ALINSUG v RTC

FACTS: Zonsayda L. Alinsug, had been a regular employee of the municipal government of Escalante, Negros Occidental, when she received a
permanent appointment as Clerk III in the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the same municipality. She absented
herself from work to attend to family matters. She had asked permission from the personnel officer but not from the mayor. Mayor Ponsica issued
Office Order No. 31, suspending Zonsayda for one month and one day commencing on 24 June 1992 for "a simple misconduct which can also be
categorized as an act of insubordination." The order also stated that the suspension "carries with it forfeiture of . . . benefits such as . . . salary and
PERA and leave credits during the duration of its effectivity." Zonsayda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, in San Carlos City,
a petition, for "injunction with damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction" against Mayor Ponsica and the
municipal treasurer. Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer filed an answer to the petition, through private practitioner Samuel SM Lezama,
alleging that the petitioner had not exhausted administrative remedies and that her suspension was in accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities?
HELD: The appointment of a legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments and optional for the municipal
government. Section 481, Article 11 of Title V of the Local Government Code, paragraph (i) states one of the functions of the legal officer :
(i)

Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any
official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, that in actions or proceedings where a component city or
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal
officer may be employed to represent the adverse party.

Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case
involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. This provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De
Guia v. The Auditor General where the Court held that the municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to situations
where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. With Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis, the Court
therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular
municipality; if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province, and when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his
wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.

CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

FACTS: The petitioner challenged EO No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other
appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, subject of the limitations imposed therein. The
respondents, in refuting the petitioners argument that the measure was violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding
of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions.
ISSUE: WON EO 284 is valid?
HELD: By ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOCCs, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
If maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment. The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 13, Art.
VII as compared to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof of the intent of the 1987
Consti. to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt during their tenure when such
is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Consti. itself.
However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13 must not be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein w/o addition compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" w/in the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials.

FLORES v DRILON
FACTS : The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under
which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this petition "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other
operational expenses attached to the office ." 2 Paragraph (d) reads -(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and
who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity
of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso infringes (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution,
which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during
his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices.
ISSUE: WON questioned proviso is valid? NOT VALID
HELD: The basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constituents. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official (the Mayor of Olongapo City)
to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional
proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B of the
Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of
Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. In any case, the view that an elective official
may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the
two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any
exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the
Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the
Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

PEOPLE v JALOSJOS
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his
having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He
states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected
by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the
intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? NO
HELD: The privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article
VI on the Legislative Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same,..
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accusedappellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same
general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal. For offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.

RABE V FLORES
FACTS: Respondent had collected her salary from the Municipality of Panabo for the period of May 16-31, 1991, when she was already working at
the RTC as Interpreter III, RTC, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao. She knew that she was no longer entitled to a salary from the municipal government, but
she took it just the same. She returned the amount only upon receipt of the Court Resolution dated January 17, 1996, or more than five (5) years later.
She posited that her overriding need for money from the municipal government, aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her initial salary
from the Court caused the delay of the delivery of the money because it was in the month of June and she needed the money to enroll her children to
school. Respondent further averred that she did not divulge any business interest in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Financial
Disclosure for the years 1991-1994 because she was never engaged in business during said period although she had a stall in the market.
ISSUE: WON Delsa Flores is guilty of Dishonesty? YES
HELD: Flores returned the money only after receipt of the Court's Resolution dated January 17, 1996, saying that she forgot all about it.
Forgetfulness or failure to remember is never a rational or acceptable explanation. It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a
public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Respondent's malfeasance is a clear contravention of the
constitutional dictum that the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption. Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other pertinent
Civil Service Laws, the penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. Accordingly, for respondent's dishonesty in receiving and
keeping what she was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to impose on her the penalty prescribed by law: dismissal. Aside from
dishonesty, however, respondent is also guilty of failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose her business interests. Respondent herself
admitted that she "had a stall in the market." The Office of the Court Administrator also found that she had been receiving rental payments from one
Rodolfo Luay for the use of the market stall. That respondent had a stall in the market was undoubtedly a business interest which should have been
reported in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Her failure to do so exposes her to administrative sanction.
URBANO v CHAVEZ
FACTS: Sometime in 1988, the petitioners Urbano and Acapulco, instituted a criminal case against Secretary Luis Santos of the Department of Local
Government as well as Sectoral Representatives Pacifico Conol and Jason Ocampos, Jr. of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tangub City, for alleged
violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint against them was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Office of the Solicitor General, through Solicitor General Francisco Chavez entered his appearance as counsel for the said respondents as far as the
preliminary investigation of the case is concerned. The said petitioners seek to enjoin the Solicitor General and his associates from acting as counsel
for the said respondents in the course of the preliminary investigation. The said petitioners submit that in the event that the corresponding information
is filed against the said respondents with the Sandiganbayan and a judgment of conviction is rendered by the said court, the appearance of the Office
of the Solicitor General on behalf of the said respondents during the preliminary investigation will be in conflict with its role as the appellate counsel
of the People of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Can the Office of the Solicitor General represent a public officer or employee in the preliminary investigation of a criminal action against
him or in a civil action for damages against him? YES

HELD: The Court held that the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the public official at the preliminary investigation of his case, and that if
an information is eventually filed against the said public official, the said Office may no longer represent him in the litigation. The rationale behind
this rule is that the said Office may no longer represent him considering that its position as counsel for the accused will be in direct conflict with its
responsibilities as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General has no authority to represent Solicitor General Chavez in the civil suit for damages filed against him in
the Regional Trial Court arising from allegedly defamatory remarks uttered by him. He may appear in his own defense in his private capacity in the
action for damages against him. The services of private counsel may also be availed of. Certainly, the Office of the Solicitor General can not assume
a responsibility in defense of such public officials beyond its statutory authority.