823, as well as its derivative TCTs, remained

undisturbed until some residents of the land it covered, particularly those

along Bolton Diversion Road, filed a formal petition before the Bureau of Lands
on July 15, 1981.

Investigation and ocular inspection were conducted by the Bureau of Lands to

check the legitimacy of OCT No. P-2823. They found out that: (1) at the time Sales
Patent No. 4576 was issued to Bugayong, the land it covered was still within the
forest zone, classified under Project No. 1, LC-47 it was released as alienable and
disposable land only on March 25, 1981, pursuant to BFD Administrative Order No.
4-1585 and to the provisions of Section 13, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705; (2)
the land was marshy and covered by sea water during high tide; and (3) Bugayong
was never in actual possession of the land.
In view of the foregoing findings, the Bureau of Lands resolved that the sales
patent in favor of Bugayong was improperly and illegally issued and that the
Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of the subject land.

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP). The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), dated July 9, 1996, declaring null and void Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-2823, as well as other titles originating from it, on the ground that at
the time it was issued, the land covered was still within the forest zone.

ISSUE:
W/N the contention of petitioner Land Bank that it had an interest over the
subject land as a mortgagee had no merit.
HELD:
The Court held that the contention of petitioner Land Bank that it
had an interest over the subject land as a mortgagee had no merit. The mortgagor,
Lourdes Farms, Inc. from which Land Bank supposedly obtained its alleged interest,
had never been the owner of the mortgaged land. Acquisition of the subject land by
Lourdes Farms, Inc., was legally impossible since it was a forest land, not alienable.
Under Art. 2085 of the Civil Code, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing mortgaged. Since Lourdes Farms Inc. is not the owner of the
land, it does not have capacity to mortgage it to LBP.
VOLUME 34 NUMBER 2 (OCTOBER 2009) 101
Survey of 2008 Court Decisions on Property and Land Registration

Even assuming that Land Bank was able to obtain its own TCT over the

property by means of its mortgage contract with Lourdes Farms, Inc. the title must
also be cancelled as it was derived from OCT No. P-2823 which was not validly
issued to Bugayong (who obtained the OCT in his name). Forest lands cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registrable whether the title is a Spanish title or
a Torrens title. It is well-settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers
property
of public domain classified as forest or timber or mineral lad. Any title issued
covering
non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent purchaser for value
shall be cancelled.

Aneco Realty and Development Corp. vs. Landex Development Corp.

G.R. No. 165952. July 28, 2008. [560 SCRA 182 (2008)]
FACTS:
Petitioner Aneco filed a complaint for injunction against respondent
Landex. Prior thereto, FHDI sold 22 lots to petitioner and 17 lots to respondent.
The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one
of its lots. To restrain the construction of the wall, petitioner filed the said case.
ISSU:
W/N the complaint for injunction is tenable.
HELD:
The Court held that the complaint for injunction should be dismissed
for lack of merit. Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose
or fence his land or tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other
means.
The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex
may fence his property subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by
law. Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, as in this case, the Court will not
interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.

Floyd vs. Gonzales

G.R. No. 169047.November 3, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners Floyd and Calixtro were occupants of a lot which was
the subject of a complaint for forcible entry filed by respondents Nisperoses against
Abarnas for constructing a house on the subject land through stealth and strategy.
Olongapo RTC ordered Abarnas to vacate. Floyd, Calixtro and Ong Sotto, the
occupants, filed a case for injunction enjoining Sheriff Gonzales from enforcing the
judgment.

ISSUE:
W/N the filing of the case for injunction is correct.
HELD:
An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein judgment is binding
only upon parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard.
Petitioners were not made party-defendants by the Nisperoses. In the forcible entry
case, petitioners had not been given their day in court to present their side to prove
their alleged bona fide possession. Neither was a court hearing held to prove that
they are mere successors-in-interest, guests, or agents of defendant Abarnas when
the ejectment judgment was sought to be enforced against them. Thus, they cannot
be bound by the decision in the ejectment case.
However, they themselves admitted having possessed the subject land only
in 1986 and 1988 respectively. These cannot prevail over the Nisperoses
possession
through their father Igmedio that started in 1950. Thus, Nisperoses have the better
right to possession, prior possession having been proved.
CRITIQUE: This case involved a forcible entry case between the Nisperoses
and Abarnases. Floyd and Calixtro had been in possession of the property since
1986 and 1988, respectively. They are possessors with a real right or de jure
possessors.
The lower court ruling the forcible entry case can only rule on the actual physical
possession of the property.

Arbizo vs. Santillan

G.R. No. 171315. February 26, 2008. [546 SCRA 610 (2008)]
FACTS:
For review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
filed by petitioner Antonio Arbizo is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31
January 2006. The Court of Appeals ordered petitioner to vacate the properties
subject

of

this

case. The

assailed

Decision

reversed

and

set

aside

the

Decision dated 20 February 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales,
which affirmed in toto the Decision ]dated 18 August 2003 of the 3rd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Botolan-Cabangan, Cabangan, Zambales, in Civil Cases
No. 833, No. 834, No. 835 and No. 836.

Central to this controversy is the possession of the above three adjoining

parcels of land (subject properties) which are all situated in Barangay San
Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, with an area of 1,200 square meters each. The subject
properties are being claimed by petitioner to be part of the property described
under

Tax

Declaration

No.

16-0032

in

the

name

of

his

deceased

father, Celestino Arbizo. Respondents, on the other hand, assert ownership over the
same based on separate titles in their names, particularly: (a) Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-50723 in the names of the spouses John and Luz Marie Wassmer; ]
(b) TCT No. 50722 in the name of Pacita Marcelo; and (c) TCT No. T-50725 in the
names of the spouses Antonio and Rosario Santillan.
The records show that on 27 June 2001, the respondents filed with the MCTC three
separate Complaints for Ejectment against the petitioner. Finding similarity in the
issues involved, the MCTC jointly heard the three Complaints under the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
ISSUE:
The pertinent point of inquiry is whether or not private respondents have a
valid ground to evict petitioner from the subject properties.

HELD:
As to whether respondents were deprived of possession by force,
intimidation, strategy or stealth, the acts of the petitioner in unlawfully entering the
subject properties, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom the prior
possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. In order to constitute force, the
trespasser does not have to institute a state of war.

Gonzaga vs. CA
G.R. No. 130841. February 26, 2008. [546 SCRA 532 (2008)]
FACTS:
Petitioners are the registered owners of a residential lot covered by TCT No.
T-240379, with an area of 247 square meters, more or less, and located in Ecoland
Subdivision, Phase IV, Matina, Davao City. Petitioners admitted that they do not
reside at this property. In May 1995, petitioners decided to construct a house on the
land and engaged the services of a civil engineer. Petitioners claimed that there was
no occupant on the land when construction began in June 1995. Sometime in June
1995, petitioners went to inspect the above lot and discovered that a shanty
belonging to private respondents Bienvenido and Rowena Agan had been built on
the land in question.

A demand later made on private respondents to vacate the lot in question went
unheeded.
Thus, on April 26, 1996, petitioners filed a Complaint dated April 18, 1996 against
private respondents for Forcible Entry, Damages, and Attorneys Fees with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) in Davao City. The case entitled Spouses Virginia Gonzaga
and Alfredo Gonzaga v. Bienvenido Agan and Rowena Agan was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3001-E-96. As alleged by petitioners, private respondents put up the
structure by stealth and strategy.
In their Answer dated June 10, 1996, private respondents alleged that they are the
occupants of a portion of what is known as the Sabroso Village that their shanty is
within the land covered by a Free Patent Application dated February 9, 1992 in the
name of Ponciano Sabroso, who knew of the shantys existence for a long time and
consented to their stay in the village.
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to reverse and set aside the
Resolution dated April 10, 1997 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
43793, denying the petition for review of petitioners-spouses Virginia and Alfredo
Gonzaga of the Decision of the Davao City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33;
and the Resolution 1997 of the CA, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
HELD:
For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the person lawfully entitled to
the possession of the property must allege and prove that he was in prior physical
possession and defendant deprived him of such possession through any of the
grounds
provided in Rule 70, Sec. 1 Rules of Court. The Court quoted Mediran vs. Villanueva
[37 Phil. 752 (1918)], on why this is so, to wit:
Juridically speaking, possession is distinct from ownership, and from
this distinction are derived legal consequences of much importance. In
giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose
of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to
preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of
ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired
possession should remain in possession pending this decision; and the
parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in petty warfare over
the possession of the property which is the subject of the dispute. To
permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing
to social order. Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the
owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against
the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an
action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be

permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual possessor,

to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the
property right.