Michael Raymond Planey III

Dr. Christopher Y. Williams

African Social and Political Systems
Sino-African Political Economic Relations
Chinas presence in the African continent has grown rapidly since the turn of the 21st
century, and has raised African countries ambitions and suspicions alike. Understanding the
exact nature of relations between Africa and China has been proven to be rather difficult. As one
scholar, George Yu, puts it: Studying China in Africa is much like pursuing a dragon in the
bush. The dragon is imposing but the bush is dense. While this analogy illustrates the obscurity
of Sino-African relations, it is important to avoid giving into the clichd ideas of China being
some sort of monolithic dragon, and of Africa being an untamed bush in which political and
socioeconomic variations are absent (Large, 2008). Analysts that have speculated on the
implications of the relations between Africa and China can be characterized as having three main
points of view: Sino-optimism, Sino-pessimism, and Sino-pragmatism. While Sino-optimists
view China as a genuine partner that offers much hope for Africas developmental prospects,
Sino-pessimists view China as a neocolonial force that inhibits Africas long-term development
and perpetuates its structural dependency (Edoho, 2011). Sino-pragmatists consider Chinas
involvement in Africa to have a neocolonial character in consequence, but do not view this as
absolute nor inherent in Sino-African relations, and give China the benefit of the doubt regarding
its intent and potential to play a constructive role in Africas development (Adem, 2012). An
analysis of Sino-African relations reveals that due to Chinas rise as an economic hegemon in
Africa, and the ability of Chinas commercial interests to readily exploit Africas corrupt and

weakened states, avoiding becoming dependent upon and subservient to Chinese interests is a
serious challenge that many African countries face.
Sino-African relations are not uniform, but rather, encompass a myriad of drivers and
dynamics that are unique to every African states relationship with China. Nonetheless, SinoAfrican relations have become predominantly motivated by economics. Inquiry will thus begin
with background on the historical foundations of Sino-African relations, changes in Chinas
dispositions and geopolitical posture that catalyzed and propelled its economic interests to go
forward into Africa, and the overall nature and scope of Sino-African economic relations in the
21st century. Subsequently, an outline of the overarching dynamics and interests that guide
intergovernmental relations between China and its African counterparts will illustrate how
African states derive and seek-out benefits from China, and how China pursues and secures its
interests in Africa. In addition, a critical distinction will be made between the way China engages
Africas influential and strong states vs. Africas isolated and weak states, which will serve as a
basis as to why Chinas predatory commercial interests tend to command its foreign relations
with isolated and weak states. Accordingly, how Chinese-driven neocolonial arrangements
develop in these weaker states will become the focus. This will entail an analysis of the political
environments and regime characteristics that Chinas predatory investors thrive on, how they
penetrate these regimes to broker resources-for-infrastructure schemes, and how these schemes
turn out and for whom theyre beneficial. This will be followed by a synopsis of the negative
effects that exploitative Chinese companies and investors have had on African states
development and populations, and on Chinas reputation and sustainable role in the continent.
Finally, potential ways to move forward with both Chinas and African states predicaments will
be proposed.

Background
Since the founding of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, Africa has played a
significant role in Chinas foreign policy. In the beginning years of the Cold War, China viewed
Africa much like it viewed itself: as victims of colonization who were in a common struggle to
gain and substantiate national independence. This powerful notion of a shared history and
mission framed the first official meetings between Chinese and African leaders (of Egypt,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya and Sudan) in 1955, and built the foundations of Chinas
ideological campaign to promote revolution and Third World solidarity throughout Africa
(Haunauer, 2014). Such ideological impetuses drove China to expand its diplomatic efforts in
Africa as newly independent states came about in the 1960s and 70s promoting itself as a
neutral alternative to the US and the USSR. Being diplomatically isolated by the two great
powers, China worked hard to compete for political alliances and support in Africa by providing
states with substantial developmental aid, and by throwing its weight behind African countries
struggles for independence (Jauch, 2011). The importance and value of Africa to China was
made clear in 1972, when Chinas seat in the United Nations was at stake, and 26 African
countries made up over one-third of the votes for China to stay. China has counted on African
countries support on the international stage ever since (Sun, 2014).
Chinas approach to Africa dramatically shifted when it reformed and opened up its
economy in 1979. Chinas domestic developmental and foreign policy goals became closely
aligned. Instead of providing economic assistance for political support, China began lobbying for
contracts, investments and trade opportunities in Africa. Political ideology became much less of
a determining factor in Chinas relations with African countries, as economic cooperation

became the focus. By the mid-1980s, China postured itself as an alternative economic partner to
the West promoting the merits of the Beijing Consensus instead. African regimes found this
development model appealing, for Chinas success in planning its economy was seen as inspiring
and repeatable, and best of all: a partnership with China came with no strings attached (Sun,
2014). Chinas appeal in Africa grew more in the early 1990s; when economic and military aid
for African countries dried up, as they were no longer valued as strategic allies within the context
of the Cold War, and aid and investment from the West plummeted or came with erroneous
conditions at best. The Wests post-cold war disengagement from Africa created an economic and
political vacuum, which therefore put China in a unique position to seize upon this opportunity to
establish a solid foothold in the continent (Edoho, 2011).
African leaders grew privy to the idea of dealing with the Chinese over the IMF and the
World Bank at this time, as Western powers tried to push for a third-wave of democracy in
mid- and late-1990s. Contrarily, the Chinese made it clear that they were ideologically opposed
to giving lessons on democracy and governance, offered an appealing state-centered
development model, and appeared to be all business when it came to aid and investment
(Taylor, 2006). African and Chinese economic ties deepened further in 1996, when China
introduced its Going Out strategy. This led the Chinese state to encourage its enterprises to
invest more heavily in foreign markets, and thus prodded many Chinese businesses to venture
forward into Africa (Edoho, 2011). The rapid warming of Sino-African relations culminated into
the launching of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, which produced
unparalleled levels of engagement between the Chinese government and its African counterparts.
To date, African and Chinese leaders bilaterally agree upon and draft mutual goals and objectives
through this forum, from which China formulates 3-year engagement plans to lay out its

economic and strategic agenda in the continent (Haunauer, 2014). The 21st century has therefore
been marked by exponential levels of growth in Sino-African aid, investment and trade.
The official amount of foreign aid that China has sent to African countries since the first
FOCAC meeting in 2000 is enormous, however, the lines between Chinese aid and investments
are often quite blurry. For one, Chinas policy of providing aid unconditionally, and allowing
African governments to decide for themselves what to spend it on, has enabled governments to
dump aid money either into their pockets or vanity projects such as airports, parliamentary
buildings, presidential palaces, and soccer stadiums (Haunauer, 2014). Secondly, since China
prides itself as an economic partner before anything else, its foreign aid has gone primarily
towards infrastructural projects that often compliment or practically constitute their foreign
direct investments (FDI). While there have been substantial Chinese investments made in
manufacturing, telecomm and retail sectors in countries with relatively strong economies, most
of Chinese companies investments in Africa have gone into construction and resource extraction
(Edoho, 2011). Chinas total investments in Africa have dwarfed all other countries
commitments since the early 2000s, rapidly increasing year over year, and totaled over $43.6
billion from 2005 to 2010 (Economist, 2011). Although Africa has never yet constituted over 5%
of Chinas yearly global FDI, and there are signs of Chinas rate of FDI in Africa decreasing as
of late; real totals are likely underreported due to large Chinese firms known use of shell
companies, and irregularities in data on small and medium sized Chinese firms on the continent
(Juach, 2011). In terms of trade, Chinas exports to African countries are mostly finished goods,
such as electronics, industrial equipment and other cheap consumer items. African exports to
China, on the other hand, largely consists of raw minerals and resources with petroleum
representing 80% of the total value of Africas exports to China in 2011 (Alessi, 2015; Sun,

2014). Trade balances between African countries and China have generally been equal if not
positive for most African countries through the 21st century; however, since commodity prices
began to drop in 2014, the total value of Africas exports to China has fallen 32% from 2014 to
2015. This has caused many African countries to accumulate enormous trade deficits with China,
and Chinese firms have taken the commodity crisis as an opportunity to aggressively acquire and
merge with resource extraction companies throughout the continent (Romei, 2015). It is therefore
important to take a close look at what has guided Sino-African relations in the 21st century, and
how many African countries seem to have become so deleveraged vis--vis China.
Overarching Dynamics & Interests
The aims and interests of African states vary widely. Nonetheless, their power in relation
to China is mostly derived from their statuses as access points to their countries markets and
resources, their cooperation and loyalty to China in multilateral platforms, and their legitimation
and recognition of China as a model for governance and leader of the developing world
(Carmody, 2015). In exchange, African governments receive international recognition
themselves, and are able to use Chinas successful ideological focus on development and
economic rights to legitimize their own deviations from western-centric norms (Taylor,
2006). Furthermore, China offers African governments the means for economic and
infrastructural development that their countries truly need without stipulations. This in turn gives
various regimes the ability to appear effective to both their populations and the international
community at large. Albeit there is much room for doubt regarding the long-term benefit and
effectiveness of Chinas aid and investments in Africa, China is filling a void and putting up the
capital that Western powers have either failed or refused to provide (Edoho, 2011). Many African
states are in dire need of infrastructure, jobs, sources government revenue and trading partners.

While many Western governments and organizations have focused on human development,
China has shown itself as the only major power whos willing to commit to doing businesses and
making enormous deals in some of Africas most distraught countries (Haunauer, 2014).
Chinas interests in the African continent can be said to be pragmatic in that they vary
depending on what long- or short-term benefits they believe can be realized from each country.
Politically, Chinas bottom line is that its African partners recognize the One China policy, and
continue to help it maintain its influence in the United Nations and the international arena at
large. As previously established, China is much less ideologically driven than before, but African
states recognition - or even reception - of the Beijing Consensus contributes much to Chinas
vision of itself and its legitimacy at home and abroad. Given its policy of non-interference,
Chinas security interests in Africa are quite limited. Nevertheless, China contributes much to the
African Unions peacekeeping operations and to governments security forces with whom their
enterprises have established strong business relations or contracts. General stability in the
African continent is very important to China, for over one million Chinese citizens live in the
continent; and when African regimes are at risk, so are Chinese enterprises valuable assets and
contracts (Haunauer, 2014). On that account, Chinas economic interests ultimately command its
relations in Africa as it continues to fuel its rapid growth. Tapping into Africas vast natural
resource reserves and consumer markets does just that; and in the long-run, Africa is viewed as a
potential destination to outsource Chinas more labor-intensive and low-skilled industries while it
continues to move up the global supply chain. The extent to which purely economic and shortterm interests override Chinas long-range and political interests in Africa depends on the
diplomatic and structural strength of the states they deal with (Sun, 2014).

The elite of Chinas foreign policy regime assumes that relations with most African
countries are secured and require little high-level attention outside of FOCAC, and thus most
diplomatic matters are handled at the bureaucratic level unless there are crises to be dealt with.
Exceptions are made for regional leaders in Africa, which include countries such as Egypt,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. Such countries either exhibit robust economies that
possess long-term market potential, dominate regional business and trade activity, and/or are
diplomatically and ideologically influential both regionally and internationally (Adem, 2012;
Carmody, 2015; Verhoeven, 2015). Otherwise, Chinas political relations with most African
states are officially managed on the bureaucratic level by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),
while the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) manages economic relations which entail aid,
investment and trade (Haunauer, 2014). Although the MFA is responsible for interpreting and
implementing Chinas policy toward Africa, and tries to promote Chinas long-term political
interests in the continent, the MFA is bureaucratically outmuscled by MOFCOM. This has often
led to a prioritization of the economic interests of China and its enterprises in Africa. Given
MOFCOMs role as a conduit to Chinese aid, commercial and financial support, MOFCOM is
known to have closer relations with many African governments than the MFA and its embassies.
Additionally, executives of Chinas large companies and state-owned enterprises politically
outrank the MFAs bureaucracy, and typically deal with African elites and heads of states
themselves (Mailey, 2015). As a result, whether by accident or design, narrow Chinese economic
interests are predominant in less strategically important (and often fragile) states in Africa
without obstruction: giving Chinas foreign policy in parts of the continent a notoriously
neocolonial and predatory character (Sun, 2014).

How Neocolonial Arrangements Develop

Chinas presence in Africa is most glaringly exploitative in countries where its predatory
investors are able to flourish, and seize upon opportunities posed by some of Africas most
troubled states. Such opportunities are founded in states vulnerabilities, as these investors have
been found to prey on governments that are diplomatically isolated and financially desperate, in
conflict or transition, and in control of inadequately tapped yet vast natural resource reserves.
Additionally, Chinas predatory investors are best able to maneuver and operate in countries
where civil societies are repressed, and whose governments are institutionally weak and heavily
reliant on patronage networks to sustain (de Morais, 2011). In these circumstances, where most
investors tend to steer clear, Chinas predatory investors who can stomach the risk find potential
for immense profits. Not only can deals for resource access be hashed out directly with
governments leadership, and without bureaucratic or public scrutiny, but they can be highly
leveraged as well. Especially in the case that a regime is constrained and struggles with
legitimacy, or has just come into power: enabling them to stay afloat with financial aid,
investments, loans and resource revenues in exchange for favorable contracts and extraction
rights has come with very high dividends (Mailey, 2015).
A famous network of Chinese predatory investors, known as the Queensway Group, is
considered to be emblematic of the impulses and modus operandi that typify such investors, and
is also considered to be a chief architect of what has become known as the Angola Model. To
be sure, much of the groups success was due to its superior ability to network, for as one
Chinese businessman states: in Africa, you must have relationships. First you make friends;
then, you do business. While Queensway originally relied on Western businessmen to connect
with Angolas leadership, they had since networked through African Ambassadors to China,

Angolan elites, and other countries military and political elites to expand their reach and
operations throughout the African continent. As in the case with Angola, and many other
countries that followed, Queensway brokered what could be considered resources-forinfrastructure schemes (Alessi, 2015; Mailey 2015).
Queensway initiated this scheme (the Angola Model) in 2006 by first forming a jointventure with Angolas state oil company, Sonangol, to create China Sonangol. In this scheme, the
Angolan state sold crude oil to China Sonangol for an undisclosed (i.e. low) price, and China
Sonangol in turn resold the oil to Sinopec (a state-owned Chines oil firm) at the world market
price. Sinopec then used this oil to collateralize and structure very large loans from swaths of
banks, which were then directed to China Sonangol. While a proportion of this loan money
would be taken by the Angolan and Queensway stakeholders of China Sonangol, the remainder
of the loans were transferred to the state of Angola. The Angolan state then used this cut of the
loan money to contract the Queensway Groups holding company, China International Fund
(CIF), to kick off multibillion dollar construction projects. CIF would then subcontract these
projects out to Chinese construction firms, but often deceived or simply didnt pay them.
Accordingly, the CIF-led infrastructure projects were often times delayed time and time again,
shoddily done, or simply cancelled (Sun, 2014). Through this convoluted and opaque process
that originated in Angola, and spread throughout many parts of Africa, only the Queensway
Group and the corrupt leadership of the African governments they dealt with benefited from
these so called developmental partnerships (Mailey, 2015).
The desperate and often despotic African governments, that engage in the sort of deals
described above, benefited in such a way that they no longer relied on the international
community or their own populations to stay in power. While sometimes assisting them to get

around arms embargos or sanctions, groups like Queensway have helped African elites access the
financing and resources needed to keep their patronage networks strong, beef up their security
forces, and stuff bribe money into their offshore bank accounts (de Morais, 2011). Queensway in
particular used the Angola Model to partner with a few other corrupt regimes, and worked to
essentially loot the countries of Guinea, Madagascar, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Edoho, 2011).
Out of these countries, due to its relatively strong civil society and oversight institutions, only
Tanzania was able to expose and prevent Queensways operations from being fully realized.
Otherwise, Queensway and many other similar Chinese investor networks have been successful
in taking advantage of corrupt regimes to siphon wealth from many of Africas weakest states.
Although it is unclear to what extent the Chinese state condones or deliberately enables groups
like Queensway: the Chinese state and enterprises benefit greatly from these investors predatory
practices, for they enable enormous amounts of natural resources and wealth to come into China
and the most influential and wealthy members of its business class. African elites benefit in much
the same way, but as far as the people in exploited weak states are concerned, theyre the ones
getting pillaged and plundered by the kinds of terrible deals that their leaders sign them up for
(Mailey, 2015).
Ramifications & Remedies
A grave long-term ramification of varieties of the Angola Model prevailing in Africa is
that they keep despots in power, and disincentivize them from properly governing their countries
in order to remain legitimate. This leads to a reverse democratization process, and worsens the
disparities and repression faced by African populations (de Morais, 2011). The resource revenues
generated by the predatory investors endeavors almost never benefit these citizens, and are
either stolen or squandered on impractical and poor quality construction projects (Mailey, 2015).

One would expect that the projects themselves may at least benefit people through the jobs and
skills they bring, but that is far from being the case. The managers and skilled workers on such
projects are typically Chinese, and more often than not, Africans have little to no chance of
reaching executive or managerial positions in these companies. Even for unskilled work, many
Chinese firms bring in thousands of Chinese workers to do labor intensive jobs, rather than
simply hire locals. If hired, however, African workers are typically paid substantially lower than
their Chinese counterparts, and face an array of labor rights abuses (Haunauer, 2014). With
governments essentially in their pockets, Chinese employers are free to ignore states labor laws,
and are given security forces assistance in crushing efforts to strike or unionize (Juach, 2011).
The same pattern goes for environmental standards too, for Chinese drilling and mining
companies in particular have cleared land and dumped waste into waters without government
scrutiny (Edoho, 2011). Add all of this to the fact that many African businesses have been driven
out by cheap Chinese goods flooding their markets, and it becomes clear that impressions of
China as a new colonizer have become very founded (Jiang, 2011).
Chinas predatory companies and investors, and the many problems theyve brought unto
Africa, have undoubtedly caused serious damage to Chinas reputation as a whole. For many in
Africa and abroad, the abhorrent practices and mercantile interests of such actors are seen as
practically endorsed and representative of Chinas foreign policy (Haunauer, 2014). This issue
has been very challenging and problematic for Chinas MFA, which is reflected in an anonymous
Chinese diplomats expressed contempt for Queensway and their operations in Angola:
Nobody at the embassy even knows how to get in touch with them. We dont know what
they do to earn their privileges, by which I mean, for example, the fact that theyre the
only ones who seem to be preapproved for Angolan visas. And they have direct access to

leaders both [in Luanda] and in Beijing. One thing I do know, though: Those thirty
projects theyre talking about? Lies. All lies. The ones that they started have been
stopped, and the others will never get off the drawing board. Theyre responsible for all
the misunderstandings between the two countries, and theyre the reason that were
currently having to use every diplomatic trick in the book to restore good relations with
Angola. (Mailey, 2015)
Similar outcries from Chinas MFA have been made regarding Queensways and other
investors predatory operations in Africa, and all speak to the MFAs inability to reign control
over these actors. While the Chinese state has certainly had the ability, authority and knowledge
required to do so, the political will has clearly not been there. The predatory investors
connections to Chinas political elites, and the Chinese states resource insecurity seems to have
caused China to essentially look the other way regarding the conduct of Queensway and others
(Jiang, 2009). Albeit theyre prone to changes in power dynamics among individuals in Beijing,
as demonstrated in Queensways architects eventual demise in late 2015, Chinas predatory
investors are clearly not subject to a consistent rule of law as enforced by Chinas institutions
(Connett, 2015; Mailey, 2015). In consequence, Chinas exploitative companies and investors
have unabatedly estranged local governments and populations, and have led many African
people to view China itself as an enabler of corruption, inefficiency and waste. Meanwhile, the
Chinese managers and workers that go to Africa for work on projects are often there to make
money and leave as soon as possible. Therefore, they typically live frugally in secluded
compounds, and often do not bother to assimilate and engage with their African counterparts.
This leads many Africans to perceive the Chinese people themselves as being cold and detached,
which has cultivated anti-Chinese sentiment and social tensions. The Chinese people in the

continent have therefore become clear scapegoats and targets to whom resentments - built up by
Chinese companies and investors exploits and labor abuses - are channeled. Especially in the
event of regime instability, and anti-Chinese sentiment is used as a political rallying point, the
Chinese people in the continent can be put in serious danger (Haunauer, 2014). These issues and
risks complicate Chinas foreign policy, for its current political and social diplomatic efforts are
far from comprehensive, and is forced to exercise an unsustainable form of reactive diplomacy
in the event of a crisis. It has therefore become in the interest of China to begin developing a
serious strategy for engaging in public diplomacy, and regulating the behavior of its commercial
actors (Sun, 2014).
Although Chinas relatively decentralized diplomatic regime makes it difficult to
coordinate a long-term public diplomacy strategy in Africa, positive steps have indeed been
taken (Wang, 2008). A potent effort made in this regard was the launching of an African branch
of the state-run Chinese Central Television, called CCTV Africa, in 2012. Apart from the
significance of the demystifying and humanizing effects the stations broadcasts presumably
have had on Africans perceptions of the Chinese as people, CCTV Africa has also put an effort
into countering negative attitudes on Chinas perceived neocolonial presence in Africa. In
addition, Chinese diplomats and ministers have begun paying lip service to promoting
sustainable development, and have explicitly discouraged Chinese enterprises from catching
fish by draining the pond in Africa. Instead, through their continent-wide image campaigns, the
Chinese state has encouraged and exemplified the potential for Chinese enterprises to engage in
genuine win-win ventures in Africa (Haunauer, 2014). Apart from this propaganda and the
sporadic (albeit substantial) PR-boosting developmental projects launched in select countries,
however, the underlying issues that have led to Chinas poor reputation in the first place have yet

to be systematically addressed (Adem, 2012). If theyre truly serious about mitigating and
preventing the damage done by its predatory companies and investors, China still needs to create
institutionally strong and mechanized ways to monitor and reprehend exploitative individuals
and organizations. For one, this would entail requiring that payments made to foreign
governments are reported, and that the payments intentions are made explicit. Secondly, any
individuals or firms that work with or within Chinas regulatory jurisdictions should be required
to allow officials audit their organizational and ownership structures. This would enable officials
to monitor and sanction accounts and individuals for abuses, and to detect any red flags, such
as the use of shell companies that have very few legitimate uses. Not only would this enable
China to better manage its long-term diplomatic efforts in Africa, but itd overall enable them to
keep the interests of the private sector in line with that of the states as well (Mailey, 2015).
Ultimately, it is the responsibility of African governments to ensure that neocolonial
patterns do not thrive in their countries. Insofar, many governments have enabled Chinas
interests to stifle their own countries future industrialization efforts. The natural resources
required to fuel industry development have become many countries primary exports, and targets
of investment. Such tunnel visioning is bound to backfire, for a sharp downturn in commodity
prices often leads these kind of states patronage networks and security forces salaries to shrink
which is more than enough to ruin any resource-dependent and weak regime (Mailey, 2015).
Even for despotic governments, therefore, it is in their best interest to leverage their relationships
with China in such a way that they can compel them to contribute to the sustainment of their
countries long-term economic development, and to help them secure more reliable sources of
revenue for themselves (Edoho, 2011).

Many African governments have more bargaining chips vis--vis China than what they
seem to believe or are willing to put into play. Especially if done in coordination with other
states, African governments can secure substantial economic gains from China if they were to
use their leverage more prudently. Such bargaining can include actions and threats such as:
company blacklists and sanctions, economic and trade barriers and stipulations, nationalizations
of Chinas resource extraction companies, disengagements from Chinas sphere of influence and
into another big powers orbit, and withdrawals of support for China in the international arena.
Additionally, the African Union or Africas Regional Economic Communities should lead the
charge to implement the mechanics or standards needed to ensure that Chinese-driven projects,
and resource extraction supply chains and revenues can be inspected and monitored by citizens
and institutions alike (Mailey, 2015). Ensuring that Chinas economic engagements in Africa are
genuinely beneficial to Africans is critical, and how African states manage this relationship may
very well define their economic trajectories for the next century. Chinas commitment to Africa
has the potential to be enormously beneficial, but also destructive. While China and its actors
will most assuredly pursue their own interests, it is the sole responsibility of African states to
preserve their own.
Conclusion
China has risen to become a formidable economic power in Africa, and its commercial
interests have demonstrated the power and will to exploit and loot some of Africas most corrupt
and weakened states. For those interested in Africas long-term development, becoming
dependent upon and servile to Chinas interests must be understood as a serious risk that must be
avoided. In filling a vacuum left by the Wests post-Cold War disengagement, China has
aggressively pursued its economic interests in Africa, which has become its prime objective ever

since. Africas strongest states enjoy more-or-less an equal footing with China, however, some of
Africas weaker states have become substantially deleveraged, dependent on and subjected to the
will of Chinas cut-throat commercial actors interests. The neocolonial arrangements that follow
such dynamics are damning to the long-term economic and political prospects of such states, and
it is ultimately the responsibility of African states and Africa as a whole to avoid this. China can
indeed become a constructive and genuine developmental partner in Africa, but only if African
states can ensure this for both themselves and their people. How Sino-African relations are
managed will arguably determine Africas developmental prospects for the coming century.

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