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IranTurkey Relations,
19792011

Both Turkey and Iran are large and important countries in the Middle East;
how these two countries relate to each other is of crucial importance both for
the region and for the wider world. This book explores the diplomatic, security
and energy relations of these two middle-power states since 1979, analysing
the impact of religious, political and social transformation on their bilateral
relationship. It considers the nature of TurkeyIran relations in the context of
middle-power relations theory, and goes on to look at diplomatic crises that
have taken place between Turkey and Iran since 1979. The author analyses
Turkey and Irans security relations with the wider Middle East, including the
KurdishTurkish War, the KurdishIranian War and the KurdishArab War,
and their impact on regional politics.
Suleyman Elik is currently Visiting Research Fellow at the Energy Institute,
and School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, UK.

Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series

Series Editor: Anoushiravan Ehteshami
University of Durham

Economic Development in Saudi Arabia

Rodney Wilson, with Abdullah
Al-Salamah, Monica Malik and
Ahmed Al-Rajhi
Islam Encountering Globalisation
Edited by Ali Mohammadi
Chinas Relations with Arabia and the
Gulf, 19491999
Mohamed Bin Huwaidin
Good Governance in the Middle East
Oil Monarchies
Edited by Tom Pierre Najem and Martin
Hetherington
The Middle Easts Relations with Asia
and Russia
Edited by Hannah Carter and
Anoushiravan Ehteshami
Israeli Politics and the Middle East
Peace Process, 19882002
Hassan A. Barari
The Communist Movement in the Arab
World
Tareq Y. Ismael
Oman The Islamic Democratic
Tradition
Hussein Ghubash
The Secret IsraeliPalestinian
Negotiations in Oslo
Their success and why the process
ultimately failed
Sven Behrendt
Globalization and Geopolitics in the
Middle East
Old games, new rules
Anoushiravan Ehteshami
IranEurope Relations
Challenges and opportunities
Seyyed Hossein Mousavian
Islands and International Politics in the
Persian Gulf
The Abu Musa and Tunbs in strategic
perspective
Kourosh Ahmadi

Monetary Union in the Gulf

Prospects for a single currency in the
Arabian Peninsula
Emilie Rutledge
Contested Sudan
The political economy of war and
reconstruction
Ibrahim Elnur
Palestinian Politics and Middle East
Peace Process
Consensus and competition in the
Palestinian negotiation team
Ghassan Khatib
Islam in the Eyes of the West
Images and realities in an age of terror
Edited by Tareq Y. Ismael and
Andrew Rippin
Islamist Extremism in Kuwait
From the Muslim Brotherhood to
Al-Qaeda and other Islamist political
groups
Falah Abdullah al-Mdaires
Iraq, Democracy and the Future of the
Muslim World
Edited by Ali Paya and John Esposito
Islamic Entrepreneurship
Rasem N. Kayed and M. Kabir Hassan
Iran and the International System
Edited by Anoushiravan Ehteshami and
Reza Molavi
The International Politics of the Red
Sea
Anoushiravan Ehteshami and
Emma C. Murphy
Palestinian Christians in Israel
State attitudes towards non-Muslims in a
Jewish State
Una McGahern
IranTurkey Relations, 19792011
Conceptualising the dynamics of politics,
religion and security in middle-power
states
Suleyman Elik

IranTurkey Relations,
19792011
Conceptualising the dynamics of
politics, religion and security in
middle-power states
Suleyman Elik

This edition published 2012

by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business
2012 Suleyman Elik
The right of Suleyman Elik to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Elik, Suleyman.
IranTurkey relations, 19792011: conceptualising the dynamics of
politics, religion, and security in middle-power states/Suleyman Elik.
p. cm.(Durham modern Middle East and Islamic world series ; 23)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. IranRelationsTurkey.2. TurkeyRelationsIran.I. Title.
DS274.2.T8E45 2011
327.550561dc22
2011013047
ISBN: 9780415680875 (hbk)
ISBN: 9780203803028 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, Devon

Dedicated to my mother

Contents

Foreword
Preface and acknowledgements
List of abbreviations

viii
ix
x

Introduction

The foundations of IranianTurkish relations: an alternative

approach to the politics of middle-power states

An interregnum: IranianTurkish diplomatic crisis

35

The phantom of terror in IranianTurkish relations

49

Post-Cold War IranianTurkish security relations: a revival of

the KurdishTurkish war and security patterns in the Middle East

65

Post-Cold War security relations of IranTurkey: from

ethno-religious conflict to new security systems in Central
Asia and the Caucasus

94

Post-Cold War IranTurkey energy relations in the Black Sea

and Caspian Sea neighbourhood: implications for European
energy security

129

Pathologies and roundups in IranianTurkish economic

relations 19792011

161

Capacities of the middle-power state: articulation of theoretical

framework

176

Notes
Bibliography
Index

200
219
235

Foreword

In the past few months, decades have happened in the Middle East! The realm
of Middle East politics is changing and in this the international relations of
MENA states could not be a more important subject for analysis. In this rapidly
changing environment two Muslim countries seem to be best placed to
influence and shape the emerging geopolitics of the region these being Iran
and Turkey. Indeed, in post-Mubarak Egypt there is already talk of the
implementation of a Turkish model for its burgeoning democratic forces,
and that is all the while that Tehran has been insisting that the regions new
revolutions thirty-two years after its own are validations of its own antiimperial and pro-Islamist message. Which of the two countries is better at
projecting and applying soft power in this really new Middle East? It is very
hard to tell, but what is not in doubt is Tehran and Ankaras real interests in
the changing nature of politics in the Middle East, albeit clearly for rather
different reasons and from very different starting points.
The role of Iran and Turkey will become increasingly important in this new
Middle East and yet deep knowledge of their bilateral relations and the ways
in which domestic and regional forces may have affected their interactions
has not been widely studied. How politics, security and economics may have
helped shape their bilateral relations is a critical set of questions; and also
critical are their perceptions of each other over the past few decades. What is
now being provided here in the really excellent book by Dr Suleyman Elik is
analytical answers to a wide range of questions about how and why Tehran
and Ankara interact. Suleyman has masterfully crafted a durable framework
for our better understanding of this relationship. Here we have a full and
dynamic account of the forces that have influenced the recent convergence in
TurkishIranian relations, but Suleyman is also very careful to draw the reader
to the multitude of problems that could potentially derail the partnership
between them. The complexities of the relationship are laid bare in this
fascinating book and as it has deep analytical roots its assessments and
judgements are likely to outlast the regions latest political earthquakes for a
considerable time.
Anoush Ehteshami
Durham, UK
March 2011

Preface and acknowledgements

This book lays emphasis on a broader conceptual and comparative perspective,

thus suggesting that the middle-power political relations of IranTurkey reflect
a direct concern with international relations and longstanding interest in
political theory. I have been working on the broad subject of this book based
on my doctoral thesis, which I wrote in the School of Government and
International Affairs at Durham University. Some of the original issues began
to take shape as part of the preparation and teaching of graduate seminars on
the politics of the Middle East, which I taught at Newcastle University, UK,
and my research was continued at Durham University Energy Institute,
UK. The actual writing of this book was done mainly from 2004 to 2011.
I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Professor Anoush Ehteshami for his
indispensable guidance at Durham. I would also like to extend my gratitude
to my internal examiner, Dr Mehmet Asutay and international liaison officer
Dr Lorraine Holmes for the valuable support they offered me at Durham
University. My most immediate and deepest debts are to my editor Lucy Abbott
of Castle College at Durham University for her excellent editing work on this
manuscript. I am delighted to offer my gratitude to Professor Robert Olson
for his untiring encouragement and generosity during the writing of this
project. I am also indebted to Professor Robert Canfield at Washington
University in St Louis for his contribution by electronic mail during the
critical stage of this research. My heartfelt appreciation also goes to Aykut
Baycan and Sabri Carmikli; without their support, this research would not have
been completed today.
Suleyman Elik
Durham, UK
21 March 2011

Abbreviations

ACG
AEOI
AIOC
ANF
ASALA
bb/d
Bcm
BLACKSEAFOR
BOTA
BSEC
BSNC
BTC
BTE
BTK
CAC
CASCO
CDC
CENTO
CIS
CNPC
CPC
CST
CSTO
CUP
D-8
ECO
EEZ
EIA
ESDI
EU
GCC
GME
GU(U)AM

AzeriChiragGunashli (oilfield)
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
Azerbaijan International Operating Company
Azerbaijani Nationalist Front
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
billion barrels per day
billion cubic metres
Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group
Turkey State Pipeline Corporation
Black Sea Economic Cooporation Organisation
Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee
BakuTbilisiCeyhan (pipeline)
BakuTbilisiErzurum (pipeline)
BakuTehranKhark (pipeline)
Central AsiaCentre (pipeline)
Caspian Sea Cooperation Organisation
Caspian Development Cooperation
Central Treaty Organization
Commonwealth of Independent States
Chinese National Petroleum Company
Caspian Pipeline Consortium
Collective Security Treaty
Collective Security Treaty Organisation
Committee of Union and Progress
Developing Eight (Islamic countries)
Economic Cooperation Organisation
exclusive economic zone
(US) Energy Information Agency
European Security and Defence Identity
European Union
Gulf Cooperation Council
Greater Middle East
GeorgiaUkraine(Usbekistan)AzerbaijanMoldova

Abbreviations xi
IAEA
IHD
IISS
IJG
ILSA
IMF
IMU
INSS
ISAF
ITF
ITGI
ITTO
JEC
KCP
KDP
KDPI
KKK
KMG
KOMALA
KRG
KTI
LEU
LNG
MAD
mb/d
MEDO
MESC
MGK
MIT
MKO
MoU
MTN
NATO
NICO
NIGC
NIOC
NIS
NKR
NPT
NWFZ
OIC
OPC
OSCE

International Atomic Energy Agency

Human Rights Association
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Islamic Jihad Group
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
International Monetary Fund
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Institute for National Strategic Studies
International Security Assistance Forces
Iraqi Turkoman Front
Interconnector of Turkey, Greece and Italy
Iran Tourism and Touring Organisation
Joint Economic Commission
KazakhstanChina pipeline
Kurdistan Democratic Party
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran
KorpezheKurt Kui (natural gas pipeline)
Kazmunaigraz
Revolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of
Kurdistan
Kurdish Regional Government
KazakhstanTurkmenistanIran
low enriched uranium
liquid natural gas
mutual assured destruction
million barrels per day
Middle East Defense Organization
Middle Eastern Security Complex (MESC)
National Security Council
Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (National Intelligence Agency
of Turkey)
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation
Memorandum of Understanding
Mobile Telephone Network
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NaftIran Intertrade Company
National Iranian Gas Company
National Iranian Oil Company
newly independent states
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
non-proliferation treaty
nuclear weapons-free zone
Organisation of the Islamic Conference
Operation Provide Comfort
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

xii Abbreviations
PfP
PJAK
PKF
PKK
PSA
PUK
QDR
RATS
RCD
RDF
RRF
RSCT
SCO
SCP
SEATO
SEE
SOCAR
SP
TAF
TAP
TAPI
TAV
TCGP
TCO
TCP
TGNA
THB
TICA
TIT
TPAO
TSF
UNCLOS
UNOMIG
UNSC
US
WMD
WMEI
WMENAI
WP
WTO

Partnership for Peace

Partiya Jiyana Azad ya Kurdistan (Party for Free Life
in Kurdistan)
peacekeeping force
Kurdistan Workers Party
production sharing agreement
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
quadrennial defence review
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
Regional Cooperation for Development
rapid deployment force
Russian Rapid Forces
Regional Security Complex Theory
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
South Caucasus pipeline
Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation
South Eastern Europe
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)
Turkish Armed Forces
Trans-Afghan pipeline
Trans-Afghanistan, Pakistan and India
Tepe-Akfen-Vie
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline
Tengizchevroil
Trans-Caspian Pipeline (oil and gas)
Turkish Grand National Assembly
Turkish Hezbollah
Turkish International Cooperation Agency
TurkmenistanIranTurkey pipeline
Turkish Petroleum Company
Turkish Special Forces
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
United Nations Security Council
United States of America
weapons of mass destruction
Wider Middle East Initiative
Wider Middle East and North Africa Initiative
Welfare Party
World Trade Organization

Introduction

Now is not the time for business as usual with Iran. We urge all of our friends
and allies, including Turkey, to not reward Iran by investing in its oil and gas
sector, while Iran continues to defy the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) by continuing its nuclear research for a weapons capability.1
(Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs)
Why cant we establish a mechanism of unrestricted trade with Iran similar
to the one we have with Europe? I personally dont see any reason why we
should not be able to accomplish this.2
(Tayyib Erdoan, Turkish Prime Minister)

Turkey and Iran, two neighbouring states with one of the worlds longest
common borders (529 km), have preserved their position as two crucial
countries in the Middle East with common geopolitical locations, historical
heritages, populations and rich cultures, while maintaining a distance in their
fundamental politics, security priorities and economic and trade cooperation.
Similar circumstances can hardly be found between any other two countries
in the world. The perceived disarray of relations between Turkey and this
distant country on its doorstep remains an option for diversifying the direction
of foreign policy for both states in the twenty-first century. Turkey and Iran
both have the option to either draw closer together or move further apart.
However, despite the tumultuous relationship that occurs from time to time,
they have managed this fragile relationship successfully with considerable
state diplomacy by recognising the mutual legitimacy of each regime and the
interests common to both states since the signing of the Qasr-i Shirin Peace
Treaty in 1639. The relationship of polarity between the leadership of Asia
Minor (now modern Turkey) and Persia (Iran) dates back to experiences
throughout the ancient and middle ages. There was continuous rivalry between
Constantinople, based in Anatolia, and the Sassanian Empire of Persia. Both
empires struggled and fought for control of Mesopotamia, now known as Iraq.
In the seventh century, Muslim Arabs from the Hejaz destroyed the Persian
Empire and the Persian people converted to Islam. However, the coalition
of Iranian and Seljuk Turks protected them from Arabic assimilation.

Introduction

The TurkoPersian alliance also permitted the Turks a widespread occupation

of the Middle East, Asia and Europe after the toppling of the Arab dynasties.
Ultimately, the TurkoPersian Islamic synthesis came to an end with the brutal
military campaign of the Mongols and the Christian crusaders invasion in
the thirteenth century. As a result, the torch of historical rivalry was taken
up by the Ottoman Empire, which Turkified and Islamised Asia Minor and
beyond, into the Balkans. The Sunni Ottomans and the Shia Safavids of Persia
fought for control, but the Ottomans finally overcame them to control Mesopotamia. Since the start of the twentieth century, much of the Muslim world
has been under Anglo-Saxon, or Russian military occupation or political
domination. The strength of both Turkey and Iran was their common ability
to sustain sovereignty against the hegemonic demands, political threats
and economic intimidation of the United States. Turkish politico-military
experience and the sophisticated Iranian cultural reserve compose two branches
of Islamic cultural identity in this age of Islamic civilisation. The legacy of
this experience facilitates a far-reaching present-day sphere of political
influence in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus for both Turkey
and Iran.
In modern times, the secular leadership of Turkey and Iran follow the same
goals as Western style modernisation. The friendship agreement signed by the
two countries in Iran on 22 April 1926 cemented commitments to policies of
cordiality, neutrality and non-aggression. Under the same agreement, the
parties also pledged to take joint action against Kurdish insurgency that posed
a threat to their new common political discourse as well as overall regional
security. The failure of the Saadabad Pact during the Second World War
questioned the sovereignty of Turkey and Iran in relation to being occupied
by great powers. However, during the Cold War, Turkeys and Irans strategic
might for the international community could be mostly observed through their
geopolitical position as buffer states against Soviet expansion. Hence, Turkey
and Iran joined the short-lived US-led Baghdad Pact with Pakistan (which
included Britain, with the US as an observer), the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) and an economic agreement, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). Iran withdrew from both the military and economic agreements
after the revolutionary leaderships seizure of power.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran increased fear of a pro-Western, secular
leadership in Turkey; around four million Iranian refugees spread across the
world and a large number via Turkey. The estimated 600,000 to 800,000
Iranians in Turkey posed major threats to Turkish domestic stability and its
relations with Iran. The Iranian state regards Turkeys Western security
orientation towards Washington and political orientation towards Brussels, in
order to protect its own interests, with suspicion, which is further increased
by its provision of refuge to opponents of the Iranian regime (Mujahedin-e
Khalq) in Turkey and its pro-Israeli stance. The new religious leadership has
also been concerned about Turkeys nationalist aspirations and influence over
its large Azeri-origin population (2025 per cent). The spiritual leader of Iran,

Introduction 3
Ali Khamenei, is an Azeri Turk and, by tradition, chiefs of Irans armed forces
tend to be Azeri Turks. On the other hand, Iran has managed to block Turkeys
Turanist ambitions to link with the Turkic State in Central Asia by closely
cooperating with Russia and Armenia. Iran has considerable geographical
advantages as an energy corridor stretching from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan to eastern Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.
However, with the Western alliance, Turkey has been reconfigured as a
regional energy hub for Central Asian, Caspian, and Russian and Middle
Eastern hydrocarbon transportation. Nevertheless, shunning competition,
Ankara and Tehran increased mutual cooperation on energy and trade matters
with the completion of a 2,577 kilometre natural gas pipeline stretching from
Tabriz to Ankara in 2001. Iran is now the second largest natural gas supplier
(20 per cent, which constitutes almost 75 per cent of TurkishIranian external
trade) for Turkey after Gazprom. The preliminary agreement and a series of
memoranda of understanding (MoU) between Iran and Turkey in July 2007,
including Tehrans approval for Ankara to develop phases 22, 23 and 24 of
Irans South Pars gas field and pumping of Iranian and Turkmen gas to
Europe via Turkey through the Nabucco pipeline project, has been backed by
Europe. This would reduce dependence on Russia by gaining access to Central
Asian natural gas resources, which run across Turkey to Hungary and Austria
through the eastern Balkans. It will eventually be able to carry 31 Bcm of gas
a year to big consumers in Europe. Turkeys increasing energy cooperation
with Iran and its mediatory role between Iran and Europe has been viewed by
a Washington spokesman as troubling. However, it is compulsory for Turkey
and Iran to cooperate in relations with regard to common problems and
interests brought along by their joint and geopolitical obligations. This neither
sacrifices Irans anti-Westernism and anti-US attitudes nor Turkeys concerns
that stem from the historical past, namely the threat posed by attempts to import
the Iranian revolution.
Following the post-9/11 paradigm shift, many events have culminated in
an international political situation in which resorting to military action is no
longer viewed as a non-option. These events include the rising power of Iran
as a pariah state, its call to wipe Israel from the map, its expanding sphere
of influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia and the Caucasus, its attempts
to incite Shiites in the Gulf region and Afghanistan, the home to two-thirds
of the oil reserves in the world, the threats against the free passage of ships
through the Strait of Hormuz, its revelation of a bridgehead for China and
Russia to project power in the Middle East, proxy war through Hezbollah and
Hamas, and Washingtons policy of curbing Iran by isolating its leadership
in the international system and formulating contingency air strike plans. Iran
produces 4 million barrels of crude oil each day and 2.5 million barrels of this
is exported to Asian markets via the Straits of Hormuz. It additionally provides
84 Bcm of natural gas annually. Hence, air strikes from Washington to
paralyse Irans nuclear energy and communications infrastructure have already
been considered. The situation is critical as Turkey cannot afford to stand idly

Introduction

on the sidelines awaiting a fait accompli from the US or Israel. Accordingly,

Turkey launched a nuclear negotiation (2010 BrazilIranTurkey nuclear fuel
swap deal) to impede other instability in the neighbouring regions. If the
Obama administration opts to strike Iran, it is highly probable that Washington
will request Turkeys cooperation for use of the jointly operated bases and
immediate closure of the borders to trade and human traffic. In this regard,
Ankara would play a key role as much of Irans trade with Europe goes through
Turkey. The Turkish position on Iran today looks much like it did during the
2003 invasion of Iraq.
The literature on TurkishIranian relations is somewhat limited as the
predominant focus has centred on the Kurdish question and ideological
competition. In this regard, this study is the first comprehensive attempt at
exploring IranianTurkish relations since 1979. It aims to locate the capacity
of middle-power states in international politics exemplified in the cases of
Turkey and Iran by utilising a domestic, regional and systemic level of
analysis, providing an experimental integrated model for international politics.
This research also attempts to clarify contemporary political historiography
concerning two of the most important Middle Eastern, Central Asian and
Caucasian states, home to a combined population of some 140 million people.
Consequently, this studys contribution stems from the application of an
experimental integrated model to the aim of the study by developing a
particular type of framework. Thus, this research goes beyond the boundaries
of political history and event analysis.
There are few studies directly related to IranianTurkish relations. Even
Turkish scholars have not paid significant attention to these countries modern
historiography. It is remarkable that the two most important countries in the
region have been neglected not only by non-Middle Eastern scholars including
Turkish scholars, who are fulfilling their Turkish nationalist responsibilities
as part of the Western political identity of Ottoman Westward, but also
by Iranian scholars. Introductory studies have mostly been written by
Western scholars; American anthropologist Robert L. Canfields TurkoPersia
in Historical Perspective is very valuable in order to define Turkish and
Persian national identity during the medieval period. On the other hand, Adel
Allouches doctoral research, The Origins and Development of the Ottoman
Safavid Conflict (15001555) outlines the basis of geopolitical competition
and clarifies the alienation from the TurkoPersian cultural synthesis. Significant contributions have been made by Turkish academics. Bekir Kutukoglus
case study, Osmanli-Iran Munasebetleri (OttomanIran Relations, 15781590)
is an example. However, Ernest S. Tuckers research highlights the possibility
and failure of conflict resolution between the two nations in his book titled
Nadir Shahs Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran, which is a significant
contribution to the pre-modern history of IranianTurkish relations. The pronationalist approaches to IranianTurkish relations are undertaken by Mehmet
Saray who briefly covers modern history in his book titled Tarihte Turkiye

Introduction 5
Iran Relations (TurkeyIran Relations in History). Ustad Robert Olsons
contribution to the pre-modern history of IranianTurkish relations is more
constructive, especially regarding geopolitical competition in Iraq in his
book entitled The Siege of Mosul and OttomanPersian Relations, 17181743:
A Study of Rebellion in the Capital and War in the Provinces of the Ottoman
Empire. Furthermore, his subsequent work, The Emergence of Kurdish
Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 18801925 applies the event
analysis method for modern historiography. He exemplified his theory,
particularly with regard to the impact of Kurdish nationalism on Turkish
Iranian relations in his two important books: The Kurdish Question and
TurkishIranian Relations: From World War I to 1998 and TurkeyIran
Relations, 19792004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups, and Geopolitics.
His other book, named Turkeys Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia,
19912000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions, highlights the geopolitics
of IranianTurkish relations in the wider context, to include Central Asia and
the Middle East. He offers a deep analysis of Kurdish ambitions to establish
an independent state in KurdistanIraq in his last book titled The Goat and
the Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in KurdistanIraq Since the
Iraqi War. The systematic approaches to IranianTurkish relations are mostly
focused on Kurdish nationalism. Olson applied omnibalancing theory in his
previous work. Additionally, there is only one relevant doctoral study,
conducted by Rengin Gun in his dissertation Uluslararas atma ve atma
zm temelinde Trk-ran ilikileri (TurkishIranian relations on the basis
of international conflict and conflict resolution). This analysis does not provide
any concrete solutions but describes the conflict between the two countries.
Adding greater depth to IranianTurkish relations is Turel Yilmazs study
titled Turkiyenin Orta Doudaki snr komular ile ilikileri, 19701997
(Turkeys relations with its border neighbours in the Middle East.). Turkish
sociologist Alev Erkilet Basers work is a significant comparative contribution
looking at three important countries, Egypt, Turkey and Iran. Her doctoral
research, Ortadouda modernlesme ve Islami hareketler: Turkiye, Msr, Iran
(Modernization and Islamic movements in the Middle East: Turkey, Egypt,
Iran) explains the process and influence of ideology in the Middle East.
There have been no scholarly monographs dealing with Turkey and Iran
relations since 1950. The only article that compares the regimes of both
countries is Republican Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: A Tocquevillian
Reading written by Jean-Francois Bayart. There is a smattering of articles
and edited books, but no full length monographs. I note a few: Tschangiz
Pahlavan, TurkishIranian relations: An Iranian view, pp. 7192 in the
Henri J. Barkey edition, Reluctant Neighbour: Turkeys role in the Middle
East (1996) is one of the few studies addressing the two countries; Gkhan
etinsayas Rafsanjaniden Hatemiye: Iran Dis politikasina Bakislar in
Turkiyenin Komsulari one of the few articles that devotes considerable
attention to TurkeyIran relations. His other article Essential friends and

Introduction

natural enemies: The historic roots of Turkish Iranian relations was published
in MERIA in 2003. It is unfortunate that his latest work with Talha Kose
reused this article, namely the Iran File published in SETA, a conservative
Turkey think tank. Another prominent article, The Islamist Iran and Turkey,
19791989: State pragmatism and ideological influence was written by
Unal Gurdogan in 2003. There are some important articles focusing on the
conflict and cooperation in TurkishIranian relations. John Calabreses article
Turkey and Iran: Limits of a stable relationship drew the main outline
of bilateral relations. Similarly, a Turkish academic, Nilufer Narli in her
article, Cooperation or competition in the Islamic World: TurkishIranian
relations from the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf War and after makes a
clear contribution to the general modern historiography of TurkishIranian
relations. Though there are many articles on the general politics of Central
Asia and the Caucusus, the impact of regional competition on TurkishIranian
relations seems limited. Henri J. Barkeys article Iran and Turkey:
Confrontation across an ideological divide, edited by Rubenstein in his book,
Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia provides a general analysis
of the first stage in regional competition. Professor Blent Aras, director of
Middle East studies at ISIK University, also focuses on Middle East and
Central Asian politics in general while also paying some attention to Turkey
Iran relations. Similarly, Patrick Clawsons and Soner Caqaptays comparative works under the auspices of the Washington Institute are valuable for the
modern political historiography of the Turkish and Iranian states.
Most of these works involve the reviewing of official records that are yet
to be de-classified by both sides and consequently are not available for firsthand inspection. The primary sources reviewed for this study include: public
statements of governments, foreign ministries and other interested ministers;
agreements between Turkey and Iran; joint communiqus announced at the
end of official talks between the two states; statements from officials from
both sides; the statesmens memoirs; parliamentary discussions in Turkey and
congressional hearings in Iran; and foreign ministries bulletins. In additional
to this, I have reviewed thirty-two years worth of archival material in the form
of Turkish and Iranian newspapers, journals, magazines and parliamentary
records. Durham University library collections were particularly useful,
particularly the microfiche copies of the Turkish newspapers: Cumhuriyet,
Milliyet and also the Tehran Times, Ittalaat and Kayhan International.
This book is the first to conduct a micro-level analysis on middle-power
state scholarship within this specific time frame and scope in the wider
regional context. Considering too the influx of modernisation, this study provides a new interpretation of the patronage and political clientelism of Turkey
and Iran as middle-power states. The key significance of this book is that it
contributes to a new definition of middle-power states and also identifies the
boundaries of middle-power statecraft in international politics.

Introduction 7

The content of the book

The structure of the book consists of many micro levels of event analysis and
nine chapters that may be read la carte. Each chapter sets up a theme with
relevant issues that offer relatively freestanding discussions of particular macro theoretical settings and experimental micro analysis. Chapter 1 first
outlines the theoretical framework of this study as middle-power state theory.
It attempts to modify the theoretical framework of middle-power state
theory through its own assumptions on IranianTurkish relations with the aim
of contributing to the wider discipline of international relations. This chapter
should be considered the backbone of this book. Chapter 2 explains diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran during the 1990s and tests the variables
of the established framework in the context of religious and ideological
confrontation. Chapter 3 deals with the armed agent, groupstate relationship and counterterrorism strategies of middle-power states to negate each
others influence in regional politics. The micro research case study of Turkish
Hezbollah and unresolved political murders will focus on the consequences
of patronage and political clientilism in the domestic politics of Turkey
and its importance in bilateral level relations. I will explain the IranTurkey
security relationship in the Middle East and particularly the role of the Turkish
Kurdish War in Chapter 4, emphasising the significance of the Higher Security
Commission between Turkey and Iran. The author presents an objective picture
of guerrilla warfare and the middle-power states involved in the conflict and
systematic and regional explanation of IranTurkey security relations since
the end of the Cold War. Chapter 5 discusses the role of ethnic instability in
regional conflict and its impact on Turkeys, Irans and Russias politics in
the region. The ethnic conflict has brought about severe consequences between
the smaller powers and strong ethnic minorities in the Southern Caucasus.
However, Central Asian instability is focused on Islamic fundamentalism in
the Fergana Valley, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The chapter evaluates major
difficulties in the democratisation process of the regions countries in the
post-Cold War international system. Chapter 6 outlines middle-power states
capacity in regional competition in energy and pipeline politics. The energy
outlook of the Caspian Sea and the Caspian Sea dispute will be evaluated under
the auspices of European Union (EU) energy security. The policy options of
Turkey, Iran, Russia and China in energy transport are also examined in this
chapter. Chapter 7 explains IranTurkey economic relations during the last
three decades in a regional context referring to the IranTurkey natural gas
agreement and ongoing negotiations regarding the Pars Gas field. Finally,
Chapter 8 clarifies the capacity of middle-power states by bringing the entire
discussion together. It provides the results of testing the modified version
of middle-power state theory. In doing so, this study demonstrates that the
modified version of middle-power state theory has effective explanatory
power in locating and examining the nature and dimensions of the Turkish
Iranian international relationship.

The foundations of
IranianTurkish relations
An alternative approach to the
politics of middle-power states

Introduction
An integrated approach towards TurkishIranian relations will present a new
model for the relations between Middle Eastern middle-power states. This
holistic approach employs systemic, regional and domestic international
theories, influencing continuity and change and explaining the long tradition
of TurkishIranian politics that history has recorded so far. The logic of this
foreign policy brings together domestic inputs, cultural, ethnic and state
identity within a regional and systems-based approach. The study attaches these
dimensions to integrated theories by adding transnational factors such as
ethnic identity and state identity (regime) to explain the evolution of continuity
and change processes. Three main areas are utilised in order to signify the
applicability of the theory, namely identity policy, regional and systemic
alignment, and economic policies. In this model a more comprehensive and
more explanatory framework than that seen in previous studies will be used,
to be discussed further in subsequent sections. This chapter utilises different
key concepts from various disciplines for the contextualisation of the
proposed model of theory. It also uses multivariate assumptions that allow for
conclusions to be made about how two or more variables are related; a positive
and direct relationship between two variables produces one variable and
causes the other to rise. The relationship between two variables also implies
that the cases are not distributed randomly, and rather indicates the presence
of an identifiable pattern.
This chapter will first overview TurkishIranian diplomacy to demonstrate
its placement in world politics, modify the definition of a middle-power state,
explain the nature of TurkishIranian relations and identify variables to offer
an alternative integrated approach to the relations of middle-power states in
international politics.

The IranTurkey niche in the international system

As middle-power states, Turkey and Iran have a long tradition of independent
conduct at the top level of bureaucratic politics and have presented measured

The foundations of IranianTurkish relations 9

responses to the balance of power conduct in global politics. The political
forces of both states aim to reach the ultima ratio in foreign policy implementation.1 Compared to a great power, a middle power employs a multidimensional art of diplomacy in communication with the regional balance of
powers to avoid war or maintain survival in international society. However,
the hierarchy of states contains ambiguous issues regarding how states can be
presented as a great/superpower, middle power or small power in international
relations. Clausewitzs criteria are utilised to classify a states power capacity
in this study; these are statistical measurement, perceived power and statecraft.2
This comparative country-based study will deal with the capacity of contemporary middle-power states. Conductors of niche diplomacy, middle-power
states concentrate resources in specific areas and may act as catalysts in
launching diplomatic missions, facilitators in setting agendas and building
coalitions of support, and institutions in international relations.3 Therefore,
looking at the diplomatic history of world politics is essential to explain the
hierarchy of the state and the capacity measurement of middle powers, great
powers and small powers in international politics.
The diplomatic history of world politics began with empires, which have
been typical modes of government for the longest period of history. The
empires aspire to be international systems themselves.4 Therefore, they have
no need to balance power. The rivalry or competition between imperial powers
presented the same power struggle to dominate others by use of a zero sum
game. For instance, the Ottoman state took the Byzantine torch of rivalry
and acted as Kaiser against the Persian Empires in the Eastern Hemisphere.
These two Middle Eastern powers were considered as great realist-oriented
powers until the Westphalian state system emerged in the European hemisphere. As a Middle Eastern regional middle power, the place of Safavid and
Qajar Persia was clear, while Ottoman Turkeys positioning was uncertain;
in spite of Western engagement, the Ottoman state remained geographically
marginal, culturally alien and historically hostile to Europe.5
The political power of Ottoman states started to decline in the sixteenth
century. However, the Thirty Years War in Europe (161848) allowed the
Ottoman state to restore its power in the Eastern hemisphere. Ottoman Sultan
Murat IV recaptured Baghdad (1638) from Iran and signed the TurkoPersian
dtente (Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin) in 1639. Allouche wrote that this agreement was seen as TurkishIranian dtente after the long lasting war by the
recognition of dual legitimacy of each others religious and political
discourse.6 On the one hand, the civil war in Europe did not only decentralise
the Holy Roman Empires power, but also created the nation state system in
Europe.7 This study outlines diplomatic history according to Heerens
classification of the international system in order to provide a comparative
analysis of the alternative system of TurkoPersian experience, in which both
states are currently viewed as middle-power states.
According to Kissinger, Cardinal Richelieu, the first architect of the modern
state system, introduced the French nation state project.8 In the seventeenth

10

The foundations of IranianTurkish relations

century, the French and Spanish Empire was the major balancer of power in
Europe, while the Ottoman state maintained its great power status quo. The
discovery of new trade routes and the rising of sea power in Europe had also
overridden Ottoman control over trade routes in the Mediterranean belt and
Eurasia. Hence, the defeat of the Ottomans by Russia in the north and by the
AustriaHungarian Empire in Vienna (1683) was further hastening the decline
of the Islamic empire.9
Changing the balance of power increased pan-European sentiment in
Richelieus system, which suspected a united Germany might dominate
Europe and overwhelm Frances interests.10 At one end, Great Britain was
revealed as a balance of power and dominated European diplomacy in the
eighteenth century. After the victory of the Napoleonic War, Great Britain,
Russia and Metternichs system reconstructed the Concert of Europe at the
Vienna settlement in 1815. This system offered a power-based multi-polarity
system.
The pessimistic approaches to power first became a subject of diplomatic
discussion in international politics, because the Russian advancement westwards further challenged the status quo of both Poland and Ottoman Turkey,
which were no longer a mortal threat for Europe. Rather, Ottoman states
became known to the cabinets of Europe as the Eastern Question.
As buffer states, Turkey and Poland blockaded the Russian advancement
into Europe during the interwar period. The question of intervention in middlepower states such as Turkey and Iran dominated the European diplomatic
environment. The Great powers, Britain, Russia and France agreed that if
there was to be any intervention into those countries, it should be a collective
intervention, not a sole competitive intervention. Therefore, the collective interference of Britain, France and Russia in Turkeys internal affairs resulted in
Greek independence in 1827 and economic bankruptcy in the Ottoman Empire
and Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century.
The RussiaIran and RussiaTurkey treaties resulted in territorial loss for
Iran, mostly in Armenia and Transcaucasia. The most important of these were
the Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) with Russia, the
Erzurum treaties of 1823 and 1847 with the Ottoman Empire and the Paris
treaty with Britain. Britain was alarmed by Russian expansion into the region
and therefore the great game between Russia and Britain in Afghanistan
(1838, 1881 and 1919) became an intense rivalry in Persia and Tibet for control
of Indian, Eurasian and Middle Eastern natural resources.
The colonial dispersion of European states destroyed the Eastern state
system and they have not found any chance to recover from this. At the end
of the nineteenth century, modernity also challenged the Turkic and Muslim
peoples when the Caucasus and Eurasian steppes fell completely under Russian
and Chinese colonial occupation. The continuity of the colonial entity
introduced the new face of Orientalism and the New Oriental approach towards
Middle Eastern states, and society imposed the tragic colonial policies that
fragmented identities in the post-Ottoman societies.11

The foundations of IranianTurkish relations 11

However, two Eurocentric revolutionary leaders, Napoleon III and Bismarck,
were not happy to see the Metternich system underline its order in the wake
of the Crimean War in 1851.12 According to Saids argument, Napoleons
activities in Egypt constituted the first organised Orientalist implementation
used later for colonial governments in the region.13
The Crimean War was a great expression of the mentally defeated Ottoman
Turks against their own superiority complex to European man, although the
Holy alliance (FrenchBritishOttoman) forced Russia to return Bessarabia,
Kars and the eastern shore of the Black Sea for Ottoman Turkish interest and
pushed Russian claims back to the guardianship of Slavic nations and the
Orthodox East, regarding the Ottoman Empire in Europe as a Christian terra
irredenta.
The new international system offered to promote France as the sovereign
authority in the Holy land of the Middle East. The Crimean War and the
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had accentuated the interest of Britain and
France in the Near East and were followed by Britains rule of Cyprus in 1878
and Egypt in 1882, which were officially part of the Ottoman Empire. This
was done to protect commerce, especially in the Persian Gulf, and also the
Levant connection with the Indian trade route for Britains imperial policy,
because Britain and Tsarist Russia negotiated many economic, commercial
contracts that transformed Iran into a semi-colonised country.
As a consequence of the Crimean War, Turkey was admitted for the first
time to the community of nations; however, this was a passive and not an
active membership.14 The practice, due cause, excluded the Sultan and his
representatives from international conferences, even from those that were
arranged especially to deal with the Eastern Question. This situation
continued until after 1856 and shows that the Ottoman Empire was not wholly
accepted as a great power. Therefore, the place of the Ottoman Empire in the
European system was a little below that of the great powers but well above
that of the small states; this position does not seem to have led anyone to
describe the Empire as a middle power.
The balance of power changed after France was defeated in the Franco
Prussian War of 18701871. It is essentially noted that the term middle-power
states was first formally recognised among the states of Germany, because
the German confederation of middle-power states, the three most important
being Bavaria, Wrttemberg and Hanover, survived the defeat of Napoleon,
having employed a particular type of foreign policy in defeating Napoleon.15
Although the post-Napoleonic international order (Treaty of Paris in 1871)
created German and Italian unity, the Ottoman state became known as the Sick
man of Europe. After the RussoTurkish War of 1877, Ottoman states further
lost Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, which achieved independence.
However, Britains historic policy in the Eastern Question was to preserve
Turkeys independence as a bulwark against Russia.
Turkey still played an effective role in the Eurasian buffer zone. Afghanistan,
an outpost of the Indian Empire, became a British protectorate as a result of

12

The foundations of IranianTurkish relations

the Second Afghan War (187880). Therefore, Britain preferred to keep

relations with the Ottoman Caliphate to secure its hegemony in the Pacific
and the Indian continent. However, the congress of Berlin further provided
an opportunity for Tsarist Russia to interfere with the internal affairs of
Turkey in 1878.
The Treaty of Berlin listed the sovereign states of Europe as six great powers,
the German Empire, Great Britain, France, Italy, Austro-Hungary and Russia,16
yet the military weakness of the Ottoman and Persian Empires and their
inefficient administration and long record of economic decline had long since
taken them out of the rank of great power; therefore, they remained silent in
world politics.17
As a great power, Britain and Frances further interference into the Ottoman
and Iranian hemisphere materialised in the Nile Valley and Persian Gulf, while
Russia had been trying to occupy the entrance of the Black Sea Straits. Beyond
that broad purpose OttomanGerman cooperation began to develop an interest
and influence in Turkey. Germany established a direct link between Berlin
and Constantinople in 1883. However, the great powers penetration into the
Ottoman periphery forced a removal of the Ottoman presence from all of
Thessaly in 1898.
On the verge of the First World War, the Young Turk government policy
caused total destruction of the Ottoman balance of power status quo in the
international system after the loss of Africa and the Balkans. In return, Persia
was positioned into the sphere of influence by Britain and Russia at the same
time. It is noted that before the First World War, both countries positions in
international society were ambiguous, because the six great powers were agreed
among themselves not to treat either of them as a great power but as a state
upon which their will was to be enforced; however, Turkey was able to negotiate
an agreement with the six great powers and participate in its execution.18 Hence,
neither the Ottoman nor Persian states were evaluated as an intermediate power
but rather accepted as oscillating between one extreme and the other.
In the Concert of Europe, Italy was like the Ottoman and Qajar Empire: it
could be regarded as an intermediate-class power.19 During the Great War,
the TurkishGerman alliance successfully resisted the entente powers in
Dardanelles and Gallipoli in 1915: this was the final surge of Ottoman Turkey.
British humiliation of Ottoman Turks at Kut-al-Amara in Mesopotamia and
the Palestine Front resulted in total British control over energy sources in 1919.
After the Arab revolt and the replacement of the British and French sphere
of influence in the Middle East, the region remained one of the cockpits of
international politics as the strategic land bridge between Europe, Asia and
Africa. The historic decision of Winston Churchill to shift the propulsion of
the Royal Navy from coal to oil was one of diversification of energy supply
on the eve of the First World War.20 The changing of energy variables further
imposed colonial power competition in the post-Ottoman Arab states. Owing
to the absence of Arab political discourse, the Arab nation became divided as
well, making them vulnerable to foreign intervention.21

The foundations of IranianTurkish relations 13

The entente powers victory established by the principles of the Treaty of
Versailles in 1919 changed the new international order. Dismantling the
imperial system, it saw the consolidation of the nation state system in
international society. The new multi-polar nation state system included the five
great powers, namely, France, Great Britain, the USA, Italy and Japan, who
were each allocated five delegates in the League of Nations. This system aimed
at enduring as long as no conflict of interests arose to create a decisive schism
between the great powers. It should be noted that the roles of intermediate
powers, such as Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Iran, Central Russia, Poland, Greater
Serbia, and so on, were considered to be below the rank of great powers.22
The First World War catapulted the United States into the position of holder
of balance in the international order. Woodrow Wilsons idealism built the
international system on the balance of power, but also recognised ethnic selfdetermination. Security would also rely on military alliance but it would be
a collective security. This was implemented by the entente powers who forced
Turkey to accept the Armistice of Moudros (1918) and Treaty of Svres (1920).
However, the imperialist policy was faced with national resistance in the form
of the Turkish War of Independence, which allowed Mustafa Kemal to easily
establish the Republic of Turkey with the European discourse of the nation
state, while Reza Shah failed to do so in Iran.
The new state legitimacy was recognised by the international society with
the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, but the rejection of the
Wilsonian Armenia and Kurdistan proposal did not allow for the development
of TurkishAmerican relations until the peaceful transition of power from
Britain to the United States.23 On the other hand, the rise of Lenins Russia
as discursive alternative to capitalism made Turkey and Poland buffer zones
for European security, while Iran became a frontline security zone for the
Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia. The situation in Eurasia was also critical with
the commencement of the Uzbek revolt in 1916, but the failure of the Turkistan
and Basmachi resistance movements in 1922, 1924 and 1926 wiped out the
Turkic peoples from the history of world politics. Consequently, Soviet Russia
occupied Turkic lands, exercising the politics of divide and rule.
It is important to note that the sources of the Middle Eastern state system
depended upon the Persian, Arabic and Turkish political experience. The Arab
state (Islamic Caliphate, Umayyad, Abbasid, Andalusia and Fatimid) adopted
the Persian state and court system. Similarly, Turkic states (Seljuk in Persia,
Memluki in Egypt) followed the same political system. The Persian language
was at one stage a lingua franca throughout the region from Central Asia to
the Indian continent. The Ottoman state system incorporated Central Asian,
Persian and Byzantine cultural influences that inspired the multi-cultural state
and society system into the reserve.24 The GreekTurkic coalition continued
until 1517 when the Ottomans conquered the Middle East, upon which they
imposed a new state system.
The author argues that Arab and Kurdish entry into the Ottoman state system
breached the contract between the Greeks and Turks, but the new dynamics

14

The foundations of IranianTurkish relations

of a TurkicArab coalition precipitated a new form of statecraft throughout

Ottoman territory. In return, Safavid Persia and Qajar Iran became alienated
from the Islamic world. As a Shia state, Iran became a negative balance to
power against Ottoman advancement in the Caucasus and the Middle East.
Ernest Tucker posits that rather than occupying Iranian territory, Ottoman
Turkey preferred to allow Persian sovereignty to maintain its presence
legitimately in the Persian Gulf.25
On account of the Ottoman and Persian empires defeat, contemporary
Turkey and Iran left behind the discourse of Gulf conflict but failed to
introduce an alternative state system to counter that of the Westphalian state.
The following section evaluates TurkishIranian relations from a Eurocentric
perspective and remarks on the potential of the middle/regional powers.

Balance of power transition and atomic revolution

The advent of new leadership in Turkey and Iran hijacked the state system
and entrenched a new oligarchy in state bureaucracy and society through the
use of authoritarian reform devoid of modernisation.26 This resulted in a
variant conceptualisation of the modern nation state. In the Western context,
the nation state is based on the social contract, rooted in Western political
philosophical tradition (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Tocqueville, Rawls) and
the Smithian and Keynesian approaches to capitalism.
However, the new political elites of Turkey and Iran designed their new
states with a new definition of strategic culture, which restricted cultural
hegemonic ambition but also failed to create any common socio-political
culture in their respective societies.27 Therefore, both countries preferred to
spend the majority of their state budgets on the stabilisation of the state and
internal security. In so doing, Turkey and Iran have made no political
contribution to the newly designed international system.
The realist school of international relations theory asserts that instituionalism exemplified in institutions such as the League of Nations can only
check morality in foreign policymaking and this plays a significant role in
state behaviour.28 The Kellogg-Briand Pact, concluded outside the League of
Nations, embodied American values and Wilsonian idealism. This failed to
bring peace to international society after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria
in 1931, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and the German invasion
of Poland in 1939.29
According to the Kellogg-Briand world order, Turkey and Iran could not
be classified as either middle powers or small powers but rather had widerscale geopolitical capability in the alignment of the great powers. Turkey and
Iran were unable to achieve security on their own despite signing the Saadabad
Pact in 1937. Both states were militarily weak and politically authoritarian,
but internationally they maintained their geopolitical importance as intermediate state powers. Hence, during the Second World War, Turkey and Iran
played essential roles as buffer states against German and Russian aggression.

The foundations of IranianTurkish relations 15

The great powers had vital interests in preventing others from controlling
buffer zones as neutral or independent in order to establish their own control.
The geopolitics and energy sources of Iran led to a reconsideration of
Irans position when the global conflict was unleashed. As a result, Britain
and Russia occupied Iran. During the interwar period, British Middle East
Command stretched from Malta to Iran, and from Syria to Ethiopia, and kept
Germany outside both the African continent and the Middle East; while
Turkeys active neutral position put Germany away from the Black Sea and
Mediterranean Sea security belt. Turkey and Iran were happy with Germanys
two-decade attempt to gain mastery of the small vassal-state in Caucasus
against Russian hegemony. Both countries hoped that the German campaign
on the Russian front would give freedom to the Turkic and Muslim peoples
in Russia. Russia always showed its ambitions in South Azerbaijan and
the entrance of the Strait in Turkey. However, after the failure of the German
Operation Barbarossa, which began on 22 June 1941, Stalins brutal campaign
destroyed the Turkic and Muslim elements in the Caucasus.
As a result of nuclear revolution, the United States moved from a policy of
isolationism to one of an open door. The peaceful transition of power from
Britain to the United States protected North Atlantic lifelines and assured the
formers survival against the German and Soviet penetration into Western
Europe. During the interwar period, the meeting of the big three (Roosevelt,
Churchill and Stalin) in Tehran in 1943 designed a strategy to combat Japan
and Germanys threat and made clear Americas balance of power status. The
dropping of the first nuclear and plutonium bomb on Japan in 1945 changed
the balance of power in international politics. The atomic monopoly overstretched American influence from the Asiatic and greater buffer belt and from
the Mediterranean to the Pacific Ocean, whereas these had been controlled by
Britain in the nineteenth century.
The agreement between King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and President Franklin
Roosevelt in 1945 was another stage in the transition of power from Britain
to the United States in the Middle East. During the transition period, the great
powers were unable to save the European buffer state, Poland, from becoming
a satellite of Soviet Russia at the Yalta Conference in 1945. Stalin also
established it as a sphere of influence and satellite in Eastern Europe from
1945 to 1948.
The rise of the Soviet threat in Europe, Asia and the Middle East challenged
Americas offshore balance in the late 1940s. However, Harry Trumans
pressure on Stalin to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran strengthened the
American offshore balancing strategy. Soviet demands on Turkey to control
the Black Sea Straits had never been satisfied and caused an additional crisis
in 1946, leading to the Truman doctrine, which in effect declared that the
United States had a vital interest in Turkish independence, which could not
be lost without a general war. The symbolic American navy vessel Missouri,
was sent to Istanbul to secure the Mediterranean security belt in April 1946.
The decision had been made to ensure the independence of Iran, Turkey,