BARNUEVO V.

FUSTER (1913)
Short summary: Spanish subjects get married in Spain, but wanted to divorce in RP.
Wife further claims the refund of the 30k Spanish dollars which is allegedly her
paraphernal property. Court held that even if divorce is not allowed in RP, the court
could still exercise jurisdiction over the parties who are domiciled in RP and it is not
divested jurisdiction by the subject matter.
Facts:
Gabriel FUSTER and Constanza Yanez were
>married in Spain 1875
>1899: made an agreement in public document that they resolved to separate and live
apart
>1909: Constanza commenced DIVORCE proceedings vs. Gabriel for Adultery, praying
for:
Decree of divorce
Conjugal society liquidated
Share adjudicated to her
Payment of support
(probably the property of the spouses belonging to the conjugal property are all located
in RP)
TC: for CONSTANZA
suspension of life in common between plaintiff and defendant
Payment of support
Division of communal property
>>>BOTH Parties appealed: Alleged dowry: WON it should be returned to CONSTANZA
WON RP courts are competent to decree the divorce? YES
Authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is NOT COMPRISED W/n
the personal status of the husband and wife
-whole theory of the statutes and the rights which belong to everyone does not go
beyond the sphere of private law
-authority and jurisdiction of courts are matters of public or political law
-jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to PROCEDURE are considered to be
of a public nature, submitted to the TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
All persons have to demand justice in a court which would have coercive means to
enforce any decision they may render

Justice should be administered WITHOUT TAKING INTO ANY ACCOUNT THE STATE
TO WHICH THE LITIGANTS BELONG
-all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their people, but to those
foreigners who contract w/n the country or outside of it juridical ties which in some
manner affect their sovereignty
HERE
CFI had jurisdiction over the person of the litigants: residents of Manila, had domicile in
Manila
THEREFORE: CFI had power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. Not divested of
jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation
If this case be decided now in RP: no absolute divorce: Divorce is considered violation
of public policy. Therefore: courts could no longer try actions for divorce even if brought
by nationals whose laws allow it

Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a
daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as

allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen

Facts:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked
of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he
registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the
foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as
dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC
denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case
was filed before the Court.
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of
the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino
spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family
Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now,
is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with
conformity to aliens national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of
divorce on the petitioner and respondents marriage certificate without judicial order
recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and Court
ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the
ruling.
CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan, Petitioner
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, Respondent.
Ponente: Sereno J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and
Resolution regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.

This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reverse the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage
between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground
of bigamy, as well as the Resolution dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion
for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and
Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988,
Orlando married respondentMeropein Calasiao, Pangasinan.Contending that said
marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with
EusebioBristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly
not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued. On October 10,
2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the respondent before appellate court and ruled in favor of her reversing
the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was dismissed by the appellate court.Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of
the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon
her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect her
family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite
overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on
the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the
divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce oramensaetthoro;or the foreign law may
restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.In such case, the
RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being
bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which
were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21,
1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.However, if there was
indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does
not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner
has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any
interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other
might subsequentlycontract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no
existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any
defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of
Orlando and Felicitas.In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree
and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando
was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of
moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from
P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the
instant case.

IWASAWA VS GANGAN GR 204169

FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his
visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as single and has never
married before. Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner
came back to the Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay
City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife
become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he
confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received
news that her previous husband passed away. Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes
confession and discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo
and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition
for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their
marriage is a bigamous one.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of petitioner and respondent is bigamous

RULING: YES. This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG,

the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits
directly prove the following facts: ( 1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20,
1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time
with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3)
that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent's
marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and ( 4) that the second marriage
of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was
still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

SANTOS vs. CA AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The
two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia
gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the
couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents
into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her.
Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home
upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance
to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to
locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him
for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his

present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
__________
Notes:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA

GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their
wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their
fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to
Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse
since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking
chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the
same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they
submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General
Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while
that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency
status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want
their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other
hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her
very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable
and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi
Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is
not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife
constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court
clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy
the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., Petitioner, vs. CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they got married, both in civil
and church ceremonies, they were awaiting their first child. Since petitioner was still a medical
student, while respondent was a student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioners parents, on
whom they were financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four children.
Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didnt have time for her; and
that she constantly quarreled with him even before marriage when he could not give her the
things she wanted. He added that she was not supportive of his career. Even marriage
counseling did not work. Petitioner stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex
with him and even told him to look for other women. He filed the petition for nullification of their
marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made pregnant by a man whom
respondent hired to follow him.
Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly accredited by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development, testified that when petitioner saw her on April 6, 1994, he was distraught,
harassed, and unhappy. She concluded from meetings with the petitioner that the marriage was
dysfunctional, destructive, and reconciliation was out of the question since he claims he would
go insane if he were to go back to his wife. Relying on the view of another expert, one Dr.
Gerardo Velasco, witness de Castro opined that professionals are per se incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage because they spend a lot of time in the pursuit of
their profession and have very little time to spend with their family. She concluded that
respondent was also psychologically incapacitated to perform the marital obligations because
she knew, from the start, that her husband was going to be a doctor, yet she did not give him the
support and understanding that was expected of a doctors wife.
Lilia Tayco, the housemaid of petitioners parents also testified that petitioner and respondent
were always quarreling because respondent was always jealous of petitioners classmates.

A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who conducted a psychiatric test on petitioner, testified that
tests showed that petitioner was a perfectionist, short-tempered, critical, argumentative and
irritable when people do not meet his expectations. He married Cynthia only after he got her
pregnant. He had depressions and tended to escapism when beset with problems. He was
vocal about his marital problems. He believed that the lack of communication, absence of
quality time, inadequacy in problem-solving, and many problems caused the failure of the
marriage.
For her part, respondent refused to submit to the psychiatric examination asked by the
petitioner, but said she would do so only when her defense requires it. She averred that she had
no marital problems, not until petitioner had an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila Posadas.
Petitioner denied the affair. Respondent narrated that early 1984, she caught petitioner and
Lucila inside the Harana Motel in Sta. Mesa where a confrontation ensued. After the incident,
petitioner seldom went home until he permanently left his family sometime in 1986. Respondent
claimed petitioner and Lucila continued to see each other and had gone abroad together several
times. She explained that she uttered she would not make love with her husband and dared him
to look for other women only out of frustration and anger upon discovery of the affair. She
admitted hiring someone to spy on petitioner, but added that she still loved her husband.
Cynthias friend since high school, Miraflor Respicio testified that Cynthia was a good, stable,
and mature person; that she was a loving and caring mother who gave up her career to take
care of her children; and that petitioner and respondent were happy during the early days of the
marriage.
On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that petitioner and respondent were both
psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations. The dispositive portion of the
courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the marriage between the parties is (sic) dated June 2, 1973 is hereby declared
null and void with the following effects:
1. The Plaintiff is hereby directed to support his children with the Defendant in the amount of
forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) a month, which sum shall be payable on or before the 5th
day of each month, effective September, 1998;
2. The parties are hereby disqualified from inheriting from each other by way of testate or
intestate succession;
3. Either of the parties may revoke the designation of the other as beneficiary in a life insurance
policy;
4. The parties children are hereby declared legitimate, and the custody of the parties minor
children is hereby awarded to the Defendant with the Plaintiff exercising his right to visit them at
least once a week;
5. The properties in the name of the parties consisting of a house and lot located at 15 Bronze
Street, Filinvest, Quezon City are hereby deemed as their advance legitime to their children.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. She averred that the trial court erred
when it annulled their marriage instead of decreeing their legal separation, with the ruling that
petitioner was the guilty spouse.
In a Decision dated January 8, 2003, the Court of Appeals held that the constant arguments,
bickerings and conflicts between the spouses did not constitute psychological incapacity. It ruled
that petitioner failed to show that any psychological incapacity in either of the two parties existed
at the time of the celebration of marriage. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial
court and declared that the marriage still subsists.
Petitioner now comes before us raising the following as issues:
(1) Are the decision and resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals proper subject for review
by the Honorable Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?
(2) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals that the lower court (RTC) erred in
finding the parties (petitioner and respondent) both psychologically incapacitated under Article
36 of The Family Code correct or not?

(3) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals that the evidence failed to show that
the parties (petitioner and respondent) were completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage correct or not? and
(4) Which is more in accord with existing law and settled jurisprudence, the decision of the Court
of Appeals or the decision of the trial court?3
Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on the ground of the parties
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner contends that the decision of the trial court was well-founded, based on the evidence
indicating that the marriage was beyond reconciliation, and allowing the marriage to subsist
would only prolong the spouses agony. Respondent counters that petitioner failed to prove
psychological incapacity, and that their psychological incapacities existed as early as the time of
the celebration of their marriage.

We shall now resolve the issue.

Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,4 we categorically said that
psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
These include the obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.5

We likewise have repeatedly reminded that the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.6 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,7 the Court gave the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 which are as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity...
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision...
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable...

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage...
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts...
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition...

In the present case, the spouses frequent squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep with
petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute psychological incapacity. The records show
that petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage,
which bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations,9 it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness10 existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
It will be noted that respondent did not undergo psychological tests. Witness de Castros
diagnosis was based solely on petitioners avowals and not on personal knowledge of the
spouses relationship. Hence, de Castros diagnosis is based on hearsay and has no probative
value.11
Further, de Castros statement that professionals are per se incapacitated to perform the
essential obligations of marriage because their profession allows them little time for family life is
highly debatable.

Lastly, petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the part of both spouses,
existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Their bickerings and arguments even
before their marriage and respondents scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their
immaturity, and immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity.12 Thus so far, both
petitioner and respondent have not shown proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an
adverse integral element in their personality structure that effectively incapacitates them from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 8, 2003
and the Resolution dated February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 65677 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

Rodolfo Aspillaga vs Aurora Aspillaga

604 SCRA 444 Civil Law Family Code Article 36; Psychological Incapacity Gravity,
Juridical Antecedence, Incurability
In 1977, Rodolfo Aspillaga and Aurora Apon met each other in college. They became
sweethearts after 5 months of courtship. In 1982, they got married. In 1983, they again married
each other as a sign of affirmation of their love to each other.
But in 1991, when Aurora returned from Japan, she discovered that Rodolfo was living with her
cousin. From that point, their marital relations soured. In 1992, Rodolfo left Aurora to live with
her cousin.
In 1995, Aurora filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that Rodolfo is
psychologically incapacitated.
Dr. Eduardo Maaba evaluated Rodolfo and Aurora. After evaluation, he concluded that both are
psychologically incapacitated. He explained that due to Auroras dark and traumatic childhood
past, she has the tendency for self dramatization and attention getting behavior. Lapses in
judgment and shallow heterosexual relationship was projected. Sign of immaturity and desire to
regress to a lower level of development were likewise projected. Self-esteem was also low.
Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness and emptiness hamper her objectivity.
On the part of Rodolfo, the doctor found that: he is an intelligent adult male, who is egoistic and
harbors an inner sense of inadequacy, helplessness and anxiety in losing agility. He, however,
projects himself as dominant person, to cover his deep-seated insecurity and inadequacy. He
tends to be suspicious and blames others for his mistakes. He claims for adulation, reassurance
and attention from other people. These can be traced from an unhealthy familial relationship
during the early maturational development specifically in the form of a domineering and
protective maternal image.
ISSUE: Whether or not both are psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No. Dr. Maaba only found that Rodolfo and Aurora are suffering from psychological
disorders but not the kind contemplated under the law on psychological incapacity which
renders them incapable to perform essential marital obligations.

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case, the foregoing were not met. Dr. Maaba failed to
reveal that these personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to
bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that
each partys condition is so grave or is of such nature as to render said party incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the
claimed incapacity is incurable and permanent. Note also that they actually had a good
marriage at first and their quarrel only began when Rodolfo cheated on her with her cousin,
hence, the allege psychological incapacity was not proven to have existed at the time of their
marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February
1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null
and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence,
the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our
civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the
spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling: The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better
for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other
but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-visexisting law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided
to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding

Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court
takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting
discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral

element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject
to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Ricardo P. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring and Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010

Facts: Ricardo and Teresita were married and had 3 children. Ricardo then filed a petition for
annulment based on Teresita psychological incapacity. He alleged that Teresita was an
adulteress and a squanderer. The doctor who performed the psychological evaluation
conducted on Ricardo and their son, Richardson, testified that the major factor that contributed
to the demise of the marriage is Teresita Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her
incapable to fulfill her essential marital obligations.

Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis to declare Ricardo and Teresita marriage void due
to psychological incapacity.

Held: No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a
marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."
It is not acceptable that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled
with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already
constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder.
SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS. RAMON REYES,
FACTS:
Marital difficulties, which mostly is due to the respondents actions, caused the petitioner to file a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent alleging psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to
his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically
incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from
Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further,
clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality
Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to
be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on
the ground of their psychological incapacity.
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC
decision and declared the parties marriage valid and subsisting. It held that the petitioner failed

to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of

herself. It held:
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents] alleged
mixed personality disorder, his come and go attitude, failed business ventures,
inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners]
feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled
promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs,
etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. [Respondents] defects were not present at the inception of marriage. They were
even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two
children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived
comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino
households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned
Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears,
however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since
1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it rejected the testimonies of
Doctors Magno and Villegas.
RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court held:

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of

Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and
interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors.
Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of
the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely
witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment
of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein
petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and
experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical
psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on
the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own
son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own
observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time
they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of
a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a

personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by
the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not
necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems;
and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards
providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail
of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality
disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder
does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the
parties or both parties psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the
inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
The respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2)
extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money
obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7)
criminal charges of estafa.
PETITION GRANTED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children. To support his family, Cesar
went to work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar learned that Lolita had been
having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez (Alvin). Subsequently, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal
home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated.
Thereafter, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of
his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity.
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent abandonment of
the family home. He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.
RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void. Upon reconsideration, CA affirmed the RTCs
decision. The Office of the Solicitor General then filed the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

CIVIL LAW: Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage. In interpreting this provision, the Court have repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and
incurability of the condition of the errant spouse. In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove
Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.
To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.
Petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is set aside.
Republic v. De Gracia
G.R. No. 171557; February 12, 2014
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at a church in Zamboanga Del Norte.
On December 25, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for the declaration of nullity of
marriage alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations. Petitioner furthered that he was forced to marry her barely 3 months into
their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18. Natividad left their
conjugal abode and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain
Engineer Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a second marriage with another
man. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated
finding that both parties suffered from utter emotional immaturity.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTCs finding of psychological incapacity?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that
Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated
with psychological incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos testimony which does not
explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be characterized as grave, deeplyrooted and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The
petition is, therefore, granted and the decision of CA reversed and set aside.