KARINA MARIE PEPITO

SWU LLB3

August 8, 2016
TORTS and DAMAGES

G.R. No. 126437 March 6, 2002JOSUE ARLEGUI vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and SPOUSES GIL AND BEATRIZ GENGUYON, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
FACTS:
Residential Apartment Unit no. 15 was leased for more than 20 years by
Serafia Real Estate, Inc. to spouses Gil and Beatriz. In 1984, Alberto Barretto
(one of the owners of Serafia) informed the tenants of the apartment bldg.
that Serfia and its assets had already been assigned and transferred to A.B.
Barretto. The tenants formed an organization called Barretto Apartment
Tenant Association to represent them in negotiations with A.B. Barretto
Enterprises for the purchase of the apartment units. Josue Arlegui was
elected vice president and Mateo Tan Lu as auditor of the association.
Genguyons were later surprised to learn that the unit they were leasing had
been sold to Mateo Tan Lu. Genguyons continued to occupy the premises
and paid rentals. They were then informed that Mateo Tan sold the
apartment to Josue Arlegui.Arlegui demanded Genguyons to vacate the
premises.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a constructive trust existed
HELD:
The petitioner denies that a constructive trust was created and maintains
that there was no fraud committed. He neither received money from
the Genguyons, nor was he unjustly enriched. However, the records show
that the Genguyons, along with the other tenants and members of the
association, contributed money to enable the officers to negotiate with the
Barrettos. Besides, constructive trusts do not only arise out of fraud or
duress, but also by abuse of confidence, in order to satisfy the demands
of justice. The petitioner also argues that the Genguyons failed to prove the
existence of an implied or constructive trust. We disagree. There is ample
documentary and testimonial evidence to establish the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between them, and that petitioners subsequent
acts betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him. It is further argued
that no implied trust, as defined under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code,
was created because the petitioner did not acquire the subject property
through mistake or fraud. Nevertheless, the absence of fraud or mistake on

the part of the petitioner does not prevent the court from ruling that an
implied or constructive trust was created nonetheless. A constructive trust,
otherwise known as a trust ex maleficio, a trust ex delicto, a trust de son
tort, an involuntary trust, or an implied trust, is a trust by operation of law
which arises contrary to intention and in in vitum, against one who, by
fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by
commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice,
concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity
and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to
property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy.
It is raised by equity to satisfy the demands of justice. However, a
constructive trust does not arise on every moral wrong in acquiring or
holding property or on every abuse of confidence in business or other
affairs; ordinarily such a trust arises and will be declared only on wrongful
acquisitions or retentions of property of which equity, in accordance with its
fundamental principles and the traditional exercise of its jurisdiction or in
accordance with statutory provision, takes cognizance. It has been broadly
ruled that a breach of confidence, although in business or social relations,
rendering an acquisition or retention of property by one person
unconscionable against another, raises a constructive trust.*There was a
breach of trust by the officers. SC annulled the sale of the apartment and
ordered Arlegui to execute deed of conveyance to Genguyon spouses

PNB vs CA (83 SCRA 237)

FACTS:
Rita Gueco Tapnio (Rita) is indebted to PNB in the sum of P2, 000.00. To
secure the loan, she mortgaged her standing crops and sugar quota
allocation to the bank. A bond was also executed by Philamgen, as surety, in
favor of PNB to guarantee the payment of Ritas account with PNB. Rita and
Cecilio Gueco also executed an indemnity agreement to guarantee payment
of whatever amount Philamgen would pay to PNB. PNB madeseveral
demands to Rita but she failed to pay. The bank then wrote a demand letter
to Philamgen which paid the full amount for Rita. Philamgen, in turn,
made several demands to Rita and Cecilio but to no avail. Philamgen
then filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money from Rita and
Cecilio.Rita refused to pay Philamgen. She told Philamgen that she did not
consider herself indebted to PNB at all. She alleged that in order to pay for
her debt, she leased her sugar quota allocation for P2, 800.00 to one Jacobo
Tuazon with the knowledge of the bank. But due to the obstacles placed by
the Board of Directors of the bank, Tuazon was forced to rescind the lease
agreement. Rita then filed a third-party complaint against PNB from whom

Philamgen should recover the sums adjudged against her. She

contended that due to the acts of the directors of PNB, she lost the P2,
800.00 which she should have received from Tuazon and which she could
have paid to the Bank to cancel off her debts. PNB argued that being the
assignee of the sugar quota, it has the right to approve or disapprove the
said lease, including the right to fix a higher rental price.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PNB is liable for the damage caused.
RULING:
There is no question that Ritas failure to utilize her sugar quota was due to
the disapproval of the lease by the Board of Directors of PNB. While PNB had
the authority to approve or disapprove the lease, it cannot escape its
responsibility of observing that degree of care and precaution which the
circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the loan. The law
provides that every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honest and good faith. For PNBs failure to observe the
reasonable care and vigilance which the surrounding circumstances impose,
it is liable for the damages caused to Rita. Art. 21 of the Civil Code provides
that
any
person
who
willfully
causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals
, g o o d c u s t o m s , o r p u b l i c p o l i c y s h a l l compensate the latter for
damages.
A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for
torts. A principal or master is liable for every tort which he expressly directs
or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person.
A corporation is liable therefore whenever a tortuous act is committed by an
officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders
or members acting as a body, or from the directors as the governing body
GAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 165 SCRA 378
FACTS:
In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused
Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo,
Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were
two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road,
one following the other about two to three meters from each other.
As the car driven by the accused approached the place where the two
vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite
direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the
one in front of it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by
the accused. To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the

defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front

bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to
cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the
parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney
to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The
pedestrian was injured. The body of the old man who was later
Identifi ed as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.
An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against peti
tioner in view of the above incident. She entered a plea of not guilty
upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.
ISSUE: The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime
of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
HELD:
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in
doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of
the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to
be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution
against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence.
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under t
hat rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence,
if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon refl ection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in
which he fi nds himself is brought about by his own negligence."
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty
of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide.
Picart vs. Smith
37 Phil 809 (March 15, 1918)
Facts:
Plaintiff, Picart was riding a pony on Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando. He
pulled his pony over the bridges railing on the right instead of left upon

seeing the automobile rapidlyapproaching. His pony was unfortunately

frightened when the automobile passed so close to them. The horse was
struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and thelimb
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions which
caused temporaryunconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days. Picart seeks to render the sum of Php31,000 as damages. CFILa Union absolved Smith.
Issue
:
Whether or not defendant was negligent and if the concept of last clear
chance is attributable to him?
Held:
The defendant Smith is negligent and liable under the doctrine of last clear
chance even though the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the
bridge. Defendant has had the opportunity to avoid the accident after
realizing that the negligence by the plaintiff could not have placed him in a
position of better safety. The last clear chance was passed unto the
defendant driving the automobile. It was his duty to bring the car to an
immediate stop or upon seeing no other persons were on the bridge to take
the other side and pass far away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of
doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. When
Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the
eye of the law. Under the circumstances, the law is that the person who has
the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm andfails to do is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party. The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by reference tothe personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the lower court, and rendered judgment that Picart recover of Smith the
sum of P200, with costs of both instances. The court heldthat the sum
awarded was estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses
of Picart, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and
lawful interest on the wholeto the date of this recovery.

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario

73 Phil. 607 (July 8, 1942)

Facts
A taxicab figured in a head-on collision with a carretela. The carretela
overturned, causing death to one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy. A
criminal case was instituted by the parents of the deceased against
Fontanilla, the driver of the taxicab, wherein the former reserved the
right to institute a separate civil action for damages. The driver of the
taxicab was convicted. Subsequently, the parents instituted the present civil
action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver.
Barredo contends that his liability rests only on the provision of the penal
code and hence, since no civil action has been filed against Fontanilla, he
too cannot be held civilly responsible.
Issue:
Can plaintiffs bring a separate civil action against the employer of
the taxicab driver making him primarily and directly responsible under Art.
1903 of the Civil Code?
Held:
YES. A Quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the civil responsibility
arising from criminal liability. Under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, an
employer is primarily and directlyresponsible for the negligent acts of his
employee.There are two remedies available for the parents to choose:The
first is under Article 100 of the Penal Code wherein the employer is only
subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the crime committed by his
employees. If the parents choose this remedy, the complainant must first
exhaust the properties of the employee, before the employers properties
could be made answerable.
The other action is under Article 1903 of the Civil code (quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana) wherein the negligent employer is held primarily liable, subject to
the defense thathe exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and engagement of his employees.
In this case, the parents chose the second type of action since it is more
practical to file for damages against the employer, who is more solvent than
his employee.
Elcano vs. Hill
77 SCRA 98 (May 26, 1977)
Facts:
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the
time of the occurrence, Reginald Hill is still a minor and, under laws

effective at the time, also legally married. Reginald is still living and
receives subsistence from his father, Marvin Hill. Reginald was acquitted on
the ground that his acts were not criminal because of lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake.
Issues:
(1) Does the prior acquittal of Reginald bar the present civil action for
damages? (2) Is Atty. Marvin Hill vicariously liable?
Held:
1. No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case does not extinguish
his liability arising from quasi-delict. For one, the quantum of proof required
in the criminal case differs from that required in a civil suit. To find the
accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required
unlike in civil cases, preponderance of evidence is sufficient. The concept of
culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation
of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Art 2177 of the New Civil
Code provides that Responsibility for fault or negligence is separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also
criminally charged, to recover damages on both scores. And assuming
awards made in the two cases vary, he would be entitled only to the bigger
award of the two. In other words, the extinction of civil liability refers
exclusively to the civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. The civil liability arising from quasi-delict is not extinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the accused is acquitted.2. While it is
true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation by marriage of
the minor, such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although
married, was living with his father and still dependent from the latter. ART
2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald. The minor may be emancipated, but that does not
mean that he is no longer under the responsibility of his parents.
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married,
was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of
the occurrence in question.Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.However, inasmuch as Reginald is now of age (at the time the case
reached the Supreme Court), it is a matter of equity that the liability of Atty.
Hill should be declared merelysubsidiary to that of his son.
Cinco vs. Canonoy
90 SCRA 369 (May 31, 1979)

Facts:
On Feb 25, 1970, Cinco filed a complaint for recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot
arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for
private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit invoking Rule 111, Section3(b) of the
Rules of Court, which provides:(b) After a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Issue
: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action.
Held:
Yes, the civil suit for damages brought by the petitioner is based on quasidelict predicated on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Thus, the civil
case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penalcode. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The separate and
independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. The civil
action referred to in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted,
is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasidelict.
Private Respondent Marilou Gonzales filed an action for damages against
Gashem Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married.
Gonzales is 22 years old, single, Filipina, a pretty lass of go

Mendoza v. Arrieta
G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979
Facts:
A t h re e w a y v e h i c u l a r a c c i d e n t o c c u rre d i n v o l v i n g a c a r o w n e d
a n d d r i v e n b y p e t i t i o n e r E d g a rd o M e n d o z a , a p r i v a t e j e e p o w n e
d a n d d r i v e n b y re s p o n d e n t Ro d o l f o Salazar, and a gravel and
sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by
Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate
Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property
were fi led against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the CFI of
Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability,
civil and criminal, in view of its fi ndings that the collision between
Salazars jeep and petitioners car was the result of the former having
been
bumped
from
behind
by
the
t r u c k d r i v e n b y M o n t o y a . N e i t h e r w a s p e t i t i o n e r a w a rd e d d a m a
g e s a s h e w a s n o t a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only
against
jeep-owner-driver
Salazar.
After
the termination
of the
criminal cases, petitioner fi led a civil case
against respondents
Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the
collision involvingtheir vehicles.
Issue:
Whether
or not the
lower court in dismissing petitioners
complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against private respondents
Held:
Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge
wrongfully sustained Timbols allegations that the civil suit is barred
by the prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against him, wherein
no
reservation
to
file
a
separate
civil
case
was
made
b y p e t i t i o n e r a n d w h e re t h e l a t t e r a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e t
r i a l a n d t r i e d t o p ro v e
damages
against
Salazar
only.
For
petitioner's
cause
of
action
against
Timbol
in
the
civil
c a s e i s b a s e d o n q u a s i - d e l i c t . Re s p o n d e n t J u d g e c o m m i t t e d
re v e r s i b l e e rro r w h e n h e dismissed the civil suit against the truckowner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of
the Civil Code provides that, When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the actor omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter. Timbols submission that
p e t i t i o n e r ' s f a i l u re t o m a ke a re s e r v a t i o n i n t h e

c r i m i n a l a c t i o n o f h i s r i g h t t o fi l e a n independent civil action, as

required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, bars the institution
of such separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in
relation to Articles 2176 and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a civil liability
distinct and different from the civil action arising from the off ense of
negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation is required to
be made in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil case filed
against Timbol is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in
the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on
quasi-delict. But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch
as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the
offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of
civil liability based on culpac r i m i n a l u n d e r s e c t i o n 1 o f Ru l e 1 1 1
of the
Ru l e s
of Court is deemed
simultaneously
i n s t i t u t e d w i t h t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i o n , u n l e s s ex p re s s l y w a i v e d o r
re s e r v e d f o r s e p a r a t e application by the offended party. The
circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that
petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against Salazar on culpa
criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation
and
intervention
i n t h e p ro s e c u t i o n o f t h e c r i m i n a l s u i t a g a i n s t s a i d S a l a z a r. T h
e l a t t e r ' s c i v i l l i a b i l i t y continued to be involved in the criminal
action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for
petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his
action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.
Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by
petitioners car for considering that the collision between the jeep driven
by him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the
hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Montoya, it
cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to
claim damages from Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as
petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is exdelictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action
must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section3(c)
which provides that, Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the
civil right arise did not exist

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

253 SCRA 483 (February 9, 1996)
Facts:
Mabasa bought a parcel of land with an apartment in Interior P. Burgos St.,
Taguig, Metro Manila. There were tenants occupying the apartment at the
time of purchase. Taking P.Burgos St. as the point of reference, on the left
side going to Mabasas apartment, the row of houses are as follows: That of
Custodio, then of Santos, then that of Mabasa. On the right side is that of
Morato and a septic tank. The first passageway from the apartment to P.
Burgos St. is through these houses. The second passageway goes through
the septic tank, with a width of less than 1 meter.
Sometime later, one of the apartments tenants vacated it. Mabasa checked
the premises and saw that the Santoses built an adobe fence, making the
first passageway narrower. Morato also built an adobe fence in such a way
that the entire passageway was enclosed. Then the remaining tenants
vacated the area. Santos claimed that she built the fence because of an
incident involving her daughter and a passing bicycle. She also mentioned
that some drunk tenants would bang their doors and windows. The RTC
granted a right of way and damagesi n favor of Custodio and the Santoses.
The CA modified it, ordering an award of damages to Mabasa. Custodio
questioned the right of way and award of damages in the SC.
Issue:
Whether or Not the award of damages is proper.
Held:
Firstly, the Custodios are barred from questioning the grant of the right of
way, because they failed to appeal the decision. The decision has become
final. As to the award of damages, the CA erred in awarding damages in
favor of private respondents Mabasa. The mere fact that Mabasa suffered
losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by Custodio, and damage resulting to Mabasa. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong does not constitute a cause of action,
since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused
by a breach or wrong.
In the case at bar, there were no previous easements existing in favor of
Mabasa
The construction of the adobe fence is a natural use and enjoyment of
ones property in a general and ordinary manner.

Garcia vs. Florido

G.R.No. L-35095 (August 31,1973)
Facts:
Petitioners German C. Garcia, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, boarded a public utility car owned and operated by respondent,
Marcelino Inesin, and driven byrespondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip
from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City. While the car was negotiating a
slight
curve
on
the
national
highway,
it
collided
with
an
oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit
Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the collision,
petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated medical
treatment and hospitalization. Petitioners filed for damages against the
private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the public utility
car and the passenger bus. Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their
answer admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by
way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless
imprudence of the bus driver. Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the petitioners had no
cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the
present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in a
criminal case already for "double serious and less serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence.
Hence, with the filing of the criminal case, no civil action could be filed
subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated.
Therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the
liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after
final judgment has been renderedf inding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of
negligence.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners may recover damages under a separate and
independent action while a criminal case is pending.
Held:
Yes. Petitioners may recover damages for liability arising from quasi-delict.
Under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. I of Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court, in
the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action,
may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately. But
it should be noted, however, that neither Sec. 1 nor Sec. 2 of Rule 111 fixes
a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In the case at bar, there
is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action

instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less
has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or
acquittal of the accused. Petitioners have two options from where they
could recover damages fromthat arising out of the criminal act, and that
under quasi-delict. Petitioners opted to recover damages under quasi-delict,
which in effect operated as their abandonment of their claim to damages
under the pending criminal case. Therefore, petitioners may still recover
damages from their civil action against the defendants.
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
38 Phil 768 (October 14, 1918)
Facts:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the
capacity of clerk. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located
upon the line of thedefendant railroad company. Everyday, he comes by
train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he works and
he uses a pass, supplied by the company, which entitles him toride the
trains free of charge.
One day, Jose Cangco stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came
in contact with a sack of watermelons causing his feet to slip making him
fell violently on the platform. His body rolled from the platform and was
drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from thetrain the car
moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.Cangco was
drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that
the injuries he had received were very serious. He was brought at once to
hospital in thecity of Manila where an examination was made and his arm
was amputated.He instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila to recover damages from the defendant company. His
action is founded upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving
them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting
from thetrains. The trial judge concluded that, although negligence
was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of
melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passingto and from the
cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering.
Judgment was accordinglyentered in favor of the defendant company, and
the plaintiff appealed.

Issues:
Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the ground that
the breach was due to the negligence of their servant.2. Whether Cango is
negligent when he alight from the moving train.
Held:
No. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that
the breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and
that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of
the servant. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad
company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in
the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as
he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective
legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows
that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned
unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In
resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of
liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined. It is
important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant
is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the
damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing
essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which
can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the
technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and
not to culpa contractual.(2) No it is not negligence per se for a traveler to
alight from a slowly moving train. As pertinent to the question of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed
upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground.
The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform,
constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a
stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was
possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same

act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the

question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say,
whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and
physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting
the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Again, it may be
noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily
custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be
no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step, which
he was required to take, or the character of the platform where he was
alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to
alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Air France vs. Carrascoso
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
Facts:
Plaintiff Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines,Inc., issued to plaintiff a first class round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in first class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of thedefendant airline
forced plaintiff to vacate the first class seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a white
man who, the Manager alleged had a better right to the seat. When asked
to vacate his first class seat, the plaintiff refused, and told defendants
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. Acommotion
ensued, and, according to said Ernnesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino
passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Casrrascoso was having ahot discussion with the white man [manager],
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give
his seat to the white man and plaintiff reluctantly gave hisfirst class seat
in the plane. Carrascoso filed a case for damages. The CFI of Manila
sentenced Air France to pay rCarrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral
damages; P10,000 as exemplary damages;P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the
trip Bangkok-Rome. The CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on
Carrascoss plane ticket.
Issue:
WON Carrascosos action is planted upon breach of contract, with the
existence of bad faith, entitling him to the award of damages.
Held

There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,

amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg. The said contract was breached
when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok. The
evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendants
Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the
presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give
the first class seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a white man whom he (defendants manager)
wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proved that this white
man had any better right to occupy the first class seat that the plaintiff
was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding first class
ticket was issued. The responsibility of an employer for the act of its
employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful
malevolent act of petitioners manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal percept;
and, held upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities
and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the carrier. Thus, Where a steamship company
had accepted a passengers check, it was a breach of contract and tort,
giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her, that the check was worthless and demand payment under
threat of ejection; though the language used was not insulting and she was
not ejected. Although the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual
both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort. And in another case, Where a passenger on a rail-road train,
when the conductor came to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare to
a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon
as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point
to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which
justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling
him alunatic, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier
liable for the mental suffering of said passenger. Petitioners contract with
Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carasscosos
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a

violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict.

Damages are proper. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code
gives the Court ample to power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts
and quasi-contracts. Theonly condition is that defendant should have acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The
manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits
into this legal precept. And this is in addition to moral damages.
JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO
vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his
capacity asPresident of the said Bank
FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case in which judgment
had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein, namely,
Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a certain sum to the plaintiff.
Philippine Milling Co., Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from
said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment,
accordingly, became final and executory. In due course, a writ of
garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the Philippine
Islands in which the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrille's
credits against the Bank were concerned. Upon receipt of the said Writ of
Garnishment, a clerk of the bank upon reading the name of the Singson in
the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further
reading the body of the said garnishment prepared a letter for the signature
of the President of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the
garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case. Subsequently, two
checks were issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M.
Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn
against the said Bank, were deposited by the said drawers. The checks
were, however, dishonored by the bank on the belief that Singson has no
more control over the same. The said B. M. Glass Service closed
Singsons credit account with them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian C.
Singson wrote the defendant bank claiming that his name was not included
in the Writ of Garnishment. The President of the bank took steps to verify
this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the
plaintiff and told that the action of garnishment from his account had
already been removed. Thus, the defendants lost no time to rectify the
mistake that had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the temporary
freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.
With this, Singson commenced the present action against the Bank and its
president, Santiago Freixas, for damages inconsequence of said illegal
freezing of plaintiffs' account. The CFI of Manila rendered judgment

dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover
from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation
between the parties is contractual in nature. The lower court held that
plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict,
their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. From this
decision, the plaintiff appealed directly to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not is entitled to damages.
DECISION: The SC held that the existence of a contract between the parties
does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor. However, considering the facts
and circumstances in the case at bar, that the wrong done to the plaintiff
was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he
and his subordinate employee had committed, the SC only awarded nominal
damages. In addition, since damages has already been awarded under
quasi-delict, Singson cannot recover other damages based on the contract,
otherwise, it would be against the rule prohibiting double recovery.
ARANETA V DE JOYA 57 SCRA 59
Facts:
Respondent De Joya, general manager, proposed
t o t h e b o a r d o f A c e Advsertising Corp., to send Ricardo Taylor to
the US to take up special studies in t e l e v i s i o n . T h e B o a rd d i d n o t a c t
u p o n t h e p ro p o s a l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , s e n t Ta y l o r t o t h e U S .
Respondent assured Antonio Araneta, a
c o m p a n y d i r e c t o r , t h a t e x p e n s e s w i l l be handled by other
parties which later was confirmed through a memorandum. While abroad, Taylor
continued to receive his salaries. The items corresponding to his salaries appeared in
vouchers prepared upon orders of, and approved by, the respondent. Petitioner Luis
Araneta, signed three of the vouchers, others signed by either respondent or
Vicente Araneta, the company treasurer. All told, Ace Advertising disbursed
P5,043.20 on account of
Taylors travel and studies. Then a year after, Ace Advertising filed a complaint before
t h e C F I a g a i n s t re s p o n d e n t f o r t h e re c o v e r y o f t h e t o t a l s u m d i
s b u r s e d t o Ta y l o r a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e t r i p w a s m a d e
w i t h o u t i t s k n o w l e d g e , a u t h o r i t y or ratification.The
respondent in his answer denied the charge and claimed that the trip was
nonetheless ratified by the companys board and at any event he had the discretion
as general manager to authorize the trip which was for the companys

benefit. A third party complaint was file by respondent against, Vicente and Luis and
Taylor. Respondent provedthat some of the checks to cover the expenses of Taylor
were signed by Vicente andL u i s . I n t h e i r d e f e n s e ,
L u i s a n d V i c e n t e c l a i m e d t h a t t h e y
s i g n e d t h e checks in good faith as they were
a p p r o v e d b y r e s p o n d e n t . T h e C F I r e n d e r e d judgement
ordering the respondent to pay Ace for the amount disbursed with interest
at a legal rate until full payment and dismissed the third party complaint.
Respondent appealed to CA. CA affirmed the decision of trial court with regard to its
decision in favor of Ace but reversed the dismissal of the 3rd
party complaint. CA found as a fact that Taylors trip had neither
b e e n a u t h o r i z e d n o r r a t i fi e d b y A c e . I t h e l d
that Luis and Vicente were also privy
t o t h e authorized disbursement of corporate monies with the
respondent. That when they approved signed the checks, they have given their
stamp of approval. As it is established that corporate funds were disbursed
unauthorized, the case is of a simple quasi-delict committed by them against the
corporation. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of quasidelict, notwithstanding that he was occupying
a contractual position at Ace? Otherwise stated,
whether or not quasi-delict (tort) may
be committed a party in a contract?
Held:
Yes. The existence of a contract between the parties constitutes no bar to the
commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages. His guilt is m a n i f e s t o n a c c o u n t
of, in spite of his being a vicepresident and director of Ace,p e t i t i o n e r r e m a i n e d
passive, through out the period of
Taylors trip and to the payment of the latters salary. As such he neglected to
perform his duties properlyto the damage of the firm of which he was an officer.

Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil 542

Facts: It appears in this case that Cuddy was the owner of the film
Zigomar and that on the 24th of April he rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a
week for P125, and it was to be delivered on the 26th of May, the week
beginning that day. A few days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to
Gilchrist, which he had forwarded to him in Manila, saying that he had made

other arrangements with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to
these defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the
injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these parties from showing it for
the week beginning the 26thof May. It appears from the testimony in this
case, conclusively, that Cuddy willfully violated his contract, he being the
owner of the picture, with Gilchrist because the defendants had offered him
more for the same period. Mr. Espejo at the trial on the permanent
injunction on the 26th of May admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the
owner of the film. He was trying to get it through his agents Pathe Brothers
in Manila. He is the agent of the same concern in Iloilo. There is in evidence
in this case on the trial today as well as on the 26th of May, letters showing
that the Pathe Brothers in Manila advised this man on two different
occasions not to contend for this film Zigomar because the rental price
was prohibitive and assured him also that he could not get the film for
about six weeks. The last of these letters was written on the 26th of April,
which showed conclusively that he knew they had to get this film from
Cuddy and from this letter that the agent in Manila could not get it, but he
made Cuddy an offer
Cuddy accepted it because he was paying about
three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist for. Therefore, in
the opinion of this court, the defendants failed signally to show the
injunction against the defendant was wrongfully procured.
Issue: whether or not there is an interference of contract.
Ruling:
From the above-quoted findings of fact it is clear that Cuddy, a resident of
Manila, was the owner of the"Zigomar;" that Gilchrist was the owner of
a cinematograph theater in Iloilo; that in accordance with the terms of the
contract entered into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the former leased to the
latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his (Gilchrist's) theater for the
week beginning May 26, 1913; and that Cuddy willfully violate his contract
in order that he might accept the appellant's offer of P350 for the film for
the same period. Did the appellants know that they were inducing Cuddy to
violate his contract with a third party when they induced him to accept the
P350? Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film.
He received a letter from his agents in Manila dated April 26, assuring him
that he could not get the film for about six weeks. The arrangement
between Cuddy and the appellants for the exhibition of the film by the latter
on the 26th of May were perfected after April 26, so that the six weeks
would include and extend beyond May 26. The appellants must necessarily
have known at the time they made their offer to Cuddy that the latter had
booked or contracted the film for six weeks from April 26. Therefore, the
inevitable conclusion is that the appellants knowingly induced Cuddy to

violate his contract with another person. But there is no specific finding that
the appellants knew the identity of the other party. So we must assume that
they did not know that Gilchrist was the person who had contracted for the
film. The right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract with Cuddy for
the lease of the film must be fully recognized and admitted by all. That
Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach ofthat contract,
there can be no doubt. Were the appellants likewise liable for interfering
with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the
time the identity of one of the contracting parties? The appellants claim that
they had a right to do what they did. The ground upon which the appellants
base this contention is, that there was no valid and binding contract
between Cuddy and Gilchrist and that, therefore, they had a right to
compete with Gilchrist for the lease of thef ilm, the right to compete being a
justification for their acts. If there had been no contract between Cuddy and
Gilchrist this defense would be tenable, but the mere right to compete could
not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away the
appellee's contractual rights. In the case at bar the only motive for the
interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants
was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There
was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the
legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. It is,
therefore, clear, under the above authorities, that they were liable to
Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from
such liability by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time
the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.The liability of the
appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as
they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract
with Gilchrist. So that if theaction of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it
would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article
1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes
damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to
repair the damage do done.
BUSTAMANTE V CA 193 SCRA 603
FACTS:
April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel
and sand truck driven by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda
passenger bus driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza,
Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck
sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the wall from

the driver's seat to the last rear seat. Several passengers of the bus were
thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained:
1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and
father of Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed
Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria
Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion
Bersamina
The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or
operated as a passenger bus jointly by Magtibay and Serrado
Before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were
approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the
highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus
driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that
the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due
to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted
from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus,
which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or
pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of
the highway
RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary
CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in
failing to avoid the collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand
tractor was the proximate cause of the collision making him solely liable
HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.
The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own
acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the
injured person is entitled to recovery.

A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an

accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a
third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. Since the case at bar is
not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both

owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving
the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
148 SCA 353 (L-652095) (1987)
Facts:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m. private
respondent Leonardo Dionisio was driving his way home from a cocktailsand-dinner meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of the
evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving
his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna
and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and
was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his
allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from
his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner
Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of
General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was
parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly
blocking the way of incoming traffic. There were neither lights nor any socalled "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck,
front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by
petitioner Armando Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the
following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the
dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures. Dionisio commenced an action for
damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that
the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in
which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that
the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor,
without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenixalso sought to
establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of
the dump truck driver.
Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is the negligence of the
driver or the negligence of Dionisio.'.

HELD: it was the negligence of the truck driver. The legal and proximate
cause of the injuries of Dionisio was the wrongful or negligent manner in
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. , The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was
a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. The
truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was
rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump
truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning
lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created
an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of
time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident,
was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. Respondent
Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"
and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
PANTRANCO V BAESA 179 SCRA 384
FACTS:
Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other
people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in
Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses
While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20
kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila,
encroached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided
with it.
As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar
Baesa, as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar
Baesa, through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from
quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the
accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who
had the chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence

HELD: NO.
Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of
making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to
defeat claim for damages.
For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the
person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care,
have been aware of it.
There is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger
When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on
his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on
his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus
to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite
direction.
Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds
before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it
Last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered.

Rakes vs. Atlantic

G.R. No. 1719 (1907)
Facts:
The plaintiff Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment
of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the
harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims
that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant Atlantic, has
proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which
were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the
ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but
without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According
to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or
at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were alsoin front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and

caught the plaintiff, breaking hisleg, which was afterwards amputated at

about the knee.
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to
show a breach of duty on its part in failing either to properly secure the load
on iron to vehicles transportingit, or to skillfully build the tramway or to
maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the
roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon thefailure
of the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition,
that the judge below based his judgment.
In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the
judgment below is not so specific. While the judge remarks that the
evidence does not justify the findingthat the car was pulled by means of a
rope attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the
circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary
to operatethe car could not walk upon the plank between the rails and that,
therefore, it was necessary for the employees moving it to get hold upon it
as best they could, there is no specific findingupon the instruction given by
the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the
necessity of the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to
gethold upon the car.
Issue:
Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of Rakes.
Held:
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not
forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the
workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made
known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the
foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this
particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the
general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of
the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the
injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is
simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the

failure to replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages
that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not
contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to
himself. Had, would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own
injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the
event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence
BERNAL V HOUSE
54 PHIL 327 January 30, 1930
FACTS
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban,
Leyte to attend the procession of Holy Friday. After the procession, they,
accompanied by two other persons,
passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed
to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. While in
front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,Ltd., an automobile
appeared on which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the
street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming
from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.House. When the mother and her
companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot
water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the
child died that same night. It was certified that the cause of death was
"Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were
"Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen. The
defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the
street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities; that
the cause of death was other than the hot water; and
that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and
negligence. The trial judge, however, after examination of the
evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their theory of the
case, except as to the last mentioned special defense. He nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs.
ISSUE
WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs

HELD: NO
The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting
hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the
lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it. The mother
and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban,
Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There
was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in
advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water.
- The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs.Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil
Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and
her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest
sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

Manila Electric Co. vs Remonquillo

99 PHIL 117 (May 18, 1956)
Facts:
Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother, to
repair a leaking media agua. The media agua was just below the
window of the third floor of his stepbrothers house. Standing on said
media agua, Magno received from his son thru the window a galvanized
iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet
came into contact with the electric wire of Manila Electric Company parallel
to the media agua, causing his death by electrocution.
Magnos widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the
company. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. The electric wire in question was an exposed,
uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles on the street and
carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was installed there some two years ago
before Pealozas house was constructed. During the construction of said
house a similar incident took place, with less tragic consequences. The
owner of the house complained to the defendant about the danger which
the wire presented, and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from
the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.
Regulations of the City required that all wires be kept three feet from the
building. There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe, because

there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire

(according to appellant, and this was not refuted).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.
HELD:
NO. It was the victim who was guilty of negligence. The liability of electric
companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules
of negligence. Nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety
of the public. The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence, and in some measure by the too close proximity of the media
agua to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the
original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction of the media agua. The company cannot be expected to be
always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the
distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the
installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. The violation of the
permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It
merely contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the
reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to
his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He had training and
experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger to
electric wires and the danger lurking in them.
NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL)
GR NO. 103442-45 May 21, 1993
FACTS
When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond the allowable limit at
the height of typhoon Kading NPC opened three of the dams spillways to
release the excess water in the dam. This however caused the
inundation of the banks of the Angat river which caused persons and
animals to drown and properties to be washed away. The flooding was
purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water
through the spillways of the Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant).
Plaintiffs claim:
NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the
Angat River despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending entry of
typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the
water level at the dam when the said water level went beyond the
maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants
suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's

spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the

banks of the Angat River causing the death of members of the household of
the plaintiffs, together with their animals
Respondents comments:
NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and
maintenance of the hydroelectric plant. NPC exercised the diligence of a
good father in the selection of its employees. Written notices were sent to
the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about
the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon
"Kading" and advising them to take the necessary Precautions. The water
released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of
the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property in spite of the
precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not
contain or control the flood that resulted the damages incurred by the
private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and
are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria
ISSUES
1. WON NPC was guilty of negligence
2. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. CA) NPC is liable given that
the inundation was caused by force majeure
HELD
1. YES
A similar case entitled National Power Corporation, et al. vs, Court of
Appeals, et al.," involving the very same incident subject of the instant
petition. The court there declared that the proximate cause of the loss and
damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein--who were similarly situated as
the private respondents herein-was the negligence of the petitioners, on the
basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the evidence adduced by
the parties in the cases subject of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93, public
respondent found as conclusively established that indeed, the
petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight,
imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat
Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the
magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendantsappellees headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness." and that the 24
October 1978 'early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected
municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was
insufficient.
2. YES
given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Juan F. Nakipil & Sons vs. Court of
Appeals is still good la as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the
case of force majeure is concerned.

In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the obligor from liability
under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an
'act of God,' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor, (b) the event must
be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a
fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor
of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which
results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. The principle
embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and
all human agencies are, to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175). Disposition
Petition dismissed.
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS
OF DOMINGA ONG
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening
of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted (a lighted
matchstick was thrown by a stranger near the opening, causing the fire).
The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses. Their owners,
among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and
Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its
agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was
attributed as the cause of the fire.

The trial court and the CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence
and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with
respect to the supervision of their employees. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of
appellees
HELD: the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees
are held liable solidarily to appellants,
Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the doctrine in
the instant case on the grounds that as to (its) applicability in the
Philippines, there seems to he nothing definite, and that while the rules do
not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, in the case at bar, however,
we find no practical use for such doctrine.
The question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The doctrine has
actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine
Power and Development Co
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force
here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and
spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or
could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees,
but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable
inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring
houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants,
namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the
flames from leaping over it.. Defendants negligence, therefore, was not

only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread
thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the
second amended complaint that the fire was caused through the acts of a
stranger who, without authority, or permission of answering defendant,
passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match
in the premises. No evidence on this point was adduced, but assuming the
allegation to be true certainly any unfavorable inference from the
admission may be taken against Boquiren it does not extenuate his
negligence. A decision of the Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous
to those of the present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here.
It is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a
degree of protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate with
a danger involved we think it is the generally accepted rule as applied to
torts that if the effects of the actors negligent conduct actively and
continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the
active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third
persons innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor from liability. Stated in
another way, The intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not
sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such
negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause
in the resulting injury.
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner, vs.ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al.,
respondent
FACTS:
The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a
two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the cor ner of Quezon
Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo,Manila was owned and
operated by Teague.The said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total
area of about 400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of

about1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which was

provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence of each of said fireexits was indicated on the wall. October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire
brokeout in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away
from the institute (across the street). Upon seeing the fire, someof the
students in the Realistic Institute shouted Fire! Fire! and thereafter, a
panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the
Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm
down the students, who numbered about 180at the time. The panic,
however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the
few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way
through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein. Nopart of the Gil-Armi
Building caught fire. But,after the panic was over, four students,
including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiff s-appellants, were
found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede.
The deceaseds five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against
Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. CFI found
for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however, reversed by
the CA. The CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of
negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491
Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with
in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building.T h e
a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n o f t h e o r d i n a n c e consisted in the fact that
the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway,1.5 meters
wide, instead of two of at least 1.2meters each, although at the time of the
firethe owner of the building had a second stairway under construction. The
petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes
Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at place; (3) shouts
of Fire!, Fire!;(4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6)injuries and
death. As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was
only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot bethe basis of liability since there
intervened an u m b e r o f i n d e p e n d e n t c a u s e s
w h i c h produced the injury complained of. According to the petitioner the
events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal
connection at all with the violation of the ordinance.
ISSUE:
Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence
HELD:
It is true that the petitioners non-compliance with the ordinance in question
was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense
that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation

was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety

designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the
occupants of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it
should become necessary to evacuate the building,which, it could be
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency conditions if
there was only one stairway available. The general principle is that the
violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an
injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which
the statute or o rd i n a n c e w a s i n t e n d e d t o p re v e n t . To consider
the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not
situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the
overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was
precisely what the ordinance intended top r e v e n t b y r e q u i r i n g t h a t
t h e r e b e t w o stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the
cases cited by the respondents,the principle of proximate cause applies to
such violation. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
LAYUGAN V IAC
167 SCRA 363 SARMIENTO; November 14, 1968
FACTS
Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, he
and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck, which was
parked along the right side of the National Highway. Defendant's truck
driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result,
plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. Due to said injuries, his left leg was
amputated so he had to use crutches to walk.- Defendant Godofredo Isidro
admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by
Daniel Serrano. Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander,
not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck; that
the truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the
right lane towards Solano, NuevaVizcaya, right after the curve; that the
proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked
truck in installing the early warning device,Daniel Serrano, defendant driver,
said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he
checked thetruck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in
driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff,
while the same was at a stop position. From the evidence presented, it has
been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was
caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. Serrano also testified that,
When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck, which was loaded with

round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function with my
many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear
right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.
Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant driver while Isidro points
to the driver of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent such proof
of care, it would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo
truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire
of the said truck.
ISSUES
WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent. WON the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur
applies in this case
HELD
NO. Negligence defined .Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that the absence or want of
care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing
evidence. Whether cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device
consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the
truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano, still
bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such
accident Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
DEL PRADO VS. MANILA ELECTRIC, 52 Phil. 900
Facts:
Ignacio del Prados right foot was caught and crushed by car no. 74 and had
to be amputated the following day. He was running across the street to
catch the car but before his position had become secure, and even before
his raised right foot had reached the platform, the motorman applied the
power and the car gave a slight lurch forward. Plaintiffs footslipped and his
hand was jerked loose from the hand post and he fell to the ground.
Issue: WON there was breach of legal duty

Held: Yes. Although motorman was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on,
it was his duty to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the
plaintiffs peril while he was attempting to board the car.
Premature acceleration of car was breach of this duty.
Duty of carrier extends to persons boarding the cars as well as alighting
there from.
Plaintiff s negligence in attempting o board moving car was not the
proximate cause of the injury. Direct and proximate cause was
the premature acceleration
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
16 Phil 8 (March 22, 1910)
Facts:
Defendant Manila Electric left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used
for blasting charges of dynamite scattered in the premises behind its power
plant. Fifteen year old David Taylor is a son of a mechanical engineer. Two
years before the incident David spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on
an inter island transports. Later he took up work in his father's office,
learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. It appears that
he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature
both mentally and physically than most boys his age. David, along with
Manuel, a 12 year old, entered the premises of the defendant without
permission. While playing, the boys saw the fulminating caps, picked some
pieces and brought them home. In the presence of Jessie, a 9 year old girl,
The two boys made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust the
ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. Next,
they tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They then opened one of
the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other
boy applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed causing
injuries to the boys and to Jesse. This action was brought by the plaintiff,
through his father, to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.
Issue:
Whether or not the company was liable for the injury sustained by plaintiff.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the negligence of
the defendant of leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury. When the immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own acts, he cannot recover damages

for the injury. The immediate cause of the explosion, which resulted in
plaintiffs injury, was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the
cap. True, David Taylor may not have known and probably did not know the
precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of
the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant
injuries which he incurred, but he well knew that a more or less dangerous
explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly,
and knowingly produced the explosion We are satisfied that the plaintiff in
this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents
of the cap; that his age and his experience qualified him to understand the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have
avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the
injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident
which inflicted the injury.
LOPEZ V PAN AMERICAN WOLRD AIRWAYS, 16 scra 431
Facts:
Then Senate Pro Tempore Lopez booked 1 st class tickets from Tokyo to
San Francisco. He was traveling with wife, daughter and son-in-law.On May
24, 1960, they arrived in Tokyo only to discover that they no longer had 1 st
class accommodations. They took flight under protest cause Senator had
scheduled meeting and wife had check-up at Mayo clinic. Damages was
claimed for breach of contract in bad faith.
Issue: WON they can recover moral damages
HELD: Yes, bad faith existed. Moral damages are recoverable in breach of
contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Badges of
Bad Faith Employee Herranz cancelled reservation of Lopez together
with that of the Rufi nos
only the Rufi nos cancelled. Despite knowledge that reservations have
been cancelled, when Lopez party called in to confirm, they assured them of
1st class accommodations. Such willful non-disclosure of the cancellation or
pretense that the reservations of the plaintiffs stood is the factor to which is
attributable the breach of the resulting contract. It is humiliating to be
compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be

expected from the contractual undertaking.Moral damages sustained by

Senator: social humiliation, wounded feelings, mental anguish. Wife:
discomfort sustained in tourist class for 13 hours for physical suffering
daughter/husband for social humiliation lose of prestige.
ZULUETA VS. PAN AMERICAN WOLRD AIRWAYS, 45 SCRA 397
Facts:
Rafael Zulueta, with his wife & daughter were passengers aboard
fl ight No. 841-23 from Honolulu to Manila. Plane had 30 minute stopover in Wake island where they (passengers) were allowed to disembark. Mr.
Zulueta disembarked so he could relieve himself but found CR full of
soldiers so he went to beach. Flight crew was looking for Mr. Zulueta
but could not be found so they decided to leave him. Flight got
delayed and so he was later found. When zulueta came on board the
Pan Am crew started yelling at him for causing the delay of fl ight. He
and his famiy where no longer allowed to board the plane and was
told to disembark. MR Zulueta and his family were humiliated .
Issue: Won moral damages may be recovered.
HELD: Yes. ART 21 of the Civil Code states that: Any person who willfully causes
lose or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
ART 2217:
Moral damages include physical suff ering
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act/omission.