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in their
richinheritance
havebothshareda particularly
NDIA andPakistan
322
patternof pay and rewards,its duties,its posts and privileges,and its sphere
of activity. Each servicekept everyother service,especiallyinferiorservices,
at arm's length. Ironically,new administrativeleaderscontinuedto believe
that they representedthe people, a myth that was firmlycherishedin the old
ICS by all membersof the administrative
elite. The mythand the peoplewho
held it are at the heartof muchof the achievements
of Pakistanand of many
opportunitieslost. And muchof the storywe have to tell is imbeddedin the
Civil Serviceof Pakistan(CSP)-in its particularexclusiveness,in its ambivalence to politicalinvolvement,in its visionarydevotionto duty,in its administrativeimpotenceand in its collectiveanxieties.
The Civil and MilitaryServicesin the Pre-Revolutionary
Period
The storyof the CSPis a storyof devotionto duty. Underits leadership,
but with the assistanceof the otherservices,the governmentof Pakistanbegan
operationsat the time of independencein the hallwaysand corridorsof makeshift buildingsin Karachi.
Inevitably,the massivetasksof nationbuildingfell to the administrators.
There was much to be done. Refugeeshad to be settled as best they could.
Abandonedland had to be dividedand put to cultivationas soon as possible.
Law and orderhad to be establishedin the tribalareas,and an attemptmade
to assertthe sovereigntyof the new Pakistan.An entireadministrative
apparatus had to be establishedto carryout the manyfunctionsof statepower. The
best tributepaid to the competenceof these civil servantsis the fact that
Pakistandid not collapsein its first90 days.
The zeal and enthusiasmof buildinga new nationmanagedto carrythe
countryforwardin its earlydaysdespitethe deathof its founder,Mohammed
Ali Jinnah,and the assassinationof his successor,LiaqatAli Khan. All too
soon though the civil servantsbecame embroiledin a struggle with the
emergingelites of the politicalparties.As a majorsourceof nationaldecisions,
the CSP soon conflictedwith a wide variety of sectional and entrenched
interests.
Eventuallythe powerful centrifugalforces within the new countrywere
overcomeand the provincesof West Pakistanwereconsolidatedinto one unit.8
New subdivisions,differentfrom the old provinces,were demarcatedand civil
servantswere given chargeof the new units. As politicaland sectionalpressuresincreased,conflictingclaimsfor scarceresourcesdevelopedbetweenEast
and West Pakistan. Within West Pakistanitself, Punjabisand Pathans,
Punjabisand Sindhis,refugeesand non-refugeesall contestedfor the limited
3. Callard,op. cit., pp. 183-193.
323
324
ship betweenthe armyand the civil service."5But this view, just as the one
that the CSP greeted the Revolutionwith enthusiasm,is truly a vast oversimplification.The union betweenthe CSPand the militaryservicewas something that occurredduring the course,not at the beginning,of the revolutionarygovernment.At the beginningof the martiallaw regime,screening
committeeswere set up at the centerand in the provincesto assessthe integrity
and efficiencyof the governmentservices.6Armymen sat on thesecommissions,
procedureswereconfidentialandratherhaphazard,andthe processwas entirely
in camera. Soon after the committeeswere formed, General Ayub Khan
promisednot to "have any hesitationin getting rid of those who fail and
entrustingtheirworkto thosewho can do the job."7A few old ICSmen were
quicklypurged. There is good reasonto believethat the CSPwas frightened
at the beginningof the Revolution;and naturallythe threatof being purged
did not stimulatean enthusiasticresponsetowardthe Revolution.
Muchcloserto the truthis the assertionthat the CSPwas frightenedinto
submission.It did not criticizethe militaryand theirplans, largelybecauseit
felt that whole heartedacceptancewas neededto safeguardits own positions.
In part, though,the CSPperceivedthat AyubKhan'sRevolutionmight well
preventthe eruptionof a moreexplosiverevolutionfrom below,whichit saw
comingin the anxiouseventsbeforethe martiallaw regime.
In realitythe partnershipof the CSPwith the militarycame earlyin the
revolutionaryregime, though it came after the CSP had submitteditself to
militaryleadership.Thatthe CSPsubmittedcanbe gleanedfromthe statement
of Mr. Aziz Ahmed, CSP SecretaryGeneralof the governmentof Pakistan,
as earlyas March8, 1959:
Given the right type of leadershipthe Civil Serviceswere fully competentto
deliverthe goods. He cited. . . the successfulhandlingof the chaoticsituation
that arosein the wake of partitionand the achievements
of the new regime
duringthe brieffour monthssincethe revolutionunderthe leadershipof President, GeneralMohammedAyubKhan,as the instancesof the heightto which
the CivilServicescouldriseunderhonestandinspiringleadership.8
325
and reductionsin rank, took place at the lower ranks. At the end of this period
of separations from the service the first link in the tie between the military
and the civil service was forged and the linkage was continued and strengthened throughout the next five years. An important factor in the process
appeared in the military's new perception that they needed the help of the
CSP in order to run the country.
9. Wayne Ayres Wilcox, Pakistan, The Consolidation of a Nation, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1963) p. 208.
10. This is not intended as an all-inclusive list. There were other reforms which came later,
particularly a recognition of the population problem and the problem of the status of women.
326
in the field of
administrations,
particularly
Centraland ProvincialGovernment
development
work.
of the Committeeto be set
To examineand co-ordinatethe recommendations
up by the ProvincialGovernments
with a view to ensuringuniformapproach
to the problemof organization
of the Government
Offices.'1
The work of the AdministrativeReorganizationCommittee was carried on
during the entire period of the revolutionarygovernment through the activities
of its successor the Standing Organization Committee. The Administrative
ReorganizationCommittee highlighted four major reforms in its initial report:
A numberof structural
andprocedural
changesproposedby the Committee,
in the administrative
and acceptedby the Government,were unprecedented
historyof the country.New groundwas brokenby the Committeein respect
of the followingmatters:
A sweepingreformwas the introduction
of the SectionOfficersystemin the
Secretariat
replacingseverallayersof subordinatestaff (the LowerDivision
and the Under
the AssistantSecretary
Clerk,the Assistant,the Superintendent,
statusassistedby a Stenotypist
Secretary)by a singleofficerof UnderSecretary's
and an Assistant.
Radicalchangeswere made in the systemof financialcontrol,budgetingand
withwidefinancialpowers;
Ministrieswereentrusted
accounting.Administrative
prescribedfor incurringexpenditure
the dilatorysystemof multipleclearances
funds was abolished;and a systemof financialadvicewas
againstappropriate
of funds;
builtintothe Ministriesto ensureefficientmanagement
The scopeof the Financeand Commerce
Pool (constitutedbut not fully develIndia) was widenedthroughthe creationof an Economic
oped in pre-Partition
Pool intendedto includeofficersselectedto servethe ministryof Industriesas
well.
of officersof the ForeignServiceof Pakistan
The scopeof the responsibilities
that commercial
was substantially
enlargedas a resultof the recommendation
and publicrelationsfunctionsperformedabroadby representatives
of the Minisrespectively,
shouldbe takenoverby officers
triesof Commerce
andInformation
of the ForeignServiceandforma normalpartof theirfunctions.12
The Standing OrganizationCommittee continued to function in the implementation of the recommendationsof the AdministrativeReorganizationCommittee through 1964.
Further, a Provincial Reorganization Committee was set up which recommended a revision of the divisional and district administration. Its emphasis
was placed upon the establishmentof clear lines of responsibility,the coordination of policy making functions, the delegation of powers, the decentralization
of administrativeand financial control, and the simplificationof administrative
procedures. The struggle to implement these recommendationshas continued
through the entire revolutionaryperiod and survives today.
11. Pakistan1958-1959, (Karachi: Ferozsons,1959) p. 11.
12. Report of the AdministrativeReorganizationCommittee(Governmentof Pakistan,President's Secretariat,EstablishmentDivision, Efficiencyand 0 & M Wing) p. IV.
327
While tackling the problemof governmentalreorganization,the revolutionarygovernmentalso launcheda programof trainingfor its administrators,
laying particularemphasisupon the issues of economicdevelopmentand
administration.In February,1960, the AdministrativeTrainingCouncilwas
set up and formulateda trainingschemefor officersat all levelsof government.
These levels of trainingincluded: (1) The AdministrativeStaff College in
Lahorefor senior governmentofficers,joint secretaries,commissioners,and
officersof equivalentstatuswith morethan 14 yearsstatus. (2) The National
in Karachi,Lahore,and Daccafor mangeInstitutesof PublicAdministration,
ment and developmenttrainingfor middle level officersof the centraland
provincial governments,autonomousagencies, and private firms. (These
officesare held by deputysecretaries,deputycommissioners,and officersof
equivalentstatuswith from 7-14 yearsstatus.) (3) Academiesfor RuralDevelopmentat Peshawarand Comillato trainadministrative
supervisory
personnel for the now-defunctvillage aid department,and other nation-building
departments,as well as for the Civil Serviceof Pakistan,and ProvincialCivil
Service officersfor village developmentprograms. (4) The Civil Service
Academyalreadyestablishedwas continuedwith only minorchangesin curriculumas the entranceinstitutionfor the Civil Serviceof Pakistan. (5) A
Secretariat
TrainingInstituteto trainministerialpersonneland newlyrecruited
SectionOfficers.(Variousclericaland ministerialtrainingprogramsfell under
its jurisdiction.)
At the same time as governmentalreorganization
cameunderscrutiny,in
January,1959, the revolutionary
governmentestablishedfourteenCivilAwards
to recognizethe serviceto the state of non-officialsand governmentservants.
In March,1959, four new awardswere added and the existingawardswere
revised.RepublicDay, March23, 1959, was the occasionfor the announcement
of the firstPakistanCivil Awards. Recognitionof distinguishedpublicservice
was now to be rewardedand this programhas continuedthroughoutthe
revolutionaryperiod and still continuesin 1964. Administrativedevicespersistedthroughoutthe revolutionary
periodto be the mainmeasuresof reform.
One fact remainedunchangedthroughoutthis period of administrative
activity. The Civil Serviceof Pakistanremainedintactand no administrative
reorganization
daredattackits privilegedposition. Its officerswere appointed
as heads of the majortraininginstitutions,and even thoughits officerswere
participantsin the programs,theyretaineda privilegedand exdusiveposition.
Moreover,this exclusivenesswas retainedin the CivilServiceAcademydespite
many pressuresto open it to recruitsfrom all the CentralSuperiorServices.
Finally, no changes were made in its trainingprogramto reflect in any
significantway whatevermay have been the ideologyof the Revolution.The
real strugglefor power can best be seen in the conflictwithin the Pay and
Services Commission.
328
329
Table 1.
Year
No. of Off.
No. of Posts
1947
1950
1954
1961
158
175
258
379
244
332
519
735
Difference
86
157
261
356
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
administrative
innovationsof the Revolution.Its successhas largelybeen determinedby the essentiallynon-revolutionary
natureof Ayub Khan'sseizure
of power. Had AyubKhan actedwith the bold and radicaldetermination
that
Americanshave now come to associatewith revolutions,the CSPcouldnever
have survived. As an entrenchedbureaucracy
with an orderlybut traditionboundmode of work,it would have been the firsttargetof a genuinerevolutionaryimpulse. That it did surviveand succesfullyretainits privilegedstatus
is a reflectionupon Ayub Khan's ideology of power and also upon his acceptanceof the CSPas a necessary-thoughinhibiting-instrumentof government.