Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
-
Constitutional issues:
of
200-Economic
Zone
(includes
Territorial
Seas
and
Contiguous Zone) READ: UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea.
Republicanism
Separation of Powers
Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot
interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue Ribbon
vs
Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003; Executive
privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643,
Mach 25, 2008)
/19/97;
Local Autonomy
( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local
government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of
local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state of an imperium in imperio
(unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or
otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is
Edison So vs. Republic, GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into
the political body of a nation by clothing him or her the privileges
of a citizen. Xxx Under current and existing laws, there are three
ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to RA No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to CA No. 473 , as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress
bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is
an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who
also possesses American citizenship having been born of an
American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for public office.
The Supreme Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin
requirements to cases which involve natural-born Filipinos who
later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter
ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
[private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born
Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of
another country. Hence, the twin requirements in RA No. 9225 do
not apply to him.
LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 Valles
and Mercado Doctrines do not apply if one reacquires his
citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply
with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that
the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal
terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to
allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at
the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may
establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines
only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No.
9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.
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other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections
2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a
law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including the
Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.
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Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and
Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine Bill
of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day
of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native
of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended
on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether
or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
lost her domicile of origin and followed the domicile of her husband
in America. When she and her husband moved back for good here
after the death of Fernando Poe Jr., she acquired a new domicile of
choice in the Philippines. As to when she acquired it depends,
on her clear intention, conduct and physical presence in the
new location.
ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)
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EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by filling the details which Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by DOLE on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
The Presidents Ordinance Power is the Executives rulemaking authority in implementing and executing constitutional or
statutory powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers
vested in the Executive that are self-executory.
SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives
and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively
in Congress.
11
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary,
the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent
sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that
participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a
sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding
the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
12
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, x x x.
The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives
is
merely
a
ceiling;
party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members
of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled.
The three-seat cap, as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats
for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance
with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
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to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk,
urban
poor,
indigenous
cultural
communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that
lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
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13
The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector
has been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against
because of negative public perception, and has even alleged acts
of violence perpetrated against members of the LGBT community
by reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity. It added
that the magnitude of opposition against petitioners participation
in the party list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sectors
lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed legislations
seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment against LGBTs have
been languishing in Congress.
14
law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules in the
absence of showing that there was violation of a constitutional
provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are mere
procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.
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Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002 Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed
a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending the
proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not
divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of
the 2nd Division. The said Order was yet unenforceable, as it has
not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as
the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as
the duly elected representative of the 4th District of Leyte.
15
16
and the priority to be given each project (LAMP vs. DBM Secretary,
GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012)
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18
between the Executive and the Judiciary, have been decided by the
courts.
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19
Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis
in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information.
20
ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)
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David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not proper
to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNALLopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law grants the
Supreme Court the power to resolve an election contest between
or among presidential candidates, no new or separate court is
created. The law merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the
functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004 Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in
order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to
prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable
institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as
possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from
participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner
to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words
dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for the
words used exclusively without doing violence to the Constitution
and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively
21
Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once an appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does not
alter its permanent character. It is effective until disapproved
by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress. It is
extended only during a recess of Congress. If disapproved
by CA, appointee can no longer be extended a new
appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to renew
the ad-interim appointment.
23
24
David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to
other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to
declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18,
25
AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13, 2009.The text of Proclamation No. 347 then issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it extends to all persons
who committed the particular acts described in the provision, and
not just rebels or insurgents.
TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only
as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. (Also read USAFFE
Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil. 1030) In the field of
26
ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)
-
27
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples
organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of
utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the
qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a
member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter of primordial
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate.
As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of
conflicting claims under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is
the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC
has the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore,
that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen.
The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother
were naturalized along with his father.
Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a Legislative
or Executive Act- The doctrine operative fact doctrine recognizes
the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In
short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. xxx It applies only to cases where extraordinary
circumstances
exist
and
only
when
the
extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its
application. Xxx Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity
and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its
related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be
undone.(Araullo vs. Aquino)
Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court held
that the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of
Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. The
word Congress is used in its generic sense. Considering the
language of the subject constitutional provision is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids such as
the records of the Constitutional Commission.
AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and the
Supreme Court en banc determine and decide the who, what,
where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they may
extend to the justices, judges, court officials and court personnel
within the parameters of the courts granted power.
PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members.
FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are
not the concern of the Supreme Court- government policy is within
the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.
(b)
the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.
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PROMULGATE RULES
concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all court, the admission to the practice of law,
the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform;
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14, 2010The Supreme Court has now the sole authority to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, pactice and procedure in all courts, Viewed
from this perspective, the claim of legislative grant of exemption
from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291
necessarily fails.
31
Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case,
Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence of the
Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as meaning
there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974 which
requires full payment before the State may exercise proprietary
rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires only a deposit was
recognized by the Supreme Court.
32
Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14 does
not preclude the validity of Memorandum Decision which
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended to
avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or portions
thereof) of the lower court.
ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service
Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders. The authority to
decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the authority
to see that what has been decided is carried out.
Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC is
the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the
responsibility
of
the
establishment,
administration
and
maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned
department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting
the department agency with respect to these qualification
standards and approving them.
CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The Constitution
grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As
defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including
every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further
classified into career and non-career service positions. Career
service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit
and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
there is security of tenure. A state university president with a
fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of
trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service
officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of
the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law,
Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion to decide
whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu of a full-blown
decision in any particular case. Further, the Supreme Court
explained that the grant of due course to a petition for review is
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. When it fails
to find any reversible error committed by the CA, there is no need
to fully explain the Courts denial as it means that the Supreme
Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.
There is no point in reproducing or restating in the resolution of
denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed.The
constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear
presentation of facts and laws applies to decisions, where
the petition is given due course, but not where the petition
is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal
basis for the dismissal.
33
Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims by
indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation
constitutes removal.
PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28, 2001The CSC is expressly empowered by the Administrative Code of
34
HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is primarily
confidential.
PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 PCCG Chair
Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution from
simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The
position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible offices since the
CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the
general rule to hold more than one office is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position/
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Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is
later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is
considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the
silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back
salaries.
DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 The Supreme
Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination
with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages can be awarded in
his favor.
CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of
an act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil service
system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary
actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par.
11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an
integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil
service system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles
those who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished
from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide
member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service.
35
SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the
Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether
government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No.
6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O. 180.
COMELEC
-
REAPPOINTMENT
OF
COMMISSIONERSMatibag
vs.
Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase without reappointment
applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not
such person completes his term of office which could be seven, five
or three years. There must be a confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment
before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.
36
Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely
to the President and Vice-President, states:
Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does not
have the requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of
the plenary legislative power.
37
Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010While the question of party leadership has implications on the
COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2 of Art. IXC of the constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue
pertaining to Ateinza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion
is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in
which the COMELEC cannot interfere, given the limited scope of its
power over political parties.
Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the
procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal,
there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so,
considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is
expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable provisions
therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be
applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may validly
order a manual count notwithstanding the required automated
counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law authorizing the
commission to use an automated election system, if that is the
only way to count votes. It ought to be self-evident that the
Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the
result of an election.
DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private
auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA
of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies.
The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private
audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and
its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and
their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger
whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of
a COA audit. Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution,
and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable
conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to
examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the
Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent
private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the
COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a governmentcontrolled corporation, or when a government corporation is
privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the
government borrows money from abroad.
MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting by
himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a decision for the
commission. The power to decide on issues relating to audit and
accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a collegial body which
has the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it.
Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the
proper officer to withhold a municipal treasurers salary and other
emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage but no to
apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for which her
liability is still being litigated.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
-
NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the
approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures.
40
41
Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009Bolos was serving his third term as punong barangay when he ran
for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning, assumed the
position of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as
punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation
of said office.
Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and
the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit rule
to apply, the local official concerned must serve three consecutive
terms as a result of election. The term served must be one for
which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by virtue of
42
43
and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
devoted to public use and thus are properties of public dominion.
As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and
Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Real Property
Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.
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PRESIDENTS
SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes,
September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga
ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief
Executive or his alter ego.
MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAAs Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government
and thus exempt from localh taxation. Second, the real properties
of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus
exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of
MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands
44
Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no
power to grant franchises.
ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)
-
45
Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed.
Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where the
respondent is absolved of the charge or in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, or suspension
for the period not more than one month or a fie equivalent to one
months salary, the Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor
and unappelable, subject to judicial review.
46
0
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881,
July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere
license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or
exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has
sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining
licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by
executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or
modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. The
determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the
State as owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or
license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the
due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in
which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the
license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to
the police power of the State. Such a privilege or license is not even
a property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as
such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. xxx
Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar
private corporations from participating in reclamation projects and
being paid for their services in reclaiming lands. What the Decision
prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is for
private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public
domain. There is no prohibition on the directors, officers
and stockholders of private corporations, if they are
Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain. They can acquire not
more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired
becomes private land.
Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property,
can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands acquired by
the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which
even private corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise,
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain if sold or transferred
to a public or municipal corporation for a monetary consideration
become patrimonial property in the hands of the public or
municipal corporation. Once converted to patrimonial
property, the land may be sold by the public or municipal
corporation to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or
qualified private corporations.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR
No. 179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands become
patrimonial property or private property of the government only
upon a declaration that these are alienable or disposable lands,
together with an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.
the Public Land Act merely requires possession since June 12,
1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession.
The possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation of title
as soon as the land it covers is declared alienable and disposable.
This is, however, subject to the December 31, 2020 deadline
imposed by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 9176.
-
Fortun vs. Republic- applicants must prove that they have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bonafide claim of acquisition or ownership for at leats 30 years or
at least since May 8, 1947.
Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014The DENR Secretary is empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.
Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009While the acquisition and the purchase of real properties in the
country by a foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to the
Constitution, the subsequent acquisition of the said properties from
the foreigner by a Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the original
transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
49
City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353Under the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when the
public interest so requires. Franchises are also subject to
alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be contracted
away.
ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)
-
HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs. Com. on
Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of civil and
political rights only either by government official or private
individual.
51
COA vs. Link Worth Intl. Inc., GR No. 182559, March 13,
2009- The COA is an unincorporated government agency which
does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own, Hence,
even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its
primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its
consent.
GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which implements a joint health
insurance project of the German and Philippine governments, is not
entitled to immunity from suit in the Philippines as GTZ, being the
equivalent of a government-owned-and-controlled corporation, has
the power and capacity to sue and be sued under the Corporation
Code. GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled
ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)
52
EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTION60%
EXCEPT:
established by religious groups and mission boards.
Schools
ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)
53
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
-
Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342
SCRA 449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the
United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted
for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not
detract from its status as a binding international agreement or
treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal
United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally
known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for
advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
whereas those that carry out or further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under
the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days
from ratification. The second reason has to do with the relation
between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August
30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified
with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United
States Senate.
effectivity of
proposed
ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)
-
Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim that
they were denied due process during the NBI Investigation. The
functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in
nature. The NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is
incapable of granting any relief to any party, it cannot even
determine probable cause.
55
Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found the
strict scrutiny standard, an American constituted construct, useful
PAGCOR vs. BIR, GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011- PAGCOR cannot
find support in the equal protection clause of the constitution. It
was granted a franchise , subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress.
Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures
PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs. Felix;
Webb vs. de Leon; Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago; Aniag vs.
COMELEC.
Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012The confiscated items having been found in a place other than the
one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of
an invalid warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained due to
warrantless search conducted by a barangay tanod is inadmissible
in evidence since a barangay tanod is an agent of a person in
authority under the Revised Penal Code.
Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime
committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited
to actually seeing the commission of the crime. The requirement of
the law is complied where the arresting officer was within an
earshot from the scene although he did not personally witness the
commission of the crime.
WARRANTLESS ARREST
-
Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under the
Rules, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
57
- Administrative arrest-Causes:
i. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you can be
arrested but only if it is absolutely necessary to do so. You will be
freed as soon as you no longer represent a threat to public security.
ii. If you disrupt a court hearing;
iii. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
iv. In case of brawling;
v. If you block traffic without authorization;
vi. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are
questionable;
vii. If you are in the country illegally.
Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the
prohibition in the constitution is if there is a lawful order from a
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, January 21, 2015- There is
no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the freedom of
expression.
Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code
59
Bayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No. 880
practically codify the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553, 569. By way of a
summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where
and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession
is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may
be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that
there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
(b)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban
of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies.
weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the
oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.
Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to
the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These
laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny.
-
61
62
MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives
petitioner the power to screen, review and examine all television
programs, emphasizing the phrase all television programs.
Thus, when the law says all television programs, the word all
covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs,
news documentary, etc.
The principle assumes that the
legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or
expression. It then follows that since The Inside Story is a
television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over
which it has power of review.
63
Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that
[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Thus, it found a grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of AngLadlad.
The Court held that moral disapproval is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party list system. Upholding equal protection,
the Court ruled that from the standpoint of the political process,
LGBTs have the same interest in participating in the party-list
system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. As such, laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The Court also found that there was a
transgression of AngLadlads fundamental right of freedom of
expression since, by reason of the COMELEC action, the former was
precluded from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other
party-list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010)
Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated when it will bring about clear and
present danger of a substantive evil which the State has a duty to
prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas
does not constitute clear and present danger.
Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silveriovs CARelate to suspension of deployment of OFWs to SARs infected
countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago vs.
Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel.
Section 9- Expropriation
-
United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor Code, validly prohibited
supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to strike does form
an integral part of the Right to Association.
Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012- Under
Section 17, Art. XI has classified the information disclosed in the
SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a
duty to disclose sprang from the right to know. Both of
constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a
65
LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a trust
account to provisionally pay Eusebio for the property taken. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation,45 we
struck down as void the DAR administrative circular46 that
provided for the opening of the trust accounts in lieu ofthe deposit
in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16(e) of R.A. No.
6657.47 We pointedly declared that the explicit words of Section
16(e) did not include "trust accounts," but only cash or
bonds, as valid modes of satisfying the governments
payment of just compensation.
Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the process,
the Court determined that the legal interest should be 12% after
recognizing that the just compensation due was effectively a
forbearance on the part of the government. Had the finality of the
judgment been the critical factor, then the 12% interest should
have been imposed from the time the RTC decision fixing just
compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest was
imposed from the time that the Republic commenced
condemnation proceedings and took the property.
LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation
cases where there is delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an
effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall
be pegged at the rate of 12% interest p.a. from the time of
taking.
66
Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The
State, through expropriation proceedings may take private
property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this property again to
another private party as long as there is public purpose to the
taking.
Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a
property subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law which was
subsequently declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier taking.
Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26,
2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July
21, 2006 The tax credit given to commercial establishments for
the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a
form of just compensation for private property taken by the State
for public use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does
not come directly from the State, but from private establishments
concerned.
ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners
who were able to prove the commitment of the government to
allow them to repurchase their land.
MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009
For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain, two
requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors
passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review
by the LWUA.
Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights
against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the
detriment of the individuals rights.
Given this function, the
provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the
expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property
owner.
67
Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then power of eminent domain comes into
play. It is inconsequential that private entities may benefit as long
as in the end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).
Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.
Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under custodial
investigation, nor it can be considered a formal arrest, by the very
nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.
In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19,
2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and probative
value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first ever Supreme
Court decision on the admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v.
Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the
Court, in Yatar, held that in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests
The Court rejected the argument. It held that the kernel of the
right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987,
151 SCRA 279. It held that the right against self- incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt and that it does not apply where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as
part of object evidence.
Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for
preliminary investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3
years and it is indicated that the case is of simple nature and was
prosecuted for political reasons, it is held that there was violation
of the accuseds right to speedy disposition of case. Right to
speedy disposition extends to preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).
Section 17- Against Self-incrimination
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against
the accused, the following must be established: 1) the provisional
dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2) the provisional
dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to the offended
party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no
justification to file a subsequent case beyond the period of one or
two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).
The civil liability from a crime is not debt within the purview of
the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non payment
of debt
71
72