LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO et. al., vs. COMELECGR

127325 19 MARCH 1997DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S.
Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections a "Petition to Amend theConstitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative".
He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the
1987 Constitution, whichprovides for the right of the
people to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the
COMELEC issued anorder directing the publication of
the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter
set the case for hearing. On 18 December 1996, the
petitionersherein filed this special civil action for
prohibition.
ISSUES:
(1) WON, Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
(2) WON, R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor, was intended toinclude or cover
initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so,
whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.
(3) WON, that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
(In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative on the Constitution,and Initiative and
Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid,considering the absence in the law
of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(4) WON, the lifting of term limits of elective officials
would constitute a revision or an amendment of the
Constitution.
RULING:
It was made clear during the interpellations of the
convention that it was their intention to leave the
details of carrying out Section 2 to thelegislature. The
conclusion then is inevitable that the system of
initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate.
Although the Constitution has recognized or granted
the right, the people cannotexercise it if Congress does
not provide for its implementation. This mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment
which bypassescongressional action. However, in the
last analysis it is still is dependent on congressional
action.
The court agrees that R.A. No. 6735 was intended to
cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. A careful scrutiny of the Acthowever,
yields a negative answer. First, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Second, the Act doesnot provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
Third, while the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum(Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This simply
means that the mainthrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation ofthe initiative on amendments to the

Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle

therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy ofinterest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative
onnational and local laws. The foregoing brings us to
the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
andconditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned.
R.A. No. 6735 is thus found to be inadequate to cover
the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and have failed to providesufficient
standard for subordinate legislation. This
deficiency cannot be cured by "empowering"
the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules
andregulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act. The delegation of the power to
the COMELEC is then INVALID.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the
issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of
elective national and local officials isan amendment to,
and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary. Note that the lifting of the term limits
was held to be that of a revision,as it would affect
other provisions of the Constitution such as
the synchronization of elections, the
constitutional guarantee of equal access
toopportunities for public service, and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by
initiative.
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec [Oct. 6,
2000]
24 SEP
FACTS:
There are 4 parameters to determine the winners in a
party-list election under RA 7941:
1. 20% allocation 3. 3-seat limit
2. 2% threshold 4. Proportional representation
The Congress enacted RA 7941 on Mar. 3, 1995 which
states that the State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. The State shall also develop the
simplest scheme possible to guarantee a full, free and
open party system by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature.
ISSUES:
1. Is the 20% allocation mandatory? Should the 20%
allocation for party-list be filled up completely all the
time?
2. Are the 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit
constitutional?
3. How should the additional seats be determined?

HELD/RULING:
(1) NO. Sec. 5(2) Art. 6 merely provides a ceiling for
party-list seats in Congress. The Congress has
prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change
this percentage requirement, and the mechanics by
which it is to be filled up.
(2) YES. The 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit are
consistent with the very essence of representation.
The 3-seat limit ensures the entry of various interestrepresentations into the legislative. Thus, no single
group would dominate.
(3) To determine the additional seats, 3 steps will be
followed:
a. rank the highest to lowest. The highest is called the
first party.
b. determine the seats the first party will have. For
the first party, it will have a 6% benchmark. Every
succeeding additional 2% of votes from the first 2%
requirement will constitute 1 additional seat. If the
first party gets 2 additional seats, then the next in
rank will get less.
c. to solve for the additional seats of other qualified
parties, the formula provided below will be used:
additional seats no. of votes no. of
for the = of the party x additional
concerned no. of votes of seats of the
party the first party first party
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation
of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein
impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners
sought the disqualification of private respondents,
arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended
to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized
or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which
Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated
the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court
was proper.
2.
Whether or not political parties may participate in
the party list elections.
3.
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.
Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue
notwithstanding the availability of other remedies
"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where
public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The
facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties even the major ones -- may

participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA
7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party
List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent
upon the Comelec to determine proportional
representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in
relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as
to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the partylist system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the
propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual
allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale
of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate
fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution,
the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from
the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in
its work. The Court ordered that the petition be
remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by
the party lists.
Baker v Carr
Brief Fact Summary. Appellants brought suit,
challenging malapportionment of state legislatures
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An apportionment case may
be reviewed on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, so
long as these grounds are independent from political
question elements.
Facts. Apportionment cases had often been brought
under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section: 4 of
the United States Constitution (Constitution), in which
the United States guarantees to the individual states a
republican form of government. The Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court) has long held that
such challenges present a political question, not
addressable by the courts. In the current case,
Appellants challenged the state apportionment of
legislatures under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue. Is it possible to bring a malapportionment claim
without raising a nonjusticiable political issue?
Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded.
In the past, apportionment challengers have generally
based their challenge on the Guaranty Clause of Art.
IV, Section: 4 of the Constitution. These claims are
nonjusticiable as they address issues solely directed to
the political branches of the government by the
Constitution. This is a separation of powers issue.

In Baker v. Carr, the claim is that the Appellants are

being denied equal protection of the laws by being
underrepresented in the state legislature. The Supreme
Court rules that the equal protection challenge in this
case is separable from the political questions.
Dissent. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter
(J. Frankfurter) argues the political question is
inseparable from the equal protection claim and that
the Supreme Court has effectively overturned a
century of apportionment jurisprudence. In particular,
the dissent argues that the Supreme Court has opened
up all state districting to judicial oversight.
Discussion. Baker v. Carr is the first of the cases
developing the Supreme Courts one person, one
vote legislation. This line of cases helped equalize
representation between country and city dwellers in an
increasingly urbanized nation.
Mariano v COMELEC

metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the

establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No.
7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities
of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under
court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to
co-equal department of government, legislators felt
that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent
elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall
continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time that
a new election is held and the duly elected officials
shall have already qualified and assume their offices:
Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of
the City shall likewise continues exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be automatically
absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with
residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections
2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Makati). Another petition
which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854
was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator,
taxpayer and concerned citizen.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the

Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

ISSUES:
xxx xxx xxx
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land
areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections
7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying
metes and bounds with technical descriptions
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides
with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution stressing that they new citys
acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the
incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two
executive terms as allowed by the Constitution
Whether the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment
cannot be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati
shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be
known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as
the City, which shall comprise the present territory of
the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area
over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast
by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong
and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest
by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under
dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives

shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be
entertained as the premise on the issue is on the
occurrence of many contingent events. Considering
that these events may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen
to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only
Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig
and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly
provides that the Congress may be comprised of not
more than two hundred fifty members, unless
otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing
its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law.
Montejo v COMELEC
FACTS:

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District

of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of
Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting
certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the
principle of equity of representation. Petitioner now
seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District of the province.
For an overview of the distribution in the province, see
the below table for the population distribution, census
1990 and 1994:
Census 1990 Census 1994
First District 303, 349 178, 688
Second District 272, 167 156, 462
Third District 214, 499 125, 763
Fourth District 269, 347 155, 995
Fifth District 309, 148 181, 242
ISSUES:
Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate
Resolution No. 2736
HELD/RULING:
The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in
Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which
states:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby
empowered to make minor adjustments of the
reapportionment herein made.
The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the
debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that
the transfer of one municipality in a district to another
district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a
substantive one. Minor adjustments does not allow the
change in allocations per district.
It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736.
Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition
praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District of the
province of Leyte is denied.
Marcos v COMELEC
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.
March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate
for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation
and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that
Marcos did not meet the residency requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELECs head office
in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first
certificate was the result of an honest
misrepresentation and that she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence.

April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of

2-1 came up with a Resolution that found Montejos
petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos
corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original
certificate cancelled.
May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted on
April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution
allowing Marcos proclamation to the office should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the
highest number of votes. However, this was reversed
and instead directed that the proclamation would be
suspended even if she did win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos
declared that she was the winner of the said
Congressional election.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1)
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required
to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district of
Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the constitutions residency qualification requirement
(as intended by the framers of the constitution)2. The
confusion of the honest mistake made when filed
her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the
fact that the entry for residence is immediately
followed by the entry for the number of years and
months in the residence where the candidate seeks to
hold office immediately after the elections. This honest
mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of
residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when
Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying her
husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos
were only actual residences incurred during their
marriage; and as such, she was required to change
residences and apply for voters registration in these
cited locations. When she got married to the late
dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the
CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the
same code. It is the husbands right to transfer
residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a
family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to
lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her
husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as
expressed when she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking
permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in
Tacloban and their farm in Olot, Leyte.
(2)
WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying
the plaintiff under Article 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting
jurisdiction to the House of Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the
fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies
would then refuse to render judgments merely on the
ground of having failed to reach a decision within a
given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6

2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987

Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs.
Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But
the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service
of the Republic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is
evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.

resident of the same for 52 years immediately

preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the
same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion,
Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile
of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most
recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections
was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe
indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati
City, it does notengender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal
domicile.

(3)
WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of the
petitioners qualifications after the elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his

domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which
is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effecta
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual
removal or an actualchange of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of clear
and positive proof, the domicile of originshould be
deemed to continue.

Aquino v COMELEC
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at
all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved.
In any challenge having the effect of reversing a
democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this
Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions
which would give effect to the will of the majority, for
sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number
of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a
winning candidate's qualifications however becomes
inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the
Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of
the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic
institutions.
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative for the
Second District of Makati City. Private respondents
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and
Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the
residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should
be for a period not less than 1 year immediately
preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman as
mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he
must prove that he has established not just residence
but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992
elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of
San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a

Bengson III v.Cruz and HRET

Facts:
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in SanClemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law
then applicablewas the 1935 Constitution. On
November 5, 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the
United
StatesMarine Corps and, without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance
to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63,
Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
by, amongothers, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.Cruz was thereafter naturalized as a US citizen
on June 5, 1990 in connection with his service inthe
U.S. Marine Corps.On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz
reacquired his Philippine citizenship
throughrepatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing marginof 26,671
votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
then running for reelection.Bengson then filed a case
for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming thatrespondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives
sincehe is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.On March 2,
2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the
petition for quo warrantoand declaring respondent Cruz
the duly elected Representative of the 2nd District of
Pangasinanin the May 1998 elections. Bengsons MR
was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

Held:
Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by
birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
citizens: the natural-borncitizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen
of aparticular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.As defined in the same Constitution, naturalborn citizens "are those citizens of thePhilippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippinecitizenship."On the other hand,
naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizensthrough naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as
theRevised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), andby
Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all thequalifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to
become a Filipino citizen. Thedecision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two
(2) years from itspromulgation when the court is
satisfied that during the intervening period, the
applicant has (1)not left the Philippines; (2) has
dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3)
has notbeen convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules; or (4) committedany
act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary
to any Government announcedpolicies.Filipino citizens
who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire
the same in themanner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modesby which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization,
(2)by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress.Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition
and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Asa mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization
is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippinecitizenship is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizenwho
wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess
certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on
the other hand, may behad under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of
the armedforces; (2) service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II; (3) service in theArmed
Forces of the United States at any other time; (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to analien; and (5)
political and economic necessity.As distinguished from
the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation
simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering said
oath inthe Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.As a rule,
repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that anaturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalizedFilipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
hisPhilippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino. The ruleapplies
to Cruzs case. Being a natural-born citizen, Cruz
reacquired this status upon hisrepatriation.