Political Relations Between the Safavids of Persia and the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria in

the Early Sixteenth Century

Author(s): Hassanein Rabie
Source: Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt, Vol. 15 (1978), pp. 75-81
Published by: American Research Center in Egypt
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40000132
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Political Relations Between the Safavids of Persia

and the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria in the

Early Sixteenth Century
Hassanein Rabie

although his domain at the time was only

The purpose of this paper is to investigate
the evolution of political relations between
Azarbayjan. He declared Shrtsm to be the
formal
the Safavids and the Mamluks during a
very doctrine of the new state. Shah
Isma^
critical period in their history. At
thenot only distinguished his new state
from
beginning of the sixteenth century, therethe Sunni Ottoman Empire, but reestablished national unity in Persia. Since
were three competent powers in the Eastern
Mediterranean, i.e. the Ottomans, the
the Arab conquest in the 7th century, Persia

had been a mere geographical province

Safavids and the Mamluks. The Ottoman

belonging to the Caliphs of Medina or

Empire was the most powerful among them.
After it had established itself in Europe,
Damascus or Baghdad and was often divided
the Ottoman Empire turned its face to
the a number of petty dynasties. But
among
east in order to prove its identity and after
quali- 1501, Persia became one state.3
fications as the most powerful Muslim
During the ten years following the fall of
Tabriz,
Shah Ismail conquered all of Persia
Empire at that time.1
The game of paramount power was

complicated and sensitive. The Ottomans

won in the end because they isolated the

and extended his state to the Fertile Crescent. In 908 A.H./1503 a.d. he defeated

the Ak-Koyunlu forces near Hamadan and

Mamluks from the conflict circle by encour- established himself in central and south
aging the deterioration of relations between Persia. A few years later he conquered

the Safavids and the Mamluks. After they Mazandaran and Gurgan, the provinces of
had defeated the Safavids, they destroyed the Caspian Sea, extending his realm to

Diyar Bakr. In 914/1508 Shah Isma'il

the Mamluk Sultanate and thus became the

captured Baghdad and in the next years he

most powerful Muslim state in the area.
The losers were the Mamluks, who, because
conquered Shirvan, Khurasan and Samar-

of their internal and external weakness,

qand. In brief, within a very short time Shah
could not participate in the game from the Isma'il extended the borders of his empire

beginning. It would seem as though thefrom

the Persian Gulf in the south to the

Mamluks themselves were expecting theirCaspian Sea in the north, from the Euphrates
in the west to Transoxania in the east, and
ner, either the Ottomans or the Safavids.2his state thus became an opponent to the

fate to be decided at the hands of the winIn the summer of 906-7 a.h/1501 a.d.

Sunni Ottoman empire.4

As profor Egypt and Syria, they had been

Ismail the Safavid entered Tabriz and
claimed himself Shah Ismail the First,
ruled from Cairo by the Mamluk Sultans
75

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76 JARCE XV (1978)

since 648/1250. In ing

the
late 15th
century,
correspondence
addressed
to the Mamor even before, the
Mamluk
Sultanate
luk Sultan al-Ghawri. The envoy wassufwell

received in Damascus and was made even

fered from maladministration
by weak

more amirs,
welcome in Cairo.
He transmitted
sultans and corrupt
in
additions t
troubles caused by
the presents
the qddis,
and the messages
fuqaM
of his master,
an
which
contained
information
about
the
common people, This was accompanied by
economic decline as a result of the deterioOttoman's intentions concerning Safavid
ration of the iqtct system,5 and frequent
preparations for war. The Ottoman envoy
occurrences of the plague and epidemics
left Cairo in Rajab 908/January 1503 carry-

with their catastrophic effects on a country

ing the reply of the Mamluk Sultan.10

When news of the Ottoman-Mamluk

that relied mainly on agriculture.6 Egypt
during the late 15th century lost its imporrapprochement reached Shah Ismacil, he
waited until 913/1507 before he marched
tant commercial position in the spice and

other oriental trade because of the arrival

westwards to the borders of the Mamluk

of the Portuguese on the coasts of Sultanate

the
near Aleppo. Meanwhile, more

Indian Ocean. In 892/1487 the Portuguese

money was being collected from the inhadiscovered the Cape of Good Hope and,
bitants of Damascus to prepare troops for
after a few years they reached India.7

the defense. The Mamluk vice-Sultan

sion.9
The Ottomans moved at that time to

Sultani Mamluks.12

Safavids. It seems that the Ottomans

Safavid army had crossed the Mamluk

In the year 907/1501, according to the

ordered a parade of Mamluk troops, and
contemporary historian Shams al-Dm they
Ibn marched under his command to Aleppo
Tulun (d. 953/1546), disturbing news circuon Thursday, 7 Jumada II 913/14 October
1507. n Sultan al-Ghawri in Cairo was
lated in Damascus concerning Shah Ismacil's
victorious campaigns and his intention
to
disturbed
by this news. He consulted his
conquer Syria.8 Sibay, the Mamluk viceamirs, and they decided to send troops to
Sultan in Syria, imposed illegal additional
stop the Safavid invasion. The Mamluk
taxes on the people in order to prepare
army for this campaign comprised five
and equip an army of infantry to be quarhigh-ranking amirs of thousands, twenty
tered in Aleppo in fear of a Safavid invaamirs of forty and amirs of Ten, and 1500
The Egyptian troops did not leave Cairo,
however,
prevent war between the Mamluks and
the because news arrived that the
realized that, if Shah Isma'il destroyed
borders
the
at the Euphrates in the same
weak Mamluk Sultanate, he would
gain
month (Jumada II 913/October 1507) and

control of Syria and Egypt, thus putting

the
had met
the army of the amir cAli Dulat of

Ottoman's own plans in jeopardy.

the They
Mamluk buffer principality Dulgadir

might have thought at this stage of(Dhu

having
al-Ghadir). According to Ibn Iyas, the

the Mamluks on their side, or at Safavid

least of
army was defeated. The amir cAli

sent to
Cairo a number of Safavid soldiers'
isolating them in their future struggle
with
the Safavids. The Ottomans pretended
that
heads and a distinguished Safavid prisoner

they wanted to establish an alliance

withSultan al-Ghawri was so pleased he
of war.

the Mamluks to stop the Safavids

fromthe heads to be hung on the
ordered

reaching the heart of the Sunni world.

The
Zuwayla
Gate in Cairo and halted the precontemporary Mamluk historian Ibn
Iyas for sending troops to Syria. All
parations
(d. 930/1524) reports that in Rabic
II 908/
this
happened during the presence of an
October 1502, the envoy of the Ottoman
Ottoman envoy in Cairo. The Mamluk
sultan
bestowed robes of honor on him
Sultan Bayezid II arrived in Damascus
carry-

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POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SAFAVIDS AND MAMLUKS 77

and his comrades and sent them back to

control of the trade routes, to reach the

the Ottoman sultan with the good news.13
Red Sea area, and to become the guardian
The Syrian Mamluk troops subsequently
of the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina

returned from Aleppo to Damascusininthe Hijaz. He wrote secretly to the

Shacban 913/December 1507.14

consuls of the Franks in the main Egyptian

In the same month (Shacban 913/Decem- and Syrian cities asking them to write to
ber 1507) Shah Isma'il sent his envoy to their kings to invade Egypt from the sea,
Sultan al-Ghawri with a letter containing an whilst he would invade by land the terri-

apology for what had happened at the

tories of both the Mamluk and Ottoman

Euphrates and for any initiative his troops sultans. In 916/1510 the Mamluk ruler of
may have taken. The Shah emphasized in al-Blra on the eastern Mamluk borders in
his letter that the incident was not intended, Syria captured some Safavid envoys carrythat the Safavid soldiers had lost their way, ing letters addressed to these consular
and that the Shah did not give his personal officials, and sent them to the Mamluk

order for such action or even have any Sultan in Cairo.18 Ibn Tulun adds that, in the

knowledge of it. Sultan al-Ghawri accepted

this apology and set the Safavid prisoner
free to return to Persia accompanied by the
Safavid delegation. Ibn Iyas comments that:
"The Safavid envoys were very impudent;
they wore red conical caps on their heads,

same year, some Franks from Aleppo and

its environs arrived in Damascus under

arrest. It was said that they were carrying

letters from the Franks to Shah Ismacil,
hiding them in their walking-sticks.19
When Sultan al-Ghawri was informed of

but were not as elegant as the Ottoman these incidents, on 23 Dhu al-Qacda 916/21

envoys."15

February 151 1, he summoned the European

wanted not to attack the Mamluk sultanate

ordered them to be handed over to the

From his incursion of 913/1507 to the

consuls, including those of Alexandria, of

Euphrates and his subsequent mission
Damascus,
to
and of Tripoli. He insulted and
Cairo, it would seem that Shah Ismacil
threatened them with hanging. Then he

Nazir al-Khass for further investigation of the

directly, but to keep it at bay and prevent
matter.20
it from impeding his future invasion of Iraq
The response of Shah Ismacil was to send
or any future conflict with the Ottomans.
a squadron to attack al-Blra because its
This assumption is supported by the stateMamluk ruler had the Safavid envoys who
ment of Ibn Iyas,16 that in the next year
had passed nearby. Sultan al-Ghawri was
(914/1508) Shah Isma'il conquered Iraq and
distirbed and reacted as if he believed this
captured Baghdad. The ruler of Baghdad,
Safavid incursion was the beginning of a
the Sultan Murad Khan ibn Ya'qub ibn

campaign against the Mamluk Sultanate.

He sent a delegation headed by the amir
914/December 1508 asking the Mamluk

Hasan al-Tawil arrived in Cairo in Ramadan

Tamur-Bay to discuss the matter with Shah

Sultan to provide him with troops to fight

the Shah. Sultan al-Ghawri refused to do so

Ismacil. In Tabriz the Shah met the amir

Tamur-Bay only once and kept him as a

because he was not ready to face the Safa-

vid. It seems also that Sultan al-Ghawri was

prisoner for about two years.21

between the Mamluk Sultanate

aware, at that time, of the movementsRelations
of
and the Safavid Empire deteriorated as
the Venetians and Hospitalers in the Meditime went by. In Dhu al-Hijja 916/March
terranean and the Portuguese in the Indian

Ocean and the Red Sea.17

No doubt Shah Isma'il wanted to remove

1511 Shah Ismacil defeated and killed

Ozbeg Khan, a Tartar chieftain. Sultan al-

Ghawri was disquieted by such news.22 A

the Mamluk sovereign in Syria, to have

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78 JARCE XV (1978)
Safavid envoy to theanyone
Mamluk
Sultan
arrived
whatsoever
from approaching
him,
in Damascus on Safar
917/10
May
15 II,23
and not
to let anyone
of the Safavid
delgaand in Cairo on 18 Rablc
1/
1 5
1511
of
tion go to
market
or June
meet any of
the inha-

the same year. The

Mamluk
was
bitants.
Only once theSultan
Safavid envoy
was
to visit the about
tombs of the
Imam
very anxious and permitted
concerned
the
purport of such aal-Shafici
mission.
Heal-Laythl
sentaccomhis
and the Imam

amirs to welcome the

outside
Cairo.
paniedenvoy
by the amir
Ozdamur.26 No
doubt
Sultan's instructions
reflected his fear
The Sultan himself the
went
personally,
but in
disguise, to the Matariyya,
outside
Cairo,
to
that the Safavid
envoy was sent
to approach
foreign
personalities
in Cairo,
and his order
watch the arrival of
the
Safavid
envoy.
Ibn
the delegation
to go to the marIyas comments thatpreventing
it was
something
very
odd for the Sultan kets
to ofdo.
After
two
days
the city
may have been
motivated
the Safavid envoybymet
the
Sultan.
his concern
that they
should not The
conletter of Shah Ismacil
was
read
in of
the
pretaminate
the Sunni
doctrine
the Egyptians.
sence of the Mamluk
amirs, and the Safavid
Thegifts
two abusive
verses
which
Shah
envoy presented the
of
his
master:
sent inahis
letter to al-Ghawri
spurred
a copy of the Holy Ismacil
Quran,
prayer
carpet,
a crossbow, and a small
box.
When
thepoets
box
competition
among
Egyptian
and
was opened in the presence
Sultan,alwriters, such asof
Ibn the
Iyas, al-Ushmuni,
Hijjar,head
al-Shirbini,
al-TahhanKhan.
and others,
they found inside the
ofIbn
Ozbeg
Sultan al-Ghawrl ordered the head to be
to write verses in reply. Sultan al-Ghawri
buried and the crossbow was broken.24
chose two verses written by Safiyy al-Din
Ismail's gift to al-Ghawri had its danger-al-Hilli which say:

ous and unequivocal implications. It sug-

gested that al-Ghawri - in the view of the

Safavid Shah - was an old man could not

I have a horse for good purposes, and

that is its rein.

I have a horse for evil purposes, and

participate in battle, so he should keepthat

is its saddle.

himself to the prayer carpet, praying to

Whoever wants to show me the right
God and reciting the Quran, leaving the
way, I am ready to respond in Kind.
Mamluk Sultanate to vigorous men, like

Shah Ismacil, who were able to kill their

enemies, like Ozbeg Khan, on the battle-

Whoever wants to lead me astray,

I will repay him in kind27

field.

After being kept in Cairo for two months

(from Rabf I to Jumada I 917), the Safavid
letter, for it contained abusive verses
envoy returned to his master carrying alinsulting the Mamluk Sultan who used to
Ghawri's letter of reply.28
visit parks and enjoy himself in gardens However, relations between the Safavids
Al-Ghawri was furious at the Safavid

and festivals. The verses read:

and the MamTuks went from bad to worse.

In Muharram 9 18/ April 1512, bad news

The sword and the dagger are our flowers;

reached Sultan al-Ghawri from Aleppo to
fie on the narcissus and the myrtle.
the effect that Safavid infantry battalions
Our wine is the blood of our enemies,
had arrived at al-Bira. This news disturbed
And our cup is an empty skull25

the Sultan, because he had at that time to

face disorders caused by the Bedouin tribes
close and trusted Mamluks, especiallyofthe
al-Buhayra, the Fayyum, and other Egypamir Ozdamur, to take care of the Safavid
tian provinces. These were accompanied by
envoy during his stay in Cairo, to prevent
devastation of crops, plunder, and disorder.
Sultan al-Ghawri ordered some of his

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POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SAFAVIDS AND MAMLUKS 79

Ibn Iyas comments that Sultan al-Ghawri

in Aleppo reported in Rabic II 919/June

1513
thatthe
Shah Ismacil had been defeated
found himself in great difficulties
with

Bedouin disorders on one side and the

Safavid problem on the other.29

by some of his Tartar enemies, had lost

many thousands of troops, and that he himOn Thursday 18 Rabic I 918/3 June
1512,
self
had been injured and was in hiding - no

the Mamluk ruler of Sis sent to the Sultan

one knew where - Sultan al-Ghawri was

in Cairo ten heads topped with red conical

pleased with the news, obviously, because
caps of Safavid soldiers whom he had killed
he thought that with this setback Shah

Isma'il would or could not attack the Mamwhile they were rampaging through his
luk Sultanate at that time.34
domain. Sultan al-Ghawri immediately
ordered these heads to be stuck on lances
In fact the only thing which saved the
Mamluk Sultanate from a definite clash
and put on display in the streets of Cairo,
with
and finally to be hung on the gates of Bab the Safavids was the transference of

al-Futuh and Bab al-Nasr.30 No doubt Shah

the circle of conflict to the Safavid - Otto-

Ismacil was unhappy when he heard this

man axis. There were many reasons for the

news. He sent a Safavid delegation of about

emergence of armed struggle between the
100 men to Cairo. He sent with them the

Safavids and the Ottomans. The Ottoman

Mamluk delegation headed by the amir

Empire, the most powerful Sunni authority
Tamur-Bay which the Shah had kept of
in the time, could not allow a Safavid defeat

of the weakened Mamluk Sultanate, beTabriz for two years.31 Two Safavid envoys

met Sultan al-Ghawri on 14 Rablc II 918/29

cause, if it happened, it would mean that

June 1512 and handed him a letter which
the Shici Shah would become the guardian
contained "abusive and hard words." Alof the two holy cities of Islam in the Hijaz
the master of the Red Sea trade. Of
Ghawri was enraged. It seems thatand
Shah
course
Isma'll blamed the Sultan for parading
the there were other reasons, such as
Safavid heads in the streets of Cairo and
the case of the amir Ahmad, brother of
even mocked the Sultan with taunts that he
Sultan Selim I and his rival, who was welcould not engage in combat with him. The
comed by the Shah and offered asylum.
Safavid delegation stayed in Cairo for less
Other reasons were the Shicite mutiny
than one month. It was sent back to Persia
which occured in Asia Minor against the
with al-Ghawri' s reply, which also contained
Ottomans, and the persecution of the Sunni

abusive words. Ibn Iyas comments on this

fuqahct in Iraq and Iran.35
The Safavid and the Ottoman armies met
event by saying that it was the beginning
at Chaldiran, near Tabriz, on 2 Rajab 920/
of the enmity between the Sultan and Shah
Ismacil.32
23 August 1514. Shah Ismacil was defeated
Al-Ghawri, by virtue of these experiences,

and Sultan Selim entered Tabriz. The Otto-

was more conversant with the tactics of

mans tried to follow Ismacil, who withdrew

Shah Ismacil, and more aware of hiseastwards
inten- devastating the villages on his
tions, than were the Ottomans themselves.
way in order to hamper the Ottoman
When the news of the death of the Ottoadvance and lengthen their supply lines.
Sultan Selim was forced to withdraw
man Bayezid II reached Cairo on 2 Jumada
because of bad roads, cold weather, and
I 918/16 July 1512, al-Ghawri mourned
him and expressed his grief for the loss.
over-extended supply routes.36

The inhabitants of Cairo were ordered to

mourn the Ottoman Sultan by

The news of the defeat of Shah Ismacil

the Mamluk Sultan al-Ghawri a few

prayer reached
in

the mosques of al-Azhar, al-Hakim and

days after its occurrence on 10 Rajab/31

others.33 But when the Mamluk vice-Sultan

August. At first, the Sultan could not

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80 JARCE XV (1978)

other version al-Ghuzzi he

states that
Sultan happy
believe the news, although
was
al-Ghawri
announced
among
his troops
enough with it. He
ordered
the
Quran
to
purpose
of his movement
to Cairo
Syria
be recited in some that
ofthe
the
mosques
of

arrange
peace betweenvictory
Selim and
and Fustat.37 News was
oftothe
Ottoman

Shah Ismacil. the

Al-Ghuzzi inhabitants
adds that when alwas circulated among
o
wrote to Selim
about his peace
Cairo next month Ghawri
(Shacban
920/November
mission, Selim
was suspicious
the reasons the
1514), but the Sultan
did
not of
order
drums to be beaten for festivals as usual
for such movement and decided to fight

the Mamluk
Sultan.42
in such cases, since he was determined
to
wait for confirmation of the news.38 At last
In the absence of more data, one cannot
on 29 Ramadan 920/17 November, 1514
refute or accept such information. In any
an Ottoman envoy arrived in Cairo carrying case, it was two years after the battle of

a detailed correspondence concerning

Ismail's defeat at Chaldiran. The most

Chaldiran, on Sunday 25 Rajab 922/24

August, 1516 that Sultan Selim met Sultan

al-Ghawri
important point was that even after
the on the field of battle at Marj
arrival of the official news, Sultan Dabiq,
al-Ghawrl
north of Aleppo. Of course the by

did not order the drums to be beaten and

did not declare that Cairo should be deco-

rated in celebration of this occasion. The

then weakened Mamluk army could not

face up to the firepower of the Ottomans.

The Mamluk army was defeated and the

Mamluk Sultan al-Ghawri was killed on the

contemporary historian Ibn Iyas comments:
"the reason was not known."39
battlefield. The Ottoman Sultan Selim con-

The reason was obvious later on; no doubtquered the cities of Syria and at last reach-

Sultan al-Ghawri was aware of the conse-

ed Cairo. The last Mamluk Sultan Tuman-

quences of such a victory and realized Bay

thatwas defeated at al-Raydaniyya, near
he would drink from the same cup as Cairo,
Shah and in other places, and was hanged
Ismacil. The Ottomans, after defeatingatthe
the Zuwayla Gate on 22 Rabic I 923/14
Safavids, turned their attention to the
April, 1517.43 In the end Egypt became a
Mamluks, to the conquest of their lands, to provincial territory, but attached to the
the guardianship of the two holy cities, to Empire of the Sunni Ottomans, rather than
extending their influences into the Red Seathe Shici Safavids.
and to becoming the sole Muslim power in
the area. Ibn Abi al-Surur al-Bakri states

Cairo

that Sultan Selim wanted to destroy the

Mamluk Sultanate because good relations

had been established between Shah Ismacil

1 K. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age

7300-7600 (London, 1973), 23-40; P. M. Holt,

and al-Ghawri, and during the Ottomanand the Fertile Crescent 7 57 6-7 922 (London,
Safavid war, al-Ghawri had sent his Egypt
orders
1966), 23-32.
to Aleppo to prevent the Ottoman supply
2 For the decline of the Mamluk Sultanate in the
trains from reaching the army of Sultan
later middle ages, cf. Lopez, Miskimin, and UdoSelim.40 Ibn Tulun reports also that vitch,
it was
"England to Egypt, 1350-1500", in M. Cook,

circulated among the people that the reason

Studies in

the Economic History of the Middle East (London,

1970), 115-28.
for the Ottoman conquest was that Sultan
3 R.alM. Savory, 'Safavid Persia,' in the Cambridge
Selim had captured al-Bahlawan, one of
History of Islam, I, 398.
Ghawri's men, who was carrying a letter
4 Sharaf Khan al-Bidlisi, Sharafnama, Arabic trans.

from his master to Shah Isma'il. In this

letter the Mamluk Sultan asked the Persian

Muhammad cAli cAwni (Cairo, 1962), II, 118-29;

P. Sykes, A History of Persia, 3rd ed. (London, 1963),

Shah for help to fight Sultan Selim.41 II,

In158-62; Savory, op.cit, I, 399.

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POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SAFAVIDS AND MAMLUKS 8 1

Iyas, ^Y, IV, 221.

5 For the iqtac system during the heyday 26
ofIbn
the

21 Ibid., IV, 222-27.

Mamluk Sultanate, cf. H. Rabie, The Financial System

28 In Tulun, Mufakaha, I, 357.

of Egypt A.H. 564-741/A.D. 1169-1341 (London,
1972), 26-72.
29 Ibn Iyas, Bads' f, IV, 256-57.

Ibid., IV, 262.

6 See al-Maqrlzi (Ahmad ibn cAli), Ighathat al-umma

31 Ibid.,
IV, 265 ff.; see above, p. 000.
bi-kashf al-Ghumma (Cairo, 1940), 32-47; Rabie,
op.
32 Ibid., IV, 27 1.
cit, 20-22, 49; M. W. Dols, The Black Death in the
33 Ibid., IV, 270.
Middle East (Princeton, 1977), 143ff.
R. B. Serjeant, The Portuguese off the South Arabian

34 Ibid., IV, 311.

Coast (London, 1963), 13-21.

35 Cf. al-Ghuzzi, al-Kawdkib al-sa'ira ft acyan al-m?a

Ibn Tulun (Shams al-Din Muhammad), Mufdkahat al-cdshira, MS, Dar al Kutub (Egyptian National

al-khilldn ft hawddilh al-zamdn, ed. Muhammad Library), no. 1206 Tdrikh, vol. I, fol. 398; Savory,
'Safavid Persia', 399-400; Holt, op.cit., 35-50;
Mostafa (Cairo, 1962), I, 252.
Inalcik, op.cit, 32.

9 Ibid., I, 261.

10 Ibn Iyas (Muhammad ibn Ahmad), Bada*f alZuhur ft waqdcf al-duhur, 2nd ed. by Muhammad
Mostafa, vol IV (Cairo, 1960), 46-47.
1 x Ibn Tulun, Mufakaha, 1,316-17.
Ibn Iyas, Baddhx, Iv, 118; for the Mamluk army,

cf. D. Ayalon, "Studies on the Structure of the

Mamluk Army," BSOAS XV (1953), 203-28, 44876; XVI (1954), 57-90.
13 Ibn Iyas, Badd'f, IV, 118-19, 121-22.
14 Ibn Tulun, Mufakaha, I, 3 1 8.

15 Ibn Iyas, Bad??, IV, 123-24.

"Ibid., IV, 146.

17 Cf. Ibn Iyas, Badd'f, IV, 82, 129, 163; A. Dar-

rag, al-MamdUk wa al-Firanj (Cairo, 1961), 127-57.

18 Ibn Iyas, Baddh\ IV, 191, 205.
19 Ibn Tulun, Mufakaha, I, 342-43.
20 Ibn Iyas, Badd'f, IV, 205; for the Ndzir al-Khdss,

who became the most important official in the

Mamluk sultanate after 1329, cf. Rabie, op.cit, 14244.

36Sharaf Khan al-Bidlisi, op.cit, II, 140-41; alGhuzzi, op.cit, I, fols. 398-99; Savory, op.cit, 400-

01; Incik, op.cit, 33.

37 Ibn Iyas, ^Y, IV, 393.

38 Ibid., IV, 396.

39 Ibid., IV, 402-04.
40 Ibn Abi al-Surur al-Bakri, al-Minatj, al-rahmdniyya
ft al-dawla al-^Uthmdniyya, MS. Dar al-Kutub, Cairo,
no. 1926 Tarikh, fol. 21 r-v; idem, al-Kawdkib al So? ir a

ft akhbdr Misr wa al-Qdhira (available in photocopy as

no. 2112 Tdrikh Taymur, Dar al-Kutub, Cairo),

fol. 18r.

41 Ibn Tulun, Mufakaha, II, 23.

42 al-Ghuzzi, al-Kawdkib, I, fol. 399.

43 Ibn Iyas, Badd'f, V (ed. M. Mostafa: Cairo,

Wiesbaden, 1961), 60-177; al-Ishbili ({Ali ibn
Muhammad), al-Durr al-musdnft sirat al-Muzaffar Setim

Khan, ed. H. Ernst (Cairo, 1962), 8-16; Ibn Tulun,

Mufakaha, II, 23-24; Ibn Zunbul al-Rammal, Waqfat
al-Sultdn al-Ghawri maca Setim al-c Uthmdni, ed. cAbd

al-Muncim 'Amir (Cairo, 1962), 26ff.; Ibn Abi al21 Ibn Iyas, Badd'f, IV, 184, 265, 271; see below,
Surur al-Bakri, a\-Minah, fol. 21r-v, M. M. Ziada,
p. 000.
22 Ibid., IV, 207.
Nihayat Salatin al-Mamalik, al-Mijalla al-Tarlkhiyya
23 Ibn Tulun, Mufakaha, I, 354.

24 Ibn Iyas, Baddh\ IV, 218-20.

25 Ibid., Iv, 221-22; Ibn Tulun, Mufakaha, I, 357;

for al-Ghawri's gardens, cf. 'Azzam (cAbd al-Wah-

al-Misriyya, IV, i (1951); B. Lewis, 'Egypt and Syria,'

in The Cambridge History of Islam, I, 229-30; Holt, op.
cit, 37-41.

hab), Majalis al-Sultan al-Ghawri (Cairo, 1941), 29-30.

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