ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCE

RELATIONSHIP

PEOPLE VS. LAMBERTE

G.R. No. L-65153
July 11, 1986
FACTS: Mansueto Lamberto raped his niece, Clarissa Arnino, 13 yrs old, with
the help of Romulo Solomon. After the consummation of rape, they brought
her to a nearby creek and Lamberte ordered her to wash her vagina which she
did. Then Lamberte told her to go home but not to tell her father about the
incident, otherwise, he would kill her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of rape committed by Lamberte falls under the
alternative circumstance by the circumstance of closely-knit family relations.
RULING:
The alleged closely-knit family ties is inaccurate because the relationship
between Clarrisa and Lamberte is actually five degrees removed. Besides, while
it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating
circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity,
regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of
the offended party, it is only taken into consideration when the offended
party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.
The relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationship
mentioned.

PEOPLE vs. TOLENTINO

G.R. No. 130514.
June 17, 1999
That during the period from May 1, 1995 to July 1995, in Masantol,
Pampanga, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
ABUNDIO TOLENTINO, step father of nine (9) year old Rachelle Parco, the
former being the common-law spouse of the latter's mother, Teresa David, by
taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over Rachel Parco, then eight (8)
years old, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously thru force
and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of the said minor Rachel Parco,
against her will and consent.
On May 1, 1995, at past noon, Rachelle Parco, 8 years old, was inside one of
the two bedrooms at the second floor of the house of her grandmother, which
was located at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga (TSN, January 22,
1997). Rachelle was arranging the clothes while in the room (Ibid, p. 7).
Suddenly, Abundio Tolentino, the stepfather of Rachelle Parco, entered the
same room and closed the door. Abundio Tolentino ordered Rachelle Parco to
stand up and lie down on the bed. When Rachelle Parco was already on the
bed, Abundio Tolentino removed his short pants and of Rachelle Parco
Abundio Tolentino placed his sex organ on Rachelle Parco's genitals and
bumped (binubundol-bundol) hers with his. At that moment, Rachelle Parco
remained silent, because she was afraid and did not know what Abundio
Tolentino was doing to her. Abundio Tolentino's carnal act lasted only for
three minutes, because Rachelle Parco's brother knocked at the door and ask
money from Abundio (Ibid, p. 9). Abundio Tolentino told Rachelle's brother
to ask money from Lola Iding (ibid). Thereafter, Abundio Tolentino put on
his short pants and hers and went down the house (Ibid).

Abundio Tolentino repeatedly did the same thing to Rachelle Parco at least
three to four times a week in May, June, and July 1995. Rachelle Parco was
overc[o]me by fear that she did not tell anyone about what Abundio
Tolentino was doing to her.

rape was committed, has already served as a special qualifying circumstance in

this case.

PEOPLE vs. SAYAT, alias "Bobby" or "Buboy,"

ISSUE:
Whether or not alternative circumstance of relationship between the victim
and the accused can be considered in the case.

G.R. No.s 102773-77

June 8, 1993

HELD:
NO.
The information specifically alleges that RACHELLE was eight years old when
the crime was committed and TOLENTINO was "the stepfather... being the
common-law spouse of [RACHELLE's] mother, Teresa David." That allegation is
inaccurate. TOLENTINO was not RACHELLE's step-father, for that relationship
presupposes a legitimate relationship, i.e., he should have been legally married
to Teresa David. A step-father is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a
marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the
offspring;[12] or, a stepdaughter is a daughter of one's spouse by a previous
marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a former a
marriage.[13] Nevertheless, since the information specifically alleges that
TOLENTINO was the common-law-spouse of RACHELLE's mother and that
RACHELLE was under eighteen years of age, we shall appreciate these special
qualifying circumstances.
The alternative circumstance of relationship can be considered only "when the
offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or
adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the
offender.[15] RACHELLE does not fit in any of the enumeration. At any rate, the
circumstance that TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of RACHELLE's
mother, together with the fact that RACHELLE was eight years old when the

Accused-appellant Godofredo Sayat, alias "Bobby" or Buboy," was charged

with five crimes of rape in five separate criminal complaints subscribed by
eight-year old Marites Sayat and separately docketed. Said complaints were
identically formulated, to wit:
That on or about (no date given in the website) in the Municipality of
Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of threat, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant, Marites, a minor of eight
years old, (sic) against her will and consent.
The prosecutions version of incident was based principally to the testimony of
the offended party Marites Sayat. She was 8 years old then when she was
raped by her brother ("kapatid sa ama") 18 years her senior.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alternative circumstance of relationship can be considered
as an aggravating circumstance in the case at bar eventhough the certificate of
live birth of Marites Sayat, marked as Exhibit "F" was not formally offered in
evidence.
HELD:

The identification of documentary evidence is different from its formal offer.

The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking
of the evidence as an exhibit; the second is made when the party rests his case.
The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as exhibit
does not mean that it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the
party. 27 The party may decide to formally offer it if he believes this will
advance his cause, but then, again, he may decide not to do so at
all. 28 Alternative circumstance of relationship between him and the victim can
not be proved by said document which was not submitted in court.
Unfortunately for said appellant, however, the victim unequivocally testified
that he is actually her half-brother ('kapatid sa ama',) 29 and said declaration
was never successfully refuted. Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that they reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence of the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family geneology, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. 30
Declarations as to pedigree may not ordinarily be proved by hearsay evidence
or by affidavit; but except for evidence of reputation which usually is limited
to members of the family, any competent witness, including the person whom
the declaration relates, may testify thereto. It has been held proper for one to
testify to facts of family history which relate to him, such as the identity of his
parents or other relatives or the place of his birth or his age. 31Parenthetically,
it will be observed that Marites and appellant bear the same family name
"Sayat."
The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE vs.PABLO PORRAS

G.R. No. L-38107
October 16, 1933
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
convicting the appellant of rape.
The complaint filed by the offended party is as follows:
(in espanol .)
The court below sentenced the defendant-appellant to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal.
The attorney de oficio submits five assignments of error all of which relate to
issues of fact. We have carefully examined the entire record and concur with
the court below that the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond
any reasonable doubt. The crime of rape is penalized by article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code withreclusion temporal. In the present instance, the
aggravating circumstance of relationship (article 15 of the Revised Penal Code)
must be taken into consideration. The crime in this case was so monstrous that
no punishment which it is in the power of this or any other human tribunal to
decree, could possibly be a sufficient expiation of the offense. we assess the
penalty at twenty years of reclusion temporal, and, as thus modified, affirm
the judgment of the court below.

NOTE: heto lang po lahat nilalaman nung case.

PEOPLE VS. RAMIREZ y ANTONIO

G.R. No. 97920
January 20, 1997
The decision of the court stated therein that the accused was found guilty of
the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt and was imposed for the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and condemns him to pay to Maribel Soriano the
amount of P30,000.00 as and by way of moral and exemplary damages and
to pay the costs of suit
Maribel Soriano, herein complainant, a 13 year girl, the daughter of Angelita
De Guzman and Alfredo Soriano. The four-year relationship of her father and
mother was turning sour and was growing worse everyday. Since the tender
age of 2 years, she has been staying with her paternal grandmother, Juanita
Soriano which the latter and her mother are not always in good terms.
Sometime on the year 1982, her father died.
Angelita de Guzman cohabited with appellant Enrique Ramirez, a casual
laborer and a member of the notorious Sigue-Sigue Commando Gang. At that
time, appellant Ramirez was already separated from his lawful wife, Cristine
Somera, by whom he had a child.
Since 1979, appellant Ramirez and Angelita de Guzman stayed and lived in a
one-room shanty, a place one can hardly call a house.
During the holiday season on the year 1988, when Maribel was at the house of
the accused, she was raped by the said accused and also on one other
occasion, she was raped again.
ISSUE:
Whether or not alternative circumstance is present in the case at bar.
HELD:
The court appreciated the presence of alternative or aggravating circumstance
of relationship in this case, as "the relationship of stepfather or stepmother and

stepson or stepdaughter is included by analogy as similar to that of ascendant

and descendant." 34 Thus, the award of exemplary damages is likewise proper.
The appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the trial court finding appellant
Enrique Ramirez y Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape committed against his own stepdaughter Maribel Soriano and imposing
on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification that he shall indemnify the victim in the amount of eighty
thousand pesos (P80,000.00) broken down as follows: fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) by way of indemnity; plus thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
as moral and exemplary damages.
INTOXICATION

PEOPLE vs. ISABELO NOBLE

G.R. No. L-288
August 29, 1946
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for murder. The defendant,
who, before arraignment, expressed through his counsel willingness to plead
guilty to simple homicide if the provincial fiscal would amend the information
accordingly, seeks absolute acquittal on appeal, claiming that he acted in
defense of his sister's honor.
George F. Ott, a private in the United States Army, with two other American
soldiers, took Consolacion Noble, a widow, 50 years old; Corazon Apacible,
Consolacion's daughter, single, 32 years old; and Paz Fores, a doctor of
medicine, single, 25 years of age, to see a cinema showing in an Army camp in
Batangas early in the evening of October 22, 1945. After the show, the three
ladies invited the three Americans to come into the house. There, the two
companions of George F. Ott seated themselves in a sofa in the drawing room,
while Ott fetched from his jeep a phonograph which he placed on a table in
the ante-room and while the ladies are preparing the foods and drinks. As Ott
was fixing the phonograph with one of the ladies standing near him. Isabelo

Noble, brother of Consolacion Noble, came up the stairs and shot the
American several times with a .45 caliber pistol. From the effects of his wounds
Ott died shortly after.
The appellant says that the lady was his sister, Consolacion Noble who was
with the deceased in the ante-room. He states that after making four or five
steps from the top of the stairs he saw Ott holding Consolacion's hands and
trying by force to embrace and kiss her; that he drew his revolver and fired a
shot that missed its mark; that, as the American started to pick a chair, perhaps
to hurl at him, he fired various other shots; that all he knew afterwards was
that Ott had fallen down and he threw away his gun.
But there is a deeper reason why he shot in cold blood the deceased in the
way he killed him.
Jealousy and disappointment drove the defendant to his rash act, Paz Fores
testimony that she was engaged to Ott and the defendant is in love with her
and that the accused had courted her but she was not interested. (in short
busted ((: ). Not only also that the deceased was his rival suitor but he was
also the one who introduced the deceased to her.
The defendant alleges that on that faithful night, he felt distressed because he
failed to meet the girl he loved. He went to his clinic and after treating a
patient he took and drink a glass of wine until he got drunk. As he was about
to go home he saw the house of her sister was still lit and he went there and
he saw his old uncle who has a heart ailment and he gave his uncle an
injection for the his heart, after that he got arrested by one Consorcio Noche,
the policeman.
Consorcio Noche, the policeman, testifies that when Isabelo Noble and he
"were about to reach the Municipal Building," the accused told him "that he
will sit down and then he vomited"; and that "he smelled wine.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alternative circumstance of intoxication in this case
can be considered as mitigating or aggravating.
HELD:

The presence of three mitigating circumstances is urged: one among others is

intoxication.
This mitigating circumstance must be proved to the satisfaction of the court to
be available as a means to lighten the penalty. The trial court has found the
evidence insufficient to "conclusively show that the accused was drunk on the
night of the incident.
The amount of liquor the accused had taken, if he had taken any, was not of
sufficient quantity to affect his mental faculties to the extent of entitling him to
a mitigation of his offense. His Honor correctly reasons that "if the accused was
thoughtful enough not to neglect giving his uncle his injection, the inference
would be that his intoxication was not to such a degree as to affect his mental
capacity to fully understand the consequences of his act."
We find, in conclusion, that the judgment of conviction appealed from,
sentencing the defendant to reclusion perpetua with the accesories of law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the
costs, is in accordance with law and the evidence, and that it should be, and
the same is hereby, affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

THE UNITED STATES v. ARTHUR FITZGERALD

G.R. No. 1179
August 18, 1903
Between 11 and 12 oclock on the night of November 15, 1902, Appellant and
the deceased Charles Marsh had an heated argument in the distillery. they
were ordered by Samuel Brown, an American who was in the vicinity ordered
the two to stopped their argument. The deceased was about to go out but the
appellant refused to go out and continued insulting the deceased. The latter
went back and gave appellant a blow that knocked him down but he
immediately stood up and run towards the ice plant and took a revolver,
while the deceased was about 15 feet away and heard the appellant uttering

some words, he turned around to look at him and just at this moment
appellant fired his revolver which hit the deceased below the nipple which was
considered fatal and Samuel Brown(deceased) died less than two hours later.
He also fired his revolver to the two other Americans in the distillery but no
one were shot.
Notwithstanding the denial and exculpatory allegations of the accused, his
guilt as principal by direct participation of the violent death of Charles Marsh is
unquestionable, for this fact is proven in the record by the testimony of several
witnesses who saw that occurred, and even heard the threatening words
uttered by the accused. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to
indicate that the accused was a habitual drunkard. On the contrary, several
witnesses affirmed that he was not in the habit of getting drunk.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alternative circumstance of intoxication in this case can be
considered.
HELD:
The court considered in his behalf the mitigating circumstance No. 6 of article
9 of the Code, there being no evidence that the vice of drunkenness was
habitual with the accused. The law does not consider drunkenness as a
complete defense, but merely as a mitigating circumstance, because one under
the influence of liquor cannot be regarded as entirely bereft of sense and
reason.

DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION

US VS. FLORES
G.R. No. 9008
September 17, 1914

This is an appeal from the judgment entered in the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, convicting the defendants and appellants Manuel Flores, Irineo de la
Cruz, Domingo de los Santos, Doroteo de los Santos, and Lorenzo Orozco of
the crime of assassination marked with various aggravating circumstances, and
sentencing each and all of them to found guilty as an accessory and sentenced
to cedena temporal in its medium degree.
The principal witness for the prosecution was one Pedro Flores, a selfconfessed accomplice, He testified that the murder was planned by the
appellant Lorenzo Orozco, with whose wife the deceased had been having an
illicit relation with, and that he himself as well as the other appellants had
joined the party which committed the crime at the invitation the appellant,
who gave small sums of money as a sign of saying that he was thankful of their
participation (gratificacion). The account of the incident that took place and
the participation and how they buried the deceased and its manner on how
they did it was fully corroborated by the law and medical officers who found
the body of the deceased buried at the place and in the manner indicated by
him in his extrajudicial confession.
A review of all the records of this case shows that all the defendants are men
of a low order of intelligence, with but little "instruction or education."
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants who are men of a low order of
intelligence, with but little "instruction or education" can be considered as an
alternative circumstance.
HELD:
The court held that in imposing the penalty upon the four defendants and
appellants convicted as principals in the commission of the crime these
aggravating circumstances should have been compensated by the extenuating
circumstances set forth in subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code and in
article 11 as amended by Act No. 2142. A review of the whole record
convinces us that all these defendants are men of a low order of intelligence,
with but little "instruction or education." It also affirmatively appears that the
investigator of the crime had been aroused to a high degree of passion and
"obfuscation" by the discovery of the fact that the deceased was carrying on

illicit relations with his wife and had recently come into the community for the
express purpose of continuing those illicit relations; while his accomplices, who
appear to have been ignorant friends, neighbors and defendents, were also
aroused by him to a high pitch of anger against the betrayer of the family of
their friend.
The sentence imposed by the trial judge, modified by substituting for so much
thereof as imposes the death penalty upon the defendants and appellants
Lorenzo Orozco, Ireneo de la Cruz, Manuel Flores and Doroteo de los Santos,
the penalty of cadena perpetua, together with the subsidiary penalties of this
instances against the appellants.

PEOPLE VS. CASILLAR

G.R. No. L-28132
November 25, 1969
On June 11, 1966, about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, testified Danilo Nicolas, a
14-year old boy, while at the corner of Lope de Vega and Misericordia Streets,
Manila, scavenging ingarbage cans for scraps of paper to sell, he saw a
Chinaman, Chan Siak, walking. He was met by 4 men, who were the accused,
and another not in Court. The 4th man was Celso Puzon who is charged with
the same offense before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, he being
only 15 years of age. Casillar and Puzon held the Chinaman's hands while
Armalda and Amita pointed a "balisong" at him; the former being then to the
right of their victim and the latter in front of him. Armalda thereafter stabbed
the Chinese in his right side whilst Amita stabbed him in his neck, after which
Armalda took Chan's wallet from the hip pocket of his trousers. This done, the
four fled.
ISSUE:
whether or not the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction can be
considered in the case.

HELD:
It is urged that the accused-appellants should be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction. Amita is a laborer who reached Grade V;
Casillar is a puto vendor, whose schooling reached Grade III; and Armalda, a
push-cart hand (nangangariton), is illiterate. It is for the trial court, rather than
the appellate court, to find and consider the circumstance of lack of
instruction, for it is not illiteracy alone but the lack of sufficient intelligence and
knowledge of the full significance of one's acts that constitute this mitigating
circumstance and only the trial court can properly assess the same.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the judgment under review is hereby
affirmed, with the sole modification that the amount of the indemnity shall be,
as it is hereby increased to, P12,000.00 Costs against appellants.

US VS FRANCISCO BALABA
G.R. No. L-12392
December 4, 1917
On the day of the crime the defendant Francisco Balaba was living in the
house of his brother Agapito Balaba, The defendant took care of fighting
cocks. On February 20, 1916, he fell out with his sister-in-law, the deceased
Fortunata Cabasagan, wife of Agapito Balaba, because she had tethered the
defendant's cocks, which were injuring the corn plantings. On the 29th of the
same month, in the morning, while the defendant was feeding this cocks, he
saw one rooster which it was not his, catched and ate it. This rooster belonged
to the deceased Claudia Ligao. In the morning of that same day, the 29th,
Donato Duero, second husband of Claudia Ligao, ask the latter to look for the
cock that had disappeared and made inquiry about it to the defendant, whom
he suspected of having stolen it. In reply to the inquiry, defendant admitted in
killing it and will exchange it to one of his cocks. Duero chose one but the
defendant would not give it to him for it was not his. Then Duero, backed up

by Sergio Daguplo, obliged the defendant to follow him for the consideration
of just paying the cock that was eaten but it appears that the defendant was
hesitant in neither to make payment nor exchange for the cock butchered by
him. To make the story short, he killed three persons.

PERSON CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES

PRINCIPAL

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alternative circumstance of ignorance and lack of
education of the accused can be considered in the case for the court stated that
the accused is an uneducated and even a densely ignorant man.

PEOPLE VS. PERALTA ET.AL

G.R. No. L-19069
October 29, 1968

HELD:
Doubtless the convict is an uneducated and even a densely ignorant man. But
having in mind the conditions under which he did his three victims to death,
we are of opinion that his criminal responsibility for these heinous crimes is not
modified in any substantial degree by his ignorance and lack of education.
Neither education nor a high degree of intelligence is necessary to teach a man
that it is unlawful and criminal in the highest degree to do murder under the
circumstances which surrounded the commission of the crime of which this
accused stands convicted. In giving way to his vindictive rage aroused by
demands for redress for the petty wrong he had done his neighbor and by
criticism of his conduct in that connection, he must have known that he
subjected himself to the severest penalties of the law, and his ignorance and
lack of education offer no justification or excuse for the merciless and
murderous assault upon the lives of his relatives and neighbors.
The judgment convicting and sentencing the accused should be affirmed with
costs of this instance against him. So ordered.

FACTS:
On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal,
two known warring gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as Sigue-Sigue and
OXO were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m. However, a fight between
the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners
were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led
away to the investigation while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to
return to their respective quarters.
In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, OXO members,
Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio
Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants charged
therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by
virtue of final judgments.
They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with
evident premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed Sigue-Sigue
sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts
confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice
picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or sharpened,
thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly
caused their deaths.
ISSUES
(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple
murder?

(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present

in the commission of the crime?
HELD:
The trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of the
murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court
can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the crime
committed by the accused was planned. First, all the deceased were Tagalogs
and members of sympathizers of Sigue-Sigue gang (OXO members were
from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that
their killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed with
improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion.
Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going
from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have
previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part
in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasirecidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of the
offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison by virtue of
convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be imposed
in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article
160 of the RPC. Hence, severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified
because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the crime.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo
Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and
Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct
crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them
shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased
victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

PEOPLE VS. MOSTOLES

G.R. No. L-2880
March 31, 1950
FACTS:
Luciano Pablo and his co-defendants Demetrio Mostoles, Rufino Lazaro, Pedro
Velasco, Benjamin Valdez, Mariano Velasco and Leandro Pablo, were charged

with triple murder for the death of Pablo Saure, Perfecto Marilao and Miguel
Marcos, in two separate informations filed in criminal cases Nos. 594 and 608,
of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which by leave of the court, were
consolidated in one case. With the exception of Luciano Pablo, Demetrio
Mostoles and Rufino Lazaro who pleaded not guilty, the other four accused
pleaded guilty and were sentenced accordingly.
After a proper trial, Rufino Lazaro was acquitted, while Luciano Pablo and
Demetrio Mostoles were each sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the death of
each of the three victims, and pursuant to article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code, the maximum period of the duration of the three penalties of reclusion
perpetua impose upon each culprit shall in no case exceed forty years, with the
accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
the deceased Pablo Saure, Perfecto Marilao and Miguel Marcos in the amount
of P2,000 for each victim, and to pay one-third (1/3) of the costs.
At about 10 o'clock in the morning of August 8, 1948, Pedro Velasco and his
wife, Mariano Velasco and Benjamin Valdez and his wife, residents of the
barrio of Bantug Petines, municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, came
to the house to the house of Rufino Lazaro in the barrio of San Manuel,
municipality of San Mateo of said province, for the purpose of borrowing
some corn grain for their consumption. Having accomplished their purpose,
they did not return, however, to their homes until about 3 o'clock in the
afternoon.
In the meantime, Luciano Pablo, with Demetrio Mostoles and Emiliano Teoso
in the house of Rufino Lazaro, and although the house of appellant Luciano
Pablo was about only one kilometer away from that of Rufino Lazaro, he
decided to stay and wait for his companions, because he unintended to load
the things that he had bought on their bullcarts. But when they ready to
depart, the rain prevented them from doing so and they transferred to a near
by store of the daughter in law of Rufino Lazaro and while they drunk some
wine.
Pablo Saure, Perfecto Marilao, and Miguel Marcos, residence of the barrio of
Bantug Petines arrived in the mean time and sought shelter in the store, and at
the suggestion of Pedro Velasco, the new arrivals, who were barrio mates of
Demetrio Mostoles, agreed that they would all go home together after taking
their supper at the house of Rufino Lazaro.
After staying for about an hour in the store, Rufino Lazaro, Luciano Pablo,
Pedro Velasco and Demetrio Mostoles went to the house of Leandro Pablo,

only about ten meters away, and upon reaching the same, Demetrio Mostoles
who was a barrio Lieutenant of Bantug Patines, told his companions that the
new arrivals Saure, Marilao and Marcos, were bandits who gave much trouble
in his barrio. On his part appellant likewise confided to his companions that he
had suspected that those three persons were responsible for the disappearance
of his carabao, and so urged to his companions that they be put to death. The
proposal of Luciano Pablo having been accepted by his confederates, they
discussed the plan to liquidate Saure, Marilao and Marcos.
At about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, while the group including the intended
victims where partaking supper in the house of Rufino Lazaro, suddenly and
expectedly three unknown persons appeared at the door of the kitchen and
ordered the inmates not to male any move. Immediately, Pedro Velasco stood
up and ordered his companion to bind the hands of Pablo Saure, Perfecto
Marilao and Miguel Marcos. It is shown in the record that this appellant
helped Pedro Velasco in tying the hands of Pablo Saure behind his back. When
the hands of the three persons were thus bound behind their backs, they were
herded and ordered to go down the house. Rufino Lazaro, sensing the
impending tragedy and unwilling to be implicated in his house; and addressing
Pedro Velasco, his brother-in-law, told him: "Please do not do that because
there are authorities before whom you could bring these people, if they really
commit any fault;" but Pedro Velasco was adamant in his purpose to carry out
their plan and said: "Whoever does not recognize my authority will be
implicated herein," and told Rufino, "You better come along to indicate the
place where we could kill them." Thus, Rufino Lazaro led them to an
abandoned well about seven meters away from his house.
The three victims, who were hog-tied, were lined up near the well, and
Demetrio Mostoles, after flouting Perfecto Marilao, cut his right ear and then
slashed him to death.
A similar fate met the other two victims, Saure and Marcos, and finally,
Mostoles gave bolo blows to all the mortally wounded victims. Upon his
suggestion, the life less bodies were thrown and dumped into the abandoned
well and covered up with dirt and pieces of wood.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appelant is equally liable as a principal in the three
murders

HELD:
Luciano Pablo had participated in tying Pablo Saure and Marcos Miguel, and
therefore, it is quite incredible that he would intercede and implore mercy for
the victims when he himself had participated in rendering them defenseless by
tying up their hands. But assuming for the sake of argument that he did not
participate in tying the victims, the fact that he voluntarily joined Pedro
Velasco, Demetrio Mostoles, Mariano Velasco, Leandro Pablo and Benjamin
Valdez in bringing the victims to the spot where they were murdered, shows
that he conspired with them to kill the victims. What is more, his participation
in the commission of the crime is not without any motive, because he
suspected Jose Saure, the brother of Pablo Saure, as the author of the
disappearance of his (Luciano's) carabao.
The circumstance of treachery qualified the killing of the three victims. Evident
premeditation has also attended the commission of the crimes as an
aggravating circumstance. The appellant and his confederates deliberately
planned the commission of the offenses of about 4 o'clock in the afternoon
and commenced the execution thereof at about 7:30 in the evening, or after
lapse of about three and a half hours. They had sufficient time to
dispassionately reflect upon the consequences of their act, or to deposit from
its execution.
The three murders under consideration were committed on August 8, 1948,
after the enactment of Republic Act No. 296, the Judiciary Act of 1948, which
went into effect on June 17, 1948. In view of the lack of the necessary number
of affirmative votes required by the provision of the last paragraph of section
9 of said Act for the imposition of the death penalty, and inasmuch as the coaccused of this appellant have been sentenced to, and are now serving three
penalties of reclusion perpetua, in line with the ruling laid down by this Court
in People vs. Sakam (61 Phil., 27), subject to the provisions of article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, this appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
with its accessories, for each of the three murders committed by him.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed. Appellant shall pay the
cost

PEOPLE VS. GENSOLA

G.R. No. L-24491
September 30, 1969
FACTS:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding the
defendants. Rufino Gensola, Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan, guilty as
principals of the crime of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion
perpetua and ordering said defendants to pay in solidum the sum of P6,000 as
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miguel Gayanilo.
Rufino Gensola was the driver, while Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were the
conductors, of a passenger truck, Gelveson No. 17 (belonging to Jose Tan,
father of Fidelina and Felicisimo) with station at Guimbal, Iloilo. They
suspected Miguel Gayanilo of having punctured the tires of the truck while it
was parked in front of his carinderia on Gerona St., Guimbal, on November
18, 1958.
In the afternoon of November 19, on the return trip of the truck, then driven
by a temporary driver, Restituto Gersaneva, from Iloilo City, Enrique Gelario
and Enrique Gela were among the passengers of the truck. Before the truck
entered the poblacion of Guimbal, it parked on Gonzales St. to discharge a
passenger and his baggage. Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela overheard
Fidelina Tan mutter to herself, obviously referring to someone she did not
name: "He does not appear because I will kill him." ("No aparece porque le
voy amatar.") The truck then continued on its way and parked in front of
Teodora Gellicanao's carinderia on Gerona St. in the poblacion. All the
passengers got off the truck.
Enrique Gelario and Enrique Gela crossed the street towards the carinderia of
Pedro Genciana to await another passenger truck for their respective barrios.
The Gelveson No. 17 then left in the direction of the nearby carinderia of
Violeta Garin, returned a short time later, and parked in front of the bodega
of its owner, Jose Tan. The time was about 6:30 p.m.
Miguel Gayanilo was crossing the street from the public market in the direction
of his carinderia with Rufino Gensola, holding in his right hand a stone as big
as a man's fist, following closely behind. At this time, Felicisimo and Fidelina
Tan were standing in the middle of the street. After Miguel Gayanilo had
crossed the middle of the street near the two, Fidelina Tan shouted, "Rufino,

strike him." Upon hearing the shout Miguel looked back and Rufino suddenly
struck him on the left face with the stone. Felicisimo then struck Miguel with a
piece of iron on the back of the head causing serious wounds and fracture of
the skull. Not content with the two blows already given, Fidelina struck
Miguel with another piece of iron on the left forehead causing serious wounds
and fracture of the skull. Miguel fell to the ground near the canal along the
side of the street. Rufino Gensola immediately left for his house situated on
Gonzales St. Felicisimo and Fidelina observed the prostrate body for a few
seconds until Fidelina muttered: "He is already dead." ("Ya esta muerto.") The
two then left the scene of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are are equally liable as principals of the crime
of murder
HELD:
The admission of Rufino Gensola that he alone was responsible for the serious
wounds and fractures of the skull inflicted upon Miguel Gayanilo in legitimate
defense of Fidelina Tan and of himself, has no probative value because it
constitutes, in the face of contrary credible evidence for the prosecution, an
assumption by Rufino Gensola of the criminal liability of Felicisimo Tan and
Fidelina Tan. The penal law does not allow anyone to assume the criminal
liability of another.
(1) Fidelina Tan's intention revealed by the words she muttered to herself, "He
does not appear because I will kill him," was not shared by Felicisimo Tan,
who kept silent. Silence is not a circumstance indicating participation in the
same criminal design. With respect to Rufino Gensola, he was not even in the
truck at the time.
(2) When Miguel Gayanilo was crossing Gerona St., it was only Rufino
Gensola who followed closely behind. Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were in
the middle of the street. The words shouted by Fidelina Tan, "Rufino strike
him," were meant as a command and did not show previous concert of
criminal design.
(3) The blows given with pieces of iron on the back of the head and on the
left forehead by Felicisimo and Fidelina after Rufino had struck with a piece of
stone the left face of Miguel, do not in and by themselves show previous
concert of criminal design. Particularly when it is considered that Rufino

immediately left thereafter while Felicisimo and Fidelina remained for a few
seconds observing the prostrate body of Miguel until Fidelina muttered, "He is
already dead."
In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three appellants is individual,
that is, each appellant is liable only for his own act.
Appellant Rufino Gensola is liable only for the lacerated wounds inflicted by
him on the left face of Miguel Gayanilo. Such lacerated wounds caused
disfigurement ("deformity") of the face within the meaning of Article 263 (3)
of the Revised Penal Code punishable by prision correccional in its minimum
and medium period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The offense
having been committed with treachery, the penalty should be imposed in its
maximum period.

Is appellant Fidelina Tan also liable for the offense considering that she gave
the command "Rufino, strike him"?

With respect to command, it must be the moving cause of the offense. In the
case at bar, the command shouted by Fidelina, "Rufino, strike not," was not
the moving cause of the act of Rufino Gensola. The evidence shows that
Rufino would have committed the act of his own volition even without said
words of command.

Are the appellants Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan both liable for the death of
Miguel Gayanilo?

Yes. The trauma inflicted by Felicisimo and the trauma inflicted by Fidelina,
combined, produced death due to traumatic shock. When Fidelina struck with
a piece of iron the left forehead of Miguel, he was not yet dead. It was only
after the trauma inflicted by Fidelina that the dying Miguel fell to the ground
and died seconds later. Although a dead person cannot be killed again, a
dying person can still be killed. The trauma inflicted by her hastened the death
of Miguel from traumatic shock made doubly severe. She must, therefore, be
also held criminally liable for the death of the victim.

Was the killing murder?

Yes. It was attended with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There was
alevosia because after Rufino suddenly struck Miguel Gayanilo with a stone,
Miguel, defenseless, was struck by Felicisimo Tan with a piece of iron on the
back of the head and by Fidelina Tan with a piece of iron on the left forehead.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, that part of the appealed judgment sentencing each
of the appellants Felicisimo Tan and Fidelina Tan to reclusion perpetua is
affirmed. Said appellants are also ordered to pay in solidum the sum of

P12,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, Miguel Gayanilo. That part
of the judgment against appellant Rufino Gensola is modified by sentencing
said appellant to an indeterminate penalty of from 3 months of arresto mayor
as minimum to 3 years of prision correccional as maximum.

US VS. GUEVARRA
G.R. No. 9265
August 22, 1914
FACTS:
Arraigned and duly tried for the crime of parricide, and having been sentenced
by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in a judgment dated August 14, 1913,
to the penalty of life imprisonment and the accessories of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs,
Jose Guevara appealed from said judgment.
About noon of Palm Sunday, March 16 of the present year 1913, in the house
of Miguela Soldevilla, mother of Ignacia Salvacion, situated in the barrio of
Banuyo of the town of Gasan in this Province of Tayabas, wherein dwelt the
defendant Jose Guevarra and his wife, the said Ignacia Salvacion, and while
the latter was starching clothes, defendant slashed her with a bolo several
times, causing three wounds: one, deep and necessarily fatal, on the left side of
her forehead, 5 inches in length, cutting through her skull and penetrating her
brain; another, 4 inches in length, also deep and serious but not fatal, in her
neck without cutting the bone; and another also 6 inches in length in the right
shoulder where it joins the arm, cutting all the muscles of that part; and two
slight cuts of the skin in the lower and posterior portion of her forearm; that
after wounding the deceased defendant fled; and that the victim died as a
result of said wounds on April 24 of this same year.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the court erred in:
(a) classifying the act as parricide
(b) not regarding the insanity of the defendant as a ground of exemption
(c) imposing the penalty of life imprisonment
HELD:

(a) There is no ground to support the allegation of the defense to which the
first error assigned refers. It was proven at the trial and admitted therein by
counsel for the defendant that the latter was lawfully married to the deceased
Ignacia Salvacion; and that the said marriage had not been dissolved at the
time of the occurrence upon which questioned or disputed by the defendants
counsel himself in the trial court.
(b) There is nothing in the evidence to show that the defendant was not of
sound mind or that he acted under influence of a sudden attack of insanity or
that he was generally regarded as insane, when he inflicted upon his wife the
wound that resulted in her death. It was incumbent upon the defense to prove
each of these facts, and in the absence of such proof, the legal presumption is
that the defendant acted in his usual state of mind and that he freely,
knowingly, and willfully performed the act.
(c) There were no mitigating circumstances. The trial court has not erred in
imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, which is the lesser of the
two indivisible penalties with which such crime is punished, with the
accessories of article 54 of the same code, indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000, and payment of the costs, as the judgment
itself sets forth.
The judgment appealed from being, therefore, in conformity with the law and
the merits of the case, we affirm it, with the costs against the Appellant.

PEOPLE VS CAIMBRE, ET AL
G.R. #L-12087
December 29, 1960
FACTS OF THE CASE:
1.
Edilberto Justimbaste and Vicente Caimbre were charged and convicted
as principals by inducement for the crime of murder. Demetrio Caimbre
pleaded guilty for the lesser offense of Homicide and was sentenced
accordingly.

2.
At about 10 oclock in the evening of May 4, 1956, Angel Olimpo
(Victim) and Fausto Broa arrived at the house of Esteban Caimbre and they sat
at a mortar. Shortly thereafter, Demetrio Caimbre arrived, sat on the same
mortar.
3.
Then, without provocation, Demetrio Caimbre slashed Angelo Olimpo
with a bolo. Olimpo ran to a nearby palay seed bed pursued by Demetrio
Caimbre up to the border of the rice field where Olimpo was overtaken by
Demetrio and the latter again slashed Olimpo several times and left him in the
rice field.
4.
During the pursuit, Edilberto Justimbaste (Appellant) told Demetrio that
you had better killed him. The victim was removed from the rice field and
taken to a higher ground when Vicente Caimbre noticed that Olimpo was still
alive, he told his brother Demetrio finish him, finish him. Whereupon,
Demetrio cut Olimpos neck.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellant is guilty as principals by inducement for the crime of
murder charged against him.
RULING:
1.
The determining causes of the crime appear to have been Demetrios
own determination to kill and his brothers inducement and not that which is
allegedly came from the appellant when he uttered the words: you had
better killed him.
2.
In determining the acts or utterances of an accused are sufficient to
make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must be shown that the

inducement was of such a nature and made in such a way as to become the
determining cause of the crime, and that such inducement was offered
precisely with the intention of producing the result.

It must appear that the inducement was made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such
inducement was the determining cause thereof.

RULING:
1.
Paragraph 3, Article 17 of the RPC considers as principals by
indispensable cooperation those who cooperate in the commission of the
offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

3.
In this case, there is no showing that appellant had any reason to have
Angelo Olimpo killed and that the appellant had no sufficient moral influence
over Demetrio Caimbre as to make the latter obey him blindly.

PEOPLE VS FRONDA
G.R. #102361-62
May 14, 1993
FACTS OF THE CASE:
1.
The defendant-appellant was charged as principal by indispensable
cooperation for the murder of Esminio Balaan and Edwin Balaan.
2.
About 6 oclock in the morning of June 11, 1986, the deceased Edwin
Balaan and Esminio Balaan who are brothers were taken by seven armed men
in fatigue uniforms with long firearms, suspected to be NPA members,
accompanied by appellant Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua from the house
of one Ferminio Balaan and brought them to the mountain.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant is guilty as principal by indispensable cooperation for
the crime of murder.

Records show that appellants participation in the commission of the

crime consisted of 1) leading the member of the armed group to the
house where the victims were found; 2) tying the victims hands; 3)
digging the grave where the victims were buried.

2.
The prosecution witnesses testified that the members of the armed
group were accompanied by, aside from the appellant, Roderick Padua,
known to be a member of the NPA.

Undoubtedly, even without appellants participation, the assailants

could have easily located the Balaan brothers through the assistance of
Roderick Padua. Taking into account the number of the assailants alone,
it is apparent that the armed men could have nevertheless committed
the crime easily without the appellant abetting the commission thereof.

3.
The acts performed by the appellant are not, by themselves,
indispensable to the killing of the Balaan brothers. As aforesaid, to be
considered as principal by indispensable cooperation, there must be a direct
participation in the criminal design by another act without which the crime
could not have been committed.

ACCOMPLICES

PEOPLE VS TAMAYO
44 Phil 38,
FACTS: In quarrel, Ramon was chocking the deceased. Then, Jose ran up and
delivered a blow with a bamboo stick on the head of the deceased. After the
blow struck by jose, which Ramon saw, the latter continued to choke the
deceased until life was extinct. The chocking by Ramon was not cause of
death. It was the blow delivered by Jose which caused the death of the
deceased.
Issue: Is ramon is an accomplice for the commission pf the crime?
Held: Yes. The reason is that after the deceased had received the fatal injury,
Ramon continued to hold and choke the deceased until after life was extinct. It
shows that Ramon approved of the blow struck by Jose, thereby showing his
participation in the criminal design of jose, and this is sufficient to make ramon
as an accomplice.

PEOPLE VS TATLONGHARI, ET AL
GRN-22094
FACTS:
That on or about August 25, 1954 in the evening in the barrio of Port
Junction, municipality of Ragay, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, armed with
bolos, confederating, conspiring, and mutually helping each other, and with
evident intent to kill Victor Eje and by means of treachery, did then and there
intentionally, wilfully criminally, and feloniously, attack and assault said Victor
Eje with stones and bolos, as a result of which the victim received contusions
and wounds in different parts of his body.
Testimony of one of the witnesses: FELIMON ALMARES, who declared
that at about 7:30 in the evening of 25 August 1954, in the barrio of Port

Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur, while he and Victor Eje were walking along
the railroad track towards their homes in barrio Catabangan, they met the
accused, Santiago Tatlonghari and Tiburcio Lalogo, in front of the house of
one Marcos Nacionales; that thereupon, Santiago Tatlonghari shouted, "listo
kayo mga bata" (get ready, boys), after which stones rained on them hitting
him (Almares) on the left knee; 1 that thus hurt, the witness rolled to the right
side of the railroad track and hid himself among the talahib and cogon grasses
that abound in the area; that before rolling to safety, he saw Santiago
Tatlonghari and Tiburcio Lalogo hitting with bolos Victor Eje who was then
lying on the ground with his two hands raised upward; 2 that he saw the
stabbing because there were beams of light coming from the houses of
Catalino Arellano, Marcos Nacionales and Juan Corod, which were within the
vicinity; 3 that Santiago Tatlonghari had also a flashlight in his left hand which
was focused on the victim while the latter was being hit with bolos; 4 that
thereafter, Fausto Mercado, Agapito Mercado, Cirilo Cueto and Ambrosia
Tatlonghari appeared from the cogon grasses along the railroad track and,
with Santiago Tatlonghari and Tiburcio Lalogo, viewed the prostrate body of
Victor Eje then they left the place together, going eastward in the direction of
the railroad station; 5 that when the group was gone he left his hiding place
and headed for home. He related the incident to Pedro Comia and Epifanio
Bico when they came to see him a little later.
ISSUE: W/N defendants are equally liable as accomplices in the commission of
the crime?
HELD:

The record is clear, however, that, although they had not acted pursuant to
previous concert, the appellants, Fausto Mercado, his son, Agapito, Ambrosio
Tatlonghari, and Cirilo Cueto, did knowingly aid the actual killers by casting
stones at the victim, and distracting his attention. However, their cooperation,
although done with knowledge of the criminal intent, was not indispensable
to the murderous assault by Santiago Tatlonghari and the fugitive Tiburcio
Lalogo, for which reason the four should be held liable only as accomplices in

the murder of the late Victor Eje and sentenced to a penalty one degree lower
to that of the principal participants in the crime (except in the case of
Ambrosio Tatlonghari whose appeal has been previously dismissed for failure
to file his brief)
Now although, as thus demonstrated, participation on the part of an
accomplice in the criminal design of the principal is essential to the same extent
as such participation is necessary on the part of one charged as co-principal,
nevertheless, it is evident, - and the cases above cited abundantly prove - that,
as against an accomplice, a court will sometimes draw the inference of guilty
participation in the criminal design from acts of concert in the consummation
of the criminal act and from the form and manner in which assistance is
rendered, where it would not draw the same inference for the purpose of
holding the same accused in the character of principal. This is because, in case
of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility.

PEOPLE VS BALLILI,
GRN: L-14044
Facts: That on September 9, 1956, and for sometime previous to that date, the
spouses Federico So, nicknamed "Diko" or "Dikoy", were living in their store
located at the Serra Street in the sitio of Bungtud, municipality of Tandag, of
this province of Surigao; that during that time, September 9, 1956, on the
occasion of the celebration of the town fiesta, there was a carnival being held
in the town plaza; that in that evening of September 9, 1956, said Juliana
Respicia, together with her children, went to the carnival ground to attend the
coronation of the carnival queen while her husband remained at home. Went
back in their home, that said Juliana Respicia slept at about eleven o'clock that
evening; that about three o'clock that next morning she was awakened by a
shout for help from her husband telling that he was wounded; that she
immediately stoop up, took a flashlight and went down to where her said
husband was, followed by her children and their woman-storekeeper; that she
found her husband Federico So lying on the floor face down and as she held
him on her arms and asked him what happened he could not answer

anymore; that she saw blood on his abdomen and he had a wound on the
breast near the left nipple and another wound on the arm; that she saw the
club. that it was found that the doors of the store, as well as the door leading
to the kitchen in the upper floor, were opened; that the robbers entered the
house by climbing a calamungay tree near the window and once inside they
went down to the store on the ground floor; that the drawer in the store was
opened and the cash money amounting to P1,000.00 was gone.
Testimonies: Martiniano Ajos, a rural policeman, testified that at about 2:00
o'clock in the morning of September 10, 1956, while he was on his way home
from the carnival where he had been on guard duty, he passed through the
street in front of the victim's house. Because the night was dark, he had a
flashlight with him. At the street corner, as he was about to make a left turn,
he happened to focus the light on the face of a man lurking near the front
door of the victim's store. The man, whom Ajos recognized to be Balili, ran
away. Ahead of him, also running, were two other men, but Ajos failed to
recognize them. Hearing the commotion inside the house of the victim, Ajos
went in to investigate and found Juliana Respicia wailing over the dead body
of her husband.
ISSUE: WN the defendants is an accomplice of the commission of the crime?
HELD: Yes. The SC held that there is no evidence, however, that appellant had
conspired with the malefactors, nor that did he actually participate in the
commission of the crime. He cannot, therefore, be considered as a principal.
But in going with them, knowing their criminal intention, and in staying
outside of the house with them while the others went inside the store to rob
and kill, appellant effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral
aid, making him guilty as an accomplice. His consciousness of guilt is confirmed
by his silence for several days and by his own confession made to Asuncion
Buenaflor.

TOPIC: ACCESSORIES

PEOPLE VS TAN
G.R. Nos. 106083-84
March 29, 1996
SYNOPSIS
FACTS:Manuelito Mendez, a former employee of Bueno Metal Industries, was
arrested for stealing product materials from the company warehouse. Mendez
admitted the accusation and pointed to Ramon Tan as the one who bought
the stolen items. Mendez was forgiven by complainant but Tan was charged
with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. After trial, Tan was convicted of the
crime charged, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the same. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue: The issue raised here is whether or not the prosecution has successfully
established the elements of fencing as against petitioner.
HELD: The Court resolved the issue in the negative. Noted is the fact that the
loss was never reported to the police. And as the complainant reported no
loss, it cannot be held for certain that the crime of theft or robbery was
committed. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent. The extrajudicial confession of Manuelito cannot be considered as evidence against the
accused as there must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain
a finding of guilt. Further, there was no showing at all that the accused knew
or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him.

PEOPLE vs. NEMESIO TALINGDAN,

TERESA DOMOGMA, ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-32126
July 6, 1978
FACTS
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967,
he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their

house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the
municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their relationship had
been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family
home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her.
On two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited
Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits
Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them,
go down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind
that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during
a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should
she get pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so before
Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back
for a period of more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later
that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during
that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned
down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa
several times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the
police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of
Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him,
for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the
latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he
would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday
morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash
clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their coappellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut
owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as
she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet";
and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter, she
shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".
The four appellants fired shots on the victim and made sure that he was dead.
Teresa Domogma was there while the shooting was happening but did not fire
shots on the victim. The victims 12-year old daughter knew what had

happened. Her teacher who also lives nearby came for help. Teresa pleaded
not guilty and even the Sol Gen advised for her acquittal.
ISSUE: IS Teresa Domogma liable?

sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision

correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with
the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

HELD:
this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the
record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to
the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her
husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from
Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When
Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the
culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew
to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I
will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who
repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them
with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects
in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband,
she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants'
conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her
constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"
which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro
Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any
mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to
DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby

PEOPLE vs. BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE et. al.

G.R. No. 116736
July 24, 1997
This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia from the Decision dated
February 9, 1994 written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio finding them
guilty of murder.
That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with abuse of superior strenght (sic) and with
deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed
weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR
MASANGKAY y ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by
counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty to the charge. Accused John Doe
was then at large. After trial in due course, the court a
quo promulgated the questioned Decision. The dispositive portion
reads:
[7]

WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. y Conje and

Manuel Garcia y Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged, the Court hereby sentenced (sic) them to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs of suit.

went with them to the crime scene. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia were apprehended and were brought to the police station.

Accused are hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum
of P35,000.00 for funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar
Masangkay and death indemnity of P50,000.00.

ISSUE:

FACTS:
October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar
Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a
drinking spree in the compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at
Daangbakal, Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. That while they were
drinking, accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were [already]
drunk arrived and joined them. That victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered
the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. That accused
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they [referring to the participants
in the drinking session] heard the victim Andre Mar shouted, Dont, help me!
(Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) That he and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back
portion of the house and [they] saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of
Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal with his face up and
stabbing the latter with a long bladed weapon. That Ariel Caranto ran and
fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of accused Benjamin, Jr. That he
[Quitlong] went to Romeo Ortega in the place where they were having the
drinking session [for the latter] to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That Romeo
Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and
brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter inside the well. That
Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones
measuring 11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet in length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to
the body of Andre Mar Masangkay inside the well. That Romeo Ortega
warned him [Quitlong] not to tell anybody of what he saw. That he answered
in the affirmative and he was allowed to go home. That his house is about 200
meters from Romeo Ortegas house. That upon reaching home, his conscience
bothered him and he told his mother what he witnessed. That he went to the
residence of Col. Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. That Col. Orig
accompanied him to the Valenzuela Police Station and some police officers

1. Is Ortega guilty of murder or Homicide?

2. Is Manuel Garcia liable?
HELD:
1. The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented conflicting
narrations. The prosecution witnesses described the commission of the crime
and positively identified appellants as the perpetrators. The witnesses for the
defense, on the other hand, attempted to prove denial and alibi. As to which
of the two contending versions speaks the truth primarily rests on a critical
evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their stories. In this regard,
the trial court held:
The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and
their witnesses and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly observed
their behavior and demeanor on the witness stand and is convinced
that the story of the prosecution is the more believable
version. Prosecution eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appeared and
sounded credible and his credibility is reinforced by the fact that he has
no reason to testify falsely against the accused. It was Diosdado
Quitlong who reported the stabbing incident to the police
authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and killed the victim Masangkay, he
will keep away from the police authorities and will go in hiding. x x x
Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor
and deportment on the stand as they rendered their testimonies, its evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect. Therefore,
unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment of
credibility must be respected.
In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records and found no
reason to reverse the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies insofar as Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration

of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. It

is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly deserves full
credence.
On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered on the
unbelievable. Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself
from Masangkays grip, he went home, treated his injuries and slept. This is not
the ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. If Ortegas version of the assault
was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the police
authorities, if only out of gratitude to Quitlong who came to his
rescue. Likewise, it is difficult to believe that a man would just sleep after
someone was stabbed in his own backyard. Further, we deem it incredible that
Diosdado Quitlong would stab Masangkay ten (10) times successively,
completely ignoring Benjamin Ortega, Jr. who was grappling with
Masangkay. Also inconsistent with human experience is his narration that
Masangkay persisted in choking him instead of defending himself from the
alleged successive stabbing of Quitlong. The natural tendency of a person
under attack is to defend himself and not to persist in choking a defenseless
third person.
Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court is based on
mere assumption and conjecture x x x. Allegedly, the medico-legal finding that
the large airway was filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was
alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles did not necessarily mean
that such muddy particles entered the body of the victim while he was still
alive. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, Nilubayan lang nang
saksak nang mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr. Thus, the
prosecution evidence shows Masangkay was already dead when he was lifted
and dumped into the well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an
accessory.[29]
2. We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. The essential requisites for the application of this
provision are that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is
likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily
caused by the actors wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the
body of Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia was committing a

felony. The offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its
discovery, i.e. that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide.[30]Although
Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when
he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the
direct and natural consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting offense
is worse than that intended.
True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the
victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that
the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died subsequently of
drowning.[31] That drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically
demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the victims airway, lungs and
stomach.[32] This is evident from the expert testimony given by the medicolegal officer, quoted below:
By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide
through drowning in an information that charges murder by means of
stabbing.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia
assisted in concealing x x x the body of the crime, x x x in order to prevent its
discovery, he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined
under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that
Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega,[38] the latters sister,
Maritess, being his wife.[39] Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from
criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. -- The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those
who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees with the single exception of accessories
falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article.
On the other hand, the next preceding article provides:
ART. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of
the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein,

either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its

commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or
the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of
the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the
author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the principal
accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled to the aforequoted exempting
provision of the Revised Penal Code.This Court is thus mandated by law to
acquit him.

PENALTIES IN GENERAL
LIMITATION OF PUNISHMENT

PEOPLE VS. TONGCO

( sorry po hindi ko mahanap case puro citation lang po)

SUPREME COURT said that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment or which public
sentiments has regarded as cruel or obsolete for instance those inflicted at the
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disempoweling, and the like

BAYLOSIS VS. CHAVEZ JR.

FACTS: That on or about the 29th day of March, 1988 in the Municipality of
San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines,Rafael baylosis and Benjamin de vera,
together with one Marco Palo, all known high ranking officers of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, and its military arm, the New Peoples
Army, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other,
did then and there willfully , unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, control and custody, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion/subversion, the Firearms/Ammunition
& Explosives without first securing the necessary license. Baylosis, de Vera, and
Palo, filed a motion to quash the information on the grounds THE FACTS
CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE BECAUSE THEY ARE
FOUNDED ON AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL/REPEALED STATUTE & FOR THE
SAME REASONS, THIS HONORABLE COURT IS DEVOID OF JURISDICTION
TO TRY THIS CASE. But , the Trial Court denied the motion to quash, by an
extended Resolution dated April 24, 1990. A motion for reconsideration filed
by Baylosis, et al. was also denied in an Order dated July 12, 1990.
Baylosis and de Vera thereupon instituted the present action in this Court.
Here, they plead for the nullification and setting aside of the Trial Judge's
Orders of April 24, 1990 and July 12, 1990; the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
72705 or, alternatively, that the information therein be considered as charging
only simple rebellion; and that the public officials impleaded as respondents be
"restrained from further initiating, filing or prosecuting cases involving
common crimes against the petitioners."
The petitioners further posit the unconstitutionality of the challenged provision
because "repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, which
guarantee full respect for human rights, equal protection of the laws, due
process, right to bail, protection against double jeopardy and from cruel,

degrading or inhuman punishment, and supremacy of civilian authority over

the military."
The petitioners further theorize that Section 1 (3) of PD 1866 is invalid because
it gives the public prosecutor an option not to file a case for rebellion and
instead file as many crimes for murder, frustrated murder, etc. as might have
been perpetrated in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
rebellion, insurrection or subversion.
ISSUE: WON the argument of petitioner that Sec 1 (3) PD is invalid
HELD: The argument is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised Penal Code
treats rebellion or insurrection as a crime distinct from murder, homicide,
arson, or other felonies that might conceivably be committed in the course of
a rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to the evidence in the hands of
the public prosecutor, and not the latter's whim or caprice, which gives the
choice. The Code allows, for example, separate prosecutions for either murder
or rebellion, although not for both where the indictment alleges that the
former has been committed in furtherance of or in connection with the latter.
Surely, whether people are killed or injured in connection with a rebellion,
or not, the deaths or injuries of the victims are no less real, and the grief of the
victims' families no less poignant.
Moreover, it certainly is within the power of the legislature to determine what
acts or omissions other than those set out in the Revised Penal Code or other
existing statutes are to be condemned as separate, individual crimes and what
penalties should be attached thereto. The power is not diluted or improperly
wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an
element or ingredient of another offense, or might usually have been
connected with another crime.
It is also argued that PD 1866 offends against the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in that government prosecutors may arbitrarily choose those they
want to prosecute under said law and those under Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code (or RA 1700, the Anti-Subversion Act). The argument is

unimpressive. It is not much different from saying that a suspected killer is

denied the equal protection of the laws because the prosecutor charges him
with murder, not homicide, both crimes, though essentially consisting in the
taking of human life, being punished with different penalties under separate
provisions of the penal code. As already stressed, it is the prerogative of the
legislature of determine what acts or omissions shall be deemed criminal
offenses and what sanctions should attach to them. Certainly, the public
prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be
initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand. That a criminal act may have
elements common to more than one offense does not rob the prosecutor of
that option (or discretion) and mandatorily require him to charge the lesser
offense although the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of the
more serious one. Now, if government prosecutors make arbitrary choices of
those they would prosecute under a particular law, excluding from the
indictment certain individuals against whom there is the same evidence as
those impleaded, the fault is not in the law but in the prosecutors themselves
whose duty it is to file the corresponding information or complaint against all
persons who appear to be liable for the offense involved.
The petitioners' invocation of the doctrine of double jeopardy as an argument
against the constitutionality of PD 1866 is equally futile. They maintain that a
person held liable under PD 1866 can still be made to answer subsequently for
rebellion.

PEOPLE VS. ESTOISTA

FACTS: Estoista was for acquitted for homicide through reckless imprudence
and convicted for illegal possession of firearms under one information by the
CFI of Lanao. The firearm with which the appellant was charge with which
the appellant was charged with having in his possession was a rifle and belong

to his father , Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Father and son
live & dame house, a little distance from a 27 hectare estate belonging to the
family which was partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second
growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house ,
the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima, a laborer of
the family who was setting a trap for wild chickens and whose presence was
not perceived by the accused. Estoista is assailing his conviction saying that the
5-10 years penalty for illegal possession of firearms is cruel and excessive.
ISSUE: WON the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal possession of firearms is
excessive.
HELD: It is of the courts opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for
possessing or carrying firearms is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the
prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant
lawlessness against property, person and even the very security of the
government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and
the use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal
circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is
out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law
is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of
an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases.
Small transgression for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small
fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts
are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief of Executive for clemency
or reduction of the penalty.

BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in

more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public

Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his
alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit
assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some
officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury and the
Teachers Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious
TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the Teachers Camp resulting in
damage to the government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32)
cases
were
filed
on
July
25,
1978.
In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo,
Cavite in the local elections held in January 1980. He was elected.
On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting
herein petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two
(32) cases filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court
and the cases are now pending review in G.R. Nos. L-54645-76.
However, on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending,
among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The said section, as
amended,
reads

"Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode
of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he
be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings had been filed against him."cralaw

rtua1aw
library
Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein
petitioner is one of the accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all
the accused-public officers pendente lite from their respective offices or any
other public office which they may be occupying pending trial of their
cases.chanrobles.com
.ph
:
virtual
law
library
On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of
all the accused including herein petitioner "from their public positions or from
any other public office that they may be holding . . ."
Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the
provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative
of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law"
ISSUE: WON the respondent court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in suspending petitioner from office as mayor.
HELD: NO. The Court find no merit in petitioners contention that Section 13
of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes
the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes
subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office
pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional
prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article
24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the
employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is
not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph
Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final
judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office,

pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the
amendatory provision committed before its effectively does not violate the
constitutional provision on ex post facto law. Further, the claim of petitioner
that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position
different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory
provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for
any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the same applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular
office under which he was charged.

PEOPLE VS DERILO
FACTS:
A detailed account of the killing was furnished by prosecution eyewitness
Cresencio Lupido.6 According to him, Perpetua C. Adalim went to his house at
Sitio Palaspas, Barangay Polangi in Taft, Eastern Samar in the early evening of
January 1, 1982 to look for farmlands willing and desiring to work in
herricefields. Lupido was an agricultural tenant of Perpetua and lived on one
of the properties owned by the latter. Upon her arrival, Perpetua instructed
Lupidos wife to get food from her house in the poblacion as she had decided
to spend the night at Sitio Palaspas.While Perpetua was waiting and standing
in the yard of the house, five armed men arrived and confronted Perpetua.
Lupido recognized two of the men as Roman Derilo and appellant Isidoro
Baldimo, as these two frequently passed by his house at Sitio Palaspas. He did
not know the other three men but he claimed that he could identity them if
brought before him.Roman Derilo talked momentarily with Perpetua. Then,
without any warning, Derilo shot Perpetua three times with the pistol he was
carrying. After she fell to the ground, appellant, who was standing at the right
side of Derilo, approached Perpetua and stabbed her several times with a knife

that looked like either a Batangas knife or a bolo known locally as depang.
A third member of the group, with a short and stout physique, followed suit in
stabbing Perpetua. After the repeated stabbings, the gang walked around the
yard for some time and left, walking in the direction of the mountains. All of
them carried long firearms. As soon as the group had left the scene of the
crime, Lupido hurriedly went to Perpetuas house in the poblacion of Taft
where he informed the family of the deceased about the incident.Appellant
does not deny his participation in the commission of the crime. Rather, in his
brief pitifully consisting of two pages, appellant merely ASKS FOR THE
MODIFICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE LOWER
COURT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
ISSUE:
Whether death penalty can be reduced to life imprisonment since there has
been an order that crimes sentenced to death penalty will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua as provided by 1987 constitution
whether the heinous crime law (imposing the death penalty on certain heinous
offenses) that took effect on December 1993 can be applied to this case
HELD:
*** At the time of the commission of the crime on January 1, 1982 and the
conviction of the accused on October 12, 1986, the substantive law in force
dealing with the crime of murder was Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
which took effect way back on January 1, 1932. Said provision provided that
any person guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death.
Then on February 2, 1987, a new Constitution came into force after its
ratification on that date by the people. The 1987 Constitution, regarded by
some as progressive since it contains new provisions not covered by our earlier
two Constitutions, proscribed in Section 19, Article III (Bill of Rights) thereof
the imposition of the death penalty, as follows: Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua
Then, Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed
in the country, Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty on certain
heinous offenses and further amending for that purpose the Revised Penal
Code and other special penal laws. Said law was officially enacted as Republic

Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993. This is now the
governing penal law at the time of this review of the case at bar.
Although the elements and circumstances which qualify a killing to murder
were maintained, Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article 248 of the Code by
imposing a heavier penalty for murder than that originally prescribed, the new
penalty provided in Section 6 of said amendatory statute being reclusion
perpetua to death.
Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may not be
applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982 by appellant, based on the
principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further, the presumption is that laws
operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly
and unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied.52 In every case of doubt,
the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.53 Nor
can the prospective application of Republic Act No. 7659 be doubted just
because of the constitutional provision leaving to Congress the matter of the
death penalty in cases of heinous crimes, since Congress did not otherwise
provide.
****One of the universally accepted characteristics of a penal law is
prospectivity. This general principle of criminal law is embodied in Article 21
of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior
to its commission, and was applied by the Supreme Court in two early cases
to mean that no act or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author
punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was
committed.55
Besides, to give retroactive effect to the pertinent provision of Republic Act
No. 7659 would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws.56 It is settled that a penal law may have retroactive effect only
when it is favorable to the accused.58 Obviously, with a penalty more
onerous than that provided by the Revised Penal Code for murder, the
pertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659 cannot fall within the
exception to the general rule on prospectivity of penal laws.
**Therefore, with or without an official executive issuance on commutation,
the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986 cannot be carried out even
though the case was brought to the Supreme Court only in 1994 after Republic
Act No. 7659 had taken effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have revived

the death penalty in the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier. By
February 2, 1987, that penalty had already been automatically reduced to
reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the President or of the courts, but by
the mandate of the fundamental law of the land.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation and by virtue of the command of the
1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court a quo is accordingly MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on death
indemnity.

Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by B.P. Blg. 179. The said law,
however, was further amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty imposed for the selling,
dispensing, delivering, transporting or distributing of shabu of less than 200
grams is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.
Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which has suppletory application
to special laws, penal laws shall be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the accused. Appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty
introduced by R.A. No. 7659.

PEOPLE VS REYES
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 146B-D, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Appellant claims that there exists a major discrepancy in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses with regard to the place where appellant was arrested.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in rendering its decision
HELD:
Although there is an inconsistency in the testimonies with respect to the exact
address of appellant, one witness saying that it was at No. 104 Roces while the
other saying that it was at No. 105 Roces, such discrepancy is of minor
importance and does not detract from the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer "the penalty of life imprisonment
with all its accessory penalties and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) and to pay the costs" pursuant to Section 4, Article II of the

PEOPLE VS. DELOS SANTOS

FACTS:
At around 2:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of December 15, 1996, victim Jose
Estrada was with his wife and son at the town proper of Pasacao, Camarines
Sur. They proce[e]ded to Nacoco, where they boarded a motorboat to go
home to Tinalmud, Pasacao, Camarines Sur. Victim Jose Estrada sat at the rear
portion of the motor boat while his wife and son sat about two arms length in
front of him.
Thereafter, appellants Nomer de los Santos, Rico Ramos, Leopoldo
Ab&nentos and co-accused Santiago de Luna (still-at-large) boarded the motor
boat and sat at the front portion of the vessel. The group drank liquor while
on board the motor boat. When the boat started to move, appellant Nomer
de los Santos moved to the rear portion of the boat and sat at about one (1)
meter from the victim.
Suddenly Florentina10 Estrada heard a gun shot. She turned and saw her
husband Jose Estrada with blood oozing from his nose and mouth. She then
saw appellant Nomer de los Santos standing next to her husband holding a
gun. Florentina Estrada pleaded for appellant de los Santos to take her
husband to the hospital but the latter refused.

At this time, the other appellants (Rico Ramos and Leopoldo Abarientos),
stood up while holding hand grenades, and ordered the people at
the motor boat to keep quiet. When the boat reached Calibaya, Dalupaon,
appellants and co-accused Santiago de Luna disembarked. Appellant Nomer de
los Santos pushed the boat out to sea again. Nobody helped Jose Estrada and
his family.
When they reached the shore of Barangay Dalupaon, Florentina Estrada went
to the barangay captain and asked for help. When they arrived at the boat,
Jose Estrada was already dead.
Dr. Melchor Baesa, the Municipal Health Officer of Pasacao, conducted a
post-mortem examination on the body of the victim Jose Estrada. Victim Jose
Estrada sustained a fatal gun shot wound on his left temple. The cause of his
death was intracranial hemorr[h]age secondary to gunshot wound.11

death penalty under the same circumstances as herein appellant may avail of
the benefit of Section 19. The accused, ipso jure, is entitled to a reduction of
his sentence. Therefore, with or without an official executive issuance on
commutation, the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986 cannot be carried
out even though the case was brought to the Supreme Court only in 1994 after
Republic Act No. 7659 had taken effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have
revived the death penalty in the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier. By
February 2, 1987, that penalty had already been automatically reduced to
reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the President or of the courts, but by
the mandate of the fundamental law of the land.
(THEREFORE not only penal laws must be given retroactive effect but also
judicial decisions since in this case, the case of People vs Derilo has been cited)

ISSUE: whether the death penalty imposed to appellant by lower court is

correct in consideration of the RA 7659 that took effect on December 1993

COMPLEX CRIMES

HELD:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing findings that the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Nomer delos
Santos, Rico Ramos and Leopoldo Abarientos of the crime of murder of which
they are presently charged, judgment is hereby rendered whereby in the
absence of any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances, said three (3)
accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
pay jointly and severally the surviving heirs of Jose Estrada, particularly his
widow Florenia Estrada the sum of TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED NINETY TWO (P23,892.00) PESOS, representing actual damages;
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, as indemnity for the death of Jose
Estrada and moral damages in the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND
(P70,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs.2 (Emphasis in original.)
** the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986 cannot be carried out even
though the case was brought to the Supreme Court only in 1994 after Republic
Act No. 7659 had taken effect.From the foregoing, it is apparent that no
presidential action is necessary in order that any accused sentenced to the

REP. OF PH VS. HON. NICASIO YATCO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-17924
October 30, 1962
FACTS:
On December 20, 1960, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by
Jose Lava, et al. before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, praying that being illegally detained by respondents, they be released
from confinement or granted provisional liberty under such terms and
conditions which the court may deem reasonable to prescribe after filing the
bonds that may be required for the purpose. On December 21, 1960, the court
issued an order directing respondents to produce the persons of petitioners
Jose Lava, et al. on a date therein set, as well as to show cause why the writ

should not be issued, or petitioners should not be given their freedom as

prayed for.cvirtual law library

was correctible only by seasonable appeal, not by attack on the jurisdiction of

the sentencing Court.

It appears that Jose Lava, et al., who filed the instant petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, were charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071 and 14270 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of rebellion complexed with
other crimes enumerated in the information of which they were convicted in a
decision rendered on May 21, 1951, the court sentencing some of them to
death penalty and the others to reclusion perpetua. Because of the nature of
the penalties imposed, as well as the appeals interposed by the accused, the
cases were elevated to this Court for review, where they are pending decision
up to the present time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

PEOPLE VS AMADO HERNANDEZ

(99 PHIL 515)

Subsequently, on July 18, 1956, this Court, in the case of People v. Hernandez,
G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, ruled that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed
with other crimes that may be committed in furtherance thereof, although if
the latter are committed with personal motives the accused may be separately
convicted thereof and sentenced accordingly, which simple rebellion is
punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code only
with prision mayor and a fine of not more than P20,000.00. And the
abovementioned ruling was later reiterated in the cases of People v.
Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, October 23, 1956 and People v. Togonon, G.R.
No. L-8926, June 29, 1957.cha
nrob
ISSUE: Whether or not Rebellion may be complexed with other crimes?
HELD:
The Supreme Court had affirmed convictions for the complex crime of treason
with murder and other offenses. As a matter of fact, the existence of the
'complexed" rebellion is still upheld to this day by a sizable number of lawyers,
prosecutors, judges and even justices of this Court. Hence, the error committed

What happened:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants were accused
of conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with
the thirty-one(31) defendants charged in the criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Theywere accused of being members of PKP Community Party of the
Philippines which wasactively engaged in an armed rebellion against the government of
the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga
Hapon), they committed thecrime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting
plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attackson government forces or civilians by HUKS.
2. Crime Committed:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
3. Contention of the State:
The government, headed by the Solicitor General, argued that the gravity of
thecrime committed required the denial of bail. Moreover, the complex crime
charged
by
theg o v e r n m e n t a g a i n s t H e r n a n d e z h a s b e e n s u c c e s s f u l l y i m p o s
e d w i t h o t h e r a r r e s t e d communist leaders and was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
4. Contention of theAccused:
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the judgment rendered by
theCFI in Manila that rebellion cannot be a complex crime with murder, arson or robbery.
5. Ruling:

The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime
of rebellion as means necessary for the perpetration of the offense. Such common offense
isabsorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article
135constitutes, one single crime it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application
of Article 48 which requires therefore the commission of at least two crimes.***

HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE
: Rebellion cannot be complexed with commoncrimes such as killings,
destruction of property, etc., committed on the occasion and infurtherance
thereof. The thinking is not anymore correct more so that there is no legal basisfor such rule
now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME. ***

PEOPLE VS. GERONIMO ET. AL.

G.R.No. L- 8936
23October1956
FACTS
On June 24, 1954 a Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. These are the
ranking officers/ or members of CCP and Huks. In the information it alleged 5
instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezons convoy on April 28,
1949 and ending on February 1954 where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay a
Barrio Lieutenant. He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court
found him guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies,
and kidnappings, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising
the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex
crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision
mayor.

ISSUES:
Can rebellion

be

complexed

with murder, robbery or

kidnapping?

- No. Even if the crime is not committed in furtherance of rebellion, without

political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not
be
absorbed
in
rebellion.
- According to the Hernandez resolution; the complexing of rebellion will lead
to
undesirable
results.
- It cannot be taken with rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the
constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. He would be
held liable for separate crimes, and these cannot be merged into a juridical
whole.
HELD:
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the
accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under
article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and
considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant
Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and
to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article
38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion and, as above explained, for the
murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal;
to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay
the costs.

PEOPLE VS. QUIJADA

G.R. Nos. 115008-09
July 24, 1996
FACTS;
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of
Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to kill and without
any justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, the
accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the victim was
unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without giving the latter the
opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation, the accused
having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to the incident of
murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm, hitting the
latter on his head and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.

of (such) an unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or murder is committed," the

crime is aggravated and is more heavily punished, with the capital punishment.
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possess
ion of a firearm without license. The crime may be denominated simple illegal
possession, to distinguish it from its aggravated form. It is Aggravated if theunli
censed firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder under the R
evised Penal Code. But the homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of
possession of an unlicensed firearm; neither is the latter absorbed in theformer
. There are two distinct crimes that are here spoken of. One is unlawful possess
ion of a firearm, which may be simple or aggravated, defined and punished res
pectively by the first and second paragraphs of Section 1 of PD1866. The other
is homicide or murder, committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The
mere possession of a firearm without legal authority consummates the crime u
nder P.D. 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is madeheavier by the fir
earm's use in a killing. The killing whether homicide or murder, is obviously dis
tinct from the act of possession, and is separately punished and defined under t
he Revised Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)

PEOPLE VS. LASALA

G.R. No. L-12141
January 30, 1962

ISSUE;
If homicide or murder is committed by the accused with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
HELD;
What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the
present case is the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others,
"unlawfully possess any firearm x x x (or) ammunition x x x." Obviously,
possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary permit and/or license
therefor is not first obtained. To that act is attached the penalty
of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua. Now, if "with the use

(Miguel Lasala was accused of the crime of serious slander by deed with less
serious physical injuries and damages)
FACTS: The accused named Miguel Lasala did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault Mayor Wenceslao Andanar at the
cockpit with fistic blows, thereby exposing the latter to public ridicule,
contempt and dishonor and causing bruises and contusions in the different
parts of his body which required 14 days medical treatment and incapacitated
him from the performance of his duty for 12 days.
And also the offended
party suffered mental anguish, wounded feelings, reputation and social
humiliation.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of complex crime of serious slander by deed
with less serious physical injuries?
HELD: The Court ruled that the crime committed is less serious physical injuries
with the manifest intent to insult and the same acts cannot constitute the
complex crime of slander by deed with less serious physical injuries, because
such complex crime only exists in cases where the Code has no specific
provision penalizing the same with specific penalty.
This specific provision should be considered as an exception to the rule
contained in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code relative to complex crimes.
Of course, we cannot deny that Article 359 considers as slander by deed any
act "which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person",
and if said act results in the infliction of physical injuries it may also be covered
by any of the articles compromised in Chapter Two, Title Eight, of the Revised
Penal Code, relative to physical injuries, but if such eventuality happens the act
cannot come under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which considers as
complex a single act that constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
for the simple reason that in this particular case that act is specifically covered
by paragraph 2 of Article 265 already abovementioned.

PEOPLE V. GUILLEN
GR No. L-1477,
January 18, 1950
FACTS: In 1947, when Pres. Manuel Roxas about to end his speech at the
meeting of the Liberal Party when the accused Julio Guillen hurled the grenade
towards the President. A general who was on the platform saw the smoking grenade
and kicked it away from the platform then exploded in the middle of a group of persons
and grenade fragments seriously injured Simeon Varela, who died the next day due to the
mortal wounds, and several other persons were injured.
.ISSUE: WON the accused was guilty of complex crime only of homicide through reckless
imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in
regard to the other injured persons

HELD: The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In
throwing the hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant
acted with malice and is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As
provided by Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. As held by the Court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. Where such unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence. The sentence of the trial court is
affirmed by unanimous vote and death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article
81 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE VS. TAYO

G.R. No. L-52798
February 19, 1986
FACTS:
- Manuel Y. Tayo convicted of the complex crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder by the Circuit Court
- Mauro Ahid, the watchman, saw Tayo, a former army draftee,
throwing a hand grenade into the second floor of the Super Chicks Nightclub.
The owner, Manuel Toledo, his wife Rose Toledo, who was also the cashier,
and his employees were wounded. Jimmy Pongos, the organist, was mortally
wounded. He died because of his shrapnel wounds.
- After throwing the grenade, Tayo left and fired his handgun four times
in the direction of the compound of the Cebu Autobus Company, as if to scare
pursuers.
-Tayos defense was an alibi which the court did not believe in.
ISSUE: WON Tayo is guilty of complex crime in a case
HELD: Yes! the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with the modification
that in lieu of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua is imposed on the accused.
The correct view is that this is a case of killing by explosion. (People vs.
Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs. Ganego and Soriano, 82 Phil. 335; People vs.
Agcaoili, 86 Phil. 549; People vs. Francisco, 94 Phil. 975.)

The single act of throwing the grenade resulted in murder as to Pongos,

frustrated murder as to Toledo and attempted murder as to Ahid.

PEOPLE VS. PAMA

G.R. Nos. 90297-98
December 11, 1992
.
FACTS:

3 unidentified men fired at the first floor of Maket aquare building

from the adjacent building. Joji Nograles was killed and Cesar
Habaradas was seriously wounded.

1 of the suspects dove into the waters of Pier whenchased by the

police. On the same night, a man was seen by the security guards of
the nearby compounds- barefoot and with only his pants on, was
soaking wet. When asked, he introduced himself as Noel Pama and
that he was help up. The guards reported the incident to the police
and afte some time, the police arrived and arrested Pama.

Pama was charged of the killing og Nograles and Habaradas in two

(2) separate Informations for Murder by the RTC.

a Motion to Consolidate Cases filed by the prosecution.

Consequently, both informations were amended to include two (2)
other accused, Leonardo Lava, Jr. and Robert Ignalaga. (both
accused could not, however, be found and have thus remained at
large.)

PEOPLE VS LASPARDAS
G.R. No. L-46146
October 23, 1979
FACTS: Laurencio Laspadas, who has been working as a farmhand of the
Arriesgado spouses, plowing their farm and harvesting their corn. Because he

had not been paid his accumulated wages amounting to more than four
hundred sixty pesos, he was very angry with the said spouses.
On December 1, 1976 the Arriesgado spouses left the house and he found
himself alone with their two daughters, Elizabeth and Josephine, he conceived
the idea of killing them and perpetrated the killing in the evening of that day.
When Elizabeth was on the verge of dying for receiving fatal wounds like her
sister, Josephine, Laurencio had a carnal knowledge with her by inserting
about half an inch of his penis penetrated her vagina.
On the extrajudicial confession of Laurencio which he had sworn to before the
municipal judge of Wao, Laspardas, he confessed his guilt.
Upon arraignment in the Court of First Instance, Laspardas, with the assistance
of counsel de oficio, again pleaded guilty after the information was translated
to him in the Cebuano dialect which he speaks. He answered in the affirmative
when the trial judge asked him if he understood the charge. His counsel
manifested that he explained to the accused the law involved. The accused
admitted to his counsel that he had executed an extrajudicial confession.
After the arraignment, Laspardas was placed on the witness stand. He testified
that the contents of his confession were explained to him in the Cebuano
dialect; that he affixed his thumbmark thereto and that it was true, as stated in
his confession, that he killed the two girls because he was mad at their parents;
that his organ touched the lips (labia) of the vagina of Elizabeth Arriesgado
who was still alive, when he tried to have sexual intercourse with her, and that
he used his bolo in wounding the two victims.
ISSUE: Should Laurencio be accused of rape with homicide although in the
information three distinct offenses, namely, rape and two murders.
HELD: WHEREFORE the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the
modification that the accused is found guilty of two separate murders and is
sentenced to two death penalties. Costs de oficio.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, imposes the death
penalty "when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed." The instant case presents a novel, reverse situation (analogous to
rape accompanying a robbery) where the rape was committed on the occasion
of the murder, that is to say, when the female victim of a murderous assault
was at death's door, she was raped.

Rape with homicide was committed (1) where the rapist, who was suffering
from gonorrhea infected the victim and, as a result of the infection, she died of
peritonitis (People vs. Acosta, 60 Phil. 158); (2) where the accused dragged a
woman to a canefield, struck her, rendered her unconscious, had sexual
intercourse with her and then killed her thereafter (People vs. Lopez, 107 Phil.
1039; People vs. Ramos, L-34355, July 30, 1979) and (3) where the accused
had sexual intercourse with a girl below twelve years of age and then strangled
her (People vs. Yu, 110 Phil, 793; People vs. Francisco, L-37418, September 28,
1979; People vs. Garcia, L-44364, April 27, 1979).
Those decided cases are different from the instant case. Since the victim herein
was already at the threshhold of death when she was ravished, that bestiality
may be regarded either as a form of ignominy causing disgrace or as a form of
cruelty which aggravated the murder because it was unnecessary to the
commission thereof and was a manifest outrage on the victim's person (Arts.
14[17 and 21] and 248 161, Revised Penal Code. See People vs. Ganal, 85 Phil.
743, People vs. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 and People vs. Cayeta, 101 Phil. 1258),
where the rape was treated as an aggravating circumstance in robbery with
homicide.
We agree with counsel de oficio that the special complex crime of rape with
homicide was not committed in this case and that two separate murders were
perpetrated.

REODICA VS CA, ET AL
G.R. No. 125066.
July 8, 1998
FACTS: On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was
driving a van along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit
the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained
physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.
ISSUE: Should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied?

HELD: No. The less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
If a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v.
Gorgonio, [27] this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in
criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex
crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony
may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to
property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of
imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in
one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties
(People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical
injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries,
a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical
injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage to
property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].

LAPUZ VS CA
G.R. No. 119107.
March 18, 2005
FACTS: On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of
Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,[1] two parcels of land located at
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent
Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he entered
into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over
three parcels of land (the property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning
1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to put up
commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The
rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private

respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In
1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction of the commercial
buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to
the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator
advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new
owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus
filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of
Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold
rights over it.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs of
Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in dire
need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied
interfering with private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease
contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal
investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject
lots.
Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty.
Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract
between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed
renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that
Atty. Fajardo showed him four copies of the lease renewal but these were all
unsigned. To refute the existence of a lease contract, petitioner presented in
court a certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no
record of any lease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had been entered into
their files. Petitioner added that he only learned of the alleged lease contract
when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from the
tenants of the building.
Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, petitioner
filed his counterclaim and prayed for the payment of actual and moral
damages.
ISSUE: Does the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the
supposed existence of Lapuz lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi,
constituted tortuous interference for which Lagon should be held liable for
damages?

HELD:
No.
Elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a
valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence
of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal
justification or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the
premises which the corporation of his grandfather was leasing from private
respondent, without the knowledge and permission of the corporation. The
corporation, prevented from using the premises for its business, sued So Ping
Bun for tortuous interference.
As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly
established. To prove this, private respondent presented in court a notarized
copy of the purported lease renewal.[10] While the contract appeared as duly
notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution
and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing
the rigid scrutiny of petitioners counsel and after the trial court declared it to
be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in
court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the late
Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that
until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized
document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its
execution and delivery.[11]
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on
the part of the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence
of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous
interference.[12] A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for
interfering with a contract he is unaware of.[13] While it is not necessary to
prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if
followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the
contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract.[14]
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract.
His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him
of any existing lease contract.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner
meritorious. He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and
unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man

probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An
examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold
interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of
the same.[15]
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such
knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous
interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in
So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal
justification or excuse for his action[16] or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant
must have acted with malice[17] or must have been driven by purely impious
reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be
justified.[18]
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent
that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him.
The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose
one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.[19] The records show
that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property
was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely
nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer
any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that private
respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai
Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on
the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of
tortuous interference was never established.
In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference can be justified at all
if the interferer acts for the sole purpose of furthering a personal financial
interest, but without malice or bad faith. As the Court explained it:
x x x, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of
another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification
does not exist where the actors motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to
this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferers interest
outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual
acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such
that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in selfprotection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial position
should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in

the subject matter with that of the others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.[20]
The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar. In our view,
petitioners purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his
financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by
improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy,[21] the Court
declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by
a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation will
not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages as long
as there is no malice or bad faith involved.
In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner
liable for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to
answer for private respondents losses.

SORIAO VS CA
G.R. No. 56481
July 21, 1989
FACTS: On January 9, 1978, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, M/B Sweet
Lord departed from the log pond of Dibet, Casiguran, Quezon. The boat was
around 44 feet in length, 5 feet in height and five feet in width. On board
were 23 passengers, 70 sacks of copra with a weight of 80 kilos per sacks , 4
sacks of rice, 4 sacks of carabao hide, luggages of the passengers, 4 pigs, 4
chickens, cash and other valuables. In addition, there were five (5) crew
members among whom was the petitioner who boarded the boat in
Dinalungan, Quezon. The boat was overloaded as evidenced by the fact that
only a palm's width of its height was above the water and its waterline was
already submerged. When the boat left Casiguran, it was piloted by Domingo
Zamora until the petitioner boarded.
At around 1:00 o'clock the following morning the boat left Dinalungan, but
this time, upon the orders of the petitioner. The waves then were as big as a
hut so that the boat had to stop at the port of Dinadiawan. After three hours
of waiting, the petitioner ordered the boat to resume its voyage despite the
fact that the sea was still rough. Petitioner made this order over the objection
of the employed captain Zamora, who said that the boat could not cope with

the trip anymore. And as expected the boat sank, causing the death of most of
the passengers and the loss and destruction of the cargoes.
Petitioner Antonio Soriao (Soriao, for brevity) and Domingo Zamora (Zamora,
for brevity) were charged with the crime of multiple homicide and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence before the Court of First Instance of Aurora
Sub-province, Baler, Quezon.
ISSUE: Whether or not Soriao is liable to suffer the prison term and civil
damages.
HELD: Yes. Soriao contends that he is neither the owner nor captain of the
M/B Sweet Lord but merely a passenger thereof but contrary to his contention,
Soriao was not an ordinary passenger in that voyage. The survivors of the illfated M/B Sweet Lord positively declared that Soriao piloted the boat from
Dinalungan up to the time just before it sank in the waters of Baler. These
testimonies were uncontradicted by Soriao. We find no evidence of any
improper motive on the witnesses' part to testify against. Soriao. Hence, their
testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit/The relatives of the victims and
the survivors themselves believed that Soriao was the owner of the boat and
the boss of Captain Domingo Zamora and the crew. Such impression naturally
would foreclose any opposition from the passengers to Soriao's alleged
suggestion that the voyage continue and his having taken the helm of the boat
in lieu of Zamora. The doctrine of pari delicto would, therefore, not apply in
this case.

PEOPLE VS. GARCIA

FACTS:
In the morning of Good Friday, some prisoners of dormitory 4-C, while
themselves in front of building IV, were feloniously attacked by other prisoners
who used improvised bladed weapons.
Four, prisoners, namely, Samuel Diaz, Augusta de Guzman, de Villa and
Salvador Alcontin, were mortally wounded and died later in the hospital while
two prisoners, Josefino So and Abdul Amking Jr., were wounded.

Diaz sustained twenty-five stab wounds of which fifteen were on the back. De
Villa, had stab wounds in the lumbar region, neck, abdomen and chest. De
Guzman, suffered four frontal stab wounds one of which penetrated his heart
and three stab wounds on the back one of which perforated his left lung.
Alcontin, had four stab wounds on his side, back and forearm. Amking was
stabbed in the lumbar region while Joaquin So had a stab wound on the left
arm and on the back near the shoulder and abrasions on the knees.
Some victims were stabbed near the water tank and others near the
dormitories. The victims were members of the Oxo gang while the assailants
were members of the Sputnik gang. The assailants took part in the riot after
they learned that Joseph Casey, a member of their gang, had been
Stabbed.
ISSUE:
Whether the the crime committed by the complinats is a complex crime
HELD:
We hold that the four murders and the double attempted murder should be
considered as a complex offense. The assailants were co-conspirators as shown
by the simultaneousness of their assaults. They belonged to the same SigueSigue Sputnik (SSS) gang and harbored a common hostility to the members of
the Oxo gang. They were impelled by the same motive which was to inflict
injury on the six victims, members of the Oxo gang.
This case is covered by the rule that when for the attainment of a single
purpose, which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such acts must
be considered as only one offense, a complex one.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is set aside. Each of the six accused is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay solidarily an indemnity of twelve
thousand pesos to each set of heirs of the four dead victim 9, one thousand
pesos to Joaquin So and another one thousand pesos to Abdul Amking Jr.
Costs de oficio.

PEOPLE VS. VELASQUEZ

FACT:
While walking home, A was approached by Reynaldo Velasquez, who asked
her where she was going. A saw Reynaldo carry a gun. The latter poked the
gun at the right ribs of A and held her arms. Accused called a taxi on which the
two boarded. They proceeded to the house of Reynaldos grandmothers.
Inside the house, Reynaldo told A that she could not do anything. In response
A warned Reynaldo that he would be jailed. Instead of answering, accused
said it would never happen and that he would not let her go home. A stood
up but Reynaldo pulled her dress and forced her to sit down. Reynaldo
warned A that if she attempted to move, he would then harm her and kill her.
Reynaldo made her lie on the floor removed her underwear, including her
panty, covered her face with the use of a pillow and then sexually molested
her. A tried to ask help from Reynaldos uncle but ignored her because he
cannot understand her. When Reynaldo saw her trying to tell his uncle what
happened, he threatened her and told her not to tell anybody what
happened. While combing her hair, she saw a small screwdriver on the table.
She hid said object in her pocket. After a while, the accused again asked A to
lie down and sexually assaulted her, and inserted his penis inside her vagina.
While molesting her, A pulled out the screwdriver and stabbed him on the
neck. This retaliatory move of A angered Reynaldo who then held her hands
and boxed her. A then begged Reynaldo to allow her to go home however
the accused refused to do so. When Reynaldo bought a soft drink, A tried to
escape by running towards the squatters area however, she was overtook by
Reynaldo and brought her back in the house. While inside the house and
talking, A found out that Reynaldos gun is just a pellet gun. A asked the
accused if she could call her parents, however, he refused fearing that she
might tell her parents what had happened. A, however, was able to convince
Reynaldo that she had previously called her parents informing them that she
was at a friends house, and that she would again call her parents just to tell
them that she would soon be home. Reynaldo believed her and went inside
his grandmothers room to get money for the phone call. Once inside,
A immediately ran towards a neighbours house and saw a man and told him
what Reynaldo did to her. She then begged for help.

ISSUE: Does Reynaldos act of abducting and raping the victim considered as
complex Crime?
HELD:
Yes. Considering that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that VELASQUEZ forcibly abducted A and then raped her twice, he
should be convicted of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and
simple rape. The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most
serious crime which shall be imposed in its maximum period. Rape is the more
serious of the two crimes and is punishable with reclusion perpetua under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and since reclusion perpetua is a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be imposed as it is.The subsequent rape committed
by VELASQUEZ can no longer be considered as a separate complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape but only as a separate act of rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE V LAWAS
FACTS:
THE ACCUSED AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE HOME GUARD
COMMENCED FIRING AT A LARGE GROUP OF MARANAOS AT A SIGNAL
FROM THE OTHER ACCUSED AND CONTINUED FIRING UNTIL CEASE-FIRE
SIGNALED.
ABOUT FIFTY (50) MARANAOS DIED IN THE SLAUGHTER.
RULING:
SC HELD THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF MULTIPLE HOMICIDE UNDER
THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE POSITIVELY SHOWS THAT THE
KILLING WAS THE RESULT OF A SINGLE IMPULSE WHICH WAS INDUCED
BY THE ORDER OF THE LEADER TO FIRE, AND CONTINUED WITH THE
INTENTION TO COMPLY THEREWITH, AS THE FIRING STOPPED AS SOON
AS THE LEADER GAVE THE ORDER TO THAT EFFECT.THERE WAS NO

INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED EITHER TO FIRE AT EACH AND

EVERYONE OF THE VICTIMS AS SEPARATELY AND DISTINCTLY FROM
EACH OTHER.IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT IF THE ACT OR ACTS
COMPLAINED
RESULTED FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL IMPULSE, IT
CONSTITUTES A SINGLE OFFENSE.

PEOPLE V HON. PINEDA ET AL

FACTS:
THE DEFENDANTS fired guns in rapid succession from outside the house of a
family, killing the father, and that defendants then forcibly entered the house,
letting loose several shots, killing all the three minor children and wounding
the mother

PEOPLE V DE LEON
FACT/RULING:
This is a case wherein SC held and explained that the act of taking two roosters
belonging to two different persons in the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own
because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.

CASES UNDER CIVIL LIABILITY, EXTINCTION AND SURVIVAL OF CIVIL

LIABILITY

The City Fiscal, according to the SC correctly presented 5 separate information4 for murder and one for frustrated murder when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
Issue: how about single pressing of a trigger of an automatic assault rifle
causing several deaths?
RULING:
In many cases, the SC decided that such is not a complex crime explaining that
although each burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the
trigger that should be considered as producing the several felonies, but the
number of bullets that actually produced them.
Accordingly, the accused will be held liable as many deaths or injuries that
resulted.

PEOPLE VS. MUYCO

G.R. No. 132252
April 27, 2000
FACTS:
JESUS MUYCO and ARNULFO MUYCO, cousins, were charged with murder
for the death of Romeo Boteja Jr. on 13 May 1995. Only Jesus Muyco was
apprehended while Arnulfo Muyco remains at large. On 11 September 1997
the Regional Trial Court, Br. 25, Iloilo City, found Jesus guilty as charged and
correspondingly sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of
Romeo Boteja Jr. P30,000.00 as death indemnity and P27,000.00 as funeral
expenses.
From 6:00 oclock to 7:00 oclock in the evening of 13 May 1995, Jesus Muyco
and Arnulfo Muyco together with Romeo Boteja Jr. were in the house of
Narciso Nadales at Barangay Pamuringao-Garrido, Cabatuan, Iloilo. At about
9:00 oclock the trio were seen walking towards the barangay dancehall where
they met Ernesto Boteja, an uncle of Romeo and a relative by affinity of Jesus

and Arnulfo. Romeo invited his uncle Ernesto for a drink so they all went to
the store of Agnes Cao about a hundred (100) meters away from the dancehall
to buy whisky. As the store was about to close, Jesus, Arnulfo, Romeo and
Ernesto decided to drink their whisky under a mango tree nearby. After
drinking for a while, Arnulfo suddenly grabbed the hands of Romeo, and
while the latter was struggling, Jesus stabbed him with a knife hitting him near
his collarbone. It was fatal. Arnulfo then dragged the lifeless body of Romeo
towards the nearby sugarcane field with Jesus following them.
Ernesto was shocked by the startling occurrence. He was virtually immobilized.
He only moved from there to run for his life when he saw Jesus and Arnulfo
returning from the field with Jesus pointing a knife at him. Ernesto fled
towards the opposite side of the sugarcane field and stayed there until dawn.
Romeos body was found lifeless at 11:00 oclock that same evening.
Leticia Boteja, mother of the victim, testified that she incurred P27,000.00 for
funeral expenses. Dr. Ricardo Jaboneta autopsied the body of Romeo and
found that he sustained one (1) stab wound which penetrated his chest wall. It
was fatal.

construction worker. As in People v. Verde, this Court is inclined

to grant the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity
despite the absence of documentary evidence. To be able to
claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence, there must be oral
testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less
than the minimum wage under the current labor laws and
judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victims line of
work, no documentary evidence is available; (b) the victim was
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws x x x
In the instant case, the victim was nineteen (19) years old at the time of his
death and earning P1,600.00 monthly as a farm laborer. Thus, his heirs are
entitled to receive an award for lost earnings in accordance with the following
formula: 2/3 (80 ATD [age at time of death]) x (GAI [gross annual income])
80% GAI.[7] Thus2/3 (80 19) x (P1,600 x 12) - 80% (P1,600.00 x 12)

ISSUE:

2/3 (61) x P19,200 - 80% (P19,200)

Whether or not Leticia Boteja could claim the award damages that she was
claiming?

40.67 x [P19,200 - P15,360]

HELD:
This court notes that the trial court failed to award damages for loss of earning
capacity despite the testimony of Leticia Boteja to this effect. In People v.
Dizon[6] this Court discussed the requisites for such awardAs a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for loss of earning capacity. In People v.
Verde, the non-presentation of evidence to support the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity did not prevent this Court
from awarding said damages. The testimony of the victims wife
as to earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was then
48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver,
sufficed to establish the basis for such an award.
In this case, Erwin Gesmundo was only 15 years old at the time
of his death and was earning a daily wage of P100.00 as a

40.67 x P3,840 = P156,172.80

On the basis of the above computation, the heirs of the deceased Romeo
Boteja Jr. are entitled to receive P156,172.80 from accused-appellant Jesus
Muyco.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from the finding accused-appellant JESUS
MUYCO guilty of murder aggravated by treachery and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of Romeo Boteja Jr. P27,000.00
for funeral expenses is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the death
indemnity is increased to P50,000.00. Accused-appellant is further directed to
pay the heirs of his victim the amount of P156,172.80 for lost earnings
conformably with prevailing jurisprudence. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

BUDLONG VS JUDGE APALISOC

FACTS
The petitioner filed information before the respondent court charging private
respondent Camilo Galagar with the crime of serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. During the scheduled arraignment, on February 4, 1982,
the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Immediately after the
plea, the respondent Judge rendered judgment and sentence the accused to
suffer 30 days imprisonment and to pay the costs. No civil liability was
imposed. The accused manifested his intention to avail of the provisions
P.D.No.968, the probation law. The respondent court gave the counsel of the
accused 5 days within which to file the petition for probation. Petitioner filed
an ex parte motion to prove the civil liability of accused but it was denied by
respondent court. Then, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE OF LAW
Whether or not the respondent Judge has committed grave abuse of discretion
on rendering court
orders denying motions to prove the civil liability of the accused.
Whether or not the probation law has bearing on civil liability.
HOLDING
Yes, the respondent judge has committed grave abuse of discretion on
rendering court orders denying motions to prove the civil liability of the
accused.
No, probation law has absolutely no bearing on civil liability.

Art 113 Obligation to Satisfy Civil Liability-Except in case of extinction of his

civil liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall
continue to be obliged to satisfy civil liability resulting from the crime
committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentenced
consisting of deprivation of liberty of other rights, or has not been acquired to
serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or
any other reason.
If under Art.113 of RPC, the obligation to satisfy civil liability continues
notwithstanding service of sentence or non service of sentence due to amnesty
,pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason,we fail to see what led
respondent judge to rule that an application for probation should have an
opposite effect insofar as determination of civil liability is concerned. It could
have not have been delay because the motion was filed on the day after the
judgment of conviction was rendered in open court right after theplea of
guilty and the manifestation that the accused was applying for probation.
The general rule is that, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
expressly waives the civil liability or reserves right to institute it separately.
The probation law clearly provides only for the suspension of sentence
imposed on the accused by virtue of his application for probation. It has
absolutely no bearing on civil liability. There is no legal basis for the
respondent courts conclusion that a hearing to prove the civil liability of the
accused under the circumstances of the case would in effect nullify the order of
the suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of
probation law.
PROBATION AND INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

VIII RATIO DECIDENDI

The extinction and survival of civil liability are governed by Chapter Three,
Title Five, Book One of the

TOLENTINO VS ALCONEL
G.R. No. L-63400

Revised Penal Code as follows:

Art. 112 Extinction of Civil Liability-civil liability established in articles
100,101,102 and 103 of this code shall be extinguished in the same manner as
other obligations in accordance with the provisions of the civil code.

March 18, 1983

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila with
violation of Section 4, Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment on September 4, 1981,
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 8, 1981, after the prosecution had presented part of its
evidence, petitioner manifested his desire to change his plea of not guilty to
that of guilty to the lesser offense of possession of Indian Hemp [marijuana],
under Section 8 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425.
On October 13, 1981, petitioner applied for probation. Respondent
judge forthwith directed the probation officer of the City of Manila to conduct
a post sentence investigation on said application and to file said report thereon
within 60 days. After conducting such investigation, the probation officer
submitted its report, recommending that petitioner be placed on a two-year
probation upon the claim that the latter was already on his way to
reformation and that a prison cell would turn him into a hardened criminal.

seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the
penalty imposed by law for the offense which he was convicted. Probation is a
special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It
essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to
immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses
to jettison an appeal.
Being discretionary on the part of the trial court, the favorable
recommendation of probation officer is at best merely persuasive upon the
courts in the consideration of the application for probation. Both the law and
the jurisprudence is clear on this point. As for the fact that the petitioner is a
first offender, this does not necessarily entitle him to the approval of his
application although it is a factor to be taken into account by the court.
Finally, the policy of liberality he invokes cannot prevail against the categorical
provisions of the law which clearly call for the denial of his application.

Such recommendation notwithstanding, the respondent judge issued the

challenged order of March 9, 1982, denying petitioner's application on the
ground that it will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.

BELLETO VS. LEVISTE

On March 23, 1982, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the March

9 order, 2 but the same was denied. The petitioner's "Ex-Parte Motion for
Hearing on the case for Probation and for Deferment of Execution of
Judgment" was likewise denied.

August 21, 1979

G.R. No. L-49907

FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
in holding that "probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed?
RULING:
Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the decision
of the court. This discretion is to exercised primarily for the benefit of
organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which may be granted to a

The Court of First Instance of Capiz in its decision dated September 5,

1978 convicted Isidro Balleta, Jr. ofconsented abduction and sentenced him to
an inderterminate penalty of three months and one day of arresto
mayor,minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional as maximum, and to indemnify Josephine Cabison in the sum of
three thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 897).
Balleta did not appeal. He filed a petition for probation. The probation officer
of Capiz recommended favorable action on the petition. The trial court denied
it on the grounds that it would be better for the accused if he served his
sentence so that he could reform himself. correct his selfish tendencies and
avoid the scandal in the community that would be caused by the grant of

probation so that the sanctity of marriage and the dignity of womanhood"

would be upheld.
ISSUE:

Upon the Courts of Appeals decision becoming final, petitioner not having
appealed therefrom, he filed a petition for probation 3 with respondent judge,
who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, denied
the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds:
(a) To grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed, and

Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in not
granting probation?
RULING:
The Supreme Court said that the accused did not intend to cause a
grave wrong and that he deserved to be under probation because he was very
remorseful and he has the potential of a good probationer. The Solicitor
General manifested that his office had no objection to the grant of probation
to the accused.
Under those circumstances and considering that the accused does not fall
within any of the five classes of disqualified offenders enumerated in section 9
of the Probation Law, he may be placed on probation under the conditions
indicated in section 10 of the law and on the basis of the treatment plan
proposed by the probation officer.

TO VS. HON. PANO

G.R. No. L-59524
February 18, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued
a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from seven years and eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine
years and four months of prision mayor, as maximum. He appealed to the
Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to one year and one day
of prision correccional as minimum, to one year and eight months as
maximum.

(b) Petitioner is not a penitent offender.

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the
respondent judge, the present proceeding was resorted to, petitioner averring
that the respondent judge erred in denying his petition for probation despite
the recommendation for its approval by the Probation Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail the benefits of probation?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that for purpose of probation, what the law
gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more
on whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which the
probation system has been established, such as giving the first-time offender a
second chance to maintain his place in society through a process of
reformation, which is better achieved, at least as to one who has not
committed a very serious offense, when he is not mixed with hardened
criminals in an atmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as within prison
walls. The consciousness of the State's benignity in giving him that second
chance to continue in peaceful and cordial association with his fellowmen will
advance, rather than retard, the process of reformation in him.
The Supreme Court held that the Probation Law was never intended to
limit the right of an accused person to present all the relevant evidence he can
avail of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty.
Neither does the law require a plea of guilty on the part of the accused to
enable him to avail the benefits of probation. A contrary view would certainly
negate the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved

AMANDY VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 76258
May 23, 1988

RESPONDENT LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXTENDING THE BENEFITS

OF THE PROBATION LAW TO HEREIN PETITIONER, WHO ADMITTEDLY,
IS A GOOD SUBJECT FOR PROBATION AND CAN STILL BE REFORMED
AND REHABILITATED, BY TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 76 IS NOT EXPRESSLY REPEALED BY PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1990;

FACTS:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1983, at Barangay Burgos,
Municipality of Padre Burgos, Province of Quezon, Philippines. The abovenamed accused, without authority of law, have in his possession one point six
grams (1.6) dried leaves of Indian Hemp or marijuana, a prohibited drug, and
sixty (60) pieces of cigarette wrappers.
Petitioner Amandy initially entered a plea of not guilty but subsequently
withdrew his former plea and substituted it with a plea of guilty, subject,
however, to the reservation of proving the mitigating circumstance of
drunkenness which was not habitual, in addition to the attenuating
circumstance of his voluntary plea of guilty.
The petitioner filed an application for probation with a petition for release on
recognizance, alleging that he is entitled to the suspended sentence under P.D.
968. The petition, was however, denied by the respondent lower court for the
reason that P.D. 1990 removed from the purview of the exceptions to the
probation law those 'sentenced to serve a maximum of imprisonment of more
than 6 years.'
On October 8, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
lower court denied the motion in a resolution dated October 9, 1986 on the
ground that it is the intention of the law to extend the beneficial effects of the
Probation Law only to correctional penalties which have six (6) years as their
ceiling and that penalties afflictive in scope and nature have to be excluded.
Hence, the instant petition for review based on the following alleged errors:
RESPONDENT LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPLICATION
FOR PROBATION DATED 26 JUNE 1986 AND THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED 8 OCTOBER 1986 FILED BY THE PETITIONER,
BY RELYING SOLELY ON THE PROVISION OF SECTION 2, PARAGRAPH (a)
OF PRESIDENTLAL DECREE NO. 1990;

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent lower court committed reversible error
in disallowing the petitioner's application for probation notwithstanding the
favorable recommendation of the Probation Officer.

RULING:
To base the grant of probation on this contention alone would be
erroneous because the law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and
who are not. Moreover, the grant or denial of the application for probation
does not rest solely on the offender's potentiality to reform but also on the
observance of demands of justice and public interest (Tolentino v. Alconcel,
121 SCRA 92). These are expressed in statutes enacted by the lawmaker. The
arguments of the petitioner are more properly directed to a trial court's
exercise of discretion in granting or denying probation to applicants who fall
within the coverage of the law, and not to a court which refuses to apply the
benefits of a law to persons excluded by that same law.

YUSI VS MORALES
G.R. No. L-61958

April 28, 1983

FACTS;
The petitioners are spouses who were convicted for Staffa in Criminal Case
No. 2260 in a decision of the respondent court dated May 20, 1982. The
court sentenced the petitioners. to suffer an indeterminate sentence of FOUR
(4) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR and SIX (6)
MONTHS of prison correctional as maximum, to pay P5,400.00 to Naty V.
Pagdanganan for the value of the piano, and to pay the costs of the suit.
On June 22, 1982, when the decision dated May 20, 1982 was promulgated,
the petitioners appeared in court without their counsel of record. The
respondent court appointed a certain Cesar Villar who happened to be in
court to act as petitioners counsel de oficio during the promulgation. On that
occasion, the petitioners through their counsel de oficio manifested that. They
are going to avail of the benefits of the Probation Law and prayed that they be
released under the same bond." (Annex "B", Rollo p. 14) The court
immediately granted the petitioners prayer. With a condition that the accused
will submit within this day a certification from the bonding company that it is
willing to accommodate the accused under the same bond for a period of five
(5)
days
beginning
today.
On June 23, 1982, the petitioners filed with the respondent court an
application for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by
Presidential Decree No.

not giving due course to the petitioners notice of appeal the respondent
court relied on paragraph 3, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968
(ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) as amended which considers an
application for probation of a convicted accused to be a waiver of his right to
appeal or an automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
In the case at bar, the respondent court hastily granted the manifestation and
application for probation on June 22, 1982, the same day that the decision
was promulgated and approved the formal application the following day
without taking steps to be informed that the petitioners were aware of the full
import
of
their
application.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 968 which established the Probation
System was envisioned among other things, "to provide an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to
serve a prison sentence" (Section 2(b), Presidential Decree No. 968).
Under the facts of this case, the petitioners cannot be considered "penitent
offenders." They appeared to have improvidently filed their application for
probation and should be allowed to withdraw it and to appeal the decision.

PEOPLE VS. NANG KAY

G.R. No. L-3565

ISSUE;
Whether or not the petitioners whose application for probation was granted
after conviction of the crime of Staffa may still withdraw such application for
probation and within the reglementary period appeal the judgment of
conviction
HELD;

April 20, 1951

FACTS;
In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Nang Kay alias Sy Kee was charged with
illegal possession of firearms in that in his possession were found three grease
guns and two Thompson Submachine guns, and empty magazines, without the
necessary license. In court he appeared without counsel and upon being

arraigned, he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to imprisonment for five (5)

years and one (1) day, with the accessories of the law, and to pay costs. The
firearms and ammunition in question were ordered confiscated in favor of the
Government. He now appeals to this Court on the ground that the trial court
failed to inform him at the arraignment of his right to be assisted by counsel.
The Solicitor General also questions the correctness of the penalty imposed,
expressing the opinion and making the recommendation that the law on
indeterminate sentence should have been applied.
ISSUE;
Whether or not to the defendant applied indeterminate sentence

HELD;
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that in cases where the
application of the law on indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the
accused, resulting in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on
indeterminate sentence should not be applied. Under this opinion, it is obvious
that the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant to imprisonment for
five (5) years and one (1) day.