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PHAENOMENOLOGICA
COLLECTION FONDEE PAR H.L. VAN BREDA ET PUBLIEE
SOUS LE PATRONAGE DES CENTRES D' ARCHIVES-HUSSERL
131
JAYLAMPERT
The titZes in this se ries are listed at the end 0/ this voZume.
Comite de redaction de la collection:
President: S. Usseling (Leuven)
Membres: J.N. Mohanty (Philadelphia), P. Ricreur (Paris),
E. Strker (Kln), J. Taminiaux (Louvain-Ia-Neuve)
by
JAYLAMPERT
ISBN 978-90-481-4463-1
ISBN 978-94-015-8443-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-8443-2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
vii
PREFACE
INTRODucnON
CHAPTER 1
73
51
38
13
88
109
152
167
CONCLUSION
182
APPENDIX
125
126
133
196
BIBLIOORAPHY
205
INDEX
211
PREFACE
viii
PREFACE
past contents. Every act of consciousness carries in medias res the problematic of grounding as it aims to recover its own content. Synthetic consciousness
always occurs too late to get started, yet all it ever does is work at constituting the ground for moving to something that can come next, which is to say,
at constituting its own starting-point. As lived carriers of the systematic
development of interpretations of the world, all contents carry out the
self-hood of consciousness, and at the same time, constitute cognition's selfcritique.
I argue, finally, that the Logical Investigations lacks an account of how
implicit backward referents can be stored in consciousness. Husserl does
offer such an account in Ideas 1 with his theory of pure consciousness - not
as an ego prior to synthesis, as most commentators take it, but as the underlying unity carried out as synthetic interpretations "draw back" or "withdraw"
to the ground of their own self-articulation.
While this study takes the form of a reading of Husserl's texts, it is at the
same time a contribution to current dialogues among phenomenologists, dialecticians, and deconstructionists. Some phenomenologists have thought of
synthesis as a set of structures for combining acts of consciousness with one
another. Some dialecticians (certainly Hegelians, and some critical theorists
as weIl) think of Husserlian synthesis as unnecessarily limited to subjective
consciousness, and argue for a metaphysical construal of synthesis, where synthetic consciousness would be grounded by some kind of real origin (whether
a Fichtean ego, a Hegelian Spirit, or a Marxist dialectic of Nature). And
some deconstructionists have argued that the very logic of synthesis depends
upon ideal end-points that are endlessly deferred, so that synthesis, while essential for a science of consciousness, is more a kind of metaphor than an actuality.
My approach incorporates many of the analyses of dialectical and deconstructive philosophies into a phenomenological context. I interpret the
extensions of the concept of synthesis into a metaphysics of subjectivity on
the one hand, and the dispersions of the phenomena of synthesis into
open-ended deferrals on the other hand, not as critiques that undermine phenomenology (though dialecticians and deconstructionists generally do interpret
their own arguments in this way, as indeed do most phenomenologists), but
as fields to be developed within a phenomenological framework. On my
reading, it is precisely the self-explicating structure of synthesis that incorporates the categories of dialectics and deconstruction into phenomenological
description.
If phenomenology, dialectics, and deconstruction are, in the final analysis,
complementary, then there are a great number of philosophers who need to
be read anew, and there are a lot of philosophical problems, from subjectivity to truth to language to time to justice, that will benefit from expanded
resources.
I would like to thank Professor John Russon for years of insightful philosophical conversation and friendship. I would also like to thank Professor
Henry Pietersma, who taught me Husserl in the first place. Professor Kenneth
PREFACE
ix
INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to say that one experience is combined with others? What
is the cause of the synthesis of one content of consciousness with another, what
are experiences before they are combined, how does the combination take
place, and what sort of experience results from this combination? When we
see an object from one side, what is it about that seeing that makes us connect
it with the last side and anticipate the next? When we interpret an object in
a particular way, what is it that leads us towards a more complete interpretation or leads us to uncover the parts and presuppositions implicit in that
interpretation? Or in general, what structures or processes allow acts of interpretative consciousness to anticipate and fulfil one another, to demand their
own explications and supplementations, to refer forward and backward
to successors and predecessors, and to ideal completion-points and ideal
points of origin? In short, how does each content of experience carry the
demands for its combination with others in an ongoing synthetic unity of
consciousness?
Such general questions could be asked of any philosophy, but they are especially urgent for Husserlian phenomenology, which is guided by doctrines of
meaning and consciousness, interpretation and knowledge, experience and
judgment, subjectivity and objectivity, intersubjectivity and history, all of which
depend on processes wherein contents of consciousness are synthesized under
unifying interpretations. Yet no study of Husserl has focused on his concept
of synthesis. In this work, I will develop a certain problematic of synthesis,
and I will show how this problematic dominates Husserlian phenomenology,
using his Logical Investigations (1900) as an exemplary early text. I will
articulate problems of the original ground, the ongoing mechanisms, and the
end results of synthesis, and I will work out a solution to these problems based
on a study of the special problems of synthesis that arise in each of Husserl's
six Logical Investigations. My argument will be that consciousness is a selfexplicating system of interpretative activity, a dynamic whose parts demand
and pass over into one another, a process that grounds its synthesizing structures as it procedes, by continuously referring forward to ideal end-points
and referring backward to ideal origin-points.
In the first part of this Introduction, I will first articulate a problematic of
synthesis in general, and outline the development of special problems to be
treated in the following chapters. I will then give abrief schematic presentation of the modern history of the concept of synthesis, to situate Husserl
in relation to Humean, Leibnizian, Kantian, and Hegelian concepts of synthesis. In the second part of this Introduction, a treatment of the secondary
literature on Husserl's concept of synthesis, I will introduce controversies
INTRODUCTION
surrounding my interpretation and approach, and will set up the sorts of arguments which will justify my construal of synthesis.
The problem of synthesis arises in the context of Husserl's most general
account of intentional consciousness. A conscious experience is said to contain
a meaning-content which presents or signifies or refers to an object from a
certain perspective and under a certain interpretation. This meaning-content
anticipates a range of possible further experiences of that and other objects.
As the flux of experience unfolds, its unity of objective references is constituted in an ongoing way by the fact that each content is apprehended as the
fulfilment (or else as the frustration) of the anticipatory force of previous experiences. In this way, the flux of experience is apprehended not in discontinuous
units, but as progress in the revelation of a self-identical world to direct
intuition. There is in fact a double synthesis at work here: the synthesis of
contents of consciousness with other contents is carried out as the synthesis
of contents of consciousness with their objects.
It is under this model that I will develop the three-fold problematic of the
grounds, the mechanisms, and the end-results of synthesis. The problematic
of the original motivating ground of synthesis, the ultimate explanation of why
each content of consciousness should have to be combined with others at
an, is a problem both for the nature of that which combines contents as wen
as for the nature of the contents to be synthesized. It seems that synthetic interpretation appeals to some sort of rule, law, or structure of consciousness.
But do these laws originate in principles of logic, in empirical habits, in a
priori categories of the understanding, in the spontaneous activity of the ego,
in the momentum of the stream of consciousness, or in something else? And
how are the contents of consciousness themselves available and prepared to
be synthesized? Individual contents will themselves at some point have to
ground their own syntheses with one another, whether in the sense that individual contents express overlapping meanings, or because they are always
already contextualized in streams of processes. Indeed the very differentiation of individual contents of consciousness from the flux of background
experience depends on syntheses wherein perceptual and/or interpretative
contents set limits to, and are determined in relation to, one another.
The problematics of the original ground of synthesizing interpretation is
thus a problem of the mechanisms wherein each given content passes over into
(e.g. borders, anticipates, fulfils, determines, entails, motivates, verifies, illuminates, conjoins with, interpenetrates with, or sublates) the next. One problem
concerns how each content has a determinate next-content, and so anticipates
a non-arbitrary range of successors. Another problem concerns what it is about
each content that makes it in principle more than it is, namely a demand for
supplements and completions in general. What does it mean to say that part
of an experience is "implicit", that experiences "anticipate" completions "in
advance"?
The problematic of the mechanisms of synthesis is thus finally one of the
results that can be produced by, or demanded by, the combination of contents.
1. A Humean Theory
Every experienced idea is strictly independent, and never entails any prior
or posterior experience. To be sure, there exists in human consciousness a
faculty of imagination which combines ideas according to their resemblance
and contiguity. But a principle of association and interpretation does not prescribe a necessary connection between ideas, it exercises only a "gentle force
in their combination".1 A so-called principle of combination is nothing but
the habit of conjoining essentially unrelated experiences. Furthermore, in so
INTRODUCTION
3. A Kantian Theory
Synthesis is "the act of putting different representations together, and of
grasping wh at is manifold in them in one act of knowledge".4 By the time
an ego has a singular experience of an object, several levels of synthesis
must have already taken place. A plurality of sensations must have been synthesized as a single intuitive manifold, perceptions must have been organized
in imagination according to rules for their reproduction in various contexts and
orderings, and these unities must have been rendered conceptually intelligible and recognizable. 5 Every cognitive synthesis obeys a law of combination
originating in apriori categories of understanding,6 and applies to material
originating in the givenness of sensuous intuition.
Hence: (1) The origin of synthesis consists in the double demand of consciousness that laws be applied to intuitions and that intuitions be organized
by rules. But categories alone would not produce intuitions to which they could
be applied, and intuitions alone would not organize themselves into patterns.
Hence categories and sense-contents count as the origin of synthesis only in
so far as consciousness 's demand for a unified experience of objects in turn
grounds both of these origins. (2) A system of synthetic combination would
be compIete when consciousness had been completely unified, when every
representation had been combined with every other under every law of understanding. (3) In the ongoing syntheses of experience that count as the
transcendental unity of apperception, theoretical references backward to originpoints and forward to completion-points are never legitimate. In fact, the
attempt to objectify pure Ideas, absolute givens (things-in-themselves), and
systematic totalities leads only to illegitimate metaphysics. The reference
backward to origin-points is legitimate only as a reflective critique of ongoing
syntheses, and the references forward to completion-points is legitimate only
in the practice of anticipating connections. The concepts of origin and completion are legitimate only in the practice of applying categories through
time, i.e. in the schematization of empirical experience.
4. A Hegelian Theory
The singularity of an experience consists in its passing over its own limits.
Even the form of experience which is seemingly the least synthesized, namely
the sense-content of an instantaneous Now-point, conceals and activates a
system of syntheses whose development ultimately becomes the system of
absolute knowIedge and self-consciousness. 7 Now-points are ceaselessly being
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
with which I began this chapter. No doubt many other theories of synthesis
may be drawn from the history of philosophy besides the empirieist, the
rationalist, the transcendentalist, and the dialectical. However, these four are
those on which Husserl hirnself has most thoroughly drawn, and against which
Husserl's account may be most sharply contrasted.
Husserl's account shares with Hume's, for example, the sense that the
primary experiences undergoing syntheses are experiences with particular
perceptual content, but Husserl departs form the Humean account by affirming
the lawful necessity of synthetic combinations, or at least of ranges of combinations. Husserl's account shares with Leibniz's account the sense of lawful
combination, as weIl as the sense that synthesis produces new knowledge,
but differs by affirming that experiences are combined not under a universal
principle but under an interpretation of an object, and by affirming that syntheses can be carried out in rather more open-ended lines of development
than Leibniz allows. Husserl's account shares with Kant's the sense of
schematic development, of categories defined by their temporal mechanics,
and of the demand for unity as the ultimate motivation for synthetic development, but differs from Kant's by attributing more positive functions to the
phenomenological references backward and forward to pure intuition and completable philosophical science. FinaIly, Husserl's account shares with Hegel's
the sense that both the particular material content of synthesis as weIl as the
general structural possibilities of synthesis are to be defined by their functions in the act in which one experience passes over its limits into another.
It also shares with Hegel's some of the sense of consciousness as a selfdetermining system. But it differs from Hegel's account by affirming that there
are functions to be played in synthetic activity, never overcome in the development of consciousness, by individual acts of consciousness and discrete units
of meaning, by uni versals with abstract rather than "concrete" meaning, by
a pure ego, and by a phenomenological science not dependent on a philosophy of nature and a metaphysics of spirit. 8
There are many issues in the problematic of synthesis according to which
one could compare theories, e.g. according to whether the theory holds that
synthetic activity produces new objects for consciousness or only makes it
possible for consciousness to be receptive to the presence of objects already
in existence; or according to whether the need to synthesize is a subjective one
based on the nature of the ego and its interpretative categories, or an objective one based on the synthetic nature of the things themselves; or according
to whether the rules goveming synthesis are categorial and structural or organizational and schematic; or according to whether the paradigmatic synthetic
act is one that subsurnes a particular content under an interpretative framework
or one that cognitively follows particular contents as they pass over their
own boundaries and force their way into the contexts of others.
In the preceding paragraph, I have not indicated which of the two alternatives in each of these issues is Husserl's, since an interpretation of Husserl's
position on these issues (as indeed those of Hume, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel)
requires preparation and qualification. Indeed, for each of the four theories
of synthesis which I have contras ted with Husserl's, there exists a school of
interpretation wh ich attributes to Husserl that very theory. In the second part
of this Introduction, I will classify and layout in more detail seven ways in
which Husserl's concept of synthesis has been interpreted in the literature,
which I will caH rationalist, empiricist, process, transcendentalist, epistemological, semantic and dialectical readings. I would not want to match up these
schools of commentaries too closely with the four historical ac counts of
synthesis that I laid out above. Nevertheless, it is clear that rationalist interpreters of Husserl are influenced by Leibnizian (as weH as Platonic) ideas,
empiricist interpreters by Humean (as weH as psychologistic) ideas, and transcendentalist interpreters by Kantian (as weH as Cartesian) ideas. Furthermore,
process readings of Husserl could be construed as attempts to break down
the distinction between rationalism and empiricism using a kind of fluid
Kantianism, and the epistemological and semantic readings develop issues
essentiaHy tied to classical modem philosophy from Descartes through Kant.
And of course dialectical readings owe something, albeit generaHy unacknowledged, to Hegel's conception of synthesis. My goal will be to show
how aH of these have some value as interpretations of Husserl, but to arrange
them by strengths and weaknesses to lead towards my own reading of Husserl 's
concept of synthesis in terms of a self-propeHing dynamic of interpretive
consciousness dominated by systems of forward and backward references.
On my reading, Husserl 's conception of synthesis is in general closer to
the Hegelian than to the rationalist, the empiricist, or the transcendentalist conceptions. Yet Husserl was not interested in Hegel. Husserl does not use the
vocabulary of dialectics, he does not articulate the problem of the origin as
a problem of the original will to consciousness, and he does not construe a
schema of self-developing interpretation to be a demonstration that substance
becomes subject. Accordingly, I will not import Hegelian terms, texts, or arguments into my analysis of Husserl. But it would not be surprising historically
to find that Husserl should come to results comparable to Hegel's, since
Husserl's concern to find middle ground between empiricist psychologism and
rationalist formalism without adopting the subjectivism or the antinomies of
neo-Kantianism gives hirn a historical context roughly similar to Hegel's.
And in terms of the system of Husserl's own philosophy, it seems to me that
one could attribute a dialectic of part and whole to Husserl's ac count of synthesis in at least three senses: (i) in that each synthetic act is possible only
in the context of a larger system of syntheses, (ii) in that the experiential
contents to be synthesized are individuated in the same processes in which they
are combined, and (iii) in that the motivation for synthesis is inherently present
in each of the synthesized determinations, each of which demands that its independence be submerged in a unity with others. Nevertheless, while there are
Hegelian themes at work in my reading of Husserl, I intend my reading and
my arguments to arise out of a systematic analysis of Husserl's text.
Now on my reading, the Logical Investigations works out a theory of
10
INTRODUCTION
11
of their parts. The account of relatively discontinuous parts passing over into
one another, and thereby setting systems of determinations off in relief together,
provides a model for synthetic activity generally.
In dealing with the fourth Investigation on independent and non-independent meanings, I will discuss Husserl's ac count of syncategorematic terms (like
"and" , "is the same as", etc.), which represent synthetic connectedness in
linguistic expressions, and yet do not refer to anything on their own. I will
argue that Husserl uses this problem to show that synthetic connectedness is
always prior to any given meaning-content, and hence that synthetic relations have always already dominated interpretative experience in advance.
In treating the fifth Investigation, which includes a general account of intentional consciousness as weH as analyses of the relation between perception and
judgment, and between names and predicates, I will argue that consciousness for Husserl is a system of self-explicating interpretations, wherein complex
predicative judgments are implicitly referred back to simple names and perceptions, and names are implicitly referred back to presupposed judgments.
I will here focus on the status of referring backward in general, of the return
both to experiential immediacy and to an ideal completion of interpretative
mediation.
In the sixth Investigation, the descriptive categories of synthesis developed in the first five Investigations are aH together brought to bear on Husserl 's
concern with epistemological questions involving the gradual intuitive fulfilment of meaning-intentions. Here we find Husserl's most extended account
of the interpretative syntheses which identify objects in their multiple appearances. In treating such issues as the nature of interpretative consistency, levels
of knowledge, the recognition of differences as weH as identities, and the
ideal of evidence in cognition, Husserl conducts a variety of analyses bearing
on the grounds, mechanisms, and results of synthetic activity. In my final,
and longest chapter, I will in five sections distinguish and analyse five increasingly complex descriptive categories under which Husserl in the sixth
Investigation ac counts for the way contents of consciousness demand to be
synthesized under unifying interpretations: namely universal names, contexts,
perspectives, limits, and backward references. In the last of these sections,
which also functions as the Conclusion to this study, I will show how the
syntheses of referring backward resolve problems of synthetic consciousness
at work throughout the Investigations. I will therein present my final account
of Husserl's concept of synthesis, and my own speculative account of how
a theory of synthesis should work with a schema of forward and backward
references.
I will end the final chapter by developing a problem that arises for Husserl's
concept of synthesis in LU, which I will call the problem of the storage in consciousness of implicit forward and backward referents (not only of memories
and explicit expectations, but of unnoticed sensory data, implicit interpretations, apriori rule-structures, ideals of completion, and so on) all of which
are presupposed by, but never present in, consciousness. I will suggest in
12
INTRODUCTION
the Appendix that in Ideen 1 Husserl develops a notion of absolute consciousness not in order to posit an ungrounded, self-certain, unchanging
substrate of experience, but in order to ground references back to presuppositions. All experience must refer back to its own prior identity in order to have
the grounds to pursue a synthetic interpretation of objects. Though I will not
analyse in this study the complexities of the relation between Husserl's early
and later work, my reading is in part designed to suggest that Husserl's later
concems, from intersubjectivity and the life-world, to science and the ego,
continue to work within the problematics of synthesis worked out in the Logical
Investigations, according to which all contents, processes, and objects of
consciousness, including all that is apparently prior to synthesis and all that
is apparently beyond the need for synthesis, are functions of the system of
self-propelling interpretative syntheses and their forward and backward
references.
NOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
(B)
14
INTRODUCTION
15
theses of identification and immediate contact with the world, and has to
ground each of these as a partial source of synthetic activity. I will argue at
the end of the first section of this chapter that the failure of these six interpretations individually and collectively to account for the ground of synthesis
in Husserlian phenomenology is a result of insufficient attention being paid
to the mechanisms whereby each content of consciousness passes over into the
next.
In the second section, I will layout a number of reasons offered in the
commentaries for Husserl 's alleged turn after LU towards life-world syntheses.
I do not hold the view that Husserl's early concept of synthesis is lacking in
something that his later version supplies. But even if the alleged later discoveries are already present in Husserl's early work, the grounds which
commentators cite for the alleged turn are nevertheless revealing. In one
common formulation, Husserl's "form-content schema" is said to turn into
his "dialectic". The third section lays out sens es in which "dialectic" is used
by the commentators. The more interesting of these, to be treated in the
fourth section, involve the concept of referring backward.
SECTION 1. SIX READINGS
I will not argue against the interpretations treated below, but I will arrange
them in such a way as to let them bring out each other's weaknesses.
(I) Rationalist and Formalist Readings and the Role 01 Rules
16
INTRODUCTION
the independence of the forms of synthesis from its contents, it must also
give an account of how forms affect or apply to contents. Some formalists
argue for a closed set of rules as opposed to open-ended systems of interpretation (Madison, 1977, pp. 254ff., also Rosen, 1977, p. 133). Others (Smith
and McIntyre, 1982) argue that rules of synthesis operate only as "constraints"
(p. 254) ensuring the "compatibility" (p. 262) of synthesized perceptions. In
any case, according to the formalist reading, when a meaning "predelineates"
future experiences, it may open up new possibilities (p. 297), but it does not
in any stronger way generate their actualization.
While formalist readings generally describe forms of synthesis as rules
according to which a plurality of intuitions are used to identify a single
object, or as rules for organizing part-experiences into a whole (e.g.
Sokolowski, 1967-68), there are also formalist readings which subordinate
synthetic identification according to forms to the synthetic identification of
forms (de Boer, 1978, pp. 146-8; Mensch, 1981, pp. 134-40; Bachelard, 1968,
pp. 21-2; Schuhmann 1971, p. 7).
Many of those who read Husserl as a formalist criticize Husserl for his
formalism. Some maintain that Husserl hirnself was working on ways of
breaking down the distinction between form and content, either by describing
the cognitive performances during which forms and contents are unified
(Eley, 1962, pp. 14-20), or by interpreting an essence as a "tool" for letting
facts be of account (Waldenfels, 1971, p. 80). But more frequently, Husserl
is criticized for leaving allegedly crucial features of consciousness out of
his form-content theory. Levin (1970, pp. 43-48) argues that Husserl's
form-content theory wrongly omits the "history" or "genesis" of forms, and
Sokolowski (1964, pp. 55-59) argues that Husserl wrongly underestimates
the role of "sense-data" as the "raw materials" of meaning. It is striking that
on attributing a form-content theory to Husserl, commentators condemn Husserl
either for having no account of form, or for having no account of content.
But the most extreme criticism of Husserl 's alleged formalism is that of Adomo
(1956, pp. 173-74), who argues that phenomenology, in positing the ideal of
full evidence, must "forget" synthesis. Adomo's claim is that the act of synthesis represents the possibility of disorder, the "other", that phenomenology
is committed to avoiding.
But Husserl is guilty of these omissions and failures only if the formalist
interpretation of Husserl is correct.
17
indicates Husserl's empiricism just as the latter indicates his idealism (also
Mohanty, 1964, pp. 49-50).
But while some empiricist readings take Husserl to posit isolated, uninterpreted, immanent, sensory givens as that to which rules for the synthesis are
to be applied, others argue that synthesis must originate in such givenness.
Eley (1972, pp. 340-44) claims that Husserl tries to ground even formallogic
in lived experience. A Husserlian account of the truth table for the logical connective "&", for example, would have to trace cognition back to the experiential
juxtaposition of a "This" and a "That". Eley holds that synthesis originates
in "This"-experiences; Diemer (1956, pp. 96-98) holds that synthesis aims
at such experiences, that all meaning presupposes a world in relation to which
the subject is "passive".
At the he art of the empiricist reading, then, there is not just the claim that
synthesis is completed in empirical experience, but the stronger claim that synthesis begins passively. Yet the empirical data which synthesis operates on,
is grounded in, and aims at, must be both passively accepted and actively interpreted (e.g. Dreyfus, 1982, p. 13). While Welton (1983, pp. 167-228) thinks
Husserl's early work cannot account for "productive" syntheses, Yamaguchi
(1982, pp. 2-5) thinks the notion of "blending" in LU iii does account for
productive intuition. And after all, the philosophers from whom Husserl
borrows the idea of perceptual "blending" (Stumpf, Wundt, and Herbart) are
empiricists for whom sense-impressions are active.
Similar problems regarding passivity and productivity arise when commentators try to decide whether Husserl accepted the distinction between
synthetic and analytic judgments, i.e. between judgments which require empirical content and judgments which describe formallaws. Van Peursen (1972,
p. 91; also Kern, 1964, pp. 140,257-75) argues that Husserl softens the synthetic-analytic distinction by holding that even non-empirical objects have
an "intuitive" structure.
In short, the empiricist reading looks at first as though it posits isolated
sense-data, but in grounding syntheses of fulfilment on such givenness, it attributes productive powers to the very reception of those data, and ends up by
softening the distinction between the forms of synthesis and the raw materials for synthesis.
(III) Process or Gestalt Readings and the Role of "Splitting"
The softening of the distinction between form and matter sets the stage for
what I am calling the process reading. Gurwitsch's early work (1929) outlines
the view that synthesis objectifies the world by unifying consciousness.
Consciousness is a process during which intentional acts are combined, singled
out, and separated (pp. 240-48), a process which undergoes continuous alterations and "restructurations" (pp. 223ff.) according to "transformation laws"
(p. 248). A "structural framework" or Gestalt (pp. 190-98) is a law not of
the form but of the process of synthesis (p. 248).
18
INTRODUCTION
19
or "opposition" (p. 36) that results from the process of splitting is also the
"condition" (p. 36) of the process of self-overcoming. The process reading,
therefore, need not reject the difference between essence and thisness, nor need
it even subordinate the changing to the unchanging. It need only articulate
the essence-thisness distinction as a splitting that is continuously performed
in the process of synthetic consciousness.
Still, it is frequently suggested that Husserl's "static" ideal units of meaning
are incompatible with "genetic" processes, and that the former should be abandoned for the latter. Sokolowski (1964) argues that the ideal meanings affirmed
in LU are "too abrupt", and that Husserl should have begun with the "encounter
that leads into" meanings (p. 209; also Levin, 1970, pp. 43-8).
Perhaps the most telling version of this alleged incompatibility of process
and ideality is embodied in Welton's (1983, p. 163, also p. 202) "reply" to
Derrida. Derrida (1967, ch. 7) argues that Husserl's first Investigation operates
within an essential tension, positing both the ideal presence of closed meanings
as wen as the indefinite openness within, and deferrals of insight into,
meanings. Derrida does not so much criticize Husserl for this tension, as
take this tension in Husserl's text between a meaning's ideality and its "need
for supplementation" (Ergnzungsbedrftigkeit) to be the very deferral of
absoluteness within which an original or first philosophy happens. Now Welton
takes Derrida's account of the doubledness of Husserl 's text to be an argument
that Husserl's theory of ideal meanings is inconsistent. (Evans (1991) takes
a similar approach, developing a range of arguments against Derrida's reading
that I cannot do justice to here.) Welton's reply is that Derrida ignores Husserl's
later genetic phenomenology. In other words, Welton first identifies Derrida's
reading with criticisms made by Sokolowski and Levin, then concedes the
inconsistency of ideal meanings, in order to defend a new, non-ideal, nonclosed (though see p. 298), kind of meaning. But for Derrida, whose reading
of Husserl's concept of synthesis in terms of deferral, interruption, and corrupted presence nevertheless essentially belongs to the process reading, the
demand for ideal closure in meaning is precisely what a theory of meaning
must demand. Derrida's process reading is far from incompatible with the
demand for ideality; process takes place rather in the labyrinths on route to
an ideality whose necessity is not diminished by its infinite deferral.
(IV) Transcendentalist Readings and the Role of Immanence
20
INTRODUCTION
21
22
INTRODUCTION
Many commentators read Husserl's concept of synthesis as a theory of knowledge. Spiegelberg (1975, pp. 158-63) says that knowledge is the result of
twin syntheses: a "selective synthesis" for eliminating non-veridical phenomena, and a "constructive synthesis" to harmonize veridical but perspectival
phenomena. The resulting unity is an epistemic "context", regulating the
"marginal fringes" of a "text" -like phenomenal field, and prescribing "tracks"
which "run" from present to absent, anticipated, phenomena (pp. 185-6).
Acts of consciousness are synthesized in order that objects be known as they
are.
The epistemological reading makes two essential claims: (a) that truth is
achieved at the end-point of synthetic acts when an object's being is rendered
fully present, and (b) that that end-point completes a process structured by
contexts of convergence, perspectival tracking, and prescriptions for the inclusion and exclusion of phenomena into joint interpretations. Controversy within
the epistemological reading concems the nature of the conceptual scheme.
Epistemic frameworks have been described both in terms of categorial frameworks (Rosen, 1977, pp. 29-39) and as investigative strategies (Eley, 1962,
p. 133). But what is important (especially in Pietersma's work) is that
epistemic contexts and horizons define optimal epistemic standpoints.
Many commentators, in defining the completion-point of knowledge
see king, speak of the evidence provided by the last synthesis in a sequence
of syntheses (e.g. Gurwitsch, 1929, pp. 190-98; Pietersma, 1977; Tugendhat,
1967, pp. 64-75; de Almeida, 1972, pp. 38-51; Rang, 1973, pp. 27-47). Yet
the last moment of fulfilment in the unfolding of a meaning or the presentation of an object is problematic. The problem is that for a perspectivally viewed
object to be known in itself, those perspectives must be synthetically ordered
in cognition, despite the fact that no one experience can present the object from
more than one perspective-point. The notion of an epistemic preparedness to
experience an object from expanded and contracted perspectives becomes a
central theme in the epistemological reading of synthesis. A meaning which
intends an object under a limited perspective contains, anticipates, implies,
refers to, leads to, progresses towards, motivates, interpenetrates with, co-determines, contextualizes, unifies, or is transformed into, other experiences of
that object so that its synthesis with experiences already possessed would
render adequate the subject's knowledge of that object. Brentano (1909, p.
89) says that to think about X is implicitly to think also about all of its properties. Yet the fullness of an experience is not sufficient to render an object
really present, since, as Zahavi (1992, p. 117) argues, fantasy-objects can
also be presented with imaginative fullness. The fullness of an experience does
not guarantee objective reference unless the syntheses oJfulfilment are carried
out objectively and systematically.
Perhaps the largest undeveloped problem in the literature is the problem
of the mechanism for moving from one perspectival experience into another.
23
How does each content of consciousness anticipate others in general, and the
next perspective in particular? How is the demand for synthesis implicit in
each?
(VI) Semantic Readings and the Roles 01 Relerence and Language
24
INTRODUCTION
of predieates", but it also needs a "component" which indexes "The X" which
"binds" the predicates (pp. 195-205). Smith and McIntyre complain that
Husserl underemphasizes demonstrative reference and overemphasizes definite
descriptions (p. 219). Hence, in the case where an expression-user misdescribes
the object he perceives, Husserl was forced to say that the expression refers
to a non-existent intentional object whereas the preferable account is that it
refers (falsely) to whatever object was perceived. Smith and McIntyre suggest
that if phenomenology were to emphasize the expression-user's "background
of belief-structures" and the "pragmaties" by which they name and describe
things in their environments (p. 221), it would harmonize the roles of patterning and indexing while solving hard cases in the theory of reference.
Some semantic readings beg in by assuming the presence of names and predieations, and then ask how these linguistic expressions manage to refer to
objects. Others question the origin of language, and regard language and indexieal reference as originally simultaneous (Hlsmann, 1964). Caputo (1987),
following Derrida, argues that non-grammatieal and "useless" expressions
res tore aspects of the world to us that structured language overregulates.
Mohanty (1964) points to two semantic problems symptomatic of problems
in the unity of consciousness: one involving the relation between objective
expressions, whieh synthesize perceptions into a common reference, and
demonstrative expressions, which do not; and the other involving syncategorematic terms (like "and") whieh draw connections and yet do not mean
anything in themselves. For Mohanty, both problems indieate the tension
between synthetic pattern and non-synthetic units of meaning. In fact, Mohanty
approves of this unresolved tension in Husserl 's theory of reference (pp. 60-6).
The reconciliation of rules and flux remains a "paradox" (p. 74-5).
While Mohanty thinks a reconciliation of objective meaning and perceptual flux is finally "resistant" to phenomenologieal description (also 1982),
Tugendhat (1967 and 1977) regards such problems as symptoms of a more
serious problem for the semantic account of synthesis which he attributes
to Husserl. Husserl's theory of truth, he says, begins as an account of how
linguistic propositions agree with facts, but defines the truth-relation "in so
far as it implies a synthesis" of judgments (p. 97). Unlike Hlsmann, Tugendhat
treats linguistic propositions as "non-synthetic meanings" (p. 99), but like
Hlsmann, he thinks the locus of truth must be synthetic. Hence, Tugendhat
approves of the fact that Husserl's desire to locate truth in propositions leads
hirn to ground propositions in synthetic judgments, but criticizes Husserl
for not grounding judgment in a Heideggerian notion of being-in-the-world
(pp. 99, 106).
The semantic reading of Husserl's concept of synthesis, like the other
readings, comes to a point at whieh the oppositions or dualities which it posits,
in this case between pattern and reference, call for a reconciliation. The
remaining sections of this chapter look at three strategies by which commentators try to reconcile alleged dualities in Husserl's concept of synthesis;
the diachronie strategy, the "dialectical" strategy, and the way of "referring-
25
0/ "More"
26
INTRODUCTION
extended from the actually perceived world. But whether on strong, weak,
or medium articulations, the analysis of "predesignation" or of "meaning-overand-beyond-itself" (ber-sich-hinaus-meinen, p. 229) is articulated in terms of
"possible acts whose senses are compatible with, but more determinate in
context than the sense of the (original) act" (p. 247).
The idea that a meaning contains "more" than it makes explicit, is at the
heart of the concept of synthesis. For de Almeida (1972), the category of
"more" has both objective and subjective aspects: in the combination of sensations, identifications correspond to an object's "possibility of being-other"
(Anders-sein-knnen, pp. 88-95); in knowledge motivated by a cognitive
"aim", the "pre-given" sides of the object correspond to the subject's "will
to know-more" (Mehr-wissenwollens, pp. 103-5).
The "more" and the "other" inherent in every experience in the form of
the next experience 's pre-givenness, is both the "more" of protended meanings
(Carr, 1974, p. 70), and the "more" of implicit consciousness (de Waelhens,
1959). The category of "more" turns the notion of the "flow" of consciousness into a notion of "overflow". Generally, "overflow" is treated in terms
of what Kant called the "ampliative" property of synthetic judgments, i.e. in
terms of the way perceptions add something to the concepts which they fulfil.
Hence Waldenfels (1971, p. 76) talks of the problem of incorporating new experiences which "overfill" (berflle), "mean more" than (Mehrmeinung), and
create an "excess" over, pre-given conceptual meanings. Mohanty (1982, p.
114) says that cognition "overflows" language, and Kern (1964, p. 270) speaks
of sensation overflowing apriori categories. Welton (1983, pp. 318-22) argues
that perception and language reciprocally "exceed" one another.
The flow of consciousness is constituted not only as the uninterrupted
succession of acts flowing one after another, but as the flowing of each act
into the next. Each act expands itself into the next, completes itself as its
own successor, and determines itself as that which is prior to its demanded
supplementation. An act's meaning consists not in what it contains, but in
that which "exceeds" or "doubles" it as its "other".
SECTION 2. THE ALLEGED DEVELOPMENT IN
HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF SYNTHESIS
A wide range of concepts and descriptive motifs have emerged in pairs. Some
are named by the classifications which I have used to distinguish readings,
such as the distinction between the forms and contents of synthesis, the process
and the substrate of synthesis, or the cognition and the reference of synthesis. Others cut across those classifications, such as the distinction between
the creative and the restitutive powers of synthesis, the openness and closedness of synthesis, or the history and the teleology of synthesis. The strategy
of some commentators is to affirm the primacy in Husserl's thought of one
side of each of such pairs. But others think that both sides of each pair have
some place in Husserl's thought. Can Husserl's theory of synthesis accomo-
27
date the oppositions between the interpretations of it? Can the theory of
synthesis itself accomplish this accommodation?
The easiest way to attribute both sides of an opposition to Husserl is to
attribute one of the sides to the "early" Husserl and one to the "late". Some
commentators hold that Husserl simply replaced one concept of synthesis
with another, while others hold that Husserl, in discovering something new
about synthesis, also attempted to unify the new with the old.
Most commentators date the new concept of synthesis from Ideen 1, and
appeal to the novelty of the descriptions of passive synthesis, the life-world,
and horizons. The feeling is that in Husserl's early work, synthesis is a kind
of interpretative conjunction of self-sufficient meanings, but that that understanding of synthesis had to be abandoned as soon as Husserl recognized a
layer of experience, meaning, and activity prior to ideal units of meaning.
Hence many commentators classify LU as a logical work, and argue that
in later works Husserl attempted to ground essences in "This"-sensations (Eley)
and to explain intentions in their relation to pre-meaningful sensations without
the earlier matter-form duality (Sokolowski). More common is the idea that
in later works Husserl moved back from thetic unities to the pre-thetic unity
of the life-world. The unity that would have to have been passively constituted
before the articulation of any thetic assertion has been variously interpreted
as the presupposed context of flowing experience (Gurwitsch), as the perceptual
surroundings that make reference possible (Smith and Mclntyre), as the teleology of unified consciousness (Hoyos Vasquez), as the implicit motivation
to unify perspectives (Rang), and as the pre-discursive facticity of beingand living-in-the-world (Diemer, Landgrebe, Tugendhat). For others, the transition to a synthesis prior to thesis is also a transition to an intersubjectivity
prior to the subject (Yamaguchi).
These readings argue for the need to articulate the genesis or his tory of
the constituted world prior to objectifying assertions about its reality, to narrate
the story of reality "from below" (Levin), to tell how the rationality of
immanent experiences first let the world be real (Souche-Dagues). For some,
the historicization of meaning is centered around the introduCtion of time
into the phenomenology of meaning (Sokolowski, Larabee). But the idea that
Husserl comes to think that meanings change as they are thought through
time is associated with the idea that Husserl's theory of synthesis becomes,
in later works, a theory of "productive" consciousness (Welton) or to a transcendental idealism that inserts consciousness itself into a theory of essences
in LU (de Boer). For still others, the transition to a transcendentallife-world
lets Husserl finally recognize the force of form in the activity of consciousness (Schuhmann). On all versions, there is a transition from a theory of
synthesis that begins with those items which are ready and about-to be synthesized, to a theory which looks back to a prior (though still synthetic)
origination of those items.
De Almeida (1972) posits a paradox of the origin of the constituents of
synthesis (p. 193): If each constituent to-be-synthesized is determined by
28
INTRODUCTION
prior constituents, then there is a regress in the process, which means that
the constituents are ultimately "ungrounded". But if the constituents are pure
facts, then their combination is ungrounded. This "aporia" of "endless regress
and irrational beginning" is due to Husserl's early theories of "static description" (p. 194). The problem is solved only if a new genetic phenomenology
can uncover, prior both to the constituent and to the process, an implicit and
original pre-experience of the world's horizons (p. 195). The unification of
discrete contents is not achieved by the "last moment" of a synthetic process,
whether progressive or regressive, but in the "totality" of temporality. In short,
the issues of meaning in later works become issues of passive synthesis, on
the understanding that the concept of synthesis itself cannot work, that synthesis always implicates either regress or irrationality. Only in the context of
a double movement forward to the world as totality (p. 201) and backward
to "pre" -thetic horizons, does synthesis achieve a grounded origin.
The problem of synthesis is thus taken to become a problem of origin which
must always have taken place before experience, before meaning and before
active synthesis, afore- (Vor-, de Almeida) and a before (frher, Aguirre, 1970,
p. 160). Now de Almeida thinks that Husserl adds this new level of synthesis only in later works. But can de Almeida's notion of a starting-point
that institutes itself as an experiential totality in the form of the before of experience, also provide a model for understanding how the alleged dualities in
Husserl's theory of synthesis may be present together even in Husserl's early
works? Could it be that when we observe in LU pairs of Husserlian oppositions such as form and matter, or essence and process, we are observing not
dualistic pairs which demand reconciliation in a new theory of passive synthesis, but are already observing a kind of mutual grounding wherein the
pair is originally grounded together in so far as each leads back to the other?
In the final two sections of this chapter, I will look at two strategies
employed by commentators who think that Husserl's theory of synthesis both
exhibits thematic dualities, and is systematic. One strategy holds that the
two sides (in whatever tension is at issue) are "dialectically" interdetermining;
the other holds that the two sides ground each other's origin, and ground the
whole process of origination itself, in so far as consciousness as a whole is
a kind of "referring-back", a unity of prior and posterior, origin and result.
SECTION 3. "DIALECTICAL" READINGS
Undeterred by the fact that Husserl never uses the vocabulary of dialectics (see
Rockmore, 1987), by Brentano's facile claim that "misled by paralogisms,
Hegel and his school even denied the law of contradiction", and by Heidegger's
concern that "dialectic is always introduced the moment opposition is mentioned" and hence nowadays means less than nothing (1940), a surprising
number of commentators use the term "dialectic" to characterize Husserl's
concept of synthesis. However, there have been few systematic attempts to
define "dialectic", either in general or as a reading of Hege!.
29
Many of those who have explicitly compared Husserl with Hegel have sympathized more with Hegel, and so accuse Husserl of lacking a fully dialectical
spirit. For some, dialectics requires a historieist interpretation of ideas (Lauer,
1974; Rockmore, 1987); for others, dialectics implies a transcendence beyond
phenomena into religious cognition (Kirkland, 1985). But those who have
developed the most systematic comparisons of Husserl and Hegel (Schrader,
1964; Harris, 1987; Westphal, 1987) have concentrated on the role of mediation in the constitution of world-interpretation. Schrader argues that Hegelian
phenomenology is "committed to the thesis that experiences can be self-interpreting" (p. 22). Harris says that Hegelian dialectics consists of a "logic of
coherence and system" (p. 98), within which the life-world is seen to be "at
once universally immanent and transcendent, both substance and subject,
Nature and Spirit" (p. 111; also Dove, 1974). Along similar lines, Westphal
argues that Hegelian dialectics must comprehend all experiences and explanations of experience as a totality, an absolute or holistic system where every
single experience is mediated by means of interpretations of all experiences
(pp. 104-113). Each part of experience is subject to the Aufhebung whereby
an interpretation of the whole brings subjective experience to truth (Watson,
1987). Now, these commentators tend to find that these features of Hegelian
dialectics are to some degree lacking in Husserl, i.e. that Husserl's phenomenology is formalist, subjectivist, ahistoricist, or founded on a theory of
experiential immediacy. While some of these authors try to locate some degree
of dialectics in Husserl, I have argued (Lampert, 1988) that Husserl's phenomenology is dialectical in just the senses usually attributed to Hegel,
particularly in the sense that "experiences are self-interpreting" within a selfpropelling dialectic of mutually mediating interpretations, constituting both the
parts and the whole of consciousness.
There are three subject-areas to which the notion of dialectical synthesis has
been attributed to Husserl (not inc1uding commentators interested in the
dialectic in Husserl's social philosophy, e.g. Adorno and Habermas): the
rational clarification of concepts, the subject-object relation, and the part-whole
relation.
Fink (1957, p. 70) defines Husserl 's "dialectical" methodology for clarifying phenomenological concepts as one which thematizes the simultaneous
unity and tension of productivity and receptivity in philosophising conceptualization. For de Muralt (1974), "dialectical" clarification in science (p. 11)
is not just methodological, but explicates the dual nature of all consciousness and all reality, namely the duality of actuality and infinite potentiality
(p. 49), or of data and norm (p. 301). Dialectical cognition does not just clarify
concepts, it brings consciousness from vagueness to precision (p. 22), and
hence transforms consciousness's relation to the world from one of ideality
to one of reality (p. 28). A dialectical unity of concepts is one whose results
would be new and not contained in its constituents, but real and constitutive
of the world nevertheless. Mller (1976, p. 39) grounds the product of dialectical synthesis by arguing that synthetic cognition is a social and technical
30
INTRODUCTION
production, and for that reason, new synthetic categories get applied to reality
by the same subjects who cognize them. Ladriere (1960, pp. 191-95), on the
other hand, argues that Husserl's lesson is that reason today must be less
technological, and that the dualities of activity and passivity, determinacy
and indeterminacy, consciousness and body, can be overcome only if "dialectical" reason takes up the standpoints of art and religion, leading logos gently
into temporality.
Commentators for whom dialectics solves not the problem of clarification
but that of the experiencing subject's relation to real objects, still name the
dialectical relations as those of activity and passivity, determinacy and indeterminacy, actuality and potentiality, consciousness and body, etc. Kchler
(1974, pp. 142-450) suggests that a dialectical relation occurs when relata
determine each other reciprocally, i.e. when each simultaneously creates itself
and makes the other dependent on it. Hence, a subject's intern al "reflection"
is both its "self-creativity", and its entry into the factical world (pp. 170ff.).
Landgrebe (1981, pp. 64f.) contends that Husserl's "dialectic" is perfected
by Heidegger's analysis of the reciprocal acts of being-in-the-world and reflection to selfhood.
For Mensch (1981, pp. 84-9), the overcoming of solipsistic subjectivity
by reality-affirming subjectivity is interpreted in cognitive terms. Mensch refers
to a "dialectic of intention and fulfilment", wh ich joins meaning with sensation, and unitary experiences with manifold ones. Dialectics is a kind of
interpretative coherence. For Mensch, "dialectics" means something like a
"balance" of ideallaws and factual contingency, and the Aufhebung of solipsistic subjectivity amounts to a "mutual dependence" of subject and object
(also Edie, 1984).
The appeals to such ideas as the actualization of conceptualized potentialities, the simultaneity of reflection and being-in-the-world, the balance of
ideality and facticity, and the mutual dependence of subject and object, make
the notion of dialectics seem rather weak and easily translatable into other
terms. Strasser (1959, pp. 150-53) uses stronger language. Husserl, he says,
in his account of the synthesis of perspectives and the gradual disclosure of
objects, makes explicit an "intuitionistic principle of completion", but leaves
implicit the prior "dialectical principle". Husserllacked the word "dialectic",
but taught the dialectic in the shape of his transcendental reductions. In that
the reductions first transform mundane experience into ideal experience, and
then transform ideal experience into critical experience-in-the-world, they
function as a Hegelian "negation of the negation" (p. 153, also Schuhmann,
1971, p. ix). For Szilasi (1959, pp. 140-42), Husserl's dialectic involves
consciousness's history of self-questioning, which other dialecticians call
"sublation by immanent critique".
But what is lacking is any clear account of how the immanent operations
that go on within each term of the subject-object duality forge the connecti on of that term with the other. We have so far found commentators who
attribute to Husserl two of the three laws of dialectics formalized by the Young
31
Hegelians, namely the law of the Negation of the Negation, and the law of
the Interpenetration of Subject and Object. The idea that the external relations which bind terms in a duality are a function of the internal relations
within each term announces the third of these laws, namely the law of the
Transformation of Quantity into Quality and vice versa.
We have seen that Waldenfels (1971) and others speak of the "overflow"
of meanings into sensations and vice versa. Waldenfels ' first articulation of
the "overflow" is in terms of the "open dialectic" (p. 77) wherein meaning
and sensation "mutually condition and demand" each other (p. 78). Each can
only partially satisfy its own cognitive demands, and hence each includes
("behind itself", p. 76) the other as part of its own telos. Every act which
intends an essence is part of a "double" move, the other part of which intends
sensible givens, and vice versa. But Waldenfels lapses into a weaker articulation of dialectics wherein experience works out "ambiguities" (p. 78) through
"dialogue" (p. 80).
Welton (1983) at times follows Waldenfels' stronger articulation. Applying
the term "dialectical" to the relations of fulfilment and implication (p. 24)
and to language and perception (p. 298), Welton describes the "exceeding"
as a process whereby each relatum ideally completes, and is the "outer horizon"
of, the other (pp 318-22). At other times, Welton talks only of the mutual
"interaction and enrichment" of language and sensation (pp. 268ff.). But at
its most promising, Welton's interpretation points to a unity-through-difference
whereby identities of meaning and individuations of perceivable objects take
place as a result of a complex of perceptual systems and linguistic systems.
Each system acts intemally and yet "strives" (p. 252) for points of contact with
the other, so that the whole "schematic genesis" (pp. 256-68) is a web of
alternations, blendings, shiftings, complementary directions, and interplays
(pp. 304).
But how is it that that which goes on inside each system breaks out of its
limits to reach the other, and how does each system constitute its own outer
limit as the border with the other. Welton's attempt at a dialectic of "here"
and "there" (p. 318) looks like it begins a dialectic of perception that at a
later stage might need and become a dialectic of meanings and laws. (Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit opens with a genetic analysis of this sort.) But such
an analysis of the dialectic among parts which transforms the system as a
whole, which alone would count as a fully dialectical reading of Husserl,
has never fully been attempted. Eley (1972, pp. 342-44) speaks of a "dialectic
of This and That" at the origin of a Husserlian genesis of laws and conjunction. Strasser (1963, pp. 256-57) defines Husserl 's "dialectical" phenomenology as an investigation into the simultaneous "ordering" and
"neutralizing" of partial standpoints. Mller (1976), for whom the "dialectic
of givenness and totality" is connected to cultural backgrounds, does take
the dialectic of part and whole seriously. If experience orders perspectives
by providing each one with a successor beyond its limit, then the very origin
of each perspectival standpoint depends on the experiential system as a whole:
32
INTRODUCTION
"The given is produced. Its reality is the result of a process" (p. 39). The
synthesis of This and That is a kind of production whose "economy" (p. 44)
trickles down into all levels: it produces "backgrounds" and "perspectives"
(p. 201) as weIl as the intentional "purposes" (p. 43) which guide epistemic
fulfilment; it produces an "open process" (p. 58-9) with creative possibilities for "innovation" and new "standpoints" (the most radical of which is
the ego standpoint, pp. 201-30) as weIl as the "fixed and static" relations within
and between these standpoints (pp. 58-9). In short, to work out a Husserlian
dialectic of whole and part, one would have to account not only for ways in
wh ich syntheses among part-experiences transform the structures of the whole
of experience, but also for ways in which each transformation of the whole
retroactively confers new meaning on each part, and changes wh at it means
to be apart.
Many commentators deny that Husserl's concept is dialectical. There is a
common feeling that it is impossible to speak without equivocation of experience as, for example, both active and passive. Natorp (1917-18) argues
that since consciousness is a "flux", it cannot also be governed by concrete
processes, as Husserl's "dialectical critics" (Adorno and EIey) claim. Mohanty
(1974, p. 189) suspects that aIl talk of a subject-object dialectic lapses into
subjectivism. Derrida (1967) argues that synthetic unities of meaning in
Husserl's account are not absolute dialectical resolutions of differences, but
rather defer the unity of interpretation infinitely. Souche-Dagues (1972) calls
Husserl's account of repeatable meanings "anti-dialectical" (p. 44).
The concern in all these readings is that the dialectical reading, which I have
portrayed as the description of relatively autonomous systems of consciousness activating their determinacy and limits in confrontation with each other,
collapses into the process reading, which I have portrayed as the description
of a relatively undifferentiated flow of experience splitting into apparently
autonomous systems. The concern is that the dialectical reading denies that
there is a genuine difference between language and perception, or between
universals and particulars, static and genetic, etc. The challenge for the dialectical reading is to ensure that the differentiation between spheres that emerge
in the course of their interaction achieve the status of logical or primordial
differentiations. It must show how the process that sets up differences sets them
up as always having been determining for consciousness. The process of
achieving synthetic unities must be the same process that refers back to original
differences.
The dialectic of achieving synthetic results by referring back to origins is
thus the strongest version of the mutual grounding of dualities that several
commentators aIlude to. When Sokolowski (1964, pp. 218-19) refers to the
"dialectic" between the two "poles" of constitution (namely of "subjectivity
and reality"), his idea is that subjectivity is the ground of material judgments
while judgments about matter ground in return the ego's reflection (though
Sokolowski thinks that Husserl insufficiently emphasized the latter). Dialectics
is the interaction which lets grounds appear as grounds or origins. Schuhmann's
33
(1971, pp. 192-94) last word on Husserl's "dialectic" of ego and nature is a
Fiehtean one. The ego is "independent and unconditioned", but only when
understood as the "ground-moment of its own self-division, i.e. into nonwill (nature) and will (phenomenology)". The ego-pole is independent only
when it returns to itself from the natural world; and the world appears as an
"absolutely given facticity" only when, "synthetically bound together", it functions as an "original result" (original Nachtrgliches), an aposteriority with
the status of apre-supposition. The most explicit reading is EIey's (1962,
pp. 31-6) account of the "dialectic" of essence and thisness as a "priusposterius difference". EIey argues that essences can only be constituted through
the unities and differences among individuals, but that once constituted,
essences count as independent of, and even as the source of the determinate
characterizations of, individuals. Citing (p. 35n.) Hegel 's category of "presupposition", Eley defines dialecties as the apriori "pre-supposition" that
is "conditioned" by the "conflict" of aposteriori moments.
Finally, then, we come to readings of Husserl's concept of synthesis in
terms of the originary result, the pre-supposition, or the reference backward
to origins.
SECTION 4. READINGS OF HUSSERL'S CATEGORY
OF "REFERRING-BACK"
34
INTRODUCTION
all past perceivings of the same object, and thus implicitly contains the past
synthetic cause within itself". De Muralt (1974, pp. Illff.) argues that science
can only progress if its goals are constantly being remembered. But other commentators, like Diemer (1956, pp. 96-102), argue that an intentionally complex
experience need not refer back to a chronologically prior experience, but
must refer back to something in this "present-now"-point out of which the
complex could have been constructed. The backward and forward (rck and
vor) references among experiences all depend on the intention "pointing
backward" (zurckweisen auf) to a passive "pre-givenness" in the present. Still
others, like Miller (1984), characterize referring-back through the futural
possibility of confirming or re-checking perceptions. Interpretations are confirmed when they "go back" to data and disconfirmed when they "go back"
on data (p. 64). Und er ideal conditions of coherence, all attributions "go
back" to one another (p. 71).
But if some commentators say that complex consciousness leads back to
simple sense-data, whether implicit or explicit, others say that that to which
consciousness refers back are ideallaws and/or the active ego. Dreyfus (1982,
p. 25) thinks that what phenomenology "uncovers" are rules and not states
of awareness. And Levinas (1973, p. 25) says that critical phenomenology
"refers back" from objective experience of things to subjectivity and the
existence of consciousness, though others argue conversely that critical phenomenology "refers back" in a new way to the same existing things that were
already present in naIve consciousness.
However, like the dialectical readings, readings which emphasize backward
reference often do not just choose one element over another (e.g. sensation
over meaning or subject over object) to be the backward-referent. Instead, they
argue that the process of backward reference is itself responsible for there being
several equally primordial elements in consciousness. Hence Landgrebe (1981)
says that consciousness leads back both to givenness and to the ego. Waldenfels
(1975, p. 76) says that experience refers "back" both to the "real given" and
to "expressed meaning", and de Almeida (1972) says that the "double"
movement (pp. 55, 77) of "pointing-back" or "leading-back" (Rckdeuten
and Zurckfhren) leads both to sensation and abstraction (pp. 38-9), both
to substrate and predicative determinations (pp. 103-4), and both to the pregiven beginnings of interpretation and to its ideal end-points (pp. 30-40).
That a single process of referring-back can ground heterogeneous elements
of consciousness, suggests that consciousness also refers back to its own
totality. When Hlsmann (1964, pp. 103-5, 154) says that reflection is directed
"back" towards the ego, he has in mind the temporally streaming ego as a
synthetic whole. Natorp (1917-18, p. 52) argues that the ego to which objectifying consciousness "relates back" (Zurckbeziehung) is a flowing synthetic
ego. Landgrebe (1980, pp. 64f.) argues that phenomenological analysis
lets consciousness "return (Rckgang) to ground" in the lifeworld. Mller
(1976, pp. 248-9) argues that individual meanings can be produced only if
the "absolute totality" of meaning is also a "taking-back" of the totality
35
36
INTRODUCTION
sense-data. But while sensation does satisfy the search for beginnings, in
that sensation must have always taken place earlier (frher) than intentional
experience, nevertheless every sensation in a temporal field has a sense-history
to be explicated. No one sensation can dose the search for beginnings, or begin
a chronology of origins. But another mode of return, namely retlection to a
timeless transcendental subject, satisfies both the search for a prior intentional experience as weH as the closure of serial history. Aguirre foHows the
"reference-back" reading in so far as he holds that the syntheses of ongoing
experience lead back through contexts to a history of origins, but he backs
away from a fuH theory of the "before" both by rejecting the ultimacy of sensedata and by affirming the ultimacy of the subject. Aguirre rejects the ultimacy
of sense-data on the grounds that the chain of ever-earlier data can never be
closed, whereas for the reference-back reading the syntheses which identify
ever more detailed sense-data thereby do constitute a region of ideaHy simple
units of sense. And Aguirre affirms the ultimacy of the subject on the grounds
that consciousness refers back to an undifferentiated transcendental identity,
whereas for the reference-back reading the identity of the subject is a product
of consciousness's recognition of the continuous possibility of reflection
present in every synthetic combination. If Aguirre's conception of genetic phenomenology degenerates into subjective idealism, it is because his account
of the reference-back to pre-constitutive beginnings is not grounded in ongoing
synthetic experience.
Derrida (1967) seems to criticize Husserl by affirming a gap between the
uncloseable adumbrations of meaning which take place in the ongoing
anticipations and retentions of synthesizing consciousness and the ideally
dosed self-identity of the origins (sensible, structural, ideal, and transcendental)
of synthesis. The charge is that Husserl's theory of origins is always dispersed in his descriptions of the unfolding of meanings. Husserl's reply is
that the dissemination of meaning through experience implies not the dissolution of beginnings but only that the ideal starting-points I)f synthesis are
constituted by the backward-reference of unclosed syntheses. Derrida's criticism of phenomenology becomes rather his perfection of it, when he says of
the open possibilities which refer back to ideal units of meaning that "by
delayed reaction, a possibility produces that to which it is said to be added
on".
Finally, according to de Almeida, the genesis of a meaning may be traced
back to an "origin" (Ursprung), but not to a "beginning" (Anfang) (1972,
pp. 18-23). The pre-suppositions of a meaning "point back" (Rckdeuten) or
"lead back" (Zurckfhren) to "end-points" (pp. 38-41), either to sensible
contents or to categorial forms. Sensible end-points ean only be pragmatic eonstmctions (p. 41), yet these construetions are already "preseribed" (vorschreibt)
by the meanings whose genesis pre-supposes them (p. 48). Categorial forms
can only exist as "operations" in, and not "before" or "after", interpretative
syntheses, yet these operations take the form of tautologie al mIes when refleetions "look back" (pp. 116-18). Both sense-data and eategorial forms, then,
37
I am going to refer to secondary works by citing in the body of the text the author, the
year of publication, and the page reference, and by citing the rest of the publication data
in the Bibliography.
CHAPTER 1
In the first Logical Investigation, Husserl is concemed with what will count
as the identity of a meaning, given that expressions of meanings become and
perish in the flux of the experience of expression-users. While Husserl uses
the term "synthesis" only once in LU i, I will argue that Husserl 's ac counts
of meaning and intentionality, science and perception, expressions and consciousness, are dominated by the problematics of what Husserl calls " 'unity
in multiplicity' " (102).
In chapter 1, I will examine three unities in multiplicity in LU i: first, the
"intimately fused unity" between meaning-intentions and meaning-fulfilments,
second, the "web" of scientific thought-contents, and third, the replacement
of the fluctuating meanings of occasional ("This-Here-Now") expressions with
objective units of meaning. I will argue that there is a single problematic of
synthesis at work in intentionality in general, in science, and in perception.
The general problematic is that each intentional act of consciousness must pass
over into successors and unfold in a complex interpretation of the world of
experience, at the same time as they refer back to an underlying synthetic unity
of interpretative consciousness. The special problem in the intentionality
relation is to explain how meanings "prescribe" their own supplements; the
problem in a science of concepts, where meanings seem not to fluctuate at
all, is to describe the dynamic wherein one proposition "follows from" another;
the problem in occasional expressions like "This-Here-Now", where meanings
seem to fluctuate without restriction, is to explain how multiplicities of experience contribute to the possibility of ideal units of meaning. On my reading,
Husserl's account of synthesis takes consciousness to be a self-propelling
dynamic of interpretative activity. Whether stable or fluctuating, the meanings
of individual acts of consciousness prescribe and pass over into determinate
ranges of successors, which in turn refer back to their predecessors as
the ground of their unity. We will be looking for an account of the grounds,
the mechanisms, and the results of these prescriptions of multiplicity and
unification.
I.
Husserl argues that meanings differ from mental states (17), from perceptual
intuitions (56-7, 66-7), and from linguistic expressions (s. 8). Meanings are
instead ideal articulations of states of affairs interconnected by subject-matter
and subject to analysis and verification independent of whether and by whom
and from what cause they are thought, and independent of whether or how
38
LU I
39
their objects have been perceived, and of what words are used to express them.
Husserl's version of the relation between meanings and perception introduces
the relation between intention and fulfilment. An expression has an "empty"
meaning-intention for an experiencing subject if it refers to an objective state
of affairs which he has not intuited; it acquires a meaning-fulfilment if the
subject has intuitively "confirmed" or "illustrated" its meaning.
The concept of synthesis is introduced to characterize the way in which
intuitions are unified under objectifying interpretations. Just as one meaning
may be illustrated by many intuitions, "the same intuition can offer fulfilment of different expressions: it can be categorically held fast in different ways
and synthetically combined (synthetisch verknpft) with other intuitions" (49).
An intuition succeeds in fulfilling an expression when, thanks to some interpretative category, it is synthetically combined with other intuitions. The
"intimately fused unity" of intention and fulfilment is therefore the result of
the "synthetic combination" of fulfilling intentions with one another.
We can consider the "intimately fused unity" from the standpoint either
of (a) the intention or (b) the fulfilment. Both sides exhibit the dynamic of
interpretative synthesis.
(a) An expression's meaning-intention is a kind of readiness: Once a thought
is formulated about some object, its meaning-content presents itself as a
meaning to be "carried out" (39). The "function" of a written or spoken word
is to "awaken" a meaning-intention, which in turn is to "point forwards to"
an intuitable object, and to "guide" our "interest" in the direction of fulfilling that intention (40). The readiness of meaning-intentions consists in their
"unactualized" potentiality, their inherent "capacity" for intuitive presentation (63). Every meaning prescribes "a sphere of possible fulfilment" (50).
It "circumscribes" a whole "range" of intuitions, a range that is both "determinate" (since distinguished from the perceptions prescribed by different
meanings) and "indeterminate" (since many different intuitions, some quite
unpredictable, may all illustrate the same meaning) (50).
The problem of a meaning's circumscription (or anticipation, or prescription) of a range of intuitions is at the heart of the problem of the synthetic
combination of contents of consciousness. On a strong reading, the determinacy of a meaning's prescription would be an algorithm for naming or
producing intuitions; on a weaker version, a meaning would simply be associated with a class of intuitions. But on either reading, meanings have implicit
possibilities, which unfold as their objects are experienced. Husserl uses a
metaphor from banking. A meaning-intention "draws a draft on (Wechsel
ausstellen auf) intuition" and a meaning-fulfilment "cashes" (eingelst) it (56).
The "drawing" takes place in-advance of the actualized intuitions, and so
the intuitive possibilites must be counted and evaluated ahead of their actualization. But now since "Wechsel" (the "draft") is also Husserl's technical
term in LU i for "fluctuation", the passage can take an alternative translation: "The fluctuation, which is exposed (ausstellen) in intuition, is taken up
(eingelst)". Husserl later attributes "fluctuation" to radically ambiguous
40
CHAPTER 1
expressions. But here, every meaning fluctuates in the sense that its prescriptions of intuitions is relatively indeterminate. The point is not that
meanings are indifferent to which intuitions can fulfil them, but rather that they
must first undergo "exposition" in a multiplicity of intuitions before they
can be "taken up" as an interpretation of the objects of experience.
(b) From the standpoint of meaning-intentions, the problem of synthesis
is one of prescribing fulfilments; from the standpoint of meaning-fulfilments,
the problem is one of fitting intentions, and of the continuity of interpretations.
The plurality of an object's possible appearances must be synthesized in
advance by an ideal meaning's "covering unity" (58), which determines
whether given intuitions "coincide" with intentions. The synthesized plurality of fulfilments thus prevents the pluralization of the meant object itself.
While the appearances of an object are experienced in a "dispersed manifold"
(97), the dispersed intuitions are synthesized, and for this reason the intuitive manifold does not make "more" objects present than the single empty
expression already made present. The manifold of appearances unfolds in an
ongoing synthetic process of dispersal and co-incidence; but the result of the
synthesis of intentions with intuitions is a reference, mediated by an ideal
meaning, to a singular object.
From the standpoints both of the starting-point and the end-point of interpretative activity, then, the problematics of synthesis involve the way in
which each individual act of intentional consciousness prescribes in advance,
passes over into, and subsequently fuses with, its successors. But so far, the
concept of "synthesis" has been applied only to the connection between abstract
meanings and immediate intuitions. We will now consider the role of synthesis
within the spheres of even the most abstract meanings (in logical science)
and of even the most concrete (This-Here-Now) intuitions.
2. IDEAL MEANINGS: THE "WEB" OF SCIENCE AND
THE "BACKWARD GLANCE" OF DEMONSTRATION
LU I
41
42
CHAPTER 1
are "made to stand out" only within the unity of a single object, then "the single
item itself" is in turn constituted precisely in the "forward and backward
references" of its variously "ordered" appearances.
Indicative signs are thus embedded in apriori structures of combination.
Are meaningful signs also constituted as synthetic unities in multiplicity? There
are considerations that prevent us from drawing this analogy straightaway.
While a meaningful sign is also a kind of "summoning into consciousness",
it works not as a thought about A summons a thought about B into consciousness; rather, a thought about A summons A itself into consciousness.
Similarly, the "unity-in-multiplicity" (102) that pertains to meanings seems not
to combine meanings, but rather to let each one "count as a unit in itself"
throughout its multiple expressions (44, also 30). If a science of logic (whether
a formal logic or a phenomenological science of philosophical concepts) is
to be possible, its first principles, rules, and results must be meaningful independent of the stream of consciousness of logicians and their immediate
surroundings.
Yet Husserl says towards the end of LU i (94-6) that the science of logic
yields three unities of multiplicity of its own. The first involves the "abstraction" (96) from the experience of a material multiplicity to logical science
in general. When we merely "live in" an expression, we attend to its objects:
in order to reflect on, to analyse and draw inferences from, its meaning, we
must "glance back" (zurckblicken) at the meaning as an ideal actuality on
its own account. Only when we return from objective experience back to
a prior sphere of ideal intentional objects, can science proceed "step by
step" (schrittweise) along the path prescribed by the meanings themselves.
The simple units of meaning have to be constituted as such by synthetic
activities.
The second unity in multiplicity in the logical sciences involves "the complication of meanings to form novel meanings" (96). On the one hand, it seems
this would be a progressive science, generating new ideas, or complicating
old ones. On the other hand, it seems a regressive science, leading back to
basic terms which will be able to explain how the meanings we now work with
got compounded into their present form. The science of pure concepts circumscribes "an ideally closed set of general objects" (105), no matter how
many pure concepts there turn out to be. Just as the "endless" number-series
is "sharply circumscribed" in advance by an ideal law even though they can
never all be named, the set of pure meanings is closed not because they can
all be named, but because they stand in a coherent, law-governed order with
respect to one another.
"All theoretical science, in its objective content, is constituted as one homogeneous stuff: it is an ideal complex of meanings. We can go further and say
that the whole, ever so manifold complex web (Gewebe) of meanings that
we call the theoretical unity of science itself belongs under the very category
that circumspans all its elements: it constitutes itself as a unity of meaning"
(95). While an ideal meaning is a unit in relation to the multiplicity of expres-
LU I
43
sions of it, it is also part of a multiplicity which makes up the theoretical content
of science as a whole. Every meaning, as an ideal unit, implicates a unity of
meanings, yielding either agreement or absurdity, but in any case making up
a single interpretative system that may weIl include points of interpretative
conflict, gaps in explanation, failures of rigour, corruptions of univocity, crosspurposes in enquiry, etc.
The third unity in multiplicity in science involves "the relation of necessarily following (Folge)" (94). An inference (Schlsse, 94), as the "closure"
of a sequence of meanings, can only yield the certain results that it does,
because of the way it is based on the meanings of its premisses and not on
their subjective content. This "reflection" on premisses introduces an additional web-like structure of science, reminiscent of the "forward and backward
references" which structure the combinations of indicative signs:
Logical reflection is carried out in further steps [Le. after and beyond the apprehension of
perceivable objects.] A propositional meaning is meant in it continuously and for further (steps),
idealized and identified in our unified thought-context (einheitlichen Denkzusammenhang), and
interpreted as one and the same. The same is the case whenever a unified theoretical demonstration (Begrndung [the establishment of a grounding relation]) is being wound up (abwickelt).
We could utter no "therefore" (also) unless there was also a glance back (Hinblick) at the meaningcontent. In judging the premisses, we do not merely live in our judgments, but reflect on their
contents; only by glancing back at these does the conclusion appear motivated. Thus and only
thus can the logical form of the premisses - which of course is not stressed in that universalconceptual setting off in relief that finds expression in formulas of inference - determine with
insight the following (Folgerung) of the conclusion (104).
Even the scientific inferences that combine the objective contents of ideal
meanings must be grounded in the structure of the subjective possibility of
drawing conclusions. The logician who merely names the rules of syllogism,
fails to account for the "insight" with which conclusions are understood to
follow from the premisses.
The text does not say that to think about a propositional meaning is to
use it as apremiss for deriving other propositions. But it does say that in
order for a subject to use a proposition in a demonstration, or even to ask
whether one proposition implies another, each propositional meaning at work
in the demonstration must be meant "continuously" (fortgesetzt); it must
carry forwards. Meanings have their objective power to imply only in so far
as the apprehension of the "web" of essences takes place in a corresponding
"unified thought-context".
In part, the issue is one of memory: a subject only knows that C follows
from PI and P2 if he knows and remembers what each proposition means.
But more fundamentaIly, the issue concerns the force of the "follows from"
(Folgerung) or the "therefore" (also). A subject recognizes the force of the
premisses precisely by means of a "glancing back" and a "winding up" in
conclusions. Thinking makes use of unifying "contexts", and the objects of
thought are graspable just in their relations to one another. But the ideal
meanings are themselves already responsible for the possibility of contexts,
44
CHAPTER 1
This account of vague (as opposed to "exact", 88) meaning accounts both
for the shifting, flowing, or blurring, of meanings, and for the demand for
the unity, limit, or containment of meanings. The cause of a meaning's vagueness is neither the feebleness of the meaning-user nor the flux of intuitions,
but is located rather in the way the meanings themselves prescribe overlapping pereeptual fulfilments. When meanings are vague, it is the meanings
themselves that fai! to "sever themselves off from one another" (71). The
limit which each meaning ought to have belongs to that meaning, but so
does the act of "passing over" those limits. Individual meanings pressure the
theoretical web of meanings to fix, or to put an end to the effacement
(verwischen) of, their boundaries, to generate a more complieated meaning
to end the oscillations to and fro (Schwanken) over vague meanings, to set
different meanings apart once and for all, in short, to effect a transformation
from flux to fixedness.
The problematic of synthesis, both in terms of science and in terms of the
experience of perceptual objects, will foeus on these mechanisms whereby individual meaning-contents demand their own supplementation, draw their own
conclusions and prescribe their own intuitive illustrations, fix their own boundaries, and shift into their own eontexts.
3.
Just as the most abstract units of meaning presuppose synthesizing interpretations, so also do the least unified of meanings.
Seetions 24-28 treat "oceasional" (okkasionelle) expressions, which use
LU I
45
46
CHAPTER I
listener can pick out the meaning of an occasional expression only because
he can presume that the speaker has a "thought-horizon" within which are
situated the same intuitable objects which the listener can also intuit within his
own thought-horizon. The listener cannot immediately experience the circumstances which give the speaker's utterance an objective meaning, but he
can imagine how he would re-situate himself into the speaker's environment
by the mediation of the speaker's act of pointing out. "This-", "here-",
"now-", and even "I"-locations have objective meanings just because their
fluctuations are always situated in environments whose determinate order
allows a mutual locatability of speaker and listener.
In fact, "I"-points and "This"-points pivot on one another in the continuous shiftings of standpoint necessary for the comprehension of any demonstrative term. A listener can shift his standpoint either by holding constant
the items wh ich he sees as "these" items in his visual field while imaginatively
shifting his perspective to that which another "I" would have, or alternatively by holding constant the "I" -point of orientation and allowing the
fluctuation of the things which count as "these". In both cases, the possibility of understanding statements about the world of the speaker depends
on the shifting of standpoints, the establishment of ideal meaning through
experiential difference, and the manipulation of horizons. Husserl 's analysis
of occasional expressions is ultimately not an argument for pure experiential
self-presence, but is rather an account of the syntheses that constitute
indexical reference.
I will leave aside for now the question of whether immediacy is itself
mediated, and whether a speaker's understanding of his own use of "here",
"this", and "I" depends on shiftings of perspective, imaginative variation,
and intersubjective communication. But it is clear that the mediations occurring within a thought-horizon carry out the transformation of occasional
expressions into objective expressions, and so carry out the closure of the
boundaries that fix meanings. Husserl's description of these mediations characterizes both the horizon and the closure. The listener "orients" (orientieren,
81) himself in the speaker's "situation" (Lage, 81). In turn, the speaker must
have pointed to something "situated" (Liegendes, 83) within the "reach"
(-bereich, 83) of his institutions and thoughts, and must have wanted to
"convince" (berzeugung, 83, or to "carry his own conviction over into")
the listener of what he said, by getting the listener to extend his own reach
over the target situation. The occasional expression acts as a "clue"
(Anhaltspunkt, 81) for "guiding" (81) the listener to pick out the object meant.
For its utterance is part of a system of "normal" situatedness; its enunciation
calls upon the listener to stop in the tracks of fluctuating experience, to take
note of his own immediate surroundings and to use them as his "footing" or
"point of support", or even his "standing-" or "stopping-point" (all possible
translations of Anhaltungspunkt) for fixing the speaker's referent. In short,
the very recognition that a certain expression is a fluctuating expression
involves the beginnings of a kind of stopping-point. The point of stopping is
LU I
47
on the one hand no more than the "point of entry" (Einsatzpunkt), which as
we shall see (in discussing Ideen 1, 253) is the point of departure for carrying
out articulated syntheses, and on the other hand is already the beginning
of the end of the "stopping" (Innehaltung), which as we have already seen
(in discussing LU 11, I, 72) is the closure of the uncontrolled overflow of
meanings.
Husserl goes further than to say that occasional expressions provide a clue
for manipulating intuitive and conceptual standpoints; the procedures for
manipulation can, in the ideal, terminate in the "replacement", without any loss
of sense, of the occasional expression by an objective expression (90). But
Husserl 's claim is a difficult one, since he also insists that any attempt to
carry out such an ideal, to express experiences in "unequivocal, objectively
fixed fashion", would be "plainly futile" (91). How does Husserl affirm the
ideal, while denying the practical possibility?
First, Husserl distinguishes "essentially" and "inessentially" occasional
experiences. The expression "this statement" is inessentially occasional if it
is uttered just after the statement in question: to replace the occasional expression with an objective one, the listener need only "glance back" (Rckblick,
84) at what has just been said. In contrast, an essentially occasional expression requires that the listener perform fresh intuitions, as when "this" refers
to a bird now in flight. Here, constantly "varying" intuitions "supplant" or
"stand in for" (supponieren, 84) the objective meaning of "this". Somehow the
"supplanting" of objective meanings by intuitions must be put in the service
of "replacing" intuitive contents with objective meanings. Even essentially
occasional expressions must glance back to an objective meaning - not to
an earlier utterance, but to a continuing possibility of giving objective expression to each new intuitive experience.
But if we try to find an actual pure language of objective expressions which
can be understood without having to look around into the speaker's intuitive
48
CHAPTER I
over into correlative spheres within the same genus, and so condition
spheres-that-pass-over (bergangssphre)" (88-89). Even within a single "train
of thought" (Gedankenzuge 88, Gedankenfolge 91), subjects make sense of
expressions only by continuously shifting their ideas of the objects and experiences they refer to. So now it looks as though all expressions with empirical
content can have multiple applications, and so are "subjectively muddied" (91)
by alternative view-points and thought-horizons.
At the end of these sections, Husserl seems to locate arealm of genuinely
"objectively fixed" expressions, by appealing to a "correlation" between "being
in itself" and "truths in themselves" (90). Meanings are unqualifiedly fixed
meanings only when the purest kind of logical science is directed to the
purest kind of subject-matter. Such a science would have to stipulate the
meanings of its basic terms and its rules for complicating those meanings would
have to guarantee that the resulting web of meanings includes no extrascientific intuitions or intra-scientific ambiguities. And yet we have seen that
even the scientific web of truths introduces a structure of passing-over from
proposition to proposition, and that even a "single train of thought" introduces a shifting of standpoint. Not only when referring to existing individuals
or empirical classifications, but also when engaging in scientific discourse, a
language-user's "distance" from an ideallanguage ofpurely objective meaning
remains "endless" (91). To the ever-narrowing sphere of pure language, the
occasional character of expressions puts up infinite resistance.
The most common interpretation of LU i is that Husserl's project is to
salvage a region, however smalI, of meanings untainted by intuitions. But
on my reading, Husserl does not first posit an ideal language wnose extrication from intuitions has been completed, and then measure corrupt expressions
according to their distance from the ideal; rather, Husserl starts with synthetic activity, that is, with the actual workings of fluctuating expressions,
and then characterizes the ideal meanings precisely from the standpoint of
the references backward and forward from fluctuating meanings to their own
ideal origins and completions. For Husserl is simply not worried by the fact
that the full replacement of occasional expressions with objective ones is
impossible. It is enough that objectifying replacement is "required as a
capacity" (90), even if we do not actually have that capacity.
Like a meaning-intention's readiness for an infinite range of intuitive fulfilments, the ideally objective clarification of the vague and the muddy,
impossible as it might be to complete in actuality, nevertheless has the status
of being given "in-advance" (von vorherein, 92). The "in-advance" fixability
of occasional expressions is the forward-referring corollary to their "backward
glance" to objective expressions. Both are categories of unity through the
transition to unity. Indeed the principle of the replaceability of occasional
expressions has its "ground" not so much in the disconnection of meanings
from intuitions, from subjects, and from each other, as in the principle that,
"Everything that is, is knowable 'in itself' .. (90). So for example if a "natural,
thing-like reality" has "quite determinate extension and position in space and
LU I
49
time and quite detenninate ways of persisting and changing" (90), it will be
described not by expressions without need of intuitive contexts, but on the
contrary, by expressions whose jluctuation of meaning is appropriate to the
object's own changes of position. Objects can be meant, in short, not because
they can be thought independent of intuitive contexts, but because they can
be cognitively pursued through contexts, and because the lawful determinacy of this pursuit is justified in-advance and referred backwards to the real
objects themselves.
The objectification of meanings requires turning occasional expressions into
their objective replacements. That is, the in-advance ideality of meaning is a
function of overcoming the resistances put up by the contextual situations
which occasion the expression of most if not a11 meanings. Consciousness
works through its movements towards objective interpretation, always situated
in the realm of the incomplete, where the problematics of synthesis are most
at issue. And the items to-be-synthesized are not just floating thoughts and
intuitions simpliciter, but thoughts and intuitions functioning simultaneously
as the readiness for, and the resistance against, the closure of objective interpretation.
Now most commentators who emphasize as I do the movements through
incomplete and interrupted syntheses in the objectification of fluctuating
meanings deny that there can be any genuine role for the theory of ideal
meanings that seemed to have been the goal of the Investigations. The final
pages of LU i, however, make such interpretations untenable. The prior and
independent status of ideal meanings, even if their priority consists precisely
in being taken as the ultimate backward and forward referents of meanings
in flux, must be interpreted in a strong sense. Husserlian phenomenology not
only posits, but depends on, the possibility of apprehending ideal "types" (88),
"Species" (102) or "universalities" (102), and indeed the "idea11y closed set
of general objects" (l05). How can the theory of ideal meanings be consistent with the fluid open-endedness of a11 intentional consciousness?
We know that even scientifica11y grasped "exact" theories must take the
form of a "web" of meanings implicating "fluid transitions" in a thoughthorizon. The problem of the phenomenological combination necessary for
the constitution of ideal meanings thus a110ws us to introduce the central
problems of synthesis into a11 regions of consciousness, the scientific as we11
as the pre-scientific, the conceptual, the intuitive, and the interpretative, the
objective, the subjective and the intersubjective, etc.: What is an individual
object of consciousness if individuals are always meant in context? What is
the status of "environments" and "horizons" on the one hand and of "universalities" on the other? What provides the impetus for "transitions" and their
"fluidity", and how is the schema of "forward and backward reference" built
into the very nature of what it is to be a content of consciousness? And
fina11y, to introduce issues that we will take up in the next chapter, in what
sense do universal laws ground the synthetic combinations of contents, and
in what sense are laws the results of identifications within those syntheses?
50
CHAPTER
NOTE
1.
This is Findlay's (1970) translation. Findlay takes some liberty in translating Bereich as
"horizon". However, it seems to me that "horizon" does capture the sense in this paragraph, and indeed that a concept of horizon operates throughout, even at this early stage
of Husserl's work. Pietersma (1973) has argued for this point.
CHAPTER 2
52
CHAPTER 2
LU 11
53
Why is the exegesis of LU ii not now closed? Why is the "ground" still
problematic even after Husserl has denied that the origin of universals in
singular intuitions could influence the content of universality? It is because
"ground" (Grund) is a technical term.
2.
54
CHAPTER 2
of the production of concepts, and deny that the alleged genetic origination
of uni versals in individuals is even relevant to the meaning of universal terms
(187, 189, 192,210,217).
Still, the term Husserl most often uses to convey the sense of "grounding"
or "basing" is Grund and Grund is a technical term for Husserl. In the
"Prolegomena" (LU I, 231), Husserl sets out the first principle of all theory:
"Scientific knowledge is, as such, grounded knowledge". Husserl goes on to
say that individual truths (of fact) are grounded in explanations from prior
circumstances, while general truths (of law) are grounded in "grounding
laws" (LU I, 232). According to the "Prolegomena", to apprehend a ground
is to apprehend a sort of lawfulness of necessary origins. The phenomenological scientist is to characterize a given object in relation to that which
grounds it, since only its ground can render it intelligible, and exhibit the
sufficient reason for its being determined as it iso Nothing could be more
striking, then, than for Husserl to be saying in LU ii that apprehension of
individuals functions as the ground of apprehensions of uni versals.
Husserl's analysis in LU ii of individuals as the ground of universals is
not weIl handled in the secondary literature. Commentaries which interpret
Husserl as saying that some sort of transformation occurs in consciousness that
turns the apprehension of individuals into an apprehension of universals, may
be arranged on a continuum according to the degree of lasting importance
which they assign to the universal's origination in individuals. On one extreme,
empiricist, transcendentalist, process, and dialectical interpretations of Husserl' s
claim that uni versals are grounded in individuals hold that part of the very
meaning of universal terms consists in their genetic origination in individual
meanings. On the other extreme, rationalist interpretations read the act in which
universals are grounded in individuals as if it involves only the illustration
of universals by means of examples, at most indispensable examples. The
former interpretations surrender the autonomy of universals, the latter surrender
any serious sense of grounding. 1
Husserl does seem to hold so me theory of the transformation of individuals into universals. At the same time as he insists that a universal is not an
aggregate of individuals, he allows that universals can be explained "as the
results of certain fusions, as products (Produkte) really but unnoticeably
embracing their factors", as long as that is not taken to entail that the resulting
universal is not genuinely logically abstract (200). So also a universal can
be called a synthesis of individuals as long as synthesis is understood to
generate not just a new complex unit but an altogether novel sense of unity.
The result of abstracting a universal from instances cannot be just another
instance, and its meaning cannot be exhausted by references to previously
perceived instances, but the act of constituting a universal result on the ground
of individual presentations may be the same act in which individuals are
constituted as instances to which universals apply.
Husserl 's version of the transformation of individuals into uni versals hangs
on his use of "synthesis". To reconstruct Husserl's account, we may set in relief
LU II
55
56
CHAPTER 2
(B) Self-Evidence
Husserl frequently uses terminology drawn from visual sensation in characterizing evidence. In addition to such formulations as "I see the truth that 4
is an even number" (125, also 171), Husserl appeals to "insight" (201, 26),
"clarity" (108, 187), "the immediate given" (183), and "feIt" generality (187).
Hence the interpretation of self-evidence as direct, unmediated, quasi-visual,
intuition.
The problem for this interpretation is the extent to which Husserl's talk
of the self-evidence of universal objects as a kind of "seeing" is metaphoricaI. Commentators who take the sight-analogy seriously tend either to approve
of it on the grounds that it heightens the indubitability and/or the passivity
of apprehensions of universals, or else disapprove of it on the grounds that
the criteria for deciding when an object is adequately seen are vague. At any
rate, Husserl hirnself is cautious about the analogy between sensuous and
intellectual apprehension (136).
(11) Evidence as Variability4
Husserl would not say that universals are self-evidently apprehended when
individuals are compared, their differences eliminated and their common
features held constant. But he is concerned about the variability of individuals in two ways; first, as a threat to objective judgments about universals, and
second, as something which can be turned into judgments about universals.
Abstraction to Species beg ins with the recognition that individuals survive
change in their appearances.
A certain fluctuation and flow of contents. and the uncertainty, even the impossibility, of
keeping them (the parts of a surface) completely identical, does not undermine the evidence of
these judgments. Like all purely descriptive judgments passed on intuitive data ... , they hold
the intuitions within a certain sphere of possible variation with a certain index, therefore, of
vagueness (206).
LU II
57
univocally understood in spite of the fact that its instances exhibit a certain
range of varied appearances. But Husserl goes farther than to say that the
apprehension of a universal survives variations in apprehended individuals;
apprehensions of variable individuals are "made into" apprehensions of
uni versals.
If we make empirical concepts and relations info (verwandeln) exact ones, if we frame ideal
concepts of extension, surface, qualitiative likeness and continuity, etc., we arrive at exact, a
priori propositions which set forth what is grounded on the intentions of such strict concepts.
Compared with these, merely descriptive assertions are imprecise approximations. Though the
vague sphere of singular phenomenal individuality in general does not belong to the sphere of
exact knowledge (which operates merely with ideals), it is nonetheless not at all closed out of
the general sphere of knowledge (206-7).
58
CHAPTER 2
Husserl rejects the theory that a universal concept is its applications, either
in the sense of being defined by the extension of individuals which it might
name (214) or in the sense of inc1uding in its meaning "in the fashion of a
bundle", the "individual presentations that fall under it" (180). But at the
same time, Husserl says several things that imply that a universal does determine ranges of individuals. The Species Triangle does function as a rule for
constructing individual triangles (133-4); the theory of Species does have to
explain how subjects know when to affirm similarities between individuals
(188, 206); and a universal object is at first "meant along with" the concrete
object (130). But in what sense can Husserl say that a universal meaning determines a range of possible instances?
The universal should provide a rule for c1assifying individuals, but it is
not about either the act or the object of application and does not create its
own instances. And the individual objects of experience provide the raw
material which trigger the application of universals, but they cannot function
as instances until uni versals have already defined them as such. In short, the
LU 11
59
We finally begin to see the force of the "ground"; the apprehension of individuals qua variable is always already setting in motion of the apprehension
of universals.
"Without general meanings, one can make no assertions at all, not even such
as are singular" (167). A subject cannot describe the features of a singular
object (e.g. its redness) unless he has already been applying general categories (e.g. colour concepts) to it. The abstraction to a universal from an
individual is a re-discovery of what the individual was all along. The universal
is thus the "immanence of the individual act" (150). Universals cannot be
reduced to a special apprehension of individuals, precisely because universalization is already at work in the very origin of the apprehension of
individuals.
For universalizing abstraction to work, the individual already has to be more
than it iso Husserl's first statement on abstraction in LU ii runs: "The primitive relation between Species and instance emerges: it becomes possible to
look over and compare a range of instances, and perhaps to judge with selfevidence: 'In all these cases individual aspects differ, but in each case the same
Species is realized .. .' " (109). Husserl places the act of comparing a range
of individuals prior to the act wh ich apprehends their Species (206). Something
in the apprehension of an individual property of an individual object causes
a subject to compare that individual with others, and to search for a Specific
respect of similarity. While the individual by itself is not a respect for
60
CHAPTER 2
LU 11
61
The types of unity which differentiate Species from instances and substances
from appearances, instead of "corresponding to something real in the phenomenon momentarily given", "rather point back (zurckweisen) to contexts
of lived consciousness in which they appear coherently, in which they are experienced and determined scientifically" (198-99). All types of unity are
62
CHAPTER 2
CONCLUSION
LU 11
63
A subject identifies an individual when he recognizes that a range of appearances reveal one and the same object. This recognition beg ins to take place
even in the apprehension of a single presentation, as soon as the subject
treats the perceptual qualities of the presentation as subject to change along
determinate directions. As soon as he treats a colour-quality as variable, for
example, he distinguishes that which is coloured from the colour. This one
act has three consequences. (a) It establishes a place-holder for colourproperties, treating the object as a colourable substance in general, (b) it allows
that colours of other things may become the colour of this one; it thus establishes the degrees of comparability of this object with others, and (c) it
prescribes possible changes and combinations of colour, ruling out some and
demanding others; it thus sets minimal, maximal, and typicallimits to possible
chains of images and thoughts. In short, the identification of an individual
property of an object already constitutes that property in relation to the type
of its alterability, its comparability with others according to determinate
respects, and its functions in chains of possible experience and discursive
reasoning. Now, the psychologism which Husserl criticises simply identifies
uni versals with one of these features of variable individuals. Husserl regards
the synthesis of individuals as a breeding ground for the constitution of
universal objects, but only as the first stage in the syntheses that ground
universals.
Second Stage
For Husserl, the fact that universals are grounded in the syntheses which
identify individuals, cannot prevent universals from being instance-independent, or prevent reflective consciousness from treating universals as
instance-independent. A particular perceptual quality, as a property of an
individual object, appears as one of a multiplicity of instantiations; a red object,
qua variable, exhibits both the fact that that object could appear as an instance
64
CHAPTER 2
of any colour, as weH as the fact that its shade of redness can appear in any
object. As soon as a subject treats an individual as variable in a determinate
manner, he has anticipated a general form, structure, or type of qualitative
identity, and has provided hirnself with the capacity to frame a universal
concept of which this individual is (actually or possibly) one of many possible
exemplifications. So as alterability guarantees a property's typical replaceability and relocatability, it generates the self-identity of types over instances.
When apprehensions of individuals pass over into one another, they are transformed into apprehensions of instance-independent universals. Universals, in
short, are grounded on individuals, and because of the grounding of universals in their instances, they are constituted as instance-independent.
Third Stage
The grounding of universals appeals in two ways to the "backward reference" of the syntheses that identify individual substances.
The first involves the reference from universals back to individuals. We
have found that grounded unities, including universals, "point back to contexts
of lived consciousness in which they appear coherently (einstimmig)". Now
Husserl cannot mean that a universal is a combination of experiences of individuals. Rather, a universal, when referred back to the lived experiences of
individuals, retraces the formation of a consistent interpretation. If universal
forms, types, laws, structures, or categories originate in an interpretation in
which all apprehensions of an object are made to speak, as it were, with one
voice, then we can now explain how universals are applied to individuals.
The syntheses which identify individuals, whose consistency grounds the
abstraction to a Species, are the same syntheses that prepare those individuals to be that to which the universal Species can refer back when it is applied.
In the final analysis, the same synthetic combinations of experiences that allow
a complex object to be recognized, for example, as a house, also aHow the
Species House to be considered on its own account, and in turn allow that
Species to be referred back in application to that and other individual houses.
But two questions remain. (a) To what syntheses of individuals do universals
whose instances have never been experienced refer back? (b) How is the
reference back to consistent interpretations in lived experience, a reflection
which I have suggested is necessary for the transformation of interpretative
patterns into the apprehension of instance-independent universals, itself
grounded?
(a) Universals can be apprehended even when no individual instances have
been experienced. But uni versals are constituted by their reference back to
individuals. If these two statements are consistent, then a universal does not
so much consist in its reference back to particular instantiating individuals,
as to a general strategy for interpreting individuals as possible instantiations.
What the universal must refer back to is the world of individuals as the
sphere of being from which that universal could have been abstracted. They
LU II
65
66
CHAPTER 2
LU II
67
68
CHAPTER 2
three problems for a concept of synthesis: What is an individual if individuals always appear in synthetic contexts? How are the schemata of "passing
over" from thesis to thesis and of "forward and backward references" built into
the very nature of meaning? And in what sense do universal laws, categories,
or structures ground the syntheses among experiences and in what sense are
the universals the result of identifications within these syntheses? In the present
chapter I have tried to show how the apprehension of objects progresses by
referring back to its grounds in structural universals and contexts of individuals. Universals do ground, provide the impetus for, and explain the limits
and the possibilities of, the ways in which contents of consciousness pass
over and are synthetically combined with one another; but uni versals are the
grounds of synthetic activity just because they are also the results of the
backward referring interpretative apprehension of individual objects. And the
consequence of Husserl's second Logical Investigation is that all consciousness of objects grounds itself in contexts of synthetic interpretations that
refer forwards to new interpretative unities and backwards to experiences
posited as having been given in advance. Consciousness distinguishes individual and universal objects as it aims at a unified interpretation of the world
as a whole. In what way individual objects can themselves be set in relief
for consciousness as individuated, in what way interpretative apprehension first
gets set in motion, and in what way individuals come to be apprehended as
parts that demand to be supplemented in the context of a whole, are the questions to be treated in the following chapter.
NOTES
1.
Starting with the lauer extreme, ten interpretations of Husserl's account of the transformation of apprehensions of individuals into apprehensions of universals may be arranged as
folIows:
(i) The dischargeable starting-point: Husserl does say, in discussing the relation between
geometrical instances and their universal laws, that instances function as "mere aids" to
understanding (157, also 162 on the "help" (Mithilfe) of sensible intuition). Levinas (1973)
argues that for all essences an ego "must" start his apprehension of universals with an
apprehension of individuals; but "what I am looking at ... (is the) red in general" (p.
106). The universal "emerges from the attributes of individuals" ("d partir des attributs",
Scherer, 1967, p. 205), as an experiencing subject varies individuals in such a way that
the result is a non-individual invariant (Schutz, 1966, p. 36). The ground of a universal is
necessarily a concrete singular intuition, but once the ground has borne fruit in a
universal, it plays no continuing role in the universal's meaning.
This interpretation suffers from the same problem as empiricism. If consciousness starts
with an individual, then what it is looking at can only continue to be an individual. But
if, on the other hand, consciousness at some point does look at a universal which is
free of particularity, it is not clear why that consciousness must have started with an
individual.
(ii) The indispensable example: Piv~evic (1970) says that an individual triangle is "just
an 'example'" of the universal, but at the same time says that illustrations are "indispensible for our apprehending the universals which they exemplify." For "of course we must
have some experience of triangular objects" in order to apprehend the universal "Triangle"
LU II
69
(p. 60). Again, "the existential aspect recedes into the background" once formalized
(p. 62). In Gutting (1971), the use of examples does not just take place in the first step of
universalization; rather universal laws are to be verified in an ongoing way through the
act of defending them against alleged counter-examples, a process which Gutting calls
"variation" (p. 206).
The reading of instances as necessary ex am pies and as the necessity of considering counterexamples has problems parallel to those in (i). Pivcevic wants to, but cannot, account
for the cognition of those universals (e.g. the concept of Identity) which are so pure that
examples of them are always dispensible (p. 61). Nor would Husserl say that we must first
experience an example of a Species in order to apprehend the Species, which is clear both
from the Species of Centaur, and from Husserl's argument that only the presence of prefulfilled meaning-intentions makes it possible to interpret individuals at all (e.g., LU i, s.
21). If individuals are really indispensable for universal ideas, then they would have to
play more of a role than is captured by the theory of individuals as examples.
(iii) The imaginative or possible representation: According to Kersten (1974), when
Husserl says that genetic origins in individuals are not part of the meaning of universals,
what he means is that subjects need not experience real perceivable individuals in order to
"seize upon" ideal universals, but that they do require apprehensions of imaginary individuals
(p. 29). If Kersten has lancied images in mind, he is off track, but chances are that de
Boer's (1978) interpretation is at the root of Kersten's: apodicticity pertains to knowledge
not of actualities, but of possibilities (p. 247), and the extension of a concept includes all
the possible objects to which a law applies (p. 258). Husserl does hold, in the course of
arguing against representationalism, that "Individual ideas are therefore merely possible,
not actual, representatives for other similar individual ideas" (179).
The effect of this reading is to allow the function of the concrete ground to be replaced
by an imaginative grounding that can be carried out in the absence of all actual individuals. However, this de-basing of particular facts is not quite what Husserl has in mind
when he introduces universal laws. When Husserl says that a law grounds "the necessity
of [an individual's] being thus and so" (LU 1,231), the point is not that laws apply indiscriminately to the possibility of a world, but that laws contain the potential to hold for
different actualities in appropriately different ways.
(iv) The dropping 01 perspective: Mohanty's (1970) reading depends on the ability
of a result of cognition to take the form of something given. The ideal meaning of a
universal is the result which occurs after a subject begins with an individual object, and
by means of thought, removes all "perspectives". The product thus appears as an immediate,
self-evident datum of intellectual sense (p. 54). In empiricism, the dropping of perspective
produces a result that looks and/or acts as if universal; here the mediation is said to result
in a genuine immediacy (see also de Boer, 1970, p. 235).
The way in wh ich this reading treats the experiencing subject as the agent of formalization, makes it difficult to see how the object of a universal concept can be the Species
itself and not the subject's idea 01 a Species. What this reading in terms of a transformation of mediacy into immediacy needs is a prior phenomenology of individuality which would
account for how the apprehension of an individual can, without the intervention of a
prejudiced subject, produce its own realm of transcendent, intuitable universals.
(v) The move from epistemology to logic: Murphy (1980) and Welch (1965) argue that
questions about grounding are epistemological, whereas questions about meaning are logical.
Murphy's weaker version has it that Husserl's interest in the origin of concepts is a later
development, with LU being "content" to restrict itself to logic, and to "ignore" genetics
(p. 91). In Welch's stronger version, the distinction involves more than adecision about
the scope of enquiry. Rather, the nature of the enquiry itself demands that the genesis of
universals be "of no concern" to logic (p. 70) although it may be the subject of some other
enquiry (p. 72).
Such readings avoid the relation between the development of a concept and its meaning
by isolating types of enquiry. However, it is not clear how any simple distinction between
70
CHAPTER 2
logic and epistemology would work in Husserlian phenomenology. For if the study of
logic is already a study of the ways in which consciousness must apprehend universal objects,
then it is already a study of how consciousness engages in knowing universals. So if the
genesis of the knowledge of universals is of no concern to logic, it must be in part due to
something about the epistemology of uni versals, and not to aseparation of logic from
epistemology.
(vi) The "common aspect": According to de Boer (1978), a "common aspect in the
acts (of individual meanings) is the basis for (universal) ideation" (p. 257, also p. 239).
The otherwise incomprehensible transformation from individual to universal is explained
by reference to an intermediary, viz., the commonness of individuals, which is both individual and universal. (De Boer's account can be somewhat confusing. He begins by saying
that a "universal is not an aspect of things", i.e. not something that can be perceived by
looking at one or many individuals as individuals, and de Boer is c1early right about setting
out this position as one that Husserl wants to reject. But on the same page (256), when de
Boer is tt;'ing to say that individuals are alike or unlike with respect to universals, he ends
up by saying that universals have a "concrete realization" in individuals, in the sense
that "things are not purely individual but also have a universal aspect". Perhaps there is
an equivocation in the word "aspect", but a universal cannot be an aspect of individual things.
One can sympathize with de Boer's argument that a universal must be recognizable in
some sense even when it is instantiated in a concrete particular, but the middle ground of
commonness between universality and individuality is unc\ear.)
De Boer's textual justification for his reading of LU ii involves an appeal to LU v,
343: "To meanings in specie correspond acts of meaning, the former being nothing but ideally
apprehended aspects of the latter". However, this passage speaks of species grounded in
acts of meaning or in aspects of acts of meaning, but not to "common" aspects at all. Husserl
wants to say that the individual is the ground for the universal. Whatever problems this raises
are not to be avoided by means of interpretative intermediaries.
(vii) The theme: Gurwitsch (1966) argues that to find an identity through the variation
of individuals is to "thematize" that identity. Onee thematized, the constant meaning is
rendered independent of the finite group of original variations, and is opened up into an
infinite possibility of variations (p. 382). A similar line is taken by Mensch (1981), who
understands that an instance validates a species by exhibiting a kind, and that a kind in
turn, by its very nature, can have a plurality of instances (p. 70).
This reading follows (iv) in holding that a mediation can transform an apprehension of
an individual into a direct apprehension of a universal. But here, the mediation is as much
objective as subjective. And perhaps because the transformation is said to take place in
the intended things themselves, this reading, more than any of the first six, maintains a
preservation of the original genesis in the result. At LU ii, 69, Husserl uses an example drawn
from arithmetical accumulation to argue that "It is plain that an act of fulfilment not only
corresponded to this final result, but to each individual step leading from one expression
of this number to the expression next in order, which c\arified it and enriched its content".
Gurwitsch says that it is necessary for a thematic universal to retain some form of
"reference to" its instances (p. 382). This seems inocuous enough until it is taken seriously. In fact, it posits a qualification of the instance-independence of the very meaning
of universals.
(viii) The circle: Some interpreters, apparently without noticing, attribute to Husserl
the view that individuals and universals are mutually grounding. Thus Cairns (1973) says
on one page that consciousness of a Species is carried out "on the basis of a clear perceiving or phantasying of at least possible instances" (p. 231) and on the next that "it is
only on the basis of the original givenness and seizedness of the kind as weH as the individual that one can judge 'with original insight': this is an instance of colour ... " (p.
232). Similarly de Boer (1978) deals with Species grounded on individuals (p. 239 and p.
257), and then refers casually to universal laws as the "basis" and "ground" of knowledge
of particulars (p. 258), with no comment on the reversal of priority.
LU 11
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
71
72
CHAPTER 2
hends an "ens rationis" (something like Hume's "distinctio rationis" which Husserl rejects
in LU ii, ss. 36-37), an "abstraction", or a "common notion". The third (which cannot be
set in motion by the first) operates through "scientia intuitiva", and must, according to the
distinctions above, apprehend "realities" (Ethics 5 XXIX S): "This kind ofknowing advances
from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate
knowledge of the essences of things". The goal is not knowledge of that which a plurality
of real individuals have in common, but knowledge of the realities themselves sub species
aeternitatis.
Now, we know that "from the necessity of the divine nature infinite things in infinite
ways must follow" (Ethics I XVI). To know the "essences of things" by scientia intuitiva
is to understand how they follow from the etemal attributes of that which is as such (substance, God, or Nature), i.e. to understand the chain of causes that makes them what they
are, and to understand that chain in such a way that the appeal to causes reaches a terminus
in a cause which is self-caused. And since "the order and connection of ideas is the same
as the order and connection of things" (Ethics 2 VII), the knowing takes the form of following through in thought the necessary and essential origin of the things themselves.
When I talk of interpretations of Husserl's theory of evidence as a theory of scientia
intuitiva, I have in mind a theory of reason as the thinking through of the ultimate explanatory order whereby the determinacy of real individuals is understood to "follow from" the
inherent attributes of what it means to be. Some of the readings which I have grouped
under this heading involve less challenging notions of reason, in particular notions of generalization (towards an ens rationis) and analyticity.
CHAPTER 3
While LU ii describes the dynamic of synthetic interpretation that constitutes universals as ideal objects, Husserl's theory of parts and wholes in the
third Logical Investigation describes the dynamic that constitutes individual
objects. I will develop three of Husserl's descriptive categories which commentators rarely thematize, namely the categories of "passing over borders"
(bergehen), of "lifting off in relief" (abheben), and of the "demand for supplementation" (Ergnzungsbedrjtigkeit). Parts pass over into, and lift off from,
one another, so that when we see an object partially, those parts demand that
we see more; when we know it partially, those parts demand that we interpret it further; and when our interpretations are only partially unified, those
parts demand a closed unity of consciousness. On this reading, the ideal closure
of the whole operates within systems of openness: each part opens up the
demands for larger contexts, while each whole opens up the demand for internal
articulation. How, then, does each part of an object demand its own supplementation? What is the ground of the dynamic of passing over from part to
part? How is a thing more than it is?
The best known commentary on this material is Sokolowski's (1967-68)
essay on "The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl's lnvestigations".
According to Sokolowski, the theory of parts and wholes concerns the constitution of objectivity within subjectivity. It describes the ways in which
parts are "blended" according to "rules" in such a way as to "structure given
regions of reality" (p. 537). Since the blending of parts is law-governed, it may
be understood scientifically, and hence objectively. All of this is true enough.
But Sokolowski gives the impression, which Husserl himself sometimes gives,
that rules are static, that parts are given, that scientific knowledge is immediate, that wholes are stable, and that blending is easy. When Sokolowski
does give a sense of the dynamic of parts and wholes, saying that "each part
... contains within itself a rule dictating the necessary progression of supplementations", he does not consider the way that all of these terms are
problematical. What is the status of the implicit "containment" of rules in
parts? What does "dictation" or "prescription" amount to, and what kind of
potentiality for self-development is being ascribed to parts and/or to the consciousness of parts? What is the force of "progression"? How does each part
fix the directions whereby it passes over into the next part? And what is the
character of the "supplement", of the movement towards completion, and of
the fact that each part has its own self-subsistence deferred until the whole
to which it belongs is completed? What are wholes and parts after all if they
are both defined by progressions of supplementation? In general, I will argue
73
74
CHAPTER 3
that part-whole relations are problematical just at the points where interpretations demand that their limits be exceeded, which are also the points at which
acts of conciousness point beyond themselves towards a unified interpretation of a world of objects. Furthermore, I will argue that the progression
towards supplementations is equally a progression towards apriori categories that must have been prior. It is precisely because interpretative
consciousness needs the supplements that it can only find by referring backwards, that part-whole relations are objectified within consciousness on the
one hand, and that subjectivity itself is constituted on the other.
This chapter has four sections. First, I will show how even simple, independent parts have to be actively constituted as such: namely through
"negation" and through "shrivelling up". Second, I will discuss Husserl's
categories of "passing over borders" and "lifting off in relief", and I will
treat Husserl's accounts (frequently unnoticed in the secondary literature) of
independent but non-separable parts and separable but non-independent parts.
Third, I will discuss Husserl's argument that the concept of "whole" can be
replaced by the concept of founded relations among parts. On my reading,
the whole is for that reason an open-ended system driving itself towards
completion, on account of the parts' "needs for supplementation". Fourth, I
will treat skeptical problems with respect to whether parts and wholes are arbitrarily designated, given that parts and wholes are ultimately only targets of
uncompleted interpretative activities. I will show that Husserl's argument is
based on the very open-endedness of interpretative activity. Parts are objectified precisely when they are passed over, and wholes are objectified even
as interpretation reaches towards and away from their boundaries.
1.
An object can have two sorts of parts. It can have "pieces" (Stck), or
"members", (Glied) (e.g. as a table has legs), into which it can be "de-pieced"
(Zerstckung) or "dismembered", (Zergliederung) when those parts are "laid
out alongside one another" (auseinanderliegen) (227). Altematively, an object
can have "interpenetrating" parts (Durchdringung, or "moments") (e.g. the
redness and the shape of a table), which cannot be cut apart from one another,
but which can be "disjoined" in thought (disjunkte) (227, 267). An object is
"complex" if it has parts that can in any sense be set off from one another,
and "simple" otherwise (246). A whole is something in which a multiplicity
of objects are "placed together" (zusammengesetzt) according to some combinatory law (miteinander verknpfen) (227). In certain passages, Husserl
defines wholes as the build-up of parts, but in others, he defines parts as
divisions introduced into a whole. What has to be explained first is how an
object is de-pieced into its simple or independent parts. What makes an indi-
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In one sense, no content can be "ripped out" from the "unity of consciousness". Even a piece of an object, like the head of a horse, is always presented
in some context or other, and its separability can only consist in its being "lifted
off" (abheben) from a "background" of contexts that appear "with" it (235).
For an object to be independent, then, its "references to other objects"
must be actively "negated" (zunichte werden, 238). But since it is impossible to imagine an object without any background relations, the only way
to negate all backgrounds is to test whether all the relations between that object
and others can undergo "infinitely free variation" (235). Variation is free if
it can be carried out by "arbitrary will" (236), or "without a rule" (236).
If an object is independent if it can be varied without a rule, then its contextfree status is something that has to be achieved. Its unrelatedness to other
objects is just as much an open relatedness to all other objects in all directions. But how is an unlimited freedom of variation exhibited? It is not enough
to find that some of an object's relations may be violated without altering
the object itself; somehow the object will have to be interpreted as an independent unit all of whose determinate relations to other objects can be negated.
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(a) a perceivable thing whose non-independent parts are not normally distinguished, (b) a sensible field whose parts are independent but not separated,
and (c) a perceivable thing whose parts are separable but not independent.
(A) A Perceivable Thing Whose Non-Independent Parts
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Husserl attributes his descriptions of the sensible field's "sharp" and "dull"
(stumpfen) "points and corners" (245) to Stumpf, but he says that Stumpf 's
dullness must be sharpened by widening the category of discontinuity into
one of cognitive distance in general, so that it will apply not only to senseobjects but to all objects.
The relevant paragraph reads as follows:
The concretum of sensible intuition owes its separation (Abtrennung) to the distance between
its bordering moments, but the setting in relief of the whole concretum occurs earlier than [the
setting in relief] of the moments of its content that are distanced from one another. This depends
on the peculiarly intimate blending of the different moments of the concretum, namely their
reciprocal 'presentation', which reveals itself in the reciprocal dependence of alteration and
negation. This blending is not a blurring into one another in the manner of the continuous or
in some other manner that sublates al1 severing (Sonderung); but it is al1 the same a sort of
peculiarly intimate belonging-together, which necessarily and at one stroke brings the totalcomplex of the mutual1y interpenetrating moments into relief, as soon as only one moment creates,
through discontinuity, the pre-conditions for it (247-48).
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An object has boundaries if each of its parts passes over into, and sets in relief,
the other parts of that object, but not the parts of other objects. Each part
exhibits a "demand/need to be supplemented/completed" by a certain limited
range of other parts (usually ErgnzungsbedrJtigkeit; Ergnzungserjorderung
at 278). A non-independent object "demands the supplementation" of other
objects both in order to "exist" and in order to be "what it is" (249); it can
"subsist only in combinations" (251) which are "prescribed" by "laws" and
"patterns" (249). The production of a non-independent object must also be
the production of its context.
A whole is what results when a part's demands for supplementation are met.
To justify talk of wholes, we have to explain how the flow of supplementation can in principle be closed off. In s. 14, Husserl articulates the requirement
of closure by redefining wholes through the concept of "foundation", wh ich
he says is equivalent to the concepts of the "demand for supplementation",
"necessary combination", and "non-independence" (261). If A requires B as
a supplement, then A is founded on B, and must be combined with B. A
whole is what results when a founded object's demand for supplementation
is "satisfied" or "stopped" or "silenced" (gestillt, 261) by its "founding" object.
When an object demands supplementation, it sets in motion aseries of syntheses, and in the temporal "flow of consciousness", these demands make so
much cognitive noise that consciousness cannot rest until it has thought through
the relations that that object has with others. Of course, a stream of consciousness never stops making "continuous demands on future consciousness"
(261). But even though these demands for supplementation are never fully
satisfied, the flow of consciousness keeps going on just because provisional
satisfactions are continually being reached and overreached.
I am going to use Husserl's descriptions of those wholes whose parts are
"stretched out" (Streckenaddition, 274), in order to show how non-independent parts determine, and expand into, their own contexts.
Husserl uses two distinctions to characterize relations of foundedness. First,
foundation may be either "reciprocal" or "reversible" (as in the mutual dependence of colour and shape) or else "one-sided" (as in the foundation of
judgments on perceptions) (265).
Second, foundation may be either "immediate" or "mediate" (265). A combination of two parts is "mediate" or "indirect" if the two parts must first be
combined with intermediate parts in order to be combined with one another
(265). Two mediately combined points on a line, for example, are connected
only by intermediaries, and so are "distanced" (275, 268). Unlike immediately combined parts, they share no common boundaries. Yet a combination
is no less necessary for being indirect. On the contrary, the necessity to
pass over from part to part is carried over step by step along a chain of
mediations.
The dominating logical feature of Husserl 's laws of wholes and parts is
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that of transitivity: If A is combined with B and B with C, then A is mediately combined with C (273, see also Proposition 3, 262). In the production
of a straight line, for example, there is a continuous adding of "next" points.
Each point becomes apart of the whole line by being indirect1y in contact with
the earlier line-segments, and by extending in the same direction, and hence
by following the same rule of combination that was at work within those earlier
segments. The same transitivity is exhibited in temporal streams, spatial configurations, qualitative continua, causal chains, historical progressions, in
horizons, environments, and all sorts of contexts, in the syntheses of epistemic fulfilment, which may stretch into many directions at once, and in general
in all unities of "enchainment" produced "through directed stretches" (274).
Each part must have a next part, a "neighbour" (274). Ordering the neighbour-hood in a determinate way counts as "fixing the 'direction of progress' "
(275). As each part comes into being, its outer limit determines the direction
for the "next" part, and once that direction is fixed, the whole complex of parts
extends out beyond its actual limits towards its supplements. And in the
orderings of numbers, times, spaces, causes, and interpretations, as soon as the
direction is fixed for the next moment, i.e. as so on as it is determined how
the chain can be added to, then the next moment has already been passed
over into: the next number has been named, the time has passed, a new pI ace
is mapped, a sufficient reason has actualized an effect, and a reasoned direction of interpretation has been pushed to its logical conclusion.
An individual object, constituted through the mediated distances among
its parts, fixes its own contexts by opening up the contextual space for its
neighbours to occupy. We have seen that a combination of parts constitutes
itself as an individual complex by setting itself off as a whole against
its surroundings. But it is also the case that the individual fixes its limits by
incorporating parts of its surroundings into its own self (by moving or
expanding).
But now if individuals are defined by the ways they take on new parts
and pass over the limits between themselves and their surroundings, then
how is it that the boundaries which we use to individuate objects are not
arbitrary? And if the boundaries between a whole and its environment might
be arbitrary, then how is it that the boundaries that individuate parts within
the whole are not also arbitrary?
4. THE OBJECTIVE V ALIDITY OF THE THEOR Y OF PARTS AND
WHOLES; PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE NON-ARBITRARINESS
OF DIVISION AND COMPOSITION; THAT THE IMMEDIACY
AT THE CENTRE OF THINGS IS NEVER GRASPED
When an object is divided into parts, what is the ground for the ordering of
that division, and what guarantee is there that the parts constructed in the
activity of dividing genuinely belong to the object itself?
The problem for the objective reality of wholes and parts arises because
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designed to provide a phenomenological account of the processes responsible for the synthetic unity of consciousness in general. This approach has
been criticized by Seebohm (1973).1 Seebohm denies that Husserl is interested in the totalization of consciousness, and argues that Husserl avoids having
to compete with Hegelian phenomenology's "philosophy of concrete totality"
(p. 20). If Seebohm is right to say that Husserl is interested only in "relative"
and never in "absolute" wholes (p. 23), it would follow that Husserl would
also avoid the deconstructive issue of the indefinite deferral of totalized
consciousness.
Seebohm 's central argument is that wholes for Husserl are objects of consciousness only in the sense that consciousness can refer to complex objects
founded on simple presentations (p. 24). As such, a "concrete whole" is a
sensible object individuated relative to a context (p. 23). One can perceive
complex objects, and one can abstract from complex objects to formal categories of wholes and parts (p. 24), but one cannot presuppose that either the
world or consciousness makes up an absolute whole over and above the relative
wholes that are individuated in concrete experience (pp. 21, 30). I do not argue
with the claims that for Husserl, no given whole is necessary, and that wholes
are given relative to determinate interpretative activities. However, I will argue
that there is a sense in which totality is presupposed notwithstanding. It
is precisely the relativity of wholes in contexts, and the open-endedness
of interpretation that that entails, that entitles the phenomenologist to speak
of intentional unities that are as yet unachieved, and in the limiting case,
of a concrete totality towards which all interpretations pass over into one
another.
(B) The Objectivity of Parts
In some cases, the principles ordering the division of an object into parts is
"evident", as for example when an object is divided into smaller and smaller
portions, or into levels of specific difference: a melody, for example, has
tones for parts, and each tone has volume as one of its parts, so volume is
an immediate part of the tone and a mediate part of the melody (271). But a
problem of ordered division emerges for "added stretches" , where it does
not matter which divisions are undertaken first. A ten-inch line may, on one
plan of division, first be divided into five-inch segments and then each segment
into five; or it may be directly divided into one-inch segments. On one ordering
the one-inch parts are mediate parts of the whole, and on the other they are
immediate. The limit at which the division into parts is silenced seems arbitrary; the order of division seems arbitrary; the boundaries between subordinate
complexes within the whole seem arbitrary; the isolation of "simples" seems
arbitrary; ultimately the self-subsistence of an "independent" part seems arbitrary; and in the end, onee again the autonomy of an ordered whole seems
arbitrary.
Husserl has two ways of responding. First, certain kinds of wholes do allow
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arbitrary orderings of division (270). The very fact that the ordering of division
is undetermined itself determines the nature of the divisibility of linear objects.
But at a deeper level, Husserl wants to ground the distinction between mediacy
and immediacy in principle, and not in "some psychologically compulsive
preference for a certain order of division" (271). Even in the case of addedstretches, where the order of division is arbitrary, Husserl insists that "the
physical whole genuinely has the parts first inspected; and these again no
less genuinely have the parts distinguished in them, which are therefore mediate
parts in relation to the whole; and so on for every step of the ongoing making
of parts" (270).
Husserl provides what he calls a "phenomenological" justification for the
principle of ordered mediation: "The particularizing grasp (or 'severing grasp',
Sondererfassung) of the mediate part presupposes the particularizing lifting off
in relief (Sonderabhebung) of the immediate part" (271). What does Husserl
mean when he says that the mediate presupposes the immediate? He means
that no matter what sort of mediate distance there is between any two parts,
the mere fact of their co-existence prescribes aspace in between the two, in
which other parts may be found. It is not that the immediate must be grasped
before the mediate is grasped, but that the mediate must be grasped as needing
the supplementation of the immediate. In the case of the stretched line, each
partial segment presupposes that there is intermediate ground to be covered
between the end of the segment and the end of the whole. The immediate is
able to play the role of setting directions and distances without necessarily
being grasped as an explicit object of consciousness. In short: it is the mediate
that is "grasped" (Sondererfassung) - the immediate is not grasped, but rather
"set in relief" (Sonderabhebung). It is in this sense that part-whole relations
belong not just to the phenomenology of grasping, but to the logic of objects.
Consciousness can supplement its graspings of mediate parts only by presupposing and objectifying prior immediacies which it never knew it had
been working with and which it may never actually grasp.
The notion of setting in relief is thus meant to solve the problem of the
ordering of parts, but in a surprising way. Earlier, the image of "passing
over" suggested that parts activate aseries of directed supplementations
which expand outwards from a single starting-point and fill out a mediated
space; so that the outer limits of that space fix the whole. Here, the description suggests parts that sUITound, and contract into, an indeterminate centre;
so that the filling-in of the centre fixes the whole. Instead of mediated objects
being built up out of immediate distances, the object from the start covers a
mediated distance. The grounding of ordered division and of real parts is
conducted from the outside in. If there are indivisible parts built into complex
objects, they are set in relief only as that from which the whole complex has
always already passed over. The indivisible point need never be grasped as
long as it is targetted as a required supplement by the backward reference of
something already passed-over. Particularizing setting-in-relief thus prescribes
ordered division in two ways. First, since the model of locating implicit parts
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certain structures which logic in turn analyses as a region prior to a11 experience. But fina11y, if the dynamic of parts and wholes renders individual
objects independent of sense-experience and categories independent of individuals, the same dynamic continues to refer back to the conscious subject
for whom parts and wholes first appear. For we have seen that all part-whole
objectification presupposes that systems of intermediate parts have already
been passed over and have already been interpreted, even if they have never
in fact appeared in the stream of consciousness. Experience refers back to
its own pure possibilities, to its own a priority. But whereas the return to
laws objectifies laws in logical investigation, the return to consciousness has
the sense of areturn to a part that is always immediately present but need never
be grasped. Consciousness, like the centre of an object whose parts are never
entirely filled in except as an ideal of completed supplementation - or like
anything that is pre-supposed (voraus-setzen), i.e. which has the status of
having been present "before" just because it is afterwards posited as having
been there a11 along - is the apriori centre of objective parts and wholes
just because it is the sort of centre that is always absent.
The dynamic of parts and wholes thus has many results: a priority just as
much as empirical determinacy, subjectivity as much as objectivity, continuity as weIl as discontinuity, individuation and contextualization, presence
and absence - a11 in the drive towards interpretative synthesis, a drive prope11ed by open-ended parts that continua11y fix boundaries even as they exceed
them.
NOTE
1.
Commentary along similar Iines to an earlier version of this chapter was offered by Angela
Schneider O'Connell.
CHAPTER 4
INTRODUCTION
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This chapter is divided into four sections, roughly following the fourth
Investigation, and injecting passages from the sixth. The first section (drawn
primarily from LU ii 295-307) introduces the problem of incomplete meanings
and the problem of the meaning of syncategorematic terms in isolation. The
second section (LU ii 308-16) discusses Husserl's treatment of a wider range
of "unclosed" meanings. The third section (LU ii 317-25) discusses Husserl's
account of syncategorematic terms as the regulators of possible exchanges
and combinations of meanings. I will argue here that combinatory laws are
given in advance of actual combinations in the form of the openness of interpretation. The fourth section (LU ii 326-40) treats Husserl's notion of the
ars combinatoria as the unfolding of the "Idea of meaning" into laws of synthesis and as the "pure construction" of synthetic combinations.
1.
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refers to simple objects, while the simple expressions "man" and "one" refer
to complex objects (296-97).
However, there are problem cases for Husserl's distinction between complex
and simple meaning, and the problem leads into the issue of syncategorematic terms. Husserl has not at this point defined "simple meaning" other
than as the limiting unit in the division of complex meanings into part-expressions. But the idea is that a meaning would be simple if it presented an object
"directly" rather than obliquely through descriptions, perspectival accounts,
or connotations. On this account, proper names should have simple meaning
par excellence. But the simplicity of the meaning of a proper name is already
problematic. For the meaning of a name seems to contain implicitly a complex
set of meanings, and to conceal a plurality of connotations, presupposed
predications, definite descriptions, etc. Furthermore, this implicit complexity
is always available to the name user: it is always the case that "forthcoming
explication and conceptual interpretation can be determinately drawn out
from [the name]" (298). Indeed the possibility of drawing out implicit descriptive meanings is an essential condition for the name-user's ability to know
which object it names. The name's meaning depends on there being "possibilities of more nearly determining" (298) that meaning. And these possibilities
are correlated with the "essential possibilities of fulfilling" its meaning (299),
that is, with knowing when the named object is actually present. The meaning
of a proper name, then, far from having paradigmatically simple meaning,
begins to look like a paradigm whole-complex, a unity always divisible into
parts which are sometimes "indefinite", "one-sided", or "incomplete", but
are at the same time always prescribed by determinate directions of division
(299,312). Why should Husserl insist that a name whose meaning can always
be explicated further, nevertheless has a simple meaning? He argues that
when a name is explicated, the resulting meaning is a "new" one, and not
one that had already been "set in relief" (Abhebung ) as a "real" (reel) part
of the name. But why should he insist that the meaning-content of the name
is simple?
Husserl's solution has two sides. First, a meaning can be called simple as
long as the possibilities of further explication remain only possibilities, and
do not in fact add part-expressions to the naming expression. Second (though
this has to be coaxed out of the text), a meaning is simple just because it is
that from which possibilities may be drawn out, and because it is that under
which a full range of descriptive explications may be re-unified. The name
is simple in the sense that it has its own meaning (and can make the explicated meanings its own), even while it is complex in the sense that it
"necessarily presupposes a wider intentional background of content" (299).
Background meanings are necessary for the meaning of the name, but are
extern al to the simplicity of that meaning.
If we now look at the form in which the "intentional background of content"
itself is expressed, we discover the motivation for introducing the problematic of syncategorematic terms. A name directly refers to an object in a
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"one-rayed" manner, and takes the simple form "S"; in contrast, a descriptive or attributive phrase refers to an object in a "multi-rayed" manner, and
takes the complex form "S is a", or "The S which is a (and band c ... )",
etc. (300-301). The multiplicity of explicated meanings, when drawn out from
the name, requires a complex expression which exhibits that multi-rayed
compIexity by me ans of part-expressions like "which is" and "and". If a syncategorematic, non-naming phrase like "which is" marks the difference between
the simple and the explicated meaning, then we can say that syncategorematica
revive the possible but concealed meanings that the simplicity of names
excluded.
Syncategorematica become an explicit issue in section 4, where Husserl asks
whether every word in a "word-complex" has a meaning. Husserl sides against
Bolzano's view that every word has some "designation", and holds the common
view that syncategorematic or "synsemantic" terms have "no meaning by themselves but acquire it in conjunction with other meanings" (302). With respect
to having meaning, syncategorematica are "incompIete" or "without full
standing" (unvollstndige), and categorematica are "complete", "full" (312) or
"closed". For Husserl, the issue behind the distinction between categorematic
and syncategorematic terms is that of the distinction between complete and
incomplete expressions, rather than the distinction between names and nonnames. Hence whereas others include in the class of categorematic expressions
only names, Husserl includes all self-enclosed expressions, including verbs,
adjectives, entire descriptive sentences, etc. (303).
A word is syncategorematic, then, if it fails on its own to express any
compIete meaning. Yet such a word is not without meaning; it is not merely
something akin to a punctuation mark. One can find four arguments from
the text to this effect. First, a word like "and" means the "same" thing whenever
it is used (168). Second, we can meaningfully ask whether two uses of a
word like "because" have the same sense (306). Third, whiIe naturallanguages
differ in all sorts of ways, every language must have some way of capturing
"the" form of conjunction, etc. (338-9). Fourth, and most important, syncategorematic terms arise in language out of its "need" to express "a plurality of
mutually belonging part-presentations and dependent presentational forms,
within an independent, closed, presentational unity" (304). Syncategorematic
terms convey the directions according to which non-independent objects need
the supplementation of, and pass over into, one another. In this way, they
"mirror" (305) relations of objective dependency. Consequently, when Husserl
asks whether syncategorematic terms have meaning, he is also asking how
language represents a non-independent object's incompleteness, its need for
supplementation, the complexity concealed in its individuality, the nonpresence of its implicit parts, the non-closure of its progress towards further
determination, and in general the synthetic combination of its internal and
external differentiations.
Thus, syncategorematic terms have meaning, and can be "understood even
standing in isolation" (306), just because they "play the same meaning-
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function" whenever they appear (307). And when they do appear in context,
they "are interpreted as carriers of detenninate moments of meaning-content,
moments which look forward to a certain supplementation which, though it
may be indetenninate materially, is fonnally detennined together with the given
content, and is lawfully circumscribed thereby" (306). Two questions are made
emphatic by these passages. First, what is the relation between the meaning
and the function of syncategorematic terms? Second, in what sense do syncategorematic tenns require the supplementation of categorematic tenns in a
complex expression, and in what sense do they satisfy the needs that categorematic language has to mirror ontological relations of dependency?
When a syncategorematic expression like the connective "and" or like the
possessive" 's" occurs in a sentence, it follows a noun already given, and it
"looks forward" to the supplementation of a noun to follow. The choice of
the supplementary noun is "circumscribed" by the meaning of the noun (and
indeed of the whole descriptive context) already given. The syncategorematic
term thus requires the supplementation of the noun to follow; in order
to limit the possible completions to meaningful ones, it also requires the
supplementation of the noun already given.
Now, a group of letters, like "fi " , also "requires the supplementation"
(307) of other letters before and after it in order to make a complete word.
But Husserl argues that unlike the meaning-fragment '''s'', the word-fragment
"fi" does not express part of a thought but at best acts as a "possible stimulation to thought", and does not have in its various contexts "a common element
of meaning" (307). The word "and", in contrast, in addition to its "function"
of allowing one categorematic meaning to be conjoined with another, has some
sort of meaning that is its own.
Yet it seems that the only way we can talk about the meaning of a syncategorematic term is to talk about its function. In section 5, Husserl has
two ways of so talking, one negative and one positive.
In negative terms, the function of syncategorematica involves the way a
multiplicity of descriptive meanings (e.g. "The author of Bruno and the friend
of Hegei"), whose conjunction requires a syncategorematic term, may be
"fused" into a nominal term (i.e. "Schelling") which discharges the syncategorematic tenn (305). The syncategorematic tenn "and" seems on the one hand
to be a mere intermediary in the process of fusing together an interpretative
unity. But the price of the discharge of syncategorematic terms would be the
removal of the background of complexity necessarily presupposed by every
simple meaning. The introduction of "and" after a nominal expression on
the one hand interrupts the simple unity of the expression; on the other hand,
it sets in motion an expansion of the interpretation of the nominal tenn, an
expansion which begins the process of bringing a multiplicity together into
one unified context.
In positive terms, the function of syncategorematica involves the way
sentences employing them look forward to completion. The syncategorematic
tenn is without reference by itself but has a meaning of its own once in context,
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"house" expresses a complete meaning to the extent that a range of houserevealing intuitions can be circumscribed, even if no one of those intuitions
is necessary for some house or other being present, and even if no group of
intuitions will ever reveal the house completely. Similarly, the expression
"A bear is larger than a house" expresses a complete meaning if intuitions
exhibiting such astate of affairs can be circumscribed, even if the ambiguity
in the expression as to the type of house requires circumscribing several disjunctive ranges of possible fulfiHing intuitions. But the defective expressions
enumerated, and in particular purely syncategorematic expressions, do not
suggest any ranges of fulfiHing intuitions: we know how to intuitively fulfil
the meaning of the expression "a house and a tree", but not the expression
"and" (315, also section 42).
But two problems remain. First, there is the problem of fixing a meaning
for syncategorematic terms once it is supposed that all meanings are fixed
by ranges of possible meaning-fulfilments and that syncategorematic terms
have no proper meaning-fulfilments. Second, we have not yet shown why
complete sentences mirror complete meanings.
Husserl's solution to the problem of the meaning of syncategorematic
terms is that syncategorematic terms can have their meanings fulfilled by
intuitive experience, but only "indirectly" or in a "founded" way. Hence the
meaning of "and" is indirect1y fulfilled by those intuitions that direct1y fulfil
the meaning of expressions like "A and B" or "a house and a tree", that is,
expressions where the need for syntactic supplementation of the word "and"
is satisfied by determinate categorical completions. In general, the word
"and" has meaning out of contexts just because it indirectly retains the meaning
it had in contexts. So when an experiencing subject grasps the meaning of
"and" in isolation, it must either be the case that an "indirect, verbally unexpressed thought of a certain familiar conjunction" gives the expression meaning
for hirn, or else that "vague, unverbalized presentations of things help us to
form a thought of the type A and B" (316). In the first case, the meaning of
"and" is founded on a reference backward to already experienced conjunctions,
in the second case on a reference forward to possible constructions of combinations; in the first case, the founded experience conjoins familiar, likely
sensible, individual concreta, in the second, familiar symbolic abstractions.
In both cases, the isolated syncategorematic term gains its meaning when it
"has undergone a completion of meaning in some context or other, so that
the syncategorematic term itself is an incomplete expression of this momentarilly activated, completed meaning" (316). The understanding of "and" is
given only "with" or "in" the understanding of determinate experienced
collections (LU 11 11 160, 169). The copula works the same way: the intuitive fulfilment of the meaning of "is" is given only through a reflective turn
(LU 11 11 178) based on the intuitions that fulfil determinate copulative judgments (LU I 11 169). The fulfilment of universal, structural, synthetic, and
"forming" meanings occurs in the course of the intuitions of appropriately
"formed" material (LU 11 11 143). It is on the foundation of determinate intu-
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sequences of images. Yet since clues for its interpretation are given in the
dream, the interpretation of logically connected meanings is founded on those
images.
Now, Freud's project of interpreting the logical connectives in dreams
does not require a generalized treatment of logical connectives in waking
intuition, nor does it require a treatment of the meaning of syncategorematic
terms in isolation. But Freud's discussion does point to the untenability of a
psychologistic construal of Husserl's claim that the meaning of syncategorematic terms in isolation are founded on syntheses "inwardly carried out".
For the psychologist, the connective "or" gets its meaning from the immediate experience a subject has when he intuits two objects disjoined from
one another; for Freud, disjunction cannot be represented at the level of
intuition, so the interpretation of intuitions as presenting disjunctions must
appeal to a level of thought that precedes intuition. Now, Husserl too says
that the meaning of syncategorematic terms in isolation is founded on inwardlycarried-out syntheses of concrete intuitions. But I will argue that what Husserl
means by this is that every intuitive situation makes possible the synthetic connections represented by syncategorematic terms. Husserl does not mean that
syncategorematic terms name or picture anything that is present in intuition.
The word "and" has meaning not because the meaning-user remembers or
artificially creates a conjunction on which to pin the isolated word "and",
but because there are always situations whose interpretation requires conceiving the situated things in their combination and separation, their relative
dependence and mutual exclusion, etc. No one feature of a sensible intuition
fulfils the meaning of a syncategorematic term. But in the permanent pos sibilities of combining intuitions, those meanings are indirectly given intuitive
fulfilment.
Finally, the founded meaning of syncategorematic terms explains why
Husserl holds that sentences express paradigmatically complete meanings. A
sentence may not be closed with respect to its interpretation or even with
respect to the circumscription of the range of intuitions that fulfil its meaning.
But it does exhibit, through the satisfaction of the needs for supplementation
inherent in its supplementary terms, the completion of some synthetic connection. And in addition to representing some synthetic completion, a full
sentence exhibits a readiness to be joined, by means of a connecting term,
to another meaning which is complete in the same sense. Of course, incomplete meanings can be combined by syncategorematic terms (e.g. "Iarger or
smaller than a house") just as weIl as complete meanings can be (e.g. "x is
larger than a house or y is larger than a house"). For that matter, a complete
sentence may not express a single unified meaning, as when "and" conjoins
mutually irrelevant sentences. But the general point is that a syntactically
complete sentence opens the unfolding of aseries of meaning-combinations,
expresses by means of words like "is ..." and "and ..." a certain amount
of the various meanings' needs for mutual supplementation, and closes off
at least the formal demands of those needs for supplementation. A sentence
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In sections 10 and 11, Husserl begins to turn the discussion of non-independent meanings towards the notion of an ars combinatoria that would proscribe
senseless combinations of meanings. In the present section, I will discuss
the relevance for a theory of synthesis of two features of the ars combinatoria which arise in connection with syncategorematic meanings: the first
concerns the "exchange" of categorematic material prescribed by laws of
combination; the second concerns restrictions on the semantic contexts in
which syncategorematic meanings may be exchanged with categorematic
meanings.
All meanings, whether independent or non-independent, "stand under a
priori laws which rule their combination into new meanings" (317).
"Combinatory forms" set limits to the type and quantity of combinations which
any given meaning may undergo. The laws of combination must therefore
on the one hand be essential, generic, or categorial rather than "arbitrary" (318),
or ad hoc, and must on the other hand "unfold" in ways that are not indifferent to the meanings to be combined. Such laws are apriori in that their
necessity is given "before" (318) combinations can produce meaningful results.
Their results count as singular (318) meaning-complexes, not merely "heaps
of meaning".
The expression "This tree is green" thus combines "tree" and "green" under
the combinatory form "This S is P" (319). Any number of terms may likewise
be combined with "green" under the same form, as long as the term substituting for S has the appropriate "nominal material" (319). As long as the
same kind of material is "freely exchanged" (Vertauschung, 319) for "tree"
(e.g. "paint", or even "moon"), the resulting combination will have a "unified
meaning", even though it may be "false, dumb, or laughable" (319). A form
for combining meanings is thus a form all of whose correct substitutioninstances count as unified meanings. The ars combinatoria is an art of
"exchange" (319), "replacement" (320), or "substitution" (320).
I will show first how syncategorematic meanings carry in expressions the
force of those rules for the combination of meanings, and second how Husserl
prevents the art of exchange from degenerating into a structuralist theory of
meaning.
A syncategorematic term like "and" functions properly as long as a categorematic term is placed on either side of it. "This S is P" is a form of
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terms of the qualitative predicates that belong together with them, and so on
for exchanges under other combinatory forms. Bence mIes of exchange cannot
be construed as entirely structural, or as indifferent to the thought-content of
the exchangeable meanings, since these mIes are grounded in the demands
of the exchangeable meaning-contents to be thought through in combination
with supplementary meanings in order for intentional objects to be made
present to consciousness. The proper use of a combinatory form closes off a
sequence of word-meanings into an independent sentence-meaning by thinking
a meaning through its synthetic context.
Syncategorematic terms thus exhibit laws of combination and exchange that
are grounded in meanings themselves. Psychologistic, psychoanalytic, and
structuralist theories of syncategorematic terms mistakenly locate the ground
of the meaning of syncategorematic terms in subjective activity, preconscious thoughts, or mechanical mIes, respectively. In adding levels of interpretative processing to meanings themselves in order to account for the
combination of meanings, they assume that meanings in themselves do not
pass over into one another. Busserl 's ars combinatoria, in contrast, accounts
for syncategorematic meanings solely by unpacking the combinatory force
of the categorematic meanings themselves.
But now when we say that syncategorematic terms carry the load of conveying in expressions the mIes for the combination of categorematic meanings,
we find once again the problem of the meaning of the syncategorematic terms
themselves. For the word "and" does not name the mle of collection or conjunction; a syncategorematic meaning is not just a categorematic meaning with
a peculiar sort of referent. And this leads to a second feature of the ars combinatoria, namely that a syncategorematic term cannot be exchanged for a
categorematic term to produce an expression like "This tree is and" (320, 326).
There are of course other terms besides syncategorematic terms wh ich
also do not have nominal content and thus also could not replace "s" in
"This S is P". But adjectival terms (e.g. "green"), verbal terms ("walks"),
etc., may undergo "transformation" or "modification" (321, 324) and take
on a nominal sense ("greenness", "the act of walking") which allows them
to become proper subjects of predication. "And" cannot be transformed into
"the and" or "andness".
Now, Busserl does allow one way in which syncategorematic terms can
be nominalized, namely in expressions like " 'And' is a syncategorematic
word". But used as a name, the word "and" does not name a universal or
categorial object, as does the nominalized term "greenness", but rather "names
itself" (322). The word '''and' " can be used as a noun, but the word "and"
cannot be. Busserl goes so far as to say that there must accordingly be two
senses of predication: properties (e.g. "non-independent") predicated of
nominalized syncategorematic terms "modify" (modifizieren) those terms qua
expressions or acts of consciousness, whereas properties (e.g. "green") predicated of all other names "determine" (determinieren) the named objects (323).
So while Busserl does not follow the medieval nominalists in identifying
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universals with capacities in the intellect, he does come c10se to giving syncategorematic meanings that status. Husserl appropriates Kant's dictum that
"Being is no real predicate" (LU 11 11 137, also 204-5): for when "is" undergoes nominalizing transformation to "being", it names a mode of expression,
but names nothing in any real state of affairs.
In sum, the price of nominalizing the syncategorematic term "and" is that
the new term" 'and' " names the syncategorematic term and does not in a direct
way name the connective relation which the syncategorematic term "and" in
an indirect way expresses in "A and B". For all that has been said about how
the meaning of "and" is founded on actually experienced collections, or at least
on the ideal possibility of collectibility inherent in the actual experience of any
object, it turns out nevertheless that the possibility of collection is not named
by the nominalization of the term that expresses the actuality of particular
collections. It seems one more time that that which "and" expresses may be
functionally activated, but may not be represented. What is the significance
of the fact that "andness" is not the name for anything, and is not equivalent
to nouns such as "collection" or "conjunction"?
One could read Husserl's restriction against nominalizing syncategorematic meanings simply as the claim that "and" has a second-order rather
than a first-order meaning, that is, that "and" refers not to something real
but to a way of referring to something real (namely the way of referring to
it in conjunction with something else). But the point is stronger. For one feature
of the nominalization of syncategorematic terms is that once nominalized as
categorematic terms they are themselves explicated in sentences that include
syncategorematic terms. In the proposition "The word 'and' sometimes
expresses the collection of items and sometimes the conjunction of propositions", or the proposition" 'is' is a term whose meaning is supplementary",
the functions of the syncategorematic terms qua syncategorematic are still
regulating the possibility of unpacking and interpreting the meanings of the
terms "'and' " and "'is' " which have been "modified" to categorematic form.
One cannot discharge all the syncategorematic meaning present in a complex
expression in the same way that we can replace all demonstrative terms in
an expression with objective descriptions (LU i). Or in other words, complex
expressions can never be built up entirely of categorematic expressions; it must
always be the case that some of the meaning of a complex expression only
be given "with" (syn-) the categorematic meaning. In short, a sentence can
name combinatory laws, but whatever it names, it is already activating, presupposing, or unfolding according to such laws. This is the reason why the
theory of syncategorematic meanings is not just a theory of second-order
meanings: the interesting feature of syncategorematic terms is not that one
can formalize the laws of combination which they in some way embody, but
that their connective force is always already at work in the possibility of all
expression.
While words like "collection" and "disjunction" do name "synthetic objectforms" (LU 11 11 159) like the "and-form" (LU 11 11 192) or the "or-form",
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the words "and" and "or" do not name forms; rather, their function is to
open up possibilities of further determination in the words preceding
them. A name, like "collection", could not perform this latter function.
Syncategorematic terms are therefore not understood any better either when
they are themselves nominalized or when other terms are introduced to name
the rules which syncategorematica activate. They are understood only when
the sense of their syncategorematicity is understood.
The syncategorematic term has a kind of meaning even when tom out of
the contexts in which it connects categorematic terms, then, in a rather surprising way. It gets its meaning not by a reflection that abstracts from
combinations already experienced, but because demands for combination are
given in advance of any particular complex experience. The word "and" is
guaranteed in advance always to have the same meaning no matter what
nominal meanings replace "A" and "B" in the combinatory form "A and B",
just because every nameable object refers back to the possibility of such
combination apriori. Syncategorematic terms have objective, and not just
psychological, meaning just because they activate pre-determined demands for
thinking objects through. The syntheses that regulate combination and interpretation operate, in Begel's words, behind the back of consciousness - not
in Freud's sense of operating at a concealed level of consciousness, but in
the sense that consciousness is always already engaged in living through
combinatory activity.
4.
In sections 12-14, Busserl returns to the issue with which the Investigation
began, namely of the ars combinatoria as a science for "avoiding" "nonsense"
and "countersense" (Unsinn and Widersinn) (333). The final section of this
chapter treats three points in the relation between the ars combinatoria, the
meaning of syncategorematic terms, and the concept of synthesis. First, it introduces two ways in which Busserl explicitly talks of "synthesis" in the fourth
Investigation. Second, it asks whether and how the particular rules that Busserl
suggests for an ars combinatoria contribute to a phenomenological account
of synthesis in general. Busserl says that particular Iaws for an ars combinatoria follow from the very "Idea of meaning" and that particular
combinations in turn follow from these laws by "pure construction". With
the help of this latter notion, I will turn to seetion 57 of the sixth Investigation,
concerning the relation between founded syncategorematic meaning and synthetic interpretation.
Busserl says that the "universal grammar conceived by seventeenth and
eighteenth century rationalists" was correct in principle, but unanalysed in
foundation. Busserl envisages a science of the laws for the combination of
meanings which, by preventing the construction of meaningless compounds,
will be a fortiori a science of the essential "structures" of meaning (328).
But whereas traditional theories of judgment cite such patterns of grammar
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without an understanding of the "primitive forms of meaning" and the "primitive forms of complication and modification", the task of a logical theory of
meanings is to fix the forms of independent and non-independent meanings
in principle (329-30). Indeed, Husserl supposes that the science of laws of
combination has a "systematic dependence" on a "small number of primitive
forms" of combination which are in turn subject to a "fixed typic" of "categorial structures" (333). The Leibnizian model for an ars combinatoria requires
as a principle of intelligibility that its basic terms and self-evident axioms
be small in number. But for Husserl, what is most important is that the patterns
of judgment-forms be "built apriori into the general Idea (generellen Idee)
of meaning" (333). The regularity of the use of syncategorematic terms is
only of relevance to logic in so far as it mirrors the way in which meanings
belong together qua meanings.
Husserl uses the term "synthesis" in two ways in the course of this account
of the ars combinatoria. First, he describes a senseless expression like "And
is green" as one where "we have only an indirect presentation, aiming at the
synthesis of part-meanings into a single meaning", but where that aim cannot
be met (327). No syntheses of part-meanings would satisfy a nonsensical
expression's aim at meaningfulness. So when a complex expression does
have sense, it is because there is a possible law-ordered synthesis which can
combine the meanings of each of its component terms into a singular interpretation of those meanings in a joint context.
Second, Husserl says that laws of combination are determined by "forms
of synthesis" (328). His examples are drawn from mathematics (e.g. the form
"a + b", 328) and from the logic of judgments (e.g. "M and N", 330). A
form of synthesis is an ordering of meanings such that any proper substitution for the variable terms produces a complex expression whose simple
terms are guaranteed to be combined in a meaningful way.
The syntheses expressed by the proper use of syncategorematic terms may
thus be characterized in two ways. The second emphasizes the formal structures whose constant re-application to the ongoing production of expressions
produces intelligible interpretations of meanings in combination. The first
emphasizes the fixing of meanings and contexts in the satisfaction of each partmeaning's demands for supplementation.
If syncategorematic terms express the synthetic force of acts of consciousness, then the particular syncategorematic meanings, laws of combination, and "forms of synthesis" that Husserl uses as examples ought to be
important for a construal of his concept of synthesis in general. 1 will not go
into detail on such speculations here, but 1 will point in the direction of such
an analysis.
We have already seen some discussion of the role of "and", "or", '''s'',
and "that is" in expressing the constitution of unity, difference, dependency,
and identity respectively. Husserl's examples of "forms of synthesis" drawn
from mathematics include "a + b" "a X b" and "ab" and their "'inverse'
operations" "a - b", "alb", and "b..J~" (328).' It would ~o doubt be too much
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argues that Husserl's account of logical connectives might have been worthy
of being called a predecessor to Carnap's if only Husserl had restricted his
account to the realm of "grammatical categories", and had left aside the "superfIuous ... labyrinth" of the "realm of meanings" (p. 365). Mohanty (1964),
on the other hand, argues that the attempt to assign syncategorematic terms
an objective meaning of their "own" is at the he art of Husserl's enterprise.
Some commentators who interpret Husserl to ground the objective meaning
of syncategorematica, appeal to intersubjective communication. Hence both
Eley (1969) and Tugendhat hirnself (1977) ground "A and B", for example,
in events where a speaker has to prove two things about the world to a skeptical listener. But Eley also argues, with some explicit and some implicit
reference to Hegel (Phenomenology of Spirit, ch. 1) that lying behind every
objectifying act are underlying connective syntheses that have already taken
place. Hence for Eley, every "This" is already based on experiences compounded over time, space, sense-content, and interpretative variation, and
consequently is already a "This and This and This ... , etc." Eley thus interprets Husserl's theory of syncategorematic terms as a theory of the terms
that make explicit the "schemata" of synthetic acts which had already been
presupposed, though not named, du ring the perfonnances of consciousness that
constitute any and all meanings, both simple and complex.
The move from the logic of connectives to the phenomenology of
synthetic apriori schemata of interpretative consciousness seems possible only
if we take Husserl seriously when he says that laws of combination are "subject
to" a "fixed typic" which is in turn "built apriori into the general Idea of
meaning", and if we take it to be possible to reconstruct this "building" in
phenomenological science. In some sense, we have to be able to derive the
diverse laws of combination from an analysis of the very concept of meaning.
If some such analysis is possible, then syncategorematic terms like "and",
"if ... then", and "that is" would provide, to use Kantian vocabulary, "transcendental clues" for the nature of the synthetic unity of apperception, but
would then require a "transcendental deduction" of the laws of synthetic
unity themselves.
What Husserl says is that the possibility of combining meanings is subject
to categorial structures, and because those structures are built into the Idea
of meaning, actual combinations of interpretations are "led forth [or "derived"]
from them through pure construction" (durch reine Konstruktion hergeleitet,
333). At first glance, "construction" here seems to mean something like "application", so that combinations of meanings would be generated by the
mechanical application of structures to given tenns. But the fact that the ground
of this construction is said in turn to be built into the Idea of meaning requires
a different construal of the passage. It requires that we think of the Idea of
meaning as the ground whereby any act of consciousness that aims at a unified
meaning is constructed into a pattern that satisfies certain fonnal demands.
Pure construction of synthetic interpretation is not so much a matter of applying
fonns as building towards forms.
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In the final analysis, syncategorematic terms do not just signal the presence
of synthetic activity at the level of hidden deep structures, hidden unconscious thoughts, or hidden pre-interpreted sense-data; they rather articulate
the unfolding of the unity of consciousness. Syncategorematic terms function
in the pure construction of meaningful combination, just because the demands
for synthetic unity are already given apriori with the possibility of all determinate consciousness; and the laws for synthetic combination are given in
advance just because the possibility of meaning demands that synthetic unity
of interpretation and experience be that at which all expression and all consciousness aims. So when Husserl argues that combinations of meanings are
"built apriori into the general Idea of meaning", the sense is that in the construction of any given meaning, the possibilities of combining that meaning
with others in a unified thought-context is constructed along with it.
Does Husserl want to say that the meaning of "and", or even that the combinatory law of conjunction, is derivable from the very Idea of meaning? I will
conclude this chapter by looking at a passage from section 57 of the sixth
Investigation wh ich relates the meaning of syncategorematic terms to the origin
of synthetic activity in every act of meaning.
The general sense of this passage is that it is in the lived carrying-out of
synthesizing acts that categorial forms and laws of combination are bound
up with synthesized, identifiable objects. The immediate issue concems the
intuitive fulfilment of founded meanings:
The complete synthetic intuition [of categorial forms, laws of combination, and the meanings
of syncategorematic terms] therefore arises ... in so far as the psychic content wh ich binds
the founding acts itself is interpreted as the objective unity of the founded objects, as their relation
of identity, of part to whole, etc." (LU II II 177).
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references that are responsible for the putting together of every single meaning
whatsoever. And the reason why forms of synthesis are never themselves
represented in the combinatory unity of experience is that synthetic form
always already lies behind the possibility of meaningful experience and
because it always lies ahead in the form of that which is demanded. The
synthetic meaning of syncategorematic terms is founded on ac tu al interpretative experience just because it is also founding for it; synthetic meaning
is the result of interpretation just because it is also that which underlies
synthetic interpretation. The lived syntheses which sustain the interpretation
of objects as unities are characterized both as that which supports founded
meanings and as that which generates an ongoing combination of mutually
supplementary contents passing over into one another in unified and unifying
interpretation.
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back to judgments depends on the force of the claim that a name refers back
to those judgments which it already contained "implicitly".
Husserl 's statements on implicitness point to the problem. On the one
hand, Husserl says that once a judgment is transformed into an attributive name,
"the carrying out of the modified act [the name] does not include the unmodified [the judgment)" (468). But on the next page, he says that "the 'original'
judgment in a certain way 'logically' 'lies in' the 'modified' act" (469). And
again: "The single-rayed intention directed towards [the state of affairs] presupposes the many-rayed Uudging intention] and refers back to it as part of
its own sense" (473-74). And finally, any name that refers back to judgments does so because those judgments are "implicit" (implizierte) in it (483).
The sense in which simple names do not refer back to judgments is clear
enough. In terms of explicit syntax, the name "the red house" does not appear
as "the house - it is red". What is included in a name is not the judgment itself.
And from the other direction, a judgment does not have to be transformed
into a name, and is itself "not yet" an attributive name (468). It provides the
"basis" for an attributive name, but "falls away" once the name is articulated; only the name "remains over" (469). That an attributive name refers back
to a judgment that has already fallen away from it, indicates that backward
reference does not simply rearrange a meaning's actual parts, but rather unfolds
aseries of prior meanings whose synthesis led to the meaning that "remains".
But now if backward reference was never supposed to be restricted to the
re arrangement of actual part-experiences, then the reason given above for
denying that syntactically simple names refer back to judgments is vitiated.
For backward reference is in alt cases a reference from one meaning to another
meaning of a different status, i.e. to a meaning that plays a different sort of
role than the directly expressed meaning. Husserl says that in "the very talk
of arising and referring back it is already said that names and judgments are
different" (468). A name refers back not to apart of a judgment but to an
act that determines the properties of the named object. Single-rayed nominal
presentations refer back to multi-rayed predicative interpretations, not by
including them, but rather by transforming a diversity of meanings into one
which now appears as one that is synthetic.
We have seen that Husserl uses the vocabulary of "unfolding" (in the
German as weIl as the Latin root plico-) to express the constitution of synthesis. Something complex (Komplex) is folded together in such a way that
that which has been folded into it (implizierte) can have its concealed parts
unfolded from it (explizierte) by means of an unfolding analysis (Explikation).
Philosophical science thus has the double task of showing how meanings can
be folded together (Komplikation) and how they can be unfolded (entfaltet)
into ranges of possible fulfilling intuitions that may be carried out step by step.
Presentation and interpretation, name and judgment, single- and multi-rayed
meanings, all "come back" to the issue of thesis and synthesis (42).
Husserl talks about unfolding both in subjective and in objective terms.
From both directions, it will turn out that to refer a name back to judgments
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can mean by an ultimately simple name, keeps alive the problem of the
mutual backward reference of names and judgments, and indeed makes
backward reference central to both names and predicates.
The reference back from complex to simple meanings is thus construed
as the reference back from judgments to names, which can also be exhibited
as the reference back from nominalized judgments to their constituent
members. Husserl treats three levels of simplicity. First, as soon as any
judgment is made into a name, it expresses "one thesis" (Einer Thesis, 481).
In this sense, every meaning is already simple; it has one meaning, it names
one objective state of affairs, even if one complex one. Still, to count a
nominalized judgment like "The S which is P and Q" as a simple would
cover over an explicit complexity within the name.
The first step of simplification removes complexities carried over from
complexities in the judgment which had been nominalized. Hence just as the
complex judgment "S is P and Q" can be "analysed" into the simple judgments
"S is P" and "S is Q", so the nominalized term "The S which is P and
Q" can be analysed into "The S which is P" and "The S which is Q". The
elimination of "synthetic forms" like conjunction resolves nominal meanings,
which all al ready express "one" meaning, into atomic nominal meanings
which express single subjects and predicates. Husserl calls this second type
of unitariness a "one-fold" (einfaltig), "one-streamed" (einstrahlig), or "simple"
(einfach) unity (483).
But the technique for removing synthetic connections does not yet give a
method for deciding when names are simple. The "series of backward references contained in a nominalization" may not have been "pursued" (483) to
"primitive" terms. The meanings arrived at may still contain "implicit"
member-meanings (483), as, for example, if naming "S" depends on the possibility of naming its parts, its properties, or its relations. It is only if a meaning
can no longer have its parts "set out beside one another", that is, if it "no longer
refers back" (483), that it is simple in the third, and primitive, sense of being
a "straightforward" (schlicht, 483) unity.
The claim that complex meanings ultimately refer back to straightforwardly
simple meanings is deceptively easy. Two questions are difficult. What counts
as a simple name? And what principle could put an end to the process of
referring a name back to further explication?
Husserl's two examples of names to which judgments ultimately refer back,
suggest two quite different things. In the paragraph which introduces the idea
of the primitive backward-referent, Husserl's examples of straightforwardly
simple names include "proper name presentations, along with one-membered
percepts, imaginations, etc., which do not set their members out alongside
one another in explicative syntheses" (483). But while it is not surprising
that names containing judgments ("The S which is P") would refer back to
proper names ("S"), there are three problems. First, it does not seem likely that
Husserl would say that "Socrates, who is mortal" would refer back to the proper
name "Socrates" as a simpk constituent, but would fail to refer back to the
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specifying term "mortal", solelyon the grounds that "mortal" is not a proper
name. Nor does it seem likely that Busserl would deny that "men, who are
mortal" refers back to the simple subject-term "men" just because "men" is
not a proper name. In short, it is not clear why Busserl would say that names
are simple only if they are proper.
Second, even if Busserl meant to say that complex names refer back to
proper names, we have seen (chapter 4) that Busserl cannot hold that proper
names are independent of all prior explicative syntheses.
Third, even if Busserl held that proper names and no others can be simple,
it is odd to class proper names with simple perceptions and imaginations.
Bow did the subdivision of a name lead back to something that is not apart
of the linguistic expression at all, but a perceptual presentation? And why
would any name, complex or simple, refer back to a simple perceptual datum
rather than to complex ranges of possible perceptions?
Busserl 's second example of the simples to which judgments refer back contrasts the judgment "2 x 2 equals 5" with the name "that 2 x 2 equals 5"
(484). We can see why one might want to count the latter as a straightforwardly
simple name, since even though there are other names contained in it, as a
whole it names a single relation. We might allow that Busserl's point is that
judgments refer back to straightforwardly objective intentionalities. It would
not matter, then, if in different contexts judgments refer back to straightforwardly referring names, straightforwardly object-exhibiting perceptions,
or straightforwardly fact-apprehending thoughts. But such a reading gets no
further in pinning down the idea of a simple. For "that 2 x 2 equals 5" is
regarded as a simple just because it articulates a single state of affairs. If the
final backward reference of a judgment is to the singularity of the fact that
it expresses, the "straightforwardly" singular simple is nothing more than
the "one-ness" of the synthesized unity of the judgment that we started with.
The synthetically unified judgment seemed complex, but the simples which
it refers back to seem no less complex.
But now if it is difficult to define the scope of simples, it is because the
notion of the primitive simple is itself a complicated one. We now turn to
the process of referring back itself, and to the problem of how it terminates.
When Busserl says that judgments ultimately refer back to straightforwardly
objectifying names, he means at least three things: (i) that every judgment
has some object that it is about, and in terms of which it is explicated, (ii)
that every nominal term in a judgment is simple in the sense that it is independently variable and could appear again with other terms in other judgments,
and (iii) that certain parts of a judgment may be separated from other parts and
have meaning on their own.
The second of these characterizations of simple meanings, i.e. in terms of
their independent variability, would by itself beg the question of what simple
backward referents are. But we will find that only such a functional definition of simplicity will reconcile the first and the third characterizations.
On the first characterization, judgments refer back to subjects requiring
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claim that the simples themselves always have to have occurred too far back
in the past to be present as the content of any actual experience - we do not
experience empty substances or sense-data despite the fact that experience ultimately, genuinely, and successfully, refers back to them.
This, finally, is Husserl 's account of the reference back from judgments
to names. Names refer back to judgments because they demand explication;
judgments refer back to names because they need to be about fixed referents. But just as the reference backward from names to judgments via
explication ultimately returns back to names because of a demand for a unified
interpretation, so the reference back from judgments to names via the fixing
of reference ultimately returns back to judgments because of a demand for
interpretative complexity. Judgments and names thus refer back to one another
as to their respective grounds and presuppositions. The forwards-directed completion of interpretation and the backwards-directed origins of interpretation
constitute each other as already having been carried out in advance, and at
the same time demand one another as still needed supplementations.
4.
REFERRING BACKWARD
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presentations thus turns into the issue of how a founded meaning takes up a
"positing stance" (491). The "origin" of meaning (343), consists not so much
in the presence of uncomplicated simples or finished products of interpretation, but in the simultaneous references forward and backward from one to
the other in an experience of a world of objects. And consciousness itself,
in order to be a continuous stream of determinations, a reflective inner awareness, and/or an intentional directedness towards objects (see subsection 1),
must likewise be constituted as a reciprocal activation of starting-points and
end-points, of simples and complexes, of units and unities.
By working on specific problems of synthesis in each of Husserl's first five
Logical Investigations, we have built up a certain categorial vocabulary.
Some of these categories, such as those of the web, the whole-complex,
the implicit, and the forward and backward reference, were introduced by
Husserl in his broadest attempts to define intentional consciousness, and so
directly warrant our use of them in an exposition of Husserlian ontology.
Others, such as the categories of the ground, the in-advance, passing-over
and setting-in-relief, independent non-separability, and the need for supplementation, have to be drawn out. In asense, all such categories should,
along with the concept of synthesis itself, be subject to what Kant would
call a deduction from the possibilty of any experience. In the next chapter,
I will use these categories as tools for developing the overall thesis of this
study, namely that consciousness and its acts of meaning are constituted as a
self-propelling synthetic system of forward and backward references. What
these mechanisms must provide is a rigourous phenomenological explanation of why and how every single interpretative act can and must refer forward
and backward to all other acts, and thus constitute the syntheses that intend
and identify objects. My approach, as always, will be to interpret Husserl
as having the strongest theory of synthesis that can be extracted from the
text.
However, I will argue that there is one area of the mechanics of synthesis
that Husserl does not treat in LU, namely the problem of the location in
consciousness of non-activated but potentially influential retentions. On my
reading of Husserl's concept of synthesis, an act's demand to be synthesized
makes use of the structure of potential combination that had been built in
by its own originative history. But the content is not its his tory, nor is
that history present to the consciousness of an experiencing subject. The
problem of locating grounds of synthesis that a conscious subject is not aware
of is, on my reading, the problem of locating backward referents which in
some sense must be in consciousness without being present to consciousness. How can there be a storage space within consciousness? On my reading,
the only way consciousness can make room for the backward referents that
make synthetic connections and intentional objects possible, is by more
backward references, i.e. by referring back to its own prior capacities to
incorporate backward referents. It is only in Ideen 1, where Husserl works
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out the possibility of withdrawing or drawing back into the backgrounds 01'
the ego, in Cartesian Meditations, where he works out the warrant for presupposing the accumulated intersubjective knowledge of a community of other
egos, and in the Crisis, where he treats the sedimentation of history in culture,
that the problem of the retention of the non-present ground of synthesis is fully
developed. In the Appendix, I will advance to the first of these three developments.
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We have seen that rationalist construals of synthesis can explain the ground
of the synthesis of one content of consciousness with another only by appealing
to categorial universals which determine which contents belong together.
Now since Husserl grounds universals in synthetic combinations of individuals, he cannot in any straightforward way ground synthesis in universals.
But he can describe the individual content of interpretative consciousness in
terms of the way it picks out an object of experience which in turn can be
experienced in a range of other ways. In other words, he can describe the
meaning-intention of each content as a kind of universal name whose instances
are the other contents subsumable within the experience of the same object.
This description provides an abstract framework for explaining the grounds,
the mechanisms, and the end-points of the synthesis of one content with the
next.
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in which the inkpot appears, and it describes this object as an instance of things
that look and behave as inkpots. The name invokes these two classifications
without being identical to either; the name calls appearances and Species
into play, as it were, when it calls the individual by name. This "overlay"
of the signifier, the baptism of the referent, the act of calling things by
name, is the activity whereby a subject provides hirnself with the rules (the
"universals" and the "circles" of relevant intuitions) for recognizing the identity
of a variously appearing individual.
2. "The word names the red thing as red" (27).
Phenomenologically, we find before us no mere sum (of name and intuition), but an intimate,
and in fact an intentional unity; we can rightly say that the two acts, one of which constitutes
the full word and the other the thing, are intentionally locked together in a unity 0/ aet. What
lies before us can be naturally described equally weil with the words, "the name 'red' names
(nennt) the red object red", as with the words "the red object is reeognized as red and named
'red' through the mediation of this recognition". To name red - in the aetual sense of naming,
which presupposes an underlying intuition of the thing named - and to reeognize something as
red, are expressions which are in their ground identical in meaning: they only differ in so far
as the latter brings out more c1early that there exists here no mere duality (Zweiheit), but a
unity set up (hergestellte) by a single act-character (28).
The "universality of the word" means, therefore, that the unified sense of one and the
same word circumspans (or in the case of a non-sense word, "pretends" to circumspan) an ideally
delimited manifold of possible intuitions, each of which could function as the ground for an
act of recognitive nominalization with the same sense. To the word "red", for example, belongs
the possibility of both knowing as, and calling "red", all red objects that might be given in possible
intuitions. This possibility connects up, with an apriori guarantee, to the further possibility of
becoming conscious, through an identifying synthesis of all such naming recognitions, of a
sameness of meaning of one with the other: this A is red, and that A is the same, i.e. also red:
the two intuited singulars belong under one and the same "concept" (29).
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synthetic cognition of individual objects. Yet there are in the text several
locutions which assign priority to one or another of the elements involved in
objective reference. For example, in the penultimate paragraph of s. 7, underlining such locutions:
[The universality of the proper name] consists in the fact that a synthesis of possible intuitions
belongs (gehrt) to a single individual object, intuitions made one by (durch) the common
intentional character conferred by every relation to the same object, despite all phenomenological difference among individual intuitions. This unity [of intentional character] is thus the
foundation (Fundament) for the unity of recognition, which belongs to the "universality of
word-meaning", to the range of ideally possible realizations. In this way the naming word has
a recognitive relation to an unlimited multiplicity of intuitions, whose single and identical
object it recognizes and thereby (dadurch) names" (31).
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within the static itself. The problem is that even in cases where there is a
one-to-one correspondence between meaning and intuition, the meaning must
still "prescribe" a range of possible intuitions "in advance" (even if a range
of one). The "belonging" of intuitions to names, we found, depends not just
on the abstract universality of the name, but also on the acts of calling something by name, on recognizing similar uses of the name, and on reapplying
the name to multiple presentations of the named object. Hence the "belonging" ,
even in static identity, must make the intuition belong to the intention, and
set up the relation of identification. The explanation of static identification
needs an account of the dynamic of looking forwards to an identifying completion, of coming up with a sequence of fulfilling acts, and of gathering
intuitions together in such a way that the result will count as the "interpretation" of the intended object. The dynamic of interpretation interrupts the
"quiet" unity of static identity, but only thereby are possibilities prescribed and
differences rendered unifiable.
In this section of chapter 6, I will look at the way in which categories of
"context" (Zusammenhang) contribute early in LU vi (especially ss. 8-12,
pp. 32-48) to an explication of the grounds, mechanisms, and ideal startingand end-points of the syntheses of identification. First, I will introduce the
problematics of the "dynamic" and the metaphor of "fitting into" epistemic
contexts. Second, I will look at the role of differences, distinctions, and distances in the unification of interpretative contexts. Third, I will introduce
problems involving interacting contexts, contexts within contexts, and latent
contexts, and in particular, the problem of the coherence of contexts and of
the storage in consciousness of implicit contexts. I will articulate Husserl 's
solutions in terms of lived interpretative synthesis, lived prescription, and lived
habit. Fourth, I will press the problem of the determinacy of interpretative
"needs for supplementation". I will argue that the categories of "context" are
inadequate to this task, in that they do not explain how partial interpretations fix directions for further enquiry, or how each contextualized act
anticipates the next, or how contexts are ideally limited or closed off. Only
Husserl 's categories of "perspective" in the succeeding sections of LU vi can
resolve these deficiencies. Finally, I will return to the metaphor of "fitting
in", and to a general account of Husserl's concept of synthesis.
(A) The Dynamics of Fitting-In
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that it is always already passing over into a grasp of the world of already
intuited objects.
Similarly, the meaning-fulfilment (the end-point of intention-fulfilment relations), ac counts from the other direction for the same absorption of the
intention-fulfilment relation into the meaning-intention. To the extent that a
subject is presented with intuitions, he ceases to be "wholly free" in his interpretations of the object before hirn (92). Intuitions "set limits" (93) to the
interpretations a subject can frame about the world.
But this phenomenon renders problematic the sense in which possible
fulfilling intuitions are prescribed in advance by a meaning-intention. The
intention prescribes a range of possible intuitions, but it is precisely those
intuitions that limit the range of possibilities that an intention may prescribe.
Understood in one way, the fact that intuitions prescribe intentions is not
incompatible with the idea that intentions prescribe intuitions. There is no
problem in saying that an intention prescribes ways in which certain
intuitions either complement or restrict it, or cause it to be expanded or revised.
But the idea that intuitions set limits to how the world may be interpreted
suggests that meaning-intentions have their capacity to anticipate intuitions
fixed only after those intuitions are given, and that meaning-intentions alter
once they are fulfilled by intuitions. Husserl says on the one hand that an intention undergoes "a certain modification in character" once the intended object
has been intuited (38); but he says on the other hand that the intention does
not "suffer" this modification, that is, that its meaning is not changed when
it is limited (38). How does the process of freeing and fixing interpretations
account for the act of "fitting" intentions and intuitions into joint contexts?
I will examine three of Husserl's examples in ss. 9 and 10.
(I) The Manipulation
0/ Spatial Backgrounds
In the passage where Husserl explains the "unbroken unity" of intention and
fulfilment in terms of the way intuitions set boundaries to the freedom of
meaning-interpretation, he raises an analogy borrowed from geometry that calls
into play the notions of "context" and "background". The first point is that
intentions can anticipate intuitions that will fit them only if intentions are
already embedded in contexts of intuitions:
The same act of meaning-intention, which occurs as the empty symbolic presentation, also dweIls
in the complex act of recognition; but the meaning-intention, which was earlier 'free', is in the
stage of coincidence [Deckung, or covering], 'bound', or brought to 'indifference' [Indifferenz].
It is so peculiarly woven into or fused into this complex, that its meaning-essence, though it
does not suffer thereunder, nevertheless does experience, in a certain way, a modification.
Approximately the same holds universaIly, whenever we consider contents first for themselves, and the next time in combination with others, as parts of wholes woven together. The
combinations would not be combined if the combined contents experienced nothing through those
combinations .... One considers a stretched line first for itself, as something on an empty
white background and then the same stretch as a segment of a figure. In the latter case, it
collides in the context of other lines, it is touched by them, cut up, etc .... The same stretch
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(namely the same according to its inner substance) appears to us over and over as something
different, depending on whether it enters into this or that phenomenal context; and if we fit
onto it a line or surface qualitatively identical with it, it becomes in fact 'indistinguishable' in
this background, it loses its phenomenal separation and its ability to count on its own (38).
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to be the distinct acts of meaning and intuiting, but to be the system of experiential contexts as an ongoing project, within which intentions and intuitions
are constantly being fixed and violated in the act of fitting objective interpretations together.
(11) The Acting Out of Habitual Expectations
In Husserl's next version of the contextual fitting in of intentions and fulfilments, the emphasis shifts from the manipulability of spatial figures to the
acting out of habitual expectations.
Husserl argues that the anticipation-fulfilment relation is not limited to
the cognitive recognition of intended objects in perception, but can also be
found in the satisfaction of desires, the resolution of doubts, and so on. Of
the many forms of "lived fulfilment", the paradigm is that of actual and
expected intuitions, as in the playing out of a continuous melody:
When the beginning of a familiar melody sounds a tone, there emerge determinate intentions,
which find their fulfilment in the step by step filling out of the shape [Ausgestaltung] of the
melody. In approximately the same way, it finds [fulfilment] when the melody is alien to uso
The lawful regularities prevailing in the melody condition intentions, which to be sure lack
fuB objective determinacy, but still find or can find fulfilments (39).
The melody fragment, no matter how short or how unfamiliar, leaves the
listener with an "expectation" (Erwartung, 40), a "demand for supplementation from a lawfully circumscribed sphere" of determinations (40). The
fragment consists of a "pointing" by way of a "direction" (Richtung, 40)
towards a relatively "indeterminate" range of possibilities. The relations
between determinacies and indeterminacies are at the centre of this problematic. A straightforward account would be three-fold. First, the melody fragment
that has actually been experienced is itself fully determinate. Second, the range
of expected completions is indeterminate in its limits - a listener could not
be expected to name in advance all the melody-fragments which would satisfy
his expectations nor even to be able to tell without hearing it whether a
certain score would be satisfying. Third, the sounds that do satisfy hirn will
again make a determinate sound.
There are two problems. The first concems the extent to which "directions" of possible fulfilment have to be fixed in order for an experience to carry
a determinate expectation. The second concerns how expectations are possible
at all. Husserl's solution in these passages will be to say the expectations
are fixed by "habit", a solution that seems at first too easy, but in fact introduces subtle and complex issues of retention.
We may pursue the problem of the determinacy of expectations by developing the example drawn from melody. Most Western listeners would expect
not to have a Mozart melody followed by, or supplemented in the background
by, a blues line. It is no doubt the tones themselves that supply the context
to which subsequent tones must be added. 1 (Two notes will have more possible
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I will say a few things about the account of backgrounds in this passage,
and then I will introduce two problems which I will be working on from this
point forward in the present chapter.
The fact that the subject does not expect to see the tapestry when he looks
at the furniture in front of it, is itself a kind of expectation, which has to be
explained just like any other. How is the expectation that further viewings
will be blocked grounded in what is actually viewed, and how does Husserl's
account of the peculiar expectation of absences of fulfilling intuitions contribute to the general account of expectation?
The "step by step" process of "going on" with perception occurs "piece
by piece". The fragment of the tapestry's pattern (Muster), interrupted by
the piece of furniture, is a "non-independent" shape which, "in the manner
of a part" (teilweise), Le. of a non-independent part, passes over its limits
towards a whole with outer limits. The pattern-fragment is thus a "model"
(an alternate translation of Muster) for going on (fortgehen) towards the next
lines and colours hidden by the furniture. But instead of seeing the next "piece"
of the pattern, an experiencing subject will see the "piece" of furniture. The
latter piece takes the place of the former. But now the very reason why the
viewing subject does not expect to see the rest of the pattern is that he expects
it to be under the piece of furniture. He knows that the pattern is in the background covered over by the foreground furniture. Or to say the same thing with
the pattern as the object in question, he knows that it has been submerged under
an obstacle which, epistemically speaking, is in the background. The very
fact that the object and its covering could each be given the title "foreground"
or "background", indicates that they "cover" the same space, just as lines in
manipulated figures "cover" one another, and just as intentions and fulfilments
"cover" one another (38). To be sure, the latter two cases of covering (Deckung,
38) have the sense of "coincidence", while the other has the sense of "coveringup" (verdecken, 40). But in fact there is little difference in the intentionfulfilment relations. For the furniture is only taken to "cover over" the pattern
once it is understood that under the furniture is the very pattern which will
"coincide" with expectations set in motion by the visible pattern fragment. The
subject fails to expect to see the remainder of the pattern under the
furniture just because he expects that he would see it under the furniture.
Are wh at we might call transcendentally grounded expectations - not
the explicit expectations for experiences coming up soon, but the implicit
expectations for certain experiences under certain conditions - indifferent to
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what we might call merely factical obstacles? In short, are cases of expectation blocked by physical obstacles irrelevant to the ground of expectation in
general?
In fact, there are three features of the pattern-behind-the-furniture model
of intention and fulfilment not present in the line-on-a-surface model and
the melody-with-a-finale model. First, we are offered here the possibility of
"movements" that would render explicit, and then satisfy the expectations
for, seeing the hidden pattern. The manipulation of the lines and the projection of the melody are also movements of sorts, but here the subject recognizes
possibilities in what he perceives in part by recognizing his own ability to
change his point of viewing. Second, we are here dealing not just with shapes
and sounds, but with shaped substances whose backgrounds are their own backsides. Third, we operate here through counterfactuals, through the opening
of possibilities from out of absences, through the overcoming of obstacles.
'If movement were to disclose a new point of view, then ... etc.'. Indeed statements like this define expectations of as yet unexperienced perceptions, even
if no explicit obstacles are in the way: 'If this melody were completed, it would
have to sound like ... ', and so on. Far from being incidental to the constitution of expectations, the presence of implicit obstacles, as the limitations
over wh ich intuitions must pass if meaning-intentions are to be fulfilled, is
the condition of all expectations.
If we put these three features together, we arrive at the following results.
An object is experienced in a lived way when its presence is seen through
its absent sides, sides which are in turn made present by the viewer's movements and made possible by the object's many-sidedness.
We can still say that an experience activates expectations by reaching back
into background contexts and activating habituated possibilities, but this takes
on a new sense. When a subject looks at a pattern-fragment cut off by furniture, he unreflectively assurnes that the pattern continues below the cut-off
point. We can say that he does so out of habit, but we would not mean that
he has experienced such patterns before, or that he has formed an inductive
rule that objects whose visibility is cut off by another object must continue
behind it in roughly the same way. Rather, the habituality that governs expectations is co-extensive with the unreflectiveness of the assumptions that there
are always backgrounds and that multi-sided objects always have sides not
in view. The sense in which it is through habit that meaning-contents anticipate fulfilment, is that an object is experienced as being already present to
the vi ewer in more ways than he is yet aware of. When a subject implicitly
realizes that the tapestry's pattern could be seen if only he could look under
the furniture, he also recognizes that there is more to the objective situation
which as yet lies under the surface of his experience. And when he recognizes that an obstacle is covering over apart of the object he is experiencing,
he also recognizes that he can re-cover the hidden parts. And when he
recognizes that he can move the furniture and find the rest of the pattern, he
also recognizes that, having been interrupted, he can later find it again. In short,
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one and the same S. Each failure to synthesize an intuition with a meaning
includes a successful synthesis. Underlying the recognition that an object,
and therefore the world as a whole, is not as expected, is the recognition
that it is that object, or at least the world, which is not as expected.
Second, frustrating intuitions give the subject grounds to distinguish,
compare, and contrast the expected content with the one present. When a
subject judges that "The roof is red" and then finds that it is not red but
green, he recognizes the mutual exclusion of red and green. As long as he
has already identified the expected red surface and the perceived green surface
as one and the same surface, he may then consider contrasts between various
colour-properties that that surface does or could have had. That certain
intuitions can frustrate a meaning-intention indicates that the meaningintention already contained rules for the exclusion of certain intuitions. It
not only included the expectation to find P but also the expectation not to
find not-Po
Intuitive frustrations thus differentiate possibilities in the context of interpretative wholes. Needless to say, many sorts of experience and judgment
operate in this way. Two objects, for example, are thought to be different when
the meanings that refer to them anticipate essentially different fulfilments.
An object is shown to be different than it was thought to be, when the meaning
is frustrated in particular points while being satisfied in essential points; and
so on. To be sure, there will always be a problem of deciding which
intuitions in a range of anticipated intuitions are sufficient to put the lie to a
meaning-intention. But such a problematic is to be expected of a theory of
knowledge based on a theory of contexts. Every unexpected intuition problematizes the world-interpretation that had failed to anticipate the intuition
at hand. It forces are-evaluation and, within limits, are-interpretation of the
whole-context of previous interpretation. It requires a new interpretation, one
that can consistently inc1ude the unexpected member.
The third positive result of failed anticipations is that they demand the
pursuit of more comprehensive interpretations. Indeed successful anticipations
work in exactly the same way. Every content prescribes not just one but a
multiplicity of possible fulfilments and so opens itself to a range of possible
interpretations. It al ready differentiates the parts of its own meaning by
differentiating partial fulfilments. When meanings which are not "simple" or
"isolated" but rather "complex" or "contextual" suffer intuitive frustration, they
do not undergo an out and out "contradiction" (Widersinn); rather, they undergo
a "counter-struggle" (Widerstreit) among their possible interpretations. Indeed
strictly speaking, "conflict" (Widerstreit) does not pertain to "simple" acts at
all (43).
Husserl's descriptions of failed anticipation are frequently articulated in
formal terms. Thus he formalizes the difference between (a) an intended object
8 with properties (e, 11, L), which is so dependent on the property that an
intuition of -e would be taken to negate the existence of 8; (b) an intended
object contextualized as the substance with properties 8(e, 11, L) which
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is open to comparison with the slightly different object 8ee, TI, t); (c) an
intention 8(e, TI) which could just as easily be identified as 8(e, TI, t) if e
should be intuited, as it could be identified as 8ee, TI, t) if -e should be
intuited, and so on. But such formalizations are always grounded in the
synthetic activities of consciousness which render such forms possible. Hence
every exclusion of one intuitive possibility by another "leads back" to the
fact that the "pre-given self-frustrated intuition is one part of a comprehensive intention" (44), and that frustrations ground the "intersections" (44) of
interpretative possibilities in the web-like context of lived experience.
Thus when a subject's intention "This red-tiled roof" "excludes" (Exklusion,
45) the intuition of something that is green, or aluminum, or not a roof but
a facade, it is not that the subject simply lacks an anticipation of those other
intuitions. And upon experiencing those intuitions, he would not merely fail
to incorporate them into his interpretation. Rather "exclusion" (Ausscheidung,
46) is the subject's way of establishing that which is "outside the borderline" of the interpretation he has been working with, as, for example, "tiled"
excludes all sorts of properties included under the idea of aluminum siding,
from technical properties such as rust-preventing, to economic properties
such as warranteed, to colour properties such as enamel off-whites, to sociological properties such as bungalow, and so on. Once an interpretation of an
object previously thought to be a roof is challenged by the intuitive apprehension that the object present is in fact only a facade, are-interpretation of
other attributions of properties to the object will also have to take place. The
subject will have to reconsider whether it had other features which had been
present all along but had gone unnoticed or had been similarly misinterpreted. If it is not a roof but a facade, the subject will have to rethink whether
it is a religious building, its date of construction, and whether its colouring
will vary with the play of light on its sculpted surfaces, etc. In short, the
syntheses of exclusion force the subject to return to contextual backgrounds
and their differentiated possibilities for re-interpretation.
The same result is found in "inclusion" (Inklusion, 46). An intuitive
fulfilment may contain not only that which an intention "needed", but "more".
But again, to add to a meaning-intention, or to "fit" new determinations into
it, is not just to subsume new properties into an interpretation in the way
that members are "subsumed" into a class (Subsumption, 49). To subsume properties under an interpretation is rather to "order them into" (Einordnung, 46)
a stream of experience. An interpretation always already begins as a complex,
and new determinations construct out of it a larger complex. An interpretation is a context with the capacity to separate itself off from, and/or to absorb
other such contexts, and to persist in its self-identity by widening and
narrowing the explicitness of its ranges of anticipations.
An intuition that conflicts with a meaning-intention neither undermines that
meaning in its entirety nor fits smoothly into it as just one more fact (albeit
a negative fact) known about the intended object. For Husserl, the principle
that "conflict can found unity" (we move now to s. 33, 108-111) means that
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Once the model of "fitting like a garment" (25, 44) is dismissed, Husserl
has three ways of characterizing the "fit": (i) in terms of intentions that "flow
over" into intuitions, and so prescribe forms of fitting-in from the beginning,
(ii) in terms of contextual systems that fit intentions and intuitions together
in medias res, and (iii) in terms of intuitions that complete interpretations
and so set criteria for fitting intuitions into interpretations from the standpoint of the ideal end-point of those interpretations.
(i) Intention and intuition "fit" together in the sense that they "belong"
together (64). In "dynamic" identification, intention and intuition are temporally distinct, and although they "flow over into one another" (34), the goal
of "exact fit" cannot apply. In this reciprocal overflow, an identification of
an object occurs - not "brought in from outside through comparison", but
presupposed "in advance" or "from the beginning" (von vornherein) in the
form of mutual demands for supplementation (35). In other words, intuitions
"fit" intentions just because an intention picks out "the object itself" and so
looks forward towards its own intuitive supplements (100).
(ii) Once each intention is characterized in terms of its prescription of
supplements, then the whole system of acts is characterized as an ongoing
process of interpretations fitting into one another. Each act both generates,
and is subject to, contexts, functioning as a signpost that indicates routes
and directions for locating acts that might come "next" on a cognitive map.
The point here is that the beginning of a joumey on a map is relative to the
choice of a point of origin. Each prescription of determinate supplements
depends on determinacy already having been attributed to that content (e.g.
44) and retained out of habit (e.g. 60). In one sense, every content "fits" into
the whole. In another, the blending of larger interpretative contexts is possible
only once local and limited contexts take on enough complexity to be able
to establish determinate relations to others (106). That is, each new experience
fixes the determinacy with which all past and future contents are able to fit
with one another.
(iii) Contexts remain underdetermined until they point forwards to a finality
of interpretative wholeness. Up to a point, contents of consciousness can fit
together even if an absolute unity of interpretation cannot yet be envisaged.
An uninterpreted perception, for example, can be "weIl-fitting" (121), provided
that it is a "lead" (Hinsicht, 121) to "getting nearer" to an interpretation. But
any provisional fit depends on the possibility of a good fit, on the ideal possibility of a last phase of interpretative completion, one wh ich would bring
the object itself to full presence, would render contextual expectations fully
determinate, and would close off the possibility of expanding the range of
potential intuitive inclusions. But what this means is that the category of
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developed so far in this chapter leaves us with four problems. First, there
remains the problem of the determinate incompleteness of a partial meaning's
need for supplementation. We still have to explain the ground of passing
over from one interpretative standpoint to the next, and we have to locate
non-explicit yet anticipated perspectives. I will show how the perspective is
a self-situating experiential content which incorporates the directions for
fulfilling intuitions and enriched meaning-intentions within the boundaries
of its own complex content. The perspectival content marks a place for itself
within a larger context, and then re-interprets itself in the light of its nextneighbours before the latter are experienced.
Second, there remains the problem of fixing the ideal limit towards which
the ongoing expansions of interpretations aim. The perspective will co-ordinate
these targets, and will provide directions for zeroing in on the things themselves.
Third, there remains the problem of what happens to a partial interpretation once it has been overcome in a more comprehensive unity, i.e. of how
contents that are no longer present can be preserved for retrieval, and implicitly retained in successive interpretations. By re-using the space of its
precedents, the perspective will account for the sense in which precedents
are stored.
Fourth, the problem immediately at hand is that of how a given content
sets up expectations for the next. The synthesis of epistemic fulfilment must
not merely place each content into the context of whatever happens to co me
up next, but must actively set up the investigative conditions for figuring
each content out and looking for the next. The relevant passage reads as
follows:
Nonna11y, intentions lack the character of expectations, they lack it in a11 cases of tranquil
perceiving or picturing, and they eam it only when perception is in flux, when it is spread out
into a continuous series of percepts, all belonging to the perceptual manifold of one and the
same object. Objectively stated: the object shows itself from different sides; what from one
side was seen only as a pictorial suggestion becomes from another side a confinning and fu11y
satisfying perception; or what was in one side only meant in conjunction with something else
(mitgemeint), meant indirectly through its adjoining sides [or through what is "marginal" or
"at its borders", AngrenzungJ, only pre-indicated (vorgedeutet), becomes in another side at
least a pictorial outline ["suggestion", or "indication at the side", Andeutung (contrasted with,
yet combining elements from, An-grenzung and vor-gedeutet)], it appears perspectiva11y foreshortened and projected (perspektivisch verkurtzt und abgeschattet), in order to appear for the
first time from a new side "just exactly as it is". According to our interpretation, each perception and imagination is a web of partial intentions, fused into the unity of one total intention.
The correlate of this latter is the thing, while the correlates of each partial intention are thingrelated parts and moments. Only thus can one understand how consciousness can reach out beyond
(hinausreichen ber) actual lived experience. It can, so to speak, mean what is beyond (hinausmeinen), and that meaning can be fulfilled (41).
In the final analysis, the intentions wh ich lack expectations are not "normal".
As soon as consciousness is spread out, syntheses of expectations are activated.
When consciousness "reaches beyond" to intend objects in an objective world,
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it positions itse1f in relation to that world and interprets its own experience
as perspectivally ordered. The task of consciousness is to de-marginalize its
own experiences, to move through a web of partial intentions, to res tore an
objectively direct viewpoint on the thing "as it is", or at least to fuse together
a well-rounded combination of viewpoints.
Each perspective, in so far as it is recognized as limited, demands to be
corrected or adjusted by other perspectives on the same object. The objectification of the intended object is thus an interpretative achievement:
consciousness must fill in the gaps in its perspectival viewpoints. In one
sense, perceptual experience is by nature "gap-holding" (lckenhaft, 100),
in that no object is present in a single blow. Indeed phenomenology in
general is an account of how synthesis achieves objective knowledge in the
face of inherent incompleteness. But while the gaps in the web of perspective motivate investigative consciousness, they also threaten it. For if the
experiencing subject does not know how to close off or control the adjoining
viewpoints needed to complete the picture he is seeing, he will lose control
of his interpretation of the object altogether (its shape and place, its front
and back, its distance and depth). He will lose his ability to distinguish the
object's true and apparent face, its essential and inessential determinations,
its substance and its shadows.
(A) "Shadowing-Off" or "Projection" (Abschattung) 2
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object has parts that it has already borrowed from the next. Even if an object's
neighbours are not actually present in the painted scene, the spectator can
still tell its colour, its size, its brightness, and sometimes can even tell what
it is (if the colour is peculiar to a certain sort of thing, as in the case of
armour, or the sea). Each object must anticipate the next in its shadows. It must
be a mirror reflection of, or to mix Albertian metaphors, a window onto, the
next.
It is a commonplace that objects appear to have a different size, colour,
figure, and individuation depending on their surroundings. It is more difficult to explain how individual contents of consciousness in themselves ground
the more active interpretative act of looking for or projecting onto invisible
next parts, sides, and neighbours. 1 will indicate three features of shadowingoff as "projection": (1) the momentum inherent in singular contents, (2) their
gradual overlapping, and (3) the objective correlates of projective activity.
(1) When a viewer looks at a barber-pole, he assurnes that the same
spiralling pattern that he sees from one perspective will continue all around
the pole. Even when standing in one spot in front of a motionless pole, the
fact that his eye is already being drawn along a curved line even within that
one viewing-point primes hirn to continue drawing that curve. Each onesided viewing is already a multiplicity of standpoints each carrying over
from the last.
(2) The quantity of looking that has always already been covered within a
single perspective is not replaced all at once when the vi ewer moves slightly
to one side, but bit by bit. Some of the distance already covered remains present
in the next perspectival viewpoint. A projecting content appropriates bits of
its successors in order to ensure itself against the loss necessitated by its
own internal movement. It is because the movement within each content can
claim parts of absent contents as its own, that absent sides can be anticipated in advance.
(3) Perspectival projection contributes to objectification in at least three
ways. First, all the perspectives on the whole object in the round can be projected on the basis of the internal multiplicity seen from a single perspectival
viewpoint. A whole sequence of shadowings-off is thus potentially a selfenclosed sequence belonging to the original viewpoint itself. (The line
fragments that the viewer of a barber-pole sees from a given perspective can
be picked up as parts of the same line only if each fragment is projected all
the way around the pole.) The self-enclosure of the sequence allows each
perspective to reveal the same object as its successors.
Second, when the notion of "shadowing-off" describes the activity of getting
to the next perspective, it also describes the activity of getting back to the backs
of objects that were there all along. The rear-side (Rckseite) of an object is
not just something in the background (Hintergrund), but also something that
has been turned away from or that can be moved back to. The possibility of
projection treats the opposite side as though it had been the content of a
possible frontal perception all along.
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Third, the viewer's capacity to project a spiral onto the backside of the
barber pole is coordinated with the fact that the pole itself can spin. The
transition from one perspectival interpretation of an object to the next is
motivated by the principle that things carry themselves from one standpoint
to the next, becoming more of what they were to be.
What is important both for the subject's interpretative activity and for the
object's interpreted unity is that each individual content of consciousness itself
contains a complex ordering of parts which guarantee that as soon as the
singular content makes up a single perspective, it has already made up a
series of perspectives all within the boundaries of that one content. And by
moving bit by bit to the next viewpoint, each perspectival content contains
parts that reflect traces of the next even be fore the next is actualized. The
category of perspective accounts (as the category of context does not) for
each content's internal capacity to anticipate the determinate parts of the
next.
But there is a problem with the individuation of sides, and there is a problem
with ensuring that the world of perspectival experience has no gaps. First, if
perspectives are constituted by the projection of each experiential content onto
the next, then every content cannot help but be a perspective on every other,
a foreshortening of the absolute totality of all possible experience. No one side
is an individual side, but is overladen with overlapping and overflowing
meanings, not only into other perspectives, but also an indefinite number of
auditory and tactile perspectives, epistemic, speculative, and emotional perspectives, and so on. The notion of perspectives has to account for multiple
systems of perspectives.
Second, there is no guarantee that the perspective that each content anticipates as the next, is the one that would reveal the object's adjacent side.
Nor is there a guarantee that an experiencing subject will even be able to
tell whether one perspective seen just after another is exactly the next one
and not one that has taken some small leap. These problems are handled by
Husserl's metaphor of "foreshortening", and by his example of filling in a
pencil-sketch.
(B) "Foreshortening" (Verkrzung) and the "Sketch" (Skizze)
In both passages in LU vi where Husserl speaks of perceptions "perspectivally foreshortened and shadowed-off", he says that while some are essentially perspectival and limited, others present the object "just as it is" (41),
or that while some present only the object's front or back, others present it
in full actuality (56-58). In a properly organized perspective, the limitations
of viewpoint, though not abolished, are in some way internally adjusted,
corrected, or accounted for. It is not that Husserl privileges the frontal perspective, as if every object had a natural front (though some objects have faces),
or a natural core property. But he does privilege the perspective that is "selfgiving" or "self-fulfilling" (51), or that "shadows-off into itself" (57). Certain
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perspectives arrange to show both frontal and rear views, not by actually
showing both, but by instructing the viewer as to how back-sides can be turned
around. This is the role played by foreshortening.
When a figure in a painting is foreshortened, its exaggerated limbs seem
to jut forward from the canvas, even to intrude into the space of the viewer,
while its compressed limbs seem to recede behind the canvas plane. The
foreshortened perspective does not itself contain the object "just as it is",
but it does provide a kind of pathway or "map" (74) into a multiplicity of
perspectives in and around the viewed object. If the foreshortened figure is
meant to extend six feet from front to rear, the painting's perspective will
incIude all the receding planar view-points along that si x-foot stretch. A single
view can contain many, though only by "abridging" them (another translation of verkrzen).
The foreshortened quality of a perspective thus ac counts for some features
of the ordering of perspectives and the recession into "next"-contents. But there
remain four problems. First, rear and inner sides have been described only
as potential frontal sides. And of course objects have fronts, backs, and insides
all at once. While cognition must think such a multiplicity all at once, a
visual perspective can only assume such a simultaneity; it cannot show it.
To account for layers of superimposed viewpoints, we require a more sophisticated sense of multiple systems of standpoints and orderings.
Second, why are some perspectives better than Others at suggesting others?
Once we emphasize asymmetrically valued perspectives and epistemic
ordering, we leave the categories of perspective behind.
Third, what will the last viewpoint in an ordered progression through
increasingly adjusted standpoints look like?
Fourth, even while a given perspective's projection into the next is quite
different from its projection into its own greater detail, the latter seems to
ground the former. It is because a perspective can be filled in that it can
spread out into others.
This group of problems is at issue in Husserl's description of filling in a
pencil-sketch (67):
Another example of an intuitive fulfilment-series is perhaps offered by the passing-over from
a rough outline-drawing to a more exactly finished pencil-sketch, from this to a ready-to-go
picture, and then up to the full-of-life finish of the painting, and to be sure [all as views] on
the same and visibly the same object (67).3
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Conseiousness passes over from one aet to the next aeeording to an order
that leads from lesser to greater knowledge of the objeet "itself":
What an intention means, but makes present in a more or less inauthentic and inadequate [or
"unsuitable", unangemessen] way, the fulfilment ... sets directly before us; or at least more
directly, relative to the intention. In the fulfilment we live, as it were, an experience of "This
is the thing itself" ... It is possible that in the step-by-step progress (Fortschritt) of knowledge, in the ascent [or "increase", Emporsteigen] by levels [or "grades", stufenweise] from acts
of poorer to acts of rieher epistemie fullness (Erkenntnisflle), one must always finally reach
fulfilling perceptions ... The relative talk of "more or less direct" and of "[the thing] itself"
points us generally towards the principal issue: that the synthesis of fulfilment draws an inequality
of value among the combined members, that is, that the fulfilling act brings with it a pre-eminence
[or "priority", Vorzug] whieh the mere intention lacks ... Each such ranking of levels points
forward to an ideal limit, or realizes it in its final member [or "end-point", Endglied], which
posits for every advance through levels a goal that cannot be over-stepped: the goal of absolute
knowledge, of the adequate (adquat) self-presentation of the object of knowledge (65-66).
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of those contents themse1ves. Third, there are two sorts of "extent" of intuitive fulfilments (29, 97-100): if an object is only meant according to some few
of its parts, the perception of those parts will fulfil the intention as given
but it will not be "adequate" to the object as it is in itself and as a whole.
In these three ways, Husserl distinguishes progress in the knowledge of
objects themselves from progress in the detailing of meanings, in the multiplication of intuitive presentations, and in the interpretation of objects'
inessential parts. Synthetic combinations of the latter sorts may be the material
for properly epistemic syntheses, but each by itself could degenerate into
repetitive or tangential experiences that do not result in an object being any
better known. But this distinction is problematical. Given that even unfruitful
proliferations of presentations follow some regular principles of ordered
increase, how can Husserl distinguish increase in epistemic fu1ness from
increase in marginal detail?
Husserl sometimes takes a hard line on this problem. In sections 18-21
(70-77) he distinguishes "mediate presentations", in which an object is viewed
"indirect1y", e.g. from an oblique angle yet nevertheless en route to seeing it
straight on, from acts which interrupt the stream of presentations of the object
altogether and present the presentations themselves. The former may lead
towards an experience of the object itself, and so are ordered into an epistemically progressive chain. The latter proliferation of presentations does not
contribute to the knowledge of objects at all. In the same way, a map (or a
painting, 76, or a likeness, 83) may contribute to imagining the mapped object,
but not if the map itself becomes the object of attention (74).
Husserl wants to avoid the possibility of "endless" (unendlich) presentations of an object. If any and all orderings were possib1e, there would be a
"loss of va1uation" in the relative epistemic value of any given presentation
(e.g. 66-67). But it is not dear how far Husserl wou1d or could maintain the
distinction between mediate presentations and presentations of presentations.
If in so me sense every content is a perspective on every other, i.e. if there
are ordered chains along which every content can contribute to the interpretation of every other, then it is not dear that reflective and marginal directions
for progress are different in kind from indirect directions for progress. It is
not dear that a better painting does not add to the viewer's knowledge of
the painted object, or that seemingly random peripheral perspectives will not
contribute to an increase in perceptual organization, and so on. For that matter,
Husserl's own distinction between complete presentations of objects (which
are adequate to the objects) and partial presentations of objects (which are
adequate only to the expectations of prior presentations) implies that completing the content of presentations does make objects appear. The point of
the distinction between mediate presentations and presentations of presentations can not so much be to exdude the latter from the sphere of epistemic
fulfilments as to establish different orderings according to which experiential contents may be interpretatively pursued, and multiple schemes for deciding
epistemic value operating within a single unity of interpretative consciousness.
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We may divide this example of fulfilling an intention into four stages. First,
the intended object is treated as a complex implicitly built up through some
sort of enchainment of member-parts. Second, a clarification goes back through
the chain of previous members. Third, there are step by step substitutions of
each member for the next. Fourth, there is an end-result, a simple unit which
is fuUy explicit. Once the object's order has been clarified, aseries of ordered
intuitions will present the thing "itself".
I will point to three issues: (1) the generalizability of the concept of order,
(2) the goal of progress, and (3) the status of pre-designation. I will then
turn to the problem of the end-point itself.
(1) Wh at makes it especiaUy plausible to say that a number concept is
epistemically fulfilled through ordered advance is that numbers are in so me
sense nothing but pure order. But if we try to extend Husserl's description
to the ordered fulfilment of objectifying intentions in general, there will be
difficulties. It seems more plausible to say that a number has a built-up
"definition-chain" which can be traced back to units than to say that a threedimensional object has a definition-chain that can be traced back to any
particular ordering of perspectives or to properties. Moreover on closer inspection, the ordering of number-concepts can be just as problematic as that of
other objects. While it is true that 5 34 is made up of a certain number of
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"End-Result" (Endresultat)
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The categories of limit offer solutions to the problems raised in the categories of names, contexts, and perspectives.
The problem of how general names prescribe a range of intuitions is solved
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by the fact that the experience of the named object can be completed. The
problem of how contexts prescribe backgrounds is solved by the fact that
contextual relations are exhausted in a perception of the object "itself". The
problem of how perspectives determine an epistemic ranking scheme is solved
by the fact that a content of consciousness can be measured by its "nearness"
to a presentation of the object as it really iso The mere possibility of such
adequation fixes the sense in wh ich one viewing-point comes "next" after
another.
The categories of limit also offer solutions to the three general problems
of synthesis. The problem of the ground of synthesis is solved by the fact
that the end-point of the perception of the thing "itself" draws each conte nt
towards the ideal. The problem of the mechanisms of passing over is solved
by the way each content reaches a limit in its ability to present the object,
and so advances in whatever direction is required by the ideal. The problem
of ideal forward- and backward-references in the face of the fact that experience in progress never actually ends or begins, is solved by the way
end-points are prescribed from the beginning of epistemic progress. Synthesis
begins where it ends, and the end-point is the possibility that inheres in all
of its mid-points.
The categories of limit also offer solutions to the special problems of perspective. The problem of whether there is a privileged viewing-point, within
which other perspectives are implicitly ordered, is solved by the way all perspectives can be reconciled in a final presentation of the object "itself". The
problem of how to guarantee that interpretation not be filled with gaps in expectation is solved by the fact that the ideal end-point of perceptual adequation
ex hypothesi includes all ordered standpoints. It not only finishes off a stream
of contents but also holds all partial contents together at the end.
The categories of limit themselves work by means of a certain problematic exemplified by Husserl 's use of the Scholastic notion of an intention
that "terminates" (terminieren, 118). A terminating intention, in Scholastic
terms, is simply one that intends a term: to terminate in an object is simply
to refer to the object. But in phenomenological terms, a terminating intention is one that brings an interpretative dynamic to its climax, synthesizing
consciousness with its objects. Does synthesis terminate with the immediate
presence of the object, or alternatively with syntheses carried out by the
subject? Is the "end-result" of synthesis a single perfect presentation at the end
of aseries of imperfect presentations, or is it the series itself gathering itself
together as it goes?
I will focus on the fifth and final chapter of LU vi, 1 on "The Ideal of
Adequation" (115-127), along with descriptions of end-points throughout
LU vi, 1. First, I will look at the teleological sense of synthesis: the "endresult" is an "ideal limit". Second, I will consider whether synthesis ends
with a single flash or alternatively keeps on ending with each new presentation: the "end-result" problematizes the "last side" in perspectival viewing and
the "last member" in analysis. Third, I will consider how contents can retain
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their histories and their differenees onee they are overeome in a final unity:
the "end-result" is a "living finish", a closure that reeonstitutes the series as
it proeeeds.
(A) End-Result as Ideal Limit
Husserl says four things about the end-point as the "goal" (Ziel) toward whieh
synthesis "aims" (abzielen). First, no matter how much perspeetival viewings
inerease in eomplexity, if no omni-perspeetival "goal" is envisaged, pereeptions will not fulfil a self-identieal meaning-intention (67). Second, the
end-result must be a "goal which is closed off" (abschliessendes Ziel, 117)
(i) in that a subject must be able to imagine getting to the point where the
intended object is "itself' present, and (ii) in that the goal is the final arbiter
for whether a given eontent measures up to epistemie demands. Third, the endresult is a "goal whieh one cannot stride over" (unberschreitsbaren Ziel, 121).
The final eontent must assure that onee it has been carried out, the subjeet
will know that nothing more is needed - it must provide "evidenee" not only
of the objeet's presenee, but also of its own completedness. Fourth, the goal
operates as final eause which, although it may not in fact be reaehed, nevertheless pulls synthetic activity along behind it.
We have seen that a presentation reaehes "perfection" (117) or "eompletion" (118) when it is brought from merely signitive to pereeptual matter
(116). An "absolute" or "all-sided presentation" (117) "direetly" presents the
object "itself" as it is "in truth", or "in its being". It "verifies" assertorie
judgments with "evidence" (121) as it reaehes an "ideal limit" (ideale Grenze,
117):
The consideration of the possible fulfilment relations thus points forwards to a goal of closing
off the levels of fulfilment, in which the full and whole intention has reached its fulfilment,
and to be sure not an intermediary and partial one, but has reached a last fulfilment whose
value is at the end [eine endgltige und letzte Erfllung erreicht hat]. The intuitive substance
of this closing-off presentation is the absolute sum of possible fulness; the intuitive representant is the object itself, as it is in itself. Representing and represented content are here identically
one. And where a presentative intention has achieved, through this ideally perfect perception,
its last fulfilment. there is produced the genuine adaequatio rei et intellectus: The objective is
precisely as it is intended. really "present" or "given"; no partial intention is any longer implicit,
which lacks its fulfilment (117-118).
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171
this agreement is lived in evidence in so far as evidence is the actual carrying-out of the
adequate identification ... The carrying-out of an identifying coincidence is not yet an actual
perception of objective agreement, but first becomes so through its own act of objectifying
interpretation, through its own glance towards the truth which is ready-to-hand (122-23).
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agreement over an object's description, but that they agree on how to fill in
the gaps of their respective perceptions. The openness, and even the partial
incorrectness, of incomplete intuitions, does not prevent different intentions
from converging on a single object through revision, since the end to which
those different intentions lead forward is in all cases an apprehension of what
there "is". If synthesis were grounded at the beginning of cognitive investigation, then if two subjects expected different intuitions, they could only be
satisfied by the presence of different objects. But if the subjects aim at the
end of interpretation, then they both aim to actualize different possibilities and
aim at the complete presentation of one and the same object.
There is, however, a peculiarity in this account, namely that the meaning
of an expression may be fulfilled by intuitions quite different from those which
the expression-user believes will satisfy it. If the end-point may be misapprehended at the beginning, then in order to guide interpretation from the
beginning, it must do so implicitly, not only when a subject does not think
of articulating it, but also when he would not or could not express it. Husserl
distinguishes the syntheses that adequately fulfil part-intentions, which are
expressed, from those that present the object "itself", which are "not expressed"
(123):
We find here [in evidence] several agreements brought to synthesis: one of these, the partial,
predicative one, is meant in the form of a claim, and adequately presented, and so is given
itself ... This is the agreement between subject and predicate, the fit of the latter to the
former. But in the second case, we have the agreement which produces the synthetic form of
the act of evidence, and thus produces the total coincidence between the meaning-intention of
the assertion (Aussage) and of the perception of the state of affairs itself, a coincidence naturally carried out step by step, which here ceases to be at issue. This agreement is plainly not
asserted [or "said out loud", ausgesagt], it is not objective like the first, wh ich belongs to the
judged state of affairs. Doubtless it can at any time be asserted, and be asserted with evidence.
It then becomes the truth-generating (wahrmachend) state of affairs of a new evidence, of
which the same holds, and so on (124).
Again, there is a double end-point. First, each property which can be predicated of the object in an assertion, may be perceived in a single act. While
no one of those predication-verifying perceptions is an adequate presentation of the object itself, the latter is only ever present as perspectivally
determined. The object itself, as the correlate of the totality of all synthetic
activity, is always present but never articulated as wholly present. The second
adequation, which closes the open system of part-adequations, is never present
as a whole-adequation that is carried out, but is always present in the form
of new part-adequations that can be carried out.
The end-point exists as that which underlies, generates, and lives on through
the steps of, the very open-ended end-points which it is supposed to close
off. The end-point must both be the ideal at which interpretative multiplicities aim to co-terminate, and also the system of non-terminating part-intentions
understood in their unexpressed unity. But how can the end-point be both an
absolute closure of interpretation and yet exist only as the reopening of inter-
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Husserl sometimes writes as though an intention is a kind of checklist adequated at the moment when the last intuition on the list is checked off. On
this model, the last moment in a synthesis of fulfilment is a single intuitive
content like any other - a sense-datum, a limited perspectival perception, an
idea-fragment, etc. - whose only distinction is that it was the last one needed
to complete the collection. At other times, he writes as though an intention
creates the demand to see the object as a whole. On this model, the last moment
in a synthesis of fulfilment is an intuition which is no longer limited, perspectival, or fragmentary, but complete, omni-perspectival, and totalizing all
by itself - an intuition which at one blow makes the entire object present in
all possible ways. Of course, neither of these kinds of end-points could actually
be reached in the case of three-dimensional corporeal objects, and possibly not
in the case of categorial objects either. Nevertheless, it makes a difference
which model Husserl intends, both for the ac count of completion-points (e.g.
for whether 53 is understood when the last unit has been counted or when
the total product has been calculated), and for the account of synthetic activity
(e.g. for whether synthesis is grounded in immediate dator intuitions or
in genetic histories). These alternatives emerge in the contrasts between
(i) the last unit and the sum, (ii) the product and the process, and (iii) the
immediate and the mediate. I will argue that both models must be held
simultaneously - the end-point must be both a singular intuition and a history
of intuitions.
(i):
Each ascending series points forwards to an ideal limit, or realizes it in its final member
[Endglied}, which sets for every advance an unsurpassable goal: the goal of absolute knowl
edge, of the adequate self-representation of the knowledge-object (66).
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relation. The goal may be one of pushing the process of fulfilment until it
has included at some point or other every content that it could include, or it
may be one which produces a single absolutely full content which no longer
has any need to refer back to any previously experienced content.
(iii) Finally, we can ask whether the end-point is an immediate result or a
mediated one. In discussing "the achievement of intuited intentions", Husserl
says that "the last outcome of the whole mediate process is an immediate
intention" (75). Yet it is not in an uninterpreted datum that the fulfilmentprocess ends, but as a synthetic achievement, "the last ideal of perfection"
(121). Likewise in "the negative ideal of the last frustration" (126), it is by
arriving at the end of a search that an intuition falsifies a hypothesis. The
last intuition is last only in the context of other intentions and intuitions
which it either proves or challenges.
How, then, can synthesis result in immediacy? When Husserl says that
the ideal of adequation requires all-sided representation "in a single blow" (67),
is "singularity" achieved through a gradual process that is nevertheless unitary
in content, or alternatively achieved in a single instant that is nevertheless
manifold in content? Either way, the singularity of the blow is something
that has to be worked up to.
The final outcome of fulfilment must be both mediated and single-blowed,
both purified of, and full of, synthesis. On the one hand, Husserl writes: "Since
the last fulfilment may include nothing at all in the way of unfulfilled intentions, it must, by the nature of its ground, follow from a pure perception; an
objectively complete perception, which nevertheless is carried out in the
manner of a continuous synthesis of impure perceptions, cannot suffice for us"
(119). Aseries of partial perceptions, synthesized in an ongoing way but incomplete at every moment and so never enclosed within a single content of
consciousness, can never count as ended even if every possible perspective has
been viewed at some time or other during the series. Yet evidence is also
"the act of the most perfect synthesis of fulfilment".
We may now draw the following conclusions. Having a perception of the
last side of an object does not count as having the object evidently present
unless the perception of the last side fits into, and finishes, a viewing that
continues to be present to consciousness. The last side without its history is
not a last fulfilment. But even as the last next-content in a continuous history,
the last side is not the ideal limit-point unless it presents the object in a
single blow. But for its side, the "single blow" is a synthetic achievement. It
cannot collapse multiple perspectives into a one-sided viewing, nor can it
turn a number-concept or a scientific category from something that can be
defined in many ways into something that can be defined only in a single
way, nor can it take something that is by nature the result of a certain ordering
of its parts (e.g. a number, a narrative picture, or a history) and turn it into
something that can be seen or understood all at once, or with no order, or
with any order at all. The all-sided perception without a history is no more
a last fulfilment than is the one last side. The end-point must be both a singular
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The problem for the end-point is that every time perception moves to make
one side of an object present, it loses the presence of the previous side. The
all-sided object is no more present in the last fulfilment than in the first, and
the process of epistemic fulfilment is an infinite fading-away where every
perceptual achievement is instantly forgotten. It is true that there are some
senses of synthesis that would apply even to pointless rotations: perceptions
could still "follow" one another in the right order, and identify sides of the
same object. But on this model there is no synthesis which gradually builds
up a viewing of the whole object. There cannot, on the model of balanced
gain and loss, be any ideal end-point, and hence there could be no limit on
the directions for further viewing, and hence no principle to distinguish direct
from digressive side-views, and finally no principle to decide whether one side
really "follows" next after another. For a "whoIe synthesis" requires growth
towards a "non-oversteppable goal". It requires that "succession" operate in
the whole-system of interpretative synthesis, and not just in individual twists
and turns. It requires that some cognitive act compensate for the perceptual
losses incurred step by step.
The issue of the retention of incomplete standpoints in synthetic unity
is, however, difficult to pin down as a Husserlian issue. For while Husserl
articulates the problem of fulfilment as one of loss-management, and defines
the end-point as the "closure" of a chain (73, 117), he nevertheless insists
throughout LU that meaning-fulfilments are not "genetic" in their presentative content:
Many an element of fulness counts for us, as a presentation that counts as the end - always
independent of all those that are genetic, since those latter, like all similar variations, grow by
virtue of association (117).
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intention directed at his own thought-processes. Yet the lesson is not that
incomplete presentations cease to be necessary once perception becomes
allsided, but rather that they must be re-ordered once the whole is mapped
out. The very fact that it does not matter which perception followed which
in subjective experience, shows that objective interpretation redistributes them
in a new order based on the relations among the object's own parts.
On my construal, the end-point is constituted in the redistribution of always
incomplete standpoints according to interpretations whose telos is a wholesynthesis. A new content avoids losing its predecessor, then, by re-ordering
it in a new mastering intention; the predecessor is interpreted no Ion ger as
something experienced at a particular time, but as an ideal possibility subsumed
within a whole. Both ideality and wholeness are constituted in this reconstruction: ideality because factual histories are transformed into possibilities
for re-interpretation, and wholeness because new acts demand the re-arrangement of all its predecessors in a new objectifying interpretation.
My construal of the end-point bears not only on the end-point of synthesis, but also on its starting-point and its mid-points. In terms of the end-point
itself, my construal permanently problematizes the sense in which an object
may be present "in one blow" (67, 70, 73). For on my construal, the "endpoint" is not a name for a super-content which solves the problem of unified
interpretation, but rather a name for any content in so far as it demands the
re-ordering of its predecessors.
For example, when all four right-angled sides of a house have been seen
in order, and the fourth corner is rounded and the first side is seen again,
the experience of the several sides is transformed into an experience of the
house as present in all sides. It is not that all sides are really present at once;
nor does the experience of a side exactly similar to one already seen guarantee that the same side is being seen a second time; nor does a succession
of four one-sided viewings guarantee that the viewer's image of the whole
ground-plan is correct; nor indeed do four perceptions in succession, even if
that is all there are, present the object as a whole and all at on ce in one final
view. What is important about the completion of the fourth side and the
return to the first is the way the succession is closed off. To complete the
viewing, the last side must be interpreted as leaving no room for a fifth right
angle on the floor-plan, and it must do this by fixing the relative place of
each of the four sides already viewed. The perception of the fourth side
avoids losing the evidence of the first just because, in setting limits to the
re-ordering of its precedents, i.e. in counting them up, it leaves room for
nothing around the next corner except the first side. Of course, this closure
of possible sides is neither absolute (since if "side" is construed broadly as any
aspect, there will always be infinite "sides" to be seen), nor indeed peculiar
to the fourth side. It is in this sense that synthetic closure is a feature not
just of the very last experience but also of every moment interpreted as the
end of its predecessors. The perception of the second side anticipates a third
just because, in attaching to the first, it cannot close off the outer walls of
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the house without a third side; the second side uses the problematics of closure
to refer back to the first so as to anticipate the third. Even the experience of
the first side gets interpreted as the side of a house only because the closure
of the house's walls is already having a backward effect, differentiating the
walled object from previously experienced objects and demanding the supplementation of its other sides. It is by referring backward from an end-point
which has not been reached that ongoing acts of interpretation master whole
syntheses. A single incomplete content, "singled out from the succession" (67),
Le. as one moment in the pointless side-to-side rotation of a perceived object,
by itself can neither count as an end-point, nor ground the passing over to
the next side. Yet incomplete contents are precisely those within which completion is recognized - not in so far as they are assessed one at a time, but
in so far as each one re-places its precedents into the succession which it closes,
and is already re-placed into a more fully closed succession which cannot
yet even have taken place.
Hence, in discussing the last fulfilment of the number concept 5 34, Husserl
says:
Plainly the act of fulfilment would not really have corresponded only to the end-result, but [would
have corresponded] already to each single step wh ich led over from one expression to the next,
clarifying it and enriching its content (69).
The intuition of units does not itself count as the intuition of 5 34 unless the
subject reconstructs the complex number even as he divides it up. The synthesis of fulfilment locates within every act both openness (since each act
runs through its predecessors in a fresh way) and closure (since each act
introduces a new end-point by which to order its predecessors). The counting
subject must at every step not forget his place, he must not forget what number
he began counting down from or how small the units are that he expects
to end with, he must not forget whether he is counting by ones, twos,
or multiples of five, and he must not forget what the countability of a unit
amounts to. That is, he must experience each division as a unit which makes
the next part of the whole present - not so as to forget the last part, but
so as to remember that the next was implicit all along and that past and
present units are to be recounted together. Each number in the chain of divisions retains the foregoing numbers, then, not because any one of the numbers
counting down from five to one includes its predecessors, nor because any
one formula (e.g. 3 + 1 + 1) or equation (e.g. 5 = 3 + 1 + 1) names its
predecessor (4 + 1 or 5 = 4 + 1), but just because the countdown is closed
by the reaching of ultimate units, and because this ideal closure, reachable
or not, confers upon each step the characteristic of referring back to its
origination in its predecessor.
The pencil-sketch too suggests that closure corresponds not only to the
last step but to all steps constituted by the last as the foregoing. Husserl
introduced the pencil-sketch as a fulfilment series achieved "in a synthetic
multiplicity" which "is achieved piece by piece and always muddied through
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such additions" (67). While falling short of the one-blowed "ideal of adequation", it reaches precisely the kind of finish appropriate to it. It is finished
precisely because of its endless "additions" or "postscripts" (Zusatz) and is
clarified precisely because its outline is "muddied" by its details. Its last fulfilment is "the full-of-life finish of the painting", or differently translated,
"the lived having-been-carried-out painting" (lebensvoll ausgefhrte Gemlde,
67). Now, when one says that a painting has come to life, one often means
that the fictional object has been represented in a way that is true to life.
But Husserl, for whom paintings are never to be confused with authentie
perceptions, says here that it is the painting itself that lives. Or to be precise,
it is the painting in the final state of having been carried out that is full of
life. It is the end-result that is lived. Finishing touches on their own, as the
last flecks of colour, the last figure to complete the narrative, and so on,
would not be much to look at. Indeed the same holds true for the last conclusion to an argument, the last effect in a causal sequence, or of course the
last percept in a visual examination - the finishing touch (almost a translation of Zusatz) is in itself merely a detail that touches up, and sets off in
relief, the foregoing series. We have said that the filled-in painting reactivates its outlines. But the end-point not only "puts into practice" (again
ausfhren) the outlines themselves, but also reactivates the "whoie synthesis"
as aseries of "passings over" from drawing to sketch to picture to painting.
The last fleck is the missing link whieh allows the whole series of interactivating flecks to be run through anew.
The end-point is a living finish, and corresponds to the whole process
leading up to it, just because it is by nature the re-making of unending incomplete parts into a new totality; the end-point is a new version of the series,
a new individual content of experience, but it brings the object "itself"
to presence in so far as it reopens the incomplete versions as closing
themselves off. The object "itself" is absolutely present if it is present in
a way that allows all of its possibilities to be run through explicitly. The
end-point is experienced when all imaginable perceptions are constituted as
having been previously experienced, and when every previous intuition
is re-interpreted as one which has led to the point where the experience
now stands. It is reached in so far as an experience refers back to prior
experiences as referring forward to it.
If we now go back to ask the most general questions about synthetie activity,
namely why contents of consciousness anticipate objectifying completionpoints, or why there is a dynamic for contents to synthetically pass over in
succession, the categories of limit supply the answer in reverse. Instead of
treating each content as the starting-point for a synthetic combination, the
categories of limit treat each content as an end-point. The individual content
is not at first something that needs to have its synthetic combinations explained,
but rather from the first is the explication of synthetic connections, of forward
and backward references. A perspectival perception, or a stage in an argument,
anticipates the next side or the next conclusion just because it is already closing
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off aseries of sides and conclusions whose order is constituted as determined in advance by the final closure of self-evident perception or systematic
science. Each moment has forward and backward references just because it
is already the backward referent of ideal end-points and the forward referent
of ideal starting-points. Ideal starting-points and end-points are grounded just
because ongoing interpretative contents must appeal to them, and contents must
appeal to starting-points and end-points just because those latter are already
constituted as having demanded that those contents appeal to them.
CONCLUSION
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next-neighbours and fix common boundaries. But there remains a problem concerning the determinacy of the next content. Third, if the intention is a kind
of perspective- or cognitive-system ordered by weight, the determinacy of nextcontents is grounded by the fact that the complexity of each content generates
the momentum for filling in its successor. But then there is a problem concerning interpretative gaps. Finally, if the intention is a kind of limit point
to an object's presentation, excess and missing intuitions are avoided by the
way an intention includes all and only those intuitions whose presence would
be demanded in a perfect presentation of the object "itself". That is, the
intention anticipates a range of intuitions from the beginning of synthesizing
activity just because it is al ready a product of the limit point at the end. The
end-point orders its own precedents into a succession of next-points.
An act of consciousness intends an object, then, by (a) tracing back a history
of previous acts, (b) reorganizing those previous acts into a common interpretation, (c) re-tracing that history back up to the present act so as to fix
its degree of completion in the present, and (d) referring forwards to a content
that would complete, by completely referring back to, the epistemic project
posited to have begun. The dynamic for passing over from each act to the
next from beginning to end is located in each singular act, as it simultaneously divides itself into aseries of actual and/or possible experiences and
unifies itself into a potentially all-sided totality. The content of each act refers
forwards and backwards by setting in motion a system of tracings and retracings according to which it is itself a forward- and backward-referent of ideal
starting- and end-points.
It is because the end-point is a Jorward-referring point from which predecessors are re-ordered, that contents differentiate themselves from their
predecessors. If the all-sided result of epistemic synthesis had to consist in
the very last act in aseries somehow holding all its predecessors in one, the
problem of the retention of precedessors as incomplete standpoints would be
unresolvable. But the last fulfilment rather unifies a singular interpretation precisely by reconstructing the limitations of its many sides. It is not that
everything experienced is remembered, or that a meaning is identical to the
history of its associative connections. The point is rather that an interpretation is the transformation of an experiential content into an actual or possible
history whose re-tracing can warrant future progress. That is to say, the
starting-point for interpretation is a backward-referring point from which
implicit anticipations are grounded.
This preview allows us to resolve the four problems of synthesis drawn from
LU vi.
(i) The fourth, namely that of how a content incorporates its predecessors, is solved by the way each content interprets the world by redistributing
previous experiences along achain within which that content constitutes an
advance.
(ii) The third problem, namely that of how an end-content closes off epistemic advance in the midst of endless series of perceptions, is solved by the
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way each content fixes its further needs for supplementation precisely by
retracing those already achieved. A content carries an expectation to intuit
all and only those properties whose presence once perceived can be interpreted
as already having unfolded in prior contents.
(iii) The second problem, namely that of "next"-contents, is solved by the
way that each content both has and is a backward referent. Each is automatically a next-point, and anticipates that perception which will have to refer
back to it as immediately past.
(iv) The first problem, namely that of how intuitions are subsumed under
an intention in general, is solved by the way each content refers back, through
previous experiences of the same object, to the ideal possibility of experiencing
that object in general, which is to say to the ideal meaning-intention, and to
the ideal meaning-fulfilment.
The categories of referring back also solve the problems of synthesis in
the first five Investigations.
(i) The problem of synthesis in the first Investigation concerns how there
can be ideal units of meaning even though every expression is embedded in
the thought-horizons of individual subjects at individual times and places. I
argued that ideal meanings are constituted by those acts which purge occasional associations. Though every meaning carries accidental associations,
every occasion of meaning-use refers back to the sense that that meaning would
have had prior to its associations. Even the purest syllogism operates within
synthetic combinations, though its task is to derive only that which is implicit
in the terms it refers back to.
(ii) The problem in the second Investigation concerns how there can be
universal objects given their ground in synthetic combinations of individuals. The solution is that synthesis produces novel intentional objects
interpreted as not being so produced. Uni versals and individuals both become
possible objects just when universals refer back to syntheses of individuals
in such a way as to exclude those very references.
(iii) The problem in the third Investigation eoncerns the objectivity
of wholes and parts. Parts are divisible only with reference back to the
whole which is thereby detailed, and the whole can be composed only
with reference back to the parts' mutually satisfying demands for supplementation. Referring backward in both directions at onee gives to objeetifying
interpretation what I have called a self-propelling dynamic towards selfexplieation.
(iv) The problem in the fourth Investigation is that this self-propelling explieation is represented in expressions by syncategorematic terms, which have no
meaning on their own. Synthetic connectedness always has the character
of having already been given in advance as the apriori history of all possibilities of expression.
(v) The problem in the fifth Investigation concerns the eompeting priorities of names and predications, perceptions and judgments. The structure of
competing priorities of seemingly distinct types of acts is precisely what
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I have been articulating two problems with the result of synthesis. First, I asked
how results of synthesis are objectively grounded. Why should the demands
for unified consciousness connect experiences according to connections present
in the objects themselves? Second, I asked how consciousness can refer to,
let alone predict, end-results, given that interpretations are in principle endless.
How can ideal results guide epistemic progress, given that the ideal is never
experienced?
Since the end-point is always deferred, its efficacy in fixing next-points
depends on its being a function of a starting-point that actually is present.
Husserl 's most general statement on referring backward introduces the
problematic of end-points and immediacies:
... The fulfilment of mediate intentions leads back [zurckfohrt] to the fulfilment, indeed to
the intuitive fulfilment; and it has also tumed out that the last outcome of the whole mediate
process is an immediate intention (75).
There are of course several ways of construing this passage. It might just
mean that complex fulfilments are buHt up out of, or are divisible into, simple
or partial fulfilments; or that indirect presentations (e.g. presentations of an
object at a distance) are possible only if they give some evidence as to how
an object could be directly presented (e.g. up close); or that complete fulfil-
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ment presupposes prior incomplete fulfilments. Yet the passage does not
say that mediate acts are inferior versions of immediate acts, but instead
attributes to mediate fulfilments a proper activity of their own, namely that
they refer backward. And while the passage does attribute a kind of firstness to immediate intentions, it does so just because the achievement of
immediate intentions is the very last thing that mediate fulfilments achieve.
Hence, for example, the experience of a house leads back to intuitions of
sides of, or bricks of, the house, not because those latter were seen first, but
because the experience sets in motion a process of retrieving intuitions whose
objects are posited as "already" there. Furthermore, the end-result not only
decides which intuitions were closer to the end; it also designates certain
intuitions and intentions as always having been present no matter how the
house is interpreted, i.e. it also fixes absolute starting-points for epistemic
fulfilment.
The question of the results of synthesis is thus a question of how cognition posits immediate intentions as having been present all along. Cognition
has end-points only in so far as it can produce the implicitness of beginningpoints. A subject can refer forwards to a complete presentation of a house
(or a theory or a subject) only in so far as he can refer back through the
his tory of his actual experiences to an ideal history of immediate sensecontents, of one-at-a-time fulfilments, of simple judgments, and of infinite
one-sided perspectives narrowing and expanding and shifting in focus and
distance.
The notion that the result of synthetic activity is a function of interpretation that refers back to what there was all along can be described either (i)
from the standpoint of the result itself as a goal, or (ii) from that of the
process which has that goal.
(i) The result of synthetic activity is the identification of an object as that
which it was meant to be from the beginning. The identification is thus what
Aristotle calls .o.l tfv elvut, the "what it was to be", the final cause. And
as for Aristotle, the ultimate final cause is for Husserl the ultimate efficient
cause and the ultimate formal cause: it is that which allows immediate intentions to generate complex intentions and that which gives order to multiplicities
of interpretative matter. One could say that this order is grounded at the
beginning from the end: each content, as a content whose epistemic worth is
conferred retrospectively by an ideal end-point, acquires thereby the potential to rate the value of succeeding contents. Each presupposes an end-point
in order to be drawn to the next content in succession. Alternatively, we
could say that the order is grounded from the beginning at the end: any completion is determined as such by counting back to see how far it has come.
Each content presupposes a starting-point in order to have been drawn from
the previous content. In short, even though no single experience may be
absolutely immediate or complete, both end-point and starting-point are
presupposed as prior. The results of synthesis are in this sense always absent,
but because their absence takes the form of being posited in order for indi-
LU VI
187
vidual contents to be named, placed in context, put in perspective, and epistemica11y pursued, it is precisely this absence of results that a110ws
synthesis to have results.
(ii) Husserl's clearest use of referring backward occurs in the example
from arithmetic, where he speaks of"going backward" (zurckgehen, Rckgang)
through a succession of contents each of which "passes over" to the "next"
(69-70). Knowledge of objects proceeds by retracing its steps and finding
that the results of epistemic syntheses had been emerging all along. We may
draw three conclusions.
First, synthetic activity is nothing but results. Every content is already a
re-interpretation of past contents in an effort to treat its object as already having
been an object of consciousness in the past, i.e. as a thing about which something is already known, if only something about how it was previously absent.
It is because of this backward-referring feature of acts that there can be no
pure sense-contents prior to interpretation, no pure thesis prior to synthesis,
no pure meanings prior to background fulfilment-chains, and so on. An immediate sense-content, for example, has already been constituted as the target
of a backward-referring attempt to see what a whole object will look like when
fu11y presented.
The second conclusion, then, is that every content, qua result, is engaged
in searching out the traces within it of other contents, and the traces by which
it is retained in others.
The third is that the objectivity of the results of synthesis is just what is
always going on in ongoing consciousness. The struggle for objectivity and
the struggle for a stream of consciousness depend on one and the same presupposition, namely that what is present now has been accessible a11 along.
Objectivity is stored in the past. And in so far as objectivity depends on an
ideal of epistemic closure which is always deferred, it is the present's reference backward to the past that is the storehouse of the future 's backward
referents.
But now to make the argument for the implicit storage of interpretations,
we have to press one last time the problem of the original ground of
synthetic activity.
(B) Re/erringBack and Husserl's Solution to the Problem
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LU VI
189
overflow. In general, the content of an act in transit, having found in its past
the meaning content that it itself put into the past, and indeed having constructed the past out of its own excess, henceforth possesses a context from
which it can draw anticipations for its successors and final goals. This backtracking interpretation for the sake of interpretative progress is wordless, since
the very distinction between prior words and posterior intuitions is already a
product of interpretative synthesis.
So a subject sees by the side of the road an unnamed object; the intuition
actualizes some interpretation, so that the object is seen as a milestone; the
interpretation then streams backwards, so that earlier experiences are interpreted to have anticipated the present intuition, as if the sentence 'There is
another milestone ahead' had earlier been expressed; the present intuition is
thus interpreted as the fulfilment of a prior meaning-intention; the interpreted
present and the present's re-interpreted past together make up a continuous
progression generated from the present end-point but precisely for that reason
interpreted as having been grounded in earlier experiences; the experience
of the object as an ancient Roman milestone is an experience of being in the
middle of a joumey with miles al ready covered and more still to go: the present
streams back in order for the future to be grounded in the past. That consciousness must refer back in order to interpret the present is exhibited even
more strikingly in cases where the interpretation of an object marks its novelty
rather than its continuity with the past. If an object were interpreted as posting
a different mileage than expected, or as a book in Hlderlin's handwriting
instead of Goethe's, the subject's response would be 'So that is what I have
been looking atlsearching for all along', and so on. On Husserl's doctrine of
reminiscience, an act of knowing is always grounded in the most distant past
just because each act fixes an object as something which has been guiding
interpretation all along.
There is an obvious problem. I have so far articulated the categories of
referring backward, which start with acts requiring a history, without
reference to those forward-referring categories that start with acts with the
potential for future explications. But if the ground of an interpretation is
conferred entirely retrospectively, a given content could set in motion any
interpretation whatsoever, and so validate any anticipations whatsoever. The
categories of referring backward seem to show that the very experiential history
that a subject would appeal to when verifying interpretations is itself an arbitrary result of the synthesis of identification that it was supposed to have
validated.
When Husserl describes the looseness of interpretation that result~ from
the insufficient determinacy of the past in relation topossible re-interpretations, his descriptions both ac count for a common phenomenon and warn
against an excess of skepticism. He describes two apparently opposite phenomena: first, where "the re-production (Reproduktion) of imagined words lags
far behind (zurckbleibt) the trains of thought re-productively re-vived through
each intuition" (61); second, involving "the extraordinary ease with which
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LU VI
191
192
CHAPTER 6
into words. The idea is not just that experience contains unnamed designations waiting to get expressed. Syntheses of recognition get expressed neither
in complete or incomplete sets of names, sentences, passages, or books, nor
in a peculiar wordless text, but rather in a total discourse continuously tuming
back towards its own prior expressions and indications in order to draw new
grounds for self-explication. More unified than a closed text precisely because
of the gaps between texts that it presupposes (in unexpressed possibilities), the
expression of synthetic interpretation takes the form of an archive full of
mutually accessible texts, each of which consists of a re-reading of the others.
Wordless recognition is an intertextual system's self-exegesis of its own history.
To conclude, the ground of synthesis is given "in advance" (von vornherein)
just because current cognition always recognizes that something was there
before all along. Synthesis is grounded not in immediate contents, but in the
references back from mediate to immediate contents; not in simple judgments, but in the references back from ongoing interpretation to a background
of objective states of affairs; not in a pure ego but in the references back
from open-ended directions of interpretative consciousness to an underlying
unity and structure of consciousness. Synthesis is grounded in the ongoing
processes of consciousness, precisely in so far as those processes refer back
to apriori structures of subjectivity and objectivity.
The self-interpretation of intentional consciousness thus leads back to the
unity of consciousness in three directions. First, to a unified world of objects;
second, to a gap-free stream of interpretation carried out by a unified subjective
consciousness; and third, to the processes of interpretation themselves, to
the structures of its own understanding, Le. to the phenomenological science
of the apriori grounds of synthesis. In LU, it is the reference back to science,
rather than to the lived world or the transcendental ego, that is decisive.
(11)
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194
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LU VI
195
3.
APPENDIX
Husserl's account of synthesis and the single ego in Ideen 1 finally explains
how the ongoing process of interpretative consciousness lays out its own
intentional history behind it as it goes. One tends to remember the central
themes of Ideen 1 as being issues surrounding the absolute ego and the methodology of the transcendental reductions. But if we concentrate on sections
118-124 where Husserl discusses the problem of synthesis, we find that while
ego and science are still in some sense treated as prior to ongoing consciousness, they are here treated as having been constituted as prior by those
syntheses.
I offer the following pages not as a complete reading of Ideen 1, or as
a general account of the relation between Husserl's early and later works, or
even as a close exegesis of sections 118-124, but as a speculative reading
of the theories of the ego, of synthesis, and of phenomenology, and in particular a reading of Husserl's descriptive category of "drawing back", that
suggests a solution to the problems of synthesis left over from the Logical
I nvestigations.
The problem we have to solve is how the synthetic interpretation of actual
experience both grounds and depends on the implicit containment of backward
references in consciousness. Consciousness must be so constituted as to extend
beyond its actualities into a prior unity of all that is possible; it must be so
active as to have prepared for the passive reception of any experience whatsoever; so unified as to establish rational connections between distinct spheres
of meaning; so committed to natural experience as to reflect back on phenomenological science. In short, for the synthesis of acts of consciousness
to keep going on, interpretative consciousness must in each act be going
back for more of its own synthetic unity.
The issues which guide sections 118-124 concern the unification of a
plurality of acts of consciousness into a single, "all-enveloping", "original"
unity or "stream" of consciousness. "Synthetic consciousness" is an "intentional combination" wherein one act of consciousness is "bound up" with
another into "one consciousness" (245). At the outset of s. 118, there is a
proposal not to begin with the "unity of immanent time-consciousness", in
spite of the fact that temporal unity is "the all-enveloping unity of all the
experiences of a stream of experience", in which no act can be "foreign" (245).
Instead, Husserl proposes to deal in these sections with syntheses which are
not continuous but "jointed" (246), where the foreignness of the experiences
is precisely what is at issue in the effort to synthesize them. As in LU, the
account of synthesis in Ideen holds that individual contents of consciousness
are each "self-limiting", and hence have a contributory value towards com196
IDEEN 1
197
198
APPENDIX
and relations within syntheses, for recognizing the distance between the steps
and their relative priority and posteriority.
For all the Kantian tradition of the transcendental ego as the agent of the
synthetic unity of apperception, and for all of Husserl's talk earlier in Ideen
of the absolute being of the ego as the necessary and indubitable phenomenological residuum (ss. 33-49), the role of the ego's directedness towards
objects and capacity for synthesizing is quite specific, and even in a sense
derivative, in s. 122. The ego's "free spontaneity and activity" consists just
in the potentiality which the synthesis has of being "drawn out" or "completed"
(vollziehen).
(11) "Having in One's Grasp"
The second mode of carrying out articulated syntheses follows from the first
with "essential necessity". The insertion-point "grasps" a new synthesizable
content, and this inserting is "forthwith and without a break changed into
'having in one's grasp' ("im Griff haben")" (255). The self-giving character
of the inserted thesis is tumed into the character of having been given. Husserl
does not mention the active ego in describing the second mode - not because
there is no longer an ego who has the thesis in his grasp, but because the
grasping takes the form of receptivity.
(III) "Still Retaining"
The pure ego carries out a new step, and now in the pervading unity of the synthetic consciousness
"still retains" in its grasp what it had just grasped (253).
The logic of "still retaining" theses wh ich have since been synthesized holds
both in perception ("When collecting things together I do not allow the object
just perceptually apprehended to slip away while I turn my apprehending glance
to the new object", 253) and in reason ("In carrying out a proof, I run through
in steps the thoughts that serve as premisses; I do not surrender any synthetic step; I do not lose my grasp of what I have won", 253-4). In s. 119,
the plurality of theses was said to be "removed" in synthesis; in s. 122, the
distinct meaning of each is preserved.
The first mode of articulated synthesis constitutes a discontinuity in the
flux of consciousness; the second apprehends the meaning given to the discontinuous moment; the third transforms that moment into, and preserves
it as, a "member" or "joint" belonging to a "jointed synthesis" (246), i.e. to
a continuity of discontinuous theses. Every grasping of an object keeps its
content in mind long enough to be connected with the next grasping of the
object.
IDEEN 1
199
The third mode plays the role that the syntheses of identification play in LU
vi, but only in cases where one apprehension of an object is succeeded by other
apprehensions of the same object. Yet synthetic activity must allow a subject
not only to focus continuously on one object, but also to stop looking at one
object long enough to look at another; a subject must be able to treat the object
no longer noticed as something that co-exists with whatever is being noticed,
and as something that could be noticed aga in.
The pure ego can draw itself back (zurckziehen) wholly from the theses; it releases the thetic
correlates "from its hold": it "turns to another theme". What had just been its theme has not
disappeared from consciousness; it is still consciously apprehended, but no longer in thematic
grasp (254).
Here we have adescription, not to be found in LU, of the mechanism of synthetic activity whereby consciousness constitutes itself as having unnoticed
and implicit experiential contents. Consciousness creates a storage space for
the multiplicities it "releases", precisely by "drawing back" to its own self.
This "drawing back" completes the developments of the ego and of the continuity of discontinuitites. The ego, which from the start was responsible for
inserting discontinuities into the stream of consciousness, is only now capable
of intemalizing or withdrawing into or retuming back to itself and distinguishing itself from its objective world. But to understand the function of
the subject's "withdrawal" from objectivity in the constitution of the synthesis of objectivity, we will have to consider Husserl's description of the
possibility of withdrawal as a culmination of his description of possibility in
general in sections 109-115.
In ss. 109-113, there is a description of four types of acts of consciousness whose objects are experienced as possible but not real. First, a proposition
not known to be true may be "assumed". Second, an object may be "fantasized" in fictions or paintings, or in imagination. Unlike recollection, whose
objects likewise do not exist, fantasy requires no basis in any previous realityaffirming experience. Third, an object may be posited as "potential" rather than
"actual". In fact, every apprehension contains a surplus of meaning in potential form (234, 229). "Potential positings" subsist for consciousness as the
200
APPENDIX
IDEEN 1
201
The ego posits its activity and its passivity, its transcendentality and the
transcendence of its objects, the empirical world and the ideal sciences, the
unity of its world-interpretation and the different spheres of intentionality,
its actualities and its potentialities, all in the same synthesis of drawing back.
For by grasping its points of entry into the world as something still retained,
consciousness treats every new content of experience as a distraction - potentially innocuous, potentially an explication of what has been, potentially a new
thematic altogether - but in itself some kind of whistle that forces two distanced contents to be inserted and retained in one interpretation not quite
big enough or organized enough to hold them both. At once meditating at
his study and hearing the outside whistle, Husserl's ego takes up two perspective points at once; unlike Descartes's ego at a similar desk, Husserl's
can be distracted, and this call from the external world to abandon a perceptual standpoint is at the same time a division between external causes and inner
experience, and a confirrnation that the world is intact despite the distances
that separate its parts. In fact, every look is a look away, every point of insertion is a point of departure, every location leaves other locations behind behind as behind. Indeed this is the only way that locations ever were and ever
can be, namely in so far as they have had their places saved for them in advance
by other places. Just as Fichte's ego posits an external world as non-ego,
Husserl's ego posits itself by constituting a world-interpretation as the storage
space for its own past experience. The underlying unity of interpretation stores
the prior conditions for syntheses of identification and fulfilment by interpreting each content as that which the ego recognizes itself as being drawn
back to. The ego withdraws from current concerns into self-reflection at precisely the same point as the map of the world itself is drawn up. The storage
space in consciousness for presupposed conditions of experience, and the
storage space in the world for co-existing states of affairs, are constituted in
one and the same withdrawal/drawing back. In short, no content can gain a
point of entry into consciousness except in so far as it is relocated into a storage
space for retentions and backward referents.
While the above is by no means a complete account of Husserl's theory
of the ego in Ideen I, it does suggest an account. The ego is a product of
completed synthesis. Yet at the same time, it would be correct to say that
the ego is a pure identity prior to and indifferent to its experiences, its synthesizing interpretations, and its objective world. For the priority of its own
underlying self-identity is something that consciousness, as it were, slips
underneath itself every time it synthesizes experiences under objectifying
interpretations. The ego is a receptacle, a framework, and a storage space
for actual and possible experience, and for explicit and implicit forward and
backward referents, just because along with the insertion of any experiential
content, consciousness achieves receptivity, prescriptive structure, and the selfreflective ability to draw upon its own achievements.
Finally, in addition to offering a solution to the problem of the storage of
implicit backward referents, the synthesis of drawing back to the ego also
202
APPENDIX
IDEEN 1
203
"source" to which rationality "leads back" (320), namely the whole "system
of manifolds" (318).
The final section of Ideen 1 returns to the question of the unity of
the philosophical sciences and its role in the unity of consciousness.
Phenomenology marks out a region for itself as a distinct endeavor of consciousness, namely to describe the structures of the rest of consciousness,
and furthermore grounds its own possibility in its relations to the rest of consciousness. In thereby carrying the demands for the unification of all synthetic
consciousness, phenomenological science refers its rationality backward to
its source and so reconstitutes the whole system of distinguished spheres of
conscious acts under a new system of ordering, wherein consciousness as a
whole is a system devoted to grounding its own rationality. In so far as phenomenological science looks back on its own results, it finds without exception
that
objectivities which were at first given (or thought of in Idea as given) in monothetic acts, in
mere experiences, let us say, can be made subject to the play of synthetic operations, and
through synthetic objectivities constitute increasingly higher formations which in the unity of
the total thesis contain a plurality of theses, and in the unity of their total material contain a
plurality of mutually detachable materials (320-1).
204
APPENDIX
and the spheres of synthetic objectivities still revolve about consciousness. But
in another sense, it is only when the spheres separate off that there is any centre
to refer back to. The workings-through of the demands of objective constitution make one solution out of both the rational and the not yet rational.
The science of phenomenology is precisely the self-explicating dynamic that
consciousness always already had to have been in advance. And consciousness's investigation of the logic of its categories becomes the synthesis of
backward reference that is its investigation of itself and of the world.
Consciousness is Logical Investigations.
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INDEX
Bachelard, S., 16
Backward Reference (zurckweisen, and
other zurck terms), problem of, 1-3
211
212
INDEX
INDEX
Dreyfus, Hubert L., 15-7, 23, 34, 100
Dynamic, 9, 73, 87, 133-5, 151, 183
&lie, James Mo, 18, 100, 105
Ego, 2, 20, 32-5, 45, 142
as backward referent, 121, 192, 196-204
Eley, Lothar, 16-8,20,22,27,31-3,35, 106
Empiricism, 14, 16-7,52,54, 122, 127, 143
Empty meaning-intention, 40, 134-7
End-results, problem of, I, 3, 21, 34, 36-7
in meaning, 40, 46-7, 85, 117
content of, 125, 151-2, 158, 163-7, 202
and backward reference, 120, 183-7,
189-91, 194
as limit, 169-73
as last fulfilment, 173-6
as closure, 176-81
Endless continuity, 28, 42, 48, 83, 95, 129,
162, 180, 183
Epistemological interpretations of Husserl,
14, 21-3, 54n
Ergnzungsbedrjtigkeit, see Supplementation, demand/need for
Evans, Jo Claude, 19
Evidence, 21, 53, 55-8, 169, 170, 172, 175
Exactness, 44, 49, 57, 133, 151
Excess, 26, 183, 189
Exchange (Vertauschung) (see Replacement,
Substitution), 99-102
Exclusion, 57, 92, 98-9, 145-7
Expansion, 47, 81, 83, 85, 93-6
Expectation, 6, 25-6, 94,138-48, 153, 1712, 183, 188
Experience, lived (and lifeworld), 7, 35,64,
89,97,135,139,149-50,153,171,
180
Explication, of singular meanings into judgments, 91-2, 102, 112, 114-9, 121-2,
174
and reference forward, 189, 194
self-, I, 184, 192, 202, 204
Explicit, 26, 113, 139-41, 142-3, 149, 166,
180, 185, 202
Expression, 23-4, 38-49
linguistic, 88-106
in linguistic philosophy, 105-6, 134-5
in dreams, 97-8
in names and judgments, 112, 117, 120
and fulfulment, 125, 127, 172, 188-92
Fantasy, 75, 199
Fein, Ho, 20
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 33, 59
Fields, visual, 41, 46, 75-9, 86, 137, 150, 152
213
214
INDEX
INDEX
and synthesis, 125, 127-36, 142, 145-6,
151, 169-76
and backward reference, 179-80, 183,
186, 188-91
Itself, the object, 42, 48, 150-1, 157-8, 1614, 168-74, 180, 183
Judgment, 24, 57, 67, 96, 103-4, 109-21,
144-5, 169
Kant, Immanuel, 5, 8-9, 15,20,26,59,69,
102, 106, 123, 135, 155, 198,200
Kern, Iso, 17, 26
Kersten, Fred, 15, 54n
Kirkland, Frank, 29
Knowledge, 5-6, 14, 18, 21-2, 26
and meaning, 43, 54, 56-7, 62, 65
and synthesis, 125, 127-8, 139, 145, 147,
154, 161-2, 169, 171-3, 187, 189-91,
199
Kohak, Erazim, 21
Kunz, Hans, 18
Landgrebe, Ludwig, 27, 30, 33-5
Language, 23-4,38,47-8,88-9,92-3, 1178, 131, 188-92
Lauer, Quentin, 29
Law, 4, 41-2,54, 63,67-8, 74, 81-2, 86-7,
92,99-107, 114, 131, 192-3
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhe1m von, 4-5, 8, 104,
131
Levin, David Michael, 16, 19,27, 54n
Levinas, Emmanuel, 21, 34, 54n
Lifeworld, see Experience, lived
Lifting off (setting off in relief, Abheben),
43-4,73,76-81,85-6,91, 155, 165,
170, 180
Limit, 5-8, 31-2, 44, 57, 63
of parts and wholes, 77-8, 82, 84-7
of meanings, 99, 129
of synthesis, 136, 138, 140-1, 153-4, 157,
167-81, 183, 194, 196
Logic,4,17,27,40-4,48,54n,60,67,81-2,
86,88-9,96-8, 104-6,204
Margins, 22, 52, 153-4, 162-3
Mastering intention (herrschende Intention),
147, 149, 166, 178
Matterofacts,15,17,93,99,II0,115,1345,149
McKenna, William R., 25, 33
Meaning, 2, 7, 13,38-40,57,83
ideal units of, 40-8
complete and incomplete, 88-108
215
216
INDEX
INDEX
Regress, 28, 42, 83
Relation, 75-6, 81, 178, 202-3
internal, 6, 31, 76, 100, 135
Replacement (see Exchange, Substitution),
45, 47-9, 99, 101-3, 129, 156
Result (Endresultat), 3, 6-7, 33, 35-7, 54, 68,
81, 125, 158, 164-81, 185-7, 189-90,
197
Retention, 18,96,151,163-7,175-9,183,
198, 201
Rockmore, Tom, 28-9
Rosen, Klaus, 22
Rules, 3, 5, 15-7, 43, 58, 66, 75, 82-3, 89,
99-106, 130, 141, 165
Scherer, Rene, 54n
Schrader, George A., 29
Schuhmann, Kar!, 18, 27, 30, 32-3, 35
Schutz, Alfred, 54n
Science, 38, 40-4, 48, 54-5, 57-8, 61-2, 86,
103, 106, 167, 192-3, 196,200--4
Scientia intuitiva, 57-8
Seebohm, Thomas, 20, 84
Seeing, 56-8
Self, 192, 194
Self-explication, 1, 192, 194, 202-3
Self-evidence, 53, 56-8, 104, 181
Self-identity, 45,127-8,146,150,170--1,
197,201
Self-propelling, 7, 80, 86
Self-consciousness (and related terms), 6,
29,192,194,197,201-2
Self-directing (and related terms), 6, 8,
59,78, 194
Self-fulfilling (and related terms), 155,
157
Self-limiting (and related terms), 92, 153,
156, 196
Self-presence (and related terms), 46, 75,
78, 84, 173-4, 319
Semantic, 23-4, 92, 99, 105
Sensation, 4-5, 15-7, 26-7, 52, 56, 66-7,
77-9, 98, 110-1, 119-21, 129-30,
135, 150, 174, 187
Sense-data,7, 16-7,33,36,66,110,119-21,
173
Separability (Ab trennung , Sonderung), 41,
60,74-80, 105, 118-20, 137, 144-6,
150,203-4
Severing, 44, 78-9, 85
Shadowing-off (Abschattung, see Perspective, Projection), 154-7
Sides, 41, 78, 83, 139-42, 152-60, 163,
166-7, 169-70, 173-81, 183, 186
217
218
INDEX
Phaenomenologica
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
Phaenomenologica
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
Phaenomenologica
88. D. Welton: The Origins of Meaning. A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian
Phenomenology.1983
ISBN 90-247-2618-2
89. W.R. McKenna: Husserl's 'Introductions to Phenomenology'. Interpretation and
Critique. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2665-4
90. lP. Miller: Numbers in Presence and Absence. A Study of Husserl's Philosophy of
Mathematics. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2709-X
91. U. Meile: Das Wahmehmungsproblem und seine Verwandlung in phnomenologischer Einstellung. Untersuchungen zu den phnomenologischen Wahrnehmungstheorien von Husserl, Gurwitsch und Merleau-Ponty. 1983
ISBN 90-247-2761-8
92. W.S. Hamrick (ed.): Phenomenology in Practice and Theory. Essays for Herbert
Spiegelberg. 1984
ISBN 90-247-2926-2
93. H. Reiner: Duty and Inclination. The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and
Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller. 1983
ISBN 90-247-2818-6
94. M. l Harney: Intentionality, Sense and the Mind. 1984
ISBN 90-247-2891-6
95. Kah Kyung Cho (ed.): Philosophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective.
1984
ISBN 90-247-2922-X
96. A. Lingis: Phenomenological Explanations. 1986
ISBN Hb: 90-247-3332-4; Pb: 90-247-3333-2
97. N. Rotenstreich: Reflection and Action. 1985
ISBN Hb: 90-247-2969-6; Pb: 90-247-3128-3
98. lN. Mohanty: The Possibility ofTranscendental Philosophy. 1985
ISBN Hb: 90-247-2991-2; Pb: 90-247-3146-1
99. lJ. Kockelmans: Heideggeron Art and Art Works. 1985
ISBN 90-247-3102-X
100. E. Levinas: Collected Philosophical Papers. 1987
ISBN Hb: 90-247-3272-7; Pb: 90-247-3395-2
101. R. Regvald: Heidegger et le Probleme du Neant. 1986
ISBN 90-247-3388-X
102. I.A. Barash: Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3493-2
103 lJ. Kockelmans (ed.): Phenomenological Psychology. The Dutch School. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3501-7
104. W.S. Hamrick: An Existential Phenomenology of Law: Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3520-3
105. I.C. Sallis, G. Moneta and I. Taminiaux (eds.): The Collegium Phaenomenologium.
ISBN 90-247-3709-5
The First Ten Years. 1988
106. D. Carr: Interpreting Husserl. Critical and Comparative Studies. 1987.
ISBN 90-247-3505-X
107. G. Heffernan: Isagoge in die phnomenologische Apophantik. Eine Einfhrung in die
phnomenologische Urteilslogik durch die Auslegung des Textes der Fonnalen und
transzendenten Logik von Edmund Husserl. 1989
ISBN 90-247-3710-9
108. F. Volpi, l-F. Mattei, Th. Sheenan, J.-F. Courtine, I. Taminiaux, l Sallis, D.
Ianicaud, A.L. Kelkel, R. Bernet, R. Brisart, K. Held, M. Haar et S. IJsseling:
Heidegger et I 'Idee de la Phenomenologie. 1988
ISBN 90-247-3586-6
109. C. Singevin: Dramaturgie de I 'Esprit. 1988
ISBN 90-247-3557-2
Phaenomenologica
110. J. Patocka: Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine. 1988
ISBN 90-247-3577-7
111. K.-H. Lembeck: Gegenstand Geschichte. Geschichtswissenschaft in Husserls
ISBN 90-247-3635-8
Phnomenologie. 1988
112. J.K. Cooper-Wiele: The Totalizing Act. Key to Husserl's Early Philosophy. 1989
ISBN 0-7923-0077-7
113. S. Valdinoci: Le principe d'existence. Un devenir psychiatrique de la phenoISBN 0-7923-0125-0
menologie. 1989
114. D. Lohmar: Phnomenologie der Mathematik. 1989
ISBN 0-7923-0187-0
115. S. IJsseling (Hrsgb.): Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0372-5
116. R. Cobb-Stevens: Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0467-5
117. R. Klockenbusch: Husserl und Cohn. Widerspruch, Reflexion und Telos in
Phnomenologie und Dialektik. 1989
ISBN 0-7923-0515-9
118. S. Vaitkus: How is Society Possible? Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as
Problems ofthe Social Group in Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-0820-4
119. C. Macann: Presence and Coincidence. The Transformation of Transcendental into
ISBN 0-7923-0923-5
Ontological Phenomenology. 1991
120. G. Shpet: Appearance and Sense. Phenomenology as the Fundamental Science and Its
Problems. Translated from Russian by Th. Nemeth. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1098-5
121. B. Stevens: L'Apprentissage des Signes. Lecture de Paul Ricreur. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1244-9
122. G. Soffer: Husserl and the Question of Relativism. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1291-0
123. G. Rmpp: Husserls Phnomenologie der Intersubjektivitt. Und Ihre Bedeutung fr
eine Theorie intersubjektiver Objektivitt und die Konzeption einer phnomenologischen. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1361-5
124. S. Strasser: Welt im Widerspruch. Gedanken zu einer Phnomenologie als ethischer
Fundamentalphilosophie. 1991
ISBN Hb: 0-7923-1404-2; Pb: 0-7923-1551-0
125. R. P. Buckley: Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility.
1992
ISBN 0-7923-1633-9
126. 1. G. Hart: The Person and the Common Life. Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics.
1992
ISBN 0-7923-1724-6
127. P. van Tongeren, P. Sars, C. Bremmers and K. Boey (eds.): Eros and Eris. Contributions to a Hermeneutical Phenomenology. Liber Amicorum for Adriaan Peperzak.
1992
ISBN 0-7923-1917-6
128. Nam-In Lee: Edmund Husserls Phnomenologie der Instinkte. 1993
ISBN 0-7923-2041-7
129. P. Burke and 1. Van der Veken (eds.): Merleau-Ponty in Contemporary Perspective.
1993
ISBN 0-7923-2142-1
130. G. Haefliger: ber Existenz: Die Ontologie Roman Ingardens. 1994
ISBN 0-7923-2227-4
131. 1. Lampert: Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl's Logical Investigations.
1995
ISBN 0-7923-3105-2
Previous volumes are still available
Further information about Phenomenology publications are available on request.