MICADLP NOTES

A.

Source of Power
Article II, Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.

B.

Scope of Authority
Doctrine of Necessary implication
o Doctrine of necessary implication. Stat. Con. The doctrine which states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed
Locham vs Ocampo

Facts: It appears that Gregorio T. Lantin, a doctor of medicine and lawyer was given an assignment by Acting Secretary of Justice
Ramon Quisumbing: Pursuant to the request of the City Fiscal of Manila and in accordance with the provision of section 1686 of the
Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby temporarily detailed to this office effective today, to assist him in the discharge of his
duties with the same powers and functions of an assistant city fiscal.

Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed informations in the aforesaid case after, presumably, conducting preliminary
investigations. Thereafter, the attorneys for the defendants filed motions to quash, questioning the acts made by Doctor Lantin.

Issue: WON petitioner has authority to sign information.

Held: Yes. Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, provides:

SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from
his office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his
duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General.

It will be noted that the law uses general terms. It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that provisions should not be given a
restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated. If the legislature had wanted to forbid the lawyer appointed to assist the
fiscal, to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions, it would have said so or indicated its intention by
clear implication. We need to be reminded that of all the functions of the fiscal, those referred to are the most important and
outstanding and the ones in which the fiscal usually needs aid.

Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they were enacted. The duties of a public office include all
those which truly lie within its scope, those which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office
was created and those which, although incidental and collateral, are germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of
the principal purposes. The authority to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is within the inferences to
be gathered from the circumstances which prompted the passage of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144 and its predecessors.

The reason is that the power to sign information, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is inherent in the power to assist a
prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in the Administrative Code. It does not emanate from the powers of the Attorney
General or Solicitor General conferred upon the officer designated by the Secretary of Justice; it is ingrained in the office or
designation itself. The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed on the appointee to assist the fiscal must be held as cumulative or an
addition to the authority to sign information, which is inherent in his appointment. In other words, the clause with the same authority
therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General does not exclude the latter authority. The power of the
Attorney General to sign information, as we have pointed out, owed its being, not to the powers legitimately pertaining to his office
as Attorney General but to the special provision authorizing him to assist fiscals. And it may be pertinent to know that when the
Attorney Generals power to assist provincial fiscals ceased, he stopped signing information. In the language of this section, the
person appointed was (1) to assist the fiscal in the discharge of his duties and (2) to represent the Attorney General in such matters. If
the two phrases meant the same thing, then one of them would be superfluous. There is no apparent reason for holding that one or the
other was a surplusage.

MICADLP NOTES
ONE-LINER: Scope of authority includes all powers necessary for the effective exercise of express powers pursuant to the
Doctine of Necessary Implication.

C.

Kinds of Authority
a.

Discretionary - One where the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how and when the duty
shall be performed. (remedy certiorari)

A faculty conferred upon a court or other official by which he may decide the question either way and still be right.

b.

Ministerial - One where its discharged by the officer concerned is imperative and required neither judgment nor discretion on his
part.

An officer or tribunal performs in given state of facts, in prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment (remedy mandamus)

c.

Cases:

Aprueba vs Ganzon
-

Petitioners alleged that they are owners and operators of a cafeteria located in Stall 17-C of the city market when respondent city
mayor ordered his policemen to close it for alleged violation of city ordinance.

When petitioner Aprueba saw respondent, he was informed by the latter that the store could only be reopened if petitioners paid
all their back accounts

That after paying the back accounts, respondent still refused to allow reopening of the store and instead scolded him for working
against respondent's candidacy in the last elections

That respondent told petitioner Aprueba to comply with health rules and regulations which he did

That respondent told him later that the store space would be used as an extension of the city health office

That petitioners have no delinquency in rentals and have complied with health rules and regulations and it is the ministerial duty
of respondent to allow them to operate the cafeteria and refreshment parlor business

That in refusing them to reopen their business, respondent unlawfully excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right they
are entitled to, or unlawfully neglected performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station; that respondent's acts were motivated by, personal and selfish considerations and intended to persecute, harass,
and ridicule his political enemies;

Respondent denied the material allegations of said complaint and alleging as defense that the remedy of mandamus cannot be
resorted to for the purpose of compelling him to reopen the stall, as petitioners' privilege to remain therein rests on an implied
contract of lease and that obligations that rest solely on contract cannot be enforce by mandamus where there is no question of
trust or official duty;

That even if mandamus may be the proper remedy, petitioners have no cause of action against respondent, because petitioner
Aprueba, who is lessee of stall 17-C, allowed his co-petitioner Modoc to conduct business therein, in gross violation of Ordinance
No. 93, s.

RTC: Mandamus not proper

Issue: WON the trial committed error when it denied petitioners motion for mandamus.

MICADLP NOTES
-

Held: This Court had held that mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where
the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act.

And where the legal rights of petitioners, as in the present case, are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition
for mandamus must be dismissed.

The privilege of operating a market stall under license is always subject to the police power of the city government and may be
refused or granted for reasons of public policy and sound public administration. Such judgment is discretionary upon the
respondent.

Such privilege is not absolute but revocable under an implied lease contract subject to the general welfare clause.

ONE-LINER: A discretionary act cant be compelled by mandamus.

First Phil. Holdings vs Sandiganbayan, Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez

Facts: The PCGG prays for the return, reconveyance, accounting and restitution of certain funds and properties.
Issues/Held:
The First issue: Does FPHC Have the Right to Intervene?
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in a proceeding, becomes a litigant therein to enable him
to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceeding. Its purpose, according to Francisco, is to settle
in one action and by a single judgment the whole controversy (among) the persons involved .

We have no doubt that petitioner has a legal interest in the shares which are the subject of the controversy. At the very least, it is
so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of the (sequestered shares) in the custody of the court.

PCGG prays that, among other properties, the shares in question should be returned and reconveyed to it. Respondent Equities
opposes the PCGG on the ground that it is the true owner thereof in its own right and name. On the other hand, petitioner claims
that said shares belong to it, not to respondent Romualdez or Equities. Clearly, therefore, petitioner would be adversely affected
by any judgment therein distributing or disposing of the property, whether to PCGG or to Equities.

The Second issue: Does Sandiganbayan Have Jurisdiction?

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has been clarified in the case of PCGG vs. Hon. Emmanuel G. Pea, thus: x x x Under
Section 2 of the Presidents Executive Order No. 14, all cases of the Commission regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and
Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their
Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees whether civil or criminal, are lodged within
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayans exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively
by the Supreme Court.

xxx (the) exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the principal causes of action,
i.e., the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases.

MICADLP NOTES
Parties who claim ownership or interest in the subject matter of sequestration proceedings before the Sandigabayan have no other
recourse than intervention in the litigation before the Sandiganbayan, whose decision is subject to review on certiorari exclusively
by this Court, for no other court or forum has jurisdiction over proceedings for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.

Indeed, in the face of such previous rulings, the inescapable conclusion is that the instant intervention must be allowed otherwise
the Sandiganbayan will not be able to determine the ultimate owner of the shares under sequestration.

The Third Issue: Will Mandamus Lie?

In resolving to deny petitioners motion for intervention, respondent Court abused its discretion because, clearly, the question of
ownership of the shares under sequestration is within its jurisdiction, being an incident arising from or in connection with the case
under its exclusive and original jurisdiction. Indeed, the respondent Court has jurisdiction to entertain both complaints and
answers in intervention over properties under sequestration by the PCGG. With the denial of its intervention, petitioner is
deprived of a remedy in law to recover its property alleged to have been taken illegally from it.

Intervention shall be allowed in the exercise of discretion by a court. Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a
discretionary act. But where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority equivalent to
denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall
issue.

ONE-LINER: Intervention shall be allowed in the exercise of discretion by a court. Ordinarily, mandamus will not
prosper to compel a discretionary act. But where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, the writ shall issue.

D.

Rights and Privileges

a.

b.

Right to Office

The right to office of an incumbent does not depend on any contract

It creates no contractual relation between the holder and the public

It exists by virtue of some law

It generally entitles the holder to compensation

Right to Compensation

Art 6, Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Art 7, Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be
determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during
their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.
Art 8, Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
Art. 9-B, Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present,

MICADLP NOTES
emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Cases:
CSC vs Richard Cruz
The respondent was charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General Manager Nicasio Reyes. He
allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging statement (Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at General Manager) against
GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors; four of the respondents subordinates allegedly witnessed the
utterance. The dishonesty charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondents act of claiming overtime pay despite his failure to
log in and out in the computerized daily time record for three working days.
The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave misconduct, he stressed that three of the four
witnesses already retracted their statements against him. On the charge of dishonesty, he asserted that he never failed to log
in and log out. He reasoned that the lack of record was caused by technical computer problems. The respondent submitted
documents showing that he rendered overtime work on the three days that the CMWD questioned.
GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the expiration of his preventive suspension, however,
GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and
dismissed him from the service.
CSC RULING: Respondent was not liable for grave misconduct, the CSC held: Cruz was adjudged guilty of grave
misconduct for his alleged utterance of such maligning statements, MASASAMANG TAO ANG MGA BOD AT GENERAL
MANAGER. However, such utterance, even if it were true, does not constitute a flagrant disregard of rule or was actuated by
corrupt motive. To the mind of the Commission, it was a mere expression of disgust over the management style of the GM
and the Board of Directors.
The CSC, however, found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable office rules for his failure to log in and log out. It
imposed on him the penalty of reprimand but did not order the payment of back salaries.
Issue: WON the Cruz is entitled to payment of backwages for the period of suspension pending appeal, of a government
employee who had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated.
Held: The Courts starting point for this outcome is the no work-no pay principle public officials are only entitled to
compensation if they render service.
The Court crafted two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found
innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way:
although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself
only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and
must be compensated.
Hence, the requirement that, to entitle to payment of salary during suspension, there must be either reinstatement of the
suspended person or exoneration if death should render reinstatement impossible.
The innocence of the employee as sole basis for an award of back salaries
Incidentally, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, if the public official or employee is acquitted of the criminal
charge/s specified in the law, he is entitled to reinstatement and the back salaries withheld during his suspension, unless in
the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Jurisprudential definition of exoneration
The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not
exonerated of the charge against him.
The Court ruled that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service
employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending
investigationand (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal; compensation is due only for the period of preventive
suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.
Bangalisan: With respect to the teachers who were away from their classes but did not participate in the illegal strike, the
Court awarded them back salaries, considering that: first, they did not commit the act for which they were dismissed and
suspended; and second, they were found guilty of another offense, i.e., violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations which is not penalized with suspension or dismissal. The Court ruled that these teachers were totally
exonerated of the charge, and found their dismissal and suspension likewise unjustified since the offense they were found to
have committed only merited the imposition of the penalty of reprimand.
The Present Case
We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during the period he was suspended from
work, following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his former position. The records show that the charges of grave

MICADLP NOTES
misconduct and dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found, there was no corrupt motive showing
malice on the part of the respondent in making the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of
dishonesty was well refuted by the respondents evidence showing that he rendered overtime work on the days in question.
On the legal issue of the respondents entitlement to back salaries, we are fully in accord with the CAs conclusion that the
two conditions to justify the award of back salaries exist in the present case.
The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and
regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty ( claiming overtime pay
despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with.
The second condition was met as the respondents committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor
suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand.
In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed by the CMWD until his reinstatement to
his former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive
suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries.
ONE-LINER: Backwages are awarded for the period of suspension or dismissal if (a) it is unjustified and
(b) the employee is found innocent of the charge

c.

Presidential immunity from suit

Soliven vs. Makasiar

Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself
filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this
would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability
to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she
may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues
Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government
is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to

MICADLP NOTES
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed
by any other person.

ONE-LINER: The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.

d. Doctrine of Official Immunity

Farolan vs Solmac Marketing
Error in good faith is covered by immunity
Imported film scrap was found to be an oriented fiber which importation is prohibited. Farolan withheld release,
pending advice from the BOI which took years before it allowed release. Farolan was sued for damages because the delay caused him
business losses.
SC held: Farolan is not personally liable because he acted in good faith. Even if he erred, he is not liable because
the damage did not result in injury to the importer.
Tuzon vs CA
Respondent Saturnino T. Jurado sent his agent to the municipal treasurers office to pay the license fee of P285.00 for
thresher operators. Mapagu refused to accept the payment and required him to first secure a mayors permit. For his part,
Mayor Domingo Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the permit
could be issued. Jurado ignored the requirement. Instead, he sent the P285.00 license fee by postal money order to the office
of the municipal treasurer who, however, returned the said amount. The reason given was the failure of the respondent to
comply with Resolution No. 9.
On April 4, 1977, Jurado filed a special civil action for mandamus to compel the issuance of the mayors permit and license.
WON the refusal on the part of the petitioners to issue a Mayors permit and license to operate a thresher to the private
respondent is "unjustified and constitutes bad faith" on their part.aw
library
:
red
The petitioners stress that they were acting in their official capacity when they enforced the resolution, which was duly
adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan and later declared to be valid by both the trial and the appellate courts. For so acting,
they cannot be held personally liable in damages, more so because their act was not tainted with bad faith or malice. This
was the factual finding of the trial court and the respondent court was not justified in reversing it.
Commenting on the petition, the private respondent avers that the signing of the implementing agreement was not a
condition sine qua non to the issuance of a permit and license. Hence the petitioners unwarranted refusal to issue the permit
and license despite his offer to pay the required fee constituted bad faith on their part.
While it would appear from the wording of the resolution that the municipal government merely intends to "solicit" the 1%
contribution from the threshers, the implementing agreement seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition
precedent to the issuance of the mayors permit. This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of liberality and
is never obligatory. If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown in view of the
challenge raised by the private respondents to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax
Code. These would include the holding of a public hearing on the measure and its subsequent approval by the Secretary of
Finance.
The only issue that has to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners are liable in damages to the private
respondent for having withheld from him the mayors permit and license because of his refusal to comply with Resolution
No. 9.cralawnad
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzons refusal to act on the private respondents
application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said
either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to
issue the permit and license to Jurado.
It doesnt appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayors permit and license
he needed. The petitioners were not Jurados business competitors nor has it been established that they intended to favor his
competitors. On the contrary, the record discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the
municipality without discrimination or preference.
The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their
honest interpretation of the resolution in question. We agree that it was not for them to rule on its validity. In the
absence of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed.

MICADLP NOTES
The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners acts, he was prevented from operating his business all
this time and earning substantial profit therefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the petitioners correctly observed, he
could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later challenging it in court to relieve him of
the obligation to "donate."
ONE-LINER: As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally liable to one
injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of his official duty. It
has been held that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith
that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages.
e. Preference In Promotion
Taduran vs Civil Service Commission
There is no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in law that persons next-in- rank are entitled to preference in appointment. But they
would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified. If the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by
transfer or other modes of appointment.
f.

Leave Of Absence
Sec. 284 and 285 of the Revised Admin Code amended by RA 2625
Sec. 284.After at least six months' continues faithful, and satisfactory service, the President or proper head of department, or
the chief of office in the case of municipal employees may, in his discretion, grant to an employee or laborer, whether
permanent or temporary, of the National Government, the provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of a
municipality, of a municipal district or of government-owned or controlled corporations other than those mentioned in Section
two hundred sixty-eight, two hundred seventy-one and two hundred seventy-four hereof, fifteen days vacation leave of
absence with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, for each calendar year of service.
Sec. 285-A.In addition to the vacation leave provided in the two preceding sections each employee or laborer, whether
permanent or temporary, of the National Government, the provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of a
municipality or municipal district in any regularly and specially organized province, other than those mentioned in Section
two hundred sixty-eight, two hundred seventy-one and two hundred seventy-four hereof, shall be entitled to fifteen days of
sick leave for each year of service with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays: Provided, That such sick leave
will be granted by the President, Head of Department or independent office concerned, or the chief of office in case of
municipal employees, only on account of sickness on the part of the employee or laborer concerned or of any member of his
immediate family.
Right to vacation leave
- At least 6 months continuous, faithful and satisfactory service
- Entitles the employee to 15 days vacation leave of absence with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.
- For each calendar year of service.
Right to sick leave in addition to vacation leave
- At least 6 months continuous, faithful and satisfactory service
- Entitles the employee to 15 days sick leave of absence with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.
- For each calendar year of service.
NOTE: on account of sickness of the employee or any member of his immediate family. So 30 days all-in-all in a year. And it
is not only the EE who is suppose to be sick but also the immediate members of his family.

g.

Retirement Pay
Pension
- Regular allowances paid to the retiree in consideration of services rendered or in recognition of merit, civil or military.
Gratuity
- A donation, an act of pure liberality of the State.
NOTE: Pension is an act of justice while gratuity is an act of generosity.
Santiago vs COA
Retirement laws should be liberally construed in favor of the retiree because they are intended to provide sustenance for
the retiree, and even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood.

MICADLP NOTES

PART III
Liabilities of Public Officers

A.

Presumption of good faith and regularity

Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. - (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his
official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.

(2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to perform a duty within a period fixed by law or regulation, or within a
reasonable period if none is fixed, shall be liable for damages to the private party concerned without prejudice to such other
liability as may be prescribed by law.

(3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or
misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.

Sec. 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in
good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are
contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under orders or instructions of his superiors.

Farolan vs Solmac Mktg.

Facts: At the time of the commission of the acts complained of by the private respondent, petitioner Ramon Farolan was then the
Acting Commissioner of Customs while petitioner Guillermo Parayno was then the Acting Chief, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Division. They were thus sued in their official capacities as officers in the government. Nevertheless, they were
both held personally liable for the awarded damages "since the detention of the goods by the petitioners was irregular and devoid
of legal basis, hence, not done in the regular performance of official duty

Solmac Marketing Corporation was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of
202,204 kilograms of what is technically known as polypropylene film, valued at US$69,250.05. Polypropylene is a substance
resembling polyethelyne which is one of a group of partially crystalline lightweight thermoplastics used chiefly in making fibers,
films, and molded and extruded products.

Without defect, it is sold at a much higher price as prime quality film. Once rejected as defective due to blemishes, discoloration,
etc., it is sold at a relatively cheap price without guarantee or return. This latter kind of polypropylene is known as OPP film
waste/scrap and this is what respondent SOLMAC claimed the Clojus shipment to be.

MICADLP NOTES
Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the BOI and by law, petitioners Parayno and
Farolan withheld the release of the subject importation.

Petitioner Parayno wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or not the subject importation may be released - the
BOI agreed that the subject imports may be released but that holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to
their release.

The late Atty. Dakila Castro, then counsel of private respondent wrote to petitioner Commissioner Farolan of Customs asking for
the release of the importation. The importation was not released, however, on the ground that holes had to be drilled on them first.
Atty. Dakila Castro then wrote a letter to BOI Governor stressing the reasons why the subject importation should be released
without drilling of holes. BOI Governor H. Zayco wrote a letter to the Bureau of Customs stating that the subject goods may be
released without drilling of holes.

Commissioner Farolan wrote the BOI requesting for definite guidelines regarding the disposition of importations of Oriented
Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) then being held at the Bureau of Customs.

On March 26, 1984, respondent Solmac filed the action for mandamus and injunction with the RTC as above mentioned. It
prayed for the unconditional release of the subject importation. RTC: Ordered defendants to release the subject importation
immediately without drilling of holes. CA: The petitioners were asked to pay for damages.

Issues: WON the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the questioned importation, or, simply, can they be
held liable, in their personal and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent.

Held: We rule for the petitioners.

We hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges the contrary
that the burden of proof lies. In Abando v. Lozada, we defined good faith as "referring to a state of the mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and its absence should be established by convincing evidence."

We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and convincing proof showing the alleged bad
faith of the petitioners. On the contrary, the record is replete with evidence bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First,
there was the report of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) dated that, contrary to what the respondent
claimed, the subject importation was not OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger material,
whose importation to the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited, under LOI 658-B. It was on the strength of this finding that
the petitioners withheld the release of the subject importation for being contrary to law. Second, the petitioners testified that, on
many occasions, the Bureau of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject importation might be released.
Third, petitioner Parayno also testified that there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI regarding the entry into the
Philippines of OPP, as the letters of BOI ordering the release of the subject importation did not clarify the BOI policy on the
matter.

It can be seen from all the foregoing that even the highest officers of the BOI themselves were not in agreement as to what proper
course to take on the subject of the various importations that was withheld by the Bureau of Customs. The conflicting
recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the petitioners to seek final clarification from the former. This resulted in the
inevitable delay in the release of the Clojus shipment, one of the several of such importations. The confusion over the disposition

MICADLP NOTES
of this particular importation removes bad faith. Thus the trial court's finding that the petitioners acted in good faith in not
immediately releasing the Clojus shipment pending a definitive policy of the BOI on this matter is correct. It is supported by
substantial evidence on record, independent of the presumption of good faith, which as stated earlier, was not successfully
rebutted.

When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use
reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is
to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful men use in the management of their affairs. In the case at bar,
prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the various
importations that were withheld at the Bureau of Customs. Consequently, the petitioners can not be said to have acted in bad faith
in not immediately releasing the import goods without first obtaining the necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As
public officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to implement was faithfully complied with.

But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake: Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an
erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria(loss without injury). Mistakes concededly
committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. After all, "even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the
presumption of good faith.

In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may be, that an official duty has been regularly performed applies in favor
of the petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly
done.) It was private respondent's burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption. We are not persuaded that it has been able
to do so.

ONE-LINER: When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully
and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his
duties, he is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful men use in the management of their affairs.

Tuzon vs CA

Even if the public officer erred in the interpretation of ordinance resulting in the delay of issuace of permit and business losses, he
is not personally liable if the interpretation is honest although erroneous.
Error in the exercise of authority is covered by immunity provided it is done:
o

Within the scope of authority

In good faith

Without wilfulness, malice or corruption