Republic vs East Silver Lane

March 26, 2014

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro
Brigola, Janica
SUMMARY: Respondent purchased a lot from its predecessors-in-interest and tried
to cause the registration of the same. It was opposed by the Republic arguing that
the predecessors did not possess the land in the manner and for the length of time
required under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 a.k.a. Public Land Act
(PLA), and Sec. 14 of PD 1529. SC ruled in favor of the Republic.
DOCTRINE:
For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) of PD 1529, and set up
acquisitive prescription against the State, the following rules must be observed:
A. The status of the property as patrimonial must first be established;
B. In determining the completion of the prescriptive period, the period of
possession shall be reckoned only after the property was classified as
patrimonial.
FACTS:
This involves a parcel of land situated at Misamis Ortl sold to respondent East Silver
Lance by (1) Francisca Oca and (2) Lims and Tans. Material dates:
December 31, 1925 - The subject land was supposedly declared alienable and
disposable.
June 12, 1945 it was claimed that the respondents predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property
since this date.
October 16, 1990- it was converted from agricultural to industrial.
1990 and 1991 - Respondent East Silverlane purchased the subject land
1994/1995 (exact year not mentioned in the case) - Respondent then filed with the
RTC an application for land registration of the subject property.
RTC: granted the respondents petition for registration, pursuant to PD 1529
(Property Registration Decree).
CA: upheld RTCs ruling. It further ruled that respondent complied with all the
requisites for land registration, to wit:
(1) the land is alienable public land (the report and certification issued by the
DENR show that the subject land was within the alienable and disposable zone. The
report and certification constitute a positive government act, an administrative
action, validly classifying the land in question.);
(2) the applicants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier (Respondent showed tax
declarations which are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner (albeit

not conclusive). They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property.);
(3) it is a bona fide claim of ownership. (Respondents predecessors owned the
land through acquisitive prescription. Petitioner Republic did not present any
evidence to contradict the claim that respondents predecessors are in possession of
the subject property and their possession of the same is open, continuous and
exclusive in the concept of an owner for over 30 years.)
Petitioner Republic assails such ruling of the CA and argues that:
1. Respondents sole witness, Vicente Oco, is not a credible/ competent
witness as he is the respondents liaison officer and not related in any way to the
respondents predecessors-in-interest. Hence he could not testify on the specific
acts of ownership performed by its predecessors-in-interest on the subject property.
2. That coconut trees were planted on the subject property only shows
casual or occasional cultivation and does not qualify as possession under a
claim of ownership.
3. Respondent failed to prove that its predecessors-in-interest
possessed the subject property in the manner and for the length of time
required under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 a.k.a. Public
Land Act (PLA), and Sec. 14 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: WON the respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the Public
Land Act (PLA) and P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
HELD: No. The evidence submitted by the respondent fell short of proving that it
has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under Section 48
(b) of the PLA. It was not established by the required quantum of evidence that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject property for the prescribed statutory period.
Hence, the respondent cannot register the subject property in its name on the basis
of either Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
RATIO:
1. For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) of PD 1529, and set up
acquisitive prescription against the State, the following rules must be observed:
C. The status of the property as patrimonial must first be established.
D. In determining the completion of the prescriptive period, the period of
possession shall be reckoned after the classification of the property as
patrimonial.
First, what is patrimonial property?
As per Article 420 of the Civil Code, the ff properties are of public dominion:
(a)
Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads and others of similar character;
(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.

All other properties of the State not mentioned in Article 420 are considered
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
Applying this to the case at bar
While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on
December 31, 1925, it was converted from agricultural to industrial only on October
16, 1990. Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject property had been
declared patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive period began
to run. The respondent cannot benefit from the alleged possession of its
predecessors-in-interest because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from
the public domain, it may not be acquired by prescription.
Prescriptive Periods under the Law
-The first PLA / Act No. 926 -required a possession and occupation for a
period of 10 years prior to its effectivity on July 26, 1904, or on July 26,
1894
Republic Act No. 1942 enacted on June 22, 1957 amended PLA/ Act 926;
itprovided for a period of thirty (30) years.
P.D. No. 1073 enacted on January 25, 1977 - possession and occupation
should commence on June 12, 1945.

Notably, the respondents application was filed after only four years from the time
the subject property may be considered patrimonial. This only shows lack of
possession whether for ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period.
Moreover, possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for
the periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property
into private property or release it from the public domain. There must be an express
declaration that the property is no longer intended for public service or development
of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified
as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and thus, may not be
acquired by prescription. (Heirs of Malabanan)
(Note: Ratio Nos. 2 to 4 are not so relevant to the topic, but they were additional
reasons for the SC to rule that the evidence of respondent was not sufficient)
2. The 23 Tax Declarations for a claimed possession of more than forty-six (46) years
(1948-1994) do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession and
occupation. Citing Wee vs Republic, The SC ruled that the tax decs only constitute
sporadic and intermittent assertion of ownership and is not proof of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation.
2. Vicente Ocos testimony does not supplement the inherent inadequacy of the tax
declarations. It is self-serving and hearsay.
3. The presence of 19 coconut trees at the time a Tax Declaration was filed in 1948
will not suffice as evidence that possession commenced prior to June 12, 1945 in the
absence of evidence that the predecessor planted and cultivated them. Even then,

considering that size of the lot, having only 19 trees planted thereon can only be
considered casual cultivation.
4. that plants were on the subject property without any evidence that it was the
respondents predecessors-in-interest who planted them and that actual cultivation
or harvesting was made does not constitute well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of
actual possession and occupation.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED. The CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the respondents application for registration of title is DENIED for lack of merit.