Rakes v.

The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company

Facts:
Rakes, respondents employee, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbour to
the companys yard. At a certain spot near the waters edge, the track sagged, the car canted, the
rails slid off and caught Rakes. He was amputated at about the knee. Rakes claims that only one
hand car was used in his work. Atlantic has proved that there were two, so that the end of the
rails lay upon sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces to prevent them from slipping off.
Issue:
Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of petitioner
Held:
While Atlantic was negligent in failing to repair the bed of the track, Rakes was guilty of
contributory negligence in walking at the side instead of being in front or behind. The amount of
damages should be reduced.

7 Phil. 359 Civil Law Torts and Damages Kinds of Fault

M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day,
they were working in the companys yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars
(karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from
the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed
on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were
also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified of said
damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and
when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars,
the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated.
Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their
workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the
cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that
Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that
Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to
work.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.

HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it
was another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of
caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On
the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was
on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from
standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of
damages though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to
2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:
1.

Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an

obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also
considered as a real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).

2.

Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to

exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing
obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).

DELSAN TRANSPORTATIONVS.C & A CONSTRUCTION, INC.

G.R. no. 156034
October 1, 2003
Facts: C & A construction, construct a deflector wall at the Vitas reclamation Area in Tondo,
Manila it was not formally turnover to National Housing Authority though it was completed
in1994. On 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994 Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan
Express receive a report that that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after eight (8) hours. At 8:35
a.m. he tried to seek shelter but it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m. Capt. Jusep drop the
anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet. The ship was
dragged by the wind toward the Napocor power barge Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the
vessel to avoid the collision but when the engine was re-started, it hit the deflector wall
constructed by the respondent. P456,198.24 was the damaged cause by the incident. C & A
construction demanded payment of the damages from Capt. Jusep but the latter refused to pay
due to the cause of the incident was by a fortuitous event. The trial court ruled that Captain Jusep
was not guilty of negligence in applying the emergency rule because it had taken necessary
precautions to avoid accident. The Court of Appeals reversed & set aside the decision of the trial
court. Captain Jusep was found guilty of negligence in transferring the vessel only at8:35 a.m. of
October 21,1994 and held liable for damages in waiting until 8:35 a.m. before transferring the
vessel to sought shelter.

Issues: (1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent.(2) Whether or not the petitioner is
solidarily liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for Quasi-Delict.
Held:
(1) The court finds Captain Jusep is guilty of negligence, the failure to take immediate and
appropriate action under the circumstances, despite the knowledge that there is typhoon but he
waited for the lapse of eight (8) hours instead. Captain Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care
and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation. The
trial court erred in applying the emergency rule because the danger where Captain Jusep found
himself was caused by his own negligence.
(2) The court finds the petitioner liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Whenever an
employees negligence causes damage to another, it instantly arise a presumption that the
employer failed to exercise the care and diligence of supervision of his employee. In Fabre ,jr.
v Court of Appeals held that due diligence requires consistent compliance of rules & regulation
for the guidance and actual implementation of rules. But the petitioner fails to give any evidence
that its rule are strictly implemented and monitored in compliance therewith petitioner is
therefore liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. The amount of P 456, 198.27due earn 6%
interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until the finality of the decision.

Civil Law: Torts and Damages

PICART v. SMITH
GR. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918

STREET, J.: (Last Clear Chance) The plaintiff was riding on a pony over a Carlatan Bridge at San
Fernando, La Union. Before he had gotten half way across, defendant approached from the opposite
direction in an automobile, going at about 10-12 miles per hour. He blew his horn as warning which the
plaintiff heard. Having seen the approaching fast-approaching auto, he pulled the pony up against the
railing on the right side instead of going left. The bridge is about 75 meters long and 4.8 meters wide. The
defendant guided the auto to the left, that being the proper side for the auto, he assumed that the plaintiff
would move to the other side. The defendant continued to approach without decreasing the speed. When
he had gotten near, there being no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, he then turned
the auto to the right to escape hitting the horse. The horse got frightened and turned its body across the
bridge with its head across the railing. The auto struck on the hock of the left hind leg of the horse which
was eventually broken. The horse fell and the plaintiff was thrown off with some violence. The horse died.
The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days. CFI of La Union absolved the defendant from liability.

ISSUE: Was defendant in maneuvering the car was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to the civil
obligation to repair the damage done?

HELD: YES. The control of the situation pass entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to
bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there was no other persons on the bridge, to take the
other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. In doing this, the
defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. In view of the known nature of the horse,
there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with autos, he might get
excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. The test of negligence is: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience. Applying the conduct of the defendant we think that
negligence is clearly established. It goes without saying that the plaintiff was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But the defendant
was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
Under this circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, with reference to the prior negligence of the
other party. Judgment is REVERSED.

MERCURY DRUG CORP. v. BAKING

GR. No. 156037, May 28, 2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: (Proximate Cause) Sebastian M. Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy
for a medical check-up. After undergoing an ECG, and several examininations, Dr. Sy found the
respondents blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal. The doctor then prescribed two medical
prescriptions- Diamicron for the blood sugar and Benalize for his triglyceride. Respondent then
proceeded to Mercury Drug Alabang to buy the prescribed medicines. The sales lady misread the
prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus what was sold was Dormicum, a potent
sleeping tablet. Unaware of the wrong medicine, he took one pill on three consecutive days. On the third

day he took the medicine, he met an accident while driving his car. He fell asleep while driving. He could
not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting the tablet he took, respondent
went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked after finding that what was sold was Dormicum instead of
Diamicron. He filed the present complaint for damages against petitioner. The trial court favored the
defendant which was affirmed by the CA hence this petition.

ISSUE: Is petitioner negligent, and if so, is the negligence was the proximate cause of the accident?

HELD: YES. Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1. damage suffered by the plaintiff, 2. fault or
negligence of the defendant, 3. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business
is imbued with public interest. Obviously, petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling the wrong
prescription. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the
said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether
the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by the physician. Petitioner contends
that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in driving his car. Proximate cause is
that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred Proximate cause is determined
from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners employee been careful in reading
the prescription. Without the potent effect of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent
would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in collision. Petition DENIED.

Umali vs. Bacani

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H.
SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570. 30 January 1976.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.
Esguerra, J.:

Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the
storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were

blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging
on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not
do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and
8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went
to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he
subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boys
parents negligence exempts petitioner from liability.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary
foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the
electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners) lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for
injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

PEOPLE vs RITTER
G.R. No. 88582. March 5, 1991. GUTIERREZ, JR., J
FAC T S :
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide involving a young girl
of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because a
foreign object left inside her vaginal canal. When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty".
Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits. The trial court rendered a decision convicting
the appellant of such crime.
ISSUE:
Whether SC should affirm the conviction of the accused rendered by the lower court?
RULING:
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the
guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most
painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to

satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act. Before the
conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit: xxx The rule is that the death of the
victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by
the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. Xxx We
cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill
of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and
outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people. The requirement
of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused
did commit the offense has not been satisfied. The established facts do not entirely rule out the
possibility that the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This
object may have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person.
However, the Court cannot base an affordance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions
and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused.(People
v. Tolentino, supra) The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs,
public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). The appellant has abused Filipino
children, enticing them with money. The Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which w i l l
adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and,
perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The
provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively
recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments
of our society. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so.
We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils
committed against them. Something must be done about it.
HELD:
The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED
on grounds of reasonable doubt.

81 SCRA 472
Torts and Damages Double Recovery of Civil Liability

VIRATA vs OCHOA
In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby
causing the latters death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for
homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved their
right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said motion. But in June 1976,
pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a separate civil
action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere

accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and
employer of Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit
alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Viratas were merely trying to
recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose
between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

American President Lines vs. Klepper

Facts:
Klepper shipped his goods on board a lift van owned American Pres. Lines his at Yokohama,
Japan. While the lift van was being unloaded, it fell on the pier and its contents spilled and
scattered. Petitioner contends that its liability should not exceed $500.00 invoking in its favor the
bill of lading. The CA, however, refused this argument and reasoned that the bill of lading was
not signed nor agreed upon by the parties.
Issue:
WON the liability of the American Pres. Lines should not exceed %500.00.
Held: YES.
Article 1753 of the civil code provides that the la w of the country to which the goods are to be
transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier in case of loss, destruction or
deterioration. This means the law of the Philippines, or the Civil Code. Under Article 1766, In
all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be
governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws, and in the Civil Code there are
provisions that govern said rights and obligations (Arts. 1736, 1737, 1738). Therefore, although
Section 4 (5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act states that the carrier shall not be liable in an
amount exceeding $500.00 per package unless the value of the goods had been declared by the
shipper and inserted in the bill of lading, said section is merely suppletory to the provisions of
the Civil Code.

In accepting the bill of lading, the shipper, consignee and owner of the goods agree to be bound
by all its stipulations, exceptions and conditions, whether written, printed or stamped on the front
or backx x x