Evidence Cases

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,
vs.
GERRY SABANGAN AND NOLI BORN
ASAL, Accused.
GERRY SABANGAN, Accused-Appellant.
at the time of the commission of the

crime.
Sabangan filed a Supplemental Brief 41 in

which he protested that the manner by
which the investigating police officers
conducted his out-of-court identification
by the witnesses was grossly suggestive.
Sabangan averred that he was made to sit
outside a police outpost, while the police
officers fetched the witnesses from their
homes and boarded said witnesses into a
heavily tinted vehicle, which passed by
the police outpost where Sabangan was.
The police officers then asked the
witnesses to confirm whether the man
sitting outside the police outpost was the
one who shot Felonia. Such manner of
identification allegedly planted already in
the witnesses minds that Sabangan was
indeed Felonias assailant and was,
therefore, highly unreliable, if not
inadmissible in evidence.
Alibi is a telltale sign of weak defense and

not an explanation of innocence.
The appeal is unmeritorious. The Court

sustains Sabangans conviction for
Felonias murder.
The totality of the evidence for the
prosecution against Sabangan establishes
with moral certainty all the essential
elements of the crime of murder qualified
bytreachery.
There is no cogent reasonfor the Court to
overturn the credence and evidentiary
value accorded by both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals to the positive
identification of Sabangan as Felonias
assailant by the disinterested witnesses of
the prosecution, rather than
Sabangansalibi, corroborated by his
relatives, that he was at some other place
ALIBI
As the trial court correctly pointed out:
In order to give credence to the defense of

alibi, it must not only appear that the
accused interposing the same was at
some other place but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
Moreover, Sabangans witnesses are
mostly his relatives, friends and neighbors
who are prone to concoct and fabricate
evidence. x xx.
The defense of alibi may not prosper if it is
established mainly by the accused
themselves and their relatives, and not by
credible persons. For against their positive
identification by the prosecution witnesse
sthe appellants alibi, which constitutes
the sum of their defenses, became
weak.48 (Citations omitted.)
The appellate court aptly added that:
Appellants alibi that he was in Barangay
Luhong cannot be accepted since it was
not impossible for him to have left the said
place after taking lunch which is usually
12:00 noon and perpetrated the crime at
1:30 in the afternoon.
xxxx
Positive identification where categorical
and consistent and without any showing of
ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter prevails over a
denial which, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence is negative and

self-serving evidence undeserving of
weight in law. They cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must
be shown with clear and convincing
evidence that at the time of the
commission of the crime charged, the
accused is in a place other than the situs
of the crime such that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the
situscriminiswhen the crime was
committed.49 (Citations omitted.)
OUT OF COURT IDENTIFICATION
Contrary to Sabangans contention,there
appears no irregularity in the conduct by
the investigating police officers of the outof-court identification of Sabangan by the
witnesses.
The following ruling of the Court in People
v. Teehankee, Jr.50 is instructive on the
conduct of and test for a valid out-of-court
identification:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by
the police in various ways. It is done thru
show-ups where the suspect alone is
brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up forthe purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case,
courts have fashioned out rules to assure
its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility
of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts

have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1)
the witnessopportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witnessdegree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.(Citation omitted.)
The out-of-court identification made by the
witnesses in the case at bar complies with
the totality of circumstances test. Given
the particular circumstances in this case,
the probability that the witnesses were
influenced to misidentify Sabanganas
Feloniasassailant seems farfetched.
First,the affidavits of Navales and Allado
establish thateven before they identified
Sabanganin person, they already
recognized Sabangan among
thephotographs of different people
shown to them during the polices
initial investigation.51 It would then
appear that the out-of-court identification
of Sabangan by Allado and Navales was
only to confirm the earlier out-of-court
identification of Sabangan. It is worthy to
note that in both instances, Allado and
Navales confidently and consistently
identified Sabangan as the person who
shot Felonia.
Second, based on their respective
accounts of the shooting incident,
Allado and Navales, at different
times,had the opportunity to clearly
view Sabangans face.
Third,and more importantly, it is settled

that an out-of-court identification
does not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent incourt identification and that, even
assuming that an out-of-court
identification was tainted with
irregularity, the subsequent
identification in court cured any flaw
that may have attended it.52 In the
instantcase, the independent in-court
identification of Sabanganby Allado and
Navales during trial proper was
categorical, candid, and positive, hence,
worthy of credence and weight.
G.R. No. 203984
2014
Section 13.Search incident to lawful

arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a
warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest is "to
protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person arrested,
who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter
from destroying evidence within
reach."
June 18,

vs.
MEDARIO CALANTIAO y
DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no merit in Calantiaos
arguments.
A valid arrest allows the seizure of

evidence or dangerous weapons either on
the person of the one arrested or within
the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his
immediate control" means the area
from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. A gun on a table
or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested.
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiaos

contention that the marijuana in his
possession cannot be admitted as
evidence against him because it was
illegally discovered and seized, not having
been within the apprehending officers
"plain view."12
In the case at bar, the marijuana was

found in a black bag in Calantiaos
possession and within his immediate
control. He could have easily taken any
weapon from the bag or dumped it to
destroy the evidence inside it. As the
black bag containing the marijuana was in
Calantiaos possession, it was within the
permissible area that the apprehending
officers could validly conduct a
warrantless search.
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful

arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Calantiaos argument that the marijuana

cannot be used as evidence against him
because its discovery was in violation of
the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
Search and Seizure of

Marijuana valid
The Plain View Doctrine is actually

the exception to the inadmissibility of
evidence obtained in a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest
outside the suspects person and
premises under his immediate
control.
Inventory and Chain of
Custody of Evidence
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act
No. 9165
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations
state:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team
having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and
photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a
representative from the media
and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory

and be given a copy thereof;
Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or
at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that noncompliance with these
requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 21 and its IRR do not even
mention "marking." What they
require are (1) physical inventory,
and (2) taking of photographs. As this
Court held in People v. Ocfemia20:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rule do not expressly
specify is the matter of "marking" of the
seized items in warrantless seizures to
ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence
subjected to inventory and photography
when these activities are undertaken at
the police station rather than at the place
of arrest. Consistency with the "chain
of custody" rule requires that the
"marking" of the seized items to
truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in
evidence should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator
(2) immediately upon confiscation.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown

that there was bad faith, ill will, or
tampering of the evidence, the
presumption that the integrity of the
evidence has been preserved will
remain. The burden of showing the
foregoing to overcome the presumption
that the police officers handled the seized
drugs with regularity, and that they
properly discharged their duties is on
Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed
to discharge such burden.22
Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear
and convincing evidence that the
apprehending officers were stirred by illicit
motive or failed to properly perform their
duties, their testimonies deserve full faith
and credit.25
G.R. No. 183091
2013
June 19,

vs.
BERNESTO DELA CRUZ @
BERNING, Accused-Appellant..
The Court has acknowledged the difficulty
in proving cases of rape with homicide, to
wit:
We have often conceded the difficulty of
proving the commission of rape when only
the victim is left to testify on the
circumstances of its commission. The
difficulty heightens and complicates when
the crime is rape with homicide, because
there may usually be no living witnesses if
the rape victim is herself killed. Yet, the
situation is not always hopeless for
the State, for the Rules of Court also
allows circumstantial evidence to
establish the commission of the crime
as well as the identity of the culprit.
Direct evidence proves a fact in issue
directly without any reasoning or
inferences being drawn on the part of

the factfinder; in contrast,
circumstantial evidence indirectly
proves a fact in issue, such that the
factfinder must draw an inference or
reason from circumstantial evidence.
To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence
may be resorted to when to insist on
direct testimony would ultimately
lead to setting a felon free.17 (Citations
omitted.)
After a careful review of the records of the
case, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that there was overwhelming
circumstantial evidence presented to point
that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing the crime of rape
with homicide. As we have stated before,
circumstantial evidence may be resorted
to establish the complicity of the
perpetrators crime when these are
credible and sufficient, and could lead to
the inescapable conclusion that the
appellant committed the complex crime of
rape with homicide.18
With respect to the appellants
contention that the witnesses
presented were not credible, we
reiterate the jurisprudential principle
affording great respect and even
finality to the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of
witnesses especially if the factual
findings are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The trial judge can better
determine if witnesses are telling the
truth, being in the ideal position to weigh
conflicting testimonies. Unless certain
facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case, its
assessment must be respected for it had
the opportunity to observe the conduct
and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying and detect if they were lying.20
In People v. Dion21 we stated that:

Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually
a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more
often than not, the victim is left to testify
for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape
cases, the victims credibility becomes the
primordial consideration. It is settled
that when the victims testimony is
straightforward, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things, unflawed
by any material or significant
inconsistency, it passes the test of
credibility, and the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis thereof.
Inconsistencies in the victims testimony
do not impair her credibility, especially if
the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters
that do not alter the essential fact of the
commission of rape. The trial courts
assessment of the witnesses' credibility is
given great weight and is even conclusive
and binding. x x x. (Citations omitted,
emphasis added.)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. EX-MAYOR CARLOS
ESTONILO,
This Courts Ruling
In essence, the defense disagrees with the

disposition of the Court of Appeals
affirming their conviction for murder with
direct assault on the ground that some
of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses constitute circumstantial
evidence, and that the prosecution was
not able to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The appeal fails.
After a review of the record of the case,
this Court sustains the conviction of the
accused-appellants for murder with direct

assault.roblesvirtuallawlibrary
(With direct evidence too) Circumstantial
evidence is that evidence which proves a
fact or series of facts from which the facts
in issue may be established by
inference.55 It consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may
be inferred according to reason and
common experience.56 Here, the
circumstantial evidence consists of the
testimonies of Servando and Serapion.
Servando was present when Mayor Carlos,
Sr. ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether
this order was executed can be answered
by relating it to Antipolos eyewitness
account as well as Serapions testimony.
OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ARNEL A. BERNARDO, ATTORNEY V,
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
(BIR), Respondent.
Administrative proceedings are
governed by the "substantial
evidence rule." Otherwise stated, a
finding of guilt in an administrative case
would have to be sustained for as long as
it is supported by substantial evidence
that the respondent has committed acts
stated in the complaint. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla
of evidence. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds
equally reasonable might conceivably
opine otherwise.8
The Ombudsman applied against the
respondent the prima facie presumption
laid down in Section 2 of Republic Act No.
1379, which states that:
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever
any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such

public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to
have been unlawfully acquired. x x x.
Nevertheless, the presumption in the
aforementioned provision is merely prima
facie or disputable.
Respondent appears to have been given
sufficient opportunity by the Ombudsman
to rebut the prima facie presumption
applied against him which is that his
properties were illegally acquired,
however, as the instant case illustrated,
the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals
came to differing conclusions with regard
to respondents evidence.
his SALNs. Such net worth of the

respondent as declared in the
statement filed by him from the first
day of his employment with the
government shall be considered as
his true new worth as of such date,
for purposes of determining his
capacity for future property
acquisitions during his tenure as a
public officer. Any unexplained
increase in his net worth thereafter
may then fall within the ambit of the
presumption provided by Republic
Act No. 1379.13 (Citations omitted.)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. EDWIN ALEMAN Y
LONGHAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
A careful perusal of the records of this

case has convinced this Court that
although respondent had acquired
properties, cash on hand and in bank, and
had gone on foreign travels with his
family, the aggregate cost of which appear
to be not in proportion to the combined
salaries of the respondent and of his wife,
it had been sufficiently shown that such
assets and expenses were financed
through respondents, and his wifes, other
lawful business income and assets, and for
which they have paid the corresponding
taxes thereon.
Notably, the Ombudsman appeared to
have heavily relied solely on the
respondent SALNs for the years 1993 to
2001. We do not understand why no
evidence was presented to show the
respondent beginning net worth from the
first day of his employment with the
government as declared in the SALNs
filed by him. His beginning net worth
must be considered for purposes of
determining whether his disposable
income was more than sufficient to
justify his property acquisitions and
foreign travels for the covered
period, and whether he possesses the
financial capability to acquire or
purchase properties as reported in
The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute

does not render him unqualified to be a
witness. The rule is that all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.26 A deaf-mute may not be
able to hear and speak but his/her
other senses, such as his/her sense of
sight, remain functional and allow
him/her to make observations about
his/her environment and
experiences. The inability to hear and
speak may prevent a deaf-mute from
communicating orally with others but
he/she may still communicate with
others in writing or through signs and
symbols and, as in this case,
sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is
competent to be a witness so long as
he/she has the faculty to make
observations and he/she can make those
observations known to others. As this
Court held in People v.
Tuangco27:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a
witness. All persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses
where they (1) can understand and
appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can

comprehend facts they are going to testify
on; and (3) can communicate their ideas
through a qualified interpreter. Thus,
in People vs. De Leonand People vs.
Sasota, the accused was convicted on the
basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute. x x
x. (Citations omitted.)
When a deaf-mute testifies in court, the
manner in which the examination of a
deaf-mute should be conducted is a
matter to be regulated and controlled by
the trial court in its discretion, and the
method adopted will not be reviewed by
the appellate court in the absence of a
showing that the complaining party was in
some way injured by reason of the
particular method adopted.28
In this case, both the trial and the
appellate courts found that Mark
understood and appreciated the sanctity
of an oath and that he comprehended the
facts he testified on. This Court sees no
reason in ruling otherwise.
G.R. No. 200793
June 4, 2014

vs.
MILAN ROXAS y AGUILUZ, AccusedAppellant.
We note that she recounted her ordeal in a
logical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner, without any artificialities or
pretensions that would tarnish the veracity
of her testimony. She recalled the tragic
experience and positively identified
accused-appellant as the one who
ravished her on five occasions. Her
testimony was unshaken by a grueling
cross-examination and there is no
impression whatsoever that the same is a
mere fabrication. For her to come out in
the open and publicly describe her
harrowing experience at a trial can only be
taken as a badge of her sincerity and the
truth of her claims.20
We further underscore that AAA was

merely 14 years old at the time she
testified.21 We have repeatedly held
that testimonies of child-victims are
normally given full weight and credit,
since when a girl, particularly if she is
a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in
fact been committed. When the
offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which
she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity.22
It is likewise axiomatic that when it comes
to evaluating the credibility of the
testimonies of the witnesses, great
respect is accorded to the findings of
the trial judge who is in a better
position to observe the demeanor,
facial expression, and manner of
testifying of witnesses, and to decide
who among them is telling the
truth.23 As the trial court further
observed, the defense witnesses
were not eyewitnesses. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as provided
in the Rules of Court.24 AAAs mother
and brothers were not present when the
five rapes allegedly occurred, and
therefore any testimony on their part as to
whether or not the complained acts
actually happened is hearsay.
G.R. No. 188310
2013
June 13,

vs.
MERCIDITA T.
RESURRECCION, Accused-Appellant.
.
Generally, the Court will not disturb the

weight and credence accorded by the trial
court to witnesses testimonies, especially
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. As
the Court explained in People v. Naelga26:
At the outset, it should be pointed
out that prosecutions involving illegal
drugs largely depend on the
credibility of the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation.
Considering that this Court has access
only to the cold and impersonal
records of the proceedings, it
generally relies upon the assessment
of the trial court. This Court will not
interfere with the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of
witnesses except when there appears
on record some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence which the
trial court has overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted.
This rule is consistent with the reality that
the trial court is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. Thus, factual
findings of the trial court, its calibration of
the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
conclusions anchored on its findings are
accorded by the appellate court high
respect, if not conclusive effect, more so
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as
in this case. (Citations omitted.)
Accused-appellant is trying to make an
issue of the alleged inconsistency between
PO2 Liques sworn affidavit and his
testimony before the RTC. In his sworn
affidavit, PO2 Lique averred that accusedappellant voluntarily emptied her pockets
and handed over to the police the canister
containing the 12 heat-sealed plastic
sachets of shabu. When he testified before
the trial court, PO2 Lique narrated that
accused-appellant had refused to obey the
order for her to empty her pockets so that
PO2 Lique himself checked accusedappellants pockets wherein he found the
said canister, which he immediately
confiscated. The inconsistency is
trifling and does not affect any of the
elements of the crime charged.
Regardless of who emptied accusedappellants pockets, the important

fact was that the canister was
actually found inside accusedappellants pockets and in her
possession. Inconsistencies and
discrepancies in the testimony
referring to minor details and not
upon the basic aspect of the crime do
not diminish the witnesses
credibility. More so, an inconsistency,
which has nothing to do with the
elements of a crime, is not a ground
to reverse a conviction.27
The Court similarly views accusedappellants defenses of denial and frameup very doubtful. The testimonies of
police officers who conducted the
buy-bust are generally accorded full
faith and credit, in view of the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of public duties. Hence,
when lined against an unsubstantiated
denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony
of the officers who caught the accused
red-handed is given more weight and
usually prevails. In order to overcome the
presumption of regularity, there must be
clear and convincing evidence that the
police officers did not properly perform
their duties or that they were prompted
with ill motive,28 none of which exists in
this case.
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE DR. ANDRES
NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA
NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO
MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD NAVARRO
BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN
NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO,
ANDRES NAVARRO III, MILAGROS
NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO,
TERESA NAVARRO-TABITA, and
LOURDES BARRUNREJUSO, Respondents.
Petitioner adds that the CA erred in not
ruling that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2
Alvarez as a witness.12 They stress that
PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert
witness to render an opinion on whether
the disputed handwriting was indeed

made by Andres, Sr. or whether it is a
forgery.13
section, all persons who can perceive, and

perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil

Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of
PO2 Alvarezs disqualification as a witness
can no longer be justified. Hence, we
reverse the CA ruling. While we agree with
the CA in considering the RTCs
Orders15 which dismissed Civil Case No.
5215, we are unable to agree with its
refusal to take judicial notice of the
Decision16 of another CA Division
which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215.
Subsequent proceedings were even
held in the reinstated Civil Case No.
5215 per Orders17 issued by the RTC
which were already submitted to the
CA. That Civil Case No. 5215 was
reinstated is a fact that cannot be
ignored.
Religious or political belief, interest

in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification.
We also agree with petitioner that the RTC

committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact
definition, but it generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility.18 Grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or
tribunal violates the Constitution or
grossly disregards the law or existing
jurisprudence.19
In Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits
System v. Republic of the Philippines,20we
said that a witness must only possess all
the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of
Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.
Except as provided in the next succeeding
Specific rules of witness disqualification

are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21
disqualifies a witness by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. Section 22
disqualifies a witness by reason of
marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness
by reason of death or insanity of the
adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a
witness by reason of privileged
communication.
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo,21 we have held
that the specific enumeration of
disqualified witnesses excludes the
operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules.
The Rules should not be interpreted to
include an exception not embodied
therein.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP,
PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
make known her perception to
others.1wphi1We have no doubt
that she is qualified as a witness. She
cannot be disqualified as a witness
since she possesses none of the
disqualifications specified under the
Rules. Respondents motion to
disqualify her should have been
denied by the RTC for it was not
based on any of these grounds for
disqualification. The RTC rather
confused the qualification of the
witness with the credibility and
weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion
of an expert witness may be received in
evidence, to wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.The

opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess,
may be received in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff

and Appellee,
vs.
LEONARDO CATAYTAY y
SILVANO, Accused-appellant.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2

Alvarezs testimony would be hearsay.
Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to
render an expert opinion, as the PNP
document examiner was allowed in
Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at
the outset that PO2 Alvarezs
testimony is hearsay even before her
testimony is offered and she is called
to the witness stand. Under the
circumstances, the CA should have
issued a corrective writ of certiorari
and annulled the RTC ruling.
In his appellants brief, accused-appellant

claims that BBBs testimony concerning
the details of the commission of the rape
as narrated by AAA is hearsay and
therefore has no probative value. Accusedappellant also points out that the
Psychological Evaluation Report dated May
25, 1999 and Psychological Report dated
June 29, 2009 illustrate that AAA can be
easily influenced.
True, the use of the word "may" in Section

49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
signifies that the use of opinion of an
expert witness is permissive and not
mandatory on the part of the
courts.23 Jurisprudence is also replete with
instances wherein this Court dispensed
with the testimony of expert witnesses to
prove forgeries.24 However, we have
also recognized that handwriting
experts are often offered as expert
witnesses considering the technical
nature of the procedure in examining
forged documents.25 More important,
analysis of the questioned signature
in the deed of donation executed by
the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial
to the resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have
disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness. She
has the qualifications of witness and
possess none of the disqualifications
under the Rules. The Rules allow the
opinion of an expert witness to be
received as evidence. In Tamani, we used
the opinion of an expert witness. The
value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion
cannot be determined if P02 Alvarez is not
even allowed to testify on the handwriting
examination she conducted.
At the outset, we agree with accusedappellant that the details concerning the
manner of the commission of the rape,
which was merely narrated by AAA at the
barangay outpost, is hearsay and cannot
be considered by this Court. A witness can
testify only on the facts that she knows of
his own personal knowledge, or more
precisely, those which are derived from
her own perception.24 A witness may not
testify on what she merely learned, read
or heard from others because such
testimony is considered hearsay and may
not be received as proof of the truth of
what she has learned, read or heard.25
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the
details of the rape which BBB merely
heard from AAAs narration,we
nevertheless find no reason to disturb the
findings of fact of the trial court. Despite
lacking certain details concerning the
manner in which AAA was allegedly raped,
the trial court, taking into consideration
the mental incapacity of AAA and
qualifying her to be a child
witness,26 found her testimony to be
credible and convincing:
AAAs mental condition may have
prevented her from delving into the
specifics of the assault in her testimony
almost three years later, unlike the way
she narrated the same when she was
asked at the barangay outpost merely
minutes after the incident. However, as
we have ruled in a litany of cases,
when a woman, more so if she is a

minor, says she has been raped, she
says, in effect, all that is necessary to
prove that rape was committed.
Youth and, as is more applicable in
the case at bar, immaturity are
generally badges of truth.28
vs.
RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY
BISAYA," Accused-Appellant.
This Court has consistently stated that the
trial court is in a better position to adjudge
the credibility of witnesses, especially if its
decision is affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.19 We have been reminded in
People v. Clores20 that:
When it comes to the matter of
credibility of a witness, settled are
the guiding rules some of which are
that (1) the appellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the
lower court, unless there is a showing
that it had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected
the result of the case x x x; (2) the
findings of the trial court pertaining
to the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great respect since it had
the opportunity to examine his
demeanor as he testified on the
witness stand, and, therefore, can
discern if such witness is telling the
truth or not; and (3) a witness who
testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remains consistent
on cross-examination is a credible
witness. (Citations omitted.)
The rationale for these guidelines is that
the trial courts are in a better position to
decide the question of credibility, having
heard the witnesses themselves and
having observed firsthand their
deportment and manner of testifying
under grueling examination.21
Second, the victim was still alive after the

stabbing incident. He had time to reach
his house and confide in his brother,
witness Renato, that it was appellant who
had stabbed him.
Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 37. Dying declaration. The
declaration of a dying person, made under
the consciousness of an impending death,
may be received in any case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence
of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
The Court has stated in People v.
Maglian24:
The Rules of Court states that a dying
declaration is admissible as evidence
if the following circumstances are
present: "(a) it concerns the cause
and the surrounding circumstances of
the declarants death; (b) it is made
when death appears to be imminent
and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she
survived; and (d) the dying
declaration is offered in a case in
which the subject of inquiry involves
the declarants death." x x x.
(Citation omitted.)
We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the statement of Florendo made to his
brother Renato has complied with the
requisites of a dying declaration. It is
important to note that Florendo, after
being stabbed by appellant twice on the
chest, went home and under labored
breathing, told Renato that it was
appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly,
the statement made was an expression of
the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of his death, and under the
consciousness of impending death. There
being nothing in the records to show that
Florendo was incompetent, he would have
been competent to testify had he
survived.25 It is enough to state that the
deceased was at the time competent as a

witness.26 Lastly, the dying declaration is
offered in an inquiry the subject of which
involves his death. We reproduce the
statement of the RTC:
Moreover, the victim did not
immediately die after he was stabbed
by the appellant. The victim,
apparently conscious that he could
die of his wound, identified his
assailant as the appellant Ramil
Rarugal. Under the rules, statement
made by a person under the
consciousness of an impending death
is admissible as evidence of the
circumstances of his death. The
positive identification made by the
victim before he died, under the
consciousness of an impending death
is a strong evidence indicating the
liability of herein appellant.27
It is of no moment that the victim died
seven days from the stabbing incident and
after receiving adequate care and
treatment, because the apparent
proximate cause of his death, the
punctures in his lungs, was a consequence
of appellants stabbing him in the chest.
vs.
RICARDO PAMINTUAN y
SAHAGUN, Accused-Appellant.
The element of carnal knowledge was
established by the testimony of AAA. Her
identification of accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the sexual attack was
positive, consistent and steadfast; her
narration of the incident, detailed and
straightforward. When she was recounting
her ordeal before the trial court, she was
overcome with emotion and shed tears on
more than one occasion. She did not
waver in her stance even as she
underwent cross-examination by the
counsel for the defense. These factors
impress upon us that AAAs claim against
accused-appellant was not at all
fabricated.
Jurisprudence teaches that

testimonies of child victims are given
full weight and credit, for when a
woman or a girl-child says that she
has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape
was indeed committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity.
The Court has often held that "full
penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an
essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of
the hymen necessary, to conclude that
carnal knowledge took place; the mere
touching of the external genitalia by a
penis that is capable of consummating the
sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge."28We also said in People v.
Opong29 that:
In People v. Capt. Llanto, citing People v.
Aguinaldo, we likewise affirmed the
conviction of the accused for rape despite
the absence of laceration on the victims
hymen since medical findings suggest that
it is possible for the victims hymen to
remain intact despite repeated sexual
intercourse. We elucidated that the
strength and dilatability of the hymen
varies from one woman to another, such
that it may be so elastic as to stretch
without laceration during intercourse; on
the other hand, it may be so resistant that
its surgical removal is necessary before
intercourse can ensue.
xxxx
It also bears stressing that a medicolegal report is not indispensable to
the prosecution of a rape case, it
being merely corroborative in nature.
The credible disclosure of AAA that
appellant raped her is the most
important proof of the commission of
the crime. (Citations omitted.)
As regards the age of AAA, the
prosecution presented her certificate of
birth to prove that she was born on
November 6, 1992. Thus, at the time of
the commission of the crime in September
2003, AAA was only a few months shy of

being 11 years old.
vs.
ROSELITO TACULOD y ELLE, AccusedAppellant.
The appellant, thus, filed the instant
appeal to this Court.26
The appellant assails the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses by insisting that the
prosecution failed to establish the exact
time of the alleged buy-bust operation.
The appellant points out that according to
the Pre-Operation Report of the buy-bust
operation, the time and date of the
operation specified therein was "24 1700H
September 2003"or three hours before the
confidential informant supposedly called
the police in this case to report on the
drug peddling activities of the appellant.
This inconsistency allegedly casts doubt
on whether a buy-bust operation was
really conducted and whether the
informant actually existed. The appellant
also argues that the police officers
failed to inventory and photograph
the drugs allegedly confiscated. This
was supposedly fatal to the
prosecutions case as it affected the
identity of the seized drugs.
Furthermore, the appellant avers that PO1
Hipolito failed to mention any
precautionary measures that were taken
in preserving the evidentiary value of the
seized drugs from the time he received
them from the arresting officers up to the
time the same were submitted to the
crime laboratory.In view of the above
unexplained lapses in procedure, the
appellant posits that the presumption of
regularity in the conduct of official duties
had been effectively destroyed in this
case. Arguably, the testimonies of the
police officers should not have been
accorded full faith and credit.27
The Ruling of the Court
What determines if there was,
indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in
a buy-bust operation is proof of the

concurrence of all the elements of the
offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor, which the
prosecution has satisfactorily
established. The prosecution
satisfactorily proved the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and presented in court
the evidence of corpus delicti.
The defense of denial and frame-up
has been invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor, for it can easily
be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in
prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.In order to
prosper, the defense of denial and
frame-up must be proved with strong
and convincing evidence.x x x.
(Citations omitted.)
Concerningthe appellants argument that
the police officers committed lapses in
procedure in the safekeeping of the seized
drug specimens and failed to explain the
same, the Court is likewise not persuaded.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165
provide the procedural guidelines that
police officers must observe in the proper
handling of seized illegal drugs in order to
ensure the preservation of the identity and
integrity thereof.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Laboratory Equipment.-The PDEA shall
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as wellas

(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizureand confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
On the other hand, Section 21(a), Article II
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of Republic Act No. 9165, which
implements said provision, stipulates:
(a)The apprehending officer/team having
initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served;
or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items[.]
It must be pointed out, however, that

the appellant raised the issue of the
police officers non-compliance with
the above provisions only in his
appealbefore the Court of
Appeals.The appellants objections
were not raised before the trial court
in such a way that the prosecution
may havehad the opportunity
toexplain and/orjustifythe deviations
from procedure that were ostensibly
committed by the police officers in
this case. As the Court underlined in
People v. Sta. Maria32:
The law excuses non-compliance
under justifiable grounds. However,
whatever justifiable grounds may
excuse the police officers involved in
the buy-bust operation in this case
from complying with Section 21 will
remain unknown, because appellant
did not question during trial the
safekeeping of the items seized from
him. Indeed, the police officers'
alleged violations of Sections 21 and
86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not
raised before the trial court but were
instead raised for the first time on
appeal. In no instance did appellant
least intimate at the trial court that
there were lapses in the safekeeping
of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value.
Objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal;
when a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, he must
so state in the form of objection.
Without such objection he cannot
raise the question for the first time
on appeal. (Citation omitted.)
vs.
REYNALDO NACUA, Accused-Appellant.
Accused-appellant likewise bewails the
total lack of compliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165, intended to
safeguard the integrity and evidentiary
value of the shabu he purportedly sold
and delivered to the police officers during
the purported "test-buy" on September 2,

2005.
Accused-appellant cites jurisprudence
applying the chain of custody rule in
dangerous and illegal drugs cases, which
require that the marking of the seized
items must be done (1) in the presence of
the apprehended violator and (2)
immediately upon its confiscation, to truly
ensure that the seized items are the same
items that enter the chain and are
eventually offered in evidence. In his case,
accused-appellant points out, there was
no proper marking, photography, or
physical inventory of the shabu which he
allegedly sold and delivered to the police
officers during the supposed "test-buy."
Also, the identity of the person who had
custody and safekeeping of the alleged
shabu, following its forensic examination
and pending its presentation in court, had
never been disclosed. The prosecution did
not proffer any justifiable explanation for
non-compliance with the aforementioned
requirements of the law and
jurisprudence.
And while accused-appellant admits that
he failed to present evidence of ill motive
on the part of the police officers for falsely
testifying against him, accused-appellant
argues that to require him to prove his
innocence is contrary to his fundamental
right to be presumed as such.
Accused-appellants appeal is impressed
with merit.
Sale or possession of a dangerous drug
can never be proven without seizure and
identification of the prohibited drug. In
prosecutions involving narcotics, the
narcotic substance itself constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to sustain a
judgment of conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. Of paramount importance,
therefore, in these cases is that the
identity of the dangerous drug be likewise
established beyond reasonable doubt.39
Given the unique characteristic of
dangerous and illegal drugs which
are indistinct, not readily identifiable,

and easily susceptible to tampering,
alteration, or substitution, either by
accident or otherwise, there must be
strict compliance with the prescribed
measures to be observed during and
after the seizure of dangerous drugs
and related paraphernalia, during the
custody and transfer thereof for
examination, and at all times up to
their presentation in court.40 Such
measures are described with particularity
under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No.
9165 and Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of Republic Act No. 9165, which read:
Section 21(1) of Rep. Act No. 9165
dangerous drugs, controlled precursor and
essential chemicals, as well as
1) The apprehending team having initial
immediately after seizure and
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
(Emphases supplied.)
Section 21(a) of the IRR of Rep. Act No.
9165:

dangerous drugs, controlled precursor and
essential chemicals, as well as
(a) The apprehending officer/team having
inventory and be given a copy thereof:
said items. (Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, in People v. Coreche,41 the
Court emphasized that the marking of
the seized drugs must be done
immediately after they are seized
from the accused and failure to do so
suffices to rebut the presumption of
regularity in the performance of
official duties and raises reasonable
doubt as to the authenticity of the
corpus delicti, wit:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the

marking of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are
seized from the accused. Marking after
seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus it is vital that the
seized contraband are immediately
marked because succeeding handlers
of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of
the evidence serves to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all
other similar or related evidence from the
time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence.
In this case, there was a total disregard of
the requirements of law and
jurisprudence.1wphi1 The prosecution
even admits that the police officers
acquired the sachet of shabu presented in
court against accused-appellant in a mere
"test-buy" operation by SPO1 Rosales, PO3
Luague, and PO1 Anion. The police
officers, after supposedly buying the
sachet of shabu from the Nacua couple for
Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), left the
residence of the Nacua couple, without
recovering the marked money or effecting
the couples arrest. The police officers
brought the sachet of suspected shabu all
the way back to their police station, and
only there marked the said item, without
the presence of the accused and/or other
disinterested witnesses.
While the Court allows for relaxation
of the rules in some cases, there
must be compelling and justifiable
grounds for the same and it must be
shown that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items
have been properly preserved.
However, such conditions are not
present in the instant case.
Firstly, the prosecution did not offer any
explanation as to why the police officers
failed to strictly comply with the
established procedure for the custody of
the suspected shabu. The Court can only
surmise that the operation on September
2, 2005 was only meant to be a "test-buy,"
so that the police officers could secure a

search warrant for the house of the Nacua
couple. There was no original intention to
arrest and charge the Nacua couple for
the shabu purchase that day. Surprisingly
and inexplicably, however, the prosecution
chose to indict the Nacua couple for the
"test-buy" conducted on September 2,
2005, rather than for the result of the
search conducted on September 21, 2005
at the house of the Nacua couple which
purportedly yielded more shabu and
related paraphernalia and led to the arrest
of the couple.
Secondly, the prosecution failed to show
that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the sachet of suspected shabu allegedly
bought from the Nacua couple during the
"test-buy" operation has been properly
preserved from the time said item was
transmitted to the crime laboratory up to
its presentation in court. No evidence was
offered to show as to how the said
specimen was kept and by whom after its
forensic examination throughout its
presentation in court.
With reasonable doubt as to the
authenticity of the corpus delicti, the
acquittal of accused-appellant of the crime
charged is in order.
vs.
REYNALDO "ANDY" SOMOZA y
HANDAYA, Accused-Appellant.
.
In both cases of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must show the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug in order
to establish the corpus delicti, which is the
dangerous drug itself.40Such chain of
custody should show that the dangerous
drug sold by or in the possession of the
accused is the same dangerous drug
seized from the said accused and taken
into custody by the apprehending officer,
marked and subjected to physical
inventory by the apprehending officer,
submitted to the PDEA or PNP forensic

laboratory, subjected by the forensic
laboratory examiner to laboratory
examination the results of which are
contained in a sworn certification, and
presented to the court as evidence against
the accused.41 This is to ensure the
integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items and preclude the possibility
of alteration, tampering or substitution of
substance in the chain of custody of the
dangerous drug. Nevertheless, a perfect
chain is not always the standard as it is
almost always impossible to obtain an
unbroken chain. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, because the same will be
utilized in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.42
This Court respects the identical findings
of the trial and the appellate courts.
The established rule in appellate review is
that the trial courts factual findings are
accorded great respect and even
conclusive effect, especially if such
findings are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.43 This Court finds no compelling
reason to diverge from the rule. A review
of the records reveals that the
prosecutions retelling of the events as
they transpired hews closer to the truth.
Accused-appellant is clutching at straws in
insisting on the following: nonpresentation of the full amount of the
marked money, lack of pre-operation
report, inconsistency in the testimonies on
who recovered the sachets of shabu and
what the total weight of the said sachets
is, and irregularity of the inventory. The
Court of Appeals has sufficiently
addressed all these matters.
This Court has already held in People v.
Ambrosio44 that the non-presentation
of the entire amount of the marked
money is not a mortal blow to the
prosecutions case. It has also been
held that the non-presentation of the
marked money,45 or the presentation
of mere photocopies of the marked
money,46 does not render the buybust operation illegal or invalid. Nor
is the presentation of the marked
money material in the prosecution of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs as the
omission to present the marked
money may be overlooked as a
peripheral matter.47As this Court ruled
in People v. Ara48:
Illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
committed when the sale transaction is
consummated,49 that is, upon delivery of
the illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt
of the payment by the seller. While the
marked money may be used to prove
payment, it is not material in proving the
commission of the crime. What is material
is the proof that the sale transaction
actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus
delicti,50 the dangerous drug subject of the
sale.51 Here, the prosecution has
adequately established the occurrence of
a sale transaction between accusedappellant and PO1 Bautista, and the
sachet containing the contraband subject
of the sale was presented in court.
The lack of pre-operation report had
no effect on the legality and validity
of the buy-bust operation. In the first
place, a pre-operation report is not
indispensable in a buy-bust
operation.52 In the second place, the
facts of the case show that the buy-bust
operation was not part of the original plan
-- to serve the search warrant on accusedappellant -- but was resorted to address
the contingencies of the circumstances.
The urgency of the situation
reasonably excused the preparation
of a pre-operation report. More
importantly, a pre-operation report is
ordinarily submitted by the local PNP
or the NBI to comply with Section 86
of Republic Act No. 9165 which
requires "close coordination with the
PDEA on all drug related matters."
Here, to require a pre-operation
report for purposes of the buy-bust
would constitute unnecessary
bureaucratic red tape as there was
already coordination by the NBI and
the PNP Dumaguete City with the
PDEA in the planning of the service of

the warrant and in the decision to
resort to a buy-bust operation.
Finally, there was no break in the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs taken
from accused-appellant.1wphi1 The
prosecution has shown that the illicit
drugs seized from accused-appellant are
the same illicit drugs marked and
subjected to physical inventory by NBI
Agent Celon, submitted by him to the PNP
forensic laboratory, received by forensic
chemical officer P/S Insp. Dagasdas and
subjected by her to laboratory
examination, and presented by the
prosecution to the trial court as evidence
against the accused-appellant. The chain
of custody was continuous and the
identity, integrity and evidentiary value of
the dangerous drugs seized from accusedappellant were preserved.
The inventory made at accusedappellants house and not at the
scene of the buy-bust operation did
not adversely affect the chain of
custody. The fact is that, as
witnessed by Kagawad Talavera and
media representative Elloren, the
illicit drugs taken from accusedappellant were marked in his
presence at the scene of the buy-bust
operation immediately after his
arrest. This marking may be considered
as the preliminary phase of the inventory.
Indeed, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165 which provides for the chain of
custody of dangerous drugs seized by law
enforcers is silent on the matter of
marking of the seized drugs. In particular,
its paragraph (1) only speaks of
conducting a physical inventory and
photographing of the illicit drugs
"immediately after seizure and
confiscation":
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of
Dangerous Drugs x x x.
(1) The apprehending team having initial
immediately after seizure and

inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Neither is marking of the confiscated
drugs found in the implementing rules of
the law which provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of
Dangerous Drugs, x x x.
(a) The apprehending officer/team having
inventory and be given a copy thereof:
said items.
Nonetheless, the Court has acknowledged
the practical value of the process of
marking the confiscated contraband and
considered it as an initial stage in the
chain of custody -- a process preliminary
and preparatory to the physical inventory

and photograph requirements in Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9165:
This step initiates the process of
protecting innocent persons from dubious
and concocted searches, and of protecting
as well the apprehending officers from
harassment suits based on planting of
evidence under Section 29 of Republic act
No. 9165 and on allegations of robbery or
theft.55 (Citations omitted.)1wphi1
"Marking" is the placing by the
apprehending officer of some
distinguishing signs with his/her
initials and signature on the items
seized. It helps ensure that the
dangerous drugs seized upon
apprehension are the same
dangerous drugs subjected to
inventory and photography when
these activities are undertaken at the
police station or at some other
practicable venue rather than at the
place of arrest. Consistency with the
"chain of custody" rule requires that
the "marking" of the seized items -to truly ensure that they are the
same items that enter the chain and
are eventually the ones offered in
evidence -- should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator
(2) immediately upon confiscation.56
["Immediate confiscation" has no exact
definition.57 Indeed, marking upon
immediate confiscation has been
interpreted as to even include marking at
the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team.58 In this case, the
dangerous drugs taken from accusedappellant were marked in his presence
immediately upon confiscation at the very
venue of his arrest.(???)]
As marking is the initial stage of
physical inventory, in effect, the
physical inventory of the confiscated
contraband commenced at the scene
of the buy-bust and was completed at
the house of accused-appellant.
Moreover, the prosecution has satisfied

the requirement that the testimonies of all
persons who handled the specimen are
important to establish the chain of
custody. Thus, all persons who handled
the shabu seized from accused-appellant
testified on how they came to take
custody of the illicit drugs, what they did
with the said drugs and to whom they
subsequently transferred such drugs. Their

testimonies established a continuous
chain of custody which preserved the
identity, integrity and evidentiary value of
the dangerous drugs seized from accusedappellant.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,

at the time of the commission of the

Sabangan filed a Supplemental Brief 41 in

Alibi is a telltale sign of weak defense and

The appeal is unmeritorious. The Court

In order to give credence to the defense of

and convincing evidence is negative and

identification of suspects, courts

Third,and more importantly, it is settled

Section 13.Search incident to lawful

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,

A valid arrest allows the seizure of

This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiaos

In the case at bar, the marijuana was

Searches and seizure incident to a lawful

Calantiaos argument that the marijuana

Search and Seizure of

The Plain View Doctrine is actually

sign the copies of the inventory

Furthermore, unless it can be shown

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,

inferences being drawn on the part of

In People v. Dion21 we stated that:

This Courts Ruling

In essence, the defense disagrees with the

accused-appellants for murder with direct

out of proportion to his salary as such

his SALNs. Such net worth of the

A careful perusal of the records of this

The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute

appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,

We further underscore that AAA was

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,

Generally, the Court will not disturb the

Regardless of who emptied accusedappellants pockets, the important

the disputed handwriting was indeed

section, all persons who can perceive, and

The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil

Religious or political belief, interest

We also agree with petitioner that the RTC

Specific rules of witness disqualification

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.The

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff

Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2

In his appellants brief, accused-appellant

True, the use of the word "may" in Section

when a woman, more so if she is a

Second, the victim was still alive after the

deceased was at the time competent as a

Jurisprudence teaches that

2003, AAA was only a few months shy of

a buy-bust operation is proof of the

and essential chemicals, as wellas

It must be pointed out, however, that

the purported "test-buy" on September 2,

are indistinct, not readily identifiable,

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the

so that the police officers could secure a

submitted to the PDEA or PNP forensic

PDEA in the planning of the service of

confiscation, physically inventory and

and preparatory to the physical inventory