ART 495

VDA de ESPINA v ABAYA

FACTS: Marcos Espina died on February 14, 1953 and was survived by his spouses, Simprosa
Vda. de Espina and their children namely, Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudiosa, Necifora, Sora
and Jose, all surnamed Espina. Decedent's estate comprises of 4 parcels of land located in
Surigao del Sur.
In 1973, an action for partition of the land was filed by petitioners Simprosa and her children
Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudencia and Necifora.
The complaint alleges that parcel No. 1 is the exclusive property of the deceased, hence the
same is owned in common by petitioners and private respondents in eight (8) equal parts, while
the other 3 parcels of land being conjugal properties, are also owned in common, one-half (1/2)
belongs to the widow Simprosa and the other half is owned by her and her children in eight (8)
equal parts.
Petitioners have several times demanded the partition of the properties, but notwithstanding
such demands private respondents refused to accede.
Private respondents alleged in their answer that in or about April, 1951, the late Marcos Espina
and his widow, Simprosa, together with their children made a temporary verbal division and
assignment of shares among their children. After the death of Marcos, the temporary division
was finalized by the heirs. Thereafter the heirs took immediate possession of their respective
shares on April 20, 1952. Private respondents took actual physical possession of their
respective shares including the portions ceded to them by Simprosa.
Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the CAUSE OF
ACTION IS BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
RTC
Trial court granted petition.
Petitioners Contention
Petitioners contended that the present action is not for reconveyance but one for partition.
Hence, the rule insisted by the private respondents on prescriptibility of an action for
reconcile conveyance of real property based on an implied trust is not applicable in the
case at bar. They also argued that private respondents cannot set up the defense of prescription
or laches because their possession of the property no matter how long cannot ripen into
ownership.
The petitioners claim that the alleged oral partition is invalid and strictly under the coverage
of the statute of Frauds.

ISSUE:
1. WoN imprescriptibility of partition applies in the case - NO
2. WoN oral partition is valid YES
HELD:
1. NO. We already ruled in Lebrilla, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72623,
December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 188; 192) that an action for partition is imprescriptible.
However, an action for partition among co-heirs ceases to be such, and becomes one for
title where the defendants allege exclusive ownership.

In the case at bar, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition cannot be invoked because two
of the co-heirs, namely private respondents Sora and Jose Espina possessed the property as
exclusive owners and their possession for a period of twenty one (21) years is sufficient to
acquire it by prescription. Hence, from the moment these co-heirs claim that they are the
absolute and exclusive owners of the properties and deny the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership.

2. YES. "An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the
partition of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The
Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance
of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to
the co-owners." (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Edition, 182-183 citing Hernandez v. Andal, et. al., G.R. No. L275,
March 29, 1957

CATAPUSAN v CA
FACTS:
Bonifacio Catapusan was first married to Narcissa Tanjuatco, the only surviving heir of Dominga
Piguing. They had four (4) children namely, Felix, Vicente, Benicio and Loreto. 3 Narcissa died in
1910. In 1927, Bonifacio married Paula Reyes and out of their wedlock petitioners Domingo,
Minelio and Filomeno Catapusan were born. Bonifacio died in 1940. Felix, Vicente and Benicio,
Bonifacio's sons from the first marriage, died before the institution of this case, survived by their
respective widows and children, private respondents.
The petitioners filed on June 11, 1974, an action for partition of the Wawa lot, which they
allegedly co-own with their half-brothers and half-sisters. Petitioners contend that the said lot

belongs to their father Bonifacio and should therefore be partitioned among the heirs of the first
and second marriages. They presented the tax declarations which noted that they each border
on one side the Wawa lot declared in the name of Bonifacio .
In their answer, respondents asserted that the Wawa lot was originally owned by Dominga and
inherited by Narcissa as her paraphernal property. Upon Narcissa's death, the Wawa lot passed
to her four children who are the predecessor-in-interest of respondents. These children
possessed and occupied the Wawa lot and secured tax declarations thereon in their names.
Respondents likewise alleged that they had been in open, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the said lot for more than 50 years when the suit was filed in 1974. They also
invoke laches and prescription against petitioner's action.
In response, petitioners argue that their action had not lapsed since respondents repudiated the
co-ownership only in 1968. They also questioned the respondents' lack of documentary proof
(like "titulo real") with regard to Dominga and Narcissa's title, as the two lived during the
Spanish
era.
RTC
Lower court dismissed the complaint and declared there respondents as the true and lawful
owners of the Wawa lot . CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
(1) whether an action for partition includes the question of ownership;
(2) whether Bonifacio had title to the Wawa lot
HELD:
1. YES
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property,
unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must
initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to
state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the
subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state
in his complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless
the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of the properties.
2. NO. It is a basic rule of evidence that theparty making an allegation has the burden of
proving it by preponderance of evidence. In this case, petitioners' evidence of their
father's (Bonifacio) ownership of the Wawa lot are the tax declarations of the adjacent lot

owners and the testimonies of some witnesses who merely saw Bonifacio working on
the lot. On the other hand, respondents presented tax declarations which indicated that
the same lot is owned by their predecessors-in-interest, the children of the first marriage,
evidence which carry more weight as they constitute proof of respondents' ownership of
the land in their possession. The statement in the neighboring lot owners' tax
declarations is not a conclusive proof that Bonifacio owned the surrounded lot.
In fact, petitioners cannot show any tax receipts or declarations of their ownership over
the same lot. Although tax declarations and receipts are not direct proofs of ownership,
yet when accompanied by proof of actual possession for the required period, they
become strong evidence to support the claim of ownership thru acquisitive prescription.
The possession contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be one under
claim of title or adverse to or in concept of owner. Possession by tolerance, as in the
case of petitioners, is not the kind of possession that may lead to title by
prescription. It is the respondents' open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession far beyond the 30 year extraordinary period for acquisitive
prescription, coupled with the tax declarations of their predecessors-in-interest, that
constitutes a superior weight of evidence that clinched their claim.
ART . 496
OLIVERAS v LOPEZ
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 im Pangasinan with an area of 69,687 square meters. In 1931,
Lorenzo Lopez died, leaving said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and 6 children. From that
time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally partition the property.
More than 21 years later, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed
of absolute sale of the "eastern (4,257 sqm) more or less, of the undivided portion of (their)
interests, rights and participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of the spouses Melecio Oliveras and
Aniceta Minor.
On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed of absolute sale of the
"undivided" (4,257) square meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor of the spouses
Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar. Each of the said documents bear the thumbmark of
Tomasa and the signature of Candido.
Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees, brothers Melecio and
Pedro, had been paying the real property taxes for their respectively purchased properties. They
also had been in possession of their purchased properties which, being planted to palay and
peanuts, were segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes.
In 1966, the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them
of the Oliverases' demands to partition the property so that they could acquire their respective
titles without resorting to court action, and that, should they fail to respond, he would be forced
to file a case in court Lopezes did not answer said letter since on December 15, 1966, the

Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a complaint for partition and damages in CFI of
Pangasinan.
The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed properties was
delivered to them with the knowledge and consent of the defendants; that they had been paying
the real estate taxes thereon; that prior to the sale, said properties were offered to the other coowners for sale but they refused to buy them; that on February 18, 1953, the transactions were
duly annotated and entered in the Memorandum of encumbrances of OCT No. 15262 as
adverse claims; and that their desire to segregate the portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was
frustrated by defendants' adamant refusal to lend them the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15262
and to execute a deed of partition of the whole lot.
In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever transpired as the alleged vendors
could not have sold specific portions of the property; that plaintiffs' possession and occupation
of specific portions of the properties being illegal, they could not ripen into ownership; and that
they were not under any obligation to lend their copy of the certificate of title or to accede to
plaintiffs' request for the partition or settlement of the property. As special and affirmative
defenses, the defendants contended that the deeds of sale were null and void and hence,
unenforceable against them; that the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the
cause or causes of action if any, had prescribed.
Lower court declared the two deeds as valid. the court observed that the total area of 8,514
square meters sold to plaintiffs by Candido was less than his share should Lot 4685 with an
area of 69,687 square meters be divided among the six children of Lorenzo Lopez and their
mother. In this connection, the lower court also found that during his lifetime, and before
Candido got married, Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot 4685 among his children who then took
possession of their respective shares.
ISSUE:
1. WON the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void considering that the land had not yet
been partitioned
2. WoN action for partition has prescribed
HELD:
1. NO
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual co-owner can claim
title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota
or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under
Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period

of twenty (20) years. And, under the former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property
undivided should be for a ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in
division which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the
period beyond such maximum.
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for more than
twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period
set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be
rendered meaningless.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more than
twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they
validly exercised dominion over them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership
had ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are
legally considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their
possession, merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act
of terminating the co-ownership.
2. NO. The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed thirteen years
from the execution of the deeds of sale and hence, as contended by the defendants-appellants,
prescription might have barred its filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil
Code, Article 494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Hence, considering
the validity of the conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and as subrogees of
Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly filed.
TAC-AN DANO v IAC
FACTS:
Petitioners Irene Tac-an Dano, Felipe G. Tac-an, Diosdado G. Tac-an and Socorro Tac-an
Genobaten, and private respondent ALFONSO G. Tac-an, are brothers and sisters, children of the
deceased spouses Pio Tac-an and Luisa Guzman. Upon the demise of Pio Tac-an on March 12,
1948, his wife, Luisa, managed the entire estate, including an agricultural land of approximately 89
hectares at San Isidro, Misamis Occidental, until her death on April 18, 1971.
In 1971, intestate proceedings for the settlement of Luisa's estate were instituted by petitioner
Diosdado Tac-an before the CFI. Alfonso opposed the petition contending that one-half of the new
6,159 coconut trees at the San Isidro property belonged to him in accordance with his agreement
with his late mother. In 1973 partition was ordered by the intestate Court pursuant to a Compromise
Agreement arrived at among the heirs. ALFONSO claimed, however, that the partition was without
prejudice to the prosecution of his claim in a separate suit.
In 1975, ALFONSO filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership of Coconut Trees and Damages
against petitioners with the CFI. He alleged that sometime in 1944, upon the request of his late
mother, and with the consent of petitioners, he planted coconut trees on an agricultural land of their
late father in Misamis Occidental, that part of the land was planted with sugar cane which he

gradually replaced with coconut trees, completing the work in 1957; that he and his mother, during
her lifetime, agreed, without objection from petitioners, that the coconut trees including the fruits and
produce, would be equally divided between them; that their equal sharing continued for fifteen (15)
years; that upon the death of their mother, petitioner Diosdado Tac-an filed an action for the partition
of the real and personal properties left by their parents, which he opposed.
Petitioners, in their Answer, stated that ALFONSO's claim for improvements is barred by prior
judgment in Special Proceedings No. 615 rendered by the intestate Court on the basis of the
amicable compromise agreement entered into by the parties after concessions were given to
respondent for the settlement of said claim; that by virtue of said Decision, the land in San Isidro was
subdivided and adjudicated in equal shares among them; that the claim of respondent for one-half
() of the produce of the coconut trees was denied by the intestate Court in its Order of April 18,
1972, which had already became final; that the complaint states no cause of action; that the claim is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and is barred by the Statute of Limitations and/or
prescription.
The trial Court, dismissed ALFONSO's Complaint. CA modified the judgment of the trial Court by
allowing ALFONSO to receive one-half of the produce of the coconut trees.
ISSUE:
1. WoN action is barred by res judicata
2. WoN the action has prescribed
3. WoN Alfonso is entitled to receive of the produce of coconut trees
HELD:
1. NO. The suit for recovery of ownership of coconut trees is not res judicata as the right of
recovery of ownership was reserved to the party in the clarificatory order of the trial court to
pursue his claim.
2. NO. Prescription can neither be invoked as against ALFONSO by reason of that reservation
in his favor. He filed suit two years after the Decision in the intestate proceedings had been
rendered. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, he had ten (10) years from the time the right
of action accrued within which to file suit upon a judgment.
3. NO.

ALFONSO's complaint, filed in the trial Court, was completely based on an alleged oral agreement
between himself, as co- owner, and his mother as another co-owner, whereby he would be receiving
benefits from the mentioned coconut land more than he would be entitled to as co-owner. Both the
trial Court and the Appellate Court made the factual finding that the arrangement if at all, could have
referred only to the produce, with the difference that the former Court held that its effectivity ceased
after the mother's death and could not bind the other heirs; whereas the latter Court ruled that since
petitioners acquiesced in the arrangement during their mother's lifetime, they are now estopped from
asserting the contrary.
It is not disputed that the San Isidro property was the capital property of the father of the opposing
parties, and that Luisa, their mother, was not authorized by petitioners upon the death of their father,
to enter into contract with ALFONSO concerning the produce of their respective shares of said
property. It has been established, too, that the expenses incurred in planting coconut trees in said

land came from the common fund and that concessions were given ALFONSO in the partition for his
work in converting the property into coconut land. So, whatever agreement the mother had with
ALFONSO regarding the produce of the coconut trees, could legally bind her share only, and chased
upon her death. Petitioners merely tolerated such sharing arrangement in deference to their mother's
commitment. This is shown by the fact that five months after her death, petitioners instituted the
proceedings for the partition of the estate of their deceased parents including the San Isidro property.
Accordingly, the doctrine of laches and estoppel as against petitioners cannot be successfully invoked.
Absent was any element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled
to his injury.
Moreover, the agreement between mother and son must be deemed superseded, for, on September
29, 1953, even during the lifetime of the mother, Original Certificate of Title No. 28 (Lot No. 1) in the
name of the deceased father, was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. RT-121 issued in the names
of "Felipe Tac-An Irene Tac-an, Alfonso Tac-an, Catalina Tac-an, Diosdado Tac-an, Socorro Tac-an
and Luisa Guzman, in pro indiviso share of one- seventh (1/7) each", the last named being the
surviving spouse (Exhibit "12"). It will be seen, therefore, that, after 1953, it was expressly made of
record that ALFONSO, his mother, and five (5) siblings (Catalina has since passed away) were coowners in equal shares. If, in fact, ALFONSO, had an agreement as to ownership of the trees and
produce with his mother, that was the time for him to have insisted on a lien to be specifically
included in the title. His mother, too, would have been in a position to confirm or deny the existence
of the agreement.
Additionally, as petitioners contend, to give ALFONSO the right to receive one-half () of
the produce of coconuts, as respondent Court did, would be to perpetuate a state of coownership, contrary to Article 494 of the Civil Code, which limits co-ownership to a period of
ten (10) years or at most twenty (20) years.
It follows that ALFONSO's claim for recovery of ownership of the coconut trees and of the produce
thereof must fail. He should only be entitled to the share alloted to him in the "share raffle" embodied
in their compromise agreement