G.R. No.

L-21664

March 28, 1969

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners,

vs.
HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, and MIGUELA TAN
SUAT, respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-21665

March 28, 1969

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners,

vs.
HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II and CHAN PO
LAN, respondents.

This is a petition to have the petitioner Chan Po Lan, a Chinese National, to be declared a Filipino
citizen. The Solicitor General has been represented by Assistant Fiscal Jose Veluz. During the trial it has
been established to the satisfaction of the Court that sometime in the year 1961, petitioner was legally
married to Cu Bon Piao, a Filipino citizen; and the petitioner has all the qualifications and more of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. After the submission of the evidence for the petitioner, the
court inquired from Fiscal Veluz if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal answered that
he has no opposition, neither has he any evidence to warrant any opposition. The Court had it
announced to the public if there is any opposition to the petition of Chan Po Lan to be declared a Filipino
citizen and nobody in the crowded courtroom registered his position.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner Chan Po Lan is hereby declared a Filipino citizen by
marriage and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the necessary
alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the
corresponding identification card.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

On July 1, 1963 the Solicitor General 1 filed separate notices of appeal from said decisions, at the same time
requesting an extension of ten (10) days within which to file the corresponding records on appeal. However, because
of the unexplained failure of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Quezon to forward the records
immediately despite repeated requests therefor by the Solicitor General, the latter, unable to prepare the records on
appeal, filed the instant petitions instead, including the Commissioner of Immigration as co-petitioner in view of the
fact that the dispositive parts of the decisions of the lower court are addressed to him for compliance.

These are actually two (2) separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction but are decided
jointly because the issues presented proceed from the same factual background.

On August 10, 1963 we issued in each case a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution and enforcement of
the judgment. Thereafter these two cases were submitted for decision without any answer from the respondents.

The pertinent facts are not disputed. On April 29, 1963 the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Branch 11), Hon.
Manolo L. Maddela presiding, rendered a decision in its Special Proceeding No. 4012, which is hereunder quoted in
its entirety:

Private respondents' identical prayer in the lower court was for a declaration of their Filipino citizenship and for an
order to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel their respective alien certificates of registration on the
ground that they had married Filipino husbands. In granting the said prayer the lower court was clearly in error. At that
time jurisprudence had already set the question at rest: no person claiming to be a citizen may get a judicial
declaration of citizenship.

First Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
De Mesa and De Mesa for respondents.

This is a petition to have the petitioner Miguela Tan Suat, a Chinese National, to be declared a Filipino
citizen. The Solicitor General has been represented by Assistant Fiscal Jose Veluz. During the trial it has
been established to the satisfaction of the Court that sometime in the year 1937 petitioner was legally
married to Sy Ing Seng, a Filipino citizen; and that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. After the submission of the evidence for the petitioner, the
court inquired from Fiscal Veluz if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal answered that
he has no opposition, neither has he any evidence to warrant opposition. The Court had it announced to
the public if there is any opposition to the petition of Miguela Tan Suat to be declared a Filipino citizen
and nobody in the crowded courtroom registered his opposition.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, petitioner Miguela Tan Suat is hereby declared a Filipino citizen by
marriage and the Commissioner of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the necessary alien
certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the
corresponding identification card.lwphi1.et
On the same day the same court rendered another similarly worded, decision in its special Proceeding No. 4013,
this time in favor of Chan Po Lan. This second decision reads:

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding
may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a
legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief
available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such
as naturalization by judicial decree. But there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a
judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan v. Republic, L-14159, April
18, 1960).2
Before these cases were submitted for decision, the Solicitor General filed a motion, dated February 14, 1964, to
cite the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Quezon for contempt by reason of his failure to forward the
records of these cases to this Court despite our resolution to that effect. It appears, however, that after the said
resolution was issued the Clerk did send those records and the same were received here on January 24, 1964. The
question of contempt has therefore become moot.

WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are hereby granted; the questioned decisions are set aside and the writs of
preliminary injunction previously issued are made permanent. Costs against private respondents.
G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang
V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee.

After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed

to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On
January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of
the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of
her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a
half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.
She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that
the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reason as set forth in the
Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:

BARREDO, J.:

First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya
Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of
and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the
Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative
from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and
deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so."
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the
case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made
in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to
enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a
period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was permitted
to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted
to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13,
1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the
amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau
Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before
the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or
within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.

Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who

is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held
to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien woman may be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law,
because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee
Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However,
from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might
herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being
disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen
by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA
LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be
disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be
naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on March
13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in the
Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen,

need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it would

have been worded "and who herself is not disqualified to become a
citizen of the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the
Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having
married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month before the
expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected merely for convenience
to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This
cannot be permitted.

The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of this
appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the
hearing ..., it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized
by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of
petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
I

Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:

5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a
temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one
month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29,
1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017,
September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT HERSELF
BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW)
INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF
SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS
SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES
NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO
MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH
MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUBPARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.

The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by the decided
cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of
Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the
Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and
procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This
paragraph is added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all
laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties
in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide
discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs.
Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision
thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his
jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and
insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write either
language.

III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A
FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME
WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER
AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY
PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD
MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT
AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM

ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A

TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.

thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine

port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this
Act.

VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN
ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two main grounds of
objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a
period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to
stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung
Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956;
Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par.
Phil. Immigration Law);
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the
latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law
to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay,
Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would necessarily cover all the points
raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants' second and fourth
assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor
General's pose that an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here
permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the
appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the
court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said
petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her
as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9
(g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently.
To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some
foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and

does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino
citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the
Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may
neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of
convenient ruses employed by alien to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in
circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling
in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and
voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the
benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on his
representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he had
promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the
Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or "correction", for the law makes no
distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous
decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted
to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy
such claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort
to examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up
permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and
evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he
entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but
who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only
to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after
all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever
legal means this has been conferred upon him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an
alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law
that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be
processed to determine whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and
hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd
construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present
Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen
of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in
consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the
decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act
613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on
whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited
shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)

In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine
citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being
entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-avis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and
is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth
assignments of error are well taken.

her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed
from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides
that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf
the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned
to the depositor or his legal representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien
female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.

II

The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely,
reads:

Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen
Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not
have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it
appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization
by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been
established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the
law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the
instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court since Lee
Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil.,
706,713, 1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30,
1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who
marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied with all the
formalities required thereby like any other applicant for naturalization, 2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our
jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging
Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee
Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go
Im Ty. 3
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial
construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of
Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a
bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she
married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of
Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage,
demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to
leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for
the recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave, because she
had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In
the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino
justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the
Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners
alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of

the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife, unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an opinion
of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No.
473, namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are
at war, during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United
States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does
not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that,
despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified in the bond in
question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her
alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not
made out, therefore a case against the respondents-appellants.

Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it
results that any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17,
1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she
possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, follows the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad
Santos.)

Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court,
had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be
lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are of the
opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be given an
opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .

From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is
as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines,
his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as
follows:

As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as regards the
following propositions: .

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of

the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman
to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being
naturalized under Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her bond
confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry
need be made as to qualifications, 5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the
Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the
following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth
Act No. 473), provided that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law of the United States has been
construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good
character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is
of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496,
5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No.
168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No.
79, s. 1940)

The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above provision,
means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the
disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus.,
No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts
stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified
classes mentioned in the law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a
Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with
the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only legally
recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s.
1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen
of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice
Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five days
later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport was forged.
On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953,
she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a
Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the
deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied
the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to
confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the
alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last

condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified
under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by
Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore,
committed no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings, where she can
anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as
well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of
Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.)
[Emphasis supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity
to prove the fact that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of
undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions,
the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby
becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any
naturalization proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not
they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that
such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a
distinguished member of this Court, 6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most
illustrative of which held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs
only to show that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those relating to the
qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary.
(See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No.
776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760,
promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section
of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that
"this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of the causes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign
wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of
Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground that a
warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the petitioner.

We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for
naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on a
finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be
invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen
under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12,
s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is
as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she
is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to
the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited
section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the
Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760,
promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section
in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized," and
that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage,
those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of the causes
enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of
Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new
one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship
to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several
earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No.
95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of section 15 excludes from the
benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of
the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of
Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was importantly
modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in the
Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the
bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice,
otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply with
the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond

confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in
criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the
bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason
for his inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the bondsman,
(section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the
temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a
breach of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the
Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it
forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and
Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Pias,
Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had
penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the
bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the
violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond failure to depart from
the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines
(25 March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours
from receipt of notice were committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a
Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter.
She must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino
citizen by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed decision now
before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473
and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940,
above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of
residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedingsbut merely that she is of the race
by persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the construction of the law, it
could be said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such
clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790,
October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua,supra, which
followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the
particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said
on the said matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under
Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as
this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration
Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of
disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha

and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped
together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-disqualifications have
to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court's position.
In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San
Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to
June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her permit, and
when she was requested to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had
become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does
not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the
case reached the court, the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the
disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of
residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the
issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to
be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of the
decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit
Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman "should be a person of the
class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect of the
qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be
regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen." (In explanation of
its conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the
question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by
reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also that the
woman then possessed all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized
under existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The
proof of the facts may have existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a
controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman or a
woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen, because,
with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she was
presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended
by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens of the
Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that
law provided:
Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens Philippine
citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who
are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the
Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United
States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may
become citizens of said country if residing therein.

Section 2. Who are disqualified. The following cannot be

naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized
government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
government; (b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or
believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects
of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at
war, during the period of such war.
Section 3. Qualifications. The persons comprised in subsection
(a) of section one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire
Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of their petition.
The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section
one shall, in addition to being not less than twenty-one years of age
on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of the
following qualifications:
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of
not less than five years, except as provided in the next following
section;
Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of their residence in
the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which they are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less
than one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known
trade or profession; and
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native
tongue.
In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare
in writing and under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and
perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or
sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then stood, alien
women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the
Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof under the
Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of

the United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United States might become
citizens of that country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set forth in
Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents and purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on
June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration from the
qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose in
eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing naturalization
act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our
neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity with all nations
[Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in
question. The result is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be
understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in which
it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as the
Solicitor General points out, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now
be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become
citizens of the Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not
belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is
not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines, because
the law treats "qualifications" and "disqualifications" in separate sections. And then it must
not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be
understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v.
Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of
disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her
husband: What that case held was that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
merely means that she belongs to the class or race of persons qualified to become citizens
by naturalization the assumption being always that she is not otherwise disqualified.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an
alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her
husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by
law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in
any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a
Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to become a
citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the same being selfserving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784, December 27,
1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding
administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her
husband two years after the decision granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was
contested in court, Justice Barrera held:

In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775,

promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790,
promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a naturalized
citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It must also be
shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to
become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-wife
is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a decision was
favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the
husband) would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary
stay.

In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman, who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines
shall be considered citizens thereof.

On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera
reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to
a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine
Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in
1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the
parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in
the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only
during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a
minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a
reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King
Tee's husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same
year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since
then, her last visa before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband
asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the
reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the
trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the
arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the
national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. 7

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching the age of majority he
fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country
where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P.
Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the
Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications
for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did
Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA
539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of
Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications,
without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law." 9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that
an alien woman who is widowed during the dependency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order
that she may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of
Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed above, 11 even as he
impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now under discussion is
settled law.

is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently
becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? if nothing
but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an
affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually
submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong,
all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make
it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the
membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two
members, Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because (they
wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and
arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the
memorandum of the amici curae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they
project in the most forceful manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical
aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even
decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying
on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative authorities in charge of the
matter, as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider
the views of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to
further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King
Teestand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied
upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would
seem to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted,
of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more
accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history
proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.

The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was
that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were
found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912
and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the
Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only
after the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject
to have any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.

SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner
should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may
continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and
minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered
during the life of the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions
were added to the above Section 13:

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .

SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a
provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens
of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and
except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino
upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to
27, which were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the
wife always followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of
naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native
born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus: .

SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen and
fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to
a citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized
under this law, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time
of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the
Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who
have been born in the Philippine Islands after the naturalization of
their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13
became its Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a)
abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change
of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our
naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty,
discussed above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien
woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding
because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not
the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the
possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala
reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by
the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the
United States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it
provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not
reenact the section providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of
Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become
citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully

naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of
disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The
alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization
Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30,
1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136,
December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew to the court
for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law
in the United States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law
was section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the
U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to
the former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26,
1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to three
classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of
the other insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or
foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter
country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become
American Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there was
at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of the two countries and hence there
was reason to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United States to
the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment of
the Revised Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial
restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in Act No. 3448 has
been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to retain the said
provision that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is no longer to the class or race to
which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to the qualifications
and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute.
Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might herself be lawfully naturalized" would be
meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to
be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after
all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately
to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines,
irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals,
customs and traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization,
even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as
a Philippine citizen.

In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing in
the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and
write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized indicate
that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino
husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being
disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court
below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is that the
woman be not disqualified under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at issue
could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the concise pronouncement
in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically
confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the rule
that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an
alien woman married to a citizen should be one who "might herself be lawfully naturalized,"
means not only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but
also one who possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473
(San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of
Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of
the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified
under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in
violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted
by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not
intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an
applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral character."

Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government
by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus
disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be
disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to organized government," nor
affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments",
nor "defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on the
absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of
the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was derived from
the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial
significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lon San
Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351,
March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot bat
reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus
rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine
citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial
requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the
admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that
Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. Philippine citizenship may be acquired
by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b)
natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United
States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said
country if residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or color of the
persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected
the inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable
stations flowing from our staffs as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of
Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority without which it could not have been done, granted by
an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of
March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have
already been footed earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth
and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our
Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of
American legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than
the intended purpose of the amendment.

2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927)
to foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races
were qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said
subdivision was to confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein
mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American
citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular
race or color and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for
American citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when
our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States already provided for the following
disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or
who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such
disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty,
necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of
specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any
other organized government, because of his or their official character, or who is a polygamist,
shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927
even if they happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first
"Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of
Aliens throughout the United States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of
May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted,
subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were
traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would
seem that the rationalization in the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act
2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our
naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the construction adopted in the opinions
of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is
beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of
Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section
1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States as it stood before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction
uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must
be considered, as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said
section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the
American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by
the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United States and all administrative authorities, charged
with the implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635
[1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct.
756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative authorities is
contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt.,
295 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:

Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117)
provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February 10,
1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section provided "that any woman,
who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be married to
a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 & 8
Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which provided that "any woman married, or who shall be married,
to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself
naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat.
4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and
Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman who marries a citizen of the
United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not become a citizen of the United States
by reason of such marriage ..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained
under either of such sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922,
has no application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the relator took place
prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994
of the Revised Statutes.
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed
this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who might lawfully be
naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application of the law to free white
women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only required that the person
applying for its benefits should be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the class or
race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of
the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of the provisions of the
immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the Act of
1855, declaring that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." He held
that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the case," the statute must
be construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or race that may
be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who marries a citizen of the United
States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it should appear affirmatively that
she possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to
naturalization.

In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United
States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States
and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge
Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as
fully as if she had complied with all of the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of
naturalization. He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283." The alien
"belonged to the class of persons" who might be lawfully naturalized.
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the
United States from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The
immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with the view of
deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the
disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of
appeals for the ninth Circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be
discharged from custody. The court declared: "The rule is well settled that her marriage to a
naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife
follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicil became
her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had
before it the application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at
that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at New York on the ground that she
was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that
the effect of the husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In
view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the husband's
application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was determined whether the
wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that the effect
of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same time he express his opinion
that the husband's naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who
could become lawfully naturalized. "Her own capacity (to become naturalized)," the court
stated "is a prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the
married status cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually decided in that
case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they
can be regarded as something more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the
learned judge, unable to accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned
Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an American
citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States, could not be excluded,
although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the immigration laws would
have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The
case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464,
184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators married, they might have been
lawfully naturalized, and we said: "Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney
to be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under
our immigration laws, it does not affect these relators."
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be
inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an

alien. The distinction between that case and the one now before the court is that, in the
former case, the marriage took place before any order of exclusion had been made, while in
this the marriage was celebrated after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere
administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a court, and works no
estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances that existed at the time the
order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being carried
into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of exclusion should be based on
the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be
made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered
from the disease, we think it plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this
case, if, after the making of the order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to
remain, she in good faith marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her
marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the
Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon, the
immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to
aliens, and not to citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of
the officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances: She entered this country
in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into custody by
the immigration authorities in the following September, and in October a warrant for her
deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in
the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was that she was afflicted
with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her entry. One of the reasons
assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the United
States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable to
believe that a marriage under such circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in
view of the facts shown." He held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul
or override the immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of the wife
of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a
class of persons excluded by law from admission to the United States does not come within
the provisions of that section. The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the
Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held
that where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute,
she was married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a citizen, and was not
subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his
opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and preventing her deportation, such fact
should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an action commenced for the
purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed.
1022.
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute by
the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402,
passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United States for
the period required by the naturalization laws was riot necessary in order to constitute an
alien woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although

she never resided in the United States, she and her husband having continued to reside
abroad after the marriage.
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion
rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight
years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at once to a town in
Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was
taken before a United States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the
Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed.
p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered this country for the purpose
of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing the
same within three years after landing. It appeared, however, that after she was taken before
the United States commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of
Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman
professed at the time of her marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and
to remove with her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had
been, but professed to believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right
to deport her, the claim being advance that by her marriage she bad become an American
citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney General ruled against the right to
deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the words, "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized,
and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27
Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that
Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the marriage
to an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes ... shall not invest such
female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall be
solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts which make her liable to
deportation under this act."
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class avoiding
deportation through the device of marrying an American citizen.
(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman of any
other of the excluded classes, either before or after her detention, should not confer upon
her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its intention would have
been expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to women of the immoral
class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We have found no warrant for the
proposition that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was
meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the
subject would seem to give such impression. The case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited
among the first of the decisions 19 simply held:

As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to
citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the
previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or "who shall be married," do not
refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state
of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be
naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the
passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that
fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship
upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the
time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as
we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to
follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application for naturalization on her
part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the restriction suggested.
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit the
application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the
time only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person,"
and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v.
Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the
application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ...
required that the person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but also) ... not an alien
enemy." This is simply because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was decided,
the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the
corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was
mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at
the time; and this is demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous
naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is impotent, since as stated in re
Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might
lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white women, must be
interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982)
meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race
and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law in force at the
time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the evidence that
because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said
eliminated section particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully
naturalized," what should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must
also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character,
adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or
ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages,
education of children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely
intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We have
come, to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.

To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already explained above of the mentioned
provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what
is definite is that Section 15 is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at
the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by American courts and
administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there can be no
doubt that in the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section
1994, which was taken, from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed
that the qualifications of residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be
considered, and that the only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject
belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra,
discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made
thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of
1855,supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen" while it may imply that the person to
whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the usual way, as
by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not
follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word
"deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore, whatever an act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing, must, in law, be
considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning "such person or thing,
and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien
woman shall, under certain circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect when
the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress,
or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation like this wherein our
legislature has copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the construction already given to such
statute before its being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a
different connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining
the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in accurate factual premises related to the real legislative background
of the framing of our naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility
requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words,
Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473.
If it were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act
3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of
Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when
precisely, according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was
approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding
American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and that what should be considered only are the
requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section
4?

Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have been
intended to convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As
already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was
enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force
because it had been repealed expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic
naturalization of alien wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization
proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature
adopted the phrase in question, which, as already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the
Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be natural
judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had
two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the other to follow the new
posture of the Americans of requiring judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have
no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous American Law On the subject. Indeed, when
Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the
American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law and make one of our own, or, at least,
follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of the
old law. What then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of
Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans had amended their law in
order to provide for what is now contended to be the construction that should be given to the phrase in question.
Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American courts had
given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to
adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature
borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our
legislators even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under
these circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say that Section
15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed independently of the previous
American posture because of the difference of circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say
that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated
legislative point of view seems to indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so called racial
requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications
in the same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473.
More accurately, they have always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess
them were the ones who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the
disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which,
incidentally, are practically identical to those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the
latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions and
opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of
this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of the secretary of
Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always treated as disqualifications
in the same light as the other disqualifications under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or
understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead
the meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as
seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth
Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448),
notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making
the phrase in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the
qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of
persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling under Section 2, and

surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by any process of
reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications that used to be before such
elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such elimination could have convicted qualifications into
disqualifications specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the
law distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence,
qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might be lawfully naturalized,"
as such phrase is used in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the
matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in
the United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the
motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case ofZita Ngo
Burca v. Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications"
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section
15 of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she
possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be deemed a
citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and
compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is
shown by the following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for
naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant "must
have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less
than ten years." If this requirement is applied to an alien wife
married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years
at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband.
If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law declares
that upon her marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses her
citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could
mean that for a period of ten years at least, she would be stateless.
And even after having acquired continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for
naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain
stateless for an indefinite period of time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for
naturalization that he "must own real estate in the Philippines worth
not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have
some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation."
Considering the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an
alien of real estate except in cases of hereditary succession (Art.
XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the
citizenship of her husband must have to prove that she has a
lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or
occupation. The income requirement has been interpreted to mean
that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said

income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs.
Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove
that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than her
husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common knowledge,
and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the
Philippines do not have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed,
Philippine law, recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the
husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the former.
(Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it
is an accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary
duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not
to be remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a lucrative
income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must
have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of the Private
Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government
and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum
during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of
him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine
citizen." If an alien woman has minor children by a previous
marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such
minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during
her period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for
naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The reason
behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in
recognized educational institutions is that they follow the citizenship
of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954;
Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic,
87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953;
Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering
that said minor children by her first husband generally follow the
citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as
applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence
prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced to five
years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman." It is
absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be
required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to qualify for
citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino husband
must reside for ten years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related
by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so
related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of the first paragraph of
Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a
Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the

enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law),
there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated
as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature
enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in
1941 is enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife
follows the nationality of the husband; but the Department of State
of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of
a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our
Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs
(23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being
political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the United States. Accordingly, the stated taken by the
Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act No. 3448, was that
marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the
former citizens of this counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in
1928 adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s.
1941; emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in
such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in
Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is submitted that
such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object,
and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which
will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should
receive the former construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493,
45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285.
See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15
Phil. 85 [1910).
... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be
avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a
construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with
the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will result in
oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will
a construction which will prejudice public interest, or construction
resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will
result in absurd consequences.
So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would
be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been

determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility,

redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature;
and the court should adopt that construction which will be the least
likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the
intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would render the
requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be avoided,
and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an
illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the construction of
Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is
it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult if not
practically impossible in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any
ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to
assume that Section 15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino
irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of
this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and
benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are
bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a
Filipino family the alien woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among
whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage.
Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her
sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy
King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The
avowed policy of "selectives admission" more particularly refers to a case where citizenship
is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts
should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to become
citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship.
But this policy finds no application in cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of
law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming
citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory
requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the
Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a
citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and
identification with Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions." A minor child of a person
naturalized under the law, who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is
likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or he adheres to the
principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required
to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship
status as a fact.
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this regard,
for it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted
that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens
could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members
of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention
on the Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and Commentary." UNITED

NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such
objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship
derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition
and law has placed the husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions
govern the life of the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and
solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a vital and
enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our
country, there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and wife, and
from the nature of the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See De la Via v.
Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of
husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the
nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For as the
court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The status of
the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile
became her domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law being that the property
relations of husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil
Code), the income of one is also that of the other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a
husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one
should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's interests in
property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the
conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own
efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect
of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. (Motion for
Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15
of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who
may be lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was
applied by the American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in the view that Philippine
statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our
naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called
"melting pot" of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is
nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting
that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to
admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close
our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is
purely American, factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of
statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late
1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that
direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien
women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings,
our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring
American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any naturalization
proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character,
adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the

disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of
this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances where
unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious
marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the
construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant
considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and
every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra,
regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered
or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been
decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court
could have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina,
without her undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that she is not
disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to
decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in the affirmative.
As already stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a
motion for its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this
account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to reexamine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen
of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she
possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court
of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the
filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official,
administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent court of justice
certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a "petition
for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once
that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections
2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court itself apparently considered the
petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the
Philippines."

In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino
citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the
disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of
judicial naturalization apparently from declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain
words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino
husband; she remains to be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she
desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for
naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish
and one of the principle local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage
in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of intention and after one
year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral character and
other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of
probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to
be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of
the provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and
children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly
conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner
to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court
might have overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that complained therein. It is
undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of
persons affected by the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our
decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the
national policy it seeks to endorse.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the Bar and well
known for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in
research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the
impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case -- that
an alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become
a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization proceedings
under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions "certifying or
declaring such woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and void" has consequences that
reach far beyond the confines of the present case. Considerably more people are affected,
and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The newspapers report that as many as
15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of the Court.
These are women of many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British,
American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the
community, some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all
exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have
acquired, separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and
they will have sold and transferred such property. Many of these women may be in
professions membership in which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or
officers or employees in companies engaged in business activities for which a certain
percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married women are now
faced with possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges
exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been

accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very agencies of government charged
with the administration of that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which
would visit such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of
Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases although
referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at
bar may have contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein and in other
analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that
the procedure followed was valid under the law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor
General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases
there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have been issued after
notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette
only once, within the periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v.
Republic was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was decided) "and (b)
from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the decision in the present case was
rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for
reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained
in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply
and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29,
1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective
application of its construction of the law made in a previous decision, 24 which had already become final, to serve the
ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in
Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that
followed them have at the most become the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds
therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines
shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the
parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who
is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine

citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines
when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after
becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he
fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country
where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or
Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of
citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion
of all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but
categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon
the members of his immediate family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that:
(a) all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor
children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically
become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such
naturalization, are also redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer their
permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born outside of the
Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by
failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where they reside and take the
necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor children, falling within
the conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine
citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or
declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation.
But it is claimed that the same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does
not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase
requiring that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to
attach only after she has undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to
become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative
naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for
the ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress of the
Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890
[1898]; See, 1 Taada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for particular
individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of
persons under general conditions applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women who marry
Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature hag
done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most
respect authorities on political law in the Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of
naturalization is often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman
married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who may apply for
naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this
comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, supra.)

More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United States statutes from
which our law has been copied, 28a the American courts have held that the alien wife does not acquire American
citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect of
this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a citizen herself,
without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing
Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by
way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied
verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already had a long
accepted construction among the courts and administrative authorities in that country holding that under such
provision an alien woman who married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and
as a consequence of the marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that, it
could be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in
force. To repeat the discussion We already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision
doubly extensive. The only point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United
States, the American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated
above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922
Explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than those for
other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting
such a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to adopt the latter law and its settled construction
rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United States herself
has evidently found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to
discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of
a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial
mentality, that as a developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our
own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said
law along the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial
legislation which it is not institutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going precisely
against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of
the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who
dies during the proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of
the benefits of the proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner
should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may
continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and
minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered
during the life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said
Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same proceedings and

are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the original
petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and minor children, and (3) that
said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered,
but before the judgment becomes executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said Section
16 contemplate the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of
inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered in the case shall, so
far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had
been rendered during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the intent of
the law to continue the proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it
were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to consider the decision rendered, as far as
it affected the widow and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not be
bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter.
Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the
deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the
oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization
proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been completed, not on behalf of the
deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the benefits of his
naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance,
as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that "any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons
naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee
Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow could not have
been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9
minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee
Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A;
Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization as
Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same
privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and
We see no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered
citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the
power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which foreigners may acquire
citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1 Taada and Carreon, Political Law of

the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens
"Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine
Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are
naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also
those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for
example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by
marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. (See Taada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172;
Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967
ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of the Revised
Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar
phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994), American courts
have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by
operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all the
provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S.
Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27
Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23
398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised
Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of
1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and
taken to be a citizens" while it may imply that the person to whom it
relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or
in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a
proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person
is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word
"deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and
therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or
"taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law, be considered
as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such
person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under
certain circumstances, be "deemed" an American citizen, the effect
when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized
directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby
prescribed. (Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in
Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965
ed.]; emphasis ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first
paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of
the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically become" as
used in the above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of

the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of
aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are
already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons
enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to whom they
are related, the effect is for said persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines.
"Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of
Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also.
Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso factobecome citizens; they
must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is
that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the
Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences.
Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under
the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from
the time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the time
when the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is able to prove that
he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization of
his father that he was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be "considered" a citizen
thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly,
an alien woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years
after her marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her
citizenship status became in question), that she is one who might herself be lawfully
naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only
after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to
conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the
law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a
Philippine citizenunless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines
if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or
acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her
citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The
word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the time of her marriage to a
Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under
the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L
ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the
fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a
citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized"
(Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of citizenship by the alien wife depends
on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is not a
citizen unless and until she proves that she may herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear
from the words of the law that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by Congress, not by the
courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its
holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her

qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those
cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they failed to establish their claim to
citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded to
the lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by
marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the Government, "might herself be lawfully
naturalized," for the purpose of " proving her alleged change of political status from alien to
citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being
deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding
that there was no proof that she was not disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of
assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is
untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of
proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily
imply that they did not become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos.
What the decisions merely held was that these wives failed to establish their claim to that
status as a proven fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship
is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is established as a
proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is
put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for instance, that his father is a
citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His
citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is established
as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be lawfully
naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband,
not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might
herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration
that a person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a
declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she
might herself be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former
becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a proven fact. But
neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become a citizen of the Philippines. If
her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she obviously has no
obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law should be
that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51
O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a representation shown to have been made
is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is them for
naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship
settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or
enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question
is that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such
paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation objections even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not

considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as
We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra.
Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier
or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these are not
really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the most immediate
relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then
Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested
parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is
as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that
she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to
the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited
section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the
Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably be less
difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and
vigor of the opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched by the trial
court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is
hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined
from causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby
declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.
G.R. No. L-27429

August 27, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.

OH HEK HOW, petitioner appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Eliezer M. Echavez for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor
Santiago M. Kapunan for oppositor-appellant.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

A decision granting his petition for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines having been rendered on January 16,
1964, petitioner Oh Hek How filed, on January 17, 1966, a motion alleging that he had complied with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen
and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. Upon petitioner's testimony, taken on February 9, 1966, the
date set for the hearing of said motion, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order
authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued
to him.
The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of February 9, 1966 and filed its
record on appeal. Before the same was approved, it also moved to cancel petitioner's certificate of naturalization,
upon the ground, among others, that it was issued and the oath taken before said order of February 9, 1966, had
become final and executory. Acting upon this motion and petitioner's opposition thereto, the court issued, on October
3, 1966, an order granting the motion, but, at the same time, authorizing the taking of a new oath by the petitioner and
the issuance in his favor of another certificate of naturalization, after thirty (30) days from notice to the Solicitor
General. Thereafter, or on November 26, 1966, the court approved the record on appeal and, once more, authorized
the petitioner to "take a new or proper oath to validate the first one made on February 9, 1966." The case is now
before us on said record on appeal filed by the Government.
At the outset, it is obvious that the oath of allegiance taken by petitioner on November 28, 1966, and the certificate of
naturalization issued to him in pursuance thereof, as well as the authority given therefor by the lower court, are null
and void. Indeed, the order of February 9, had not and up to the present has not become final and executory in
view of the appeal duly taken by the Government. What is more, petitioner's second oath was taken, not only after the
filing of the notice of appeal 1 and the submission of the record on appeal, but also after the approval thereof. In other
words, the lower court had already lost its jurisdiction over the case. 2
Again, petitioner's net income in 1960 and 1961 was P3,945.65 and P5,105.79, respectively, or from about P330 to
P425 a month. His income tax return for 1962, filed subsequently to the institution of this case, showed a net income
of P6,485.50 for that year, or about P540 a month. Considering that petitioner has a wife and three (3) children, one of
them of school age, at the time of the filing of his application for naturalization, his aforementioned income is not a
lucrative one. Indeed, it has been held that the following incomes are not lucrative, from the viewpoint of our
naturalization laws, namely: (1) P4,200 3 or P5,000 a year 4 for one married, with five (5) children; 5 (2) P6,000 a year
for one married, with two (2) minor children; 5 and (3) P6,000 6 or P6,300 a year 7 for one married, with only one (1)
child.

between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired." The question of how a Chinese
citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code
by the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines. 9 As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized
as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous
permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.
The view to the contrary, adhered to in Parado v. Republic, 10 Chausintek v. Republic, 11 and Lim So v. Republic12 has
been superseded by our ruling in the subsequent case of Go A. Leng v. Republic 13 which we hereby reiterate.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the oath of allegiance taken, on November 28, 1966, by
petitioner Oh Hek How, as well as the certificate of naturalization issued in pursuance thereto, are hereby declared
null and void, with costs against said petitioner, who is, moreover, directed to surrender the aforementioned certificate
of naturalization to the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, within ten (10) days after this
decision shall have become final. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO

ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs.

JR., respondent.

Lastly, it is conceded that petitioner has not required from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China the
permission required by the laws thereof for a valid renunciation of his Chinese citizenship. In Go A. Leng v.
Republic, 8 a decision granting the application for naturalization of a Chinese national was reversed by this Court,
upon the ground, among others, of "his failure to secure" the aforementioned permission.
It is argued that the same is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of the
Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any foreign law. Section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides, however, that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall
"solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement
is to divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have
two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the
Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine
citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty

RONALD

ALLAN

KELLEY

POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO

POE,

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the
privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition, [1]that cannot be taken lightly by
anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to
the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the
highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he
not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us
of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence
that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May
1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R.
No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy,
FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on
09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the
latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his
claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of
an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie
Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F.
Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that
there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines
before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the
effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones
being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no
available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of
Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan,
in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the
name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage
contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or
cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born
citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 [2] in
an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987
Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by
the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt
of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be
taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to
be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government
post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted
before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to
designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to
declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June
1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear
and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines
and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793,
the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13,
and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18
April 1992, would support this premise Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition
for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30)
days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. [5] In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.,"
and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have
to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of
citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322
B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. [7] The concept
grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with
concomitant obligations, on the other. [8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing
to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was
limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights
to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship,
which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. [10] The 20th century saw the next stage
of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and
social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed
in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village,
might well be the internationalization of citizenship.[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made
it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to
the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July
1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among
experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political
status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which
was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express
mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramaramong which this country was included,
would be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out
with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
period.[25] More about this later.

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of
1902 -

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower,
Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted
principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws
then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. [21] Under
Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United
States would be determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event
all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also
have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as
are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein." [26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when
he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act,
also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act
of Congress in 1912 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others
as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for,
is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall
be determined by the Congress."[22]

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines
as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3)
since that date, not a citizen of some other country.

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they,
however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for
all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the
United States on the Philippines -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th
day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety
eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish
subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11
April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902,
during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time,
which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino

citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly
found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the
new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines.Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F.
Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11
September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915
to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July
1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino
citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ,
would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to
Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate
of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree
of certainty from the documents would be that 1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3)
thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able
to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[27]

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been
submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted
by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true
copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules
of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded
on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a
breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870
when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the
Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any
other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San
Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to
presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would
be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father
[or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently
being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day
prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish
filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could
only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or
the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or
only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document
the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father
could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the
certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same
useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his
birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient
proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it

contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents
as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the
nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by
decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals
which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary,
legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood
brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove
filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an
authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the
father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent
official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted
to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,

[36]

the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take
place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30,
1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to
merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or
illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the
State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in
the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of
property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance,
authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the
protection of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond,
the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce
upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of
the husband and wife."

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly,
citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, [39] such as on successional
rights and family relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive
parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights
under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to
the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these
bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the
invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil
Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family
Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter
about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before
the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b)
the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the
declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted
as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being
sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
stating that -

3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -

4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street,
Manila.

xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my
sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St.
(now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some
months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald
Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural
born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to
Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent
and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an
American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents
would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship
of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,
[43]
citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he
states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court
on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule
of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision
but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a
Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson
followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of
the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a
legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant
to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.

Declarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain,
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue
of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has
now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact
that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to
deny progress."

Petitioners Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate
child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his
mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who
was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the
Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court
therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin
therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if
Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement
about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter
dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat. [47] I would grant
that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real

differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for
another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can
there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his
parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an
illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is
neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben
Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views.The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately
hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it
is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are
those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove
whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
[48]
must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X.
Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160869

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED
WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice,Respondent.
DECISION

In Sum

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R.
No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the
petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material representation in
his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No.
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the
Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship
to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in

May 11, 2007

QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official
tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop
respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens
Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended,
and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV
of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign

country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:

SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."

SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

We shall discuss these issues jointly.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)
years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for
a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other
section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2)
Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?

Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all
Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without
losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the
Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The
OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former
Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking
the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical
affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the
intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No.
9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative deliberations
reveals the following:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - - the retention of foreign
citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships
and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest.
He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance
as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the
taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and not
to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no
concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is involved.

Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which did not require an
oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the
Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign citizenship and
therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine
government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not
a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national interest should be
dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the
Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship.

For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be
dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any
jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that
would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for
the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had
already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance.12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely
renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left
it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he
utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of
the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No.
9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority
of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not
there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
NORBERTO GURAY, ET AL., respondents.
NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee.

Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual
allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further
contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through
Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual
citizenship.7

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30241

December 29, 1928

Mabanag and Primicias, Gibbs and McDonough, and Mariano Alisangco for appellant.
Sison and Siguion and Franciscco Ortega for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of La Union,
upholding the defense of res judicata and dismissing the quo warranto proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio
Nuval against Norbeto Guray and others, with costs against the petitioner.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its
judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the judgment rendered upon Gregorio Nuval's petition for the
cancellation of Norbeto Guray's name on the election list of Luna is conclude and constitutes res
judiata in the present case.
2. The trial court erred in not holding that Norbeto Guray at the time of his election, was ineligible for the
office of the residence in said municipality.
3. The lower court erred in not finding in its judgment that the petitioner is entitled to hold the office in
question.
In regard to the first assignment of error, the evidence adduced during the trial of the case shows:
That on May 11, 1928, and within the period fixed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3387, Gregorio Nuval filed, in civil case No. 1442 of the Court of First Instance of La Union, in his dual capacity as a
voter duly qualified and registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered candidate for
the office of municipal president of said municipality, a petition against Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his
name from the election list of said municipality, not being a qualified voter of said municipality sine he had not resided
therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said Administrative Code.
Proceedings were had upon the petition in accordance with sections 437 and 438 of the same Code, as amended by
Act No. 3387, and Judge E. Araneta Diaz, rendered judgment dismissing it because, in his opinion, Norberto Guray
was a bona fide resident of the municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As that order was not appealable, Norberto
Guray's name remained in the election list of the municipality of Luna.
The general election having been held on June 5, 1928, Norbeto Guray was elected to the office of municipal
president of Luna by a plurality of votes, Gregorio Nuval obtaining second place. On June 7, 1928, the municipal
council of Luna, acting as the municipal, Norberto Guray, elected to the office of municipal president of the said
municipality of Luna for the next triennium.
On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto as provided in section 408 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, asking that Norberto Guray be declared ineligible had a legal
residence of one year previuos to the election as required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to
be eligible to an elective municipal office.
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in the case of
the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent
the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act. No. 3387 is of a summary
character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of
the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom
said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.

The petition for execution was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as qualified voter of the municipality of
Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of the president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as
a registered voter in the election list of said municipality. The present proceedings of quo warranto was intreposed by
Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against
Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases,
since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which said
persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par.
1165.)
In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the conclusion of
Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto
proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter in his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he
has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six months' legal
residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceedings of quo warranto,
the case of this action is that Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for the eligibility to the
office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist, therefore, identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) Identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c)
identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 850). And as in the case of the petition for exclusion and in
the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity either of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of
issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.1awphi1.net
For the above considerations, the trial court erred in holding that the judgment rendered in the case on the petition of
Gregorio Nuval asking for the cancellation of Norberto Guray's name in the election list of Luna is conclusive and
constitutes res judicata in the present case.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the evidence establishes the following facts:
Up to June 27, 1922, Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his birthplace, where he had married
and had held the office of municipal treasurer. On that date he was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan,
Province of La Union. The rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, to which Norberto Guray was subject as such
municipal treasurer, require that municipality treasurers live continuously in the municipality where they perform they
official duties, in order to be able to give an account of their acts as such treasurers at any time. In order to qualify
and be in a position to vote as an elector in Balaoan in the general election of 1925, Norberto Guray asked for the
cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna, where he had voted in the general elections of 1922, alleging as
a ground therefore the following: "On the ground of transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th day of
June, 1922. My correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;" and in order to be registered in the
subscribed affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of election inspectors of precinct No. 1 of Balaoan, by virtue of which
he was registered as an elector of the said precinct, having made use of the right of suffrage in said municipality in
the general elections of 1925. In his cedula certificates issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from the
year 1923 to 1928, included, he made it appear that his residence was the residential district of Balaoan. In the year
1926, his wife and children who, up to that time, had lived in the municipality of Balaoan, went back to live in the town
of Luna in the house of his wife's parents, due to the high cost of living in that municipality. Norberto Guray used to go
home to Luna in the afternoons after office hours, and there he passed the nights with his family. His children studied
in the public school of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a house of strong materials in Luna,
which has not yet been completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. On February 1, 1928, Norberto Guray
applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the 16th of the same month he filed his

resignation by telegraph, which was accepted on the same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was
already provided with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him
resident of said town, he obtained another cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was
dated January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of Luna,
Province of La Union. On February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in
the election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, he applied for registration as a voter in Luna,
alleging that he had been residing in said municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he made of the cedula
certificate antedated.
In view of the facts just related, the question arises whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal residence of one
year immediately prior to the general elections of June 5, 1928, in order to be eligible to the office of municipal
president of Luna, Province of La Union.
There is no question but that when Norberto Guray accepted and assumed the office of municipal treasurer of
Balaoan, La Union, he transferred his residence from the municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.
The only question to determine refers to the date when he once more established his residence in the municipality of
Luna.

The present case is different from that of Doctor Apacible cited by the appellee in his brief. Doctor Apacible never had
abandoned his legal residence in the Province of Batangas, nothwithstanding that he had been living with his family in
the City of Manila, taking out his cedula certificates here, but he never exercised the right of suffrage here. Norberto
Guray abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality of Luna, transferring it to the municipality of Balaoan by
reason and an account of the requirements of the rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose
jurisdiction is said municipality, exercising his right of suffrage in the latter.1awphi1.net
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and in law Norberto Guray only abandoned his
legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and began to acquire another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury
16, 1928, when he filed his resignation from the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding,
and which resignation was accepted; and on being elected municipal president of Luna in the general elections of
June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of municipal president of Luna is
hereby held to be unlawful and quashed and, in consequence, he has no right to take possession of said office,
petitioner Gregorio Nuval being the one legally elected to said office with a right to take possession thereof, having
secured second place in the election. With costs against the respondent. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 43314. December 19, 1935.]

It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in another state, he
cannot again vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus
Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only intention
to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
(People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and acquired another in Balaoan, in
order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter
municipality for the length of time prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do
so, but his personal presence in said municipality.
By reason of his office as municipal treasurer of Balaoan and on account of the rules of the provincial treasurer of La
Union, under whose jurisdiction was such municipality, Norberto Guray had to reside and in fact resided in said
municipality until the 6th of February, 1928 when he filed his resignation from his office, which was accepted on the
same date. The fact that his family moved to the municipality of Luna in the year 1926 in order to live there in view of
the high cost of living in balaoan; the fact that his children studied in the public shool of said town; the fact that on
afternoons after hours he went home to the municipality of Luna and there passed the night with his family, are not in
themselves alone sufficient to show that from said year he had transfered his residence to said municipality, since his
wife and children lived with his father-in-law, in the latter's house that only in the month of January, 1927, did he begin
the construction of a house of strong materials, which is not yet completed, nor occupied by himself or his family, His
aftrenoon tips to Luna, according to his own explanation given to the provincial treasurer, were made for purpose of
visiting his sick father. His own act in recording in his cedula certificates for the years 1927 and 1928 issued by
himself in his favor as municipal treasurer of Balaoan, that his place of residene was that municipality, and in taking
out a new cedula in the municipality of Luna of February 20, 1928, and having the date of its issuance surreptitiuosly
put back to January 15 1928, show that until the date of his resignation he did not consider himself as a resident of
the municipality of Luna. The fact that his wife and children lived in Luna not in his own house but in that of his wife's
father since the year 1926, cannot be looked upon as a change of residence, since a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment of the former (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71) and one cannot have two legal residences
at the same time.

A. L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUAN POSADAS,
JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, Defendant-Appellee.
Ohnick & Opisso for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. INHERITANCE TAX; DOMICILE OF TAXPAYER. To effect the abandonment of ones domicile, there must be a
deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared
or provable intent that it should be ones fixed and permanent place of abode, ones home. There is a complete dearth
of evidence in the record that M ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.
2. INHERITANCE AND INCOME TAXES. As Ms legal domicile at the time of his death was the Philippine Islands
and his estate had its situs here, the inheritance and income taxes here involved were lawfully collected.

DECISION

BUTTE, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in an action to recover from the defendantappellee as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P77,018,39 as inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income
taxes assessed against the estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.
The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of facts as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.
"II. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, certified copy of which marked Exhibit AA is

hereto attached and made a part hereof, by virtue of which will, he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida
M. Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, United States of America.
"III. That on February 24, 1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate of the deceased Arthur
Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same being
designated as case No. 39113 of said court. Copy of said petition marked Exhibit BB is hereto attached and made a
part hereof.
"IV. That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition was filed by Ida M. Palmer, asking for the probate of said will of
the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court in a decree dated
May 5, 1931. Copies of the petition and of the decree marked Exhibits CC and DD, respectively, are hereto attached
and made parts hereof.
"V. That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only heiress of the deceased Arthur
Graydon Moody by virtue of an order issued by the court in said case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit EE is
hereto attached and made a part hereof; and that during the hearing for the declaration of heirs, Ida M. Palmer
presented as evidence a letter dated February 28, 1925, and addressed to her by Arthur Graydon Moody, copy of
which marked Exhibit FF is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"VI. That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally of bonds and shares of stock of
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are
more fully shown in the inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special administrator with the court in said case No.
39113, certified copy of which inventory marked Exhibit GG is hereto attached and made a part hereof. This
stipulation does not, however, cover the respective values of said properties for the purpose of the inheritance tax.
"VII. That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody
an inheritance tax return, certified copy of which marked Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period from January 1, 1931 to June 30,
1931, certified copy of which marked Exhibit II is hereto attached and made a part hereof, was also prepared by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.
"IX. That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed with the court its report, certified copy of
which marked Exhibit KK is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"X. That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for the administratrix Ida
M. Palmer a letter, copy of which marked Exhibit LL is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"XI. That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the letter of the Collector of Internal Revenue
referred to in the preceding paragraph. Said answer marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"XII. That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is
hereto attached and made a part hereof.
"XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied in a letter, marked Exhibit OO, hereto
attached and made a part hereof.
"XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and
the other sum of P40,019,75 on January 19, 1932, making a total of P90,019,75, of which P77,018.39 covers the
assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the assessment for income tax against said estate.
"XV. That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the protest made by Ida M. Palmer
through her attorney.
"XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing of the present case.
"Manila, August 15, 1933."cralaw virtua1aw library

In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral and documentary evidence from
which it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and
engaged actively in business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. He
had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds and shares of
stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and
personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by the Collector of
Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of his death was
located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property of any kind
located anywhere else. In his will, Exhibit AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities of the
Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. Palmer, he stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the Philippine Islands, hereby publish and
declare the following as my last Will and Testament . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The substance of the plaintiffs cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his complaint as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands under or by virtue of which any
inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal
properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of inheritance
tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted
and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and
organic law of the Philippine Islands."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. Every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift
mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance, devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine
Islands and real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands; of any
shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima organized or constituted in the
Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in any partnership, business or industry
established in the Philippine Islands or of any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to
the following tax:"
x

It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a "non-resident of the Philippine
Islands." The answer, besides the general denial, sets up as a special defense that "Arthur G. Moody, now deceased,
was and prior to the date of his death, a resident in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was engaged
actively in business." Issue was thus joined on the question: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the
time of his death?
The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any evidence that Moodys domicile was
elsewhere than in Manila at the time of his death based on the proposition that as no such objection was made before
the Collector of Internal Revenue as one of the grounds of the protest against the payment of the tax, this objection
cannot be considered in a suit against the Collector to recover the taxes paid under protest. He relies upon the
decision in the case of W. C. Tucker v. A. C. Alexander, Collector (15 Fed. [2], 356). We call attention, however, to the
fact that this decision was reversed in 275 U. S., 232; 72 Law. ed., 256, and the case remanded for trial on the merits
on the ground that the requirement that the action shall be based upon the same grounds, and only such, as were
presented in the protest had been waived by the collector. In the case before us no copy of the taxpayers protest is
included in the record and we have no means of knowing its contents. We think, therefore, the preliminary objection
made on behalf of the appellee does not lie.
We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to whether Arthur G. Moody was legally
domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his death. Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he
had his legal domicile in the Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a fortune

from his business in the Philippine Islands. He lived in the Elks Club in Manila for many years and was living there up
to the date he left Manila the latter part of February, 1928, under the following circumstances: He was afflicted with
leprosy in an advanced stage and had been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the Philippine
authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law. Distressed at the thought of being thus
segregated and in violation of his promise to Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left the
Islands the latter part of February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance
certificate. The record does not show where Moody was during the remainder of the year 1928. He lived with a friend
in Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929 where he was receiving treatment for leprosy
at the Pasteur Institute. The record does not show where Moody was in the interval between April, 1929, and
November 26, 1930, on which latter date he wrote a letter, Exhibit B, to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him his
interest in the Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In
this letter, among other things, he states: "Certainly Ill never return there to live or enter business again." In this same
letter he says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I wish to know as soon as possible now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently decided either to sell or put in a
line of school or office supplies . . . before I go to the necessary investments in placing any side lines. I concluded to
get your definite reply to this . . . I have given our New York buying agent a conditional order not to be executed until
March and this will give you plenty of time . . . anything that kills a business is to have it peddled around as being for
sale and this is what I wish to avoid." He wrote letters dated December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the
same line to Wendt. As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these letters were written, there can be no
doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he returned to the Philippine
Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance
with the law of the Philippine Islands.
There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent
from Manila. Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the
appellant does not claim that Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and
cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there again. Much less
plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record
contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed abode
that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged
in any settled business on his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the
establishment of a legal domicile there. The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to
Manila does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely
consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur
Institute. The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moodys continued absence from his legal domicile in the
Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious departure,
namely, to evade confinement in the Culion Leper Colony; for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be
immediately confined, because his affliction became graver while he was absent than it was on the day of his
precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well known, as he might do in
foreign parts.
Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual residence." The record
before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes
as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a century, rather
than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the
abandonment of ones domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with
actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be ones fixed and permanent
place of abode, ones home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new
domicile in a foreign country.
The contention under the appellants third assignment of error that the defendant collector illegally assessed an
income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody estate is, in our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment,
stated by the Collector of Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount of
P259,986.69 was received by the estate of Moody as dividends declared out of surplus by the Camera Supply
Company is clearly established by the evidence. The appellant contends that this assessment involves triple taxation:
First, because the corporation paid income tax on the same amount during the years it was accumulated as surplus;
second, that an inheritance tax on the same amount was assessed against the estate, and third, the same amount is

assessed as income of the estate. As to the first, it appears from the collectors assessment, Exhibit II, that the
collector allowed the estate a deduction of the normal income tax on said amount because it had already been paid at
the source by the Camera Supply Company. The only income tax assessed against the estate was the additional tax
or surtax that had not been paid by the Camera Supply Company for which the estate, having actually received the
income, is clearly liable. As to the second alleged double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the additional
income tax in question are entirely distinct. They are assessed under different statutes and we are not convinced by
the appellants argument that the estate which received these dividends should not be held liable for the payment of
the income tax thereon because the operation was simply the conversion of the surplus of the corporation into the
property of the individual stockholders. (Cf. U. S. v. Phellis, 257 U. S., 171, and Taft v. Bowers, 278 U. S., 460.)
Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is relied on by the appellant, plainly provides that the income from
exempt property shall be included as income subject to tax.
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, first,
because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the
Philippine Islands and, second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine
Islands. Costs against the Appellant.

G.R. No. L-22041

May 19, 1966

MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
Tagayuna, Arce and Tabaino for petitioner and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor F. C. Zaballero and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for
oppositor and appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur.
Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is married to Maxima O. Ujano with
whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. He left the Philippines for the United States of America in
1927 where after a residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. He returned
to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay. He owns an
agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. He receives
a monthly pension of $115.00 from the Social Security Administration of the United States of America. He has no
record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.1wph1.t
After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the
residence required by law six months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the
present appeal.
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: "One of the qualifications for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies
for naturalization' [Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This 'residence' requirement in cases of naturalization,
has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence
or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he
lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his

domicile. In other words domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into this
country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually present in this
country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in
nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the present case, petitioner, who is
presently a citizen of the United States of America, was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he
has maintained at the time of the filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which
continues up to the present. Such being the case, he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding
six months residence before filing his present petition."
We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it to be a correct interpretation [Section 3 (1)
of Commonwealth Act No. 63] which requires that before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall
have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization." The word "residence" used
therein imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic, L-18885, January 31,1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). Indeed, that
term cannot refer to the presence in this country of a person who has been admitted only on the strength of a permit
for temporary residence. In other words, the term residence used in said Act should have the same connotation as
that used in Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, even if in approving the law permitting the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship our Congress has liberalized its requirement by foregoing the qualifications and
special disqualifications prescribed therein. The only way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine
citizenship is by securing a quota for permanent residence so that he may come within the purview of the residence
requirement of Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.
Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao,

Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card
holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First
Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local
elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision dated June 21, 1989,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival
candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of
his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration
Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for
convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his
children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous
elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the
congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy,
Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish
that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his
green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in
Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the
respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to
elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code,
there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo,
G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and
respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent
has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel, respondents," the petitioner
prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C.
Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the
regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the qualification of
the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner

meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective
local officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner,
considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the
Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent
resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or
immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the
U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the entering
into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent
residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the
term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all
times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971,
EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the present administration of
President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold
elective public office in the Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and
submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to
Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer
was,"Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration
and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT
ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No.
84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his
doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his

As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he
resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general entitled
to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil
and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain are
entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of person and property
and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the
benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no state
shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person the equal protection of the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to
the right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is
entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (3 CJS
529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United Statesbefore he was
elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of
Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States?

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card
holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of
filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as
a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some
act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior
waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or
immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status
as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he
was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he
intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government
Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he
resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November
1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign
country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public
office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its
citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption
is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and
welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties
under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United States, he never
really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the
U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under
false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines.
Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it,
and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card
attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits
to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear
evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate
U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that
he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is
aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973
Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item
no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private
respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for
the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified
and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven"
months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed
on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed
on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office
on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she
noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter
in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said
city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa
following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with
the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill,
along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill
did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an
honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up
with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate
of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy
after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year
residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven"
(months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and,
therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that
what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin
or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and
which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit
petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of
Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for
the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She
never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake."
Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her
Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban
City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa
is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In
fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the
explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,

therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the
case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is
misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the
result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and
orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment
only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a
matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which
determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the
amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating
candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in
order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be
committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the
respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her
Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a
resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex
A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration
in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of
August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission,
therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent
has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez
vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the
Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila.
Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since
childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her
husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she
was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a
registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila.
She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of
Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the
President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of
fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan,
Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters
that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places,
including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte,
she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that
she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is
considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how
one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old
domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi withanimus non revertendi.
When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to
stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of
that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood
and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always
intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is
not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to
show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban.
Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident
of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte
"since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of
Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she
placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it
refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident

of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing
proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY
it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the
canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a
total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of
Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into
two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte
for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner
outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under
Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of
settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with
the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a
settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of
domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure,
one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place"
and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof",
that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can
only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one
domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As
these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent
therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law
that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his
permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to
actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the
same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual
stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the
same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of
actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry
for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place
for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in
which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he
lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it,
and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his
residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in
the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing
down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second
Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when
(petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila."
The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place
where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959,
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her
husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter,
she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion
lies.

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes,
to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his
avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his
birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from
his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the
qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the
officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not
forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other
than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or
loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person
to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth
must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner
was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we
lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile
in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from
1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St.
Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952
she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his
office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E.

Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter.
When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was
elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace
and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to
Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a
minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history
and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S
Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did
not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her
residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing
her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent

plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction
between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains
the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in
Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms
imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact
while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female
spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el
marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it
refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the
phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall
transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only
once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept
of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify
the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin).
This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of
actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and
wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account
the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or
transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together."
Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced
with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one
of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the
ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which
the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in
a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence
has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an ironclad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our
jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other
such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously
practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court
allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the
wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or
reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on
pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered
to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof;

and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel
the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were
found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt
bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir
James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of
Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that
which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could
not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against
the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment;
though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can
discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to
live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with
her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision
referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of
Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and
the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of
the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected.
(21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an
order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital
domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of
certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to
her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it
does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was
sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience
to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by
virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem
here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac,
Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming
that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was
actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result
of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To
underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence
has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and

spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights
in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code)
and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the
rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired
a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate
that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as
her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner
sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences"
following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not
domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse
either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly
illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive
act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a
domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim
of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions
were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with
Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American
authorities, this court inMarcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds
of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding
than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a

limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of
counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate
to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the
period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision
within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident
that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under
Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate
has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the
meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what
he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12790

August 31, 1960

JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:

In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a
decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of
the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow
the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed
at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one
day after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She
did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court
directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an
order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her
physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the
result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order
of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's
certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented
by her husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the
marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to
be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be
reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each
other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be
subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the
decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the
complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with
safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a
condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are
governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to
exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing
the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have
been satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she
had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not
arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to
and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to
be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is
in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Dizon,
JJ. concur.
G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913
CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant,
vs.
GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant.
O'Brien & DeWitt for plaintiff.
Chicote & Miranda for defendant.

JOHNSON, J.:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in
the city of Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired
real and personal property. Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yaez came to Manila, where her husband was
residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day of that month and
year they made an agreement, in a public document, by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both
consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to
reside in such place as the said lady pleases." (B. of E., p. 13.) In the same document, the husband undertook to
send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of June of
the said year 1899. The husband complied with this obligation until August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make
further payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but the husband had absented himself therefrom
in the early days of February of the same year. On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings
against her husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him in or about the year 1899 with a
certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by whom he had had
two children. She prayed that she be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties
of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal society be therefore
liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to
her; furthermore, as to the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered
to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at
the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90.
The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila, as they had their domicile in
Barcelona, Spain, and he alleged that both of them were natives and subjects of Spain. He admitted that he was
married to Constanza Yaez; he also admitted having executed the document of the 4th of April, 1899, in which he
had undertaken to make an allowance for the support of his wife in Madrid, but he denied the other paragraphs of the
complaint. As a special defense with regard to the allowance, he alleged: "That in or about the month of May, 1900,
he wrote to his wife, the plaintiff, instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of joining her husband and being
maintained by him in his own house; that the communication was ignored by the plaintiff, who against the will of the

defendant, continued to live separately from him that from the year 1901, the defendant did not know her address;
that since 1900, the plaintiff has lived in comfort and has known where her husband resided; that the plaintiff, during
all of the time referred to, in addition to dispossing of valuable property belonging to her husband, possessed and still
possesses property of her own, acquired by her, in greater amount than that owned by her husband; and that in any
case the action has prescribed by operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.) As to the divorce, he admits that he had by
the plaintiff two children that have died. He expressly denied the contents of paragraph 5 of the complaint, relating to
the charge of adultery and also those of paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, concerning the possession of real and personal
property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount, and their qualification as being all conjugal
property. As a special defense, he alleged that prior to the year 1899 he conferred powers of attorney upon the
plaintiff to administer and collect property and credits pertaining to him to the value of about 200,000 pesos; that the
plaintiff accepted and exercised the said power of attorney, attached the property and collected the credits without
ever having rendered any account of them. As a special preferred defense, he alleged that neither the trial court nor
any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, because, as to the
allowance for support, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the
Philippine Islands, the agreement upon the subject was neither celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in the Philippine
Islands; and as to the divorce, because the action therefore ought to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts. In
conclusion, he prayed that the court find: That the court was without jurisdiction over the two causes of action; that
even if it had jurisdiction, it could not order the payment of the sum claimed as arrears of alimony; that, after all, the
action with regard to this cause of action has prescribed; and as to the prayer for a decree of divorce, the defendant
should be acquitted, while on the other hand the plaintiff should be required to render to the defendant an accounting,
supported by proofs, of her operations as his attorney and administratrix of his property in Spain.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the
suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17,
directed that the communal property be divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and in event
that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners according to law.
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of the property, by means of
commissioners, was proceeded with. These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the
partition to the court, who then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties appealed.
I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and of all other courts of the Islands to try the
case, either with regard to the fulfillment of the contract to furnish alimony, or to decree a divorce or suspension of life
in common between the spouses: lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the litigation;
and over the persons of the contending parties, because neither of the spouses was a resident of the Philippines on
the date of the complaint.
The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a
legal domicile other than that which he manifestly had in the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the
date of the complaint. On the contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that during this not
inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in
March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands, had kept open house, and had acquired in the city of
Manila quite a little real property which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society. It is also plainly shown,
without proof to the contrary, that his wife resided in this city of Manila from the middle of 1896 until April, 1899, at
which time she was permitted by him to change her residence. It is affirmed by the defendant in point five of his
answer to the complaint, that in May, 1900, he sent a letter instructing the plaintiff to return to Manila to live with her
husband and to be supported by him in his house, but that the plaintiff, against the will of the defendant, continued to

live part from him. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also affirmed in the said answer, that during all of the time referred to in the
complaint, and especially since 1900, the plaintiff knew where her husband resided. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also very
evident that the contract, by virtue of which he authorized his wife to move to Spain and residethere in such place as
was agreeable to her, was executed in these Islands, "in the city of Manila on the 4th of April, 1889," as is to be seen
in the heading of the document. (B. of E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11 of his brief, he says that the record shows him to
be a Spanish subject, inscribed in the consulate of his nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil Code, the Treaty of
Paris and the Philippine Bill.
Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant, although a Spanish subject, was a resident of these
Islands. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign
country, where they may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein, shall be
required, in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or
consular agent, who must record them in the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be
married, and any children they may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive and irrefutable law governing
the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the
Treaty of Paris. Without this supposition of having acquired his domicile and residence in these Islands, he could not
have required his wife to return to live with him therein because this requirement could only be based on articles 58 of
the Civil Code of Spain, according to which the wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish
his residence, or on article 48 of chapter 5 of the Marriage Law in force in the Philippines, which imposes upon the
wife the duty of obeying her husband, living in his company, or of following him to wherever he transfers his domicile
or residence. And just because he was absent for a month before his wife returned to the Philippines, he cannot be
understood to have surrendered his habitual domicile of more than seventeen years, without having established any
other afterwards, and without making any declaration in legal form, before he absented himself, of it being his
intention to change his domicile, while at the same time he retains here his house, real property and all manner of
means of subsistence. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the bringing of
a personal action like the one at bar either in the place where the defendant may reside or be found, or in that where
the plaintiff resides.
The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile (domicilio) but also residence (vecindad) in Manila. In this
litigation the defendant claims that, born as he says in Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he is not subject, in his
marriage, to the rules governing conjugal property, that are in force in the territories of Spain that are governed by the
common law of Castillo (as the Philippines in their day), because they are opposed to the Foral Law in force in the
said Islands and which is respected by the Civil Code. Even if this defense could be sustained herein, paragraph 2 of
article 15 of the said Civil Code would be applicable. It provides: "For the purposes of this article, residence
(vecindad) will be acquired: By residence of ten years in common law provinces or territories, unless before the
termination of that time he manifests his will to the contrary; or by a residence of two years, if the interested person
declares this to be his will . . . In any case, the wife will follow the condition of her husband. . . ." On no occasion had
the defendant manifested his will to the contrary, not even as he was leaving, after a residence of seventeen years, a
month before the return of his wife to these Islands. On the contrary, when he inscribed himself in the Spanish
consulate, he declared his intention of continuing to reside in the Islands as a Spaniard and not as a Mallorquin,
subject as such to the common law of Spain.
In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands over the subject matter of the
complaint that is to try an action for divorce between two Catholic Spaniards, he alleges in his appeal: That both
litigants are Spanish subjects and that they contracted a Catholic marriage; that in accordance with article 9 of the
Civil Code of Spain (the same as that of these Islands) the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, "all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond,
the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for

divorce, the extent of the latter, the AUTHORITY to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce
upon the person and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the
husband and wife, and, in our case, by the Spanish law by virtue of article 9 as above set out." (Brief, p. 12.) The
appellant and defendant continues his argument, saying: That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code
of Spain, "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical courts,"
while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the action for divorce brought by the plaintiff
in the cause does not fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of persons, because these
courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil Cod of Spain, and this Spanish
law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the ecclesiastical courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these
Islands con subrogate itself. Says this appellant: "If a law of a foreign country were of rigorous application in a given
case, a North American tribunal would have no jurisdiction upon an ecclesiastical court and therefore the North
American tribunal in applying it would have to exercise a faculty which that law reserved to the ecclesiastical court."
(Brief, pp. 13, 14, and 15.)
Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning cannot be upheld. The question is precisely
whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal, and it is
taken for granted that the power to decree it is one of the rights included in the personal statute, but appellant does
not prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner carries with it, to whether he
transfers his domicile, the authority established by the law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had
to demonstrate.
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the personal status of the
husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does
not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private
law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to
procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle.
. . . All persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing by a
simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property
situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to
making useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because of
the court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos de Derecho International Privado," p. 108.)
"Justice," says the same professor, "is a principle superior to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered
without taking into any account whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their relations
and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own people, but to
those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner effect their
sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.) Might its courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its territory, apply
the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering justice because the personal
law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is not the territorial one of the nation?
This has never yet been claimed in any of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions of
nationality and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in favor of private persons. The
provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany
the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in
China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in
Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could
not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives
jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their
nation.1awphi1.net
It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme Court (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3
Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).

In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the
persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile
herein.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of
the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation.
The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the court that the defendant had committed adultery
with a certain woman in this city from the year 1899 until 1909; the third was against the finding that the adultery was
accompanied by public scandal and injured the dignity of his wife; and the fourth for having decreed the divorce,
suspension of the married life, and the separation of the properties of the parties.
The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal, we are unable to review it, so we accept the
findings of the trial court.
There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even though it were proven would not be a cause for
divorce, because no public scandal resulted therefrom nor was there contempt displayed for the wife. (Appellant's
brief, p. 26.) The facts must be accepted by this tribunal as they were found by the trial court, since the evidence
cannot be reviewed; moreover, the appellee affirms the contrary and maintains that it is a proven fact, public and
notorious, an assertion that the trial court must have found to be proven. (Appellee's brief, p. 5.) In law, it is not
necessary that adultery, to be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the
wife. There is no law that requires this. Law 2, title 9, of the Fourth Partida does not require it.
The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the finding of the trial court that there exists conjugal
property, a finding that the appellant maintains is without foundation, and that which holds that the property in the
hands of the receiver (that sought to be divided) is conjugal property, a conclusion which the appellant claims to be
contrary to the law which should be applied to the case and according to which, as alleged in the tenth assignment of
error, the whole of the property should be adjudicated to the defendant as being exclusively his.
Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the Balearic Islands and that is also the condition of his
wife, the plaintiff. Law: That although the rule of the Civil Code is that which legally governs conjugal property, yet at
the same time it admits, as an exception, the laws, usages, and customs of the Foral Law, according to which, as
applied in the Balearic Islands, the law of the family is that of the division of property and that of conjugal property is
not known; so that the property pertains exclusively to the spouse who, by whatever title, has acquired it. In support of
the facts, appellant cites pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of exceptions; and of the law, the doctrinal authority of
Manresa, Gutierrez, and Alcubilla.
The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only pertinent one, is but an affidavit filed by the
defendant in which, under oath, he himself testifies as to the Foral Law in the Balearic Islands. The adverse party
says with regard to this: "This affidavit was never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge, and
cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands, indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country
may be proved. We maintain that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never submitted as proof,
never received by the trial court, and which has never been subjected to any cross-examination, is not a means of
proving a foreign law on which the defendant relies." (Brief, pp. 6 and 7.)
Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the Foral Law as the law of his personal status in the
matter of the regimen of his marriage, and that to allege this he be considered as authorized by article 15 of the Civil

Code, we have said before, in dealing with his law of domicile, that paragraph 2 of this article 15 of the Civil Code
would be entirely adverse to his claim, and if it be advanced that there is a similar Foral Law in the Philippines by
virtue of paragraph 1 of the said article 15, it might be said, though there is not at present any need to say it, that it is
not in force. The two findings attacked are in perfect accord with the law. All the property of the marriage, says article
1407 of the Civil Code, shall be considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. No proof has been submitted to this effect.
As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below erred in holding in the judgment that the plaintiff had
brought to the marriage a dowry of 30,000 Spanish dollars. But the defendant himself adds that the court made no
order or decree regarding the alleged dowry. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth assignment of errors,
claimed that the court erred in not confirming the report of the commissioners which gave to the said plaintiff the sum
of 30,000 Spanish dollars. It is unnecessary to say anything further.
The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine
currency, whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in her complaint with respect to this sum; that no arrears of
payment are owing for alimony, even though payments had been stipulated in the contract, unless they are claimed
by the person who had furnished the actual support, and that alimony is due only when it is necessary; so that, as the
plaintiff has had no need of it for ten years, nor has she stated who has furnished it, there is no reason for awaring her
the amount of the arrears for all that time; that as she has allowed ten years to elapse before claiming it, her action
prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after five years.

An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe like all personal ones, but, by the provisions of
article 1964 of the Civil Code, after fifteen years. But even though the provisions of article 1966 were applicable, by
which an action to compel the fulfillment of an agreement to pay alimony prescribes in five years, yet by section 50 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, "when payment has been made upon any demand founded upon contract . . . an action
may be brought . . . after such payment. . . ." And the parties admit that on the 18th of August, 1908, the plaintiff
secured the payment of 6,365.68 pesetas by virtue of the contract of April 4, 1899. So that from August, 1908, until
March, 1909, the date of the complaint, the said period of five years had not elapsed.
The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred in empowering the receiver to proceed to the
separation of the property and in appointing commissioners to make the partition and distribution between the
spouses, since the principal question in this action hinges upon the classification of the property; that it was
erroneously classified as conjugal property, whereas all of it pertained to the husband alone and should be
adjudicated to him for the reason that, as it reiterated in the tenth assignment of error, the conjugal partnership was
not subject to the provisions of the law governing conjugal property, because such provision are totally foreign to the
Foral Law of the Balearic Islands.
The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was in accordance with law.
The only question before this court is the partition of real property. All that referred to in the second decision appealed
from, dated September 9, 1911, is urban real estate. Its classification as conjugal property is in accordance with law,
as is shown in the foregoing reasoning, and that no consideration of the Foral Law enters into the question has also
been demonstrated.

The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her complaint as to this cause of action, but she
considers that in equity such an omission can be supplied.

II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.

Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure determines one of the requisites of the complaint: "A
demand for the relief which the plaintiff claims." The section goes on to say: "If the recovery of money or damages is
demanded, the amount demanded must be stated. If special relief, such as an order for the special restitution of
property, etc., the ground of demanding such relief must be stated and the special relief prayed for. But there may be
added to the statement of the specific relief demanded a general prayer for such further or other relief as shall be
deemed equitable."

As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff only P5,010.17, the petitioner here
prays that the judgment be reversed and that in its place this court order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim
of P12,959.90, plus the additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per month, dating from
the 1st of August, 1909, until the date of payment, with legal interest upon the said P12,959.90 from the date of the
filing of the complaint until the date of payment, and, furthermore, legal interest upon each of the monthly payments
due after the filing of the complaint, and which will continue to become due until the close of this litigation.

In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said section 89 [90] are complied with by
setting forth in its paragraphs 4 and 5 the relation of the cause of action, that is, the contract of the 4th of April, 1899,
by which the defendant obligated himself to send to the plaintiff in Spain a certain amount of money monthly, for her
support, and the failure to comply with this obligation after the month of August, 1899. Paragraph 6, as a
consequence of the promise established in 4 and 5, says as follows: "That the defendant Gabriel Fuster y Fuster
actually owes the plaintiff the sum of 36,100 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 dollars, which, reduced at the present
rate of exchange, amounts to the sum of P12,959.90, Philippine currency." (B. of E., p. 2.) In the case of default on
the part of the defendant "the court shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses and assess the damages or
determine the other relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled, including the costs of the action, and render final
judgment for the plaintiff to recover such sum or to receive such other relief as the pleadings and the facts warrant."
The pleadings, not the prayer of the complaint.

The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total amount of the alimony owing to the plaintiff amounted to
34,200 pesetas; second, that of this sum the plaintiff had collected in Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the remainder, that
is, 27,834.32, was equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican currency; fourth, that the Mexican peso was worth 90 centavos
Philippine currency; fifth, that therefore the sum of $5,566.86 Mexican currency was equivalent to P5,010 Philippine
currency; and finally, as there was no evidence as to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it
was that current at the time and place where the agreement was made, which was Mexican pesetas.

This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer, exactly, are the essential part of a complaint.

With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is made in her complaint that the defendant had
obligated himself to pay her a "monthly pension for her support of 300 Spanish pesetas, that is, 60 Spanish dollars,
which, reduced to Philippine currency, amounts to P107.70;" that the defendant had admitted this in hi answer to the
complaint, and that by his finding in a sense other than that accepted and not refuted in the answer of the defendant,
the court violated the provisions of section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future, which constitutes the first cause of action, but of
certain sums stipulated in a contract. This contract is a law for the contracting parties, a law which rises superior to
those general laws which regulate the nature of the subject matter of the contract (in the present case an entirely
voluntary one) and which govern judicial action.

In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are erroneous in that, firstly, the parties had admitted that
the pesetas referred to in the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, were Spanish, and in view of this admission the court
was not empowered to define them as being different from the kind admitted by the parties; secondly, if he were so
empowered, his interpretation should be governed by the terms of the law.

The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear that the defendant in his answer accepted the fact in
the manner alleged in the complaint. The defendant said that he admitted having made the agreement referred to in
paragraph 4 of the complaint, and that he stood upon its contents. The contents of the document to which he refers is
of the following tenor: "Mr. Fuster binds and obligates himself to pay to his said wife the sum of 300 pesetas, monthly,
payable de su cuenta in the city and capital of Madrid, for her support. . . ." He did not therefore admit the matter of
the Spanish pesetas; that does not appear in the contents of the document the only thing he admitted in his
answer.
As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in article 1287 of the Civil Code. "The
usages or customs of the country shall be taken into consideration in interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the
contract the word " pesetas," not being specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this precept to interpret
it as being the peseta then in use or current when and where the agreement was made, Mexican being then the usual
and current money in the Philippines. Furthermore, the phrase de su cuenta clearly means that it was not
"Spanish pesetas" that the contracting parties had in mind, because if the agreement had been a specific one to pay
300 Spanish pesetas in Madrid, everyone would of course understand that the expense of following the fluctuations of
change and of the differences in value between the money current in the country, and the Spanish pesetas, would
have to be defrayed by the obligated party; whereas, if nothing more than pesetaswas mentioned, it was necessary to
decide which party should pay for the difference in value so that the 300pesetas stipulated here should be 300
Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the reasons of the court below for his decision this court can offer no legal
grounds. The rule of interpretation cited is the one applicable and it supports the reasoning of the decision appealed
from.
The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate to her the 30,000 Spanish dollars which the
commissioners proposed in their report. First she characterizes this sum of 30,000 dollars as the dowry of the wife
delivered to the husband, then, later, as paraphernal property brought to the marriage.
According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners, this amount of 30,000 dollars could not enter into
the partition, and with reason. If, as was claimed, it was inherited by the plaintiff from her uncle, it really constitutes
paraphernal property under article 1381. "Paraphernal property is that which the wife brings to the marriage without
being included in the dowry and that she may acquire after the creation of the same without being added thereto." But
it is a provision of article 1384 that "The wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has
delivered the same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer said property. In such case the
husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the personal property he may receive, or to secure said
property, in the manner established for the dowry property." Not even was there offered in evidence the public deed of
delivery, nor the equally public mortgage deed that is required by law. So that, therefore, the necessary proof of the
obligation to return paraphernal property as here demanded does not exist.lawphil.net
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of September, 1911, should be and is
hereby confirmed.
The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement of costs in this instance.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July
1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On
23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in
the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal
was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted
certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his
estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and
Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of
birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the
issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without
the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of
conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children
had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother
of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly,
equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition
of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child,
had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted
declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of
Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated
in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly
void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed
by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the

Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it
declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need
because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to
the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the
parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversybefore
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as
to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to
appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs
would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in
fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo
was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12Reading between
the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the
arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her
claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment however
from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent.
She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the
reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy
thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was
since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner
however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their
divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate
court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved
by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was
subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and
that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the
actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical
causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the
subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of
titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of
forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case
to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and
Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by
granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan,
is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he
limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum
shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address
the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to
resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in
Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as
the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt
persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. [13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of
the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. [14]

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] modifying that of the Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City [2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia),
as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo)
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. [15] Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]

The Facts

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public
Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito
Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10,
1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. [4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the
conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. [6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave
by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. [7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant
and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. [8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was
left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary
and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their
marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their
conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act
since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed
by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by
Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of
the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County
of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. [11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]

(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente
and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my
real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz
F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed
of by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever
bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or
personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.
[17]

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.[18]

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.
[19]

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. [20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition [22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance
of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas
petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star. [26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is
void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16,
1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary
is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner
and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled
to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname
(sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let
the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00
conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any
other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or
such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all
orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier
decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not
legally adopted by him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the
estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the
trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as
co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, [36] the issue is
simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on
the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. [43] We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best
left to the determination of the trial court.

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The
Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law
of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same
breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory
hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will. [38]

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in
a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring
ours)

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions
in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. [39] Second,
there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown
in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.[44]

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in
the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children,
Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property
she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law
which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law. [45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID
the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was
no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.