Professional Documents
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between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by
the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers
with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles
1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles
1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that
he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do
not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked,
its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of
the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This
is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his
motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede
the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking
on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the
free passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than
the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same
law. It provides:
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated
under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. 5 As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith,
as provided in Art. 2220.6
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there
was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith
in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that
petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to
assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission
of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to
the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight
of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena
that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995,
and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference
that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained.
However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be
prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be
deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury. (65 C.J.S. 1156)
The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes
negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or, according to the decisions on
the question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-observance of what
the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe
that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the
state regards certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their
absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect
to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed,
when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard
is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence
of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has
been violated, whether the act or omission constituting such violation would
have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any statute on the
subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate
that injury would result from such violation. x x x. (65 C.J.S. pp.623-628)
But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an
accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do not inquire
whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough
that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is
negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to
avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent,
it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such
circumstances the law has no reason to ignore the causal relation which
obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it
is the very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court
has applied these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the
manner of driving. (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).
x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward
an injury intervened between the violation of a statute or ordinance and the
injury does not necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be
maintained. The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events
or agents, but in their character and in the natural and probable connection
between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. The general
principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote
as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very
thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. (38 Am Jur
841)[34]
In Teague, the owner of a vocational school stricken by a fire resulting in
fatalities was found negligent, base on her failure to provide adequate fire
exits in contravention of a Manila city ordinance. [35] In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals[36], the failure of the petitioner to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances sufficed to support a finding of negligence.
[37]
In Cipriano v. Court of Appeals, [38]the Court found that the failure of the
petitioner to register and insure his auto rustproofing shop in accordance
with the statute constituted negligence per se, thus holding him liable for the
damages for the destruction by fire of a customers vehicle garaged therein.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting
from his violation of an ordinance? It cannot be denied that the statutory
purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to
promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents
involving bicycles. At face value, Villagracias mishap was precisely the
danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated. Aonuevo
argues that Villagracias violation should bar the latters recovery of damages,
and a simplistic interpretation of negligence per se might vindicate such an
argument.
But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we
consider as proven, that Aonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and
such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless
behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of
Aonuevos car as it turned into the intersection, whether they are fellow
motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that
Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with
safety regulations, especially considering that Aonuevo was already speeding
as he made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even assuming that
Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped
with headlights, such lapse on the cyclists part would not have acquitted the
driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the
mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
establishing liability for damages. In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[39] a collision between a truck and a privately-owned Cimarron van
caused the death of three of the vans passengers. The petitioner therein, the
owner of the truck, argued that the driver of the Cimarron was committing
multiple violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code [40] at the time
of the accident. Among these violations: the Cimarron was overloaded at the
time of the accident; the front seat of the van was occupied by four adults,
including the driver; and the van had only one functioning headlight. Similar
as in this case, petitioner therein invoked Article 2185 and argued that the
driver of the Cimarron should be presumed negligent. The Court, speaking
through Justice Mendoza, dismissed these arguments:
[It] has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the
burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that
it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence consisting in whole or in part,
of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence
unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that driving an
overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime
certainly increases the risk of accident, that because the Cimarron had only
one headlight, there was decreased visibility, and that the fact that the
vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded decreased its
maneuverability. However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient
to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was
the contributing cause of the injury.[41]
Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are not
grievous enough so as to negate monetary relief. In the absence of statutory
requirement, one is not negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a
horn, bell, or other warning devise onto a bicycle. [45] In most cases, the
absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not constitute negligence as a
matter of law[46] but is a question for the jury whether the absence of proper
lights played a causal part in producing a collision with a motorist. [47] The
absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or
ordinance, may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the
bicyclist is struck by a motorist as long as the absence of such lights was a
proximate cause of the collision; [48] however, the absence of such lights will
not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was well
illuminated by street lights,[49] if substitute lights were present which clearly
rendered the bicyclist visible,[50] if the motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the
absence of lights thereon,[51] or if the motorist would have been unable to see
the bicycle even if it had been equipped with lights.[52] A bicycle equipped
with defective or ineffective brakes may support a finding of negligence
barring or diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition
was a contributing cause of the accident.[53]
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the bicycle
owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by
ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a
causal connection is established between such failure and the injury
sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein
we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the
proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto.
[54]
Aonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of
Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latters injury.
On this point, the findings of the Court of Appeals are well-worth citing:
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise
from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The
doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial
guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the
earlier (sic) jeep which was already at a full stop giving way to appellee. But
according to [eyewitness] Sorsano, he saw appellant Aonuevo umaarangkada
and hit the leg of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30). This earlier (sic)
jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but Aonuevo at an
unexpected motion (umarangkada) came out hitting Villagracia (TSN March
9, 1990 p. 49). Appellant Aonuevo admitted that he did not blow his horn
when he crossed Boni Avenue (TSN March 21, 1990 p. 47). [55]
By Aonuevos own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance
of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the
turn, Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia.
Moreover, the fact that Aonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident
would negate any possibility that the absence of lights on the bike
contributed to the cause of the accident. [56] A motorist has been held liable
for injury to or death of a bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly into
the bicyclist so as to cause a collision.[57]
Neither does Aonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal
connection between the safety violations imputed to Villagracia and the
accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these
violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable
against Villagracia. Since the onus on Aonuevo is to conclusively prove the
link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having
failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving Villagracias own liability.
Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence.
The leading case in contributory negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf[58]clarifies
that damages may be mitigated if the claimant in conjunction with the
occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury. [59] To hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending
danger to health and body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is still
necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense,
negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury,
and not simply a condition for its occurrence.[61]
As between Aonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged
Aonuevo as solely responsible for the accident. The petition does not
demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that
the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracias bicycle had
been equipped with safety equipment. Aonuevo himself admitted having
seen Villagracia from ten (10) meters away, thus he could no longer claim not
having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact
that Aonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us
to believe that even if Villagracias bicycle had been equipped with the proper
brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid
the speeding car. Moreover, it was incumbent on Aonuevo to have
established that Villagracias failure to have installed the proper brakes
contributed to his own injury. The fact that Aonuevo failed to adduce proof to
that effect leads us to consider such causal connection as not proven.
All told, there is no reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs.THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT
out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a
collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered
some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump
truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on
the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was
his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under
the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.
Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the
selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix
and Carbonel and ordered the latter:
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P
15,000.00 for hospital bills and the replacement of the lost
dentures of plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P
1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected income for plaintiff
brought about the accident in controversy and which is the
result of the negligence of the defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P
10,000. as moral damages for the unexpected and sudden
withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a
marketing man; mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious
anxiety, social humiliation, besmirched reputation, feeling
of economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and
frustration in life experienced by plaintiff and his family
since the accident in controversy up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P
10,000.00 as damages for the wanton disregard of
defendants to settle amicably this case with the plaintiff
before the filing of this case in court for a smaller amount.
and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and
Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that both courts failed to pass upon the
defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the true legal and proximate
cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been
parked but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that
night when he smashed into the dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate
Court in its questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in some
way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio's
negligence and made no further mention of it. We have examined the record
both before the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court and we find
that both parties had placed into the record sufficient evidence on the basis
of which the trial court and the appellate court could have and should have
made findings of fact relating to the alleged reckless manner in which
Dionisio drove his car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel
contend that if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck
was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening,
efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.
The need to administer substantial justice as between the parties in this
case, without having to remand it back to the trial court after eleven years,
compels us to address directly the contention put forward by the petitioners
and to examine for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged
negligence which must bear upon the liability, or extent of liability, of
Phoenix and Carbonel.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not
private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that
eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before
the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned
off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those
headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d)
whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass
was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was
any found in his car. Phoenix's evidence here consisted of the testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno who had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati Medical
Center for emergency treatment immediately after the accident. At the
Makati Medical Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them
along with the contents of pockets together with Patrolman Cuyno. 1
Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during
the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have
misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two years
after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone
Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
which was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and
Metro Manila. This certification was to the effect that private respondent
Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however, specify
any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew
pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove
possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that
the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass
during that night. The relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew
pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other related issues:
whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had indeed purposely
put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and
possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after
the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.
On the second issue whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night
both the trial court and the appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman
Cuyno who was at the scene of the accident almost immediately after it
occurred, the police station where he was based being barely 200 meters
away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene
of the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not
have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed that he was
travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour and had just
crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and
had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision
took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was
hearsay and did not fag within any of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not acquired by him through
official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to any
duty to do so. Private respondent's objection fails to take account of the fact
that the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official
records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as part of the res
gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule
consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or
event sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal
reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made as a
avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or
omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the
fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts
seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate
them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position
must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence
on the part of his employer Phoenix 16in supervising its employees properly
and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in
our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of
negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to
bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early
the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on
the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is
parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing
of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative
negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners
Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands
of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 2080 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate
court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00
as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio;
only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and
Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively
by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from
Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of
damages made by the respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by
reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected
income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20%
of such amount. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway
by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. On the other hand,
private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo
Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was
Erlinda's allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium
(Pentothal).
After considering the evidence from both sides, the Regional Trial Court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, to wit:
After evaluating the evidence as shown in the finding of
facts set forth earlier, and applying the aforecited
provisions of law and jurisprudence to the case at bar, this
Court finds and so holds that defendants are liable to
plaintiffs for damages. The defendants were guilty of, at
the very least, negligence in the performance of their duty
to plaintiff-patient Erlinda Ramos.
On the part of Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, this Court finds that
she omitted to exercise reasonable care in not only
intubating the patient, but also in not repeating the
administration of atropine (TSN, August 20, 1991, pp. 510), without due regard to the fact that the patient was
inside the operating room for almost three (3) hours. For
after she committed a mistake in intubating [the] patient,
the patient's nailbed became bluish and the patient,
thereafter, was placed in trendelenburg position, because
of the decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain. The
evidence further shows that the hapless patient suffered
brain damage because of the absence of oxygen in her
(patient's) brain for approximately four to five minutes
which, in turn, caused the patient to become comatose.
Thus, on 8 January 1986, petitioners filed a civil case 6 for damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents
alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of
Erlinda's injury. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz
and Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the sustained by Erlinda was due to
SO ORDERED.
10
A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. Sillano on 11 April 1996.
The next day, or on 12 April 1996, Atty. Sillano filed before this Court a
motion for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under
Rule 45. The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave
petitioners additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day
(15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals
within which to submit the petition. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. The
petition was filed on 9 May 1996, well within the extended period given by
the Court.
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the following
grounds:
I
IN PUTTING MUCH RELIANCE ON THE TESTIMONIES OF
RESPONDENTS DRA. GUTIERREZ, DRA. CALDERON AND DR.
JAMORA;
II
IN FINDING THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS
DID NOT CAUSE THE UNFORTUNATE COMATOSE CONDITION
OF PETITIONER ERLINDA RAMOS;
III
11
Before we discuss the merits of the case, we shall first dispose of the
procedural issue on the timeliness of the petition in relation to the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals. In their
Comment, 12 private respondents contend that the petition should not be
given due course since the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners on
the decision of the Court of Appeals was validly dismissed by the appellate
court for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. We do not agree.
A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in
filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the
decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of
petitioners, the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of the decision of the
appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos
on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos.
Based on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos,
the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Thus,
no copy of the decision of the counsel on record. Petitioner, not being a
lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for
reconsideration, referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995.
It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices
should be sent to the party's lawyer at his given address. With a few
exceptions, notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no
notice at all. In the present case, since a copy of the decision of the appellate
court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner, there can be no
sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. Moreover, since the Court
of Appeals already issued a second Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, which
superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995, and denied the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner, we believed that the receipt of the
former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of the
present petition. Based on this, the petition before us was submitted on time.
After resolving the foregoing procedural issue, we shall now look into the
merits of the case. For a more logical presentation of the discussion we shall
first consider the issue on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquiturto the instant case. Thereafter, the first two assigned errors shall be
tackled in relation to the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for
the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption
of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima faciecase, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. 13 Where the
thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management
or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by
the defendant's want of care. 14
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that,
as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain
types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. 15 It is
grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis
of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself. 16 Hence,res ipsa loquitur is
applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent
or separate ground of liability. 17 Instead, it is considered as merely
evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. 18 It is regarded as a mode
of proof, or a mere procedural of convenience since it furnishes a substitute
for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of
negligence. 19 In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a
step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along
with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to
invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and
to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the
proof. 20 Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following
requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and
prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the
injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard
of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way,
under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress
for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following
situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an
operation, 32 injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not
under, or in the area, of treatment, 33 removal of the wrong part of the body
when another part was intended, 34 knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw
was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, 35 and loss of an eye
while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or
following an operation for appendicitis, 36 among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been
measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not
a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be
cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is
generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able
to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed
if
due
care
had
been
exercised. 37 A distinction must be made between the failure to secure
results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily
found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of
those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. 38 The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain
why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
treatment did not produce the desired result. 39 Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of
an operation or treatment was not accomplished. 40 The real question,
therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary
incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which
is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the
average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward
consequence. 41 If there was such extraneous interventions, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to
explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could. 42
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will
hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior
to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application
ofres ipsa loquitur.
A case strikingly similar to the one before us is Voss vs. Bridwell,
Kansas Supreme Court in applying theres ipsa loquitur stated:
43
where the
Indeed, the principles enunciated in the aforequoted case apply with equal
force here. In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy
and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder.
On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and
control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control
over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and,
except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and
body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the
performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her
brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room
already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage,
which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the
process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in
the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia
and in the use of endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under
anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering
such anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the
endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private
respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda
could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under
the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is
injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the
immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical
administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon
these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as
a matter of common knowledge and observation, if negligence attended the
management and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians
and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to
secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the
diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever
performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is
made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case
we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where
injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia
cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to
be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage.
Having in mind the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and the
presumption of negligence allowed therein, the Court now comes to the issue
of whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents
were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the
operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the
proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose condition. Corollary thereto, we shall
also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of
the witnesses for the private respondents.
In sustaining the position of private respondents, the Court of Appeals relied
on the testimonies of Dra. Gutierrez, Dra. Calderon and Dr. Jamora. In giving
weight to the testimony of Dra. Gutierrez, the Court of Appeals rationalized
that she was candid enough to admit that she experienced some difficulty in
the endotracheal intubation 45 of the patient and thus, cannot be said to be
covering her negligence with falsehood. The appellate court likewise opined
that private respondents were able to show that the brain damage sustained
by Erlinda was not caused by the alleged faulty intubation but was due to the
allergic reaction of the patient to the drug Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal), a
short-acting barbiturate, as testified on by their expert witness, Dr. Jamora.
On the other hand, the appellate court rejected the testimony of Dean
Herminda Cruz offered in favor of petitioners that the cause of the brain
injury was traceable to the wrongful insertion of the tube since the latter,
being a nurse, was allegedly not knowledgeable in the process of intubation.
In so holding, the appellate court returned a verdict in favor of respondents
physicians and hospital and absolved them of any liability towards Erlinda
and her family.
We disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeals. We hold that private
respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their
part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of
her piteous condition.
In the instant case, the records are helpful in furnishing not only the logical
scientific evidence of the pathogenesis of the injury but also in providing the
Court the legal nexus upon which liability is based. As will be shown
hereinafter, private respondents' own testimonies which are reflected in the
transcript of stenographic notes are replete of signposts indicative of their
negligence in the care and management of Erlinda.
With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, we find her negligent in the care of Erlinda
during the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, respondent Dra.
Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. This fact was attested to by
Prof. Herminda Cruz, Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing
and petitioner's sister-in-law, who was in the operating room right beside the
patient when the tragic event occurred. Witness Cruz testified to this effect:
ATTY. PAJARES:
Q: In particular, what did Dra. Perfecta
Gutierrez do, if any on the patient?
A: In particular, I could see that she was
intubating the patient.
Q: Do you know what happened to that
intubation process administered by Dra.
Gutierrez?
ATTY. ALCERA:
She will be incompetent Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer if she knows.
A: As have said, I was with the patient, I
was beside the stretcher holding the left
hand of the patient and all of a sudden
heard some remarks coming from Dra.
Perfecta Gutierrez herself. She was saying
"Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata
ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony of expert
witnesses is not required. It is the accepted rule that expert testimony is not
necessary for the proof of negligence in non-technical matters or those of
which an ordinary person may be expected to have knowledge, or where the
lack of skill or want of care is so obvious as to render expert testimony
unnecessary. 49 We take judicial notice of the fact that anesthesia procedures
have become so common, that even an ordinary person can tell if it was
administered properly. As such, it would not be too difficult to tell if the tube
was properly inserted. This kind of observation, we believe, does not require
a medical degree to be acceptable.
At any rate, without doubt, petitioner's witness, an experienced clinical nurse
whose long experience and scholarship led to her appointment as Dean of
the Capitol Medical Center School at Nursing, was fully capable of
determining whether or not the intubation was a success. She had extensive
clinical experience starting as a staff nurse in Chicago, Illinois; staff nurse
and clinical instructor in a teaching hospital, the FEU-NRMF; Dean of the
Laguna College of Nursing in San Pablo City; and then Dean of the Capitol
Medical Center School of Nursing. 50Reviewing witness Cruz' statements, we
find that the same were delivered in a straightforward manner, with the kind
of detail, clarity, consistency and spontaneity which would have been difficult
to fabricate. With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied
that she was able to demonstrate through her testimony what truly
transpired on that fateful day.
Most of all, her testimony was affirmed by no less than respondent Dra.
Gutierrez who admitted that she experienced difficulty in inserting the tube
into Erlinda's trachea, to wit:
ATTY. LIGSAY:
Q: In this particular case, Doctora, while
you were intubating at your first attempt
(sic), you did not immediately see the
trachea?
DRA. GUTIERREZ:
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did you
immediately?
pull
away
the
tube
62
on the above standard since he lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and
training in the field of anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting testimony
from a specialist in the wrong field, private respondents' intentionally
avoided providing testimony by competent and independent experts in the
proper areas.
Moreover, private respondents' theory, that Thiopental Sodium may have
produced Erlinda's coma by triggering an allergic mediated response, has no
support in evidence. No evidence of stridor, skin reactions, or wheezing
some of the more common accompanying signs of an allergic reaction
appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented to the court.
In any case, private respondents themselves admit that Thiopental induced,
allergic-mediated bronchospasm happens only very rarely. If courts were to
accept private respondents' hypothesis without supporting medical proof,
and against the weight of available evidence, then every anesthetic accident
would be an act of God. Evidently, the Thiopental-allergy theory vigorously
asserted by private respondents was a mere afterthought. Such an
explanation was advanced in order to advanced in order to absolve them of
any and all responsibility for the patient's condition.
In view of the evidence at hand, we are inclined to believe petitioners' stand
that it was the faulty intubation which was the proximate cause of Erlinda's
comatose condition.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. 64 An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from
the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury
or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence
of the act or omission. 65 It is the dominant, moving or producing cause.
Applying the above definition in relation to the evidence at hand, faulty
intubation is undeniably the proximate cause which triggered the chain of
events leading to Erlinda's brain damage and, ultimately, her comatosed
condition.
Private respondents themselves admitted in their testimony that the first
intubation was a failure. This fact was likewise observed by witness Cruz
when she heard respondent Dra. Gutierrez remarked, "Ang hirap ma-intubate
nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Thereafter, witness
Cruz noticed abdominal distention on the body of Erlinda. The development
of abdominal distention, together with respiratory embarrassment indicates
that the endotracheal tube entered the esophagus instead of the respiratory
tree. In other words, instead of the intended endotracheal intubation what
actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation, such
distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the
esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the
esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the
lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal
distention had been observed during the first intubation suggests that the
length of time utilized in inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the
tube was withdrawn for the second attempt) was fairly significant. Due to the
delay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs of
cyanosis. 66 As stated in the testimony of Dr. Hosaka, the lack of oxygen
became apparent only after he noticed that the nailbeds of Erlinda were
already blue. 67 However, private respondents contend that a second
intubation was executed on Erlinda and this one was successfully done. We
do not think so. No evidence exists on record, beyond private respondents'
bare claims, which supports the contention that the second intubation was
successful. Assuming that the endotracheal tube finally found its way into the
proper orifice of the trachea, the same gave no guarantee of oxygen
delivery, the hallmark of a successful intubation. In fact, cyanosis was again
observed immediately after the second intubation. Proceeding from this
event (cyanosis), it could not be claimed, as private respondents insist, that
the second intubation was accomplished. Even granting that the tube was
successfully inserted during the second attempt, it was obviously too late. As
aptly explained by the trial court, Erlinda already suffered brain damage as a
result of the inadequate oxygenation of her brain for about four to five
minutes. 68
experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough preoperative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going around the short
neck and protruding teeth. 72 Having failed to observe common medical
standards in pre-operative management and intubation, respondent Dra.
Gutierrez' negligence resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of
Erlinda.
The above conclusion is not without basis. Scientific studies point out that
intubation problems are responsible for one-third (1/3) of deaths and serious
injuries associated with anesthesia. 69 Nevertheless, ninety-eight percent
(98%) or the vast majority of difficult intubations may be anticipated by
performing a thorough evaluation of the patient's airway prior to the
operation. 70 As stated beforehand, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to
observe the proper pre-operative protocol which could have prevented this
unfortunate incident. Had appropriate diligence and reasonable care been
used in the pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician could have been
much more prepared to meet the contingency brought about by the
perceived anatomic variations in the patient's neck and oral area, defects
which would have been easily overcome by a prior knowledge of those
variations together with a change in technique. 71 In other words, an
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing
of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises.
Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or attending, are required to
submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications;
generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate),
evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are
carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a
review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the
application. 75 This is particularly true with respondent hospital.
patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege
of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of
admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to these, the physician's
performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review
committee on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback
from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties,
or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards
acceptable to the hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely
terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying
all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that
for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now
arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with
respondent doctors for petitioner's condition. 76
We now come to the amount of damages due petitioners. The trial court
awarded a total of P632,000.00 pesos (should be P616,000.00) in
compensatory damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being updated"
covering the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15 April 1992, based on
monthly expenses for the care of the patient estimated at P8,000.00.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of
its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others
based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas. 77 Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned
prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage. 78 In other words, while the burden of proving negligence
rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the
respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that
they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the
degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to
offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby
failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting
and relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents.
Indeed, as shown by the above discussions, private respondents were unable
to rebut the presumption of negligence. Upon these disquisitions we hold that
private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 79 of
the Civil Code.
Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the
plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation,
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the
time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of
negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated.
However, these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in
this case, where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future
complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are
difficult to predict.
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are
to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one
which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of
trial;and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but
which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. 80 In
other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of
actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
As it would not be equitable and certainly not in the best interests of the
administration of justice for the victim in such cases to constantly come
before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the
compensatory damages previously awarded temperate damages are
appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain
extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care.
In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing
care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a
decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the
amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now
much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for
temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their
loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove
negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and
with respect to the supervision of their employees.
The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain reports on
the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain
Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Portions of the first two
reports are as follows:
1. Police Department report:
This case is before us on a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing petitioners' second amended complaint against respondents.
The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code.
It appears that in the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the
Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue,
Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the
nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned several
neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside
them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex
(Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and
the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both
of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
contended: first, that said reports were admitted by the trial court without
objection on the part of respondents; secondly, that with respect to the police
report (Exhibit V-Africa) which appears signed by a Detective Zapanta
allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the latter was presented as witness but
respondents waived their right to cross-examine him although they had the
opportunity to do so; and thirdly, that in any event the said reports are
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under section 35 of Rule 123,
now Rule 130.
The first contention is not borne out by the record. The transcript of the
hearing of September 17, 1953 (pp. 167-170) shows that the reports in
question, when offered as evidence, were objected to by counsel for each of
respondents on the ground that they were hearsay and that they were
"irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent." Indeed, in the court's resolution
only Exhibits J, K, K-5 and X-6 were admitted without objection; the admission
of the others, including the disputed ones, carried no such explanation.
On the second point, although Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand,
he was not examined and he did not testify as to the facts mentioned in his
alleged report (signed by Detective Zapanta). All he said was that he was one
of those who investigated "the location of the fire and, if possible, gather
witnesses as to the occurrence, and that he brought the report with him.
There was nothing, therefore, on which he need be cross-examined; and the
contents of the report, as to which he did not testify, did not thereby become
competent evidence. And even if he had testified, his testimony would still
have been objectionable as far as information gathered by him from third
persons was concerned.
Petitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves, that is, without
further testimonial evidence on their contents, fall within the scope of section
35, Rule 123, which provides that "entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a)
that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here.
Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and
circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the
officers who conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such facts,
however, acquired by them through official information? As to some facts the
sources thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo
Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas station were the fire occurred;
to Leandro Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was being
transferred at the time to the underground tank of the station; and to
respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give
any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their statements as "official
information" acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons
who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the
facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record. 1
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule;
the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through
official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any
duty to do so.
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin
of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume
negligence on the part of appellees. Both the trial court and the appellate
court refused to apply the doctrine in the instant case on the grounds that
"as to (its) applicability ... in the Philippines, there seems to he nothing
definite," and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate
cases, "in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such
doctrine." The question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The
doctrine has actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu
vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. (CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September
20, 1949), wherein the decision of the Court of Appeals was penned by Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes now a member of the Supreme Court.
The facts of that case are stated in the decision as follows:
In the afternoon of May 5, 1946, while the plaintiff-appellee and
other companions were loading grass between the municipalities of
Bay and Calauan, in the province of Laguna, with clear weather and
without any wind blowing, an electric transmission wire, installed
and maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and Development
Co., Inc. alongside the road, suddenly parted, and one of the broken
ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck.
As a result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts carried by
the wire and was knocked unconscious to the ground. The electric
charge coursed through his body and caused extensive and serious
multiple burns from skull to legs, leaving the bone exposed in some
parts and causing intense pain and wounds that were not
completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947, over
one year after the mishap.
The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to show any specific act of negligence, but the appellate court
overruled the defense under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court said:
The first point is directed against the sufficiency of plaintiff's
evidence to place appellant on its defense. While it is the rule, as
contended by the appellant, that in case of noncontractual
negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was the
negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized principal that
"where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured
person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the
injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he
having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from
defendant's want of care."
And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has
observed due care and diligence. (San Juan Light & Transit Co. v.
Requena, 244, U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 680.) This rule is known by the
name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself), and is
peculiarly applicable to the case at bar, where it is unquestioned
that the plaintiff had every right to be on the highway, and the
electric wire was under the sole control of defendant company. In
the ordinary course of events, electric wires do not part suddenly in
fair weather and injure people, unless they are subjected to unusual
strain and stress or there are defects in their installation,
maintenance and supervision; just as barrels do not ordinarily roll
out of the warehouse windows to injure passersby, unless some one
was negligent. (Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H & Co. 722; 159 Eng. Reprint
299, the leading case that established that rule). Consequently, in
the absence of contributory negligence (which is admittedly not
present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a
reasonable presumption of negligence in its installation, care and
maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock, "if
the tank truck were under the control of the defendant and operated
by its agents or employees. We further find from the uncontradicted
testimony of plaintiff's witnesses that fire started in the underground
tank attached to the filling station while it was being filled from the
tank truck and while both the tank and the truck were in charge of
and being operated by the agents or employees of the defendant,
extended to the hose and tank truck, and was communicated from
the burning hose, tank truck, and escaping gasoline to the building
owned by the plaintiff.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of
defendant's failure to explain the cause of the fire or to show its lack
of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has evoked the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which the doctrine may be
successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of them.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to
be under the management of defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. (45 C.J. #768,
p. 1193).
This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely
approved and adopted by the courts of last resort. Some of the
cases in this jurisdiction in which the doctrine has been applied are
the following, viz.: Maus v. Broderick, 51 La. Ann. 1153, 25 So. 977;
Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, etc., Co., 111 La. 522, 35 So. 731, 64
L.R.A. 101, 100 Am. St. Rep. 505; Willis v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 115
La. 63, 38 So. 892; Bents v. Page, 115 La. 560, 39 So. 599.
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force
here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees,
was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and
burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known
how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the
incident happened because of want of care.
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio Mariano of the Manila Police
Department (Exh. X-1 Africa) the following appears:
broke out. He said: "Before loading the underground tank there were no
people, but while the loading was going on, there were people who went to
drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from the hole
leading to the underground tank." He added that when the tank was almost
filled he went to the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back
turned to the "manhole" he, heard someone shout "fire."
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses
were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely,
their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames
from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high,
and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which
would predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat.
Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of
the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the
second amended complaint that "the fire was caused through the acts of a
stranger who, without authority, or permission of answering defendant,
passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in
the premises." No evidence on this point was adduced, but assuming the
allegation to be true certainly any unfavorable inference from the
admission may be taken against Boquiren it does not extenuate his
negligence. A decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous
to those of the present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here.
"It is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a
degree of protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate with a
danger involved ... we think it is the generally accepted rule as applied to
torts that 'if the effects of the actor's negligent conduct actively and
continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active
and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person's
innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm, does not protect the actor from liability.' (Restatement of the Law
of Torts, vol. 2, p. 1184, #439). Stated in another way, "The intention of an
unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer
from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately
cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury." (MacAfee, et
al. vs. Traver's Gas Corporation, 153 S.W. 2nd 442.)
The next issue is whether
caused to appellants. This
independent contractor, as
Caltex. This question, in the
and hence may be passed upon by this Court. These facts are: (1) Boquiren
made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex; (2) at the time of the fire
Caltex owned the gasoline station and all the equipment therein; (3) Caltex
exercised control over Boquiren in the management of the state; (4) the
delivery truck used in delivering gasoline to the station had the name of
CALTEX painted on it; and (5) the license to store gasoline at the station was
in the name of Caltex, which paid the license fees. (Exhibit T-Africa; Exhibit UAfrica; Exhibit X-5 Africa; Exhibit X-6 Africa; Exhibit Y-Africa).
In Boquiren's amended answer to the second amended complaint, he denied
that he directed one of his drivers to remove gasoline from the truck into the
tank and alleged that the "alleged driver, if one there was, was not in his
employ, the driver being an employee of the Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or the
owners of the gasoline station." It is true that Boquiren later on amended his
answer, and that among the changes was one to the effect that he was not
acting as agent of Caltex. But then again, in his motion to dismiss appellants'
second amended complaint the ground alleged was that it stated no cause of
action since under the allegations thereof he was merely acting as agent of
Caltex, such that he could not have incurred personal liability. A motion to
dismiss on this ground is deemed to be an admission of the facts alleged in
the complaint.
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment
therein, but claims that the business conducted at the service station in
question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present
any contract with Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship
at the time of the fire. There must have been one in existence at that time.
Instead, what was presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for
purposes of this case, since it was entered into shortly before the expiration
of the one-year period it was intended to operate. This so-called license
agreement (Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed on November 29, 1948, but made
effective as of January 1, 1948 so as to cover the date of the fire, namely,
March 18, 1948. This retroactivity provision is quite significant, and gives rise
to the conclusion that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from any
responsibility with respect to the fire, as shown by the clause that Caltex
"shall not be liable for any injury to person or property while in the property
herein licensed, it being understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is
not an employee, representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."
But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can hardly be
considered an independent contractor. Under that agreement Boquiren would
pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and
all the equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex Products. Maintenance of
the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words
control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee
without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be
from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated
by Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel
and terminate the agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex
products, or did not conduct the business with due diligence, in the judgment
of Caltex. Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to
Caltex but not to Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent
of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter
was virtually an employee of the former.
Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his
position to the company and the latter could remove him or
terminate his services at will; that the service station belonged to
the company and bore its tradename and the operator sold only the
products of the company; that the equipment used by the operator
belonged to the company and were just loaned to the operator and
the company took charge of their repair and maintenance; that an
employee of the company supervised the operator and conducted
periodic inspection of the company's gasoline and service station;
that the price of the products sold by the operator was fixed by the
company and not by the operator; and that the receipts signed by
the operator indicated that he was a mere agent, the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the operator was an agent of the company
and not an independent contractor should not be disturbed.
To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not
bound to rely upon the name or title given it by the contracting
parties, should thereby a controversy as to what they really had
intended to enter into, but the way the contracting parties do or
perform their respective obligations stipulated or agreed upon may
be shown and inquired into, and should such performance conflict
with the name or title given the contract by the parties, the former
must prevail over the latter. (Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd.
vs. Firemens' Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil.
757).
The written contract was apparently drawn for the purpose of
creating the apparent relationship of employer and independent
contractor, and of avoiding liability for the negligence of the
employees about the station; but the company was not satisfied to
allow such relationship to exist. The evidence shows that it
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are 1) the decision 1 of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court 2 in AC-G.R. CV No. 01055, entitled "Pedro
T. Layugan, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Godofredo Isidro, Defendant-Appellant
and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Travellers Multi-Indemnity
Corporation, Third Party Defendant- Appellant, "which reversed and set aside
the decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch XXVI,
Cabanatuan City, and also dismissed the complaint, third party complaint,
and the counter claims of the parties and 2) the resolution 4 denying the
plaintiff-appellee's (herein petitioner) motion for reconsideration, for lack of
merit.
The findings of fact by the trial court which were adopted by the appellate
court are as follows: 5
xxx xxx xxx
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against
Godofredo Isidro, alleging that on May 15, 1979 while at
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck with
Plate No. SU-730 which was parked along the right side of
the National Highway; that defendant's truck bearing Plate
No. PW-583, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped
the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and
the case if the findings are contrary to the admission of both the appellant
and the appellee; 6) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; 7) the said findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 8) the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and 9) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on
record.
Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 obtain in the instant case to warrant a
deviation from the general rule.
From its finding that the parked truck was loaded with ten (10) big round
logs 13 the Court of Appeals inferred that because of its weight the truck
could not have been driven to the shoulder of the road and concluded that
the same was parked on a portion of the road 14 at the time of the accident.
Consequently, the respondent court inferred that the mishap was due to the
negligence of the driver of the parked truck. 15 The inference or conclusion is
manifestly erroneous. In a large measure, it is grounded on speculation,
surmise, or conjecture. How the respondent court could have reversed the
finding of the trial court that a warning device was installed 16 escapes us
because it is evident from the record that really such a device, in the form of
a lighted kerosene lamp, was installed by the driver of the parked truck three
to four meters from the rear of his parked truck. 17 We see this negative
finding of the respondent appellate court as a misreading of the facts and the
evidence on record and directly contravening the positive finding of the trial
court that an early warning device was in proper place when the accident
happened and that the driver of the private respondent was the one
negligent. On the other hand, the respondent court, in refusing to give its
"imprimatur to the trial court's finding and conclusion that Daniel Serrano
(private respondent Isidro's driver) was negligent in driving the truck that
bumped the parked truck", did not cite specific evidence to support its
conclusion. In cavalier fashion, it simply and nebulously adverted to
unspecified "scanty evidence on record." 18
On the technical aspect of the case, the respondent corporation would want
us to dismiss this petition on the ground that it was filed out of time. It must
be noted that there was a motion for extension, 19 albeit filed erroneously
with the respondent court, dated March 19, 1986, requesting for 30 days
from March 20, 1986, to file the necessary petition or pleading before the
Supreme Court". Also, on April 1, 1986, an appearance of a new lawyer for
the petitioner before the Supreme Court" with motion 20 was filed, again
erroneously, with the Court of Appeals, requesting for 20 days extension "to
file the Petition for Review on Certiorari." Likewise a similar motion 21 was
filed with this Court also on April 1, 1986. On the other hand, the instant
petition for review was filed on April 17, 1986 22 but it was only after three
months, on August 1, 1986, in its comment 23 that the respondent
corporation raised the issue of tardiness. The respondent corporation should
not have waited in ambush before the comment was required and before due
course was given. In any event, to exact its "a pound of flesh", so to speak, at
this very late stage, would cause a grave miscarriage of justice.
Parenthetically, it must be noted that private respondent Isidro did not raise
this issue of late filing.
We now come to the merits of this petition.
The question before us is who was negligent? Negligence is the omission to
do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do 24 or as Judge
Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 25
In Picart vs. Smith,
rule, we held:
26
petitioner, for, as previously claimed, his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to
be on the road, while the immobile cargo truck had no business, so to speak,
to be there. Likewise, Isidro proffers that the petitioner must show to the
satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he (petitioner) himself,
provided an early warning device, like that required by law, or, by some other
adequate means that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending
danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time, place, and other
peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the
case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur,
evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked
cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat
tire of the said truck. 27
Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable.
The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of
the parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed. 28 Moreover, there is
the admission of respondent Isidro's driver, Daniel Serrano, to Wit: 29
Question No. 8 (by Patrolman Josefino Velasco)Will you
narrate to me in brief how the accident happens (sic) if you
can still remember?
Answer: (by Daniel Serrano)
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of
the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the
warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four
meters from the back of the truck. 30 But despite this warning which we rule
as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the
private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a
direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his
left forearm and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the
knee when gangrene had set in. 31
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of
Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. It
follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by respondent
Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to escape liability for the negligence
of his employee, the respondent court committed reversible error.
32
This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to
be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care. 33 Or as Black's Law Dictionary 34 puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent,
which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident
was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby
negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from
mere fact that accident happened provided character of
accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to
belief that in absence of negligence it would not have
occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to
have been under management and control of alleged
wrongdoer. Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484
S.W. 2d 133, 155. Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the
happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence
where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury
was caused by an agency or instrumentality under
exclusive control and management of defendant, and that
the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of
things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first
place, it is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he
apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he
could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut,
and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided.
Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to intruct
his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the
fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent court,
are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial
Court given the facts established at the trial 47 The private respondent or his
mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough
inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of
the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove
that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his
employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to
the petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a
family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an
iota of evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum
of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly
in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is
not all. There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in
the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of
his truck and thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility
of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code
has not ceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
respondent court as well as its Resolution denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court,
dated January 20, 1983, is hereby REINSTATED in toto. With costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
vs. METROPOLITAN
WATER
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 o'clock, Dominador Ong, a 14year old high school student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and
Eusebio, went to defendant's swimming pools. This was not the first time that
the three brothers had gone to said natatorium for they had already been
there four or five times before. They arrived at the natatorium at about 1:45
p.m. After paying the requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one
of the small pools where the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m.,
Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an
adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and
Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so
they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In
that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound,
namely, Manuel Abao and Mario Villanueva. The tour of duty of Abao was
from 8:00 to 12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00 in the afternoon,
and of Villanueva from 7:30 to 11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m.
Between 4:00 to 5:00 that afternoon, there were about twenty bathers inside
the pool area and Manuel Abao was going around the pools to observe the
bathers in compliance with the instructions of his chief.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a
bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming
under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel
Abao of the same happening and Abao immediately jumped into the big
swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong
from the bottom. The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abao
immediately applied manual artificial respiration. Soon after, male nurse
Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector
Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of
the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a
medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil.
After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the
University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abao continued the artificial
manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the
resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted. Not long thereafter,
Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator, but the same became of no use
because he found the boy already dead. The doctor ordered that the body be
taken to the clinic.
In the evening of the same day, July 5, 1952, the incident was investigated
by the Police Department of Quezon City and in the investigation boys Ruben
Ong and Andres Hagad, Jr. gave written statements. On the following day,
July 6, 1952, an autopsy was performed by Dr. Enrique V. de los Santos,
Chief, Medico Legal Division, National Bureau of Investigation, who found in
the body of the deceased the following: an abrasion on the right elbow lateral
Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence,
the principle to be observed is that the person claiming damages has the
burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the
person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his employees (Walter
A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517). The
question then that arises is: Have appellants established by sufficient
evidence the existence of fault or negligence on the part of appellee so as to
render it liable for damages for the death of Dominador Ong?
There is no question that appellants had striven to prove that appellee failed
to take the necessary precaution to protect the lives of its patrons by not
placing at the swimming pools efficient and competent employees who may
render help at a moment's notice, and they ascribed such negligence to
appellee because the lifeguard it had on the occasion minor Ong was
drowning was not available or was attending to something else with the
result that his help came late. Thus, appellants tried to prove through the
testimony of Andres Hagad, Jr. and Ruben Ong that when Eusebio Ong and
Hagad, Jr. detected that there was a drowning person in the bottom of the big
swimming pool and shouted to the lifeguard for help, lifeguard Manuel Abao
did not immediately respond to the alarm and it was only upon the third call
that he threw away the magazine he was reading and allowed three or four
minutes to elapse before retrieving the body from the water. This negligence
of Abao, they contend, is attributable to appellee.
But the claim of these two witnesses not only was vehemently denied by
lifeguard Abao, but is belied by the written statements given by them in the
investigation conducted by the Police Department of Quezon City
approximately three hours after the happening of the accident. Thus, these
two boys admitted in the investigation that they narrated in their statements
everything they knew of the accident, but, as found by the trial, nowhere in
said statements do they state that the lifeguard was chatting with the
security guard at the gate of the swimming pool or was reading a comic
magazine when the alarm was given for which reason he failed to
immediately respond to the alarm. On the contrary, what Ruben Ong
particularly emphasized therein was that after the lifeguard heard the shouts
for help, the latter immediately dived into the pool to retrieve the person
under water who turned out to be his brother. For this reason, the trial court
made this conclusion: "The testimony of Ruben Ong and Andres Hagad, Jr. as
to the alleged failure of the lifeguard Abao to immediately respond to their
call may therefore be disregardedbecause they are belied by their written
statements. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has
taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or
prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that
the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof,
towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of
the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is
on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards
who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were
issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared
by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on
duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a
sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there
are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from
the bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to
bring him back to life. Thus, after he was placed at the edge of the pool,
lifeguard Abao immediately gave him manual artificial respiration. Soon
thereafter, nurse Armando Rule arrived, followed by sanitary inspector
Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an oxygen resuscitator. When they
found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately
injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration
proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents
were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for
Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however came late
because upon examining the body he found him to be already dead. All of
the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under
the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair
to hold it liable for his death.
Sensing that their former theory as regards the liability of appellee may not
be of much help, appellants now switch to the theory that even if it be
assumed that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate
incident, still appellee may be held liable under the doctrine of "last clear
chance" for the reason that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it
failed to do so.
We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does
not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing
the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he
was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time
on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved.
The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where
it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last
clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is
imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident." (38 Am. Jur. pp. 900-902)
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from
fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself
in the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always
is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It
will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded
the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances, the law is that a person who has the last clear
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. (Picart
vs. Smith, 37 Phil., 809)
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it
being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one
of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it
appearing that lifeguard Aba__o responded to the call for help as soon as his
attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts
at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back
to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now
invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot
be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is
or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have
contributed to the injury. O'Mally vs. Eagan, 77 ALR 582, 43 Wyo.
233, 350, 2, P2d 1063. (A.L.R. Digest, Vol. 8, pp. 955-956)
Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial court,
which we find supported by the evidence: "There is (also) a strong suggestion
coming from the expert evidence presented by both parties that Dominador
Ong might have dived where the water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so
doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against the bottom of the
pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and which to his drowning.
As a boy scout he must have received instructions in swimming. He knew, or
have known that it was dangerous for him to dive in that part of the pool."
Wherefore, the decision appealed from being in accordance with law and the
evidence, we hereby affirm the same, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ.,concur.
3RD SET
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana,
there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although
this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we
are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of
the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasidelict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters
may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This
will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because
it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged
or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in
fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference
made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14,
1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act.
Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of
Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or
omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall
be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasidelicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by
law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or
interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that
giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no
longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that
the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character
or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article
1162, simply says, "Obligations derived fromquasi-delicto shall be governed
by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and
by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new
code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasidelict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar
to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission,
p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth
the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule
111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the
spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it
refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
them to its (the consignees) warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, [7] in turn engaged
the services of TVI to send a barge and tugboat at shipside.
On October 26, 1991, around 4:30 p.m., TVIs tugboat Lailani towed the barge
Erika V to shipside.[8]
By 7:00 p.m. also of October 26, 1991, the tugboat, after positioning the
barge alongside the vessel, left and returned to the port terminal. [9] At 9:00
p.m., arrastre operator Ocean Terminal Services Inc. commenced to unload
37 of the 545 coils from the vessel unto the barge.
By 12:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991 during which the weather condition had
become inclement due to an approaching storm, the unloading unto the
barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. [10] No tugboat pulled the barge back
to the pier, however.
At around 5:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991, due to strong waves, [11] the crew of
the barge abandoned it and transferred to the vessel. The barge pitched and
rolled with the waves and eventually capsized, washing the 37 coils into the
sea.[12] At 7:00 a.m., a tugboat finally arrived to pull the already empty and
damaged barge back to the pier.[13]
Earnest efforts on the part of both the consignee Little Giant and Industrial
Insurance to recover the lost cargoes proved futile. [14]
Little Giant thus filed a formal claim against Industrial Insurance which paid it
the amount of P5,246,113.11. Little Giant thereupon executed a subrogation
receipt[15] in favor of Industrial Insurance.
Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport, TVI,
and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape (the defendants) before
the RTC of Manila, for the recovery of the amount it paid to Little Giant plus
adjustment fees, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.[16]
Industrial Insurance faulted the defendants for undertaking the unloading of
the cargoes while typhoon signal No. 1 was raised in Metro Manila. [17]
By Decision of November 24, 1997, Branch 21 of the RTC held all the
defendants negligent for unloading the cargoes outside of the breakwater
notwithstanding the storm signal.[18] The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the
sum of P5,246,113.11 with interest from the date the complaint was filed
until fully satisfied, as well as the sum of P5,000.00 representing the
adjustment fee plus the sum of 20% of the amount recoverable from the
defendants as attorneys fees plus the costs of suit. The counterclaims and
cross claims of defendants are hereby DISMISSED for lack of [m]erit. [19]
To the trial courts decision, the defendants Schmitz Transport and TVI filed a
joint motion for reconsideration assailing the finding that they are common
carriers and the award of excessive attorneys fees of more than P1,000,000.
And they argued that they were not motivated by gross or evident bad faith
and that the incident was caused by a fortuitous event. [20]
By resolution of February 4, 1998, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration. [21]
All the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which, by decision of
June 27, 2001, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, [22] it finding that
all the defendants were common carriers Black Sea and TVI for engaging in
the transport of goods and cargoes over the seas as a regular business and
not as an isolated transaction,[23] and Schmitz Transport for entering into a
contract with Little Giant to transport the cargoes from ship to port for a fee.
[24]
In holding all the defendants solidarily liable, the appellate court ruled that
each one was essential such that without each others contributory
negligence the incident would not have happened and so much so that the
person principally liable cannot be distinguished with sufficient accuracy. [25]
In discrediting the defense of fortuitous event, the appellate court held that
although defendants obviously had nothing to do with the force of nature,
they however had control of where to anchor the vessel, where discharge will
take place and even when the discharging will commence.[26]
The defendants respective motions for reconsideration having been denied
by Resolution[27] of September 28, 2001, Schmitz Transport (hereinafter
referred to as petitioner) filed the present petition against TVI, Industrial
Insurance and Black Sea.
Petitioner asserts that in chartering the barge and tugboat of TVI, it was
acting for its principal, consignee Little Giant, hence, the transportation
contract was by and between Little Giant and TVI.[28]
By Resolution of January 23, 2002, herein respondents Industrial Insurance,
Black Sea, and TVI were required to file their respective Comments. [29]
By its Comment, Black Sea argued that the cargoes were received by the
consignee through petitioner in good order, hence, it cannot be faulted, it
having had no control and supervision thereover. [30]
For its part, TVI maintained that it acted as a passive party as it merely
received the cargoes and transferred them unto the barge upon the
instruction of petitioner.[31]
In issue then are:
(1) Whether the loss of the cargoes was due to a fortuitous event,
independent of any act of negligence on the part of petitioner Black Sea and
TVI, and
(2) If there was negligence, whether liability for the loss may attach to Black
Sea, petitioner and TVI.
When a fortuitous event occurs, Article 1174 of the Civil Code absolves any
party from any and all liability arising therefrom:
ART. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
The proximate cause of the loss having been determined, who among the
parties is/are responsible therefor?
Contrary to petitioners insistence, this Court, as did the appellate court, finds
that petitioner is a common carrier. For it undertook to transport the cargoes
from the shipside of M/V Alexander Saveliev to the consignees warehouse at
Cainta, Rizal. As the appellate court put it, as long as a person or corporation
holds [itself] to the public for the purpose of transporting goods as [a]
business, [it] is already considered a common carrier regardless if [it] owns
the vehicle to be used or has to hire one. [42] That petitioner is a common
carrier, the testimony of its own Vice-President and General Manager Noel
Aro that part of the services it offers to its clients as a brokerage firm
includes the transportation of cargoes reflects so.
Atty. Jubay: Will you please tell us what [are you] functions x x x as Executive
Vice-President and General Manager of said Company?
Mr. Aro: Well, I oversee the entire operation of the brokerage and transport
business of the company. I also handle the various division heads of the
company for operation matters, and all other related functions that the
President may assign to me from time to time, Sir.
Q: Now, in connection [with] your duties and functions as you mentioned, will
you please tell the Honorable Court if you came to know the company by the
name Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation?
A: Yes, Sir. Actually, we are the brokerage firm of that Company.
Q: And since when have you been the brokerage firm of that company, if you
can recall?
A: Since 1990, Sir.
Q: Now, you said that you are the brokerage firm of this Company. What work
or duty did you perform in behalf of this company?
A: We handled the releases (sic) of their cargo[es] from the Bureau of
Customs. We [are] also in-charged of the delivery of the goods to their
warehouses. We also handled the clearances of their shipment at the Bureau
of Customs, Sir.
xxx
Q: Now, what precisely [was] your agreement with this Little Giant Steel Pipe
Corporation with regards to this shipment? What work did you do with this
shipment?
A: We handled the unloading of the cargo[es] from vessel to lighter and then
the delivery of [the] cargo[es] from lighter to BASECO then to the truck and
to the warehouse, Sir.
Q: Now, in connection with this work which you are doing, Mr. Witness, you
are supposed to perform, what equipment do (sic) you require or did you use
in order to effect this unloading, transfer and delivery to the warehouse?
A: Actually, we used the barges for the ship side operations, this unloading
[from] vessel to lighter, and on this we hired or we sub-contracted with
[T]ransport Ventures, Inc. which [was] in-charged (sic) of the barges. Also, in
BASECO compound we are leasing cranes to have the cargo unloaded from
the barge to trucks, [and] then we used trucks to deliver [the cargoes] to the
consignees warehouse, Sir.
Q: And whose trucks do you use from BASECO compound to the consignees
warehouse?
A: We utilized of (sic) our own trucks and we have some other contracted
trucks, Sir.
xxx
ATTY. JUBAY: Will you please explain to us, to the Honorable Court why is it
you have to contract for the barges of Transport Ventures Incorporated in this
particular operation?
A: Firstly, we dont own any barges. That is why we hired the services of
another firm whom we know [al]ready for quite sometime, which is Transport
Ventures, Inc. (Emphasis supplied)[43]
It is settled that under a given set of facts, a customs broker may be
regarded as a common carrier. Thus, this Court, in A.F. Sanchez Brokerage,
Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,[44] held:
The appellate court did not err in finding petitioner, a customs broker, to be
also a common carrier, as defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, to wit,
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public.
xxx
Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity. The contention, therefore, of petitioner that it is not a
common carrier but a customs broker whose principal function is to prepare
the correct customs declaration and proper shipping documents as required
by law is bereft of merit. It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the
goods for pecuniary consideration.[45]
And in Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc.,[46] this Court held that as the
transportation of goods is an integral part of a customs broker, the customs
broker is also a common carrier. For to declare otherwise would be to deprive
those with whom [it] contracts the protection which the law affords them
notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods for [its]
customers, is part and parcel of petitioners business.[47]
As for petitioners argument that being the agent of Little Giant, any
negligence it committed was deemed the negligence of its principal, it does
not persuade.
True, petitioner was the broker-agent of Little Giant in securing the release of
the cargoes. In effecting the transportation of the cargoes from the shipside
and into Little Giants warehouse, however, petitioner was discharging its own
personal obligation under a contact of carriage.
Petitioner, which did not have any barge or tugboat, engaged the services of
TVI as handler[48] to provide the barge and the tugboat. In their Service
Contract,[49] while Little Giant was named as the consignee, petitioner did not
disclose that it was acting on commission and was chartering the vessel for
Little Giant.[50] Little Giant did not thus automatically become a party to the
Service Contract and was not, therefore, bound by the terms and conditions
therein.
Not being a party to the service contract, Little Giant cannot directly sue TVI
based thereon but it can maintain a cause of action for negligence.[51]
In the case of TVI, while it acted as a private carrier for which it was under no
duty to observe extraordinary diligence, it was still required to observe
ordinary diligence to ensure the proper and careful handling, care and
discharge of the carried goods.
Thus, Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and
2202, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in
the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be
required.
Was the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation exercised by TVI? [52]
This Court holds not.
TVIs failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase the risk that
might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation, but
was the proximate cause of the loss. A man of ordinary prudence would not
leave a heavily loaded barge floating for a considerable number of hours, at
such a precarious time, and in the open sea, knowing that the barge does not
have any power of its own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of the
sea. That it was nighttime and, therefore, the members of the crew of a
tugboat would be charging overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling for
one such tugboat.
As for petitioner, for it to be relieved of liability, it should, following Article
1739[53] of the Civil Code, prove that it exercised due diligence to prevent or
minimize the loss, before, during and after the occurrence of the storm in
order that it may be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods.
While petitioner sent checkers [54] and a supervisor[55] on board the vessel to
counter-check the operations of TVI, it failed to take all available and
reasonable precautions to avoid the loss. After noting that TVI failed to
arrange for the prompt towage of the barge despite the deteriorating sea
conditions, it should have summoned the same or another tugboat to extend
help, but it did not.
This Court holds then that petitioner and TVI are solidarily liable[56] for the
loss of the cargoes. The following pronouncement of the Supreme Court is
instructive:
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation
to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of
its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In
the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier
may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be
for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. x x x [O]ne might ask further,
how then must the liability of the common carrier, on one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same
act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the
other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine,
a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasidelictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract
can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort
to apply.[57]
As for Black Sea, its duty as a common carrier extended only from the time
the goods were surrendered or unconditionally placed in its possession and
received for transportation until they were delivered actually or
constructively to consignee Little Giant.[58]
Parties to a contract of carriage may, however, agree upon a definition of
delivery that extends the services rendered by the carrier. In the case at bar,
Bill of Lading No. 2 covering the shipment provides that delivery be made to
the port of discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get, always afloat.
[59]
The delivery of the goods to the consignee was not from pier to pier but
from the shipside of M/V Alexander Saveliev and into barges, for which
reason the consignee contracted the services of petitioner. Since Black Sea
had constructively delivered the cargoes to Little Giant, through petitioner, it
had discharged its duty.[60]
In fine, no liability may thus attach to Black Sea.
Respecting the award of attorneys fees in an amount over P1,000,000.00 to
Industrial Insurance, for lack of factual and legal basis, this Court sets it
aside. While Industrial Insurance was compelled to litigate its rights, such fact
by itself does not justify the award of attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code. For no sufficient showing of bad faith would be reflected in a
partys persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.[61] To award attorneys fees to a party just because
the judgment is rendered in its favor would be tantamount to imposing a
premium on ones right to litigate or seek judicial redress of legitimate
grievances.[62]
On the award of adjustment fees: The adjustment fees and expense of divers
were incurred by Industrial Insurance in its voluntary but unsuccessful efforts
to locate and retrieve the lost cargo. They do not constitute actual damages.
[63]
As for the court a quos award of interest on the amount claimed, the same
calls for modification following the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals[64] that when the demand cannot be reasonably established
at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run not from the
time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially but from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which the time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). [65]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner Schmitz
Transport & Brokerage Corporation, and Transport Venture Incorporation
jointly and severally liable for the amount of P5,246,113.11 with the
MODIFICATION that interest at SIX PERCENT per annum of the amount due
should be computed from the promulgation on November 24, 1997 of the
decision of the trial court.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners claim that for the video coverage, the cameraman was employed
by Pablo Lim who also owned the video equipment used. They further assert
that they merely get a commission for all customers solicited for their
principal. 3
This contention is primarily premised on Article 1883 of the Civil Code which
states thus:
Art. 1883. If an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of
action against the persons with whom the agent has contracted; neither have
such persons against the principal.
In such case the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with
whom he has contracted, as if the transaction were his own, except when the
contract involves things belonging to the principal.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners' argument that since the video equipment used belonged to Lim
and thus the contract was actually entered into between private respondents
and Lim is not deserving of any serious consideration. In the instant case, the
contract entered into is one of service, that is, for the video coverage of the
wedding. Consequently, it can hardly be said that the object of the contract
was the video equipment used. The use by petitioners of the video
equipment of another person is of no consequence.
It must also be noted that in the course of the protracted trial below,
petitioners did not even present Lim to corroborate their contention that they
were mere agents of the latter. It would not be unwarranted to assume that
their failure to present such a vital witness would have had an adverse result
on the case. 4
As regards the award of damages, petitioners would impress upon this Court
their lack of malice or fraudulent intent in the erasure of the tape. They insist
that since private respondents did not claim the tape after the lapse of thirty
days, as agreed upon in their contract, the erasure was done in consonance
with consistent business practice to minimize losses. 5
We are not persuaded.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to human nature
for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their
wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case against petitioners
belies such assertion. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for
having failed to process the video tape. Considering that private respondents
were about to leave for the United States, they took care to inform
petitioners that they would just claim the tape upon their return two months
later. Thus, the erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was
unjustified.
In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and
those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages."
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his
seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and
plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the
findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent
court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid
before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be
rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the
statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall
state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and
that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings
of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct
attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential
ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice
is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised.
Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence
the facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the
mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A
decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not
confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals
contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said
court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the
evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no
law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision)
the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them
is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it
was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the
evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even
mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own
testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the
decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence
presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has
overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all
the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed
upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe
defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the
court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has
been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari
from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to
the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or
to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received
from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did
not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties;
that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he
would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed
in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error,
which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed
reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of
his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a firstclass ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had
been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as
in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every
station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by
such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant
airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never
meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of
first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its
employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the
company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be honored
or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of
petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there
can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael
Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does
this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga
and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first
class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The
court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence
cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B",
"B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show
that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael
Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for
the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the
"first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of
a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of
the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other
respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged
the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a
determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of
First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the
assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be
regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment
affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy
construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this
point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those
of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a
ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the
conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first
class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is
therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands
of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an
easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the
contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long
learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that
spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a
meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding
of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation
with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that
defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the
plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the
airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he
(defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not
proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class"
seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the
corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him. 40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need
not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of
petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the
Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we
held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages
are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. 43And this, because of the relation which
an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it
was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in
the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was
worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this,
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and
continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements
then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For,
they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition
of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the
notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an
employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to
have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such
entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the
matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is
admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court
ample power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasicontracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The
manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary
damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can
be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition
that discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00,
by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of
fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals
did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we
give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to
the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer
from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against
petitioner. So ordered.
... courts have said that "when the jurisdictional amount is in question, the
tendering of a counterclaim in an amount which in itself, or added to the
amount claimed in the petition, makes up a sum equal to the amount
necessary to the jurisdiction of this court, jurisdiction is established,
whatever may be the state of the plaintiff's complaint." American Sheet & Tin
Plate Co. v. Winzeler (D.C.) 227 F. 321, 324. 5
Thus, in Ago v. Buslon, 6 We held:
... . Then, too, petitioner's counterclaim for P37,000.00 was, also, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the latter courts, and there are ample
precedents to the effect that "although the original claim involves less than
the jurisdictional amount, ... jurisdiction can be sustained if the counterclaim
(of the compulsory type)" such as the one set up by petitioner herein,
based upon the damages allegedly suffered by him in consequence of the
filing of said complaint "exceeds the jurisdictional amount." (Moore Federal
Practice, 2nd ed. [1948], Vol. 3, p. 41; Ginsburg vs. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of California, 69 Fed. [2d] 97; Home Life Ins. Co. vs. Sipp., 11 Fed. [2d]474;
American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. vs. Winzeler [D.C.], 227 Fed. 321, 324; Brix
vs. People's Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 P. 2d. 537, 2 Cal. 2d. 446; Emery vs.
Pacific Employees Ins. Co., 67 P. 2d. 1046, 8 Cal. 2d. 663).
Needless to say, having not only failed to question the jurisdiction of the trial
court either in that court or in this Court, before the rendition of the latter's
decision, and even subsequently thereto, by filing the aforementioned motion
for reconsideration and seeking the reliefs therein prayed for but,
also, urged both courts to exercise jurisdiction over the merits of the case,
defendant is now estopped from impugning said jurisdiction. 7
Before taking up the specific questions raised in defendant's motion for
reconsideration, it should be noted that the same is mainly predicated upon
the premise that plaintiffs' version is inherently incredible, and that this Court
should accept the theory of the defense to the effect that petitioner was offloaded because of a bomb-scare allegedly arising from his delay in boarding
the aircraft and subsequent refusal to open his bags for inspection. We need
not repeat here the reasons given in Our decision for rejecting defendant's
contention and not disturbing the findings of fact of His Honor, the Trial
Judge, who had the decided advantage denied to Us of observing the
behaviour of the witnesses in the course of the trial and found those of the
plaintiffs worthy of credence, not the evidence for the defense.
It may not be amiss however, to stress the fact that, in his written
report, made in transit from Wake to Manila or immediately after the
occurrence and before the legal implications or consequences thereof could
have been the object of mature deliberation, so that it could, in a way, be
considered as part of the res gestae Capt. Zentner stated that Zulueta had
been off-loaded "due to drinking" and "belligerent attitude," thereby belying
the story of the defense about said alleged bomb-scare, and confirming the
view that said agent of the defendant had acted out of resentment because
his ego had been hurt by Mr. Zulueta's adamant refusal to be bullied by him.
Indeed, had there been an iota of truth in said story of the defense, Capt.
Zentner would have caused every one of the passengers to be frisked or
searched and the luggage of all of them examined as it is done now
before resuming the flight from Wake Island. His failure to do so merely
makes the artificious nature of defendant's version more manifest. Indeed,
the fact that Mrs. Zulueta and Miss Zulueta were on board the plane shows
beyond doubt that Mr. Zulueta could not possibly have intended to blow it up.
The defense tries to explain its failure to introduce any evidence to contradict
the testimony of Mr. Zulueta as to why he had gone to the beach and what
he did there, alleging that, in the very nature of things, nobody else could
have witnessed it. Moreover, the defense insists, inter alia, that the
testimony of Mr. Zulueta is inherently incredible because he had no idea as to
how many toilets the plane had; it could not have taken him an hour to
relieve himself in the beach; there were eight (8) commodes at the terminal
toilet for men ; if he felt the need of relieving himself, he would have seen to
it that the soldiers did not beat him to the terminal toilets; he did not tell
anybody about the reason for going to the beach, until after the plane had
taken off from Wake.
We find this pretense devoid of merit. Although Mr. Zulueta had to look for a
secluded place in the beach to relieve himself, beyond the view of others,
defendant's airport manager, whom Mr. Zulueta informed about it,soon
after the departure of the plane, could have forthwith checked the veracity of
Mr. Zulueta's statement by asking him to indicate the specific place where he
had been in the beach and then proceeding thereto for purposes of
verification.
Then, again, the passenger of a plane seldom knows how many toilets it has.
As a general rule, his knowledge is limited to the toilets for the class first
class or tourist class in which he is. Then, too, it takes several minutes for
the passengers of big aircrafts, like those flying from the U.S. to the
Philippines, to deplane. Besides, the speed with which a given passenger
may do so depends, largely, upon the location of his seat in relation to the
exit door. He cannot go over the heads of those nearer than he thereto.
Again, Mr. Zulueta may have stayed in the toilet terminal for some time,
expecting one of the commodes therein to be vacated soon enough, before
deciding to go elsewhere to look for a place suitable to his purpose. But he
had to walk, first, from the plane to the terminal building and, then, after
vainly waiting therein for a while, cover a distance of about 400 yards
therefrom to the beach, and seek there a place not visible by the people in
the plane and in the terminal, inasmuch as the terrain at Wake Island is flat.
What is more, he must have had to takeoff part, at least, of his clothing,
because, without the facilities of a toilet, he had to wash himself and, then,
dry himself up before he could be properly attired and walk back the 400
yards that separated him from the terminal building and/or the plane.
Considering, in addition to the foregoing, the fact that he was not feeling
well, at that time, We are not prepared to hold that it could not have taken
him around an hour to perform the acts narrated by him.
But, why asks the defendant did he not reveal the same before the
plane took off? The record shows that, even before Mr. Zulueta had reached
the ramp leading to the plane, Capt. Zentner was already demonstrating at
him in an intemperate and arrogant tone and attitude ("What do you think
you are?), thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer back in the same vein. As
a consequence, there immediately ensued an altercation in the course of
which each apparently tried to show that he could not be cowed by the other.
Then came the order of Capt. Zentner to off-load all of the Zuluetas, including
Mrs. Zulueta and the minor Miss Zulueta, as well as their luggage, their
overcoats and other effects handcarried by them; but, Mr. Zulueta requested
that the ladies be allowed to continue the trip. Meanwhile, it had taken time
to locate his four (4) pieces of luggage. As a matter of fact, only three (3) of
them were found, and the fourth eventually remained in the plane. In short,
the issue between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta had been limited to
determining whether the latter would allow himself to be browbeaten by the
former. In the heat of the altercation, nobody had inquired about the cause of
Mr. Zulueta's delay in returning to the plane, apart from the fact that it was
rather embarrassing for him to explain, in the presence and within the
hearing of the passengers and the crew, then assembled around them, why
he had gone to the beach and why it had taken him some time to answer
there a call of nature, instead of doing so in the terminal building.
Defendant's motion for reconsideration assails: (1) the amount of damages
awarded as excessive; (2) the propriety of accepting as credible plaintiffs'
theory; (3) plaintiffs' right to recover either moral or exemplary damages; (4)
plaintiffs' right to recover attorney's fees; and (5) the non-enforcement of the
compromise agreement between the defendant and plaintiff's wife, Mrs.
Zulueta. Upon the other hand, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration contests
the decision of this Court reducing the amount of damages awarded by the
trial court to approximately one-half thereof, upon the ground, not only that,
contrary to the findings of this Court, in said decision, plaintiff had not
contributed to the aggravation of his altercation or incident with Capt.
Zentner by reacting to his provocation with extreme belligerency thereby
allowing himself to be dragged down to the level on which said agent of the
defendant had placed himself, but, also, because the purchasing power of
our local currency is now much lower than when the trial court rendered its
appealed decision, over five (5) years ago, on July 5, 1967, which is an
undeniable and undisputed fact. Precisely, for this reason, defendant's
characterization as exorbitant of the aggregate award of over P700,000 by
way of damages, apart from attorney's fees in the sum of P75,000, is
untenable. Indeed, said award is now barely equivalent to around 100,000 U.
S. dollars.
was predicated upon Article 2180 of our Civil Code, the pertinent part of
which reads:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, the amount of damages warded in the Palisoc case is not and
cannot serve as the measure of the damages recoverable in the present
case, the latter having been caused directly and intentionally by an
employee or agent of the defendant, whereas the student who killed the
young Palisoc was in no wise an agent of the school. Moreover, upon her
arrival in the Philippines, Mrs. Zulueta reported her husband's predicament to
defendant's local manager and asked him to forthwith have him (Mr. Zulueta)
brought to Manila, which defendant's aforementioned manager refused to do,
thereby impliedly ratifying the off-loading of Mr. Zulueta at Wake Island.
It is next urged that, under the contract of carriage with the defendant, Mr.
Zulueta was bound to be present at the time scheduled for the departure of
defendant's plane and that he had, consequently, violated said contract
when he did not show up at such time. This argument might have had some
weight had defendant's plane taken off before Mr. Zulueta had shown up. But
the fact is that he was ready, willing and able to board the plane about two
hours before it actually took off, and that he was deliberately and maliciously
off-loaded on account of his altercation with Capt. Zentner. It should, also, be
noted that, although Mr. Zulueta was delayed some 20 to 30 minutes, the
arrival or departure of planes is often delayed for much longer periods of
time. Followed to its logical conclusion, the argument adduced by the
defense suggests that airlines should be held liable for damages due to the
inconvenience and anxiety, aside from actual damages, suffered by many
passengers either in their haste to arrive at the airport on scheduled time
just to find that their plane will not take off until later, or by reason of the late
arrival of the aircraft at its destination.
PANAM impugns the award of attorney's fees upon the ground that no
penalty should be imposed upon the right to litigate; that, by law, it may be
awarded only in exceptional cases; that the claim for attorney's fees has not
been proven; and that said defendant was justified in resisting plaintiff's
claim "because it was patently exorbitant."
Nothing, however, can be farther from the truth. Indeed apart from plaintiff's
claim for actual damages, the amount of which is not contested, plaintiffs
did not ask any specific sum by way of exemplary and moral damages, as
well as attorney's fees, and left the amount thereof to the "sound discretion"
of the lower court. This, precisely, is the reason why PANAM, now, alleges
without justification that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the present case.
Moreover, Article 2208 of our Civil Code expressly authorizes the award of
attorney's fees "when exemplary damages are awarded," as they are in
this case as well as "in any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees ... be recovered," and We so deem it just and
equitable in the present case, considering the "exceptional" circumstances
obtaining therein, particularly the bad faith with which defendant's agent had
acted, the place where and the conditions under which Rafael Zulueta was
left at Wake Island, the absolute refusal of defendant's manager in Manila to
take any step whatsoever to alleviate Mr. Zulueta's predicament at Wake and
have him brought to Manila which, under their contract of carriage, was
defendant's obligation to discharge with "extra-ordinary" or "utmost"
diligence and, the "racial" factor that had, likewise, tainted the decision of
defendant's agent, Capt. Zentner, to off-load him at Wake Island.
As regards the evidence necessary to justify the sum of P75,000 awarded as
attorney's fees in this case, suffice it to say that the quantity and quality of
the services rendered by plaintiffs' counsel appearing on record, apart from
the nature of the case and the amount involved therein, as well as his
prestige as one of the most distinguished members of the legal profession in
the Philippines, of which judicial cognizance may be taken, amply justify said
award, which is a little over 10% of the damages (P700,000) collectible by
plaintiffs herein. Indeed, the attorney's fees in this case is proportionally
much less than that adjudged in Lopez v. PANAM 16 in which the judgment
rendered for attorney's fees (P50,000) was almost 20% of the damages
(P275,000) recovered by the plaintiffs therein.
The defense assails the last part of the decision sought to be reconsidered, in
which relying upon Article 172 of our Civil Code, which provides that "(t)he
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent,
except in cases provided by law," and it is not claimed that this is one of such
cases We denied a motion, filed by Mrs. Zulueta, for the dismissal of this
case, insofar as she is concerned - she having settled all her differences with
the defendant, which appears to have paid her the sum of P50,000 therefor "without prejudice to this sum being deducted from the award made in said
decision." Defendant now alleges that this is tantamount to holding that said
compromise agreement is both effective and ineffective.
This, of course, is not true. The payment is effective, insofar as it is
deductible from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount due)
from the defendant, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs.
Zulueta. What is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the
conjugal partnership is concerned. Mrs. Zulueta's motion was for the
dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned, and the defense cited in
support thereof Article 113 of said Code, pursuant to which "(t)he husband
must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have in
fact been separated for at least one year." This provision, We held, however,
refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real party in interest, not to
the case at bar, "in which the husband is the main party in interest, both as
the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal
partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of
carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the
contract, with funds of the conjugal partnership," to which the amounts
recoverable for breach of said contract, accordingly, belong. The damages
suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident of the humiliation to
which her husband had been subjected. The Court ordered that said sum of
P50,00 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be deducted from the aggregate
award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the simple reason that upon
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, as provided by law, said amount
would have to be reckoned with, either as part of her share in the
partnership, or as part of the support which might have been or may be due
to her as wife of Rafael Zulueta. It would surely be inane to sentence the
defendant to pay the P700,000 due to the plaintiffs and to direct Mrs. Zulueta
to return said P50,000 to the defendant.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy,
she is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership,
before the dissolution thereof. 17 She cannot even acquire any property by
gratuitous title, without the husband's consent, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth
degree. 18
It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations by
compromise agreement between the contending parties, but, it certainly
does not favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are
plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the defense of the rights
of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the
compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" which the
law 19 seeks to protect by creating an additional cause for the
misunderstanding that had arisen between such spouses during the
litigation, and thus rendering more difficult a reconciliation between them.
It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the plaintiffs,
that neither is there any evidence that the money used to pay the plane
tickets came from the conjugal funds and that the award to Mrs. Zulueta was
for her personal suffering or injuries. There was, however, no individual or
specific award in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or any of the plaintiffs. The award was
made in their favor collectively. Again, in the absence of said proof, the
presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the
plaintiffs and that the money had come from the conjugal funds, for, unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed "(t)hat things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life." 20 In fact Manresa maintains 21 that they are deemed conjugal, when the
source of the money used therefor is not established, even if the purchase
had been made by the wife. 22 And this is the rule obtaining in the
Philippines. Even property registered, under the Torrens system, in the name
of one of the spouses, or in that of the wife only, if acquired during the
marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless there is
competent proof to the contrary. 23
PANAM maintains that the damages involved in the case at bar are not
among those forming part of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 153
of the Civil Code, reading:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership,
or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the
spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming
from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.
Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a
breach of plaintiffs' contract of carriage with the defendant, for which
plaintiffs paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal
partnership, We hold that said damages fall under paragraph (1) of said
Article 153, the right thereto having been "acquired byonerous title during
the marriage ... ." This conclusion is bolstered up by Article 148 of our Civil
Code, according to which:
ART. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other
property belonging to only one of the spouses;
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband.
The damages involved in the case at bar do not come under any of these
provisions or of the other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title VI, of
Book I of the Civil Code, which chapter is entitled "Paraphernal Property."
What is more, if "(t)hat which is acquired by right of redemption or by
exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses," and
"(t)hat which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband," 24belong exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily
that that which is acquired with money of the conjugal partnership belongs
thereto or forms part thereof. The rulings in Maramba v. Lozano 25 and Perez
v. Lantin, 26 cited in defendant's motion for reconsideration, are, in effect,
adverse thereto. In both cases, it was merely held that the presumption
under Article 160 of our Civil Code to the effect that all property of the
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed on 28 August 1996
by petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang 4 against herein respondents Philippine
Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI)5 and Dusit Thani Public Co., Ltd. (DTPCI), 6 as owners of
Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (Dusit Hotel); 7 and co-respondent First Lepanto
Taisho Insurance Corporation (First Lepanto), 8 as insurer of the aforesaid
hotel. The said Complaint was premised on the alleged negligence of
respondents PHI and DTPCIs staff, in the untimely putting off all the lights
within the hotels swimming pool area, as well as the locking of the main
entrance door of the area, prompting petitioner to grope for a way out. While
doing so, a folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her serious
brain injury. The negligence was allegedly compounded by respondents PHI
and DTPCIs failure to render prompt and adequate medical assistance.
Petitioners version of the antecedents of this case is as follows:
On 11 June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel,
invited her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotels
swimming pool facility. They started bathing at around 5:00 p.m. At around
7:00 p.m., the hotels swimming pool attendant informed them that the
swimming pool area was about to be closed. The two subsequently
proceeded to the shower room adjacent to the swimming pool to take a
shower and dress up. However, when they came out of the bathroom, the
entire swimming pool area was already pitch black and there was no longer
any person around but the two of them. They carefully walked towards the
main door leading to the hotel but, to their surprise, the door was locked. 9
Petitioner and Delia waited for 10 more minutes near the door hoping
someone would come to their rescue but they waited in vain. Delia became
anxious about their situation so petitioner began to walk around to look for a
house phone. Delia followed petitioner. After some time, petitioner saw a
phone behind the lifeguards counter. While slowly walking towards the
phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned out to be the folding
wooden counter top, fell on petitioners head that knocked her down almost
unconscious.10
Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the hotel
telephone operator of the incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at
the main entrance door of the swimming pool area but it took them at least
20 to 30 minutes to get inside. When the door was finally opened, three hotel
chambermaids assisted petitioner by placing an ice pack and applying some
ointment on her head. After petitioner had slightly recovered, she requested
to be assisted to the hotels coffee shop to have some rest. Petitioner
demanded the services of the hotel physician. 11
Dr. Violeta Dalumpines (Dr. Dalumpines) arrived. She approached petitioner
and introduced herself as the hotel physician. However, instead of
immediately providing the needed medical assistance, Dr. Dalumpines
presented a "Waiver" and demanded that it be signed by petitioner,
otherwise, the hotel management will not render her any assistance.
Petitioner refused to do so.12
After eating her dinner and having rested for a while, petitioner left the
hotels coffee shop and went home. Thereupon, petitioner started to feel
extraordinary dizziness accompanied by an uncomfortable feeling in her
stomach, which lasted until the following day. Petitioner was constrained to
stay at home, thus, missing all her important appointments with her patients.
She also began experiencing "on" and "off" severe headaches that caused
her three (3) sleepless nights.13
Petitioner, thus, decided to consult a certain Dr. Perry Noble (Dr. Noble), a
neurologist from Makati Medical Center, who required her to have an X-ray
and a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) tests. 14 The MRI Report15dated 23
August 1995 revealed the following findings:
CONSULTATION REPORT:
MRI examination of the brain shows scattered areas of intraparenchymal
contusions and involving mainly the left middle and posterior temporal and
slightly the right anterior temporal lobe.
Other small areas of contusions with suggestive pertechiae are seen in the
left fronto-parietal, left parieto-occipital and with deep frontal periventricular
subcortical and cortical regions. There is no mass effect nor signs of localized
hemorrhagic extravasation.
The ventricles are not enlarged, quite symmetrical without shifts or
deformities; the peripheral sulci are within normal limits.
The C-P angles, petromastoids, sella, extrasellar and retro orbital areas
appear normal.
The brainstem is unremarkable.
IMPRESSION: Scattered small intraparenchymal contusions mainly involving
the left middle-posterior temporal lobe and also right medial anterior
temporal, both deep frontal subcortical, left parieto-occipital subcortical and
cortical regions. Ischemic etiology not ruled out. No localized intra - or
extracerebral hemorrhage.16
Petitioner claimed that the aforesaid MRI result clearly showed that her head
was bruised. Based also on the same MRI result, Dr. Noble told her that she
has a very serious brain injury. In view thereof, Dr. Noble prescribed the
necessary medicine for her condition.17
Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Ofelia Adapon, also a neurologist
from Makati Medical Center, who required her to undergo an
Electroencephalogram examination (EEG) to measure the electrostatic in her
brain.18Based on its result,19 Dr. Ofelia Adapon informed her that she has a
serious conditiona permanent one. Dr. Ofelia Adapon similarly prescribed
medicines for her brain injury.20
Petitioners condition did not get better. Hence, sometime in September
1995, she consulted another neuro-surgeon by the name of Dr. Renato
Sibayan (Dr. Sibayan), who required her to have an X-ray test. 21 According to
petitioner, Dr. Sibayans finding was the same as those of the previous
doctors that she had consultedshe has a serious brain injury. 22
By reason of the unfortunate 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotels
swimming pool area, petitioner also started to feel losing her memory, which
greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession. 23 Thus,
on 25 October 1995, petitioner, through counsel, sent a demand letter 24 to
respondents PHI and DTPCI seeking payment of an amount not less than
P100,000,000.00 representing loss of earnings on her remaining life span.
But, petitioners demand was unheeded.
In November 1995, petitioner went to the United States of America (USA) for
further medical treatment. She consulted a certain Dr. Gerald Steinberg and
a certain Dr. Joel Dokson 25 from Mount Sinai Hospital who both found that she
has "post traumatic-post concussion/contusion cephalgias-vascular and
neuralgia."26 She was then prescribed to take some medications for severe
pain and to undergo physical therapy. Her condition did not improve so she
returned to the Philippines.27
Petitioner, once again, consulted Dr. Sibayan, who simply told her to just
relax and to continue taking her medicines. Petitioner also consulted other
neurologists, who all advised her to just continue her medications and to
undergo physical therapy for her neck pain.28
Sometime in 1996, petitioner consulted as well a certain Dr. Victor Lopez (Dr.
Lopez), an ophthalmologist from the Makati Medical Center, because of her
poor vision, which she has experienced for several months. 29 Petitioners Eye
Report dated 5 March 199630 issued by Dr. Lopez stated: "IMPRESSION:
Posterior vitreous detachment, right eye of floaters." Dr. Lopez told petitioner
that her detached eye is permanent and very serious. Dr. Lopez then
prescribed an eye drop to petitioner.31
For petitioners frustration to dissipate and to regain her former strength and
physical well-being, she consulted another neuro-surgeon from Makati
Medical Center by the name of Dr. Leopoldo P. Pardo, Jr. (Dr. Pardo, Jr.). 32She
disclosed to Dr. Pardo, Jr. that at the age of 18 she suffered a stroke due to
mitral valve disease and that she was given treatments, which also resulted
in thrombocytopenia. In Dr. Pardo, Jr.s medical evaluation of petitioner dated
15 May 1996,33 he made the following diagnosis and opinion:
DIAGNOSIS AND OPINION:
This patient sustained a severe head injury in (sic) 11 June 1995 and as a
result of which she developed the following injuries:
1. Cerebral Concussion and Contusion
2. Post-traumatic Epilepsy
3. Post-concussional Syndrome
4. Minimal Brain Dysfunction
5. Cervical Sprain, chronic recurrent
It is my opinion that the symptoms she complained of in the foregoing history
are all related to and a result of the injury sustained on 11 June 1995.
Pearlie), the hotel staff nurse, who was at the hotel clinic located at the
mezzanine floor, received a call from the hotel telephone operator informing
her that there was a guest requiring medical assistance at the hotels
swimming pool area located one floor above the clinic. 44
Immediately, Ms. Pearlie got hold of her medical kit and hurriedly went to the
hotels swimming pool area. There she saw Delia and petitioner, who told her
that she was hit on the head by a folding wooden counter top. Although
petitioner looked normal as there was no indication of any blood or bruise on
her head, Ms. Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical attention to
which petitioner replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did not
need any medical attention. Petitioner, instead, requested for a hirudoid
cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded.45
At about 8:00 p.m., after attending to petitioner, Ms. Pearlie went back to the
hotel clinic to inform Dr. Dalumpines of the incident at the hotels swimming
pool area. But before she could do that, Dr. Dalumpines had already chanced
upon Delia and petitioner at the hotels coffee shop and the latter reported to
Dr. Dalumpines that her head was hit by a folding wooden counter top while
she was inside the hotels swimming pool area. When asked by Dr.
Dalumpines how she was, petitioner responded she is a doctor, she was fine
and she was already attended to by the hotel nurse, who went at the hotels
swimming pool area right after the accident. Dr. Dalumpines then called Ms.
Pearlie to verify the same, which the latter confirmed.46
Afterwards, Dr. Dalumpines went back to petitioner and checked the latters
condition. Petitioner insisted that she was fine and that the hirudoid cream
was enough. Having been assured that everything was fine, Dr. Dalumpines
requested petitioner to execute a handwritten certification 47 regarding the
incident that occurred that night. Dr. Dalumpines then suggested to
petitioner to have an X-ray test. Petitioner replied that it was not necessary.
Petitioner also refused further medical attention. 48
On 13 June 1995, petitioner called up Dr. Dalumpines. The call, however, had
nothing to do with the 11 June 1995 incident. Instead, petitioner merely
engaged in small talk with Dr. Dalumpines while having her daily massage.
The two talked about petitioners personal matters, i.e., past medical history,
differences with siblings and family over inheritance and difficulty in practice.
Petitioner even disclosed to Dr. Dalumpines that she once fell from a horse;
that she had a stroke; had hysterectomy and is incapable of having children
for her uterus had already been removed; that she had blood disorder,
particularly lack of platelets, that can cause bleeding; and she had an "on"
and "off" headaches. Petitioner oftentimes called Dr. Dalumpines at the hotel
clinic to discuss topics similar to those discussed during their 13 June 1995
conversation.49
Also, during one of their telephone conversations, petitioner requested for a
certification regarding the 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotels swimming
was fine. Even the medical services offered by the hotel physician were
turned down by petitioner. Emphatically, petitioner cannot fault the hotel for
the injury she sustained as she herself did not heed the warning that the
swimming pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. As such, since
petitioners own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of her
injury, she cannot recover damages.55
The trial court similarly observed that the records revealed no indication that
the head injury complained of by petitioner was the result of the alleged 11
June 1995 accident. Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might
have been the cause of her recurring brain injury. Secondly, the findings of
Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between the 11 June 1995 accident
and the brain damage suffered by petitioner. Even Dr. Perez himself testified
that the symptoms being experienced by petitioner might have been due to
factors other than the head trauma she allegedly suffered. It bears stressing
that petitioner had been suffering from different kinds of brain problems
since she was 18 years old, which may have been the cause of the recurring
symptoms of head injury she is experiencing at present. Absent, therefore, of
any proof establishing the causal relation between the injury she allegedly
suffered on 11 June 1995 and the head pains she now suffers, her claim must
fail. Thirdly, Dr. Teresita Sanchezs (Dr. Sanchez) testimony cannot be relied
upon since she testified on the findings and conclusions of persons who were
never presented in court. Ergo, her testimony thereon was hearsay. Fourthly,
the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of doctors
whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment were neither identified
nor testified to by those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay, they
cannot be given probative value. Even assuming that petitioner suffered
head injury as a consequence of the 11 June 1995 accident, she cannot
blame anyone but herself for staying at the hotels swimming pool area
beyond its closing hours and for lifting the folding wooden counter top that
eventually hit her head.56
For petitioners failure to prove that her serious and permanent injury was
the result of the 11 June 1995 accident, thus, her claim for actual or
compensatory damages, loss of income, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees, must all fail.57
With regard to respondent First Lepantos liability, the trial court ruled that
under the contract of insurance, suffice it to state that absent any cause for
any liability against respondents PHI and DTPCI, respondent First Lepanto
cannot be made liable thereon.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals with the
following assignment of errors: (1) the trial court erred in finding that the
testimony of petitioner is self-serving and thus void of credibility; (2) the trial
court erred in applying the doctrine of proximate cause in cases of breach of
contract and even assuming arguendo that the doctrine is applicable,
petitioner was able to prove by sufficient evidence the causal connection
between her injuries and respondents PHI and DTPCIs negligent act; and (3)
the trial court erred in holding that petitioner is not entitled to damages. 58
On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the
findings and conclusions of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this wise:
At the outset, it is necessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide
this case on the theory that herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are liable for
breach of contract or on the theory of quasi-delict.
xxxx
It cannot be gainsaid that herein petitioners use of the hotels pool was only
upon the invitation of Delia, the hotels registered guest. As such, she cannot
claim contractual relationship between her and the hotel. Since the
circumstances of the present case do not evince a contractual relation
between petitioner and respondents, the rules on quasi-delict , thus, govern.
The pertinent provision of Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict."
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delict or
tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties
not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. Thus, to
sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following requisites must
concur: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI and
DTPCI and its employees were negligent? We do not think so. Several factors
militate against petitioners contention.
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool areas closing time is 7:00
p.m.. She, herself, admitted during her testimony that she was well aware of
the sign when she and Delia entered the pool area. Hence, upon knowing, at
the outset, of the pools closing time, she took the risk of overstaying when
she decided to take shower and leave the area beyond the closing hour. In
fact, it was only upon the advise of the pool attendants that she thereafter
took her shower.
Two. She admitted, through her certification that she lifted the wooden bar
countertop, which then fell onto her head. The admission in her certificate
proves the circumstances surrounding the occurrence that transpired on the
night of 11 June 1995. This is contrary to her assertion in the complaint and
testimony that, while she was passing through the counter door, she was
suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she
admitted having lifted the counter top, it was her own doing, therefore, that
made the counter top fell on to her head.
Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioners assertion that the pool
area was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a telephone at
the counter after searching for one. It must be noted that petitioner and Delia
had walked around the pool area with ease since they were able to proceed
to the glass entrance door from shower room, and back to the counter area
where the telephone was located without encountering any untoward
incident. Otherwise, she could have easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped
into something while searching for the telephone. This negates her assertion
that the pool area was completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision.
xxxx
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that
the proximate and immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was due to her
own negligence.
Moreover, petitioner failed to sufficiently substantiate that the medical
symptoms she is currently experiencing are the direct result of the head
injury she sustained on 11 June 1995 as was aptly discussed in the lower
courts findings.
xxxx
It bears stressing that in civil cases, the law requires that the party who
alleges a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proving it. Hence, for petitioner to be entitled to damages, she
must show that she had suffered an actionable injury. Regrettably, petitioner
failed in this regard.59 (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in a
Resolution dated 5 November 2007.
Hence, this Petition raising the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the findings of fact of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive in this case.
(2) Whether or not herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are responsible by
implied contract to exercise due care for the safety and welfare of the
petitioner.
(3) Whether or not the cause of action of the petitioner can be based on both
breach of contract and tort.
(4) Whether or not it is respondents PHI and DTPCI and its employees who
are liable to the petitioner for negligence, applying the well-established
doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior.
(5) Whether the petitioners debilitating and permanent injuries were a result
of the accident she suffered at the hotel on 11 June 1995.
(6) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the payment of damages,
attorneys fees, interest, and the costs of suit.
(7) Whether or not the respondent insurance company is liable, even directly,
to the petitioner.
to petitioner and, thereafter, holding the hotel and its employees not
negligent for petitioners failure to prove their negligence. Moreover,
petitioner alleges that there was no contributory negligence on her part for
she did not do anything that could have contributed to her injury. And, even if
there was, the same does not bar recovery.
Petitioner equally declares that the evidence on record, including the
objective medical findings, had firmly established that her permanent
debilitating injuries were the direct result of the 11 June 1995 accident inside
the hotels swimming pool area. This fact has not been totally disputed by
the respondents. Further, the medical experts who had been consulted by
petitioner were in unison in their diagnoses of her condition. Petitioner was
also able to prove that the falling of the folding wooden counter top on her
head while she was at the hotels swimming pool area was the cause of her
head, eye and neck injuries.
Petitioner reiterates her claim for an award of damages, to wit: actual,
including loss of income; moral, exemplary; as well as attorneys fees,
interest and costs of suit. She states that respondents PHI and DTPCI are
liable for quasi-delict under Articles 19, 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code.
At the same time, they are liable under an implied contract for they have a
public duty to give due courtesy, to exercise reasonable care and to provide
safety to hotel guests, patrons and invitees. Respondent First Lepanto, on the
other hand, is directly liable under the express contract of insurance.
Lastly, petitioner contends that her Motion for Reconsideration before the
Court of Appeals was not pro forma for it specifically pointed out the alleged
errors in the Court of Appeals Decision.
The instant Petition is devoid of merit.
Primarily, only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 61 This
Court is not a trier of facts and it is beyond its function to re-examine and
weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties.62 Besides, this Court
adheres to the long standing doctrine that the factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on
the parties and this Court.63 Nonetheless, this Court has, at times, allowed
exceptions thereto, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the Court of Appeals findings are contrary to those by the trial
court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.64
Upon meticulous perusal of the records, however, this Court finds that none
of these exceptions is obtaining in this case. No such justifiable or compelling
reasons exist for this Court to depart from the general rule. This Court will not
disturb the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and adequately supported by the evidence on record.
Also, this Court will not review the factual findings of the trial court simply
because the judge who heard and tried the case was not the same judge who
penned the decision. This fact alone does not diminish the veracity and
correctness of the factual findings of the trial court. 65 Indeed, "the efficacy of
a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over
from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is showing
of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him." 66 In this
case, there was none.
It bears stressing that in this jurisdiction there is a disputable presumption
that the trial courts decision is rendered by the judge in the regular
performance of his official duties. While the said presumption is only
disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other
evidence. Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the presumption
that the trial court judge, in resolving the case and drafting the decision,
reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on record. That the said
trial court judge is not the same judge who heard the case and received the
evidence is of little consequence when the records and transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) are complete and available for consideration by
the former,67 just like in the present case.
Irrefragably, the fact that the judge who penned the trial courts decision was
not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence therein
does not render the findings in the said decision erroneous and unreliable.
While the conduct and demeanor of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in
deciding a case, it is not, and should not be, his only consideration. Even
more vital for the trial court judges decision are the contents and substance
of the witnesses testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs, as well as the object
and documentary evidence submitted and made part of the records of the
case.68
This Court examined the records, including the TSNs, and found no reason to
disturb the factual findings of both lower courts. This Court, thus, upholds
their conclusiveness.
In resolving the second and third issues, a determination of the cause of
action on which petitioners Complaint for Damages was anchored upon is
called for.
Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on account
of their negligence but not on any breach of contract. Surprisingly, when the
case was elevated on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner had a change
of heart and later claimed that an implied contract existed between her and
respondents PHI and DTPCI and that the latter were liable for breach of their
obligation to keep her safe and out of harm. This allegation was never an
issue before the trial court. It was not the cause of action relied upon by the
petitioner not until the case was before the Court of Appeals. Presently,
petitioner claims that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict
and breach of contract.
A perusal of petitioners Complaint evidently shows that her cause of action
was based solely on quasi-delict. Telling are the following allegations in
petitioners Complaint:
6. THAT, in the evening of 11 June 1995, between the hours from 7:00 to 8:00
oclock, after herein petitioner and her friend from New York, Delia, the latter
being then a Hotel guest, were taking their shower after having a dip in the
hotels swimming pool, without any notice or warning, the Hotels staff put off
all the lights within the pool area including the lights on the hallway and also
locked the main entrance door of the pool area, x x x;
7. THAT, Hotel guest Delia started to panic while petitioner pacified her by
telling her not to worry as they would both find their way out. Petitioner
knowing that within the area there is a house phone, started to look around
while Delia was following her, eventually petitioner saw a phone behind the
counter x x x, that while slowly moving on towards the phone on a stooping
manner due to the darkness CAUSED BY UNTIMELY AND NEGLIGENTLY
PUTTING OFF WITH THE LIGHTS BY THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS PHI AND
DTPCIS EMPLOYEE while passing through the open counter door with its
Folding Counter Top also opened, x x x, a hard and heavy object fell onto the
head of the petitioner that knocked her down almost unconscious which hard
and heavy object turned out to be the Folding Counter Top;
8. THAT, Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the
Hotel Telephone Operator about the incident, immediately the hotel staffs
(sic) arrived but they were stranded behind the main door of the pool
entrance and it too (sic) them more than twenty (20) minutes to locate the
hotel maintenance employee who holds the key of the said main entrance
door;
9. THAT, when the door was opened, two Hotel Chamber Maids assisted the
petitioner to get out of the counter door. Petitioner being a Physician tried to
It is evident from petitioners Complaint and from her open court testimony
that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her by
respondents PHI and DTPCI, through their management and staff. It is now
too late in the day to raise the said argument for the first time before this
Court.71
Petitioners belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action
cannot be sanctioned by this Court. Well-settled is the rule that a party is not
allowed to change the theory of the case or the cause of action on appeal.
Matters, theories or arguments not submitted before the trial court cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal or certiorari. 72 When a party adopts a
certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the
other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process.73 Hence, a party is bound by the theory he adopts
and by the cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after
having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt
another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or
on appeal.74
In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following
differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract
(culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and
independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to
the performance of the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract
or obligation.75 In quasi-delict, the defense of "good father of a family" is a
complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers
are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper
defense in the selection and supervision of employees. 76 In quasi- delict ,
there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured
party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the formers
complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is
presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract
and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in
the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior
is followed.77
Viewed from the foregoing, petitioners change of theory or cause of action
from quasi-delict to breach of contract only on appeal would necessarily
cause injustice to respondents PHI and DTPCI. First, the latter will have no
more opportunity to present evidence to contradict petitioners new
argument. Second, the burden of proof will be shifted from petitioner to
respondents PHI and DTPCI. Petitioners change of theory from quasi-delict to
breach ofcontract must be repudiated.
As petitioners cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon
her to prove the presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI
and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.78 Further, since petitioners case is for quasi-delict , the negligence
or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. 79 The
burden of proof is upon petitioner. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
provides that "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount
of evidence required by law." It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his
cause of action or the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the
plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because of the
negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such
negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence. 80
In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of respondents PHI
and DTPCI. Other than petitioners self-serving testimony that all the lights in
the hotels swimming pool area were shut off and the door was locked, which
allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding wooden
counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence was
presented to substantiate the same. Even her own companion during the
night of the accident inside the hotels swimming pool area was never
presented to corroborate her allegations. Moreover, petitioners aforesaid
allegations were successfully rebutted by respondents PHI and DTPCI. Here,
we quote with conformity the observation of the trial court, thus:
x x x Besides not being backed up by other supporting evidence, said
statement is being contradicted by the testimony of Engineer Dante L.
Costas,81 who positively declared that it has been a normal practice of the
Hotel management not to put off the lights until 10:00P.M. in order to allow
the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the pools surrounding, the toilets and
the counters. It was also confirmed that the lights were kept on for security
reasons and so that the people exercising in the nearby gym may be able to
have a good view of the swimming pool. This Court also takes note that the
nearby gymnasium was normally open until 10:00 P.M. so that there was a
remote possibility the pool area was in complete darkness as was alleged by
herein petitioner, considering that the illumination which reflected from the
gym. Ergo, considering that the area were sufficient (sic) illuminated when
the alleged incident occurred, there could have been no reason for the
petitioner to have met said accident, much less to have been injured as a
consequence thereof, if she only acted with care and caution, which every
ordinary person is expected to do.82
More telling is the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI and
DTPCI and its employees were negligent? We do not think so. Several factors
militate against petitioners contention.
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool areas closing time is 7:00
p.m.. She, herself, admitted during her testimony that she was well aware of
the sign when she and Delia entered the pool area. Hence, upon knowing, at
the outset, of the pools closing time, she took the risk of overstaying when
she decided to take shower and leave the area beyond the closing hour. In
fact, it was only upon the advise of the pool attendants that she thereafter
took her shower.
Two. She admitted, through her certification, that she lifted the wooden bar
countertop, which then fell on to her head. The admission in her certificate
proves the circumstances surrounding the occurrence that transpired on the
night of 11 June 1995. This is contrary to her assertion in the complaint and
testimony that, while she was passing through the counter door, she was
suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the fact that she
admitted having lifted the countertop, it was her own doing, therefore, that
made the counter top fell on to her head.
Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioners assertion that the pool
area was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a telephone at
the counter after searching for one. It must be noted that petitioner and Delia
had walked around the pool area with ease since they were able to proceed
to the glass entrance door from the shower room, and back to the counter
area where the telephone was located without encountering any untoward
incident. Otherwise, she could have easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped
into something while searching for the telephone. This negates her assertion
that the pool area was completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision.
xxxx
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than that
the proximate and immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was due to her
own negligence.83 (Emphasis supplied).
Even petitioners assertion of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and
DTPCI in not rendering medical assistance to her is preposterous. Her own
Complaint affirmed that respondents PHI and DTPCI afforded medical
assistance to her after she met the unfortunate accident inside the hotels
swimming pool facility. Below is the portion of petitioners Complaint that
would contradict her very own statement, thus:
14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents PHI and
DTPCIs gross negligence despite medical assistance, petitioner started to
feel losing her memory that greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her
chosen profession. x x x.84 (Emphasis supplied).
Also, as observed by the trial court, respondents PHI and DTPCI, indeed,
extended medical assistance to petitioner but it was petitioner who refused
the same. The trial court stated, thus:
Further, herein petitioners asseverations that the Hotel Management did not
extend medical assistance to her in the aftermath of the alleged accident is
not true. Again, this statement was not supported by any evidence other that
the sole and self-serving testimony of petitioner. Thus, this Court cannot take
petitioners statement as a gospel truth. It bears stressing that the Hotel
Management immediately responded after it received notice of the incident.
As a matter of fact, Ms. Pearlie, the Hotel nurse, with two chambermaids
holding an ice bag placed on petitioners head came to the petitioner to
extend emergency assistance when she was notified of the incident, but
petitioner merely asked for Hirudoid, saying she was fine, and that she was a
doctor and know how to take care of herself. Also, the Hotel, through its inhouse physician, Dr. Dalumpines offered its medical services to petitioner
when they met at the Hotels coffee shop, but again petitioner declined the
offer. Moreover, the Hotel as a show of concern for the petitioners welfare,
shouldered the expenses for the MRI services performed on petitioner at the
Makati Medical Center. Emphatically, petitioner herself cannot fault the Hotel
for the injury she allegedly suffered because she herself did not heed the
warning at the pool to the effect that it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00 P.M.
Thus, when the petitioners own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, shecannot recover damages x x x. 85
With the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1)
petitioner stayed in the hotels swimming pool facility beyond its closing
hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her
head; and (3) respondents PHI and DTPCI extended medical assistance to
her. As such, no negligence can be attributed either to respondents PHI and
DTPCI or to their staff and/or management. Since the question of negligence
is one of fact, this Court is bound by the said factual findings made by the
lower courts. It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's factual
findings, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive and binding
upon this Court, if they are not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of significance and influence. Petitioner has not
presented sufficient ground to warrant a deviation from this rule. 86
With regard to petitioners contention that the principles of res ipsa loquitur
and respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this Court holds
otherwise.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an
inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case.
The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the
occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
lacking.87 Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there is direct
proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is sufficient proof
showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred,
then the creative reason for the said doctrine disappears. 88
Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident was
of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.89
In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCIs staff
negligently turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden
counter top would still not fall on petitioners head had she not lifted the
same. Although the folding wooden counter top is within the exclusive
management or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI, the falling of the same
and hitting the head of petitioner was not due to the negligence of the
former. As found by both lower courts, the folding wooden counter top did not
fall on petitioners head without any human intervention. Records showed
that petitioner lifted the said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell
and hit her head. The same was evidenced by the, (1) 11 June 1995
handwritten certification of petitioner herself; (2) her Letter dated 30 August
1995 addressed to Mr. Yoshikazu Masuda (Mr. Masuda), General Manager of
Dusit Hotel; and, (3) Certification dated 7 September 1995 issued to her by
Dr. Dalumpines upon her request, which contents she never questioned.
Here, we, respectively, quote the 11 June 1995 handwritten certification of
petitioner; her letter to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995; and Dr.
Dalumpines Certification dated 7 September 1995, to wit:
Petitioners 11 June 1995 Handwritten Certification:
I was requested by Dr. Dalumpines to write that I was assured of assistance
should it be necessary with regard an accident at the pool. x x x The phone
was in an enclosed area on a chair I lifted the wooden bar counter top
which then fell on my head producing a large hematoma x x x.90
Petitioners Letter addressed to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995:
Dear Mr. Masuda,
xxxx
x x x We searched and saw a phone on a chair behind a towel counter.
However, in order to get behind the counter I had to lift a hinged massive
wooden section of the counter which subsequently fell and knocked me on
my head x x x.91
Dr. Dalumpines Certification dated 7 September 1995:
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was called to
attend to an accident at the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June 1995.
Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the folding
countertop fell on her head when she lifted it to enter the lifeguards counter
to use the phone. She asked for Hirudoid.
The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpnes at the Coffee Shop. After
narrating the poolside incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines offer of
assistance, she reiterated that the Hirudoid cream was enough and that
petitioner]being a doctor herself, knew her condition and she was all right.
This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever purpose
it may serve, 7 September 1995 at Makati City. 92 (Emphasis supplied).
This Court is not unaware that in petitioners Complaint and in her open court
testimony, her assertion was, "while she was passing through the counter
door, she was suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object, which
turned out to be the folding wooden counter top." However, in her open court
testimony, particularly during cross-examination, petitioner confirmed that
she made such statement that "she lifted the hinge massive wooden section
of the counter near the swimming pool."93 In view thereof, this Court cannot
acquiesce petitioners theory that her case is one of res ipsa loquitur as it
was sufficiently established how petitioner obtained that "bukol" or
"hematoma."
The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of
any showing that the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI were
negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and the appellate court found no
negligence on the part of the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI, thus,
the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence and be made to pay the
millions of pesos damages prayed for by petitioner.
The issue on whether petitioners debilitating and permanent injuries were
the result of the accident she suffered at the hotels swimming pool area on
11 June 1995 is another question of fact, which is beyond the function of this
Court to resolve. More so, this issue has already been properly passed upon
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. To repeat, this Court is bound by
the factual findings of the lower courts and there is no cogent reason to
depart from the said rule.
The following observations of the trial court are controlling on this matter:
Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might have been the
cause of her recurring brain injury.
Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between
the 11 June 1995 accident and the brain damage suffered by petitioner. Dr.
Perez himself testified that the symptoms being experienced by petitioner
might have been due to factors other than the head trauma she allegedly
suffered. Emphasis must be given to the fact that petitioner had been
suffering from different kinds of brain problems since she was 18 years old,
which may have been the cause of the recurring symptoms of head injury
she is experiencing at present.
Thirdly, Dr. Sanchezs testimony cannot be relied upon since she testified on
the findings and conclusions of persons who were never presented in court.
Ergo, her testimony thereon was hearsay. A witness can testify only with
regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge. Testimonial or
documentary evidence is hearsay if it is based, not on the personal
knowledge of the witness, but on the knowledge of some other person not on
the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence -- whether objected to or
not -- has no probative value.94
Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of
doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment were neither
identified nor testified to by those who issued them. Being deemed as
hearsay, they cannot be given probative value.1wphi1
The aforesaid medical reports/evaluations/certifications of different doctors in
favor of petitioner cannot be given probative value and their contents cannot
be deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein. It must be stressed
that a document or writing which is admitted not as independent evidence
but merely as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of
the facts related therein.95 In the same vein, the medical certificate which
was identified and interpreted in court by another doctor was not accorded
probative value because the doctor who prepared it was not presented for its
identification. Similarly, in this case, since the doctors who examined
petitioner were not presented to testify on their findings, the medical
certificates issued on their behalf and identified by another doctor cannot be
admitted as evidence. Since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one
who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight
or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications.96 Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document
cannot be accorded probative value. It is precluded because the party
against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to
cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed.
Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other
party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere
hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its
contents suspect and of no probative value.97
All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and
DTPCI, as well as their management and staff, they cannot be made Iiable to
pay for the millions of damages prayed for by the petitioner. Since
respondents PHI and DTPCI arc not liable, it necessarily follows that
respondent First Lepanto cannot also be made liable under the contract or
Insurance.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution or the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007 and 5 November
2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The issue now is who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B
Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid Columbia.
At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and
Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the
subject cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because
it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its
trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private
carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement
and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. [10] The
distinction is significant in the sense that the rights and obligations of the
parties to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their
stipulations, not by the law on common carriers. [11]
In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the
contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was private in character. There is
no showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to
Glodel.
In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier.[12]
In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the
context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum,[13]it states that it is a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering. It
cannot be considered otherwise because as held by this Court in Schmitz
Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., [14] a customs
broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods
being an integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from
the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them
according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733
of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, itis that
extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence
and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property
or rights.[15] This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract
of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who
is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for
shipment.[16] Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. [17] This
presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that
the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.
With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil
Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time
the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by,
the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a
right to receive them.[18]
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and
Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the
subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the responsibility of
two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by
Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a
valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia,
but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts which expressly provide:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and
Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York,/McGee &
Co., Inc.[19] where this Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of
a contractual relationship, to wit:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and
McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen,
states a cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising
from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging
to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have
only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party
to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the
insurance carriers may have a cause of action in light of the Courts
consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is
that which breaches the contract. In the present case, Phoenix and McGee
are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the
contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which
Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce.
Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce
and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the
defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from
quasi-delict. [Emphases supplied
In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of
Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in
the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should
be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted
within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the
warehouse.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantumthat the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.[20] To avoid liability for a
quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.[21] In this regard, Loadmasters failed.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary
diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the
undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated
destination. It should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to
Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to
accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be
held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent
relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters, as erroneously found by the
CA. Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: By the contract of agency a
person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the
latter. The elements of a contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or
implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the
execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as
a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of
his authority.[22]
Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the
parties. Loadmasters never represented Glodel. Neither was it ever
authorized to make such representation. It is a settled rule that the basis for
agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the
principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the
same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal. On the
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot
come to its aid on equitable grounds. Equity,which has been aptly described
as a justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. [26] The Court cannot be a
lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 24,
2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals isMODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters
Customs Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly
and severally liable to respondent R&B Insurance Corporation for the
insurance indemnity it paid to consignee Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation
and ordering both parties to pay, jointly and severally, R&B Insurance
Corporation a] the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance
indemnity; b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent thereof for
attorneys fees; and c] the amount ofP22,427.18 for litigation expenses.
The cross-claim belatedly prayed for by respondent Glodel Brokerage
Corporation against petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.