Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as
Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA
IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar,
instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief
sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of
the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of
justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may
the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated
otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the
jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial
and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the
same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are
hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions
posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in
related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the
record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions"
after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990
without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the

granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education.

The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at
the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with
an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face
dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into
the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8)
private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School,
Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report
and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and
temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An
investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario
Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate
answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But
when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990
of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for
reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to
boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of
Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the
evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the
respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked
CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court
(on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged
violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly
docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before
the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this
Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals,
and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly
situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements

dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of
their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for
reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by
the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking
Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission
scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary
Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he
(Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the)
Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R.
Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the
complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process
and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the
mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the
mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR
complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an
Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in
its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two
teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very
badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of
Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and
enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to
bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated
herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was
granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was
submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the
complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the
case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments
affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as
aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case
No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and
the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445
and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still
timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on
the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful
for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges
against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those
charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec.
Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to
submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the
Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or
without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were
denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a
chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their
civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate;
and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts
before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court"
(the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6,
1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor
General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action
of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not
feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra.
It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try
and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following
general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause
exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their
superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine
with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been
passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports,
subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as
aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil
Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of

justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory

powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the
powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent
office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights
and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their
families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty

obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise
that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise
that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court.
In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve
or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . .
to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose
of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the
facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and

collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve
on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions
engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted
by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their
classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary
sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what
where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if
any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted
to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken
cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have
been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission;
and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are
void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed

upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the

Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be
reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things.
It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education
Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the
same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the
questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the
complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the
Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they
anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve
no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to
those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse
the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil
Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can
do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the
appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil
Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights
and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the
case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means

to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.

PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern
itself in this case and in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights
of students and their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the
victims and the latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but
also those who defend the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a
consequence of strikes may be laid off because of financial repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as
the Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers
defending so-called "human rights' but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES
(governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there
are also corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate
opinion filed in this case.

# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means
to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern
itself in this case and in many other similar cases:
(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights
of students and their parents;
(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the
victims and the latter's families;
(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but
also those who defend the same;
(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a
consequence of strikes may be laid off because of financial repercussions.
The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as
the Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers
defending so-called "human rights' but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES
(governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.

Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there
are also corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate
opinion filed in this case.

# Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 6-13.
2 G.R. No. 95445 (Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. v. Hon.
Perfecto Laguio, Jr., etc., et al) and G.R. No. 95590 (Alliance of Concerned
Teachers [ACT], et al. v. Hon. Isidro Cario, etc., et al.).
3 (Joint) Resolution, G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, prom. Aug. 6, 1991, pp. 3-4.
4 Rollo, p. 7.
5 Id., p. 7.
6 Also impleaded as respondents were other teachers, Adelaida dela Cruz, Ma.
Teresa Rizardo, Rita Atabelo and Digna Operiano (Rollo, p. 77).
7 Rollo, pp. 77-78.
8 Id., pp. 77-81.
9 Id., pp. 7-8, and 47-50 (Annex "I," petition: Decision of Judge Perfecto A.S.
Laguio in Civil Case No. 90-54468 of the RTC of Manila [Branch 18] entitled
Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. v. Hon. Isidro Cario and Hon.
Erlinda Lolarga).
10 Id., pp. 8; 51-52 (Annex J, Petition: Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of 7
affiants including respondents Budoy, Babaran, and del Castillo), and 53-54
(Annex K, petition: sworn statement given by Apolinario Esber under questioning
by Nicanor S. Agustin, CHR).
11 Id., p. 56: Order in Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90-775, 1st par., p. 1.
12 Id., 1st and 2nd pars., p. 1.
13 Id., pp, 56-57.
14 Id., pp, 11-58-76 (Annex M, petition).
15 SEE footnote 8 and related text, supra.
16 SEE footnote 3, supra.

17 Rollo, p. 11.
18 Id., pp. 12-13.
19 Including Regional Trial Courts designated and acting as Special Agrarian
Courts, and the Court of Tax Appeals. SEE Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 eff.
April 1, 1991.
20 Vested with judicial authority or quasi-judicial powers are such agencies,
boards or officers like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees' Compensation Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission. SEE Circular No. 1-91, supra. Also possessed of quasi-judicial
authorities are department heads and heads of office under the Civil Service
Law, and the Ombudsman.
21 The nature of a "judicial function" was inter alia described in Republic of the
Philippines (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 90478 as follows: "The
resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts.
This essential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the
material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by
the parties, and second after that determination of the facts has been completed,
by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be
settled authoritatively, definitively and finally."
. . . "It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine
what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter
in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially." . . . Mun. Council of
Lemery v. Prov. Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 270, citing State ex rel. Boards
of Commrs. v. Dunn, 86 Minn. 301, 304.
It has been held that a special civil action of certiorari "would not lie to challenge
action of the "Integrity Board" set up by Executive
Order No. 318 of May 25, 1950, because that board, like the later Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission, was not invested with judicial functions but
only with power to investigate charges of graft and corruption in office and to
submit the record, together with findings and recommendations, to the
President." Ruperto v. Torres G.R. No. L-8785, Feb. 25, 1957 (Unrep., 100 Phil.
1098) (Rep. of the Phil. Digest, Vol. 1, Certiorari, Sec. 22, p. 430).
Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., treating of "jurisdiction" in relation to a
criminal case, states it to be "the power of a court to inquire into the fact, to apply
the law, and to declare the punishment, in a regular course of judicial proceeding
. . ." In Black's Law Dictionary 5th Ed., "adjudge" is defined as: "To pass on

judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a

judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment (emphasis supplied).
22 A distinguished Member of the Constitutional Commission that drew up the
1987 Constitution, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., citing the Commission's official
records, states that the "principal function of the Commission (on Human Rights)
is investigatory. In fact, in terms of law enforcement, this pretty much is the limit
of its function. Beyond investigation, it will have to rely on the Justice Department
which has full control over prosecutions. Thus, under Section 18 (9) it can only
request assistance from executive offices." (Bernas, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, a Commentary, 1988 ed., Vol. II p. 503/).
23 Art. XIII, Sec. 17. (1).
24 Id., Sec. 17. (3).
25 Id., Sec. 18.
26 E.g.: the prosecution of persons guilty of crimes, or institution of civil or
administrative proceedings; exercise of visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or
detention facilities; the submission of recommendations to the Congress of
measures to promote human rights provide for compensation to victims of
violations thereof, etc.
27 Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed., 1961) definition is: "To search or inquire into; to examine (a matter)
systematically or in detail; to make an inquiry or examination into." The American
College Encyclopedic Dictionary (1959 ed.) defines (a) "investigate" as "to search
or examine into the particulars of; examine in detail;" and (b) "investigation," an
act or process of investigating; a searching inquiry in order to ascertain facts; a
detailed or careful examination.
28 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.
29 Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.
30 Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed., 1961) definition is "To adjudge; to award; "to give something
controverted to one of the litigants, by a sentence or decision. . . . To try and
determine judicially; to pronounce by sentence of court. . . . To sit in judgment
and pronounce sentence; to act as a judge, or court of judgment."
31 Id., the Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is "To settle,
determine, or decide judicially; to adjudicate upon; . . . To pronounce or decree
by judicial sentence . . . To award judicially; to grant, bestow, or impose by
judicial sentence . . . ."
32 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.; in Ballentine's Law Dictionary, "adjudicate" is
defined as: "To give judgment; to render or award judgment," and "adjudge" as:
"To give judgment; to decide, to sentence." In Bouvier's Law Dictionary Third

Revision (8th Ed.), "adjudication" is defined as "A judgment; giving or

pronouncing judgment in a case. Determination in the exercise of judicial power."
33 SEE footnotes 6 to 8, and 15, and related text, supra.
34 SEE footnotes 16 and 17 related text, supra.
35 SEE footnote 26, supra.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND
GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS
JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights
("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit
public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 901580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by
Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of
the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of
the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the
officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In
said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to
12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1
Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were
informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to
the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the
CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon
City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and
carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No.
90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners
"to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending
resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and
ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31
July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28
July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990,
ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00
in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food
under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist

from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to
a citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction.
The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the
Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed
on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in MetroManila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred
to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor
dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent
business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1
August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the
sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and
authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if
already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement,
arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be
resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to
the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the
petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as
being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights,
and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political
rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for
resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the
private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground
that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each
of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of
the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to
dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission
to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights,

but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide

appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life
and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by
respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and
children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically
scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a
violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was
subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which
we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and
DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private
respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected
by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused
from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own
comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court
also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo,
who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring
such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via
Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987
Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights
and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their
families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR
theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to
make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been
shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has
observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that
bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can
in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other
kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's
investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that
any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that
has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The

participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the

following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity.
They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England,
Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property;
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of
the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect
public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations
and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education,
employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the
sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not
granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They
are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights
can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to
the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing
almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our
1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human
rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It
may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law
regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly
represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in
his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29
observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of
Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these
rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21
September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the
thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held
for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered
released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition
for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were
forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to
censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of

the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure,
except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of
resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can
see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of
the importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have
been determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations
in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and
subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we
might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity
would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission
can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights
are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights.
Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So,
where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in
the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the
right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are
very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international
documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and
these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic
rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed
to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions,
and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its
wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the
jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to
define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by
the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the
particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or
prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which

we would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we
are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those
rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human
rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the
Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I
would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of
human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of
fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is
that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised
by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we
should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as
much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually
disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the
rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on,
this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after
mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or
linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture
of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other
covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that
other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it
would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like
"convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the
Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of these
articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights,
not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to
give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included,
without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there
was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether
the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil
right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and
political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision
freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and
public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings
and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to
protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and
therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no
longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with
the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific
article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as
we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction
between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant
and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the
rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the
committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I
cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few
lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more

abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate
torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and
the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in
the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be
independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission,
especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and
cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political
violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no
place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis
supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987
Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined
civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state
or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of
being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment
for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the
right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general,
the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious."
While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect,
more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for
the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that
"Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should
fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be

demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North
EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy
national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be
likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to
have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is,
in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not
prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment
of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted
within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any
person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court."
That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential
to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the
said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a
semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is
not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on
Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina GrioAquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were
the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of
preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself
has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only
be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A
writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its
findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way
of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate
issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of
the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies
with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case
No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting
final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the
doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act
already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to
promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has
been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing
that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission
on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case
No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The
temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human
rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to
the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export
Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered
view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo
pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation;
that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a
threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the
private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation
because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents,
under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and
which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII,
1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive
displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count.
Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional
agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from
the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the
CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which
may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the
CHR for further proceedings.
# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human
rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to
the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export
Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered
view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo
pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation;
that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a
threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the
private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation
because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents,
under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and
which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII,
1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive
displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count.
Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional
agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from
the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the
CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which
may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the
CHR for further proceedings.
#Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 16.
2 Rollo, p. 17.
3 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
4 Ibid., p. 21.
5 Ibid., see also Annex "C-3", Rollo, pp. 102-103.
6 Ibid., p. 79.
7 Annex "C", Rollo, p. 26.

8 Rollo, pp. 26-27.

9 Annex "E", Ibid., p. 34.
10 Rollo, p. 5.
11 Annex "F", Petition, rollo, pp. 36-42.
12 Annex "G", Petition, Rollo, pp. 44-46.
13 Rollo, p. 46.
14 Annex "J", pp. 56-57.
15 Rollo, p. 59.
16 Ibid., p. 66.
17 Ibid., p. 67.
18 Rollo, pp. 77-88.
19 Art. XIII, Sec. 17, [1].
20 DECLARING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CREATION OF THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
21 Ibid., Sec. 17, [3]; E.O. No. 163, Sec. 4.
22 Ibid., Sec. 18.
23 Rollo, p. 45.
24 204 SCRA 483, 492.
25 Remigio Agpalo, Roxas Professor of Political Science, University of the
Philippines, Human Rights in the Philippines: An Unassembled Symposium,
1977, pp. 1-2.
26 Emerenciana Arcellana, Department of Political Science, U.P., Ibid., pp. 2-3.
27 Nick Joaquin, National Artist, Ibid., p. 15.
28 Salvador Lopez, Professor, U.P. Law Center, Ibid., p. 20.
29 Submitted to the LAWASIA Human Rights Standing Committee: Recent
Trends in Human Rights, circa, 1981-1982, pp. 47-52.
30 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 3, pp. 722-723; 731; 738739.
31 Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, 1324; Handbook of American
Constitutional Law, (4th ed., 1927), p. 524.
32 Malcolm, The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands, (2nd ed., 1926),
pp. 431-457.
33 Black's Law Dictionary, Ibid., p. 1325.
34 Anthony vs. Burrow, 129 F. 783, 789 [1904].
35 Sec. 19, Art. XIII.
36 208 SCRA 125, 131.
37 See Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,
208 SCRA 125.
38 Cabaero vs. Torres, 61 Phil. 523; Agustin vs. dela Fuente, 84 Phil. 515;
Navarro vs. Lardizabal, 25 SCRA 370.
39 See Magallanes vs. Sarita, 18 SCRA 575.