Consti 1 Case Digests 1st Sem

Deans
Circle
2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors: Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Luigi Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
CONSTITUTION
AL LAW 1
FIRST SEM CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Table of Contents
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS2
THE STATE3
STATE IMMUNITY
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
15
DELEGATION OF POWERS 24
STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
LEGISLATURE
42
PRESIDENCY
74
30
JUDICIARY 108
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
138
COMMISSION ON ELECLTIONS
147
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
132
154
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
159
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS 181
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PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, BELLOSILLO, J.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution.
Facts:
GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government decided to
sell through public bidding issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). Two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy the shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner
and the execution of the necessary contracts, Manila Prince matched the bid price of P44.00
per share. Perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid,
Manila Prince came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether GSIS is mandated to abide the dictates of the Constitution on National
Economy and Patrimony.
Ruling:
YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is
not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall
only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is
not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter
into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee, respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS,
lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle
in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of
the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block
of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
THE STATE
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PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA vs EDUARDO ERMITA
G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011, Carpio
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory.
Facts:
R.A. 3046 was passed demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines. After
five decades, RA 9552 was passed, amending RA 3046 to comply with the terms of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The new law shorterned one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough
Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the new law on the ground that: it reduces
the Philippine maritime territory, in violation of Article 1 of the Constitution and it opens the
countrys waters to maritime passage by all vessels, thus undermining Philippine
sovereignty. Respondents, on the other hand, defended the new law as the countrys
compliance with the terms of UNCLOS. Respondents stressed that RA 9522 does not
relinquish the countrys claim over Sabah.
Issue:
Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long
negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of
States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic
States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their
coasts.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international
law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use
rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are
instead governed by the rules on general international law.
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC. vs.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969, FERNANDO, J.
The court cited Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon which held that the jurisdiction of
the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of
no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an
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investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such
restriction.
Facts:
Petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American
corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines,
imported a 1960 Cadillac car. The car thereafter was sold to a member of the United States
Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga.
Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed Petitioner for income tax in the sum
of P2,979.00. Consequently, petitioner questioned the assessment by respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue contending that the sale was made outside Philippine
territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.
Issue:
Whether the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond its
jurisdictional power to tax.
Ruling:
NO. Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof
that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its
terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to
a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a
power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in
the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the
exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses
to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does
the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no
means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their
status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished,
but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces
by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign
territory.
Note:
In People v. Acierto thus: "By the Military Bases Agreement, it should be noted, the
Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain
cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over
offenses committed therein."
Nor did he stop there. He did stress further the full extent of our territorial jurisdiction
in words that do not admit of doubt. Thus: "This provision is not and can not on principle or
authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government. If
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anything, it is an emphatic recognition and reaffirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the
bases and of the truth that all jurisdictional rights granted to the United States and not
exercised by the latter are reserved by the Philippines for itself."
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SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former
Twelfth Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City,
La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, MELO, J.
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA (Bases Conversion and Development
Authority) under Section 2 of Proclamation No. 216, the government no longer has a right or
interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not
institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being
applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Being the owner of the
areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not
the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued
in the name of petitioner is cancelled.
Facts:
Rafael Galvez conveyed two parcels of land to Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana,
Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat which in turn conveyed the said lots to Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Corporation. The latter then conveyed the said lots to petitioner
Shipside Incorporated. However, unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation, the
Court of First Instance declared the land title of Rafael Galvez, including the two parcels of
land, null and void. The Court, in this case, issue a writ of execution of the judgment
declaring the land title of Rafael Galvez null and void.
Twenty four long years thereafter, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter
from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation,
stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court have not been
executed by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union despite receipt of the writ of
execution.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and
cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Court. The Solicitor General, nonetheless,
argues that the States cause of action in the cancellation of the land title issued to
petitioners predecessor-in-interest is imprescriptible because it is included in Camp Wallace,
which belongs to the government.
Issue:
Whether the Republic has a cause of action.
Ruling:
NO. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may
not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject
matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael
Galvezs title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer
holds true today.
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With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA (Bases Conversion and Development
Authority) under Section 2 of Proclamation No. 216, the government no longer has a right or
interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not
institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being
applicable only in cases where the government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the
right sought to enforced. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or
a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential. Being the owner of the areas covered by
Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the Government,
which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of
petitioner is cancelled.
STATE IMMUNITY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and
ROBERT GOHIER vs.HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First
Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985, ABAD SANTOS, J.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of
an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise
of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
Facts:
United States invited the submission of bids for projects for the repair of wharves and
shoreline. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Thereafter, a letter was sent saying that the company did not qualify to receive an award for
the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performancerating on a repair contract
for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company
sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and
Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is
to order the plaintiff to allow the company to perform the work on the projects and, in the
event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay
damages.
The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. The
Trial court issued the writ.
Issue:
Whether the company has the capacity to sue the plaintiff.
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Ruling:
NO. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International
Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil. The
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez. Further, the
latter case ruled that the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the
contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to
be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jureimperii and not for jure gestionis.
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MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., vs. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and

BUREAU of CUSTOMS
G.R. No.L-23139, December 17, 1966, BENGZON, J.P., J.
Although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident
of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the
same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not
perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign
immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that
end.
Facts:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped and consigned to Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc., Manila. Later on, the cases were discharged to the custody of the Customs
Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations
therein. Unfortunately, only three cases of rotary drill parts were delivered. Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs
Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case
plus other damages. One of the arguments raised by the respondent was that they cannot
be sued.
Issue:
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Whether or not the respondent arrastre service is immune from suit.
Ruling:
YES. The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function

proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said nongovernmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no
waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is
part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart from that of the
national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting
lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges,
fines and penalties. To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical
reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply
receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being
imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers
must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this
checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a
suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it
requires arrastre operations.
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of
public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim
to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act
327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be
filed. It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are
strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not
be lightly inferred. From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre
operations to private parties, We see no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances
where it undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part
of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service,
pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime
governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU, Fourth Branch, Presided by the Honorable, Judge JOSE C. BORROMEO, THE
PUBLIC HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER, and THE AUDITOR GENERAL
8 | Page
G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971, FERNANDO, J.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated
by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon
payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to
such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment."
Facts:
Petitioners as plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking the payment of just compensation
for a registered lot, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized
representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of
the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and
without any agreement, either written or verbal.
The respondent lower court ruled that the suit was against the government without
its consent. But granting that no compensation was given to the owner of the land, the case
is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is no showing that the
government has consented to be sued in this case. It may be contended that the present
case is brought against the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General and not
against the National Government. Considering that the herein defendants are sued in their
official capacity the action is one against the National Government who should have been
made a party in this case, but, as stated before, with its consent.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners could sue defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the
Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials
Ruling:
YES. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his
capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly
set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligean:
"Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials
or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the
State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity
against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does
not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State
may not be sued without its consent."
However, as noted in Alfonso v. Pasay City, this Court speaking through Justice
Montemayor, restoration would be "neither convenient nor feasible because it is now and
9 | Page
has been used for road purposes." The only relief, in the opinion of this Court, would be for
the government "to make due compensation, ..." It was made clear in such decision that
compensation should have been made "as far back as the date of the taking."
If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad
plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide
by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if
not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law
were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any
property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is
no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
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MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME,

JUANA RIMANDO-BANIA, IAUREANO BANIA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIA,
MONTANO BANIA, ORJA BANIA, AND LYDIA R. BANIA
G.R. No.L-52179, April 8, 1991, MEDIALDEA, J.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally
not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can
be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show
that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was
committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.
Facts:
The passengers of the jeepney died as a result of the collision between a jeepney and
a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. As a result, the heirs filed a
complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, as well as the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. The respondent judge rendered a judgment ruling
that the Municipality of San Fernando is jointly and severally liable with the driver of the
dump truck. Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering
a decision.
Issue:
Whether the Municipality can be held liable for the tort committed.
Ruling:
10 | P a g e
NO. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that
"he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule
131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of IlocosNorte, the
District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that "the construction or maintenance of
roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities." Consequently, municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though
it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO, in his capacity as

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, CARMELO V.
CACHERO, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and TARCILA
LAPERAL MENDOZA,
G.R. No. 161657, October 4, 2007,GARCIA , J.
The State generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiffs claim in
the absence of express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by processes of law.
Facts:
Tarcila Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance and the
corresponding declaration of nullity of a deed of sale and title against the Republic, the
Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty. Fidel Vivar, alleging that he was the owner of the
Arlegui property and that the Republic used the property for public use without just
compensation. The trial court ruled that defendant Republic must pay the plaintiff the sum of
P1,480,627,688.00 representing the reasonable rental for the use of the subject property,
the interest thereon at the legal rate, and the opportunity cost at the rate of three (3%) per
cent per annum, commencing July 1975 continuously up to July 30, 2003, plus an additional
interest at the legal rate, commencing from this date until the whole amount is paid in full;
Issue:
Whether the Republic should be held liable by the assessment.
Ruling:
11 | P a g e
NO. The assessment of costs of suit against the petitioner is, however, nullified, costs
not being allowed against the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law. The assailed trial
courts issuance of the writ of execution against government funds to satisfy its money
judgment is also nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments.
Albeit title to the Arlegui property remains in the name of the petitioner Republic, it is
actually the Office of the President which has beneficial possession of and use over it since
the 1975 takeover. Accordingly, and in accord with the elementary sense of justice, it
behooves that office to make the appropriate budgetary arrangements towards paying
private respondent what is due her under the premises. This, to us, is the right thing to do.
The imperatives of fair dealing demand no less. And the Court would be remiss in the
discharge of its duties as dispenser of justice if it does not exhort the Office of the President
to comply with what, in law and equity, is its obligation.
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MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Judge RTC of Makati, Branch CXLII ADMIRAL
FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R. PASTRANA
G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990, CORTES, J.
Well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality,
whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues
derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the
municipality, are exempt from execution.
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati
determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private
respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It
issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds
of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by
petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could
neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing
the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.
Issue:
12 | P a g e
Whether the funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and
levy upon execution.
Ruling:
YES. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account are public funds of the
municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not
subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly,
the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use
cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the
municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which
are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. The foregoing rule
finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati
has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the
balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94
deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected
on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal
recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment
of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy
of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET.AL. VS. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.
All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from
the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a special trust fund, the
disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and
should always be subject to auditing by the COA. Hence, the funds subject of this action
could not be validly made the subject of the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment. The
adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was
not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did
not necessarily mean its liability.
Facts:
UP failed to pay in a contract it entered with Stern Builders Corporation. The RTC
ruled in favour of Stern Builders Corporation. Consequently, the RTC authorized eventually
the release of the garnished funds of the UP directing DBP to release the funds. While UP
brought a petition for certiorari in the CA to challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing
the order averring that the UP funds, being government funds and properties, could not be
seized by virtue of writs of execution or garnishment.
Issue:
Whether UP funds are subject to garnishment.
Ruling:
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NO. The UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional
mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. Presidential Decree No. 1445
defines a trust fund as a fund that officially comes in the possession of an agency of the
government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received for
the fulfillment of some obligation. A trust fund may be utilized only for the specific purpose
for which the trust was created or the funds received.
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include
the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only
for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could
not be validly made the subject of the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse
judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not
immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not
necessarily mean its liability.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the
Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme:
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. Suability depends
on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on
the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is
not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state
does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can,
that the defendant is liable.
The CA and the RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction imposed on the
trust funds of the Government and its agencies and instrumentalities to be used exclusively
to fulfill the purposes for which the trusts were created or for which the funds were received
except upon express authorization by Congress or by the head of a government agency in
control of the funds, and subject to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations.Indeed,
an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP liable
for moral and actual damages (including attorneys fees) would be satisfied considering that
such monetary liabilities were not covered by the appropriations earmarked for the said
project. The Constitution strictly mandated that (n)o money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, ET. AL. VS.SCOTT H. SWIFT, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31
of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal
waters and the territorial sea.
Facts:
Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs
Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009", a "no-take" policy was created whereby entry into the
waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized
or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the
TRNP. The USS Guardian requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and
exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
14 | P a g e
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."However, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs.
Petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No.
10067: unauthorized entry; non-payment of conservation fees; obstruction of law
enforcement officer; damages to the reef; and destroying and disturbing resources.
Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional. Consequently, the petitioners
filed a petition for a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of
Kalikasan.
Issue:
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any
pleading or manifestation in this case.
Ruling:
YES. During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in
violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter
within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit
as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in
cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
Non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights
of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus
expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Under Article 197 of the
UNCLOS provides, Cooperation on a global or regional basis: States shall cooperate on a
global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection
and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional
features.
No Waiver of State Immunity in the VFA
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ
of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal
case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or nonapplication of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to
determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we
cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The
Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under
R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), v. HON. CESAR D.
SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN,
ROGER R. RAYEL, ROMEL R. BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER FRANCISCO C. BOLASTIG,
LEAGUE OF URBAN POOR FOR ACTION (LUPA), KILUSAN NG MARALITA SA
MEYCAUAYAN (KMM-LUPA CHAPTER), DANILO M. CALDERON, VICENTE C. ALBAN,
MERLYN M. VAAL, LOLITA S. QUINONES, RICARDO D. LANOZO, JR., CONCHITA G.
GOZO, MA. TERESA D. ZEPEDA, JOSEFINA A. LANOZO, and SERGIO C. LEGASPI, JR.,
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), EDY CLERIGO, RAMMIL
DINGAL, NELSON B. TERRADO, CARMEN DEUNIDA, and EDUARDO LEGSON
G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, SERENO, J.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent,
be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Facts:
Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of Section
I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System. Export Import Bank of China and the
Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding, wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine
government to finance the Northrail Project. Thereafter, Roque et al. filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine
the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive
Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic
Development Authority and Northrail. CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the Chinese
government, making it immune from suit.
Issue:
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity.
Ruling:
NO. CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. The Loan Agreement was entered
into between EXIM Bank and the Philippine government, while the Contract Agreement was
between Northrail and CNMEG. Although the Contract Agreement is silent on the
classification of the legal nature of the transaction, the foregoing provisions of the Loan
Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking, nonetheless reveal the
intention of the parties to the Northrail Project to classify the whole venture as commercial
or proprietary in character.The application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been
restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of state
immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
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JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in
bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Facts:
Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Thereafter,
MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
stating that Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. As a result, MeTc judge dismissed the two
criminal cases. However, RTC set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest. Liang elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for
review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.
Issue:
Whether Liang is covered by the immunity under the agreement.
Ruling:
NO. Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB provides that Officers and staff of the Bank including
for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall
enjoy immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. The immunity mentioned therein is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official capacity.
Slandering a person is not covered by the immunity agreement because Philippines laws do
not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, v. SATURNINO DAVID
G.R. No. L-6355-5, August 31, 1953, MONTEMAYOR, J.
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision,
validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be
so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
Facts:
A petition was filed by Endencia and Jugo to declaring section 13 of Republic Act No.
590 unconstitutional. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 states that no salary wherever
received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
17 | P a g e
exempt from the income tax. The basis of the petition were the Constitution, particularly
section 9, Article VIII, mandates that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax
on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries,
specifically prohibited by the Constitution and Supreme Court decision.
Issue:
Whether the Legislature can lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the
salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, after the Supreme Court has found and
decided otherwise.
Ruling:
NO. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will
have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent
portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two,
and if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. The collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a
diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. Supreme Court further held that the
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department. In enacting a law, the Legislature may
not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said
statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court
of the land.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES
G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, LEONEN, J.
The Court is possessed with the constitutional duty to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
Facts:
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Joy C. Cabiles deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. to work as quality control for one
year. Thereafter, without prior notice, she was terminated. This prompted Joy to file a
complaint before NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal for illegally dismissal. She asked for
the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her
salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. LA dismissed her complaint.
Joy appealed to the NLRC and the latter reversed the decision. Sameer appealed before the
CA which affirmed the decision of the NLRC. CA under Sec. 10 of RA 8042 and RA 10022
awarded Cabiles NT$46,080.00 or the three month equivalent of her salary, attorneys fees
of NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered
for her repatriation. SC reversed the CA and ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" Sec. 10 of RA 8042 and RA 10022 is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
Issue:
Whether Congress classification may be subjected to judicial review.
18 | P a g e
Ruling:
YES. When RA 10022 was passed it incorporates the exact clause from R.A. 8042
which was already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in
the circumstances. This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Court of Appeals. When cases become moot and academic, SC do not
hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations
are capable of repetition but will evade review. Limiting wages that should be recovered by
an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and
the equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Congress classification may be
subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class. Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are
entitled to security of tenure, at least for the period agreed upon in their contracts. This
means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their contract terms without due
process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers right to security of tenure is violated.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
BLAS F. OPLE, v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA,

CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER
and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, PUNO, J.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.
Facts:
Senator Blas F. Ople prays to declare Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" invalid on two constitutional
grounds, first, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and second, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. According to Senator
Ople, A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, violates their right to
privacy and also not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of
the President to issue.
Issue:
Whether Administrative Order No. 308 is beyond the power of the President.
19 | P a g e
Ruling:
YES. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes
the laws. The executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer
the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance.
A.O. No. 308 does not merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such
a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy
of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government,
the choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some
basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it
ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO

UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T.
CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, v. THE DIRECTORGENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting
on the ID card does not require legislation.
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 420 requiring all government agencies

and government-owned and controlled corporations to streamline and harmonize their
identification systems. Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded
under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address;
(3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9)
Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13)
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification
Number. KMU challenges the constitutionality of EO 420 because it allegedly usurped the
20 | P a g e
legislative power of Congress as President Arroyo has no power to issue EO 420 and that the
implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that
purpose.
Issue:
Whether EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President.
Ruling:
NO. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card
system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation
because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card
system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent
constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use
for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording
of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the
citizens right to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the
existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper
appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not
compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and
recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the
data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded
under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO
420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO ERMITA

G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006, Carpio, Morales J.
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While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or
not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Facts:
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). Thereafter, President issued Executive
Order 464, ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the
rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the constitution. Section 2 in relation to 3 of
the said executive order states that Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads shall secure prior consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of
separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights
of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. As a result, Bayan Muna, House
of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo et al., all claiming to have standing to file the
suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their
petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for violating the power of inquiry vested in
Congress being hence, unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 contravene the power of inquiry
vested in Congress.
Ruling:
YES. Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 provides that, once the head of office
determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear
the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before
Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the
exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege is recognized with respect to
information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role
and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from
disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The
doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must, as
a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to
limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. The privilege being an extraordinary
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other
words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, CORONA, J.:
22 | P a g e
The determination of a persons gender appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes.
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and
sex in his birth certificate in the RTC. He prays that his name to Mely and gender be changed
to female since he underwent sex reassignment surgery. Trial court rendered a decision in
favor of Silverio. Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
CA. OSG alleges that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration. Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
Issue:
Whether it is within the power of the court to change Silverios gender and name on
the ground of sex reassignment.
Ruling:
NO. It is within the power of the legislative to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines
becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. It
is the statutes that defines who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be
invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege
to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, vs. FLORENCIO M. REYES, Officer-inCharge, and RENE DE GUZMAN, Clerk, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija
A.M. No. P-08-2535, June 23, 2010, Per curiam
Legislative policy as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug
use by resort to sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in
light of this Courts constitutional power of administrative supervision over courts and court
personnel.
Facts:
A complaint for gross misconduct against Rene de Guzman, Clerk, RTC of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija by Atty. Hugo B. Sansano, Jr. alleged incompetence/inefficiency in the
23 | P a g e
transmittal of the records of Criminal Case No. 1144-G to the Court of Appeals. De Guzman
was also asked to comment on the allegation that he is using illegal drugs and had been
manifesting irrational and queer behavior while at work. Thereafter, Nueva Ecija Provincial
Crime Laboratory Office after mandatory drug testing found de Guzman positive for
"marijuana" and "shabu. As a result, OCA recommended that de Guzman be held guilty of
two counts of gross misconduct. Majority of the SC adopts the OCAs recommendation. On
the other hand, the minority opines that the SCs action in this case contravenes an express
public policy, under Republic Act No. 9165 "imprisonment for drug dealers and pushers,
rehabilitation for their victims." They also posit that De Guzmans failure to properly perform
his duties and promptly respond to Court orders precisely springs from his drug addiction
that requires rehabilitation.
Issue:
Whether or the not De Guzman must be sanctioned despite the underlying policy
under Republic Act No. 9165.
Ruling:
YES. The legislative power imposing policies through laws is not unlimited and is
subject to the substantive and constitutional limitations that set parameters both in the
exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. As such, it cannot limit
the Courts power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and court
personnel. Neither should such policy be used to restrict the Courts power to preserve and
maintain the Judiciarys honor, dignity and integrity and public confidence that can only be
achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of decency and propriety governing the
conduct of justices, judges and court employees.
Finally, it must be emphasized at this juncture that De Guzmans dismissal is not

grounded only on his being a drug user. His outright dismissal from the service is likewise
anchored on his contumacious and repeated acts of not heeding the directives of this Court.
As we have already stated, such attitude betrays not only a recalcitrant streak of character,
but also disrespect for the lawful orders and directives of the Court.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL v. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARI'A
CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI CITY
A.M. No.SCC-13-18-J, July 1, 2015, MENDOZA, J.
Sharia Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code) enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to
divorce.
24 | P a g e
Facts:
Mamiscal and Adelaidah decided to have divorce repudiated Adelaidahs (talaq)
embodied in an agreement (kapasadan) but later on they reconciled. Despite such,
Adelaidah still filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD) with the office of Abdullah for
registration. Albeit the same was not signed by Mamiscal it was annotated in the certificate
that it was executed in the presence of two witnesses and in accordance with Islamic Law.
Abdullah then issued the Certificate of Registration of Divorce finalizing the same. It was
opposed through a motion by Mamiscal contended that the kapasadan and the COD was
invalid because he did not prepare such and that there were no witnesses to its execution
but it was denied by Abdullah opined that it was his ministerial duty to receive the COD and
the attached kapasadan. Mamiscal then filed a complaint with the SC against Abdullah
charging the same with partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty, and conduct
unbecoming of a court employee.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to impose administrative sanction against
Abdullah for his acts
Ruling:
NO. Sharia Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code) enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to
divorce.
The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the recording of vital events and
other documents affecting the civil status of persons. The Civil Registry Law embraces all
acts of civil life affecting the status of persons and is applicable to all persons residing in the
Philippines. Under Article 185 of the Muslim Code provides that neglect of duty by registrars.
Any district registrar or circuit registrar who fails to perform properly his duties in
accordance with this Code shall be penalized in accordance with Section 18 of Act 3753
states that any local registrar who fails to properly perform his duties in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and of the regulations issued hereunder, shall be punished for the
first offense, by an administrative fine in a sum equal to his salary for not less than fifteen
days nor more than three months, and for a second or repeated offense, by removal from
the service.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it becomes apparent that SC Court does not have
jurisdiction to impose the proper disciplinary action against civil registrars. While he is
undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, a review
of the subject complaint reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold Abdullah liable for registering
the divorce and issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as Circuit Registrar of Muslim
divorces. It has been said that the test of jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not the
personality of the offender. The fact that the complaint charges Abdullah for "conduct
unbecoming of a court employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that what
controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint.
Verily, unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can
act on a matter submitted to it.
SERGIO OSMEA, JR. v. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN ET AL.

G.R. No.L-17144, October 28, 1960, BENGZON, J.
25 | P a g e
There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the
exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the
legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the
senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either
house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative
functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmena Jr. delivered his privilege speech wherein he attacked
the President of the Philippines that it committed crime but did not substantiate such with
evidence. Thus, the Congress issued a House Resolution which created Special Committee
which to investigate whether or not Congressman Osmenas speech is with basis or pure
assault. Congressman Osmena filed a petition for declaratory relief, certiorari, and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the special committee to enjoin them from
proceedings because it is a ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity. However,
the special committee ruled that the allegations of Osmena is without basis. Thus, he was
suspended. The petition of Osmena was opposed by the Congress contending that it is
within its discretion to punish its erring members and cannot be interfered by the SC.
Issue:
Whether the Supreme Court may intervene in a disciplinary action against a member
of Congress.
Ruling:
NO. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive
constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments pro
and con have been advanced. SC believe, however, that the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction
upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the
House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine
whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government.
The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in
such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
Judicial Interference with Legislature provides that the principle is well established
that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the
judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally independent within
the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. The general rule has been applied in other
cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions.
Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not
review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. Under our form of
government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of
the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by
high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied
power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
26 | P a g e
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, (3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768,) the supreme court of Mass. says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to
enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;'
'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the
sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. There is no provision
authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of the
power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department and
therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An
attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the
exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is
expressly forbidden to do.
JOKER P. ARROYO ET.AL. v. JOSE DE VENECIA ET AL.

G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, MENDOZA, J.
At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.'
And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.'
Facts:
Arroyo questioned the validity of RA No. 8240 which amends certain provisions of
NIRC imposing sin taxes on manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. He alleged that law
was passed in violation of Internal House Rules. Arroyo contend that the House rules were
adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules
of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. He filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the SC. Jose De Venecia on his defense is anchored on
the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. He argued that the Court
is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in
Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the
rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional
requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Courts may enforce Internal House Rules
Ruling:
No, It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in
the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27.
Arroyo contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this
reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on
27 | P a g e
its head. In the decided cases, the constitutional provision that "each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of
invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. SC
has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that
House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is
shown. Arroyo must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its
separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on
which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system of
government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT
MANUFACTURERS CORP., ET AL.
G.R. No. 158540, July 8, 2004, TINGA, J.
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
Facts:
Philippine Cement Manufaturers Corporation is an association of domestic cement
manufacturers. It contended that because of the importation of Gray Portland cement, it
affected caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales
and employment; as well as caused depressed local prices. It sought the imposition of
provisional remedies but the Tariff Commissioner did not grant such imposition. DTI then
imposed the provisional remedies in violation of the Safeguard Measures (SMA). This was
then alleged by South Cement that DTI cannot impose provisional remedies since Tariff
Commissioner did not approve such. It was contended by South Cement that the power
delegated by Congress to President in case of tariff and customs is absolute.
Issue:
Whether the power of the President delegated by the Congress in case of tariffs and
customs code is absolute and not subject to limitation.
Ruling:
NO. Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution confirms the delegation of
legislative power, yet ensures that the prerogative of Congress to impose limitations and
restrictions on the executive exercise of this power:
28 | P a g e
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized
by the Constitution itself. At the same time, the Constitution also grants the delegating
authority (Congress) the right to impose restrictions and limitations on the taxation power
delegated to the President. The restrictions and limitations imposed by Congress take on the
mantle of a constitutional command, which the executive branch is obliged to observe.
The SMA empowered the DTI Secretary, as alter ego of the President, to impose
definitive general safeguard measures, which basically are tariff imposts of the type spoken
of in the Constitution. However, the law did not grant him full, uninhibited discretion to
impose such measures. The DTI Secretary authority is derived from the SMA; it does not flow
from any inherent executive power. Thus, the limitations imposed by Section 5 are absolute,
warranted as they are by a constitutional fiat.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. v. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, and FILIPINAS ORIENT
AIRWAYS
G.R. No. L-24219, June 13, 1968, CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Under, Section 10-C(1) of Republic Act No. 776, reads that CAB shall have the
following specific power and duty to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel
suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, upon petitioners complaint, or upon its own initiative,
any temporary operating permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity;
Provided, however, That in the case of foreign air carriers, the permit shall be issued with
the approval of the President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Facts:
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) granted Filipinas Orient Airways Inc. provisional
authority to operate scheduled and non-scheduled domestic air services subject to specified
conditions. However, Philippine Air Lines opposed to such contending that CAB is not
empowered to grant any provisional authority to operate, prior to the submission for
decision of the main application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
Issue:
Whether or not CAB has the authority to grant provisional authority to operate
Ruling:
YES. Under, Section 10-C(1) of Republic Act No. 776, reads that CAB shall have the
following specific power and duty to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel
suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, upon petitioners complaint, or upon its own initiative,
any temporary operating permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity;
Provided, however, That in the case of foreign air carriers, the permit shall be issued with
the approval of the President of the Republic of the Philippines. This explicitly authorizes CAB
to issue a "temporary operating permit," and nothing contained, either in said section, or in
Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 776, negates the power to issue said "permit", before the
completion of the applicant's evidence and that of the oppositor thereto on the main
29 | P a g e
petition. Indeed, the CAB's authority to grant a temporary permit "upon its own initiative,"
strongly suggests the power to exercise said authority, even before the presentation of said
evidence has begun.
EMMANUEL PELAEZv.THE AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, CONCEPCION, J.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Facts:
President Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). Later on Pelaez challenge the validity
of the Executive Orders contending that Section 68 was already repealed by Section 3 of RA
2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries may not be
changed. The Auditor General contended that there was no repeal on the law and maintains
that under Section 68 of RAC congress has delegated the power to create Municipalities to
the President.
Issue:
Whether under section 68 of RAC delegates to the President the authority to create
municipalities
Ruling:
NO. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could
thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is
worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.
Thus, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID v. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 161414, January 17, 2005, TINGA, J.:
President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to
the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before SC. However, with the
promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the
30 | P a g e
municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. Thus, creating
a de facto municipality which is recognized to be existing.
Facts:
Municipality of Andong in Lanao del Sur was one of the Municipalities created by
virtue of Executive Order No. 107.4. However, the creation of the same was not valid since
EO 107.4 was declared null and void pursuant to the ruling of the SC in Pelaez v. Auditor
General. But it was alleged by Camid that the Municipality continued to exist but without
local officials and no appropriation of funds for the same thus, must be declared as a valid
Municipality.
Issue:
Whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by the
SC may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.
Ruling:
NO. The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect
of the petition, merely by pointing out that the Municipality of Andong never existed.
Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was declared "null and void ab initio" in
1965 by this Court.
The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was
recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed
curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.
However, Andong is not entitled to be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation
Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order
may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Local Government Code." Camid admits
that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the
fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the
national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share
of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.
The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the
municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State
of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENRCENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to
Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon
the request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of
Andong, Lanao del Sur, thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present
inoperative.
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P.

DILANGALEN
G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008, CARPIO, J.
Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and
cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
31 | P a g e
exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.
Facts:
Cotabato City is the first district of Maguindanao. Although it forms part of
Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but Region XII. ARMM
Regional Assembly exercising its power to create provinces under Art VI Section 9 of RA
9054 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan which Maguindanao ratified. Cotabato City was then became part of
Shariff Kabunsuan.
Issue:
Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional
Ruling:
NO. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for it is contrary
to the constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the
office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM
Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
RAMON P. BINAMIRA v. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR.
G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990, CRUZ, J.
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot
be delegated.
Facts:
Binamira was designated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority by
the Secretary of tourism and Garrucho was then appointed by the President to the same
position since Binamiras appointment was not valid since it was not made by the latter. It
was then opposed by Binamira for violation of his security of tenure. He also contended that
Secretary of Tourism has the authority to appoint which is delegated by the President
Issue:
Whether the power to appoint by the President can be delegated.
Ruling:
32 | P a g e
NO. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature
cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume
the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment of the
Banamira was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by
a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the
presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to
exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his
place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. In those cases in
which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of
judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit
and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute
another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
RODOLFO D. LLAMASv. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN

OCAMPO III
G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991, Paras, J.
The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city
officials devolves at the first instance on the Department of Interior and Local Government
and ultimately on the President. Implicit in this authority, however, is the "supervision and
control" power of the President to reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the imposable
penalty or to modify the suspension or removal order, even "in the sense" of granting
executive clemency.
Facts:
A verified complaint was filed before the then Department of Local Government
(DLG) against private respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III (Ocampo), then incumbent
governor of Tarlac, for allegedly violating the Local Government Code as well as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. After trial, then Secretary of DLG issued a decision finding
Ocampo guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, Ocampo
was suspended from office for 90 days. Ocampos motion for reconsideration having been
denied, he elevated the matter to the Office of the President. Meanwhile, petitioner Rodolfo
Llamas (Llamas), then incumbent Vice-Governor of Tarlac, assumed the governorship while
Ocampo was serving his penalty of suspension. Subsequently thereafter, public respondent
Orbos, by authority of the President, issued a resolution granting executive clemency to
private respondent Ocampo. Hence, the current petition.
It is the position of Llamas that executive clemency could only be granted by the
President in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the
Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases.
Issue:
Whether the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
Ruling:
YES. The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city
officials devolves at the first instance on the Department of Interior and Local Government
(Secs. 61 and 65, B.P. Blg. 337) and ultimately on the President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this
33 | P a g e
authority, however, is the "supervision and control" power of the President to reduce, if
circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the suspension or removal
order, even "in the sense" of granting executive clemency. "Control," within the meaning of
the Constitution, is the power to substitute one's own judgment for that of a subordinate.
Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different executive departments are
mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until
countermanded or reprobated by her (Vinena v. Secretary, 67 Phil. 451; Free Telephone
Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 108 SCRA 767 [1981]). Replying upon
this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General that in the present case, the President, in the
exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may
substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor
would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President
not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a
subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged
would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted,
after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest. "the relative success of . . .
livelihood loan program."
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA), represented by Its

President ROGER S. SAN JUAN, SR., NPC EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (NEWU)
NORTHERN LUZON REGIONAL CENTER, represented by its Regional President
JIMMY D. SALMAN, in their own individual capacities and in behalf of the members
of the associations and all affected officers and employees of National Power
Corporation (NPC), ZOL D. MEDINA, NARCISO M. MAGANTE, VICENTE B. CIRIO, JR.,
NECITAS B. CAMAMA, in their individual capacities as employees of National
Power Corporationv. THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL
POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO as Chairman of
the National Power Board of Directors (NPB), ROLANDO S. QUILALA, as President
Officer-in-charge/CEO of National Power Corporation and Member of National
Power Board, and VINCENT S. PEREZ, JR., EMILIA T. BONCODIN, MARIUS P.
CORPUS, RUBEN S. REINOSO, JR., GREGORY L. DOMINGO and NIEVES L. OSORIO
G.R. No. 156208, September 26, 2006, Chico-Nazario, J.
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the
officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen
because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and,
unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate
his duties to another. However, a delegate may exercise his authority through persons he
appoints to assist him in his functions provided that the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
Facts:
On 8 June 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Under the EPIRA Law a new National Power Board of
Directors was constituted composed of the Secretary of Finance as Chairman, with the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Budget and Management, the Secretary of Agriculture,
the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, the
Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, and the President of the National Power
Corporation as members. Subsequently thereafter, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002124 which provided for the Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and the
34 | P a g e
Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPC Table of Organization. Under said
Resolution, all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on 31 January 2003, and shall be
entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution No.
2002-125, whereby a Transition Team was constituted to manage and implement
the NPCs Separation Program.
Arguing that NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 are void for having been
issued by only three members of the Board of Directors of the NPC, petitioners filed the
present Petition for Injunction praying that the implementation of the said Resolutions be
enjoined. According to the petitioners although there were seven board members who were
present during the meeting where the assailed Board Resolutions were passed, four of the
board members who were present therein and signed the questioned resolutions were not
the secretaries of their respective departments but were merely representatives or
designated alternates of the officials who were named under the EPIRA Law to sit as
members of the NPB. Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are violative of
the well-settled principle that delegated power cannot be further delegated.
Issue:
Whether or not NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 are void.
Ruling:
YES. In enumerating under Section 48 those who shall compose the National Power
Board of Directors, the legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their
judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as the
act or the liberty to decide according to the principles of justice and ones ideas of what is
right and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or favor. Discretion, when
applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting
officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and
conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. It is to be presumed that
in naming the respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the
legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of
their personal qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to occupy their present
positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their
duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions,
because it is their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such
responsibility.
STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
LEON G. MAQUERA v. JUAN BORRA, CESAR MIRAFLOR, and GREGORIO SANTAYANA,
in their respective capacities as Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Elections, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. L-24761, September 7, 1965, Per Curiam
The Constitution provides for the qualifications required to be met before a person
may be allowed to run for public office. No property qualification of any kind is thereunder
required. Consequently, a law requiring the posting of a bond before a person may be
allowed to run for public office is void for being unconstitutional.
Facts:
35 | P a g e
The Congress passed Republic Act 4421 requiring all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary
or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate. In compliance with said Republic
Act No. 4421, the Commission on Elections had, on July 20, 1965, decided to require all
candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives to file a surety bond, by a bonding company of good reputation, acceptable
to the Commission.
Finding RA 4421 as well as the aforementioned action of the COMELEC to be
undemocratic and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, the petitioners filed
the present petition assailing the constitutionality of RA 4421.
Issue:
Whether RA 4421 is constitutional.
Ruling:
NO. Said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the
Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying
the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies
necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth
of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all,
rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied
the chance to be elected to public office.
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919, Malcolm, J.
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties,
or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass
upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
Facts:
Respondent Justo Lukban (Lukban), then Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the
segregation of 170 women considered to be of ill repute and directed that they be sent to
Mindanao to work as laborers therein. About midnight of October 25, 1918, the police, acting
pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann (Hohmann) and City Mayor
Lukban, forcibly hustled on board two steamers going to Mindanao the 170 women. The
women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings. They had no knowledge that
they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart
from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the
deportation.
Issue:
Whether City Mayor Lukban has the authority to order the deportation of the 170
women.
Ruling:
36 | P a g e
NO. Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or
be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn
him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225,
Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The
courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man
who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to
submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise
of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea,"
said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118
U.S., 356, 370.)
CITY OF MANILA and MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as City Mayor of
Manila vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service;
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the
Municipal Board, Manila; FELICISIMO REYES CABIGAO and GERINO M. TOLENTINO,
in their respective capacity as Members of the Municipal Board of Manila
G.R. No. L-25835 May 20, 1966 BENGZON, C.J.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not
rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is
expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the
responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are
empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied.
In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that
departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.
Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an
acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we
must take all pains to avoid.
Facts:
91 women as street sweepers in the City of Manila was appointed by the then City
Mayor of Manila Petitioner Antonio Villegas (Villegas). The appointment of the 91 women as
street sweepers was subject to the approval of the Office of the Civil Service Commission.
Respondent Abelardo Subido (Subido), in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service,
however, refused to extend the approval of such appointment on the ground that the
appointment of women as street sweepers is in violation of Memorandum Circular No. 18
series of 1964 which prohibits the appointment of women to positions requiring them to
perform manual labor outside offices. According to the questioned Memorandum Circular the
act of putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and
placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a
violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood. Villegas on the
other hand argues that Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964 have been declared to
be without force and effect by the Office of the President under a fifth endorsement to
Villegas on September 14, 1965.
37 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether the refusal of Subido to extend the approval to the appointment of the 91
women as street sweepers is justified.
Ruling:
NO. In the present case, it appears that Subido is unalterably convinced that to allow
women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino
tradition. The sincerity of his conviction is conceded, but that does not suffice. A public
official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of
a challenged authority. So it was correctly held in the decision on appeal. The pertinent
excerpt from the case of Villegas v. Subido decision follows: "One last word. Nothing is better
settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government
itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforce. Its
officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its
functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be
delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they
are devoid or power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. The principle cannot be
sufficiently stressed. In the appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: 'It must be
conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by
statute. "Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an
acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we
must take all pains to avoid."
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47,
Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO
G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12, 1995, Kapunan, J.
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges,
under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond
boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then
law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor,"resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, 5 or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.
Facts:
Two separate informations were filed against respondents Lagarto and Cordero
charging them of the crime of Rape with homicide. After trial, the RTC found respondents
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced both accused with the
"penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law. Disagreeing with
the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila,filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
praying that the Decision be modified in that the penalty of death be imposed against
respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion
perpetua).Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent
Judge Veneracion issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
38 | P a g e
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under
Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
Ruling:
YES. In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the
prosecution and the defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime for which respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he
was bound by its provisions.
RA 7659 plainly and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the
occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves
no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty
under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because
of his religious convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its
bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the
morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death
as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by
law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter upon which judges have
no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.
2nd LT. SALVADOR PARREO represented by his daughter Myrna P. Caintic v.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMEDFORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162224, June 7, 2007, Carpio, J.
The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject
to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to
each member of the class.
Facts:
Petitioner Salvador Parreo (Parreo) is a retired member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. After having served the AFP for more than 32 years, Parreo was entitled to
receive monthly pension from the government. In 1985, Parreo started receiving his
monthly pension, the AFP, however, pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638 which provides that a
retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship, stopped Parreos monthly
pension when he migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. Parreo
requested for reconsideration but the same was denied. Subsequently, Parreo filed a claim
before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension, the COA however, denied the
claim of Parreo for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition. Parreo argues that Section 27
of PD 1638 is unconstitutional. According to him, the obligation to retain his Filipino
citizenship as a condition for him to remain in the AFP retired list and receive his retirement
benefit is contrary to public policy and welfare, oppressive, discriminatory, and violative of
the due process clause of the Constitution. Parreo further argues that Section 27 of PD
1638, as amended, discriminates against AFP retirees who have changed their nationality.
39 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is constitutional.
Ruling:
YES. There is a substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of
the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another
country, such as petitioner in the case before us. The constitutional right of the state to
require all citizens to render personal and military service necessarily includes not only
private citizens but also citizens who have retired from military service. A retiree who had
lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no
longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need
arises. Petitioners loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that
distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another.
Republic Act No. 7077(RA 7077) affirmed the constitutional right of the state to a
Citizen Armed Forces. Section 11 of RA 7077 provides that citizen soldiers or reservists
include ex-servicemen and retired officers of the AFP. Hence, even when a retiree is no
longer in the active service, he is still a part of the Citizen Armed Forces. Thus, we do not
find the requirement imposed by Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, oppressive,
discriminatory, or contrary to public policy. The state has the right to impose a reasonable
condition that is necessary for national defense. To rule otherwise would be detrimental to
the interest of the state.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., herein represented by PROF.

ABDULRAFIH H. SAYEDYv.OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the Office of
the President of the Philippines, herein represented by HON. ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, Executive Secretary, and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS, herein
represented by its Executive Director, HABIB MUJAHAB HASHIM
G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003, Corona, J.
The act of certifying food products as halal is one considered to be a religious
function which can be performed only by practicing Muslims. Thus, the government cannot
pass a law vesting the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates to a government agency
without violating the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
Facts:
Petitioner IDCP is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to
the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. One of the functions IDCP carries out
is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to
qualified products and manufacturers. Subsequently however, respondent Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme. Under
the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform
other related regulatory activities.
Finding EO 46 to be in violative of the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State, IDCP filed the present petition for prohibition praying that EO 46 be
declared null and void. According to IDCP, it is unconstitutional for the government to
formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a
40 | P a g e
function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for
the Muslims. IDCP argues that a food product becomes halal only after the performance of
Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter
animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore
perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.
Issue:
Whether EO 46 is constitutional.
Ruling:
NO. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware
that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man
to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
MAXIMO CALALANGv. MAXIMO CALALANG

G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940, Laurel, J.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Facts:
Respondent Williams, Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, recommended to
the Director of Public Works that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing certain
streets at certain hours for a period of one year. Acting favorably on the recommendation of
Williams, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works,
promulgated rules and regulations prohibiting animal-vehicles from passing in the streets
mentioned in the rules and regulations.
Contending that the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public
Works have the effect of infringing upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice, petitioner Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and taxpayer of
Manila, brought the present petition for prohibition against herein respondents praying that
the disputed rules and regulations be declared unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works is
unconstitutional for being violative of the constitutional provision regarding social justice.
41 | P a g e
Ruling:
NO. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare
of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments
on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest
good to the greatest number."
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARILYN ABUCAY
G.R. No. 80609, August 23, 1988, Cruz, J.
As a rule an employee dismissed for a valid cause is not entitled to separation pay.
However, the 1987 Constitution being replete with positive commands for the promotion of
social justice, particularly the protection of the rights of the workers, an employee validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character may be entitled to separation pay as a measure of social justice.
Facts:
Marilyn Abucay (Abucay), a traffic operator of PLDT was accused by two complainants
of having demanded and received money in consideration of her promise to facilitate the
approval of their applications for telephone installation. After investigation she was found
guilty and accordingly separated from the service. She went to the Ministry of labor claiming
the she had been illegally removed. The Ministry of labor sustained the decision of the
company and dismissed the complaint of Abucay for lack of merit. It however ordered PLDT
to give her one month pay for every year of service as financial assistance. Both PLDT and
Abucay appealed to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB in its decision
affirmed in toto the decision of the Ministry of Labor saying that it is for reasons of equity
and compassion that it resolves to uphold the award of financial assistance. Abucay took no
further action, but PLDT questions the financial assistance awarded to Abucay.
PLDT argues that under the law if an employee has been validly dismissed he is
entitled neither to reinstatement nor to backwages for his dismissal is in accordance with
law. Furthermore they argue that equity and compassion cannot be a substitute for law.
Issue:
42 | P a g e
Whether the award of financial assistance to an employee who had been validly
dismissed is legal.
Ruling:
YES. Strictly speaking, however, it is not correct to say that there is no express
justification for the grant of separation pay to lawfully dismissed employees other than the
abstract consideration of equity. The reason is that our Constitution is replete with positive
commands for the promotion of social justice, and particularly the protection of the rights of
the workers. The enhancement of their welfare is one of the primary concerns of the present
charter. In fact, instead of confining itself to the general commitment to the cause of labor in
Article II on the Declaration of Principles of State Policies, the new Constitution contains a
separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights with a separate
sub- topic for labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of labor, hand in hand with
management, in the advancement of the national economy and the welfare of the people in
general. The categorical mandates in the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the
workers are more than sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases
even if the dismissal be for cause.
JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF

OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG AND BERNADETTE CARLOS
IMBONG AND MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC. v. HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS AND HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. 204819April 8, 2014, Mendoza, J.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution absolutely proscribes abortion, or the
taking away of the life of the unborn, in all cases. Since life begins at conception, or more
specifically, from fertilization, the duty of the State to protect the unborn begins at that point
and not at the time of implantation of the fertilized ovum in the mothers womb.
Facts:
Immediately after the Reproductive Health Law was passed, various petitions were
filed questioning the constitutionality of the said law. Among other arguments, the petitions
claim that the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn in violation of Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.
Issue:
Whether the RH Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to life of the unborn.
Ruling:
NO. Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution makes it a policy of the State to
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
provision unequivocably proscribes abortion, or the taking away of the life of the unborn, in
all cases. Since life begins at conception, or more specifically, from fertilization, the duty of
the State to protect the unborn begins at that pointand not at the time of implantation of
43 | P a g e
the fertilized ovum in the mothers womb. This is precisely what the RH Law seeks to
achieve when it prohibited all forms of abortifacients, which are drugs or devices which
either (a) induces abortion, (b) induces destruction of the fetus inside the mothers womb, or
(c) prevents the fetus from being implanted inside the mothers womb.
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law
recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life,
and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it exists- all the way until it
reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and protection
only from the moment of implantation of the fertilized ovum, there is nothing to prevent any
drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation, which is
tantamount to abortion as stated in the Constitution.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) AND DIRECTOR OF
CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT V. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO AND
JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 172
G.R. No. 89572December 21, 1989, Cruz, J.
The right to quality education is not absolute. No less than the Constitution provides that
"every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements.
Facts:
Roberto Rey C. San Diego took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) thrice and
flunked it as many times. Invoking his right to quality education, San Diego filed a petition to
declare the three-flunk rule of the DECS as invalid, and to allow him to take the NMAT for a
fourth time.
Issue:
Whether San Diego should be allowed to take the NMAT for a fourth time.
Ruling:
NO. The right to quality education invoked by San Diego is not absolute. No less than
the Constitution provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. It is
not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
The right of the citizen to quality education is likewise tempered by the duty of the
State to regulate and enrich the countrys system of education by directing the student to
the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations.
Otherwise, the country will be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes,
not because its citizens lack intelligence but because the country has become a nation of
misfits.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
44 | P a g e
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO AND JOSE ALFONSO, ALL SURNAMED OPOSA,
MINORS, AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS ANTONIO AND RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS CALVIN AND
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD AND PATRISHA, ALL SURNAMED
FLORES, MINORS AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS ENRICO AND NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS SIGRID
AND DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II AND MA. CONCEPCION, ALL SURNAMED MISA,
MINORS AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS GEORGE AND MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS ANTONIO
AND ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER
PARENTS JOSE AND MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO,
MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS FREDENIL AND JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS JOSE AND ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HIS
PARENTS GREGORIO II AND CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS
IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA AND MARIE GABRIELLE, ALL SURNAMED SAENZ, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS ROBERTO AND AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE AND DAVID IAN, ALL SURNAMED KING, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS MARIO AND HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
AND THERESE VICTORIA, ALL SURNAMED ENDRIGA, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY
THEIR PARENTS BALTAZAR AND TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. AND REGINA MA.,
ALL SURNAMED ABAYA, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS ANTONIO AND
MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. AND MARIETTE, ALL SURNAMED CARDAMA,
MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS MARIO AND LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL, AND IMEE LYN, ALL SURNAMED OPOSA, MINORS AND
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS RICARDO AND MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN AND ISAIAH JAMES, ALL SURNAMED QUIPIT, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS JOSE MAX AND VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL AND FRANCISCO, ALL SURNAMED BIBAL, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS FRANCISCO, JR. AND MILAGROS BIBAL, AND THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., V.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC, MAKATI, BRANCH 66
G.R. No. 101083July 30, 1993, Davide, Jr., J.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not mean that it is less
important than the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said
to predate all governments and constitutions.
Facts:
The petitioners-minors, for themselves and for generations yet unborn, filed a
complaint for the cancellation of all existing Timber License Agreements (TLAs) in the
country, and to desist from processing and approving new TLAs. They claim that the
continued deforestation threaten their right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complainants have no cause of action.
In particular, defendants point out that complainants failed to point out a specific legal right
violated by the defendants.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners have a cause of action against the defendants.
45 | P a g e
Ruling:
YES. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not mean
that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.
In this case, the right of the citizens, both present and those yet to be born, to a
balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty on the part of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to protect and preserve the said right. A
violation of such right gives rise to a cause of action.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
MARITIME GROUP, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY DIVINA
V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL
DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN,
VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS
BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, AND JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA
G.R. No. 171947-48 December 18, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
The issuance of a continuing mandamus is proper to place government agencies
tasked to preserve the environment on continuing notice and to ensure that the decision would
not be set to naught by administrative inaction.
Facts:
The concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint against Metro Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), et al. for the clean-up, rehabilitation, and protection of the
Manila Bay, arguing that the water quality of Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law due to MMDA, et al.s continued neglect. In their defense, MMDA, et al.
argued that the cleaning of Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.
Issue:
1. Whether the clean-up of Manila Bay is discretionary on the part of MMDA, et al.
2. Whether the duty of MMDA, et al. extends only to specific pollution incidents.
Ruling:
1. NO. A discretionary duty allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not
to perform. However, a perusal of MMDA, et al.s charters readily show their duty to take
46 | P a g e
care of the environment, which includes the clean-up of Manila Bay. In fact, their ministerial
duty does not end with the clean-up and/or restoration of Manila Bay, but extends to the
preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process. Otherwise, any
clean-up effort would be futile. To place MMDA, et al. on continuing notice and to ensure that
the decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction, the issuance of a
continuing mandamus is proper.
2. NO. Section 17 and 20 of the Environmental Code requires them to act even in the absence
of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a degree where
its state will adversely affect its best usage. The duty to upgrade the quality of water is not
conditioned on the occurrence of any pollution incident. In any case, even if MMDA, et al.s
duty is limited to a specific pollution incident, it should be observed that the pollution in
Manila Bay is of such magnitude that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a
general and a specific pollution incident.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY
GOVERNOR CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY, AND THE DENR-EMB (REGION VI)
G.R. No. 196870June 26, 2012, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
It is the policy of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature, and to strike a rational
and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental protection.
Facts:
Gov. Carlito S. Marquez of the Province of Aklan was authorized by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to file an application before the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to
reclaim a portion of Caticlan foreshore, which is a strait away from Boracay, for commercial
purposes. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay and the Sangguniang
Barangay of Caticlan registered their opposition, arguing that no public consultation was
made prior to the approval of the Province of Aklans application for an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC), which is a prerequisite for the reclamation. Thereafter, the
Municipality of Malay and Barangay Caticlan filed for a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order.
Issue:
Whether prior public consultation with all stakeholders is mandatory before a national
project affecting the environment may be made.
Ruling:
YES. It is the policy of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature, and to
strike a rational and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental
protection. It is in that light that the Local Government Code establishes the duties of
national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them
to secure both prior public consultation and approval of local government units for the
projects described therein. Absent either of these requirements makes the project illegal. In
fact, the prior public consultation is necessary so that the environmental concerns of all
47 | P a g e
stakeholders could be taken into account in the Environmental Impact Assessment, which in
turn, is required before an ECC is issued and a national project undertaken.
In this case, since the Municipality of Malay and Barangay Caticlan were not
consulted prior to the issuance of the ECC and prior to the approval of the project by the
PRA, the implementation of the reclamation project must be enjoined.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
REV. ELLY VELEZ LAO PAMATONG, ESQUIRE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004, Tinga, J.
There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office, but a privilege, subject to
limitations imposed by the law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right since the equal access
provision, like the other state principles and policies under Article II, are generally not selfexecuting.
Facts:
Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President for the
2004 elections, but the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to
the same on the ground that he was a nuisance candidate who could not wage a nationwide
campaign and/or not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency. Pamatong questions the COMELEC ruling before
the Supreme Court, arguing that the COMELEC violated his right to equal access to
opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether Pamatong has the constitutional right to run for or hold public office.
Ruling:
NO. It is not a constitutional right, but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right. The state principles and policies under Article II
are generally not self-executing, and this includes the equal access provision. Like the rest
of the policies under Article II, the provision merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action.
In this case, the privilege to run for the Presidency is limited by the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to
everybody equally without discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated. Hence,
the COMELECs act of denying due course to Pamatongs COC on the ground that he is a
nuisance candidate is valid.
LEGISLATURE
THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY TREASURER AND THE CITY ASSESSOR OF DAVAO CITY v.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO CITY AND
THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
G.R. No. 127383August 18, 2005, Tinga, J.
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Like irrepealable laws, those laws which impose conditions for its future repeal
effectively restricts on the competency of Congress to enact future legislation. It restrains the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may preclude or
restrict the power to amend or repeal laws, and not a prior statute.
Facts:
GSIS enjoyed tax-exempt status by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1146. With the
enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC), the City of Davao thought that Sec. 193 of
the said law withdrew the tax exemption privileges of GSIS. Thus, the City of Davao sent a
Notice of Public Auction to the GSIS Davao City branch office due to non-payment of realty
taxes. GSIS protested, claiming that since the LGC failed to comply with the conditions set
forth in Sec. 33 of PD 1146 to withdraw the tax exemption privileges of GSIS, the subsequent
enactment of the LGC did not repeal the tax exemptions of GSIS.
Issue:
Whether a law may validly impose conditions for its future repeal.
Ruling:
NO. Like irrepealable laws, those laws which impose conditions for its future repeal
effectively restricts on the competency of Congress to enact future legislation. It restrains
the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may
preclude or restrict the power to amend or repeal laws, and not a prior statute. Since the
past, present, and future legislative assemblies are regarded with equal footing with the
same plenary powers, it would be anathema to democratic principles to allow one legislative
body to restrain or bind the actions of the future legislative body.
In this case, President Marcos cannot bind the future legislature to a particular mode
of repeal. He cannot, like all legislative bodies, declare in advance the intent of subsequent
legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. Thus, the
conditions for repeal imposed by Sec. 33 of PD 1146 is invalid.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
AND PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)
G.R. No. 157870November 3, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.
Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
substantive and constitutional limitations, which circumscribe both the exercise of the
power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. As such, Congress may not amend or
enlarge the qualification requirements for senatorial candidates as enumerated in Section 3,
Article VI of the Constitution.
Facts:
Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office. Pursuant to the said
legal provision, COMELEC issued a Resolution which required all candidates for public office,
both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections to
undergo mandatory drug tests. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a candidate for re-election,
49 | P a g e
claims that the mandatory drug tests are unconstitutional since these impose a qualification
for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether mandatory drug tests may be validly imposed as an additional qualification for
senatorial candidates.
Ruling:
NO. Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain substantive and constitutional limitations, which circumscribe both the exercise of
the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. One such limitation is found in
Section 3, Article VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.
In this case, neither Congress nor the COMELEC may enlarge the qualification
requirements enumerated in the aforesaid constitutional provision. To require a senatorial
candidate to be certified illegal-drug clean would add another qualification layer to what the
1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Hence, the
mandatory drug test requirement for senatorial candidates is unconstitutional.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III AND MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN JOSE A.R. MELO
AND ITS COMMISSIONERS, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO
N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010, Perez, J.
The Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled
to a representative, but not so for a province.
Facts:
A law was passed increasing the legislative districts of the Province of Camarines Sur
from four (4) to five (5). Because of the reapportionment, the first legislative district was left
with a population of only 176,383. The constitutionality of the reapportionment was
questioned on the ground that each legislative district should contain a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000), based on Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The said provision reads: (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
Issue:
Whether there is a minimum population requirement to apportion a new legislative district
in a province.
Ruling:
NO. The cited provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement
of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the
other. While a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
50 | P a g e
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled. In fact, pursuant to the Local Government Code, a province may be created even if
its population is less than 250,000.
In addition, the use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
"each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each
province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only
required for a city, but not for a province. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but
not so for a province.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO,JULIO G. MORADA, AND
MINERVA ALDABA MORADA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 188078March 15, 2010, Carpio, J.
A city should have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
before it could have a legislative district in the immediately following election. Although
demographic projections are valid bases for purposes of legislative apportionment, such
projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an
official and credible source.
Facts:
On May 1, 2009, Republic Act No. 9591 amended the Charter of Malolos City and
created a separate legislative district for the city. The apportionment was based on unofficial
projections that Malolos Citys population will breach the two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) mark before the May 10, 2010 elections, which under the law will entitle it to one
(1) representative.
Issue:
Whether the creation of a legislative district in Malolos City is valid.
Ruling:
NO. A city should have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
before it could have a legislative district in the immediately following election. Although
demographic projections are valid bases for purposes of legislative apportionment, the
source of the projections must be authoritative. Any population projection forming the basis
for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order 135, dated November 6, 1993, for
certifications on demographic projections to be used as valid reference, (1) the projections
must be declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB), (2)
certifications based on demographic projections should be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer, and (3)intercensal population projections
must be as of the middle of every year.
In this case, the source used by Republic Act No. 9591 to project the population of
Malolos City is unauthoritative since it failed to comply with the requisites of Sec. 6, EO 135.
Since there is no official record that Malolos City will have a population of at least 250,000,
51 | P a g e
whether actual or projected, by May 10, 2010, the legislative district of Malolos City as
apportioned by Republic Act No. 9591 is invalid.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines;
Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of
Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S.
BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR
GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat
Islands
G.R. No. 180050,April 12, 2011, Nachura, J.
Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight in the criteria
of income, population and land area, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy
preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local
government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of
the framers of the LGC.
Facts:
Petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte sought to
nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that when the law was passed,
Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only failing to comply with Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
On February 2010, Supreme Court declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure
to comply with the land requirement of 2,000 sq. km. in the creation of a province under the
LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as
null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2)
LGC-IRR, stating that the land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province
is composed of one (1) or more islands for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC,
inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.
Issue:
Whether the creation of the Congress of the Island Province of Dinagat is valid even if
it did not comply with the land and population requirement under Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.
Ruling:
YES. It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of
local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to
deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income,
population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light,
Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three
criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without
doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a
province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit,
is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its
52 | P a g e
average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, which is four times
more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere
fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a
province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008, Brion, J.
The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to
carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision.
Facts:
On August 10, 2006, Congressman Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859,
entitled "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of
Cagayan De Oro." The bill eventually became a law, R.A. No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de
Oros legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oros
voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending
on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. The
COMELEC thereafter promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing RA 9371. Rogelio
Bagabuyo assails the COMELEC Resolution as unconstitutional. According to him, RA 9371
cannot be implemented without conducting a plebiscite because the apportionment under
the law falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether a plebiscite is necessary in case of apportionment of the legislative district
of the City of Cagayan De Oro.
Ruling:
NO. The pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section
10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement
exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.
Under the wordings of RA 9371 and Resolution 7837, no division of Cagayan de Oro
City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City
politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its
territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another
legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion
Cagayan de Oro City into two districts
53 | P a g e
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FORNATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers)
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009, Carpio, J.
The two percent threshold in relation to the distribution of the additional seats is
unconstitutional. It presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
Facts:
In May 2007 elections, Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT)filed before the National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to
proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution; that
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized
with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of RA 7941 and should be
applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their
initial/first ranking; that the 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and that the
formula/procedure prescribed in the allocation of party-list seats, Annex A of Comelec Res.
2847 shall be used for the purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed,
which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees
shall seat. However, COMELEC denied the same for being moot and academic. It announced
that it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or
coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.COMELEC formula.
Subsequently, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC to reconsider
its decision to use the Veterans formula because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory.
2. Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional.
3. Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 in
allocation of additional seats is constitutional.
Ruling:
1. NO. Neither the Constitution nor RA. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The 20% allocation of partylist representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally
allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled.
2. YES. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
3. NO. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The
54 | P a g e
two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, Carpio, J.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented"
or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Facts:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions with the SC in an effort
to reverse various resolutions by the Comelec disqualifying them from the May 2013 partylist race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and
December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed
to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees did not come from
a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups
were not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners
from participating in the May 2013 party-list election.
Ruling:
NO. COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. However, cases were remanded back to the COMELEC because petitioners may
now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the
new parameters prescribed by this Court.
In determining who may participate in the party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the partylist system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a political party through a coalition.
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4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013, Reyes, J.
Sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to
adduce evidence showing their track record. It is sufficient that the ideals represented by
the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.
Facts:
COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. It pointed
out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the
marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged
activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. It further opined that ABANG LINGKOD
failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that
they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC can cancel a party list's registration upon failure to show that its
nominees belong to a marginalized and underrepresented sector or that they have been
involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
Ruling:
NO. Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as
ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e.
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
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represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by
the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups
seeking registration under the party-list system still comply with the track record
requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking
registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 190582,April 8, 2010, Del Castillo. J.
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves
as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). It filed a petition for
accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. COMELEC dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds citing certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It
also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuisance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in
its Article 201.
Ang Ladlad now argues that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened
its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC can exclude Ang Ladlad as a party-list on moral grounds and
for being violative of public policy.
Ruling:
NO. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom,
what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful
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as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We hold that moral disapproval, without
more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

(SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First
Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013, Leonardo-De Castro. J.
If the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto,
it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and
arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. There can be no disobedience on the part of
SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement.
Facts:
On May 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled
Irrevocable Covenant, which contains the list of their candidates and terms on sharing of
their powers. It contained an agreement on who among the candidates will serve the terms
according to the power sharing agreement. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the
term of Kho as member of the HR was cut short to 1 yr and 6 mos. In line with this, Kho
tendered his resignation to be effective on December 31, 2011.
In the interim, COMELEC Resolution was promulgated on February 21, 2012.
Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that filing of vacancy as a result of term
sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be
allowed. On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS issued recalled the
resignation of Kho and allowed him to continue to represent the party-list. Despite of the
recall of resignation, COMELEC found the term-sharing agreement contrary to public policy
and hence resolved to CANCEL the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS under the Party-List
System of Representation.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC can disqualify and cancel the registration and accreditation of
SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition against termsharing.
Ruling:
NO. There was no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to
implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this
Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of
the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and
served his term as a member of the House of Representatives.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the
parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been
unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be
disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from
carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or
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regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the
cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.
MILAGROS E. AMORES v. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010, Carpio Morales. J.
The law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least
be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so
it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a
youth sector nominee.
Facts:
In her Petition for Quo Warranto, petitioner alleged that private respondent was
disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of
his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the
age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act and that
since his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections,
he is not qualified to represent the new sector pursuant to Section 15 of the same law. Public
respondent countered that the age limit applied only to those nominated as such during the
first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent, 31 years of age, can still be a nominee of a youth sector.
Ruling:
NO. The law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election, so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified
to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, it covers ALL
youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats. The Court finds that private
respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections. The records disclose
that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being
stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.
DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SEERES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

MELQUIADES A. ROBLES
G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009, Velasco, Jr. J.
Since no successor was ever elected or qualified, Robles remained the President of
BUHAY in a hold-over capacity. By fiction of law, the acts of such de facto officer are
considered valid and effective.
Facts:
In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and chairperson of BUHAY
party-list. The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all its party officers,
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without re-election. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its
president. On March 2007, Robles signed and filed a Certificate of Nomination of BUHAYs
nominees for the 2007 elections. Earlier, however, petitioner Hans Christian Seneres, holding
himself up as acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, also filed a Certificate of
Nomination.
Seneres, in his Petition to Deny Due Course to Certificates of Nomination, claims that
the nominations made by Robles were, for lack of authority, null and void owing to the
expiration of the latters term as party president. Seneres also contends that Robles, acting
as BUHAY President and nominating officer, as well as being the Administrator of the LRTA,
was engaging in electioneering or partisan political campaign, hence, in violation of Civil
Service Law and Omnibus Election Code.
Issues:
1. Whether Robles term as President of BUHAY had already expired, thus effectively nullifying
the Certificate of Nomination and the nomination process.
2. Whether Robles was engaging in electioneering or partisan political campaign.
Ruling:
1. NO. As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration of
their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed. The voting
members of BUHAY duly elected Robles as party President in October 1999. And although his
regular term as such President expired in October 2002, no election was held to replace him
and the other original set of officers. Further, the constitution and by-laws of BUHAY do not
expressly or impliedly prohibit a hold-over situation. As such, since no successor was ever
elected or qualified, Robles remained the President of BUHAY in a hold-over capacity. By
fiction of law, the acts of such de facto officer are considered valid and effective.
2. NO. The twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal
processes of the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory
of the candidate in the elections. The act of Robles of submitting the certificate nomination
and others was merely in compliance with the COMELEC requirements for nomination of
party-list representatives and, hence, cannot be treated as electioneering or partisan
political activity proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the Constitution for civil
servants.
LUISK. LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC), CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION PARTY LIST represented by
VIRGINIA S. JOSE SHERWIN N. TUGNA, and CINCHONA CRUZ-GONZALES
G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012, Sereno, J.
COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination
of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party
leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register
political parties.
Facts:
Respondents submitted a certified Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the
COMELEC. The nomination was certified by President Villanueva and Secretary General Jose.
Subsequently, Derla submitted a 2nd Certificate of Nominees including Lokin, and Planasas
party-list nominees, affixing her signature as acting secretary-general of CIBAC. Alleging
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that the nomination made by Derla was unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC a
Petition to expunge from the records and/or for disqualification. Respondents contended
that Derla had misrepresented herself as acting secretary-general, and not even a
member of CIBAC.
COMELEC First division granted the petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to
be expunged from the records, and declared respondents group as the true nominees of
CIBAC. COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions findings. Aggrieved, petitioners now argue
that the authority of Secretary General Jose to file the partys Certificate of Nomination is an
intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over which
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the controversy on who has authority to file the nomination in a party-list is
an intra-corporate dispute, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over
which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
Ruling:
NO. COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is
well established. This singular power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership
is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers.The Court ruled in
Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section
2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political
party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in another
case that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an
intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power
to register political parties.
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON v. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and
AGUSTIN C. DOROGA
G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010, Abad, J.
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY,
RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO
USTAREZ
G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010, Abad, J.
Since party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no
less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon
their qualifications.
Facts:
D
aryl Grace Abayon and Jovito Palparan were both first nominees of Aangat Tayo partylist organization and Bantayparty-list group respectively that won seats in the House of
Representatives in the 2007 elections. In two separate petitions for quo warranto,
respondents questioned the eligibility of Abayon and Palparan and their respective party-list
groups. Abayon and Palparan both questioned the jurisdiction of the HRET contending that it
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is the party-list that was elected in the House of Representatives and not them who were
just its nominees. The HRET, on both petitions, issued an order dismissing the petition
against against the party-list groups for the reason that the issue of the qualification of the
party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System
Act. However, it defended its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of Abayon
and Palparan.
Issue:
Whether the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of
the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
Ruling:
YES. The members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x
who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
This means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who
are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations. Once elected, both the district
representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner.
Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members"
of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, represented herein by its
Chairman, JAMES MARTY LIM v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MELANIO
MAURICIO, JR.
G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011, Peralta, J.
Based on Sec. 2 (5) of Art. IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the authority to
register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the
registration of the same on legal grounds.
Facts:
Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of
registration and accreditation of ABC Party-List on the ground that it is a front for a religious
organization called Children of God International, which is more popularly known as Ang
Dating Daan; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list group under Section 6 (1) of R.A.
7941 or the Party-List System Act. The said petition was dismissed by the COMELEC Second
Division. The COMELEC en banc partially granted Mauricio's Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend Its Effects. ABC then filed a petition for certiorari
questioning the said resolution of the COMELEC en banc reinstating the petition for
cancellation.
Issue:
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Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to cancel the registration and
accreditation of ABC after its proclamation.
Ruling:
YES. Based on Sec. 2 (5) of Art. IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the
authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel
the registration of the same on legal grounds. The said authority of the COMELEC is also
reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. It provides that the COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
on the ground that it is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes. It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction
over the instant petition for cancellation of the registration of the ABC Party-List.
In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has
jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list
organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and
becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the party-list
nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS

G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000, Ynares-Santiago, J.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
Facts:
Romeo Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. He filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense. He raised among others that his reelection being an expression of
popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest
not even the police power of the State.
Issue:
Whether Jalosjos should be allowed to discharge his duties as a member of the House
of Representatives.
Ruling:
NO. Jalosjos has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Section 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
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The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of
the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of
one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty
of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with
unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and
order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN
DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEA
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008, Carpio-Morales, J.
The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial courts judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty.
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
Facts:
Antonio Trillanes IV was charged with coup d' etat before the RTC of Makati City in
connection with the Oakwood Incident that happened in 2003. While in detention, he won a
seat in the Senate in the 2007 elections. On June 22, 2007, he filed with the RTC an
"Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related
Requests." The trial court denied his request and his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition for certiorari. He points out that in Jalosjos case, he was already convicted, albeit his
conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioners Omnibus
Motion, whereas in Trillanes' case, he is a mere detention prisoner. Jalosjos was charged with
crimes involving moral turpitude whereas Trillanes was charged with a "political offense."
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in denying his request.
Ruling:
NO. The Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
Also, the Rules of Court state no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited
provisions apply equally to rape and coup detat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
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imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that Trillanes application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong,
whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial courts
judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his
right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in
such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for
confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention
prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA,

JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND
MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001, Vitug, J.
R.A. No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.
Facts:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation filed
complaints for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 against Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against her before the Sandiganbayan. The
prosecution then filed a motion to issue an order suspending Santiago. The Sandiganbayan
granted the motion and ordered the suspension of Santiago for 90 days from her position as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other government position she may
be holding at present or hereafter. Hence, this petition assailing the said order of the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has the authority to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago.
Ruling:
YES. The order of suspension prescribed by R.A. No. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated
in the said constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination
by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
The Court ruled that Section 16 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution deals with the power of each
House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or
expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that
the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it
appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of R.A. 3019, which
is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the
latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives."
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The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from R.A. No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives
and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from
unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch. R.A. No. 3019 does not exclude
from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not
err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
ANTERO J. POBRE v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J.
No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Facts:
Antero Pobre filed an administrative complaint against Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago regarding the speech she delivered on the Senate floor. In the said speech, she
said the following:
"I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I
am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living
my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested
in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots."
In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the
aforequoted statements. However, she invoked parliamentary immunity contending that it
was delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
Issue:
Whether Santiago can be subject to a disciplinary action.
Ruling:
NO. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Art. VI,
Sec. 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof."
The Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court
lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that
enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate
and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served.
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Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or
of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does
not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI v. RICHARD J.

GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, Carpio, J.
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Facts:
On February 23, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon was elected as Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross during his incumbency as a member of the Senate. Petitioners
then filed a petition to declare Senator Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate.
They allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, he has
ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution. In
his Comment, Senator Gordon asserted that petitioners have no standing to file this petition
which appears to be an action for quo warranto and that it was already barred by
prescription. He further insisted that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation and that the prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution does not apply
in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an
employment.
Issue:
Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art.VI
of the Constitution.
Ruling:
NO. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the
thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC
Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to
membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be
a PNRC member for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the
year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Sec. 5 of the
PNRC Charter, as amended by P.D. No. 1264, provides that membership in the PNRC shall be
open to the entire population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Thus, the PNRC is a
privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not
a government-owned or controlled corporation.
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REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B.
TAN
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, Perez, J.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.
Facts:
In 2012, Joseph Tan filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel the COC of Regina
Reyes before the COMELEC citing material misrepresentations contained therein such as her
citizenship, civil status, and residence. The COMELEC First Division cancelled her COC on the
ground that she is not a Filipino citizen and she did not meet the one-year residency
requirement making her ineligible to run as representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
The COMELEC en banc denied her motion for reconsideration. Four days after the election,
Regina Reyes was proclaimed winner. However, on June 5, 2013, the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc became final and executory. She took her oath of office on the same day.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of June 30,
2013. Reyes filed this present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over Reyes who has been proclaimed and who
has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.
Ruling:
YES. The COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the reason that the jurisdiction of the HRET
begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as
stated in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office. Here, Reyes cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has
earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only
"at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Thus, until such time, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B.

TAN
G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, Perez, J.
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The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Facts:
In 2012, Joseph Tan filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel the COC of Regina
Reyes before the COMELEC citing material misrepresentations contained therein such as her
citizenship, civil status, and residence. The COMELEC First Division cancelled her COC on the
ground that she is not a Filipino citizen and she did not meet the one-year residency
requirement making her ineligible to run as representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
The COMELEC en banc denied her motion for reconsideration. Four days after the election,
Regina Reyes was proclaimed winner. However, on June 5, 2013, the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc became final and executory. She took her oath of office on the same day.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of June 30,
2013.
Issue:
Whether the jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of Reyes is lodged with the
HRET.
Ruling:
NO. Reyes, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which
has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written
constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is not a Member
of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful
winner in the election for such membership. Indeed, the action for cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant
of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was
completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On
and after May 14, 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case.
The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to Reyes'
proclamation.
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO v. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,

SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
The administration of oath and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no
longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap.
Facts:
The COC of Regina Reyes was cancelled in a petition filed for the purpose. Pending
the resolution of Reyes' motion for reconsideration, elections were held. A day after the
election, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the said resolution. Despite such decision, Reyes
was still proclaimed as the representative of the lone district of Marinduque. In the
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meantime, the COMELEC's resolution became final and executory. Velasco filed a petition for
certiorari assailing that the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes were
null and void. The COMELEC denied the aforementioned petition. The COMELEC en banc
reversed the denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and void the proclamation of
Reyes. However, Velasco alleged that despite all the letters and requests to Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction.
Issue:
Whether Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap can be compelled to administer
oath and to delete the name of Reyes in the Roll of the members of the House of
Representatives respectively.
Ruling:
YES. The present Petition for Mandamus seeks to compel respondents Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory
Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of
office to Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives. In other words, the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the
prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration of the oath of office to Velasco; and (if) the
inclusion of his name in the Roll of Members, are ministerial in character vis-a-vis the factual
and legal milieu of this case. As the Court has previously stated, the administration of oath
and the registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives for
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no longer a matter of discretion or
judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally
duty-bound to recognize Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by the
Court and the COMELEC'S compliance with the said ruling, now both final and executory.
MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL AND PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY
GR. No. 219603, January 26, 2016, Carpio, J.
A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Facts:
In 2008, Philip Pichay was convicted of four counts of libel. In 2016, he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the 2013 elections. A petition for his
disqualification was filed by Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado under Sec. 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code on the ground that he was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude. When Pichay paid the fine in lieu of imprisonment, on February 17, 2011, the fiveyear period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. When Pichay was proclaimed as
the winner, she filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET reiterating that Pichay's
ineligibility. However, the HRET concluded that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's
conviction for libel showed that the crime did not involve moral turpitude.
Issue:
70 | P a g e
Whether Pichay is disqualified to become a member of the House of Representatives.
Ruling:
YES. A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground
for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. Libel is listed as one of
the crimes involving moral turpitude. In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for
four counts of libel. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines (587 Phil. 64, 2008), the Court found
Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with
reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12, which
became final on June 1, 2009, Pichay made a false material representation as to his
eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 2013 elections. Pichay's
disqualification under Sec. 12 is a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under
Secs. 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for
his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude.
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC v. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, et al.

G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991, GRIO-AQUINO, J.
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must
be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to
be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
Facts:
Marciano Pineda of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio Bondoc of
the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner in the elections,
thus, Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The
Tribunal issued a decision in favor of Bondoc. One of the members of the HRET was
Congressman Juanito Camasura, JR. of LDP. He revealed to his party that he voted for
Bondoc in the said HRET case. Thus, LDP expelled him from the political party. The LDP
informed the House of Representatives about Cong. Camasuras expulsion. The House of
Representatives then decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong.
Camasura to the HRET. This resulted to the cancellation of the promulgation of the election
contest between Bondoc and Pineda.
Hence, Bondoc filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the House of Representatives can validly removed Congressman Camasura
from the HRET.
Ruling:
NO. The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives. The tribunal was created to function as
71 | P a g e
a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. To be able to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature
nor with the Courts.
Disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET
for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the
House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a
violation of the Constitution. Furthermore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may
not be terminated except for a just cause. Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura
from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and
valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
JEAN L. ARNAULT v.LEON NAZARENO, et al.

G.R. No.L-3820, July 18, 1950, OZAETA, J.
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function.
Facts:
The Senate investigated the purchase by the Government of the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates.A certain amount of money was paid to Ernest Burt thru his agent
petitioner Jean Arnault. Arnault was called upon by the Senate to answer questions
regarding the whereabouts of the P440,000.00.Upon his failure to answer questions
pertinent to the subject of inquiry, the Senate ordered his confinement to the New Bilibid
Prison. Hence, Arnault filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that the Senate has no
power to compel him to answer questions which are not pertinent to the matter under
inquiry and to punish him for contempt.
Issue:
Whether the Senate has the power to punish for contempt a person for refusing to
answer a question pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
Ruling:
YES. The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess
it. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must
be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as
72 | P a g e
to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered
to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to
any proposed or possible legislation.
Where the alleged immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body
from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass
upon the contention. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the
performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to
remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of
his liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate,
which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), et al. v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON

BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007, NACHURA, J.
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasijudicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.
Facts:
Because of the privilege speech delivered by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile regarding the
sale of unregistered foreign securities by the Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) Philippines
which is a violation of the Securities Regulation Code, the respondent Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies conducted an investigation, in aid of legislation,
of the subject matter of the speech. Petitioners, who are the officials of SCB, filed a petition
for prohibition against respondent to enjoin the members thereof from compelling the
petitioners to testify before any hearing to be conducted by the respondent. Petitioners
contended that the respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its subject
matter was already the subject matter of the civil and criminal cases against the SCB
pending before the CA and the trial courts.
Issue:
Whether the respondent may conduct the subject inquiry, in aid of legislation, and
compel the petitioners to testify, despite the pendency of cases involving the same subject
matter of the inquiry.
Ruling:
YES. The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by
Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or
an administrative investigation.
As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno, [t]he power of inquiry
with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
73 | P a g e
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish
contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. Such power is sui generis, as it
attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character
of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.
It is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the
attendance of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is
the power to ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative
investigation.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA

G.R. Nos. 169777, 169659, 169660, 169667, 169834 & 171246, April 20, 2006,
CARPIO-MORALES, J.
Congress has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it
is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
Facts:
The Senate invited several executive officials as resource speakers for public
hearings involving the alleged overpricing of the North Rail Projects and the massive
electoral fraud in the presidential elections of May 2005. Thereafter, the President issued
Executive Order No. (EO) 464 which requires that all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress. Because of the EO, many of those who were invited were
not able to go to the inquiry because of lack of approval from the President. Hence, the
Senate of the Philippines filed a petition to Supreme Court to question the validity of EO 464.
Issue:
Whether EO 464 is void on the ground that it contravenes the power of inquiry vested
in Congress.
Ruling:
Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 are void while sections 1 and 2 (a) are valid.
Congress has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it
is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all official mentioned in Sec. 2 (b) to obtain the consent
of the president before they can appear before congress. This enumeration is broad and
when the officials concerned invokes this as a basis for not attending the inquiries there is
already an implied claim of privilege. Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information and not to categories of person.
Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are void because they are too broad and would
frustrate the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation because it allows
74 | P a g e
the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and or pro-offering its reasons therefor.
ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

AND INVESTIGATIONS, et al.
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation extends even to
executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of
executive privilege.
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri, as the former Director of NEDA, was invited by the
respondent Senate Committees to appear and testify on matters involving the controversial
ZTE-NBN deal. Neri testified that he was offered a bribe to accept the deal, but did not
accept such as instructed by the President. When he was further asked on the details of the
matters he discussed with the President about the NBN Project, Neri, invoking executive
privilege, refused to answer particularly three questions: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize
it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. When called again to testify in
another hearing, Neri refused upon orders of the President, invoking executive privilege.
Thus, he was arrested for contempt of the Senate.
Issue:
Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered
by executive privilege.
Ruling:
YES.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close
advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered
a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is
based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect
or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the
power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights
of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. The power extends
even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid
claim of executive privilege.
75 | P a g e
ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND INVESTIGATIONS, et al.
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The presumption of executive privilege can only be overturned by a showing of
compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by the privilege.
Facts:
Respondent Senate Committees filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 25,
2008 Decision of the Court wherein the Senate cited in contempt Romulo Neri for his refusal
to answer three specific questions involving the controversial ZTE-NBN deal. The Court held
that the communications elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege, hence, the contempt order issued by respondents was void.
Respondents now contend that the information elicited by the three questions are necessary
in the discharge of their legislative functions.
Issue:
Whether respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by
the three questions are critical to the exercise of their functions.
Ruling:
NO. The Court recognizes respondent Committees power to investigate the NBN
Project in aid of legislation. However, the Court cannot uphold the view that when a
constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of
a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent Committees questions can
be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to
which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by the
Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only
be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered
by executive privilege.
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the
respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific
need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of
this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion
that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and
non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these
bills could not be determined without the said information sought by the three (3) questions.
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged
bribery to the Office of the President. While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the
potential culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given
government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the
Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyones guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our
Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary
cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF

CAMILO L. SABIO v.HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
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Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision
granting such exemption.
Facts:
Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG was invited as one of the resource persons in the
public meeting for the investigation of the anomalous losses incurred by the POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors. Sabio refused to appear invoking Sec. 4(b) of Executive Order (EO) No. 1
issued by former President Corazon Aquino, which exempts all PCGG members or staff from
testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding. Hence, he was arrested
for contempt of the Senate. Because of this, Sabio filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging
that the respondent Senate committees disregarded Section 4(b) of EO No. 1.
Issue:
Whether Sec. 4(b) of EO No. 1, which limits the Senates power to conduct legislative
inquiry, has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. Section 4(b) of EO No. 1 is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power
of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision
granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG
belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.The Constitution is the highest law of
the land. It is "the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to
which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be
valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution." Consequently, the
Court has no recourse but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987
Constitution.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v.THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. Nos. 115455, 115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873,
115931, August 25, 1994, MENDOZA, J.
What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives.
Facts:
This involves suits for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7716 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. One of the grounds
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invoked by petitioners is the violation of Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
Petitioners contended that in enacting the said law, Congress violated the Constitution
because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was not
passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in
the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. In other
words, they alleged that RA 7716 did not originate in the House of Representatives, as
required by the Constitution, and it has not thereby become a law.
Issue:
Whether RA 7716 violated Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
Ruling:
NO. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate
that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. What is important to note is that, as a result
of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and
not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power
not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to
violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make
the House superior to the Senate.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of
local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected
as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected
at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both
views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, et

al.
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 & 113888, August 19, 1994, QUIASON, J.
Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which
can be vetoed separately from an item.
Facts:
Petitioners, as taxpayers and members of the Senate, assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7763 or the General Appropriations Bill of 1994. When the law was
passed, the President vetoed specific provisions and imposed certain conditions therein.
One of petitioners contentions is that the President exceeded his veto power when he
vetoed specific provisions of the Bill and not the entire bill itself.
Issue:
Whether the President has the power to veto certain provisions of an Appropriations
Bill, and not the entire bill itself.
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Ruling:
YES. The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a
veto, the same as it will presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress. The veto
power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. That is
why it is found in Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the
Executive Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the
presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof
to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely
parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto
power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general
appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]).In so doing, the President must
veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited
to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. As the
Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill
must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does
not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of
appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately
from an item.
CESAR BENGZON, et al. v. HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, et al.

G.R. No. 103524 & A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA, April 15, 1992, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
Facts:
Republic Act No. (RA) 910, as amended by RA 1797, provided for the retirement
pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court (SC) and of the Court of Appeals (CA). The
benefits under the said law were extended to members of the Constitutional Commissions
under RA 1563, as amended by RA 3595. President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 644 which repealed RAs 1797 and 3595.Subsequently, automatic readjustment of
pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men was restored through PDs 1638 and
1909. Realizing that the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the AFP was
restored while that of the retired Justices of the SC and CA was not, Congress approved
House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740 providing for the reenactment of the repealed
provisions of RAs 1797 and RA 3595. However, President Aquino vetoed House Bill No.
16297.
Pursuant to the Resolution of the SC in A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA, Congress included in
the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 (House Bill No. 34925) certain
appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due
the retired Justices of the SC and CA. However, the President vetoed the provisionsrelating to
the said appropriations.Hence, petitioners, who are retired Justices of the SC and the CA,
assailed the constitutionality of the said veto by the President.
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Issue:
Whether the challenged veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Ruling:
YES. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President
nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The
legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of
laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies. The
act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally
vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to
its exercise. The veto power is not absolute.
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or
not at all. He or she cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or
paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally
all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the
Administration needs the money to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the
entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore,
compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this
reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient
riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The
power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to
veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, et al. v. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., et al.
G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493& 209251, November 19, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in
Congress.
Facts:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System in the Philippines. The controversy arose when several whistleblowers revealed that
certain legislators received kickbacks from the PDAF Funds. They declared that JLN (Janet
Lim Napoles) Corporation had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using dummy NGOs. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of
PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles private
accounts. After the NBI conducted an investigation of the Napoles controversy, complaints
for plunder, malversation of funds, direct bribery and violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act were filed against certain legislators. The Commission on Audit (CoA) also
released a report about its three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators'
PDAF during the last three years of the Arroyo administration, which showed anomalies in
the disbursement of PDAF funds.
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Issue:
Whether the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional for violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative
powers.
Ruling:
YES. As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In
particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral
body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally
wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power.
The Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress. That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an
act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law
of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which
they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013
PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the
Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014 J. Bersamin
Appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization
prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while
appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its
creditors.
Facts:
Jinggoy Estarda delivered a privliege speech in the Senate to reveal that some
Senators, with him, have been given an additional P50 Million for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. Responding to this, Secretary Abad issued a statement
explaining that the funds for these were part of the DAP, a program designed to hasten
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economic expansion. This DAP have been sourced from savings which comes from the
pooling of unreleased and the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also meant for slowmoving programs amd projefcts. Aruallo then brogutht the case to the Court alleging that
the DAP is unconstitutional alleging that its implementing arm direcrted the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments of government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations,
both for continuing and current allotments.
Issue:
Whether there is a law necessary to implement the DAP.
Ruling:
NO. The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the
economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the
Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP.
Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution
Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by which Congress "designates a particular fund, or
sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to
be applied to some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual
purchase or expense.
In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury,
while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning
to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to
its creditors.
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
countrys economic situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could
pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings
pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not
involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from
the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not
usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs.HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008 J. Corona
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve
or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
Facts:
Abakada is seeking for prohibition in implementing RA 9335 or the Attrition Act of
2005 which was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
BIR and Customs. It provides for a system of rewards and sanctions to the employees of the
agencies for them to exceed their revenue target. Abakada claims that by establishing such
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system, the law turns officials and employees of the two agencies into mercenaries and
bounty hunters as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Furthermore,
Abakada assails the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers for it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of such law.
Issue:
Whether the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional.
Ruling:
NO. Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress.
It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial
power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the
following: (1) Scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear
before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments
and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve
or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form
of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to
an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
PRESIDENCY
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C.
ELAMPARO, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ
G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700 March 8 2016 J. Perez
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The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Facts:
In the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe ran for president and she stated in her COC that
she is a natural-born citizen and that she met the residency requirement to run for the
highest position in the land. Before her permanent stay on May 24, 2005, she was having
frequent trips before the US and the Philippines. She was adopted by FPJ and Susan Roces
when she when she was found a newborn infant in Iloilo. She then moved to the US in 1991
and was naturalized as an American citizen in 2001. Immigration granted her reacquisition
of citizenship on July 18, 2006 and when she assumed her post as chairperson of MTRCB,
she renounced her American cirizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American
passport. Several petitions were filed before the COMELEC to prevent her candidancy on the
ground that she is not a natural-born citizen as she has not proven that her biological
parents are Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc denied her candidancy for not meeting the
citizenship and residency requimrents and finds that she has done material
misrepresentation in her COC.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC validly denied Grace Poes COC.
Ruling:
NO. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the
President, the Vice-President was made clear by the Constitution. The Constitution did not
provide any provision for the COMELEC to have jurisdiction over such issues.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which
is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under
Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds
from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of
voters.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes
Cast for President and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 Elections.
G.R. No. 163783June 22, 2004 J. Puno
The Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess
to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day
of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Facts:
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Senator Pimentel Jr. seeks to declare null and void the continued existence of the
Joint Committee and prohibit it with its continuous action. He claims that with the
adjournment on June 11, 2004 by the 12th Congress of its last regular session, its legal
existence has ended thus all pending matters and proceedings end upon the expiration of
the Congress.
Issue:
Whether Senator Pimentels action will prosper.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure,
precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly
contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an
incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint
session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and
Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed by the Senate Panel for respondent
Joint Committee and that of the Office of the Solicitor General, the precedents set by the
1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing
canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of former Senate President
Jovito Salonga.
Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine
die on May 25, 1992. On June 16, 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for
President and Vice-President. Thereafter, on June 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in
joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel
V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President, respectively.
Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress
adjourned sine die on May 25, 1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the
votes for President and Vice-President on May 27, 1998. The Tenth Congress then convened
in joint public session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed
Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and VicePresident, respectively.
ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO vs. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and

G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010 C.J. Corona
The Constitution prohibits a President from having the highest position twice but he
is not considered as having two terms if he does not win the elections.
Facts:
Former President Estrada won the presidency in the 1998 elections but was later on
ousted by former President Arroyo in which he was not able to finish his term. He sought to
run again in 2010. Pormento opposed such candidacy and filed a petition for Estradas
disqualification which was denied by the 2nd division of the COMELEC. His motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the COMELEC en banc. Pormento filed for certiorari on
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May 7, 2010 but he did not file for any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction thus Estrada was
able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in May 10, 2010 where he
garnered the second highest number of votes.
Issue:
Whether Estrada violated the Constitution when he ran for president in the May 10,
2010 elections.
RULING:
NO. Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran in the May
2010 elections. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection
will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President,
there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights
exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a
President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer
true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected
President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be
hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs.PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010 J. Nachura
It is expressly provided in the Constitution in a clear and concise language that the
Supreme Court is vested the authority to be the sole judge in all electoral contests against
the President or Vice-President.
Facts:
Atty. Macalintal claims that the PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Article 7,
Sec 4 of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET and it violates Art VIII,
Sec 12 of the Constitution. The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is
valid on the ground that the grant of authority to the SC to be the sole judge of all electoral
contests for the President or Vice-President is given in Article 7, Sec 4, par 7 of the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the PET is constitutional.
Ruling:
YES. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting
the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what
was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is
plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
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bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it
into effect.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001 J. Puno
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.
Facts:
Former President Estrada was impeached for allegations of wrong doings eventually
amounting to graft and corruption. In the impeachment proceeding before the Senate, 11
senators were sympathetic towards the president and they succeeded in suppressing the
evidence against Estrada which led to an uproar within the Senate. The PNP and AFP
eventually withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at the EDSA Shrine.
Estrada called for snap elections to be held with the local and congressional elections where
he said he would not be running thus the SC declared that he constructively resigned from
his post. Arroyo became the President in lieu of him. Estrada filed for prohibition with a
prayer for Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting further
proceedings in cases filed against him until his term as president ends. He also wishes to be
declared the President still albeit the fact that he is only temporarily unable to discharge his
duties.
Issue:
Whether Estrada enjoys immunity from suit.
Ruling:
NO. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991 C.J. Fernan
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office.
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Facts:
Former President Cory Aquino issued EO 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to have other government posts in addition
to their primary one. The petitioner assailed that such law is unconstitutional on the ground
that it adds an exception to Article 7, Sec 13 of the Constitution. It further contends that only
the Vice President when appointed as a Cabinet Member and the Secretary of Justice as
member of the JBC is technically allowed to have more than one offense.
Issue:
Whether EO 284 is constitutional.
RULING:
NO. It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of
Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on
the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal
opinions which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the people'
understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive
Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. ALBERTO C. AGRA

G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013 J. Bersamin
Except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII,
appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Facts:
Agra was designated Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devandera
while being Government Corporate Counsel. Agra was also designated Acting Secretary of
Justice when Devandera resigned. He relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel to
continue performing his duties as Acting Solicitor General. Funa questioned his appointment.
Agra claims that his designation were only temporary in nature in that even if he was
holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as Solicitor General is merely a
hold-over and that he did not receive any of his salaries and other money benefits as Acting
Solicitor General when he was appointed Acting Secretary of Justice.
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Issue:
Whether Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid.
Ruling:
NO. Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, provides that:
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office
or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section
7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants.
On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding
multiple government offices or employment. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances
cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances
provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII,
supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not
validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General,
because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA vs. SALVADOR MISON, AND
GUILLERMO CARAGUE
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 J. Padilla
Except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII,
appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Facts:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by President
Aquino. Sarmiento and Arcilla are assailing the said appointment stating that the said
appointment is not valid since it was not submitted to the Commission on Appointment for
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approval further arguing that under the constitution the appointments made for Heads of
Bureaus need confirmation from the COA.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Mison is valid.
Ruling:
YES. In the 1987 Constitution the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the
word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads
of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article
VII.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs under RA 1937 and PD 34.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have
to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG v. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,

FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN
G.R. NO. 149036, APRIL 2, 2002, J. CARPIO
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. In order to determine whether the renewal of an ad interim
appointment violates the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution we must distinguish those which weredisapproved from those which were
by-passed, for the by-passed reappointment is valid and allowed while the disapproved is
not and can no longer be renewed.
FACTS:
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim,
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each
for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. However, the Commission on
Appointments did not act on said appointments. Consequently, On June 1, 2001, President
Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same
positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. Congress
adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus,
on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions.
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Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag filed the instant petition questioning the
appointments Matibag claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason violate the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its
Chairman and members.
Issues:
1. Whether the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
2. Whether the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office
to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
1. NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. Thus, the ad
interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying
that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President
can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly
without basis.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill
the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during
the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor General
Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President,
during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
2. NO. We must distinguish those which were disapproved from those which were by-passed.
An ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be
extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on
Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the
President. On the contrary a by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad
interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the
fixed term of seven years.
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no
previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A
reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad interim
appointments and renewals of appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit
because all the appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not
extend the expiry date of their terms of office. The continuing renewal of the ad interim
appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on
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February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. v. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDOR. ERMITA, FLORENCIO

B. ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR.
G.R. No. 164978, OCTOBER 13, 2005, J. CARPIO
Being an alter ego of the president, a department secretary may be appointed in an
acting capacity even when the congress is in session in line with its purpose as a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office.
Facts:
This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to respondents Abad et al as Department Secretaries in an acting
capacity while the Congress is in session. Nonetheless, when Congress adjourned on 22
September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments
to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in
an acting capacity.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of respondents Abad et.al as acting secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is
a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily
appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her
choice could assume office. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the
acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the
very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting
capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may
not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the
acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Further, contrary to the claims of petitioner members of congress, we find no abuse
in the present case. In addition to the 1 year limit of effectivity of temporary appointments
the absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim
appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the
lapse of one year.
ARMITA B. RUFINO, v. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA ET AL.
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G.R. NO. 139554, JULY 21, 2006, J. CARPIO
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution excludes a situation where the
appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him for what it allow are heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than
such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
Facts:
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines. PD
15 created a Board of Trustees "Board" to govern the CCP. The case boils down to the
constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board.The
clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP
Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one trustee
survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the
ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be
filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the same ranking officers
of the CCP Thus, the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for
a fixed four-year term. On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to
reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive terms.
The petition claims that Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect
their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank"
than the appointing power. Further, PD 15 must be struck down for impeding the Presidents
power of control.
Issues:
1. Whether PD 15 violates Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

2. Whether PD 15 violates the Presidents constitutional power of control and supervision over
the CCP.
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Ruling:
1. YES. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the
CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On
the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the
appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the
trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to
"elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill
vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the
power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in
that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing
power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently
conflicts with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring
controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.
2. YES. The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The
CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasijudicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive
branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or
order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the
President."Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an
office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all
executive offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any
executive office one performing executive functions outside of the independent
constitutional bodies from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the
CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the
Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office
from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must
remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the
94 | P a g e
President of his constitutional power of control over "all the executive offices." Section 6(b)
and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the
Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from
political influence and pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such
a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.
DOMINADOR R. AYTONA v. ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL.

G.R. NO.L-19313, JANUARY 19, 1962, CJ. BENGZON
As early as this case midnight or last minute appointments were already abhorred for
an incumbent president is no more than a "care-taker" administration and should not do
acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor such
as having midnight appointments.
Facts:
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R.
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and others all in all, about three hundred
fifty (350) "midnight" or "last minute" appointments. On December 30, 1961, at noon,
President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on December 31, 1961, he issued
Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointment
made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, (date when he, Macapagal, had been
proclaimed elected by the Congress).
Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had qualified for the post and that
Administrative Order No. 2 is invalid.
Issue:
Whether the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad
interim appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees had already
qualified.
Ruling:
YES. Nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon
of December 30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the
election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a "care-taker" administration. He was
duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he
should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. The time for debate had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for him to
use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to
avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies
in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications
may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and
planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new
President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant
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positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to
revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if
such equity might be successfully set up in the present situation, considering the rush
conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracting from that
degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to
equitable relief. The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with
the stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity and
efficiency of the public service.
Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an
appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered, especially where the appointee has
qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty),
issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined
herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying
revocation and if any circumstances justify revocation, those described herein should fit the
exception.
IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30, 1998 of HON. MATEO A. VALENZUELA

AND HON. PLACIDO B. VALLARTA
A.M. NO. 98-5-01-SC., NOVEMBER9, 1998, CJ. NARVASA
The prohibited appointments contemplated by Article VII section 15 not only applies
to the executive department but also to appointments by the president to the members of
the judiciary. Nonetheless, as an exception appointments to the judiciary can be made
during the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
Facts:
The Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta and others were appointed by the president as
RTC judges and to other judicial positions during the prohibited period contemplated by Art.
VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution in light of the upcoming elections. The President expressed
the view that "the election-ban provision Article VII, Sec. 15 applies only to executive
appointments or appointments in the executive branch of government," the whole article
being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'" He also observed that further proof of his theory
"is the fact that appointments to the judiciary have special, specific provisions applicable to
them" citing Article VIII, Sec. 4 [1] and Article VIII, Section 9. In view thereof, he "firmly and
respectfully reiterate his request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit the final list of
nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy in order to complete the appointments. On
the contrary, Chief Justice Narvasa is of the contrary view, CJ Narvasa claims that the
election ban provision also applies to appointments in the judiciary. Faced by an important
and ripe constitutional question, hence, the Court En banc was called to decide on the
instant Administrative matter.
Issues:
1. Whether during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections
4(1) and 9 of Article VIII.
2. Whether the President can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban
in the interest of public service.
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Ruling:
1. NO. The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution "two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term" - the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor
allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President
is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless
prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments
comes into effect only once every six years.
In view of the general prohibition in Art. VII, sec.15, One interpretation that
immediately suggests itself is that Section 4(1), Article VIII is a general provision while
Section 15, Article VII is a particular one; that is to say, normally, when there are no
presidential elections - which after all occur only every six years - Section 4(1), Article VIII
shall apply: vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days; but when (as now)
there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the
President shall not make any appointments. The reason for said prohibition, according to Fr.
J. Bernas, S.J., an authority on Constitutional Law and himself a member of the Constitutional
Commission, is "In order not to tie the hands of the incoming President through midnight
appointments."
In the ultimate analysis of the provision, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is
directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the
two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited
by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v.
Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected
President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no
more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President. Therefore, the appointments by Hon. Valenzuela and
Vallarta by the President during the prohibited period is deemed void.
2. YES. The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during
the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be
the case should the membership of the court be so reduced that it will have no quorum or
should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be
evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor
Section 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30,
1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 1998) were unquestionably
made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of the first
prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying
votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly
in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the
making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already
discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made
within the period of the ban.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT

GLORIA MACAPAGAL
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ARROYO
G. R. NO. 191002, MARCH 17, 2010, J. BERSAMIN
In reversing the Valenzuela ruling, the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII is now
deemed inapplicable to the appointments in the judiciary.
Facts:
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners De Castro, with the exception of Soriano,
Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against
presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in
the Judiciary. In support thereof, the OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary (specifically in
this case the upcoming Chief Justice position).
Ruling:
NO. We reverse Valenzuela. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the
President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of
the Article.Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and
qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9
of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can
only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by
the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or
Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial
appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC
by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the
appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned,
should prevail.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby,
Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a
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Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The
failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite
mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial
interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was
couched in stronger negative language. Such interpretation even turned out to be
conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commissions deliberations on
Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on
the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be
sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false
premises have been exposed. It will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these
cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela
decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the
unworthy and forgettable.
SEPARATE OPINION:
J. BRION, CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
The Disputed Provisions
In my view, the provisions of the Constitution cannot be read in isolation from what
the whole contains. In considering the interests of the Executive and the Judiciary, a holistic
approach starts from the premise that the constitutional scheme is to grant the President
the power of appointment, subject to the limitation provided under Article VII, Section 15. At
the same time, the Judiciary is assured, without qualifications under Article VIII, Section 4(1),
of the immediate appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, i.e., within 90 days from
the occurrence of the vacancy. If both provisions would be allowed to take effect, as I believe
they should, the limitation on the appointment power of the President under Article VII,
Section 15 should itself be limited by the appointment of Members of the Court pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 4(1), so that the provision applicable to the Judiciary can be given full
effect without detriment to the Presidents appointing authority. This harmonization will
result in restoring to the President the full authority to appoint Members of the Supreme
Court pursuant to the combined operation of Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section
4(1).
Viewed in this light, there is essentially no conflict, in terms of the authority to
appoint, between the Executive and Judiciary; the President would effectively be allowed to
exercise the Executives traditional presidential power of appointment while respecting the
Judiciarys own prerogative. In other words, the President retains full powers to appoint
Members of the Court during the election period, and the Judiciary is assured of a full
membership within the time frame given.
I concluded that the appointment of a Member of the Court even during the election
period per se implies no adverse effect on the integrity of the election; a full Court is ideal
during this period in light of the Courts unique role during elections. I maintain this view and
fully concur in this regard with the majority.
On the Valenzuela Decision
In any case, let me repeat what I stressed about Valenzuela which rests on the
reasoning that the evils Section 15 seeks to remedy vote buying, midnight appointments
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and partisan reasons to influence the elections exist, thus justifying an election
appointment ban. In particular, the "midnight appointment" justification, while fully
applicable to the more numerous vacancies at the lower echelons of the Judiciary (with an
alleged current lower court vacancy level of 537 or a 24.5% vacancy rate), should not apply
to the Supreme Court which has only a total of 15 positions that are not even vacated at the
same time. The most number of vacancies for any one year occurred only last year (2009)
when seven (7) positions were vacated by retirement, but this vacancy rate is not expected
to be replicated at any time within the next decade. Thus "midnight appointments" to the
extent that they were understood in Aytona will not occur in the vacancies of this Court as
nominations to its vacancies are all processed through the JBC under the publics close
scrutiny. The institutional integrity of the Court is hardly an issue. If at all, only objections
personal to the individual Members of the Court or against the individual applicants can be
made, but these are matters addressed in the first place by the JBC before nominees are
submitted. There, too, are specific reasons, likewise discussed above, explaining why the
election ban should not apply to the Supreme Court. These exempting reasons, of course,
have yet to be shown to apply to the lower courts. Thus, on the whole, the reasons justifying
the election ban in Valenzuela still obtain in so far as the lower courts are concerned, and
have yet to be proven otherwise in a properly filed case. Until then, Valenzuela, except to
the extent that it mentioned Section 4(1), should remain an authoritative ruling of this Court.
ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 203372, JUNE 16, 2015, J. CARPIO
Appointment is a process in which all of its requisites starting with the selection by
the appointing power up to the acceptance of the appointment by the appointee must be
present. Hence, if the act of acceptance falls within the prohibited appointment
contemplated by Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution such appointment even if
the other requisites were done prior to the ban shall be void.
Facts:
On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking
appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on
midnight appointments. Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several
government offices. Atty. Velicaria-Garafil one of the appointed (as State Solicitor II) persons
during the alleged midnight appointments and petitioner in this consolidated case assails
that EO No. 2 is unconstitutional and that their appointments were already perfected before
March 11 2010 which was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. However, as
gleaned from the records it was shown that the transmittal of their appointments to the MRO
and their corresponding Oath and assumption of office all came at a later date than March
10, 2010.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Velicaria-Garafil et ALs appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. All of petitioners appointments are midnight appointments and are void for
violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The well-settled rule in our
jurisprudence, that an appointment is a process that begins with the selection by the
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appointing power and ends with acceptance of the appointment by the appointee,
stands.The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should
be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and
evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt
of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all
these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether
outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.
The facts in all these cases show that none of the petitioners have shown that their
appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have been issued (and released) before the
ban. The dates of receipt by the MRO, which in these cases are the only reliable evidence of
actual transmittal of the appointment papers by President Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates
clearly falling during the appointment ban. Thus, this ponencia (J. Carpio) and the dissent
both agree that all the appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in violation
of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. For an appointment to be valid, it must be
made outside of the prohibited period or, failing that, fall under the specified exception like
the appointments in the judiciary as held in De Castro v JBC.
The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire
appointment process prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively
easy to antedate appointment papers and make it appear that they were issued prior to the
appointment ban, but it is more difficult to simulate the entire appointment process up until
acceptance by the appointee.
Petitioners Atty. Velicaria-Garafil have failed to show compliance with all four
elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment
papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand,
petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. Petitioners
have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT v.

SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY
G.R. NO. 180771, APRIL 21, 2015, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Under the principle of qualified political agency the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally.
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was impleaded as an unwilling copetitioner, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the
Taon Strait, among others in this case. Petitioners toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and
other cetacean species referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals, which inhabit the
waters in and around the Taon Strait and Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio
as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") filed a
case against the secretary of the Dept. of Energy and others for granting JAPEX exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately
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2,850 square kilometers offshore the Taon Strait which hampers the environment and
habitat of the petitioners resident marine mammals.
In defense, public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that
petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the
present petition; that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws
cited in the petitions. Further, invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public
respondents claim that absent any proof that former President Arroyo had disapproved of
their acts in entering into and implementing SC-46 granting JAPEX exploration, development,
and production, such acts remain to be her own.
Issues:
1. Whether former President Macapagal Arroyo can be impleaded as an unwilling copetitionerfor her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the
Taon Strait.
2. Whether the alter-ego principle invoked here by the public respondents apply.
Ruling:
1. NO. Albeit the court here ruled that it liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing
environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature. The reason cited by the petitioners Stewards
for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead
her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling copetitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary
to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
office holder's time, also demands undivided attention."Therefore, former President
Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name
is stricken off the title of this case.
2. NO. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself
be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any
participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually the acts of then President
Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the
President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary
statute, but in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving the exploitation,
development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount interest to the
present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the
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guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that
may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the President has
authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA
and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA et al.
G.R. NO. 168056,SEPTEMBER 1, 2005, J. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
When the act of the Secretary of Finance is in pursuance of a mandate as an agent of
the congress and not as the presidents alter ego the President cannot alter or modify or
nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.
Facts:
R.A. No. 9337 or the VAT law provides that the President, upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax
to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1 %).
Petitioner Escudero, et al. claims that any recommendation by the Secretary of
Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of
the latter.
Issue:
Whether the President notwithstanding the mandate of R.A. 9337 can easily brushed
aside the recommendation by the Secretary of Finance on the assumption that the latter is a
mere alter ego of the President.
Ruling:
NO. When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it
simply means that as head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the
Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as
such, occupies a political position and holds office in an advisory capacity, and, in the
language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" and, in the
language of Attorney-General Cushing, is subject to the direction of the President."
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence
of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control
and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
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determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined
and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is
to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the
two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality
but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the
President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the
Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, J. MENDOZA
Pursuant to Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution which mandates the President
to faithfully execute all laws, the President may create ad hoc committees such as truth
commissions to investigate against class of previous administrations graft and corruptions.
Facts:
This is a consolidated petition assailing Executive Order No.1 dated July 30, 2010,
entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, a separate body dedicated solely
to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration. Petitioners Louis Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI
of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor. In addition, Biraogo claims that it is
unconstitutional for it is not under the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the
Office of the President. Finally, E.O. No. 1 accordingly, violates the equal protection clause
as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration
In defense, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that,E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate
the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed. Also, E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress. And that the Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
Issues:
1. Whether the Creation of the Truth Commission of 2010s basis is the Presidents power of
control.
2. Whether the Creation of the Truth Commission of 2010s basis is the Presidents duty to
faithfully execute the laws under Section 17,Article VII.
3. Whether the Truth Commission of 2010 is constitutional.
Ruling:
1. NO. The creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that
of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public
offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a
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valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. Further,
there is no valid delegation from the congress that would warrant the creation of the
commission because P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 where the respondent anchors
its legality was already held functus oficio. Thus, it begs the question of where does the
Truth Commission of 2010 finds legal basis? This is answered by the second issue herein.
2. YES. While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D.
No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive.
That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that
he is bereft of such authority.Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that
our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
3. NO. It violates the equal protection clause. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations.
It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, ET. AL V. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, ET. AL
G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should
be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws.
Facts:
After the Cultural Center of the Philippines and National Commission for Culture and
the Arts submitted the recommendation of final list of National Artists to the President,
aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on
Honors. Meanwhile, the OP allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural
groups and individuals strongly endorsing Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, et.al. The Committee on
Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited resource persons to validate
the qualifications and credentials of the nominees. Acting on this recommendation,
Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued. Subsequently,
Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar
Alcuaz and Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. A
petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction was filed by Virgilio Almario, et. al who claim
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that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the
results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and
in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to them, the
Presidents discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In particular, her
discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or against the
recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
Issue:
Whether there was grave abuse of discretion committed by former President Arroyo.
Ruling:
YES. The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to
whom it is made."In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and
as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the
President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to
him/her by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have
considered conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not considered and
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper import of the provision of
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on
the conferment of the Order of National Artists." Applying this to the instant case, the former
President could not have properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa
and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous screening process be
rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under
relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and
regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and
undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will also become meaningless.
CESAR R. DE LEON V. J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO

G.R. No. 85243 October 12, 1989, CRUZ, J.
It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the

Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive
departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines.
Facts:
Francisco Estavillo and Cesar de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister
of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined
to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with
the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the
Civil Service Commission. The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their
dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security
of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement.
However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary
of Justice to CSC without action, claiming that they were null and void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
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Issue:
Whether the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him
by the Secretary of Justice.
Ruling:
NO. The Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members
of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under
their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The constitutional vesture of this
power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor
may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.
In the case of Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, the Court ruled that theoretically,
the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as he
sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under
the disposition of the President as their immediate superior. Without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
In the case at bar, there is no question that when the Sec. of Jusice directed Carpio to
reinstate Estavillo and de Leon, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his
functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been respected by
Carpio, the Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of Justice under the direct control
of its Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, Carpio was (and is) bound to obey the
Secretarys directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines.
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO AND NORBERTO JIMENEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. ENRIQUE A.

FERNANDEZ, ET. AL
G.R. No.L-1278, January 21, 1949,FERIA, J.
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be
declared by the court or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty.
Facts:
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of
murder. Jimenez was the only one arrested and after trial was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal, Jimenez decided to submit his
case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission in accordance with Proclamation No. 8, issued by
the then President Manuel Roxas, which grants amnesty. After a preliminary hearing had
started, the Amnesty Commission returned the cases to the CFI without deciding whether or
not they are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that
inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense,
because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolention who shot and killed the victim,
they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of the amnesty issued by the President.
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Ruling:
YES. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed
the criminal act of offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it
is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the
offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not
correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against
him, he may be declared by the court or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits
of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense
with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the
interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and
the accused on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy , or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether
he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have
rendered invaluable services to the nation," or not, in accordance with the terms of the
Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as
the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said
Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or
jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if
the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
SALVACION A. MONSANTO V. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.

G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989, FERNAN, C.J.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly
restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
Facts:
Salvacion A. Monsanto, then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, and three other
accused were convicted before the Sandiganbayan of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents. Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Court which
subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said
motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon. By
reason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. The
Finance Ministry ruled that Monsanto may be reinstated to her position without the necessity
of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.
Issue:
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Whether a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
Ruling:
NO. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and
legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and
purpose of the privilege. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion
that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from
refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment
were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth,
Monsanto may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to
determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated
differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment.
VICENTE GARCIA V. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, ET. AL

G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993, BELLOSILLO, J.
The bestowal of executive clemency on Garcia in effect completely obliterated the

adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and
ordered his separation from the service.
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Facts:
Vicente Garcia was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. He was summarily dismissed from the service on the
ground of dishonesty. A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against him however the
trial court acquitted him. Consequently, Garcia sought reinstatement to his former position
in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. However the same was denied. Hence, he
pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency, which was granted.
Garcia thereafter filed with COA a claim for payment of back salaries but the same was
denied on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the
payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service. He was recalled
to the service but the records do not show whether petitioner's reinstatement was to the
same position of Supervising Lineman. Garcia again filed a claim to recover his back salaries
when he was reinstated. The same was denied again.
Issue:
Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been
reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
Ruling:
YES. Garcia's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to

back wages. This is meant to afford relief to Garcia who is innocent from the start and to
make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service.
Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed
and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against
them.
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any
criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is the
direct consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department
over which the President, as its head, has the power of control. The President's control has
been defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to the judgment of the
former for the latter." In pardoning Garcia and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief
Executive exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner and
relieved him from administrative liability. The separation of the petitioner from the service
being null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages. After having been declared innocent
of the crime of qualified theft, which also served as basis for the administrative charge,
petitioner should not be considered to have left his office for all legal purposes, so that he is
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entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the office held,
including back wages.
LEO ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999, PUNO, J.
For the Secretary of Justice to contend that only the Executive can protect the right
to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
Facts:
On January 4, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The Secretary of Justice assailed the
issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the Supreme Court not only violated the rule
on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue:
Whether the court abused its discretion in granting a TRO on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered by which
the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
Ruling:
NO. Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures
after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying
the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth,
an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and
these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The suspension of a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects is the same the temporary suspension of the execution of the
death convict.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
Facts:
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The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and accessory penalties.
However, former President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to
Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights. After failing to
win during the presidential election, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of the
City of Manila. Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada
before the COMELEC stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Risos-Vidal relied on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC dismissed the petition for
disqualification holding that President Estradas right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race.
Issue:
Whether Estrada may run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime
of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public
office.
Ruling:
YES. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action as
provided under Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C. Moreover, even if we
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Section 12 of
the OEC allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and
hold any public office, whether local or national position. Contrary to Risos-Vidals
declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. The whereas clause at issue
is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone
operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the
fulfillment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, ET. AL V. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN

GR. NO.187298, JUY 3, 2012, SERENO. J.
It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
Facts:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC)
were
kidnapped in Sulu. A task force was created by the ICRC and the PNP. The local group
convened under the leadership of Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan. He organized the Civilian
Emergency Force, a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities, who
were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. Later on, Governor Tan issued Proclamation
1-09 declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. In the same Proclamation,
respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints,
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conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to
ensure public safety. Jamar M. Kulayan, et. al filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether Governor Tan can exercise the calling out powers of a President.
Ruling:
NO. A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational
supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations.
Moreover, in the discussions of the Constitutional Commission, the framers never intended
for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency
situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as
provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day
situations. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM,
properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the
armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed
Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ET. AL V. HON. RONALDO PUNO

G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011, ABAD, J.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such
places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. It is clearly to the
President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.
Facts:
After the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters,
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She
directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the
named places. Consequently, President Arroyo also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of
the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. But, due to issues raised over the
terminology used in AO 273, the President issued AO 273-A amending the former, by
delegating instead of transferring supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.C laiming that the
Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et. al
filed a petition for prohibition under Rule 65. ARMM officials claimed that the President had
no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The
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deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the
Presidents emergency powers. Ampatuan, et. al asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as
AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the
AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.
Issue:
1. Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
2. Whether the President had factual bases for her actions.
Ruling:
1. NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly
vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
2. YES. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is
clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for
calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown
that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord
respect to the Presidents judgment.
Here, Ampatuan, et. al failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in
the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents
exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all
areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over
of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued
Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed
and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was
movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to
the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had
to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of
loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and
security in the affected places.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES V. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, ET. AL
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, ABAD, J.
The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Facts:
After the killing of 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao, President
Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in
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Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless
violence in Central Mindanao. Consequently, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
However, after her submission of report as required under the Constitution and before
Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law
and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. Philip Sigfrid A.
Fortun, et. Al challenged the constitutionality of President Arroyos Proclamation 1959
affecting Maguindanao.
Issue:
Whether the Court can rule on the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.
Ruling:
NO. President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in
these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial
law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a
supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been
meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of local
government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting
Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest
had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or
promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the
Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended
by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In
her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a
determined and amply armed government presence.
FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN v. LT./GEN.

GENEROSO S. SENGA
G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, TINGA, J.
The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the
President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as
commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the
other functions being clearly civil in nature.
Facts:
Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing
regarding allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio allegedly
of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the
COMELEC. That same day, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.
Issue:
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Whether the president may prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying
before a legislative inquiry.
Ruling:
YES. The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the
Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the
military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. The
Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a
civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief
represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions
being clearly civil in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the
notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such
as conducting warrantless searches and seizures.
The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction
is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is
not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
The Courts ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers
to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the
notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as
commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters
such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the
President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives
and functions appertaining to the position.
PROVINCEOFNORTHCOTABATOv.GOVERNMENTOFTHEREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, CARPIO MORALES, J.
The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
Facts:
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners sought to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the
MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending
the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD. Petitioners alleged that respondents
exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the President, in the course of peace negotiations may agree to pursue
reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments.
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Ruling:
YES. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel
groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority. The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has
the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the
more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to
them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino
people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and
the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end
and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in
the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for
their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations
with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their
grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she
considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations
to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal
procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have
the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the
recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or
submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
RAMON A. GONZALES v. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA

G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963, CONCEPCION, J.
The main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress.
Facts:
Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign
rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee
composed of the other respondents herein for the implementation of said proposed
importation. Herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, filed a petition averring that respondents
"are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452
which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn.
Issue:
Whether the Executive Secretary has the authority to authorize the importation of
67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources.
Ruling:
NO. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through
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an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws.
AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY v. THOMAS G. AQUINO

G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, CARPIO MORALES, J.
While the Court should guard against the abuse of executive privilege, it should also
give full recognition to the validity of the privilege whenever it is claimed within the proper
bounds of executive power,
Facts:
Petitioners sought to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto.
Petitioners asserted that the refusal of the government to disclose the documents
bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public
concernand contravenes other constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on the
policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Respondents only
claimed that from the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident
that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its
execution are matters of public concern and that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and
the policy of full public disclosure.
Issue:
Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still
covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
Ruling:
YES. It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor
the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public
concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature.The privileged character of
diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid
limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that information on
inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest. Even earlier, the
same privilege was upheld in Peoples Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus
wherein the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the
Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom
of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. Verily, while the Court
should guard against the abuse of executive privilege, it should also give full recognition to
the validity of the privilege whenever it is claimed within the proper bounds of executive
power, as in this case. Otherwise, the Court would undermine its own credibility, for it would
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be perceived as no longer aiming to strike a balance, but seeking merely to water down
executive privilege to the point of irrelevance.
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVESECRETARY,

represented by HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGNAFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS OPLE
G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005 PUNO J.
The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the
Senate.
Facts:
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents to transmit the signed
text of a treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification. It is the theory of the
petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a
function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the
signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with
respect to ratification of treaties.
Issue:
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have
a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a
member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the
President.
Ruling:
NO. It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is
vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to
the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the
refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the
petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government
to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative
with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested
with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.
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BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO
ZAMORA
G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, BUENA, J.
The power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests
the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all
the members of the Senate.
Facts:
The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the conditions under which US
Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. President Joseph E.
Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA and transmitted
the document to the Senate of the Philippinesfor concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.Petitioners imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
chief Executive in ratifying the VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the Chief Executive committed grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the
VFA, and referring the same to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
NO. As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least twothirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the
subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no
less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment
calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a
treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall
within the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down,
much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power
or discretion.
It is the Courts considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in
submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of
the powers vested in him bythe Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the
exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within
the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for
concurrence under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much
less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in
his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of
complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so,
the President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly
pertains to the functions of his office.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, et al., v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.

ROMULO
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G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010,DEL CASTILLO, J.
The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign relations.
Facts:
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claimed that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in
the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners,
and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already
been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Issue:
Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
Ruling:
NO. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. The question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department
has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the
courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the US Supreme Court held that the
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign relations.The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would
be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the court to overturn the
Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments
by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has
lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample
discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis
if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS v. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS

G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, CORTES, J.
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The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.
Facts:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines. But Mrs. Aquino has stood firmly
on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The petitioners contended that the President is without power to impair the liberty of
abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law."
Petitioners likewise advanced the view that the President's powers are limited to those
specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they asserted: "The President has
enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her.
Issue:
Whether the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
Ruling:
YES. The Constitution provides that "the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive
power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inherent in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President
other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over
the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total
economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state
of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
JUDICIARY
FERNANDO LOPEZ v. GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. L-25716, July 28, 1966, CONCEPCION, C.J.
Facts:
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Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were the main contenders
for the Office of Vice-President of the Philippines in the general elections. Petitioner Fernando
Lopez was proclaimed Vice President of the Philippines. Respondent filed, with the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Election Protest No. 2, contesting the election of petitioner
herein as Vice-President of the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not he, but said
respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office.
Petitioner Lopez instituted in the SC the present action, for prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground
that Republic Act No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is unconstitutional, and that, all
proceedings taken by it are a nullity.
Issue:
Whether the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has judicial power to hear and decide the
election contest.
Ruling:
YES. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether
or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or
reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to recount
the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine
whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress
has power to do.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. This provision vests in the
judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but
the judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said
power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as
the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives which is vested by the
fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,
respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights.The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative
action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for
violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said
controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the
Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental
law.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG

RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, v. BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M.
GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary
G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, CONCEPCION, C.J.
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When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden
private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry.
Facts:
While the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections, two (2) hand
grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates and other
persons were. As a consequence, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, wherein the President suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus,
Petitioner assailed the validity of the proclamation. The respondents, on the other
hand, averred that the determination thus made by the President in suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the court and upon all other
persons.
Issue:
Whether the proclamation is subject to judicial inquiry.
Ruling:
YES. In Sterling v. Constantin, in which the Supreme Court of the United States,
declared that when there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for
judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals charged with
the transgression. To such a case the Federal judicial power extends and, so extending, the
court has all the authority appropriate to its
exercise.
In the Courts resolution, it stated that "a majority of the Court" had
"tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and
889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the
requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine
Constitution...." Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in
the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in
order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
HON. ISIDRO CARIO et al. v. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS et al.

G.R. No. 9668, December 2, 1991, NARVASA, J.
Fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
Facts:
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As a result of their participation in a mass concerted action and their refusal to
comply with the Return to Work order, administrative case were filed against the private
respondents with the Department of Education, Culture & Sports (DECS). Furthermore, they
were preventively suspended and temporarily replaced. Subsequently, Secretary Cario
ordered the dismissal and suspension of some of the teachers involved. In the meantime,
the respondent teachers filed with the Commission on Human Rights a complaint alleging
that their replacement was arbitrary and done without due process thereby violating their
civil and political rights. Later, Sec. Cario, through the OSG, moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case. CHR
denied the motion to dismiss and it further held that the teachers were denied due process.
Hence this present action of certiorari and prohibition praying to invalidate and set aside the
order of the CHR.
Issue:
Whether the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine the complaint filed by the teachers.
Ruling:
NO. The Commission on Human Rights to have no such power and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country,
or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded
to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does
not have.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But it
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cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Hence it is that the
Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should
not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. ANG CHO KIO and
THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No.L-30001, June 23, 1970, ZALDIVAR, J.
Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of the
judiciary to express an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or
propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters purely political in nature.
Facts:
Ang Cho Kio (Kio) was convicted and later granted pardon by the President with a
condition that Ang Cho Kio will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release and never
to return. Kio agreed to the said conditions. Later, Kio, under the name "Ang Ming Huy",
arrived at the Manila International Airport for a 72-hour stop-over for his trip to Honolulu.
When his friends knew of his presence in the country, they convince him to stay longer. They
sent a letter to the Commissioner of Immigration requesting for an extension for his stay.
However, Kio was identified by the inspector of the Bureau of immigration who later arrested
him for violating the condition of his pardon. Subsequently, the Executive Secretary, by
authority of the President, ordered that Kio be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired
portion of his sentence. Kio filed a motion for reconsideration with the Executive Secretary
but the same remained unacted which prompted him to file a petition for writ of habeas
corpus with the CFI of Rizal against the Director of Prisons and Executive Secretary. The CFI
dismissed the petition and held that Kio was validly recommitted. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the CFI however it recommended that Kio be allowed to leave the
country immediately. The Solicitor General moved for the reconsideration of the CAs
decision but the same was denied.
Issue:
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Whether Kio can be allowed to leave the country.
Ruling:
NO. The recommendation in the majority opinion of the special division of the Court
of Appeals is not authorized under the provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence that was imposed on Ang Cho
Kio. It was simply called upon to determine whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or
not, in the insular penitentiary under the Director of Prisons. It is not proper that the majority
of the justices in the special division make a recommendation that would suggest a
modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive. When the Chief Executive,
exercising his powers pursuant to Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, ordered
Ang Cho Kio recommitted to prison, it is assumed that the Chief Executive had decided that
Ang Cho Kio should be dealt with that way under the circumstances. For the court to suggest
to the Chief Executive to modify his decision to recommit Ang Cho Kio to prison by allowing
him to leave the country instead is indeed to interfere with the functions of the Chief
Executive. It would be to interfere on, or an attempt to influence, the exercise by the Chief
Executive of the political powers of his office. The matter of whether an alien who violated
the laws in this country may remain or be deported is a political question that should be left
entirely to the Chief Executive to decide.
LEO ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.

G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999, PUNO, J.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the
entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Facts:
After the decision of the Court convicting Echegaray has attained finality, the
Secretary of Justice sought the reconsideration of the resolution of the Supreme Court
temporarily restraining the execution of Echegaray. The Secretary alleged that since the
decision affirming the guilt of Echegaray, the execution of the decision enters the exclusive
ambit of the executive branch and the issuance by the Court of the TRO encroached on the
power of the executive branch. For his part, Echegaray contends that the decision to stay
the order is still within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive
powers.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court lost its jurisdiction over case upon its finality.
2. Whether or not the execution of the decision falls exclusively on the executive branch.
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Ruling:
1. NO. The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute
and enforce the same judgment. The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court
has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final
the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the
jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter
the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. For after
the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the
execution unjust or impossible. The power to control the execution of its decision is an
essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of litigation, whether
civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights
of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control
of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.
2. NO. An accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights
and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The suspension of such a death
sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the
presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same the temporary suspension
of the execution of the death convict. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason
that there is no higher right than the right to life.
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties
Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, PER CURIAM
The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
Facts:
In an opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the
Commission on Audit (COA), it shows that the scheme in the judiciary allowing the sale of
their personal properties to retired justices after their incumbency resulted to an
underpayment amounting to P221,021.50. This underpayment was attributed to the
erroneous appraisal of the value of the property involved using the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines. Acting on this Opinion,
Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of
Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice, submitted Memorandum to the SC
praying that the Court advise the COA to respect the scheme existing in the Judiciary
pursuant to the recognize fiscal autonomy of the Judicial Branch.
Issue:
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Whether the post-audit examination conducted by COA violated the Judiciarys fiscal
autonomy.
Ruling:
YES. The COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional
bodies granted fiscal autonomy as provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution must be read not only in light of the Courts fiscal autonomy, but also in relation
with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence
and Court rulings on these matters. The Constitution mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and judicial personnel. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of
the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as
its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and
supervision of the courts and its personnel. Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys
fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine
and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend
to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Courts
granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
The use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the
Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted
retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these
retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal
autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional
duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the
Judiciarys own affairs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al. v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS et al.

G.R. No. 131719, May 25, 2004, CALLEJO, SR., J.
In litigations between governmental and private parties, courts go much further both
to give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they are accustomed to go
when only private interests are involved.
Facts:
With the enactment of RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995 and the promulgation of its rules and regulations, the Asian Recruitment Council
Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed a petition for declaratory relief praying that
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provisions of the law be declared unconstitutional and for the court to restrain its
enforcement. ARCO alleged that the enforcement of RA 8042 will cause grave and
irreparable injury to recruitment agencies. Later, 11 other corporation joined the petition for
the invalidation of the law. In their answer, the respondent averred that the presumption of
constitutionality should apply and such presumption is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. Necessarily, the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order and/or a
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for must fall for an act of legislature approved by the
executive is presumed to be within constitutional bounds
Later the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of RA
No. 8042. Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC. Undeterred the petitioners filed
this present petition alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether the RTC in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction committed grave abuse
of discretion.
Ruling:
YES. A law is presumed constitutional until otherwise declared by judicial

interpretation. The suspension of the operation of the law is a matter of extreme delicacy
because it is an interference with the official acts not only of the duly elected
representatives of the people but also of the highest magistrate of the land. Considering that
injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing whether to issue a
preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the situation,
including the public interest. In litigations between governmental and private parties, courts
go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they
are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved. The higher standard reflects
judicial deference toward "legislation or regulations developed through presumptively
reasoned democratic processes."
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LORENZO M. TAADA et al. vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA et al.
G.R. No.L-63915, April 24, 1985, ESCOLIN, J.
The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in

the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an allinclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Facts:
Senator Taada, invoking the right to be informed, sought to compel respondents via
a writ of mandamus to publish in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. For their part, Tuvera et al contends that publication is not a sine
qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws. The Court however ruled that law
presidential issuances, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Issue:
Whether the presidential issuances and orders which have been judicially declared
void have absolute retroactive invalidity.
Ruling:
NO. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential
decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been
enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
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In Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank, the court ruled that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and
of its previous application, demand examination. An all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER

OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 115455, G.R. No. 115525, G.R. No. 115543, G.R. No. 115544, G.R. No.
115754, G.R. No. 115781, G.R. No. 115852, G.R. No. 115873, G.R. No. 115931,
August 25, 1994, MENDOZA, J.
The Court does not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory judgment.
Facts:
This consolidated petition is filed to question the constitutionality of the R.A. No.
7716, or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Petitioners alleged that it violated the some
provisions of the Constitution and should therefore be declared invalid. The petitioners
alleged that since there has been grave abuse in the passage of the law, the court has the
duty to pass upon all issues presented before it relative to the constitutionality of the law.
Issue:
Whether the Court may pass upon hypothetical issues on the pretext that it has the
duty to review acts tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
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Ruling:
NO. The substantive issues raised are presented in abstract, hypothetical form
because of the lack of a concrete record. The issues presented before the Court do not have
a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of
actuality to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say, the
Court does not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory judgment.
Furthermore, when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it

does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.
It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this "duty" to justify this Court's
intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty
must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, 5(2)
clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of "cases," and nothing but "cases." That the other
departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an
independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by
the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our
authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment
according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day.
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO v. SPEAKER

PROSPERO C. NOGRALES
G.R. No. 187883 and G.R. No. 187910, June 16, 2009, PUNO, C.J.
This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide it, shall
not shirk its bounden duty to wield its judicial power to settle "actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Be that as it may, no amount
of exigency can make this Court exercise a power where it is not proper.
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Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned
citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A
Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering
Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members
of Congress." In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would
warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for
the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the court rule on the constitutionality of the said House Resolution.
Ruling:
NO. Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While some
may interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal
of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by this
Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.
It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The
determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive
province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation
of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment
of its "solemn and sacred obligation" under the Constitution. This Courts power of review
may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties
having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. The "case-or-controversy" requirement bans this court from deciding
"abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions," lest the court give opinions in the nature of
advice concerning legislative or executive action.
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An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." The
issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be
to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of
government before the courts may step in.
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review
is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse
injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No.
1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the
purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has
yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no
proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion
has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example
of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an
intervention from this Court.
Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or
standing to sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can
demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In
the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow
them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a
controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of
issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack
of petitioners personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozanos three-page
petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are
instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayers suit requires
that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public
funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in
cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when
paramount public interest is involved. While the Court recognizes the potential far-reaching
implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is
yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the "transcendental
importance" doctrine.
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The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional
requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts
of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable."
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire
to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our
resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely
limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for
them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective
dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of
locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of "personal injury" to the broader
"transcendental importance" doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open
invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their
cerebral deficit.
JELBERT B. GALICTO v. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III et al.

G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, BRION, J.
The respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated
unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked
only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Facts:
Aiming to curb the grant of unwarranted and excessive allowances, bonuses and
other benefits given to GOCCs and government financial institutions, President Aquino
issued EO 7, entitled "Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position
Classification System in the GOCCs and GFIs, and for Other Purposes." The Executive Order
precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and
releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and from increasing
salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their employees.
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Later, Jelbert Galicto, a Court Attorney of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation,
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of
Executive Order No. 7 for being unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers
of the President and for being in breach of existing laws.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the Executive Order be made subject to a petition for
certiorari.
Ruling:
NO. Certiorari is not the proper remedy.Under the Rules of Court, petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory
acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition
for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper
recourse to assail the validity of EO 7.
The respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated
unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. A
respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial
function is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature."
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MOLDEX REALTY, INC. v. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, OFFICE OF
APPEALS, ADJUDICATION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS et al
G.R. No. 149719, June 21, 2007, TINGA, J.
It must be emphasized that this Court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions assailing the constitutionality of a law or an administrative regulation.
Facts:
Moldex Realty, Inc. is the owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I Subdivision

while private respondent is the association of homeowners in the said subdivision. The
controversy arose when Moldex stopped paying the electric bills for the operation of
streetlights in the subdivision and advised the association that it should assume such
obligation. The association objected ad refused to pay. Consequently, Meralco discontinued
its services which prompted the Association to apply for a preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction with the HLURB against petitioner. The HLURB granted the
application and issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Moldex filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, Moldex filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA against
the decision of HLURB and it seeks the nullification of the HUDCC Resolution No. R-562. The
CA dismissed the petition holding that the question of constitutionality of the Resolution
should be lodged before the SC and not to the CA. As such, Moldex filed this present petition.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition arguing that it is the Regional Trial Court, and not
the SC nor the CA, which has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Issue:
Whether the doctrine of hierarchy of courts was violated.
Ruling:
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YES. It must be emphasized that this Court does not have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions assailing the constitutionality of a law or an administrative
regulation. The lower courts also have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality at the first
instance.The general rule is that this Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over
cases involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in
circumstances where the Court believes that resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law
or regulation at the first instance is of paramount importance and immediately affects the
social, economic and moral well being of the people. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that a question on the constitutionality of a regulation may be brought only to this
Court.
The instant petition does not allege circumstances and issues of transcendental
importance to the public requiring their prompt and definite resolution and the brushing
aside of technicalities of procedure. Neither is the Court convinced that the issues presented
in this petition are of such nature that would nudge the lower courts to defer to the higher
judgment of this Court. The application of the assailed HUDCC resolution mainly affects the
proprietary interests of the parties involved and can hardly be characterized as overriding to
the general well-being of the people. Ultimately, the Court is called upon to resolve the
question of who bears the obligation of paying electricity cost, a question that the lower
courts undoubtedly have the competence to resolve.
TERESITA G. FABIAN v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman;

HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and
NESTOR V. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, REGALADO, J.
Sec. 27, RA No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the Court from decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases as it violates the
proscription of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court.
Facts:
Teresita Fabian and Nestor Agustin, then incumbent District Engineer, had a
relationship. When Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and
employed acts of harassment. Fabian filed an administrative case against Agustin.
Ombudsman Desierto found Agustin guilty of grave misconduct. Agustin moved for
reconsideration, and he was exonerated from administrative charges. Fabian then appealed
to the Supreme Court by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in accordance with
Sec. 27, RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). She argued that said provision is not
violative of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution. She claimed that what is proscribed is the
passage of law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this
Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved." Since Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution authorizes the Court to
review on appeal or certiorari these final judgment or orders as the law or the Rules of Court
139 | P a g e
may provide, said Section 27 does not increase the Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by
providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what
may be raised therein are only questions of law of which the Court already has jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether Sec. 27, RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is valid.
Ruling:
NO. The Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 even if questions of
fact are involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. Also, Rule 45 specifies that
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final
judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial
system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the
legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be
reviewable by the Supreme Court or the CA, a specific provision to that effect is included in
the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court.
No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated
judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5,
Article VIII. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, the Court
held that Sec. 27, RA No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription of the Constitution against a law which increases the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. v. JOY C. CABILES

A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
Facts:
Joy Cabiles, an overseas worker, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency. The Labor Arbiter dismissed her complaint but the NLRC
declared that she was illegally dismissed. Such decision was affirmed by the CA. Cabiles,
having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract that was violated together with attorneys fees and reimbursement of
amounts withheld from her salary, pursuant to Sec. 10, RA No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995). Said provision provides that overseas workers who were
terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less." However, in Serrano v. GallantMaritime
Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., the Court ruled that the clause "or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. Despite being declared
unconstitutional, the clause was reinstated in RA No. 10022 in 2010, amending RA No. 8042.
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Thus, it creates confusion on the part of the NLRC and the CA with regard to the execution of
the judgment.
Issue:
Whether the clause declared as unconstitutional be cured by reenactment or
reincorporation.
Ruling:
NO. When a law is passed, the Court awaits an actual case that clearly raises
adversarial positions in their proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as
unconstitutional. However, this case shows a unique situation. The law passed incorporates
the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial
change in the circumstances.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the

government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot
be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that
is inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is
inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was
already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as
to warrant a reverse conclusion. In this case, the parties failed to prove that the situation
has so changed so as to cause the reversal of the binding precedent.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. v. JOY C. CABILES

A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
Facts:
Joy Cabiles, an overseas worker, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency. The Labor Arbiter dismissed her complaint but the NLRC
declared that she was illegally dismissed. Such decision was affirmed by the CA. Cabiles,
having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract that was violated together with attorneys fees and reimbursement of
amounts withheld from her salary, pursuant to Sec. 10, RA No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995). Said provision provides that overseas workers who were
terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
141 | P a g e
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less." However, in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., the Court ruled that the clause "or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
Despite being declared unconstitutional, the clause was reinstated in RA No. 10022 in 2010,
amending RA No. 8042. Thus, it creates confusion on the part of the NLRC and the CA with
regard to the execution of the judgment.
Issue:
Whether the clause declared as unconstitutional be cured by reenactment or
reincorporation.
Ruling:
NO. When a law is passed, the Court awaits an actual case that clearly raises
adversarial positions in their proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as
unconstitutional. However, this case shows a unique situation. The law passed incorporates
the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial
change in the circumstances.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the

government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot
be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that
is inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is
inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was
already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as
to warrant a reverse conclusion. In this case, the parties failed to prove that the situation
has so changed so as to cause the reversal of the binding precedent.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. v. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, REYES, R.T., J.
The Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of statutes, executive orders, presidential decrees and other issuances. The
Constitution vests that power not only in the Supreme Court but in all Regional Trial Courts.
Facts:
Then President Ferdinand Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 which provided for the
imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of
fertilizers in the Philippines. Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid for every bag of fertilizer it
sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). After the 1986
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EDSA Revolution, FPA stopped the imposition of the levy. Fertiphil then demanded from
Planters Product, Inc. (PPI) a refund of the amounts it paid under the LOI, but the latter
refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection against FPA and PPI and also questioned the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. The RTC ruled in favor of Fertiphil, and was affirmed by the
CA, as the lis mota of the complaint was the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. PPI insisted
that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling the constitutionality of the LOI, as it cannot be
collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection and that it is the very lis mota of the case.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.
Ruling:
YES. It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute, presidential decree or an executive order, under Sec. 5 (2)(a), Art. VIII of the 1987
Constitution. Judicial review of official acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be
sought or availed of through any of the actions cognizable by courts of justice, not
necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. Such review may be had in criminal actions or in
ordinary actions. The constitutional issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and
presented in the case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e.,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
In this case, the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 was properly and adequately raised
in the complaint for collection filed with the RTC. The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also
the very lis mota of the complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI to
refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law imposing the levy is
unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect.
Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies duly paid
pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded under the principle of unjust
enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared unconstitutional.
The RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI
unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The issue
of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the complaint with the RTC.
PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and

PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS EMPLOYEES UNION
G.R. No. 110068, February 15, 1995, FELICIANO, J.
Where the two cases present quite different factual situations and the doctrines
enunciated in fact co-exist one with the other, the later decided case cannot serve as
precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Facts:
In November 1993, the Supreme Court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by
Philippine Duplicators, upholding the NLRCs decision directing the Duplicators to pay 13 th
month pay to Philippine Duplicators Employees Union computed on the basis of their fixed
wages plus sales commissions. Duplicators motion for reconsideration was also denied. In
1994, a second motion for reconsideration was filed invoking the Courts decision in the two
consolidated cases of Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. Hon. Dionisio de la Serna and
Philippine Fuji Xerox Corp. vs. Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano, in December 1993. In the said
cases, the Court declared null and void the second paragraph of Sec. 5 (a)of the Revised
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Guidelines issued by then Secretary of Labor Drilon. Duplicators submits that the decision in
the 1993 Duplicators case should now be considered as having been abandoned or reversed
by the 1993Boie-Takeda decision, considering that the latter went "directly opposite and
contrary to" the conclusion reached in the former. Duplicators prays that the decision
rendered in 1993 Duplicators casebe set aside and another be entered directing the
dismissal of the money claims of Philippine Duplicators Employees' Union.
Issue:
Whether the 1993 Duplicators case has been abandoned or reversed by the 1993
Boie-Takeda case.
Ruling:
NO. The decision rendered in Boie-Takeda cannot serve as a precedent under the
doctrine of stare decisis. The Boie-Takeda decision was promulgated a month after the Court
had rendered the decision in the instant case. Also, the Duplicators first Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision dated 10 November 1993 had already been denied, with
finality, on 15 December 1993, i.e.; before the Boie-Takeda decision became final on 5
January 1994.
The Court noted that Duplicators did not put in issue the validity of the Revised
Guidelines on the Implementary on of the 13th Month Pay Law either in its Petition for
Certiorari or in its first Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, Duplicators counsel relied upon
these Guidelines and asserted their validity in opposing the decision rendered by NLRC. More
importantly, the decision in Boie-Takeda is not directly opposite or contrary to the decision in
the present case. To the contrary, the doctrines enunciated in these two cases in fact coexist one with the other. The two cases present quite different factual situations (although
the same word "commissions" was used or invoked) the legal characterizations of which
must accordingly differ.
GROUP COMMANDER, INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY GROUP, PHILIPPINE ARMY,

represented by COLONEL PEDRO R. CABUAY, JR. v. DR. POTENCIANO MALVAR and
MARCELINO LOPEZ
G.R. No. 123780, September 24, 2002, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court en banc or its
divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. A decision
rendered by a division of the Court in violation of the above constitutional provision would
be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.
Facts:
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G.R. No. 90380 was rendered by the Supreme Court First Division recognizing the
right of ownership of Hermogenes Lopez (predecessor-in-interest of the Lopez heirs) over the
property by reason of his continuous possession since for 30 years and his full compliance
with the requirements by the Public Land Act for the issuance of a homestead patent. On the
other hand, G.R. No. 110900 of the Third Division affirmed, in a Resolution, the CA Decision
sustaining the Land Management Bureau (LMB) decision dismissing Hermogenes claim over
the property and ordering the reconstitution of the homestead application of the Adia heirs
predecessor-in-interest, Elino Adia, or the filing of a new application by the Adia heirs. The
CA ruled that the Courts decision in G.R. No. 90380 did not bind the government.
Meanwhile, pursuant to the decision in G.R. No. 90380, the Lopez heirs filed a motion for the
issuance of writ of execution, which was granted by the RTC. Thus, in a writ of execution, the
RTC ordered the demolition of the communication facilities and other structures belonging to
the Intelligence and Security Group (ISG) of the Philippine Army which also purchased a
portion of the property from the Adia heirs. This prompted Col. Pedro Cabuay, Jr. to file a
Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two Final and
Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether G.R. No. 110900 of the Third Division is valid.
Ruling:
NO. The Court held that its decision in G.R. No. 90380 is the law of the case binding
upon the LMB and the Court of Appeals and is beyond their authority to reverse. Sec. 4 (3),
Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the Supreme Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court
sitting en banc. A decision rendered by a Division of the Court in violation of the above
constitutional provision would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.
In this case, G.R. No. 90380 was rendered by the First Division, while G.R. No. 90380
was rendered by the Third Division. This obviously runs afoul with the constitutional
prohibition.
RE: REQUEST OF JURISCONSULT SAMANODIN L. AMPASO FOR UPGRADING OF HIS

POSITION TO SALARY GRADE 31, EQUIVALENT TO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 91-10-160, May 15, 1996, PER CURIAM
As an aspiring member of the Bench, it is incumbent upon him to check the
important personal data being supplied in his documents.
Facts:
Samadon L. Ampaso was appointed as Jurisconsult in Inslamic Law by then President
Corazon Aquino. Said position was created by virtue of PD No. 1083 (Code of Muslim
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Personal Laws of the Philippines). Ampaso requested the Court for the upgrading of his
position to Salary Grade 31, equivalent to an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
claiming that under PD No. 1083, he is the highest Muslim Judicial Officer of the Philippines.
However, a cursory check by the Office of the Court Administrator into the 201 file of
Ampaso revealed that he was born on January 2, 1952. This information regarding his date of
birth was personally supplied by him in his Personal Data Sheet for judges and in the
information sheet for membership in the GSIS. On the basis of such data, it is evident that
when he took his oath as Jurisconsult, he was only 39 years, 3 months and 8 days, and that
therefore, he failed to comply with the age requirement as provided under Art. 165 of PD
1083, which must be at least 40 years of age. Ampaso argued that his true birthdate is
January 2, 1948 and not January 2, 1952, as the said documents were not personally
prepared by him but by his brother who inadvertently mis-stated the year of his birth. He
submitted various documents to bolster his claim. He alleged that the mis-statement in his
year of birth was not done in bad faith nor was it intended to cause damage to any party, it
having been the result of an honest mistake.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Ampaso was valid.
Ruling:
NO. The Senior Deputy Court Administrator found the explanation of Ampaso
attributing to his brother the innocent mis-declaration of his year of birth, to be
unacceptable. The Court holds that Ampasos claim is nothing but a lame excuse and a mere
after-thought. It is very unlikely, improbable and unbecoming that a person aspiring for such
a high office would request another to fill up and file such personal data forms. But granting
that he did make such request, still, he himself had to sign the forms just the same prior to
filing, and in the normal course of things, he should have read the documents before affixing
his signature thereto. That he signed it without reading and/or understanding its contents is
not excusable, nor credible. As an aspiring member of the Bench, it was incumbent upon
Ampaso to check and double-check important personal data being supplied through such
forms.
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETTIONER IN BIRAOGO V.

NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No. 179120
A.M. No. 09-02-19-SC, February 24, 2009, PER CURIAM
The internal deliberations of the Supreme Court are confidential. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those
tasked to exercise judicial power.
Facts:
Louis Biraogo circulated to the media an undated letter signed by him, together with
the photocopy of the unpromulgated ponencia (Gilbert copy) of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the
consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles
and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles. Since the unauthorized release of a copy of the
146 | P a g e
unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court and
constituted contempt of court, the Investigating Committee was created under the Court
Resolution to investigate and determine who are responsible for the leakage of a confidential
internal document of the En Banc. The Investigating Committee then found that the leakage
was intentionally done as the top page of the Gilbert copy sent to the Office of the Chief
Justice and Justice Nachuras Office for signature and the top page of Biraogos copy differ.
The Committee found that the evident undue interest of Justice Reyes to circulate a draft
ponencia of the case soonest even before the memoranda of all the parties fell due, and to
withhold the information to his staff that the promulgation of the ponencia was put on hold
and, instead, allow the immediate promulgation after lunch despite his admission that the
decision to hold the promulgation was arrived at lunchtime, it was Justice Reyes himself who
leaked a photocopy thereof. Subsequently, Justice Reyes retired, but the Committee ruled
that the subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not
preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he is answerable. Thus, the
Committee found Justice Reyes administratively liable for gross misconduct
Issue:
Whether Justice Reyes is administratively liable for the leakage of confidential
internal document.
Ruling:
YES. The Court, in adopting the report of the Committee, reiterates the importance
of the task of preserving the confidentiality and integrity of court records. A number of rules
and internal procedures are in place to ensure the observance of this task by court
personnel. The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that confidential information acquired
by justices and judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other
purpose not related to their judicial duties. Thus, any release of a copy to the public, or to
the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes on the confidential internal
deliberations of the Court. It is settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are
confidential. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise judicial power.
RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT

SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010, CORONA, J.
The rule-making power is now the Supreme Courts exclusive domain and is no
longer shared by the Court with Congress and with the Executive.
Facts:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on governmentowned or controlled corporations under Sec. 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court.
It anchors its claim on Sec. 39, RA No. 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997). The GSIS argues that its
exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA No. 8291 is superior to
the Rules of Court. It would merely show deference by the Court to the legislature as a coequal branch. This deference will recognize the compelling and overriding State interest in
the preservation of the actuarial solvency of the GSIS for the benefit of its members.
Issue:
147 | P a g e
Whether Congress may exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees.
Ruling:
NO. Rule 141 of the Rules of Court was promulgated by the Court in the exercise of
its rule-making powers under Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution. The Rules of Court is
essentially procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically procedural. It does not create or take
away a right but simply operates as a means to implement an existing right. Thus, the
payment of legal fees under Rule 141 is an integral part of the rules promulgated by the
Court and it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts.
Indeed, payment of legal fees is a jurisdictional requirement. Thus, the rules on payment of
legal fees cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the
safeguards of the Courts institutional independence, the rule-making power is now the
Supreme Courts exclusive domain and is no longer shared by the Court with Congress and
with the Executive.
The Court also held that Congress could not exempt GSIS from the payment of legal
fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts
independence fiscal autonomy, which recognizes the power and authority of the Court to
levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees have two basic
components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund (SAJF), which guarantee the independence of the Judiciary. Thus, any
exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or
controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the
SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Courts
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and fiscal independence.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA

MANUFACTURING, INC.
G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994, NOCON, J.
Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Art. 82, EO No. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned as these are procedural aspects which the Supreme Court has the power to
regulate by virtue of its rule-making power.
Facts:
The Board of Investments (BOI) granted First Lepantos application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration. Mariwasa Manufacturung opposed such decision and filed a
petition for review with the CA pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91. The CA
temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. First Lepanto then filed a
motion to dismiss petition and to lift restraining order on the ground that the CA has no
appellate jurisdiction over the BPI case, as the same is being exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 82, EO No. 226 (Omnibus Investments Code of 1987). The
CA denied the motion, prompting First Lepanto to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Supreme Court, arguing that BP Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a
Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be
the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to the CA because the procedure for appeal laid down therein
148 | P a g e
runs contrary to Art. 82, E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of
the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether EO No. 226 has been repealed or superseded by Circular No. 1-91.
Ruling:
YES. The right of appeal provided in EO No. 226 is clearly not in consonance with the
current procedure before the Court, since only decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on petitions for certiorari under Rule 65
by the aggrieved party. Thus, the Court, pursuant to its rule-making power under Sec. 5(5),
Art. VIII of the 1987, and by way of implementing BP Blg. 129, issued Circular 1-91
prescribing the rules governing appeals to the CA from final orders or decisions of the CTA
and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of
procedure.
The argument that Art. 82, EO No. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91
because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be
modified, diminished or increased by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is
not entirely defensible as it seems. Such provision grants the right of appeal from decisions
or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what
manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural
aspects which the Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making
powers.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G.

ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, MENDOZA, J.
Allowing the Legislature to have more than one representative in the JBC negates the
principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.
Facts:
Pursuant to Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), designated one representative
to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal
opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and
the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had
only one representative. In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.
Instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half of a vote. Then, in
2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House
of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Escudero and Congressman Tupas
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Thus, arising from the
unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato Corona, former Solicitor General Francisco
Chavez was nominated and questioned this practice in the JBC.
Issue:
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Whether or not this practice of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. First, Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution uses the singular letter "a"
preceding "representative of Congress" which is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of the intention of the Constitutional Commission that
Congress may designate only one representative to the JBC.
Second, the purpose of the seven-member composition of the JBC is to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This reason leads the Court to conclude that
a single vote may not be divided into half, between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This practice can possibly
cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process. The purpose would then be
rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created.
Lastly, the paramount justification of the Court is that "Congress," in the context of
JBC representation, should be considered as one body. It is evident that the definition of
"Congress" as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to legislate.In
the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in
the process and in its non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. Verily, each house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions
peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other
chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the other
branches of government. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in
the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term "Congress" must be taken
to mean the entirelegislative department. Therefore, the practice of having more than one
representative from the Congress in the JBC negates the principle of equality among the
three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
Note: In an En Banc decision (April 16, 2013 penned by J. Mendoza), the Court
denied the OSGs motion for reconsideration on behalf of Sen. Escudero and Rep. Tupas.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZAv. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014, Mendoza, J.
As provided for by the 1987 Constitution, the Court has supervisory powers over the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Verily, as a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the
definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing
the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials
see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do
they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may
order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe
their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed.
Facts:
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Due to the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Abad, the JBC announced the
opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated position of Justice Abad. The
JBC received a letter nominating herein petitioner Jardeleza, incumbent Solicitor General of
the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was
included in the names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews.
Subsequently however, Jardeleza received telephone calls from Justice Aurora Santiago
Lagman (Justice Lagman), an incumbent member of the JBC, informing him that Chief Justice
and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno), during the
JBC meeting manifested that she is questioning the integrity of Jardeleza. As a consequence
thereof, Jardeleza was directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC
wherein he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Meanwhile, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition with the SC with a prayer that it issue an
order, in the exercise of its constitutional power of supervision over the JBC, directing the
latter to give him a written notice of the specific charges against him and that the hearing
on June 30, 2014 as well as the deliberation as to who will be the nominees to the position
vacated by Justice Abad be rescheduled to another date.
On June 30, 2014, both the hearing and the deliberation proceeded. Subsequently,
the JBC issued a shortlist naming therein the nominees for the position vacated by Justice
Abad. Jardeleza was not included in the shortlist, hence, the current petition.
Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to compel
the JBC to include him in the list of nominees.
Issue:
Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
YES. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the
JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads: A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress
as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of
supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a
government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules
are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work
done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner
of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the
overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardelezas principal allegations in his
petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
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FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,
COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015, Reyes J.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial
vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this
pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain
whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the
qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement
policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to the function
conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Facts:
Ferdiand Villanueva (Villanueva) herein petitioner, is an MTC Judge who has been
serving as such for a period of one year and a half. Subsequently, Villanueva sought
appointment as RTC Judge with the Judicial and Bar Council. The JBC did not include
Villanuevas name in the list of candidates because the rules of the JBC require that a judge
of a first level court should rendered service for a minimum of five years before he may be
considered and shortlisted for nomination as RTC judge. Villanueva assails the legality of the
aforementioned rule imposed by the JBC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the five year service rule required upon first level court judges before they
may be eligible and shortlisted for RTC judgeship is valid
Ruling:
YES. As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening,
and selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has
the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to
this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in
the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the
rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is shielded from any
outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those
judges with five years of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential
applicants, however, should have been informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they could properly prepare for and comply with them. Hence, unless there
are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the
exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in the
latter.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates
of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL.
94 Phil. 534, March 18, 1954, Diokno J.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within
the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
152 | P a g e
Facts:
Sometime in 1953, Republic Act No. 972 (RA 972) or the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953
was passed which in essence sought to admit to the Bar, those candidates between the
years 1946 up to 1953 who flunked the Bar examinations. The reason for the law was that
allegedly because of the recently concluded wars in the Philippines, the flunkers suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Now, the constitutionality of RA 972 is being questioned, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 972 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
YES. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules
are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and
should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these
rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is
therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to
existing rules.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING
CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, Cruz J.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under
the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.
Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its
own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion.
Facts:
Sixto Brillantes Jr (Brillantes) herein petitioner assails the legality of the action of the
President in appointing Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac (Yorac) as acting Chairman of
the COMELEC when then Chairman Hilario Davide was named chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate a coup d etat attempt.
Sixto argues that the President has no authority to appoint an official of an
independent commission created by the Constitution such as the COMELEC and therefore
such act is void for having been made outside the ambit of law. Hence this petition.
Issue:
153 | P a g e
Whether the action of the President in appointing Assoc. Comm. Yorac as Chairman of
the COMELEC was valid.
Ruling:
NO. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman
comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its
consent, by the President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and
therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming
its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever
reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will
not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed
at will from her permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however,
that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived of
the powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of
the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly
sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for presidential action. The situation
could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves
without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
THELMA P. GAMINDE v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN,
Hon. RAUL C. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000, Pardo J.
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its
workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a
common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the
expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the
variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that
the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular
recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.
Facts:
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Thelma Gaminde (Gaminde) herein
petitioner as ad interim Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Verily, her
appointment letter provides that her term would expire on February 2, 1999 pursuant to
provisions of existing law. Come February 24, 1998, Gaminde sought clarification from the
President as to the date of the end of her term in office. The Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
opined that Gamindes term of office would expire on February 2, 2000 and not on
February 2, 1999. Thereafter, Gaminde remained in office after February 2, 1999.
Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA) questioned the extension of Gamindes term.
154 | P a g e
Since as per her appointment letter, Gamindes term of office should have been only until
February 2, 1999.
Issue:
Whether the term of Gaminde expired on February 2, 1999 as per her letter of
appointment.
Ruling:
YES. The term of office of Gaminde expired on February 2, 1999. The term of
office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the
1987 Constitution, as follows:
"Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity."
In a string of cases, we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires two
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3)
Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term."
Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date,
irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the
appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years
should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the
terms.
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner,
Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999. This terminal date is
specified in her appointment paper. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment. She accepted the appointment and assumed
office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring
February 02, 1999. In this connection, the letter dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona clarifying that her term would expire on February 02, 2000, was
in error. What was submitted to the Commission on Appointments was a nomination for a
term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor must be deemed to
start on February 02, 1999, and expire on February 02, 2006.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A.
VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012, Velasco J.
Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,
disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
155 | P a g e
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
Facts:
On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President MacapagalArroyo) appointed Guillermo N. Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit
(COA) for a term of seven (7) years. Caragues term of office started on February 2, 2001 to
end on February 2, 2008.
Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A.
Villar (Villar) as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February
2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and
during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008,
Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,
2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of
the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Villar, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of
seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such
chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he
was appointed to that position.
Now, Dennis Funa (Funa) assails the constitutionality of Villar's appointment as
Chairman of COA on the ground that an appointee of a vacant office shall only serve the
unexpired portion of the term of the vacated office. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Villars as Chairman was unconstitutional.
Ruling:
YES. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,
after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall
always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7)
years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational
system prescribed by the Constitution. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain
causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the
unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec.
1(2), Art. IX(D). Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were
appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollary, the first appointees in the
Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than
seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban
on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven
(7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from
death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
156 | P a g e
"reappointment" found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same
office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to
Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a
reappointment barred under the Constitution. Any member of the Commission cannot be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Thus, Villars appointment as chairman ending February 2, 2011 which Justice
Mendoza considers as valid is likewise unconstitutional, as it will destroy the rationale and
policy behind the rotational system or the staggering of appointments and terms in COA as
prescribed in the Constitution. It disturbs in a way the staggered rotational system of
appointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC),
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, Bersamin J.
Duques designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,Article VII of the
Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive
Branch which includes the aforementioned agencies. Thus the appointment of is
unconstitutional.
Facts:
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864) CSC Commissioner Francisco Duque III
was appointed as member of the Board of Trustees or Directors in an ex officio capacity of
the GSIS, PhilHealth, the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) and the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). Dennis Funa (Funa) assails the constitutionality of EO
864 on the ground that it violates the independence of constitutionally created office of the
CSC since the aforementioned agencies are within the control and supervision of the
President, thus subjecting Duque under the control and supervision of the President. Hence
this petition.
Issue:
Whether EO 864 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
YES. the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the
Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President.
The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive
power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch
that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without
any legal or constitutional basis.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a
government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health45 and the
Department of Labor,46 respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the
Office of the President.47 The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are
157 | P a g e
exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the
President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the
members of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As
such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the
control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987
Constitution.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO
ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, Austria-Martinez J.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its
decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making
authority.
Facts:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal (Macalintal) herein petitioner, assails the constitutionality of
some of the provisions in Republic Act 9189 (RA 9189) or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003 on the ground that the aforementioned provisions are in violation of the
independence of the constitutionally created office that is COMELEC. Specifically,
Macalintal assails the power of Congress through a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
(JCOC) to review, revise, amend and prove the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for
RA 9189 that the COMELEC shall promulgate. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the provisions authorizing the JCOC to review, revise, amend and approve
the IRR of RA 9189 to be issued by the COMELEC is valid.
Ruling:
NO. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR
for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to
withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval, and the second sentence of the
second paragraph of Section 25 stating that [i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission, whereby Congress, in
both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution,
should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions
brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight
Committee in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to
158 | P a g e
authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and
the phrase, only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require
review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may
not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by
mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided
for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its
constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
Civil Service Commission (CSC) v Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005, Carpio-Morales J.
That the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against
offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution which provides: Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their
approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Facts:
The CSC herein petitioner, seeks to compel the DBM herein respondent, to release
the balance of its budget pursuant to the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the fiscal
year 2002. Verily, the balance in favor of CSC was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis
of DBMs no report, no release policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending
their submission of certain documents which CSC allegedly failed to undertake. On its part
the CSC contends that the application of the no report, no release policy upon an
independent constitutional body such as the CSC is a violation of its fiscal autonomy and is
therefore void. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the DBM can validly withhold the appropriated balance of funds against the
CSC
Ruling:
NO. By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations
to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus
be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
If respondents theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to
automatically and regularly release approved appropriations would be suspended every
year, or even every month that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby emasculating to a
significant degree, if not rendering insignificant altogether, such mandate.
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To
hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a
revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with
fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy,
thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.
159 | P a g e
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be
given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not
similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
ERLINDA P. MERAM v. FILIPINA V. EDRALIN, THE MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 71228, September 24, 1987, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Civil service laws are not enacted to penalize anyone. They are designed to eradicate
the system of appointment to public office based on political considerations and to eliminate
as far as practicable the element of partisanship and personal favoritism in making
appointments. These laws intend to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency as the
basis of appointment; to secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better
government.
Facts:
Private respondent Filipino V. Edralin (Edralin) was proposed to be appointed to the
position of Administrative Officer V. Alleging that they are the next-in rank to the position of
Administrative Officer V, thus, much more entitled to be appointed to the said position,
petitioner ErlindaMeram (Erlinda) and Hermocio M. Agravio (Agravio), filed their protests
against the proposal. Meanwhile, respondent Minister of Natural Resources (Minister)
appointed Edralin to the position of Administrative Officer V. The Civil Service Commission
(CSC) approved the appointment of Edralin but noted that it was still subject to the outcome
of the protests of Erlinda and Agravio.S ubsequently, the Minister issued a decision
dismissing the protests of Erlinda and Agravio. On appeal, however, by Agravio, the Merits
Systems Board (MSB)reversed the decision of the Minister and directed the Minister to
appoint Agravio to the contested position instead of Edralin. Both the Erlinda and Edralin
filed motions for reconsideration. The MSB promulgated another decision modifying the
earlier one and appointed Erlinda. Edralin appealed with the CSC, but the same was denied.
Subsequently, Edralin filed a letter-petition with the Office of the President. In her
petition, Edralin argued that it is the Office of the President that has jurisdiction over an
appeal from the decision of the Ministry head and not the MSB nor the CSC. Acting
favourably on the letter-petition of Edralin, the Office of the President issued a decision
affirming the decision of the Minister dismissing the protests of Erlinda and Agravio. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the President acted correctly in taking cognizance of
respondent's letter-petition, and passing upon the same, and thereafter, setting aside the
decisions of the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission.
Ruling:
NO. P.D. No. 1409, Section 5(2) provides: Sec. 5. Powers and Functions of the Board.
The Board shall have the following functions, among others: (2) Hear and decide cases
brought before it by officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the determination of
appointing authorities involving appointment, promotion, transfer, detail reassignment and
other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the government arising
from abuses arising from personnel actions of these officers or from violations of the merit
system."
160 | P a g e
In connection with this power of the MSB, Section 8 of this decree also provides: Sec.
8. Relationship with the Civil Service Commission. Decisions of the Board involving the
removal of officers and employees from the service shall be subject to automatic review by
the Commission. The Commission shall likewise hear and decide appeals from other
decisions of the Board, provided that the decisions of the Commission shall be subject to
review only by the Courts.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS v. GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES

G.R. No.L-3881, August 31, 1950, Tuason, J.
Three specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarily confidential and

highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers
and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution.
Facts:
Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio, by the
President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Subsequently, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to
the same position, after which, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another
assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other
officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary
corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings.
Issue:
Whether Petitioners removal from office is legal.
Ruling:
161 | P a g e
NO. The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining,

nor highly technical. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary
confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter
phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does
not formulate a method of action for the government or any its subdivisions. His job is to
execute policy, not to make it. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly
so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training
in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is
employed in the Constitution.
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTEv. BEATRIZ O. GONZALES

G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013, Brion, J.
The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of Congress.
The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and
statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature of the position. For
purposes of determining whether Gonzales termination violated her right to security of
tenure, the nature of the position she occupied at the time of her removal should be
considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment at the time she entered
government service.
Facts:
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines

Norte on a permanent capacity by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. Years after, he was
dismissed by Governor Pimentel. Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentels decision to the
Civil Service Commission which held him guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six
months. Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator but terminated
her services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letterto the CSC regarding
his dismissal for lack of confidence. The CSC, in its response, held that the conversion of the
provincial administrator position from a career to a non-career service should not jeopardize
162 | P a g e
Gonzales security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution. As a permanent
appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of
trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointees dismissal or
discipline under existing laws.
Issue:
Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator
which was converted from career to a non-career service.
Ruling:
NO. Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the
provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career
service position. Flowing from the legislative power to create public offices is the power to
abolish and modify them to meet the demands of society; Congress can change the
qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory offices. When done in good faith,
these acts would not violate a public officers security of tenure, even if they result in his
removal from office or the shortening of his term. Modifications in public office, such as
changes in qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as they
are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.
In the case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial administrator
position but significantly modified many of its aspects. It is now a primarily confidential
position under the non-career service tranche of the civil service. This change could not
have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was not the only provincial administrator
incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted. Rather, this change was part of the reform
measures that RA 7160 introduced to further empower local governments and decentralize
the delivery of public service.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION v. MARITA A. ANGARA

G.R. NO.142937, November 15, 2005, Austria-Martinez, J.
163 | P a g e
Justice Regalados incisive discourse yields three (3) important points: first, the
classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly
technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not
conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. Second, whether
primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical, the exemption provided in the
Charter pertains to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness
to enter the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of
tenure. Last, and more to the point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all
positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.
Facts:
Respondents Beatriz T. La Victoria (La Victoria) and Marita A. Angara (Angara) were
Slot Machine Roving Token Attendants (SMRTAs) of petitioner Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) assigned at its casino in Davao City. Eventually, they were
dismissed by the PAGCOR Board of Directors for loss of trust and confidence. Respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied. They, then, filed their appeal
memorandum with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which ruled in their favor; hence, the
case.
Issue:
Whether respondents hold confidential positions whose removal from the service can
be justified through loss of trust and confidence.
Ruling:
NO. From the nature of respondents functions, their organizational ranking, and their
compensation level, it is obviously beyond debate that respondents, occupying one of the
lowest ranks in petitioner, cannot be considered confidential employees. Their job
description spells out their routinary functions.
164 | P a g e
Petitioner, therefore, cannot justify respondents dismissal on loss of trust and
confidence since the latter are not confidential employees. Being regular employees that
enjoy security of tenure, respondents can only be dismissed for just cause and with due
process, notice and hearing. Petitioner cannot, in the alternative, allege that respondents are
being dismissed for dishonesty since petitioners thesis, in its motion for reconsideration in
the CSC and petition before the CA, has always been that respondents, as confidential
employees, can be dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. Besides, dishonesty is not the
reason for which they were dismissed per the letter of dismissal of July 23, 1997, but for loss
of trust and confidence.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. NITA P. JAVIER

G.R. No. 173264, February 22, 2008, Austria-Martinez, J.
Presently, it is still the rule that executive and legislative identification or

classification of primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical positions in
government is no more than mere declarations, and does not foreclose judicial review,
especially in the event of conflict. Far from what is merely declared by executive or
legislative fiat, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether it is primarily
confidential, policy determining or highly technical, and no department in government is
better qualified to make such an ultimate finding than the judicial branch.
Facts:
Respondent Javier was first employed as Private Secretary in the GSIS on a

"confidential" and permanent status. She spent her entire career with GSIS. Before her 64 th
birthday, respondent opted for early retirement but GSIS President Winston F. Garcia, with
the approval of the Board of Trustees, reappointed respondent as Corporate Secretary, the
same position she left and retired from barely a year earlier. Respondent was 64 years old at
the time of her reappointment. In its Resolution, the Board of Trustees classified her
appointment as "confidential in nature and the tenure of office is at the pleasure of the
Board. Subsequently, petitioner issued a resolution, invalidating the reappointment of
respondent as Corporate Secretary, on the ground that the position is a permanent, career
position and not primarily confidential; thus she cannot be reappointed for being at the age
of retirement. They may reappoint her even she is beyond the retirement age but only if the
position is primarily confidential position but the CSC, in its resolution, held that the position
occupied by respondent is a career position.
165 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether the courts may determine the proper classification of a position in

government.
Ruling:
YES. Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of
positions in the civil service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a
constitutional body like the petitioner. The Court is expected to make its own determination
as to the nature of a particular position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position
or not, without being bound by prior classifications made by other bodies. The findings of the
other branches of government are merely considered initial and not conclusive to the
Court. Moreover, it is well-established that in case the findings of various agencies of
government, such as the petitioner and the CA in the instant case, are in conflict, the Court
must exercise its constitutional role as final arbiter of all justiciable controversies and
disputes.
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIAv. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. BIENVENIDO A.

ICASIANO
G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000, Purisima, J.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without

the employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step
toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would
in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in
the Civil Service.
Facts:
166 | P a g e
Private respondent Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division

of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino. Subsequently,
Respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that the
petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST (Marikina Institute of Science and
Technology), to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent; which
recommendation was approved by the President. When Private Respondent learned of such
reassignment, he requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but
the latter denied the request. The petitioner prepared a letter to the President of the
Philippines asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment. However, he subsequently
changed his mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.
Issue:
Whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent

of Quezon City to Vocational School Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of
tenure.
Ruling:
YES. It appears that the reassignment of private respondent to MIST appears to be

indefinite. The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President
Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his
qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It
can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private
respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field.
Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private
respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no
period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to
reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the
reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private
respondent.
CESAR Z. DARIOv. HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME

G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989, Sarmiento, J.
167 | P a g e
The present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result of
reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for "automatic"
vacancies. It must also pass the test of good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is
carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs
because the position itself ceases to exist. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is
nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and
whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there
is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by
the existence of ample funds.
Facts:
President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3 providing for an orderly
transition to a government under a new constitution. Subsequently, the President
promulgated an executive order providing for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) and prescribing a new staffing patter. During the said period, the Filipino people
adopted the new constitution. The problem arose when incumbent Commissioner of
Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum prescribing the procedure in personnel
placement. On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals
Board charged with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum
which issued notices to the petitioners for their separation. A total of 394 officials and
employees of the BOC were given individual notices of separation. A number supposedly
sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). The first thirty-one mentioned above came directly to the SC.
The petitions under the CSC where granted ordering the reinstatement of the employees. All
the petitions were consolidated in this case.
Issue:
Whether Commissioner Mison acted in good faith in issuing the notices of separation.
Ruling:
NO. The Court finds that Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith since after
February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy - except for the
change of personnel - has occurred, which would have justified the contested dismissals.
There is also no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made or a
reorganization actually undertaken at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office,
which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees. The records indeed show
that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced them with
522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs. He
did so, furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a
consequence of reorganization. Finally, he was aware that layoffs should observe the
procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY

G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, Pardo, J.
168 | P a g e
Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is

issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of
the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c) chief of the bureau or
office, and d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. To constitute a
violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or
office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Facts:
Respondent was found guilty for nepotism on two counts by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as
driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision
and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and
imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the CSC ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito
and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism.
Issue:
Whether respondent is guilty for nepotism.
Ruling:
YES. Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College

of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend
his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and
Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who
recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag's authority to recommend the
appointment of first level positions such as watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility
workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of three to six months was
recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director Eladio C.
Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclags immediate
169 | P a g e
supervision. On July 1, 1992, Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS Regional Office VIII,
Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. On January 3, 1993, Mr. Daclag
also appointed Ped Dacoycoy casual utility worker. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy
who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and
even rated his performance as very satisfactory. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his
position description form that his father was his next higher supervisor. The circumvention of
the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag
to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate
supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents two sons and
placed them under respondents immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker
of the school. Both positions are career positions.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MARICELLE M. CORTES

G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014, ABAD, J.
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third

civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2)
recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee. By way of exception, the following shall not be
covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3)
physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Facts:
Respondent Cortes was appointed by the Commission En Banc of the Commission on

Human Rights (CHR) to the position of Information Officer V (IO V). Commissioner Eligio P.
Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and requested the CHR to render
an opinion on the legality of the respondent's appointment. The opinion given by the CSC is
that the appointment is not valid because it is covered by the rule on nepotism under
Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions.
According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with
respect to respondent Cortes despite being a mere member of the Commission En Banc. On
appeal, the CA granted the petition.
170 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO
V in the CHR is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.
Ruling:
YES. It is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in

the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.
In the present case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does
not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.
Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that "we must interpret not
by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule that the prohibition applies
only to the Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the
prohibition meaningless. Apparently, the Commission En Banc, which is a body created by
fiction of law, can never have relatives to speak of.
LUCIANO VELOSOv. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011, Peralta, J.
IRR of RA 7160 reproduced the Constitutional provision that "no elective or
appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind from any foreign
government." Section 325 of the law limit the total appropriations for personal services 37 of
a local government unit to not more than 45% of its total annual income from regular
sources realized in the next preceding fiscal year.
Facts:
The City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of
Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected
for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. However, Atty. Espina, Supervising
Auditor of the City of Manila, observed that the monetary award is tantamount to double
compensation in contravention to Article 170 (c) of the IRR of RA 716 which provides that no
elective or appointive local official shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation
unless specifically authorized by law.
Issue:
171 | P a g e
Whether the conferment of exemplary public service award to Elective Local officials
are considered double compensation.
Ruling:
YES. The recomputation of the award disclosed that it is equivalent to the total
compensation received by each awardee for nine years that includes basic salary, additional
compensation, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance, representation and transportation
allowance, rice allowance, financial assistance, clothing allowance, 13th month pay and cash
gift. This is not disputed by petitioners. There is nothing wrong with the local government
granting additional benefits to the officials and employees. The laws even encourage the
granting of incentive benefits aimed at improving the services of these employees.
Considering, however, that the payment of these benefits constitute disbursement of public
funds, it must not contravene the law on disbursement of public funds. Undoubtedly, the
above computation of the awardees' reward is excessive and tantamount to double and
additional compensation. This cannot be justified by the mere fact that the awardees have
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Neither can it be justified
that the reward is given as a gratuity at the end of the last term of the qualified elective
official. The fact remains that the remuneration is equivalent to everything that the
awardees received during the entire period that he served as such official. Indirectly, their
salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they receive half of them at the end of their last
term.
CONRADO L. DE RAMAv. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001, Ynares-Santiago, J.
The prohibition under Article VII, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution applies only to
presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective
officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
Facts:
Petitioner de Rama is seeking for the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14)
municipal employees alleging that the appointments of the said employees were "midnight"
appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied the request for the recall of the
appointments of the fourteen employees for lack of merit. The CA upheld CSCs decision;
hence, the case.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the CSC was correct in not upholding the
Petitioners recall of the appointments of private respondent.
Ruling:
NO. The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the
appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he
cited to justify his action was that these were "midnight appointments" that are forbidden
under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so,
that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there
is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days
of his or her tenure.
172 | P a g e
RENATO CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity
as Secretary of Budget and Management
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, PARAS, J.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Facts:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of

Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years as required under Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution. Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC and he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed
office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Renato Cayetano challenged the validity of the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination and filed the
instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid nomination and confirmation of appointment of Monsod as

he satisfied the ten year practice of law requirement.
173 | P a g e
Ruling:
YES. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN EDGARDO

J. ANGARA V. THE COMMISION ON ELECTIONS AND AGAPITO A. AQUINO
G.R. No. 161265, February 24, 2004,TINGA, J.
COMELEC is empowered to register political parties [Sec. 2(5), Article IX-C.]
Necessarily, the power to act on behalf of a party and the responsibility for the acts of such
political party must be fixed in certain persons acting as its officers. In the exercise of the
power to register political parties, the COMELEC must determine who these officers are.
Consequently, if there is any controversy as to leadership, the COMELEC may, in a proper
case brought before it, resolve the issue incidental to its power to register political parties.
Facts:
General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) political party,
manifested to the COMELEC that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his
authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official
candidates. It further stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General,
Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on indefinite forced leave. In the meantime,
Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General. Rep. Aquino filed
his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose
disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. The COMELEC resolved that the chairman
and the secretary general should share the authority to nominate certain number of
nominations of LDPs candidates. Sen. Angara filed a petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide who is authorized to nominate candidates
for a political party.
174 | P a g e
2. Whether the Party Chairman has the authority to sign certificates of candidacy of the official
candidates of the political party.
Ruling:
1. YES. In Palmares v. Commission on Elections, to which the assailed Resolution made
reference and which involved the Nacionalista Party, this Court ruled that the COMELEC
has jurisdiction over the issue of leadership in a political party. Under the Constitution, the
COMELEC is empowered to register political parties [Sec. 2(5), Article IX-C.] Necessarily, the
power to act on behalf of a party and the responsibility for the acts of such political party
must be fixed in certain persons acting as its officers. In the exercise of the power to
register political parties, the COMELEC must determine who these officers are.
Consequently, if there is any controversy as to leadership, the COMELEC may, in a proper
case brought before it, resolve the issue incidental to its power to register political parties.
2. YES. The LDP has a set of national officers composed of, among others, the Party Chairman
and the Secretary General. The Party Chairman is the Chief Executive Officer of the Party,
whose powers and functions include:
(1)
To represent the Party in all external affairs and concerns, sign documents for and
on its behalf, and call the meetings and be the presiding officer of the National Congress
and the National Executive Council
The Secretary General, on the other hand, assists the Party Chairman in overseeing
the day-to-day operations of the Party. Among his powers and functions is:
(1)
When empowered by the Party Chairman, to sign documents for and on behalf of
the Party.
The Secretary Generals authority to sign documents, therefore, is only a delegated
power, which originally pertains to the Party Chairman.
Assuming that Rep. Aquino previously had such authority, this Court cannot share the
COMELECs finding that the same has not been revoked or recalled. No revocation of such
authority
can
be
more
explicit
than
the
totality
of
Sen.
Angaras Manifestations and Petition before the COMELEC, through which he informed the
Commission that Rep. Aquinos had been placed on indefinite forced leave and that
Ambassador Zaldivar has been designated Acting Secretary General, who shall henceforth
exercise all the powers and functions of the Secretary General under the Constitution and
By-Laws of the LDP. As the prerogative to empower Rep. Aquino to sign documents
devolves upon Sen. Angara, so he may choose, at his discretion, to withhold or revoke such
power.
MA. SALVACION BUAC AND ANTONIO BAUTISTA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO
G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004, EN BANC, PUNO, J.
The power of the COMELEC to ascertain the true results of the plebiscite is implicit in
its power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.
175 | P a g e
Facts:
A plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood Law
(Republic Act No. 8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality into a city.
The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared that the "NO" votes won without completing the
canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns. The Board of Canvassers was ordered by
the COMELEC en banc to reconvene and complete the canvass. The Board did and it issued
an Order proclaiming that the negative votes prevailed in the plebiscite conducted.
Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the results
of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots cast therein. Cayetano
intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. COMELEC treated the petition akin to an election protest. Cayetano filed an MR
which was granted. It dismissed the petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite and
ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over said case as it involves an exercise of quasijudicial powers not contemplated under Section 2 (2), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the plebiscite protest?
Ruling:
YES. Article LX-C, Section 2(1) is very explicit that the COMELEC has the power to
"enforce administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall." To enforce means to cause to take effect or to cause the
performance of such act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or operation, a plan or
measure. When we say the COMELEC has the power to enforce all laws relative to the
conduct of a plebiscite, it necessarily entails all the necessary and incidental power for it to
achieve the holding of an honest and credible plebiscite. Obviously, the power of the
COMELEC is not limited to the mere administrative function of conducting the plebiscite. The
law is clear. It is also mandated to enforce the laws relative to the conduct of the plebiscite.
Hence, the COMELEC, whenever it is called upon to correct or check what the Board of
Canvassers erroneously or fraudulently did during the canvassing, can verify or ascertain the
true results of the plebiscite either through a pre-proclamation case or through revision of
ballots. To remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain the true results of the
plebiscite through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally mandated
power to "enforce" laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite. It is not correct to argue that
the quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC is limited to contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective Barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. If the COMELEC has quasi-judicial power to enforce laws relating to elective
176 | P a g e
officials then there is no reason why it cannot exercise the same power to ascertain the true
results of a plebiscite. All that the Constitution provides is that the COMELEC shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to elective officials. The provision is not a
limiting provision in the sense that it only limits the quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to
said cases. To repeat, the power of the COMELEC to ascertain the true results of the
plebiscite is implicit in its power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.
ALROBEN J. GOH v. HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014, EN BANC, CARPIO, J.
The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the COMELECs fiscal autonomy, but also
granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its
savings.
Facts:
Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, against Mayor Bayron due to loss of
trust and confidence brought about by gross violation of pertinent provisions of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross
inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional immaturity
as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City. The COMELEC found the recall petition sufficient in form
and substance, but suspended the funding of any and all recall elections until the resolution
of the funding issue. Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for Clarification. COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution of the
division.
Issue:
Whether the 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to
perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections.
Ruling:
YES. the 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed
the COMELECs fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment
items in its appropriations from its savings.
Under these factual circumstances, we find it difficult to justify the COMELECs
reasons why it is unable to conduct recall elections in 2014 when the COMELEC was able to
conduct recall elections in 2002 despite lack of the specific words Conduct and supervision
of x x x recall votes x x x in the 2002 GAA. In the 2002 GAA, the phrase Conduct and
supervision of elections and other political exercises was sufficient to fund the conduct of
recall elections. In the 2014 GAA, there is a specific line item appropriation for the
Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x.
More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC
has a line item for the Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and
177 | P a g e
plebiscites. This admission of the COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this specific
budgetary appropriation. To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a
specific purpose. However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into
different related sub-categories of the same nature. For example, the purpose can be to
conduct elections, which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall
elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific to fund elections, which naturally
and logically include, even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also special or recall
elections.
KILOSBAYAN, INC., FERNANDO A. SANTIAGO, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, EMILIO C.

CAPULONG JR., RAFAEL G. FERNANDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, FRANKLIN DRILON, CESAR SARINO, LEONORA V. DE JESUS, TIBURCIO
RELUCIO, RONALDO V. PUNO, BENITO R. CATINDIG, MANUEL CALUPITAN III,
VICENTE CARLOS, FRANCISCO CANCIO, JIMMY DURANTE, MELVYN MENDOZA
G.R. No. 128054 October 16, 1997, HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
Indeed probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt, but it certainly demands more than "bare
suspicion" and can never be "left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic".
Facts:
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, otherwise known
as the "General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1992" allocates a specific amount of
government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and activities. Cesar Sarino
as Secretary of DILG entered into a MOA with an accredited NGO known as the "Philippine
Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc." (PYHSDFI). PYHSDFI applied with the
DILG for accreditation as NGO. Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by PYHSDFI
President Catindig and DILG-NCR Regional Director Relucio to transfer 70 million pesos.
Commission on Elections (Comelec) received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informing
the former of two serious violations of election laws: That the amount of P70 million was
released by his department, shortly before the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of a
private entity, the so-called "Philippine Youth, Health and Sports Development Foundation,"
headed by Mr. Ronaldo Puno and the illegal diversion of P330 million by Malacanang from
the Countryside Development Fund to the Department of Interior and Local Government
which disbursed this huge amount shortly before the May 11, 1992 elections. COMELEC en
banc issued a resolution dismissing the charge against Secretary Enriquez (Secretary of
DBM) and held in abeyance the charges as to the others for further investigation. MR was
denied and the supplemental MR was also denied.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the lettercomplaint.
Ruling:
178 | P a g e
NO. The COMELEC, whenever any election offense charge is filed before it, must
have first, before dismissing the same or filing the corresponding information, conducted the
preliminary investigation proper of the case. At this initial stage of criminal prosecution, is
the determination of probable cause, i.e., whether or not there is reason to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial or as the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure phrase it, whether or not "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed".
Kilosbayan must have necessarily tendered evidence, independent of and in support
of the allegations in its letter-complaint, of such quality as to engender belief in an ordinarily
prudent and cautious man that the offense charged therein has been committed by herein
respondents. Indeed probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt, but it certainly demands more than "bare
suspicion" and can never be "left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic".
The efforts of petitioner Kilosbayan, thus, in order to successfully lead to the judicial
indictment of respondents, should have gone beyond a largely declamatory condemnation of
respondents and diligently focused on its two-fold obligation of not only substantiating its
charges against respondents but also proffering before the COMELEC substantial evidence of
respondents' utilization, through conspiratorial, cooperative and/or interrelated acts, of
Seventy Million Pesos from the CDF for electioneering activities in violation of the pertinent
provisions on election offenses as enumerated in the Omnibus Election Code.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS v. HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE, PRESIDING JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, IMUS, CAVITE
G. R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60, February 17, 2003,DAVIDE JR., C.J.
Respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who are the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 795000 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue
of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646.
Facts:
Florentino A. Bautista ran for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Kawit,
Cavite. He filed with the COMELEC a complaint against then incumbent mayor Atty. Federico
Poblete, Bienvenido Pobre, Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo Ganibe, Leonardo Llave, Diosdado del
Rosario, Manuel Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and Pedro Paterno,
Jr., for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code or vote-buying
activities. Law Department of the COMELEC filed the information. Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor resolved to file separate informations for vote-selling (I.S. No. 1-99-1080) in the
various branches of the RTC in Imus, Cavite. The Law Department of the COMELEC filed
motions to suspend proceedings which was granted. COMELEC en banc declared null and
void the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 pursuant to
the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646 otherwise known as The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which grants immunity from criminal prosecution persons who
voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or voteselling. Law Department filed a motion to dismiss for the criminal cases but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether the respondents of I.S. No. 1-99-1080 should be exempted from criminal
liability pursuant to the immunity to witnesses of vote-buying or vote-selling.
179 | P a g e
Ruling:
YES. The respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who are the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling
by virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Respondent
judge lost sight of the fact that at the time the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 had already
executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying in the case
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. It cannot then be denied that they had
already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly
testified in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 per petitioners Memorandum filed with this Court.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY

(BANAT) PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY SALVADOR B. BRITANICO v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 177508, August 07, 2009, CARPIO, J.
It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is
that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law.
Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party
List filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9369 (RA 9369)and enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing the statute. BANAT also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38,
and 43 of RA 9369.
Issues:
1. Whether o RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
2. Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution.
3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.
Ruling:
1. NO. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that
the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court
to declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the
petition must fail.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a
practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute
seeks to achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred
from the title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified
code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.
180 | P a g e
2. NO. In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other,
are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice
President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be
invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been
proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall
determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress
and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning
presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.
3. NO. It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election
offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative
enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give the COMELEC the
"exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the framers would have
expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did not.
4. NO. Section 34 would still be constitutional because the law was enacted in the exercise of
the police power of the State to promote the general welfare of the people. We agree with
the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is invested with public interest. In fact, even
petitioner concedes that poll watchers not only guard the votes of their respective
candidates or political parties but also ensure that all the votes are properly counted.
Ultimately, poll watchers aid in fair and honest elections. Poll watchers help ensure that the
elections are transparent, credible, fair, and accurate. The regulation of the per diem of the
poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties promotes the general welfare of
the community and is a valid exercise of police power.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. v. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER BARTOLOME C. FERNANDEZ and HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER ALBERTO P. CRUZ
G.R. No. 92585, May 8, 1992, DAVIDE, JR., J.
There can be no doubt, however, that the audit power of the Auditor General under
the 1935 Constitution and the Commission on Audit under the 1973 Constitution authorized
them to disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds and property. Our present
Constitution retains that same power and authority, further strengthened by the definition of
the COA's general jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines and Administrative Code of 1987.
Facts:
COA sent a letter to Caltex Philippines, Inc. (CPI) directing it to remit to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) its collection, excluding that unremitted for the years 1986 and
1988, of the additional tax on petroleum products authorized under the aforesaid Section 8
of P.D. No. 1956 which amounted to P335,037,649.00 and informing it that, pending such
remittance, all of its claims for reimbursement from the OPSF shall be held in abeyance. COA
sent another demand letter with a grand total of P1,287,668,820.00. Caltex requested the
COA for an early release of its reimbursement certificates from the OPSF covering claims
181 | P a g e
with the Office of Energy Affairs since June 1987 up to March 1989 but COA denied. Caltex
submitted a letter of proposal to pay which was granted but prohibiting petitioner from
further offsetting remittances and reimbursements for the current and ensuing years. Caltex
filed an MR. Unsatisfied with the decision, Caltex filed the present petition.
Issue:
Whether the Constitution gives the COA discretionary power to disapprove irregular
or unnecessary government expenditures.
Ruling:
YES. There can be no doubt, however, that the audit power of the Auditor General
under the 1935 Constitution and the Commission on Audit under the 1973 Constitution
authorized them to disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds and property. Our
present Constitution retains that same power and authority, further strengthened by the
definition of the COA's general jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines and Administrative Code of 1987. Pursuant to its power to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds, the COA promulgated on 29 March
1977 COA Circular No. 77-55. Since the COA is responsible for the enforcement of the rules
and regulations, it goes without saying that failure to comply with them is a ground for
disapproving the payment of the proposed expenditure.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, DOLORES A.

SANTIAGO, LYNN H. CATUNCAN, NORMA O. TERREL, MA. ANTONIA G. REBUENO v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002,CARPIO, J.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that
the COAs power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COAs
authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and
disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
Facts:
Philippine government obtained from the World Bank an Economic Recovery Loan of
US$310 million. As a condition for granting the loan, the World Bank required the Philippine
government to rehabilitate the DBP. Philippine government sent the World Bank a letter
assuring the World Bank that pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 1124, all Banks,
including government banks, shall be fully audited by external independent auditors in
addition to that provided by the Commission on Audit. The new COA Chairman, Eufemio
Domingo protested the Central Banks issuance of Circular No. 1124 which allegedly
encroached upon the COAs constitutional and statutory power to audit government
agencies. DBP Chairman wrote the COA Chairman for an MR but it was denied. COA en banc
also denied. DBP filed this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the COA has the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government
banks under Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
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NO. The qualifying word exclusive in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be
applied to the first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying word is
intended to refer only to the phrase to which it is immediately associated, and not to a
phrase distantly located in another paragraph or sub-section. Thus, the first paragraph of
Section 2 must be read the way it appears, without the word exclusive, signifying that nonCOA auditors can also examine and audit government agencies. Besides, the framers of the
Constitution intentionally omitted the word exclusive in the first paragraph of Section 2
precisely to allow concurrent audit by private external auditors.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that
the COAs power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COAs
authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and
disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its
framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive
power to examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were
fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in
addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a government-controlled
corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the
case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad.
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THEPREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS v.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not make
the entity a public corporation subject to the audit authority of the Commission on Audit.
Facts:
The Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (PSPCA) was
incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285at the
time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The
objects of PSPCA, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to
cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippines and generally,
to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals
and promote their welfare. On December 1, 2003, an audit team from respondent COA
visited the office of the petitioner to conduct an audit survey addressed to the PSPCA. The
petitioner demurred on the ground that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction of
COA.
Issue:
Whether PSPCA is subject to COAs jurisdiction.
Ruling:
NO. COA shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its
183 | P a g e
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies,
commissions and officers that have been granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution;
(b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required
by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
However on the case at hand, PSPCA is not an agency of the government. The mere
fact that a corporation has been created by a special law doesnt necessarily qualify it as a
public corporation. At the time PSPCA was formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the
applicable law and no proscription similar to the charter test can be found therein. Moreover,
PSPCAs charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the
State. The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not make the
entity a public corporation. They may be considered quasi-public corporations which are
private corporations that render public service, supply public wants and pursue other
exemplary objectives.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. Nos. 89679-81, September 28, 1990, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
The power to compromise or release claims or liabilities of banking institutions, is not

limited to the COA, although commercial banks granted with such authority may still be
subjected to COAs general audit jurisdiction.
Facts:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 80-222, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), through its
Loan Executive Committee, waived the penalty charges in the amount of P9,636.36 on the
loan of Home Savings Bank and Trust Company (HSBTC), a thrift banking institution
organized under Philippine laws. The LBP asserts that it has the power to condone penalties
being a commercial bank clothed with authority to exercise all the general powers
mentioned in the Corporation Law and the General Banking Act. COA, on the other hand,
maintains that such power is exclusively vested in the Commission pursuant to Section 36 of
Pres. Decree No. 1445, or the Government Auditing Code.
184 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether LBP is authorized to release claims or liabilities in whole or in part.
Ruling:
YES. LBP was created as a body corporate and government instrumentality to

provide timely and adequate financial support in all phases involved in the execution of
needed agrarian reform under RA 3844. Section 75 of its Charter also authorizes it to
exercise the general powers mentioned in the General Banking Act including writing-off
loans and advances with an outstanding amount of one hundred thousand pesos or more.
Thus, that LBP is a unique and specialized banking institution, not an ordinary government
agency within the scope of Section 36 of P.D. No 1445.
However, LBP is still subject to COA's general audit jurisdiction under Sec 26 of P.D.
No. 1445, to see to it that the fiscal responsibility that rests directly with the head of the
government agency has been properly and effectively discharged.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 101976, January 29, 1993, NARVASA, C.J.,J.
COA is vested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds owned by, or pertaining to, the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.
Facts:
Tirso B. Savellano furnished the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with a confidential
affidavit of information denouncing the National Coal Authority (NCA) and the Philippine
185 | P a g e
National Oil Company (PNOC) for non-payment of taxes totalling P234 Million on interest
earnings. BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr. recommended to the Minister of Finance
payment to petitioner Savellano of an informer's reward equivalent to 15% of the amount of
P15,986,165.00. COA disllowed in audit the payment of informer's reward to Savellano on
the ground that payment of an informer's reward under Section 281 of the National Internal
Revenue Code is conditioned upon the actual recovery or collection of revenues, and no
such revenue or income was actually realized, since two government agencies were
involved. Under Sec 90, the final determination by the Department of Finance, through the
recommendation of the BIR, of petitioner Savellano's entitlement to the informer's reward is
conclusive only upon the executive agencies concerned.
Issue:
Whether the final determination made by the Finance Department can bind
respondent COA or foreclose its review.
Ruling:
NO. The exercise by respondent COA of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check-and-balance system inherent in a
republican form of government such as ours. Taken in this light, such exercise cannot be
regarded as an unlawful or unwarranted invasion of, or interference with, the authority and
power of the executive agency concerned to determine whether or not a person is entitled to
a reward provided by law and the amount thereof. Under Art IX-D, not only is the COA vested
with the power and authority, but it is also charged with the duty, to examine, audit and
settle all accounts pertaining to the expenditures or uses of funds owned by, or pertaining
to, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities. The
disallowance in audit by respondent COA is not in itself final. The same may be set aside and
nullified by this Court, if done with grave abuse of discretion.
FELIX UY, ROMAN CAGATIN, JAMES ENGUITO et al., v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 130685, March 21, 2000, PUNO, J.
The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties,
therefore it cannot disallow the necessary payment of the Provincial Government of its
liabilities.
186 | P a g e
Facts:
Petitioners were among the more than sixty permanent employees of the Provincial
Engineering Office, Province of Agusan del Sur, who were dismissed from the service by then
Governor Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. when the latter assumed office, allegedly to scale down the
operations. However, the COA ruled that payment of their back salaries and other money
benefits became the personal liability of former Governor Ceferino Paredes Jr. and not of the
Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur.
Issue:
Whether the COA can disallow the payment of backwages of illegally dismissed
employees by the Provincial Government.
Ruling:
NO. The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties. Payment of backwages to illegally dismissed government employees can hardly
be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable. The
exercise of the power to decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds
involves the quasi-judicial aspect of government audit. This pertains to the examination,
audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. Its work as
adjudicator of money claims for or against the government means the exercise of judicial
discretion. It includes the investigation, weighing of evidence, and resolving whether items
should or should not be included, or as applied to claim, whether it should be allowed or
disallowed in whole or in part. Its conclusions are not mere opinions but are decisions which
may be elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party.
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
G. R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012, SERENO, J.
The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty of COA. COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.
Facts:
The COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of government
financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. After the change in administration due
to the February 1986 revolution, grave irregularities and anomalies in the governments
financial transactions were uncovered. Hence, the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which
reinstated the pre-audit of selected government transactions. Thereafter, COA issued a
series of circulars which lifted and again reinstated the pre-audit of government transactions
of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled corporations
(GOCCs).In the interregnum, Gualberto dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the
recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Department of
Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. Gualberto alleges that the pre-audit duty on
the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
187 | P a g e
Whether the pre-audit of government transactions is the duty of COA, that cannot be
lifted by a mere circular.
Ruling:
No. There is nothing in Sec 2 of Art IX-D that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit
of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to
a pre-audit requirement is found in Sec 2, par 1, which provides that a post-audit is
mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only
when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the
COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the
deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may
compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LISTOFFICERSv. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR. and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, CORONA, J.
A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public accountability.
Facts:
RA 9335 or the Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC).The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fundand a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. The petitioner
challenge the constitutionality of RA 9335, contending that by establishing a system of
rewards and incentives, the law transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in consideration of
such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines
the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Issue:
Whether the implementation of RA 9335 runs counter to the concept of public
accountability.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioners claim is not only without any factual and legal basis but is also
purely speculative. Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and
employees. The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It
cannot be overturned by mere conjecture especially in this case where it is an underlying
principle to advance a declared public policy. Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless,
188 | P a g e
public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A
system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to
the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty,
industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF

APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.,
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The condonation doctrine is abandoned, for being inconsistent with the concept of
public office as a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people
at all times.
Facts:
A complaint for Plunder and violation of RA 3019 or the the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Jejomar Erwin S. Binay,
Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati in connection
with the five phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building. Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable since
Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010 and Phases
III to V transpired during his first term. Binay Jr assails and that his re-election as City Mayor
of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability, if any, thus
rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. Binay Jr. added that in
view of the condonation doctrine his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of his services.
Issue:
Whether or not the condonation doctrine can be applied to pardon a public officials
administrative liability.
Ruling:
NO. Condonation is a victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, especially
by treating the offender as if there had been no offense. It is a jurisprudential creation that
originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. The
decision in Pascual was based on American authorities who argued that when the people
have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any.
However, the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases. The concept of
public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at
all times, as mandated under the Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the condonation
doctrine. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense. Furthermore, Sec 40
(b) of the LGC precludes condonation since, an elective local official who is meted with the
penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post. Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the
LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against
an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In
addition, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of
a public official's misdeeds. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.
189 | P a g e
However, the abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 56384.March 22, 1984, RELOVA, J.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also
over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft
and corrupt practices.
Facts:
Francisco Lecaroz was charged with the crime of grave coercion when he allegedly
took over the operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro Par, to sell the
gasoline therein to the public. The information was amended with the insertion of the phrase
"by ordering his policemen companions" between the words "Pedro Par" and "to sell the
gasoline. Lecaroz claimed that offense of grave coercion is not among those mentioned or
determined by Section 4(c), P.D. No. 1486 or the Act Creating the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over cases not involving graft and
corrupt practices committed by public officers.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, Sandiganbayan has jurisdictional
competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them
in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be
determined by law. The intention of the framers of the Constitution is patent from the
explicit language thereof as well as from Section 1 of the same Article XIII on Accountability
of Public Officers. On the case at hand, the original and amended information clearly alleged
that petitioner took advantage of his position as mayor when he intimidated the gasoline
stations owner in taking over the operation and control of the establishment, ordering his
policemen to sell the gasoline therein and padlocking the dispensing pump thereof without
legal authority. Stated differently, if petitioner were not the mayor he would not have
allegedly directed the policeman and the latter would not have followed his orders and
instructions to sell Pedro Pars gasoline and padlocked the station
MIGUEL CUENCOv.HON. MARCELO B. FERNAN

A.M. No. 3135, February 17, 1988, PER CURIAM
190 | P a g e
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office only by impeachment
and not through disbarment during the Members incumbency.
Facts:
Vito Borromeo died without any forced heirs, but instituted Fortunate, Tomas and
Amelia Borromeo, under a will, as the sole heirs. The probate court rendered a Decision
declaring the will to be a forgery. That decision became final after being affirmed by the
Supreme Court. Atty. Miguel Cuenco ordered the disbarment of Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan,
Chairman of the Third Division of the Supreme Court. Miguel alleges that Justice Fernan
despite having already accepted his appointment as an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court continued to be counsel for the instituted heirs. Moreover, Miguel asserted that Justice
Fernan exerted personal efforts to take away from the Supreme Court en banc, the First and
Second Divisions of the Tribunal, the Vito Borromeo proceedings to his Office as Chairman of
the Third Division to enable him to influence the decision or the outcome of the Vito
Borromeo proceedings.
Issue:
Whether Justice Fernan as member of the Supreme Court, can be disbarred.
Ruling:
No. The charges against Mr. Justice Fernan were completely unsupported by the facts
and evidence of record. There was nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Justice Fernan
had appeared as counsel in such proceedings representation of instituted heir. The record
reveals that Mr. Justice Fernan withdrew as such counsel. It is entirely clear that Mr. Justice
Fernan's professional involvement in the Special Proceedings had ceased long before his
appointment to the Supreme Court in April of 1986. Moreover, Mr. Justice Fernan inhibited
himself from participating in the deliberations on the Vito Borromeo estate cases and, in
fact, did not take part in the resolution thereon. Consequently, Members of the Supreme
Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar
and may be removed from office only by impeachment as provided under Article XI [2] of
the Constitution. To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the
Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the
191 | P a g e
constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution.
Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman, a majority of the members
of the Commission on Elections and the members of the Commission on audit who are not
certified public accountants all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the
Philippine Bar.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORMER

DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA
G.R. No. 146486, March 4, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The list of impeachable officials under the Constitution is exclusive and it excludes
the Deputy Ombudsman.
Facts:
Officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led
by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting
an investigation on Arturo Mojica, then Deputy Ombudsman who allegedly committed
offenses including sexual harassment, forfeiture of money from confidential employees and
oppression against employees. The Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation. The FFIB report was
referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers. The Committee of Peers
initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of
impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman after careful
study that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through
impeachment.
Issue:
Whether the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer.
Ruling:
NO. Sec 2, Art XI of the Constitution provides the list of impeachable officers namely
the President, Vice-President, Members of the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
reveal that the term Ombudsman refers to the person and not to the office. Therefore only
the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment, excluding his deputies. Moreover,
the leading legal luminaries of the Constitution agree that the list under Sec 2 is exclusive
and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The power to impeach is
essentially a non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Congress only within
the limits of the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be
expanded by the grantee itself even if motivated by the desire to strengthen the security of
tenure of other officials of the government.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA

MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, WORLD WAR II
VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.v.THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
192 | P a g e
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
JAIME N. SORIANO
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, CARPIO MORALES, J.
Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized
only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
Facts:
Former President Estrada filed an the first impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. (CJ Davide) for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes. The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same for being
insufficient in substance.
Four months after the dismissal of the first complaint, the second impeachment
complaint was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella against CJ Davide, Jr. founded on the alleged results of the investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
The instant petitions arose against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year."
Issue:
Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.
Ruling:
YES. As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution which states that the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government and the judiciary
in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments
in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
193 | P a g e
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another. Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond
the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE
ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.et al.
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the
rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people
as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.
Facts:
Respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn
Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez.
Also, respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia,
Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint
against Ombudsman Gutierrez.
During its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to the public respondent HOR Committee on Justice. After hearing, public
respondent, through two separate Resolutions, found both complaints sufficient in form and
in substance which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public
trust.
Petitioner Gutierrez, challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the
Resolutions of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice. Respondents raise the
impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent
was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of
the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in
nature.
Issue:
Whether HOR Committee on Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions.
Ruing:
NO. Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative
NielTupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his
father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions
194 | P a g e
taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by
public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at
the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit,
there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice. The
act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint
is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the
discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated
determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint.
Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its
duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the
minimum constitutional guidelines.
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the
lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules. Public
respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in
any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation."
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood
that is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally
spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general
meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the
restricted sense was to be used.
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication,"
the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the
discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much
the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision
means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. Publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to
make known its rules.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an
IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS
BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS,
NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA,
REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES)
G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in
impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of
the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our
government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper
subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Facts:
195 | P a g e
A caucus was held by the majority bloc of the House of Representatives (HOR) during
which a verified complaint for impeachment against Chief Justice Renato Corona (CJ Corona)
was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. On the same day, the
complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it. The complaint
was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment court the following day.
CJ Corona received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption. On January 16, 2012, the
Senate, acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial proceedings against CJ Corona.
CJ Corona filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
immediate issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction assailing the impeachment
case initiated by the Members of the HOR and trial being conducted by Senate. Senate
contends that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this
Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of SenatorJudges during the proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or
incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged
violations of right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as
Impeachment Court.
Ruling:
YES. Impeachment, described as the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of
democracy, was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting preexisting factions with the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the
comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt. Our
own Constitutions provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. CJ
Corona was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner
that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective
for lack of probable cause.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit
na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., the Court ruled that the power
of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous
referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly
a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar provision.
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of CJ
Corona by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner
immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. Unarguably,
the constitutional issue raised by CJ Corona had been mooted by supervening events and his
own acts. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and
value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be
entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
196 | P a g e
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division)
and EFREN L. ALAS
G.R. Nos. 147706-07, February 16, 2005, CORONA, J.
The Court ruled that the concerned officers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, whether created by special law or formed under the Corporation Code, come
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
Facts:
Two separate informationsf or violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Efren Alas (Alas) for the alleged anomalous advertising contracts
entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and COO of the Philippine Postal Savings
Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which caused damage and prejudice
to the government.
Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and that its officers did not fall
under Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. The records disclosed that while PPSB is a subsidiary of
the Philippine Postal Corporation which is a GOCC, the same is not created by a special law.
It was organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code.
The People, through the OSP, contends that in further defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a distinction as to the manner of creation of the
GOCC for their officers to fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, being President and COO of the
PPSB at the time of commission of the crimes charged, Alas came under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
197 | P a g e
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated
under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019.
Ruling:
YES. PPSB fits the bill as a government-owned or controlled corporation, and

organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary of the Philippine
Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB
belongs to the government while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were
themselves officers of PHILPOST.
It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters
whenever charges of graft and corruption are involved. However, a question arises whether
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the same officers in government-owned or
controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code in view of
the delimitation provided for in Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution which
states that the Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.
It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

separate and distinct from the Civil Service Commission. The same is governed by Article XI,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the present anti-graft court known as
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority vested under the 1987
Constitution, enacted RA 7975 maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations without any distinction whatsoever. The legislature, in mandating the inclusion
of presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from
making any distinction with respect to the manner of their creation.
198 | P a g e
The deliberate omission, in Courts view, clearly reveals the intention of the
legislature to include the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of both types of
corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in
graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary
distinction. But it did not. Corollarily, Article XI Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, on the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the governments prosecutory arm against persons charged
with graft and corruption), includes officers and employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations, likewise without any distinction.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 159940, February 16, 2005, CARPIO-MORALES, J.
It bears emphasis that that under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9 (h) which authorizes the CSC to
approve appointments to positions in the civil service, except those specified therein, its
authority is limited only to determine whether or not the appointees possess the legal
qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else.
Facts:
The CSC approved the Qualification Standards for several positions in the Office of
the Ombudsman including that for Graft Investigation Officer III. The Career Executive
Service Board (CESB) advised the Ombudsman that the position of Graft Investigation Officer
IIIwas classified as a Career Executive Service (CES) position, hence, governed by the rules
of the CES pertaining to eligibility, appointment to CES ranks, and performance evaluation.
Melchor Arthur H. Carandang (Carandang), Paul Elmer M. Clemente (Clemente) and
Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr (De Jesus) were temporarily appointed Graft Investigation Officers
III of the Ombudsman. The CSC approved the appointments on the condition that for the
appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must obtain Civil Service Executive (CSE)
eligibility. It appears that Carandang and Clemente were conferred with CSE Eligibility.
Ombudsman subsequently reclassified several positions, including Graft Investigation
Officer III which was reclassified to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III. With
respect to the reclassified Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III position, the
Qualification Standards were the same as those for Graft Investigation Officer III.
The CSC issued the questioned resolution changing the status of Carandangs and
Clementes appointments to permanent, but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that
he has not met the eligibility requirements. The questioned resolution provided that a Graft
Investigation Officer III position is a career service position requiring a CSE Eligibility.
Considering that De Jesus has not met the eligibility requirement, the change of status of his
appointment from temporary to permanent cannot be effected.
Issue:
Whether the of CSC can constitutionally and validly restrict the specific discretionary
power of appointment, including the grant of security of tenure, by the Ombudsman as an
independent constitutional body in favor of the latters own officials.
Ruling:
199 | P a g e
NO. The positions subject of the present case are unique and highly technical in
nature, as are those of the Judiciary. A person occupying the position of Graft Investigation
Officer III is not, however, appointed by the President but by the Ombudsman as provided in
Article IX of the Constitution which states that the officials and employees of the
ombudsman, other than the deputies, shall be appointed by the ombudsman according to
the civil service law.
To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the CES and
require an appointee thereto to acquire CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure
would be absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position
in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not
occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.
It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the
basic qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as provided in the Qualification
Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the
Ombudsman that appointment be made permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse
to heed the request is a clear encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the
Ombudsman as appointing authority. It goes without saying that the status of the
appointments of Carandang and Clemente, who were conferred CSE eligibility pursuant to
CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003, should be changed to permanent effective
December 18, 2002 too.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
EMILIO A. GONZALES IIIv.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting

through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in
Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO
A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD. CATAYONG
G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied
from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Facts:
G.R. No. 196231
200 | P a g e
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza (Mendoza), and four others were charged criminally and
administratively for Grave Misconduct. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III (Gonzales) requested
all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Upon the recommendation of
Gonzales, a decision in the administrative case finding Mendoza and his fellow police officers
guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman with the penalty of
dismissal from the service.
Mendoza and his fellow police officers filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing Decision. The motion remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp.
Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a
desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC) found that Deputy Ombudsman
Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own
rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more
than nine months without any justification. The inaction is gross, considering there is no
opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostagetaking.
The Office of the President issued a resolution, after due investigation, finding Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust, and meted out the penalty of dismissal from service.
G.R. No. 196232
Major General Carlos F. Garcia and his family were charged with Plunder and Money
Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The government, represented by petitioner Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Barreras-Sulit), sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a
Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan approved the
Plea Bargaining Agreement.
The House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on

the Plea Bargaining Agreement which in effect recommended to the President the dismissal
of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges.
201 | P a g e
The Office of the President initiated an investigation against petitioner Barreras-Sulit.

In her written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of
jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the administrative disciplinary proceeding against her.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative

disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
YES. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care

should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as
an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction
that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated
and harmonious whole. Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every
part thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.
A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No.

6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the
President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the
wisdom of the legislature, which prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2)
and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through
the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over
the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the
constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to
202 | P a g e
address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try
to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
GEORGE UYv. SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C. BERBANO, SR.,

Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor
G.R. Nos. 105965-70, August 9, 1999, PARDO, J.
It can be deduced from provisions of law that both the nature of the offense and the
position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before the Sandiganbayan can
validly take cognizance of the case.
Facts:
George Uy (Uy) was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy and has the authority
is to sign disbursement vouchers relative to the procurement of equipment needed by the
Philippine Navy. Six informations for estafa through falsification of official documents and
one information for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner Uy and 19 co-accused.
The Special Prosecutor Desierto recommended that the informations for estafa
through falsification of official documents be withdrawn and, in lieu thereof, informations for
violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, be filed against five accused
including the petitioner Uy.
Petitioner Uy filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the informations on the
grounds that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person
of the accused, the facts charged do not constitute an offense and more than one offense is
charged. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Uy's motion to quash for lack of merit.
203 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or the
person of petitioner Uy.
Ruling:
NO. The Court rules that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at
the time of the filing of the informations, and as now prescribed by law. RA No. 8249, the
latest amendment to P. D. 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan, provides the prevailing scope
of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
The pertinent portions of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law states that the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving; a.
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense: xxx (d.) Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank.
In the instant case, while petitioner Uy is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.
A. No. 3019, as amended, which is an offense covered by Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan
Law, his position as Lieutenant Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than
"naval captains and all officer of higher rank" as prescribed under sub-paragraph (d) of
Section 4.
Thus, not falling within the "rank" requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive
jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts pursuant to the provision of Section
4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that "In cases
where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27" or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
204 | P a g e
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to
file the corresponding information/s against petitioner Uy in the regional trial court. The
Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
RENATO A. TAPIADOR v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ATTY. RONALDO P.

LEDESMA
G.R. No. 129124, March 15, 2002, DE LEON, JR., J.
Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to
be at fault, to the public official concerned.
Facts:
Walter Beck (Beck), a U.S. citizen, filed a complaint-affidavit against the Renato
Tapiador (Tapiador), a BID Special Investigator, with the BID Resident Ombudsman alleging
that Tapiador demanded and received from herP10, 000.00 in exchange for the issuance of
an alien certificate of registration (ACR) which was subsequently withheld by Tapiadorunless
Beck pay an additional P7, 000.00. Tapiador denied that he demanded nor received any
amount of money from Beck in consideration for the issuance of Becks ACR.
BID Resident Ombudsman found Tiapador liable for violating civil service rules and
penal laws and thus, recommended that criminal and administrative charges be filed against
the Tapiador.The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal charge for lack of evidence but found
Tapiador liable for grave misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the
government service.
205 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in finding Tapiadorliable for grave misconduct
and imposing the penalty of dismissal from the government service.
Ruling:
YES. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by

substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil case; rather,
it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Notably, the instant administrative complaint was resolved by the Ombudsman

merely on the basis of the evidence extant in the record of OMB-ADM-0-94-0983. The
preliminary conference required under Republic Act No. 6770was dispensed with after the
nominal complainant. Consequently, the only basis for the questioned resolution of the
Ombudsman dismissing the petitioner from the government service was the unverified
complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that of his alleged witness, PurisimaTerencio.
A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject affidavits of Beck
and Terencio were not even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding
investigation conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at the BID office in Manila. Neither
did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn
statements despite prior notice before the investigating officer who subsequently dismissed
the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge against the petitioner "was not
supported by any evidence". Hence, Beck's affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
On this basis alone, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
should have dismissed the administrative complaint against Tapiador in the first instance.
Nonetheless, a perusal of the affidavit executed by Walter Beck does not

categorically state that it was petitioner Tapiador who personally demanded from Beck the
amount of P10,000.00 in consideration for the issuance of the latter's ACR. Walter Beck
could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount directly to Tapiador if it
were indeed the latter who actually received the same, but he did not. This significant
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omission in his affidavit is fatal in establishing the alleged administrative liability of the
petitioner.
The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to prove
the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial evidence. Besides,
assuming arguendo, that Tapiador was administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no
authority to directly dismiss Tapiador from the government service, more particularly from
his position in the BID.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA v. EDWARD F. RANADA and the Honorable OMBUDSMAN

Aniano A. Desierto (now succeeded by Hon. Simeon Marcelo), and his Deputy
OMBUDSMAN for Mindanao, Hon. Antonio E. Valenzuela
G. R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006, QUISUMBING, J.
Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office
of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the
Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with
broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.
Facts:
Edward Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao
Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross
Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Captain
Edgardo V. Estarija (Estarija), who as Harbor Master, issues the necessary berthing permit for
all ships that dock in the Davao Port.
NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5, 000 marked money used by the NBI to
entrap Estarija for his alleged extortion activities. Estarija denied demanding money for the
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approval of berthing permits. The Ombudsman issued a decision in the administrative case
finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct imposed the penalty of dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits.
Estarija questioned the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him with the CA claiming
that dismissal was unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and
immediate power to remove government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are
not removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsmans administrative authority is merely recommendatory, and that Republic Act
No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is unconstitutional because it
gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the
Constitution. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ombudsmans decision.
Issue:
Whether the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine or
censure erring officials is constitutional.
Ruling:
YES. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, the Court
may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an
actual and appropriate case and controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lismota of the
case.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent
with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, in addition to the power of the
Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide
the Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any
officer under his authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was
likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of
Congress and the Judiciary.The Court also held in Ledesma that the statement in Tapiador v.
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Office of the Ombudsman that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best,
merely an obiter dictum and cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court.
Lastly, the Constitution gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman other
powers and functions. Thus, the Constitution does not restrict the powers of the
Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to
enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of
Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such
powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.To conclude, the Court holds that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No.
6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely
functional but also effective. Thus, the Court rules that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the
1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from
government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court,
Antique v. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A.
ABIERA
G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993, NOCON, J.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it
is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Facts:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera (Abeira) of the Public Attorney's Office filed his affidavitcomplaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging that Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
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(Maceda) had falsified his Certificate of Service by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when no decision had been
rendered in five civil and ten criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Judge Maceda contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of 90
days to decide the cases and that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite
this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the
judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
NO. The Court disagrees with the first Part of Judge Macedas basic argument. There
is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge
unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised
Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, the Court agrees with Judge Maceda that in the absence of any
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of Jude Macedaon the powers
granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific
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mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all
courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of
service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status
of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of
government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as
suggested by Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and
refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had
acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
JUDGE JOSE CAOIBES, JR. v. OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE FLORENTINO ALUMBRES

G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001, BUENA, J.
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the SC which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman
cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have
all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the SC for
determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.
Facts:
Alumbres filed before the Ombudsman, 2 complaints, the 2 nd one being an

administrative case against Caoibes Jr., praying for his dismissal from the judiciary. Caoibes
Jr. filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the SC and contended that the SC, not the
Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of their respective
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culpability, both being members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and
control. Ombudsman denied and invoked Sec 15(1) of RA 6770. MR denied, hence a petition
for certiorari was filed.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman should defer action on the case before it, pending the
resolution of the administrative case.
Ruling:
YES. Section 15(1) of RA 6770 grants the powers and duties to the Ombudsman. The
provisions supply the legal basis for the Ombudsman in maintaining its jurisdiction over the
charges of physical injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a person in authority filed
by Alumbres against Caoibes Jr. This conclusion seems to be reinforced by Section 16 which
states that the powers of the Ombudsman apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
and nonfeasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure or office.
But it appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were
entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the SC which is vested with exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself
and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and
court personnel filed before it, referred to the SC for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an
administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is
already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not
know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and
recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an
administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities
but also other administrative concerns.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case
before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court
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of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not
constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial
independence. By virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest MTC
clerk, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO v. COMELEC AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,

SORSOGON CHAPTER, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE
G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, CRUZ, J.
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution: all public officials and employees owe the
State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times". Under CA 473 and PD 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
Facts:
Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time.
The League filed with COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and
proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
US. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against Marcos..
Issue:
Whether Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as
provincial governor of Sorsogon.
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Ruling:
NO. Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution: all public officials and employees owe
the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times". Sec 42 of the LGC: a candidate for
local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Sec 117 of the OEC: a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage.
The SC cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his
own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.There
were many other Filipinos in the US similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject
to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced
to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the
US, unlike Frivaldo who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce
and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of
whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic
of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in
exile who, unlike Frivaldo, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their
resistance to the Marcos regime. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, he should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA 473 and PD 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by
simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered
Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special
Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that Frivaldo had to
wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
MATEO CAASI v. CA and MERITO C. MIGUEL

G.R. No. 88831, November 8, 1990, GRIO-AQUINO, J.
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To be qualified to run for elective office, the law requires that the candidate who is a
green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country. His act of filing a COC for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the US. The waiver
of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior
to filing his candidacy for elective office. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to
run for any elective office.
Facts:
Under dispute is the disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC of Miguel for the
position of municipal mayor of Bolinao on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a
permanent resident of the USA. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by
the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the US. He
allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US
for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. COMELEC dismissed the
petitions. RTC denied the MD. CA ordered RTC to dismiss and desist from the quo warranto
case.
Issue:
Whether Miguel is disqualified to hold the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao.
Ruling:
YES. Section 68 of the OEC: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an

immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration", Miguel's answer to
Question 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay", was," Permanently."On its face,
the green card that was subsequently issued to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as
a RESIDENT ALIEN. Miguel's immigration to the US constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. Based on that application of his, he was issued by
the US the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
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To be qualified to run for elective office, the law requires that the candidate who is a
green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a COC for elective office in the Philippines, did not
of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the US.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver,
he was disqualified to run for any elective office. Miguel's said application and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the US despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of
such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear
evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green
card before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections, our conclusion is that he was
disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS,

MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO and ORLANDO SALVADOR v. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO;
JOSE OSIAS; PACIFICO MARCOS; EDUARDO ROMUALDEZ; FERNANDO and JUANITO
ORDOVEZA
G.R. No. 130140, October 25, 1999, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which Marcos and his cronies
accumulated and which the Government through the PCGG seeks to recover. Besides, even
assuming ex gratia that the right to file criminal charges against Osias, et. al. is
prescriptible, the prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the crimes
charged, and not from the date of their commission.
Facts:
President Ramos issued AO no. 13, creating the Committee. The Committee reported
that the PSI of which Osias, et. al. were the Directors, was one of the 21 corporations which
obtained behest loans. Through Salvador, the Committee filed a sworn complaint against the
Directors of PSI. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription and
relied on the ruling in People v. Dinsay(CA 40 O.G., 12th Supp., 50): the questioned
transactions were evidenced by public instruments and were thus open for the perusal of the
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public, the prescriptive period commenced to run from the time of the commission of the
crime, not from the discovery thereof.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
offenses with which Osias, et. al. were charged had already prescribed.
Ruling:
YES. Behest loans are part of the ill-gotten wealth which Marcos and his cronies
accumulated and which the Government through the PCGG seeks to recover. Besides, even
assuming ex gratia that the right to file criminal charges against Osias, et. al. is
prescriptible, the prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the crimes
charged, and not from the date of their commission. The ruling in Dinsay is not applicable to
the case at bar. First, it is a decision of CA. Second, it involved a prosecution for
estafa. Third, Dinsay involved private parties, while the instant case involves the
Government and public officers. Fourth, the ruling is not absolute.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Sec 3, RA
3019, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Sec
2 of Act No. 3326. This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the
prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was committed.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to
have known the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as
alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the
loans. Thus, we agree with the Committee that the prescriptive period should be computed
from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.The
Ombudsmans reliance on Dinsay is misplaced. The estafa committed by the accused was
known to the offended party from the very start; hence, it could even be said that the
commission and the discovery of the offense were simultaneous. Since the computation of
the prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal action should commence from the
discovery of the offense, the Ombudsman clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in
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dismissing outright the case. It should have first received the evidence to resolve the case
on its merits and on the issue of the date of discovery of the offense.
ILUMINADO URBANO and MARCIAL ACAPULCO v. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, RAMON

BARCELONA and AMY LAZARO-JAVIER
G.R. No. 87977, March 19, 1990, GANCAYCO, J.
This Court held that once an information is filed against the public official, the OSG
can no longer represent the said official in the litigation. The anomaly in this paradigm
becomes obvious when, in the event of a judgment of conviction, the case is brought on
appeal to the appellate courts. The OSG, as the appellate counsel of the People of the
Philippines, is expected to take a stand against the accused. More often than not, it does.
Accordingly, there is a clear conflict of interest here, and one which smacks of ethical
considerations.
Facts:
Chavez caused to be published certain defamatory imputations against Urbano.

Chavez was the counsel of the PCGG and a Solicitor General(Solgen). By way of a Motion
seeking the disqualification of the OSG to act as counsel of Solgen Chavez, Urbano
manifested that he is suing the Solgen in his personal capacity for acts which he committed
beyond the scope of his authority and as such he cannot be represented by the said Office in
the civil suit instituted. RTC denied Urbanos motion.
Issue:
Whether the OSG has the authority to appear for Solgen Chavez in the said civil suit
for damages.
Ruling:
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NO. This Court held that once an information is filed against the public official, the
OSG can no longer represent the said official in the litigation. The anomaly in this paradigm
becomes obvious when, in the event of a judgment of conviction, the case is brought on
appeal to the appellate courts. The OSG, as the appellate counsel of the People of the
Philippines, is expected to take a stand against the accused. More often than not, it does.
Accordingly, there is a clear conflict of interest here, and one which smacks of ethical
considerations, where the OSG as counsel for the public official, defends the latter in the
preliminary investigation stage of the criminal case, and where the same office, as appellate
counsel of the People of the Philippines, represents the prosecution when the case is brought
on appeal. This anomalous situation could not have been contemplated and allowed by the
law, its unconditional terms and provisions notwithstanding. It is a situation which cannot be
countenanced by the Court. Otherwise, if the Solgen who represents the state on appeal in
criminal cases can appear for the accused public official in a preliminary investigation, then
by the same token a provincial or city fiscal, his assistant or any government prosecutor who
represents the People of the Philippines at the preliminary investigation of a case up to the
trial thereof can appear for an accused public official at the preliminary investigation being
conducted by another fiscal, prosecutor or municipal judge. The situation would simply be
scandalous, to say the least.
This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on
a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him. Any pecuniary
liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own
account. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the OSG likewise has no authority to
represent him in such a civil suit for damages.
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary of the DECS v. CA, AMPARO
A. ABAD, VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A. SOMEBANG and NICANOR
MARGALLO
G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, MENDOZA, J
Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty

but only means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive
although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with
full pay for the period of the suspension.
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Facts:
Abad, et. al. are public school teachers. They were administratively charged and
placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded before the lapse of
90-day suspension and they were found guilty as charged. Merit Systems and Protection
Board(MSPB) found Margallo guilty and imposed on him a six-month suspension and
dismissed the appeal of the others. Civil Service Commission(CSC) affirmed with respect to
Margallo, but found the other three guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and
regulation, by filing to file applications for leave of absence and, therefore, reduced the
penalty imposed on them to reprimand and ordered them reinstated to their former
positions. CA affirmed but ruled that they were entitled to the payment of salaries during
their suspension beyond 90 days.
Issue:
Whether Abad, et. al. were entitled to the payment of salaries during their suspension
beyond 90 days.
Ruling:
YES. Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a

penalty but only means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive
although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with
full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, respondent "shall be considered as under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins." On the
other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his
suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal.
Sec. 47 of the present law providing that an administrative decision meting out the
penalty of suspension or dismissal shall be immediately executory and that if the respondent
appeals he shall be considered as being merely under preventive suspension if eventually he
220 | P a g e
prevails is taken from P.D No. 807. Nonetheless, under R.A. No. 2260 the payment of salaries
was ordered in cases in which employees were found to be innocent of the charges or their
suspension was held to be unjustified, because the penalty of suspension or dismissal was
executed without a finding by the Civil Service Commissioner that it was necessary "in the
interest of the public service." On the other hand, payment of back salaries was denied
where it was shown that the employee concerned was guilty as charged and the immediate
execution of the decision was ordered by the Civil Service Commissioner "in the interest of
the public service."To be entitled to such compensation, the employee must not only be
found innocent of the charges but his suspension must likewise be unjustified. But through
an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal
in the event he wins, his suspension is unjustified because what the law authorizes is
preventive suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days. Beyond that period the
suspension is illegal. Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to reinstated with full pay.
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN v.

COMELEC, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO & CARMEN PEDROSA, as founding members of
PIRMA
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, DAVIDE, JR., J.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the

Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress,
for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. There is, of course, no other
better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of
a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by
the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII.
Facts:
Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative. The provisions sought to be amended are Sec 4 and
7 of Article VI, Sec 4 of Article VII, and Sec 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Said Petition for
Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% of the
total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Hearing ensued. Santiago, et. al. filed this SCA for prohibition.
221 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether RA no. 6735 which intended to include the system of initiative on

amendments to the Constitution is inadequate to cover that system.
Ruling:
YES. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress,
for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. There is, of course, no other
better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of
a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by
the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII.
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. But R.A. No. 6735 is not a full compliance with the
power and duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right.
First, Sec 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. Initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." Second,
the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. It
does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Third,no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence simply means that the
main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended it to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of
things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national
and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in
the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby
222 | P a g e
giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading
of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a
humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service. Thus, R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
"empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of the Act.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, CARPIO, J.
Two essential elements must be present: the people must author and sign the entire
proposal and it must be embodied in a petition. These are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
Facts:
Lambino Group, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution. They filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under Sec 5(b) and (c) and Sec 7 of RA No. 6735. They alleged
that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered
voters. COMELEC denied the petition.
Issue:
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution.
Ruling:
NO. The framers intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment"
should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal, before they
sign there is already a draft shown to them and that the people should sign on the proposal
itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. Two
essential elements must be present: the people must author and sign the entire proposal
andit must be embodied in a petition. These are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written
on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state such fact.
223 | P a g e
This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible to
prove.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition, a copy of the paper that
the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted a copy of
a signature sheet after the oral arguments. The signature sheet merely asks a question
whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the UnicameralParliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the
draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the
signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when
they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be
incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present
initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached
to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the
rug from under their feet. With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be
physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen
the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed
changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed
the signature sheets.
224 | P a g e
225 | P a g e

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