Published as:

The Habsburg Monarchy and the Projects for Division of the Ottoman Balkans, 1771-1788,
in Plamen Mitev, Ivan Parvev, Maria Baramova, Vania Racheva (eds.), Empires and
Peninsulas: Southeastern Europe Between Carlowitz and the Peace of Adrianople, 16991829, Berlin 2010, 51-62.

Boro Bronza
Department of History
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Banja Luka

The Habsburg Monarchy and the Projects for Division of the Ottoman Balkans 17711788

After the Seven Years War (17561763) and financial exhaustion, the Habsburg
Monarchy was not in a position to lead offensive policy in Southeastern Europe. Maria Theresa
had publicly proclaimed a friendly policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The inner question of
dynastic rule and inheritance became very complex after 1765, when Joseph II was declared coruler by his mother. The division of their authority was never clearly resolved. Until her death
Maria Theresa was the real ruler; despite their frequent clashes, her son had to accept her will
and decisions. 1 As the years passed, however, Joseph II increasingly took the initiative,
especially in the context of foreign policy. The beginnings of a new offensive policy of Austria
in Southeastern Europe throughout the 1770s were related exclusively to his activities.
The new Russo-Turkish War (17681774) was crucial for changing the perception of the
European Southeast in Vienna. After seven years of war and the exhaustion of Austria and
Prussia, the new Russian Empress Catherine II (17621796) was allowed to exploit quickly and
efficiently the possibility for action, starting a major offensive in the Southeast in order to
finally achieve the goals of Russian policy set at the end of the 17th century by Peter the Great.
The new war displayed the great superiority of Russia over Turkey. The Russian army claimed a
series of victories. Azov was taken, followed by the entire coast of the Sea of Azov and, more

Derek Beales. Joseph II. In the Shadow of Maria Theresa 17411780. Cambridge 1987, p. 11.

importantly, the Black Sea coast west to Kherson. 2 The Peace in Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) gave
Russia substantial benefits and definitively confirmed it was the leading contestant in the claims
for the Ottoman territories in Europe.
Joseph II watched with great dissatisfaction the spread of Russian power. He even
considered entering the war against Russia to prevent its excessive expansion to the Balkans and
Istanbul. Already in 1768 he discussed the possibility of the capture of Belgrade and the
strategic advantages that such an endeavour could bring. Maria Theresa firmly rejected his
proposal and Austria was intensely engaged in peace mediation between Turkey and Russia.
The aim was twofold: to stop the Russian troops before they penetrated far south, threatening
parts of Turkey that Austria considered under its sphere of influence, and open possibilities for
compensation from the Ottomans for preventing their total military and political debacle through
successful negotiation.
The hypothetical compensation was related to a small territory, and this desire was
communicated to the Divan through the Austrian internuncio. A positive response came very
soon, because the situation on the Turkish front was verging on disaster. Austria had a chance to
gain an appropriate area for the successful mediation and the first choice was Small Wallachia,
the westernmost part of Wallachia, which was already in Austrian hands between 1718 and
1739. For Joseph II this was an acceptable solution, but later he decided on another option. For
its help in the final peace negotiations with Russia in 1774, Austria was awarded Bukovina, a
small territory (approximately 10,400 square kilometres) in northern Moldova. 3 The choice of
Bukovina was the product of different understanding of priorities by the Austrian crown prince.
This territory was expected to provide better connection between the Habsburg hinterland and
the new Austrian territories in Galicia, and a base from which Austria could more easily and

V. N. Vinogradov. Ekaterina II i proryiv Rossii na Balkanyi. In: V. N. Vinogradov (ed.). Istoria Balkan. Vek
vosemnadtsatyi. Moscow 2004, p. 112-35.
3
After the agreement with the Turks Austrian troops occupied Bukovina in the spring of 1775. The internuncio
Thugut had a key role in the implementation process and the area was officially named The border area of
Moldavia and Transylvania (les Terres de Moldavie entre la Transylvanie). sterreichisches Staatsarchiv,
Abteilung Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (further: HHStA), Staatenabteilungen, Trkei III, Kart. 7:
Grenzverhltnisse 16991795, Fasz.: Granzvertrge 16991795 Varia, Fol. 43-47. Demarcation under the
supervision of the internuncio was conducted in August 1775. HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Intercepte, Kart. 2: 1775
1809, Fasz. Thugut 1775, 1791, 1801, Fol. 6-8.

effectively thwart future Russian penetration to the south of Moldova. These plans were clearly
showing Josephs great ambition for territorial claims in Southeastern Europe. 4

The case of Bukovina was associated with Austrias participation in the first Partition of
Poland on 5 August 1772. Poland was constantly being weakened by Austria, Russia and
Prussia, as each gained a significant part of Polish territory through mutual agreement. Austria
received Galicia and some adjacent territories totalling 83,000 square kilometres, with over two
million inhabitants. This expansion eastward moved Austria further away from the Western
sphere towards Eastern political projections. 5
The first Partition of Poland gave rise to projects anticipating the future division of the
Ottoman Empire, already significantly drained by the Russians. The possibility of a small
territorial gain through mediation could be eventually replaced by entering into a new war
against Turkey on the side of Russia on the promise of large territorial expansion. Such plans
were already brewing in Vienna in 1772.
At the end of 1771 the Austrian diplomat Baron von Bender presented to the court a
Project of the division of Turkey. 6 On 17 January 1772 the project was officially sent to Maria
Theresa. 7 The Austrian internuncio in Istanbul, Thugut, came in contact with the Russians about
their views on division, on 7 January 1772. 8 On 19 January Joseph II sent the same proposal to
the Prussian king Frederick II to examine his views. After 1740 Prussia became a constant factor
for Austria to reckon in any plan for Southeastern European, because there was always the
possibility of alliance between Prussia and Turkey. Any possible territorial expansion at the
expense of Turkey implied some Austrian territorial compensation for Prussia, be it from
Poland, the small German states or even Austria itself.
A huge obstacle for Josephs plan was the completion of negotiations to create a
defensive alliance between Prussia and Russia, whose relations were much closer than the
Austro-Russian relations. When Frederick II announced his vague response, 9 the young

Hans Magenschab. Josef II. sterreichs Weg in die Moderne. Wien 2006, p. 105.
Horst Mller. Frstenstaat oder Brgernation. Deutschland 17631815. Berlin 1998, p. 297.
6
Project einer Theilung der Trkei von Baron Bender; HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei III, Kart. 15:
Grenzverhltnisse 17181795, Fasz. Teilungsprojekt 1771/72, Fol. 1.
7
Ibid., Fol. 41.
8
Ibid., Fol. 67-70.
9
Ibid., Fol. 85-90.
5

Austrian ruler was forced, on 19 January, to address Maria Teresa for advice and opinion. 10 At
first the empress showed restraint. Chancellor Kaunitz announced his vision on 13 February,
clearly sceptical about the possibility to go to war and engage in aggressive action to splinter
Ottoman territory. 11 Joseph II saw that, apart from a few diplomats, there was no support for his
aggressive plans. The geopolitical situation was not favourable for a new war adventure against
the Turks, because the prospect of hostile engagement by Prussia was very much alive.
Therefore, precedence was given to modest requirements for territorial expansion through
mediation that resulted in the gain of Bukovina. 12 During the entire consideration of the project,
Joseph II never clearly stated which Ottoman territory he really wanted to incorporate. Just
before the end he pointed out that his priority were Wallachia and Moldavia. This supported the
efforts to control the possible Russian advance south and create a trade monopoly along the
Danube.
Prussia and Russia were allies since 1772, especially after the War for the Bavarian
Succession (17781779). Joseph II was aware that to move the centre of political gravity in
Germany or expand in Southeastern European, Austria needed to align much closer with Russia
than Prussia already had. The Austrian alliance with France since the 1750s was of no particular
use.
In order to bring Vienna together with Russia, in the spring of 1780 Joseph II initiated a
new negotiation process through the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Ludwig Cobenzl.
He contacted the Russian representative in Vienna, Prince Galicin. Empress Catherine II was
pleased to accept the proposal for a meeting. Joseph II lost no time and on 26 April 1780 left for
Russia. During the meetings and talks in Mogilev from 4 to 9 June, joint plans were not defined,
but Joseph II managed to gain the confidence of the Russian empress, laying a solid basis for
further development of the Austro-Russian relations. The first results were already evident in
late 1780, when Catherine II refused to extend the union with Prussia. 13
Maria Theresa was adamant against the policy of union with Russia, knowing that such
alliance would eventually lead to a joint offensive against Turkey. Her views that the division of
Turkey was utterly unnecessary had shaped the Habsburgs foreign policy over the past few

10

Ibid., Fol. 103-7.

Ibid., Fol. 130.
12
Project de paix generale, ibid., Fol. 131-5.
13
Oskar Criste. Kriege unter Kaiser Josef II. Wien 1904, p. 136.
11

decades: Austria would gain nothing, even if its powers were expanded to the walls of
Constantinople, but unhealthy, abandoned territories inhabited by unreliable Greeks; all things
considered, this would not increase the might of the Monarchy, but exhaust it. 14 The conflict
with Joseph II about the alliance with Russia was the last of many clashes between mother and
son. After 40 years in power, Maria Theresa died on 29 November 1780. Joseph II sent a letter
advising Sultan Abdul Hamid of the change of throne, according to the principles of
primogeniture and heritage. 15 The letter was a symbolic message that a new era was coming in
the Austrian policy towards the Ottoman Empire.

After fully assuming the throne of Austria, Joseph II zealously continued the policy of
approaching Russia. In December 1780 he wrote to ambassador Cobenzl: The current situation
is such that together Austria and Russia can do everything, but one without the other
nothing. 16 At the end of 1780 and throughout 1781 Joseph II and Catherine II maintained
intense correspondence. In May 1781, the alliance between Austria and Russia was finally
concluded. 17
One of the key architects of Austrias new Ostpolitik was Cobenzl. He thought that
Austria, in aggressive campaigns against Turkey in alliance with Russia, should conquer Bosnia,
Serbia, Bulgaria, Wallachia, and the entire course of the Danube up to the Black Sea. 18 After the
emperors visit to the Russian court in 1780, Cobenzl assumed the role of chief negotiator with
Russia; his counterpart was Prince Potemkin, who had successfully supplanted Panin as the
most influential minister in Catherines palace. 19
14

Die Theilung des Osmanenreiches wre von allen Unternehmungen die khnste und gefhrlichste. Was wrden
wir gewinnen, wenn wir unsere Eroberungen selbst bis vor die Mauern Constantinopels ausdehnen wrden?
Ungesunde, culturlose, entvlkerte oder von unzuverlssigen Griechen bewohnte Provinzen, welche die Krfte der
Monarchie nicht steigern, sondern erschpfen wrden. Maria Theresa wrote this in a letter to her ambassador in
Paris, Count Mercy d`Argenteau, on 31 July 1777. Adolf Beer. Orientalische Politik sterreichs seit 1774. PragueLeipzig 1883, p. 39.
15
haereditario et primogenitali jure...; HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei II, Kart. 74: Weisungen, Berichte
1780, 1781 I-III, Fasz. Weisungen 1780 (1-188), Fol. 175-6.
16
Der Satz bleibt richtig, da Ruland mit uns und wir mit Ruland alles, eines ohne dem anderen aber sehr
beschwerlich etwas Wesentliches und Nutzbares ausrichten knnen... Criste. Kriege unter Kaiser Josef II, p. 137.
17
Ivan Prvev. Land in Sicht. Sdosteuropa in den deutschen politischen Zeitschriften des 18. Jahrhunderts. Mainz
2008, p. 161.
18
HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei III, Kart. 15: Grenzverhltnisse 17181795, Fasz. Projekte einer Teilung des
Osman. Reichs, Fol. 338-48.
19
Nur thtige Theilnahme an dem Kriege kann uns gegen alle erwhnten und mehrere andere sich von selbst
darstellende Bedenklichkeit sichern... Ludwig Wiener. Kaiser Josef II. als Staatsmann und Feldherr. sterreichs
Politike und Kriege in den Jahren 17631790, Mittheilungen des K.K. Kriegs-Archivs Jahrgang 1885 (1885), 97.

The correspondence between Joseph II and Catherine II continued during 1782, plotting
new plans for the division of Turkey. The Russian Empress took the initiative, openly venturing
offensive proposals. In many letters of that year Catherine II discussed in detail the proposed
partitioning. On 10 September 1782 she sent a final memorandum to Joseph II containing the
famous Greek Project.
The Greek Project envisioned the creation of a new independent state of Dacia
incorporating Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia. 20 Allegedly independent, Dacia would act as
a buffer state between Russia and Austria. The Austrians quickly learned, however, of Russias
plans to make Potemkin the ruler of Dacia. Next to independent Dacia, a Greek Empire based in
Constantinople should be established, again as an independent state. 21 Catherine II stated that
her grandson Constantine was destined to be the ruler of this state. 22 Her ideas breathed the
principles of the future Christian supremacy in the Balkans, since in 1774 Russia was awarded
the right to protect all Orthodox Christians in Turkey.
Josephs court received the Greek Project with great interest, but not
enthusiastically. 23 The project undermined Austrias own plans for the Western Balkans. After
thoroughly analysing the geopolitical situation in Europe and the world, and the military
capabilities for a major war in the Balkans, Joseph II, Kaunitz and Cobenzl came to the
conclusion that Catherines project was unfeasible. In their private correspondence, they
dismissed it merely as a folly, or a futile flight of imagination (chimrique). 24
Joseph II did not publicly reject the plan, but in his response to Catherine the Great on 13
November 1782 he made it clear that if such divisions should materialise, he expected Austria to
gain certain territory from Turkey. According to Joseph II, Austria should have the right to take
part of Small Wallachia (up to the river Olt), including a belt of land along the right bank of the
Danube from Belgrade to Nikopol, with both cities, as well as Vidin and Orova, serving as a
defence base for Hungary. The shortest straight line had to be drawn from Belgrade to the

20

HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei III, Kart. 15: Grenzverhltnisse 17181795, Fasz. Projekte einer Teilung des
Osman. Reichs, Fol. 229-38.
21
Ibid.
22
Vasilj Popovi. Istono pitanje. Istorijski pregled borbe oko opstanka Osmanlijske carevine u Levantu i na
Balkanu. Belgrade: 1996, p. 118.
23
HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei III, Kart. 15: Grenzverhltnisse 17181795, Fasz. Projekte einer Teilung des
Osman. Reichs, Fol. 239-74.
24
Harald Heppner. sterreich und die Donaufrstentmer 17741812. Ein Beitrag zur habsburgischen
Sdosteuropapolitik. Graz 1984, p. 59.

Adriatic, in the Bay of Drin. Austria voiced its aspirations to parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina
that constituted the largest part of the total territory the monarchy was striving to get. In Vienna
this denouement was considered the ideal solution for Austria. If the proposed division failed,
Joseph II was ready to accept the return of the borders of 1718; this option existed in Austrian
politics throughout the decades preceding the final outbreak of the war with Turkey in 1788.
The alliance of Austria and Russia was rather complicated. For Austria it was primarily a
tool for better control of the political situation in Germany, specifically for implementation of
the Bavarian Plan that failed in 1779. For Russia, it offered an excellent framework for
continued expansion southward after the initial impetus from the war in 17681774. Over time,
the contradicting interpretations of the union presented a growing problem for the AustroRussian relations. Once the Greek Project was ventured, Joseph II began recalling in his
writings to the Russian Empress the old historic rights of the Habsburg dynasty as the
exclusive successor of the medieval Hungarian kings. In his plan, Austria should get all the
territory west of the line BelgradeDrin, including the Venetian territories on the east coast of
the Adriatic (Istria, Dalmatia and the Bay of Kotor). Venice could receive in compensation the
Peloponnese, Crete, Cyprus and other islands in the Mediterranean. Joseph II justified his claim
on the grounds that the Venetians had acquired their possessions in the East Adriatic in the
distant past, in reality stealing these lands from the Habsburg Monarchy. 25
Catherine II accepted Josephs counter plan with great reserve. She was reluctant to
break the territorial integrity of the Venetian Republic or the unity of the future Greek Empire
where the Peloponnese, Crete and Cyprus were a natural part of the whole. Catherines proposal
substantially deteriorated the Austro-Russian relations and the willingness of the Viennese court
to act offensively against Turkey waned from year to year, as the project progressively
highlighted the conflicting intentions of the two empires. 26
25

HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei III, Kart. 15: Grenzverhltnisse 1718-1795, Fasz. Projekte einer Teilung des
Osman. Reichs, Fol. 287-329.
26
Austrias perception of Catherine's Greek Project, the realism of the proposed ideas and the realism of Joseph
II in his answer to Catherines proposal are still a complex issue in historiography. In the past the Greek Project
was generally viewed as a much more realistic option than it objectively was (for example, in the work of Popovi,
Istono pitanje). Recent Austrian historians tend to view the Greek Project as an extremely unrealistic idea, seen
through by Joseph II and chancellor Kaunitz (for example, in Heppner. sterreich und die Donaufrstentmer, pp.
53-61). The idea that the Greek Project should be viewed as a more realistic option has also reappeared,
especially in the context of the planned development of Russian relations with the Orthodox Christians in the
Balkans. Such attitudes, among others, are displayed by the Bulgarian historian Tamara Stoilova (Tamara Stoilova.
Tretiat Rim. Mirnite reshenia na ruskata imperska politika v Yugoiztochna Evropa prez XVIII vek. Sofia 2001, pp.
87-105). Her statement seems confirmed by the serious memoirs of Baron von Spielmann (Memoire sur le partage

During the war in North America, France still was a key opponent to Britain and the
British diplomatic circles sought alliances that could undermine France on the continent. 27
Seeing the rapprochement between Austria and Russia in 1780, 28 Britain was ready to give up
all ties with the outcast Prussia to arrange continental relations in a way that would best serve
her interests. The British foreign minister, Viscount Stormont, proposed a defensive alliance of
Britain, Austria and Russia. 29 In a letter sent on 12 December 1780 to the British ambassador in
Vienna, Robert Keith Murray, Stormont emphasised the importance of a possible alliance with
Austria, arguing that: Such an alliance would be the cornerstone of that system, which every
friend to this country, and the general interests of Europe, must wish to see restored 30 True
to the customs of the time, each court believed that its global policies alone best reflected the
European interests. Joseph II, however, did not want to enter into an alliance against France or
change the course of his foreign policy, and the union failed in 1781 as well as later. During the
following years, Austria often lacked Britains support.

The period from the creation of the Austro-Russian alliance in 1781 until the outbreak of
the war with Turkey in 17871788 was filled with bustling diplomatic activity in Europe.
Already in 1783 Russia had successfully started to achieve its goals around Crimea. In the
summer of 1783 Prince Potemkin launched the Russian offensive and officially proclaimed not
only the inclusion of Crimea, but also of Kuban and Taman Island. 31 The French King Louis
XVI had to persuade the Sultan Abdul Hamid to formally recognise the agreement whereby the
Crimean Tatar Khan Girai had already relinquished the power over his territories to the Russian
Empress.

de la Turquie 1782) and Josephs remarks on his memoirs (Bemerkungen ber Theilung); HHStA,
Staatenabteilungen, Trkei III, Kart. 15: Grenzverhltnisse 17181795, Fasz. Projekte einer Teilung des Osman.
Reichs, Fol. 213-38. Soon Joseph II and his diplomacy began to understand the impossibility to realise this project.
Ibid., Fol. 239-74.
27
Eberhard Weiss. Der Durchbruch des Brgertums 17761847, Weltbild Geschichte Europas, Band 4 (2002), 70.
28
HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei II, Kart. 74: Weisungen, Berichte 1780, 1781 I-III, Fasz. Weisungen 1780 (1188), Fol. 2-11.
29
HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, England, Kart. 4: Hofkorr. 17401789, Fasz. Georg III. an Joseph II 17651789,
Fol. 387.
30
Jeremy Black. British Policy Towards Austria, 1780-1793, Mitteilungen des sterreichischen Staatsarchivs, 42
(1994), 188-228, here: 195.
31
HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei II, Kart. 74: Weisungen, Berichte 1780, 1781 I-III, Fasz. Turcica 1781
(Berichte) Jnner-Mrz (1-364), Fol. 25.

Joseph II had to wait for Russia to achieve its first goal before he could proceed with his
plans. His diplomatic offensive from 1784 pursued two ends: the campaign against Turkey and
the incarnation of the old ideas about substituting the uncertain Austrian Netherlands for
Bavaria. 32 He insisted on repairing the border line in the far northwestern part of the Bosnian
province on the left bank of the Una River (including Cazin, Cetin, Dreznik and other fortresses
along the border). Among other reasons, this revision of borders was requested due to frequent
clashes between the Turkish and Austrian border guards.
Skirmishes broke out in 1782 and Austria was eager to take Dubica, Buim, Ostroac
and Cetin. Turkey opposed the change of borders and Russia offered lukewarm support to
Austrias intentions. With the mediation of France the former delineation was preserved. 33
Austrias diplomatic debacle in 17841785 was offset by a significant economic success. When
the attempts to persuade Turkey about the border completely failed, Austria at least managed to
get a very favourable trade agreement (Sened) on 24 February 1784. It enabled the Habsburgs
to achieve significant liberalisation of trade, 34 mail 35 and other forms of communication with the
Ottoman Empire. 36

The great importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Austrian plans stemmed from
their geographical location and proximity to Austria. In the decade of Josephs independent rule
his Balkan policy grew more precise and concrete. 37 The monarch understood that he faced little
competition over Bosnia and Herzegovina; that much was clear already during his conversations
with Catherine II in 1782.

32

Heppner. sterreich und die Donaufrstentmer, p. 61.

..du cot delUnna... ; HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei V, Kart. 12: Cobenzl Herbert 17851793, Fasz.
Cobenzl Herbert Juli 1785 Dezember 1789 (660-1010), Fol. 719.
34
Was den Unnafluss anbelangt, so muss auf denselben bestanden werden, weil durch dessen GrenzenBehauptung wir, ohne das triplex confinium mit Venedig zu beirren, den Vortheil erhalten, den Handel von Bosnien
durch das Carlstdter Generalat und an unsere Seehfen von Zengg und Karlobago zu leiten, anstatt dass er jetzo
nach Zara geht. Beer. Orientalische Politik, p. 77.
35
Andreas Patera. Die Rolle der Habsburgermonarchie fr den Postverkehr zwischen dem Balkan und dem brigen
Europa. In: Harald Heppner, ed., Der Weg fhrt ber sterreich... Zur Geschichte des Verkehrs- und
Nachrichtenwesens von und nach Sdosteuropa (18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart). Wien-Kln-Weimar 1996,
pp. 37-89, here: 43.
36
HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Konsulate, Kart 35: Sira, Smyrna, Stancio, Stettin, Syrien, Tanger, Toulon, Trapezt..,
Fasz. Travnik 18071808, Subfasz. 1807 Weisungen, Berichte, 1-17, Fol. 11-5.
37
Paul Mitrofanov. Joseph II. Seine politische und kulturelle Ttigkeit. Wien 1910; Criste. Kriege unter Kaiser
Josef II; Fritz Valjavec. Die josephinischen Wurzeln des sterreichischen Konservativismus, Sdostforschungen,
XIV/1 (1955), 166-75.
33

Relations with the Bosnian Franciscans were established at the very beginning of
Josephs reign as the most important part of Austrias policy towards the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 38 Access to the Bosnian Franciscans was not a novelty in the long history of the
Habsburg Balkan policy. Similar efforts were invested in the mid-17th century, and the secret
connections between Vienna and the Bosnian Franciscans were present during the Long War
(15931606). These ties, however, weakened during the 17th and the better part of the 18th
centuries, and Austria had done little to bind more firmly the Franciscans to its interests. 39
With the growing influence of Joseph II at the end of the reign of Maria Theresa and his
plans to launch a new wave of offensives against the Ottoman possessions, the scene was set for
revitalising the bond between the Habsburgs and the Bosnian Franciscans. The trip of two
Franciscans to Vienna in 1779 was very important for the spirit of cooperation. 40 Shortly after
Maria Theresas death in 1780, Joseph II began to make plans for territorial expansion of the
Habsburg Monarchy in the Balkans. At the beginning of 1780 the German emperor issued
orders for providing intensive help to the Bosnian Franciscans. On 21 January 1780 chancellor
Kaunitz dispatched an instruction to the new Austrian internuncio in Istanbul, Baron HerbertRathkeal, quoting a letter sent to Vienna from Fojnica in Bosnia on 24 October 1779; it was an
appeal from the Bosnian Catholics who prayed Austria for help. Herbert-Rathkeal was enjoined
to make every effort (alle Mhe zu geben) to invalidate the decisions of the Sultan in favour
of Orthodox Christians in the Bosnian paalk. 41 That requirement was once again highlighted to
the Austrian internuncio on 22 February. 42 That marked the renewal of intensive cooperation
between Austria and the Bosnian Franciscans.
A happy circumstance for Austrias diplomatic approach to the Ottomans was that Baron
Philipp von Herbert-Rathkeal (17351802) had taken office as the Austrian internuncio just a
few months earlier, in late 1779. 43 Over the next 23 years he showed diplomatic skills that made

Sreko M. Daja. Katolici u Bosni i Zapadnoj Hercegovini na prijelazu iz 18. u 19. stoljee. Doba fra Grge
Ilijia Vareanina (17831813). Zagreb 1971, p. 86.
39
Filip Lastri. Pregled starina bosanske provincije, edited by Andrija Zirdum. Sarajevo 1977, pp. 70-90; Bono
Beni. Ljetopis sutjekog samostana, edited by Ignacije Gavran,, Sarajevo 1979, pp. 53-94.
40
Bono Beni, Ljetopis sutjekog samostana, p. 280.
41
Foiniza aus Bosnien; HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei II, Kart. 74: Weisungen, Berichte 1780, 1781 I-III,
Fasz.: Weisungen 1780 (1-188), Fol.: 12-5.
42
Ibid., Fol. 28.
43
Instruction fr Freiherrn von Herbert 10. July 1779; HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei V, Kart. 17:
Instructionen 17541802, Fasz. Herbert, Fol. 1-131.
38

10

him the best Austrian internuncio in Istanbul in the 18th century. 44 Following the instructions
from Vienna, Herbert-Rathkeal started the painful process of alternating pressure and corruption
with the Porte to achieve his task. In 1783 the Bosnian Franciscans were glad to see the first
results of this new cooperation: the efforts of the Austrian internuncio in Istanbul produced a
much desired frman in response to their pleas.
A turning point for Austrias influence among the Bosnian Franciscans arrived in 1784.
In the beginning of the year the former apostolic vicar Marko Dobreti died and, at the initiative
of Vienna, Augustin Boto-Oki was elected as his successor on 17 March 1784. The early
1780s marked a milestone and a change of guard at the Franciscan Province of Bosnia
Argentina. Two long-standing leaders of the province, Filip Lastri and Bonaventura Beni,
passed away and the scene was free for a new generation, notably Augustin Boto-Oki (c.
17251799), Grgo Iliji-Vareanin (17361813) and Augustin Mileti (17631831), who were
ready to bind the Bosnian Franciscans much closer to Vienna in the coming decades. Their
choices triggered a series of conflicts within the province. 45
On the way from Rome to Bosnia in 1784, Boto-Oki spent two months in Vienna,
where he was granted several audiences by Joseph II. The emperor gave many gifts to the new
vicar; most importantly, he created a foundation with an endowment of 107,700 forints. Every
year 23 Bosnian Franciscans were offered education in Zagreb and Budapest to advance the
foundations interests, with individual grants up to 180 forints. 46 Of course, the Austrian
government sought adequate return for its assistance, mainly through spying assignments. An
agreement was quickly reached, and the internuncio in Istanbul received new instructions to
continue with the propaganda in favour of the Franciscan Order. 47 Since 1787 the Bosnian
Franciscans enjoyed continuous transfers towards the theological institutions in the Habsburg
Monarchy, primarily in Croatia. 48
44

HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Personalia, Kart. 12: Z, Pers. Listen, Fasz. alt Fasz 24, Fol.15.
Daja. Katolici u Bosni i Zapadnoj Hercegovini, pp. 190-216.
46
...Sacratissima Sua Majestas erga demissam Pttae D Vrae Repraesentationem ex illis pecuniis, quae pro
perrenni Conservatione Sacrorum Locorum in Palestina deserviunt, pro educando juniore Clero Bosniensi 107.700
fos... Julijan Jeleni, ed., Izvori za kulturnu povijest bosanskih franjevaca. Sarajevo 1913, pp. 57-8.
47
Letter from Philip Cobenzl to Herbert-Rathkeal dated 2 November 1785: Vos remontrances en faveur des
Franciscains seront mises sous les geux de lEmpereur, mais je doute quelles fassent effet, le referain de S. M.
tant toujours quil ne peut avoir rien faire avec les missions et la Propaganda et que ces moines ne le regardent
en rien. HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei V, Kart. 12: Cobenzl Herbert 17851793, Fasz. Cobenzl Herbert
Juli 1785 Dezember 1789 (660-1010), Fol. 701.
48
Cum Sacratissima Regia Caesarea Sua Majestis, ea Clementia qua praedita est nostro Bosniensi clero
facultatem concesserit, ut possint juvenes se conferre ad conventum Zagrabiensem Fratrum Franciscanorum,
45

11

In 1787 Russia and Turkey were on the verge of open conflict. France and Britain were
very busy in Istanbul, ready to back the weak Ottoman position to safeguard their commercial
interests and prevent Russian penetration in Mediterranean Turkey. 49 While Russia and Austria
were contemplating when and how to start the war against Turkey, the war broke out in Istanbul,
led by the grand vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha (17861789). The vizier was able to convince the
Sultan Abdul Hamid to launch a war against Russia, although the Turkish army was ill-prepared
to engage and secure a quick victory. 50 The Ottoman government called the Russian
ambassador, Bulgakov, and asked him to guarantee the peaceful conduct of Russia concerning
any matters on the Russo-Turkish border. Bulgakov could not give every warranty required by
the Turks and was imprisoned in the closed fortress Seven Towers, while Turkey declared war
against Russia on 24 August 1787. 51
The nature of Austrian participation in the war was decided in the fall of 1787 by
Josephs determination. With time he was increasingly inclined to embrace his historic mission
to liberate Christians from the Turkish barbarism and restore the Southeastern lands to the
Habsburgs, their only rightful owners. 52 Austria officially entered the war against Turkey on 9
February 1788. On that day, the Austrian internuncio Herbert-Rathkeal officially handed the
ibique se sistere illis ad quos spectat, ut illos de humanioribus studiis provideant: idcirco Te Rendum Prem
Franciscum Milloscevich Nostrum Secretarium mittimus..., Jeleni, ed., Izvori za kulturnu povijest, pp. 58-9.
49
In the spring of 1787 the Austrian agent in Istanbul, Testa, often wrote to chancellor Kaunitz about his beliefs
that the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Robert Ainslie, encouraged Turkey to wage war against Russia. Jeremy
Black, British Policy, 207. The internuncio Herbert-Rathkeal had been expressing such doubts for more than a year.
HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei II, Kart. 74: Weisungen, Berichte 1780, 1781 I-III, Fasz. Turcica 1781
(Berichte) Jnner-Mrz (1-364), Fol. 221-3. See extensive analysis of the activities of Robert Ainslie and the British
policy in the East in: A. I. Bais. Britain and the Struggle for the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Sir Robert
Ainslies Embassy to Istanbul 17761794. Istanbul 1984. The public in Britain was surprised by the declaration of
war. HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, England, Kart. 126: Korr. Ber. 17871788 (Revitzky), Fasz. Ber. 1787, VII-XII,
Fol. 8-10. This does not mean that some government circles were not involved in preparations of war.
50
Vinogradov. Ekaterina II i proryiv Rossii na Balkanyi, p. 144.
51
At the end of 1787 and the beginning of 1788 Austria was engaged in intense diplomatic brokerage to release
Bulgakov. After the withdrawal of Herbert-Rathkeal from Istanbul immediately after the declaration of war, Austria
was informed abour Bulkagov's fate by the ambassador of Naples in Istanbul, Ludolph. On 16 February 1788 the
news spread: Bulgakow erasi accordata la liberta colla sola restrizione del termine di 25. giorni, quale decorso
potrebbe a pieno suo grado partire per Mare, o per Terra; e cio pel guisto riflesso, che se unutamente al Ministro
Imperiale si liberava; mal appreso sarabbesi dalle Milizie, e dal Popolo nelle attuali circostanze della Guerra coll
Imperatore, e colla Russia. HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei II, Kart. 96: Berichte, Weisungen 1788, Fasz.:
Schreiben aus Konstantinopel, Fol. 1-10. Bulgakov was finally released in 1789.
52
On 6 July 1788, Joseph II wrote from Zemun a letter to the French foreign minister, Montmorin. He pointed out
his decision to solve the problem of the barbarians from the Orient once and for all: Diese Barbaren des Orients
haben mehr denn 200 Jahre alle mglichen Treulosigkeiten gegen meine Vorfahren begangen, Tractate verletzt...
Die Zeit ist gekommen, wo ich als Rcher der Menschheit auftrete, wo ich es ber mich nehme, Europa fr die
Drangsale zu entschdigen, die es einstens von ihnen dulden musste... Wiener. Kaiser Josef II, p. 109.

12

grand vizier a note with the declaration of war, justified primarily with Austrias alliance with
Russia that Turkey had just attacked. The casus foederis was placed in the foreground to give
the Austrian position a formally defensive character for as long as possible. 53
After tendering the declaration of war, the Austrian internuncio retired and the Turkish
government allowed him to freely leave the country, returning to Austria via Tuscany. 54 On the
following day the Austrian troops crossed into the Bosnian province and began one of most
disastrous conflicts in the entire history of the Austro-Turkish wars. It marked the beginning of a
new phase in the Austrian policy towards the Bosnian territory and the provinces of the Ottoman
Balkans that was completed, due to later developments in France and a series of European wars,
only at the Congress of Vienna in 18141815, when Austria finally achieved its ambitions in the
Balkans through the annexation of the entire territories of the former maritime republics of
Venice and Dubrovnik. On the entire area of the Western Balkans Austro-Turkish War of 17881791 has led to the emergence of ideological dimensions, religious and national mobilization
that in the previous time in this form were completely unknown in the Balkan routes, which
amended the permanent character of the entire space. In this sense, the war of 1788-1791
became a real crossroad of the eras.

53

Die Pforte hat es also einzig und allein sich selbst beyzumessen, dass Se. Kays. Majestt nach einer gegen sie
beobachteten so vieljhrigen friedfertigen guten Nachbarschaft und nach allen bez jeder Gelegenheit angewandten
Vermittlungsbemhungen nun mehr sich veranlasset, und durch sie genthigt sehen, die Allerhchstdenselben als
getreue Freunden und Allirten Ihrer Russisch Kais. Majestt obligenden Pflichten in die vollstndigste Erfllung zu
bringen und an dem Kriege unverzglichen wirklichen Teil zu nehmen. Drag(oljub) M. Pavlovic. Srbija za vreme
poslednjeg austrijsko-turskog rata (17881791 .). Belgrade: Srpska knjievna zadruga 1910, pp. 7-8.
54
The ambassador of Naples in Istanbul, Ludolph, assumed the role of key informant about the events in Vienna
and Istanbul after the declaration of war and the suspension of diplomatic relations between Austria and Turkey. On
16 February it was reported in Vienna that the internuncio Herbert-Rathkeal together with all his staff and their
families safely boarded a ship for the Tuscan port of Livorno. In Istanbul Herbert-Rathkeal also served as
Ambassador of Tuscany, which was then managed as a Habsburg secundogeniture): LInternunzio altro non
aspettava per imbarcarsi per Livorno con tutti gli Individui della sua missione, offiziali, e dragomani, colle Mogli,
e Figli loro; che il Firmano della Porta, senzil quale a verun Bastimento si permette il libero passo per il Canale
dei Dardanelli... HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei II, Kart. 96: Berichte, Weisungen 1788, Fasz.: Schreiben aus
Konstantinopel, Fol. 1-10. The internuncio arrived in Livorno in mid-April. HHStA, Staatenabteilungen, Trkei V,
Kart. 12: Cobenzl Herbert 17851793, Fasz. Cobenzl Herbert Juli 1785 Dezember 1789 (660-1010), Fol. 989.
13