Mo Ya Lim Yao vs.

Commissioner of Immigration
GR L-21289, 4 October 1971

First issue:
The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not and up to the present has not become final and executory in view of the appeal duly
taken by the Government.

Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival,
Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner
of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer
for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

2nd Issue:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed
exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any foreign law.

However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our
Civil Code by the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of

Issue:

the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Held:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to
an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo
the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino,
who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau
Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
OH HEK HOW vs REPUBLIC 29 SCRA 94

renunciation of nationality.

Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No.473 provides, however, that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly
swear," interalia, that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the
state "of which" he is "a subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring
Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws
do not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the
Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship, if the law of that
country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign
country from which citizenship is acquired."
G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,

Facts:
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a motion alleging that he had complied with
therequirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the
corresponding certificate of naturalization. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the taking
of said oath. On that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. The Government seasonably gave
notice of its intention to appeal from said order of February9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken
prior to judgment having been final and executory.
Issue:
- Is the oath valid
- Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China.

G.R. No. 161634

March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824

March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Held:
Facts:

Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his
(Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed
the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court
may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

AASJS

vs

Datumanong

Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the
Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Issue:

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to
enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.

By

recognizing

&

allowing

dual

allegiance,

is

RA

9225

unconstitutional?

CAASI vs CA

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take

Facts:

cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was
sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines

green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides:

are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino
Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in
1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence
prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal

country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He argued that he obtained the
green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children
there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on
February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.

filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed
marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently
establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material

Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United States such that it would

misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

disqualify him to run for any elective local position.

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such

Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null

status areconclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the United States. In the"Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien

and void.

Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United
States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy

was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and

is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a

Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the

permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the

following information is printed: Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in

Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

the United States.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence

Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess

in the Philippines. He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live

dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without

there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.

mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such
entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their
duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao
in the January 18, 1988 local elections, waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he

Held: No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must

acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao,

have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for

Pangasinan. (G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)

elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office

MARCOS vs COMELEC

in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office."

Facts:

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that

conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant
status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988,
the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office.

Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended
her COC, changing seven months to since childhood. The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason
that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.

On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended as well as original COCs. The
Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by

Held: Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but

registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,

the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of

where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus

showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires

appealed

an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for

to

the

Supreme

Court.

different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must

Tacloban, Leyte.

be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24,
1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of

c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President

Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite

Issues:

another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband
and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this

1.
2.
3.

Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections.
Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?
Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections?
Held:

unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a
new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly

1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to
run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following reasons:

chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her

a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father

residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

brought his family back to Leyte.

b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the Comelec does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result
it would have clearly indicated it.

(e) On December 17, 1956, the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten (10) days from the receipt of the order, a
medical certificate on the result thereof.
(f) On March 14, 1957, the defendant was granted additional five (5) days to comply in relation to the order issued in the
preceding number.
(g) On April, 11, 1957, the defendant did not show. The Court deemed lack of interest on her part in the case. The Court entered
a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.

HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

On April 26, 1957, the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered upon the ground that:
(a) The defendants impotency was not satisfactorily established as required by law;

JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC

(b) That instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo
a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and
JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-12790, August 31, 1960

(c) That the decree sough to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude
or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them.

Plaintiff-Appellee: Joel Jimenez

He prayed that the complaint be dismissed that the wife be ordered for a physical examination.

Defendant: Remedios Canizares

On May 13, 1957, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

Intervenor-Appellant: Republic of the Philippines

Issues:

Ponente: J. Padilla

The issue is whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed
and testified that his wife was and is impotent.
Held:

Facts:
In a complaint filed on June 7, 1955, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zamboanga, the plaintiff prays for a decree annulling his marriage to
the defendant with the following facts:
(a) Such marriage was contracted on August 3, 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City;
(b) The ground for the annulment was that the office of the defendants genitals was to small to allow the penetration of a male
organ or penis for copulation;
(c) On June 14, 1955, the defendant was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer.
(d) On September 29, 1956, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire
whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence of the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted, or fabricated;

No. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
have bound them together as husband and wife. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically
enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of
the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established,
The decree is set aside and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Barnuevo vs. Fuster
Facts:
Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez were married in Spain. Fuster came to the Philippines, settled, and acquire property. After
several years, Yanez also went to the Philippines to live with his husband. Subsequently, they made an agreement in a public instrument by

which they resolved to live apart and Fuster authorizing Yanez to go back to Spain and reside therein. Fuster also undertook to gove Yanez a
monthly allowance for support. Yanez returned to the Philippines and commenced divorce proceedings against her husband. She prayed that
she be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date
of the said decree; that the conjugal society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been determined, that
one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant
be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas. As a special preferred defense, Fuster alleged that neither the trial court nor any
other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, because, as to the allowance for support, since
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine Islands In deciding the case, the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and
defendant. Both parties appealed from this judgment
Issue:

HELD:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this
case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their countrys national
law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving
spouse of Arturo
Llorente vs CA
GR 124371 November 23, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Divorce

Whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal

Ruling:
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the personal status of the husband and
wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law,
and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The
jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally
submitted to the territorial principle. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does
not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in
Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical
courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their
personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the
territory of their nation. In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons
of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
Quita vs Court of Appeals
December 22, 1998

Laws Applicable: Art. 15, Art. 17, Art. 26 FC

FACTS:
Alicia( 2nd wife) Lorenzo N. Llorente --- Paula (1ST wife) --- Ceferino Llorente (brother)
Crisologo Llorente(son)

Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957

February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home

November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization

1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines, He discovered that his wife
Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente

FACTS:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got
divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent
herewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the
intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our
country. Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that
aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself
answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained
the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary
estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and the Padlan children moved for reconsideration.
On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one- half of
the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to
Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal
to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.

December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente with the
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her

February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written agreement which was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother to the
effect that

1. all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance
and support would be suspended
2. they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings
3. they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio. (2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary
as surviving spouse of Arturo.

4. Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully.

November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County

Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was

of San Diego

living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a

December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final

divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last

January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and lived together as husband and wife and bore 3 children: Raul,

will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed

Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente

Alicia

March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three

proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter and

children

denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial

December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and

Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

his

special

administrator

of

his

estate.

Before

the

testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate

January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason that the Lorenzo was still alive

January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was duly executedthe will to probate

June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died

RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by Paula over Lorenzos estate contending that she was the surviving spouse
and WITHOUT terminating the testate proceedings filed by Alicia, gave due course to Paulas petition

divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage
he contracted with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is void

Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and conjugal estate

illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate

RTC denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him thus, Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles her to
1/3 of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate

CA: Affirmed with modification

ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce
granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made
final on December 4, 1952. REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy.

ISSUE:
Whether

or

not

the

National

Law

shall

apply.

RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed
his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law.
Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce
was

contracted

after

he

became

an

American

citizen.

Furthermore,

his

National

Law

allowed

divorce.

The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of the
parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.